HERETICAL VIEWS IN EARLY BUDDHIST LITERATURE.

Like many other religious precepts, the precepts of Buddha were handed down orally for a number of years. The Buddhist monks used to keep the teachings of Buddha on the tip of their tongue. Bhikkhu Śoṇa is one such monk. In the Udāna, it is related that upon being asked by the Buddha as to how he understood the Dhamma, Śoṇa recited all the sixteen āstakas with accents.

Time and again, the Tripitakas have a word of praise for such monks and these monks are known as Dhammadharas, 2 Vinayadharas and Mātikādharas. In fact, in the Anguttara Nikāya, we find a whole list of monks and nuns, who exhibited great skill in remembering everything that they had been taught.

This was the state of things when the Buddha was alive. But after his Mānaparinibbāna, certain monks tried to mislead the followers by saying that they were now freed from the great Buddha and could do whatever they liked.

1. cf. Udāna, 1. 6 - 
बायस्म बौधाई मयालो परिपुक्ता सो लोको अकृत्वभक्ति सम्बन्धनां
समेत अभावम्।
2. विनयपिद्ध कुलवर्ग - १२. २. ६० - चच्चाधारो विनयवर्गो मातिकाधारो - ----।
The samgha therefore thought that it was time to assemble for the purpose of recitation, verification and collection of the Buddha's teachings. Consequently, three councils were held. The first council was held at Rājagṛha in 483 B.C. (Four months after the Mahāparinibbāna of the Buddha); the second at Vaisāli in 383 B.C. and the third at Pātaliputra in 247 B.C. The first one was presided over by the elder Mahākassapa; the second by the elder Revata; and the third, by Moggaliputta Tissa.

When the third council was held, Aśoka was the ruler. In his kingdom, there were many heretics (tirthikas), i.e. teachers of other faiths, who sought honour and patronage by entering the Buddhist order, but they were so far denied this privilege. The result was that they now claimed their own heresies to be the real doctrines and teachings of the Buddha. In order to weed out these heretics, Aśoka convened a meeting and sending for each group in turn asked what really the doctrine of the Enlightened one was. Since each of these groups held its own doctrine to be that of the Buddha, Aśoka, with the help of Tissa Moggaliputta (who was the president of this Council), threw these heretics out of the order. Only the Vibhajjavādins were found to be the real followers of the Buddha. When this task was over, Elder Tissa, Moggali's


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son, composed the Kathāvatthu, in which five hundred theses, put forward by various schools, in opposition to the doctrine of the Pīṭakas, are set out and refuted.

The canonical texts of the Buddhists, are known as Pīṭakas. In the first and second Councils, they were only recited. It was in the third Council that they were actually compiled. It may, nevertheless, be noted that the whole Kathāvatthu, in its present form, is not the same as it originally was because many later additions appear to have been made therein.

The Buddhist Canon gives a detailed account of the religious doctrines and the disciplinary rules of the Buddhists. In the Canon, we find at places, an exposition of the views of rival schools, possibly meant for the better appreciation and understanding of the Buddha's own views. An exposition thereof is given here, as it might help us in understanding the Prāvādūka-dṛṣṭis, discussed in the Nyāya-Sūtras. 4.1.11-43.

Before we proceed to examine the presentation and refutation of such heresies, we may first give a brief account of the sacred texts of the Buddhists.

The Buddhist canon is classified in three main divisions known as Pīṭakas. They are:

(A) Vinaya Piṭaka;
(B) Sutta Piṭaka;
(C) Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

(A) The Vinaya Piṭaka comprises
(i) Sutta Vibhaṅga,
(ii) The Khandhakas which consist of the Mahāvagga and the Cūlavagga,
(iii) Parivāra.

(B) The Sutta Piṭaka comprises five Nikāyas:
(i) Dīgha Nikāya,
(ii) Majjhima Nikāya,
(iii) Samyutta Nikāya,
(iv) Anguttara Nikāya,
(v) Khuddaka Nikāya.

The Khuddaka Nikāya, in its turn, consists of some minor works which are as under:

(1) Khuddaka Pātha,
(2) Dhammapada,
(3) Udāna,
(4) Itivuttaka,
(5) Sutta Pīṭha,
(6) Vimānavatthu,
(7) Petavatthu,
(8) Theragātha,
(9) Therigātha,
(10) Jātaka,
(11) Niddesa,
(12) Paṭisambhidāmagga,
(13) Apadāna,
(14) Buddhavamsa,
(15) Cariyāpiṭaka.

(C) In the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, we find seven independent works:

(1) Dhammasangani,
(2) Vibhanga,
(3) Dhātukathā,
(4) Puggalapaṭṭani,
(5) Kathāvatthu,
(6) Yamaka,
(7) Paṭṭhāna.

It must be noted that this is the Abhidhamma of the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins have an Abhidharmapiṭaka in Sanskrit; the books of which, even though also seven in number, differ entirely from those of the Pāli Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

1. See 'A History of Indian Literature,' p. 173 by M. Winternitz;
All this concerns the canonical texts of the Buddhistā. Buddhist thought was later divided in several schools among which four are preminent. These are:

1. Bāhyapratyakṣavādins or Vaibhāsika Baudhās (Direct Realists),
2. Bāhyānymeyavādins or Sautrāntika baudhās (Critical Realists),
3. Vījñānavādins or Yogācāra Baudhās (Subjective Idealists), and
4. The Śūnyavādins or Madhyāmika Baudhās (Nihilists).

We need not enter into any details regarding these views. We shall only refer to a few of the treatises of these schools which are as under:

1. The Madhyāmaka Śāstra of Nāgarjuna (2nd Century A.D.);
2. Śataśāstra of Āryadeva who was the disciple of Nāgarjuna (and flourished at about the turning point of the second and third century A.D.);
3. Yogācārabhūmi of Asaṅga (who lived in the fourth Century A.D.)
4. Jātakamāla of Āryasūra (4th Century A. D.);
5. Lankāvatāra Sūtra known as Saddharma-Lankāvatārasūtra also (of the 4th Century A.D. Its first Chinese translation is of 443 A. D.),

1. The dates of these works are according to Winternitz's "A History of Indian Literature", vol. II, pp. 342, 350, 355, 276 and 337 respectively.
Upāyahrdayam - this is a book of which the original Sanskrit text is lost. It is a very ancient work according to Giuseppe Tucci, who has translated it from the Chinese into Sanskrit again. This book is ascribed to Nagarjuna, but no such name is found in the list of books generally regarded as composed by Nagarjuna; and as Tucci observes, it must be the work of some other Nagarjuna.

Besides the Buddhist canonical texts, a non-canonical treatise namely Milindapañho (first century A.D.) and the books noted above which are of quite an early date, refer to several heretical views of their time; which were traditionally handed down. We cannot pronounce any opinion whether some of them as actually presented were prior to the Nyāya Sūtras but we are confident that their exposition will help us in understanding the Prāvāduka dṛṣṭis in the Nyāya Sūtras.

We shall first discuss the main heretical doctrines, found in the Canonical Buddhist texts. These views are as under:

1. cf. Pre-Dinnaga Buddhist texts of logic from Chinese Sources, by Tucci, Introduction, page XI.

2. cf. Ibid, p. XII.

An exposition of this theory is found at length in the Sāmaññaphala sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya. Prince Ajātaśatru approaches Buddha in order to know the immediate fruit which the life of a recluse can yield, such a fruit as is visible in this very world. Buddha asks him whether he, (Ajātaśatru), had put the same question to other teachers as well. And Ajātaśatru, admitting that he had put the question to some others, relates the answer which Pūrṇa Kassapa had given to him as under:

"To him, who acts, 0 king, or causes another to act, to him who mutilates or causes another to mutilate, to him who punishes or causes another to punish, to him who causes grief or torment, to him who trembles or causes another to tremble, to him who kills a living creature, who breaks into houses, who commits dacoity, or robbery, or highway robbery, or adultery,
or who speaks lies, to him thus acting, there is no guilt. If with a discus, with an edge as sharp as a razor's, he should make all the living creatures on the earth one heap, one mass of flesh, there would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase of guilt would ensue, were he to go along the south bank of the Ganges, striking and slaying, mutilating and having men mutilated, oppressing and having men oppressed, there would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase of guilt would ensue. Were he to go along the north bank of the Ganges, giving alms, and ordering gifts to be given, offering sacrifices or causing them to be offered, there would be no merit thence resulting, no increase of merit. In generosity, in self-mastery, in control of the senses, in speaking truth, there is neither merit, nor increase of merit."

And then the king says to the Buddha, "Thus Lord, did Pūraṇa Kassapa when asked what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, expound his theory of non-action (i.e. Akriyāvāda) Just, Lord, as if a man, when asked what a mango was, should explain what a bread-fruit is, just so did Pūraṇa Kassapa, when asked what was the fruit, in the present state of being, of the life of a recluse, expound his theory of Non-action".

In the Majjhima Nikāya, this same theory is stated in the same words, and then a view quite opposite to it is thus stated: "To him, who acts or causes another to act, ... or who tells lies, to him thus acting there does occur guilt. If with a discus... increase of guilt does ensue, Were he to go along the south bank... increase of guilt does ensue. Were he to go along the north bank giving alms......there is the increase of merit. In generosity, in self-mastery, in control of the senses, in speaking truth, there is merit and the increase of merit."

From these, Buddha seems to be inclined to support the theory of Kriyāvāda, hence he says, "the view that there is action is the right view".

In the Samyutta Nikāya, after describing the Akriyāvāda in these very words, Buddha says that such a view arises because there is rūpa (matter), Vedanā (feeling), Samjñā (ideation), Samskāra (conformation) and Vijñāna (consciousness). And then he explained that the rūpa ........ etc. are all momentary and non-eternal and one who knows this, is finally emancipated and is not born again.

There is another passage in the Samyutta Nikāya where different heretical views are stated by Pāṭali and one of them is the Akriyāvāda of Pūraṇa. In the same breath, a

1. Majjhima Nikāya, (2.10)
2. See Majjhima Nikāya, (2.10.)
view quite opposite to it, is stated. Then Pātali, asks the Buddha which of these the Śramana or the Brāhmaṇa was right.

Buddha tells him that even if the view that "to one who acts or causes another to act ..... there is no sin...

..... there is no increase of merit" is right, an Āryaśāravaka is not affected thereby as he never causes any evil to anyone. So also even if the view that "To one who acts or causes another to act ..... there is sin..... there does ensure the increase of merit" be right, an Āryaśāravaka is not affected. And at the very thought that he is not affected even if either one or the other view be right, he feels a sense of great joy.

From this, it is clear that for Pūrapā's doctrine, the name Akriyāvāda seems quite proper and this is the name given to it in the Sāmaññaphala sutta. His is the theory of non-action, according to which one is not affected by acts, either good or sinful. In other words, the soul according to him does not act, it is passive (निष्ठिः). We must however note at this juncture that the Akriyāvāda of Pūrapā Kassapa is confounded sometimes with the Ahetuvaīda of Gosāla Maṁkhaliputra. This gives rise to a confusion regarding their teachers also.

Gosāla in fact, held that "there is no cause, either ultimate or remote for the depravity of beings, they become depraved without reason and without cause. There is

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1. Samyutta Nikāya (42.13).
no cause; for the rectitude of beings they become pure without reason and cause.

In Samyutta Nikaya (22.60), Licchavi Mahāli comes to Buddha; and tells him, "Lord! Pūrṇa Kassapa says that no cause, ultimate or remote, is there for the depravity of beings, they become depraved without reason and without cause. There is no cause, either proximate or remote for the rectitude of beings, they become pure, without reason and without cause."

Here we see that the theory of Gosāla, with the same terminology, is ascribed to Pūrṇa. Even then it is difficult to come to any conclusion, whether both of these views can result in a single theory or they are quite complementary.

It seems that in both the views, there is a lot of difference in the way of laying stress on a particular viewpoint. Pūrṇa first refers to action and then explains in respect of action that any kind of action, either good or bad, cannot bring any fruit, either good or bad. While Gosāla, refers to the fruit either good or evil first, and then in respect of that fruit, says that it is not brought forth by any action, previously existing.

Thus the problem of the relationship of action and fruit is the same, which is faced by both of them from different point of view by the former from the viewpoint of action, by
the latter from the viewpoint of fruit. And it is this treatment given by each of them, that differentiates their views. It should nevertheless be noted that both of them, any how accept no relationship of cause and effect between the actions and the fruits. Could it be that it is only because of this similarity that their views are often confounded?

Śīlaṅka, while commenting upon a passage in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, I. 1.1.13, says that Aklrakavāda is here described. The view therein set out is this: "When a man acts or causes another to act, it is not his soul (ātman) which acts or causes to act. Thus they (i. e. the holders of their view) boldly proclaim.

So also, in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga II.14, we have a description of the theory of Pancamahābhūtavādins. We shall examine it in detail in the next chapter. At this stage, we only refer to the last portion of that description from which it may be clearly inferred that it is quite similar to the theory of Pūraṇa Kassapa. It is as follows:

"A man buys and causes to buy, kills and causes to kill, cooks and causes to cook, he may even sell and kill a man - know that even in this case, he does not do any wrong".

\[ \text{कुव्वं च कार्यं चेव} \]
\[ \text{सव्वं कुव्वं न चिज्जहिः} \]
\[ \text{स्वमकाराष्ट्रे वष्पा} \]
\[ \text{सचं ते त्र पश्चायक्ष्मा} \]
This can be interpreted to mean that the soul does not act but it is the five elemental substances that do so. Thus there is a striking similarity between the views of the Pañcamahābhūtavādin and Pūraṇa Kassapa and the description in the Dīghanikāya, is rather detailed, though not exaggerated. The line of thought in the Dīghanikāya, is almost the same as that in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, and expressions are also at both the places, the same.

We can therefore conclude that (i) Pūraṇa recognises no action on the part of soul; (ii) he holds that no act results either in sin or in merit; that is to say, there is no Punya and pāpa, (iii) in his view, there can be no otherworld (Paraloka) (as the other-world is the result of action, but Pūraṇa does not recognise any result of any action.

Ahetuka Śuddhivāda:

Relating the answer which he got from Gosāla, Ajātaśatru thus describes the view of Gosāla. Gosāla said to him: "There is, O King, no cause, either ultimate or remote, for the depravity of beings, they become degraved without reason and without cause. There is no cause, either proximate or remote for the rectitude of beings, they become pure without reason and without cause. The attainment of any given condition, of any character, does not depend either on one's own acts or on the acts of another,
or on human effort. There is no such thing as power or energy, or human strength or vigour. All animals, all creatures, (with one, two or more senses), all beings (produced) from eggs or in a womb, all souls (in plants) are without force and power and energy of their own. They are bent this way and that by their fate, by the necessary conditions of the class to which they belong, by their individual nature: and it is according to their position in one or other of the six classes, that they experience ease or pain. There are eighty-four hundred thousand periods, during which both fools and wise alike wandering in transmigration, shall at last make an end of pain. Though the wise should hope: by this virtue or performance of duty, or this penance, or this righteousness, will I make the Karma, (I have inherited) that is not yet mature, mature— though the fool should hope by the same means to get gradually rid of Karma, that has matured— neither of them can do it. The ease and pain, measured out as it were with a measure, cannot be altered in the course of transmigration, there can be neither increase nor decrease thereof, neither excess nor deficiency. Just as a ball of string is cast forth, it will spread out just as far, and no farther than it can unwind, just so both, fools and wise alike, wandering in transmigration, exactly for the allotted term, shall then, and only then, make an end of pain."
Thus, Lord, did Makkhali of the cow pen, when asked what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse expound his theory of purification through transmigration.

The same description occurs in Majjhima, Nikāya, and the Buddha, after describing this theory; and a theory quite opposite to it, says that those, who do not accept cause and reason for the depravity and rectitude of beings are wrong and those who accept it are right.

To see the Buddha's own opinion in this matter would be quite interesting. He obviously believes that there does exist a reason and a cause for the depravity and rectitude of beings.

If rūpa were only to create misery and if it were completely devoid of happiness, then nobody would be interested in it. Because there is a lot of pleasure in rūpa and no misery, beings are interested in it, hence their contact with it follows, due to which they are depraved. The same is the case with Vedanā, Samjñā, Samskāra and Vijnāna.

And also, if rūpa were to create pleasure only and were completely, devoid of misery, nobody would have a

2. 2.10.1.
dislike for it. But Mahāli, there is much misery in rūpa and little happiness, hence beings have a dislike for it, and then being unattached to rūpa, they become pure and this is the cause of the rectitude of beings. The same is the case with Vedā, Samjñā, Samskāra and Vijnāna.

**UCCHEPAVĀDA** :-

In the Sāmaññaphala Sutta, Ajātaśatru tells the Buddha what Ajita, with the garment of hair (Ajita Kesakambali) had said: "There is no such thing, 0 king, as alms, or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next. There is neither father, nor mother, nor beings springing into life without them. There are in this world no recluses or Brahmanas who have reached the highest point, who walk perfectly and who, having understood and realised by themselves alone, both - this world and the next make their wisdom known to others."

"A human being is built up of the four elements. When he dies, the earth in him returns and relapses to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire, the windy to the air and his faculties pass to the space. The four bearers on the bier as a fifth, take his dead body away till they reach the burning ground, men utter eulogies, but his bones are bleached and his offerings end in ashes. It is
a doctrine of fools, this talk of gifts. It is an empty lie, mere idle talk, when men say there is profit therein. Fools and wise alike, on the dissolution of the body, are cut off; annihilated, and after death, they are not?

"Thus, Lord, did Ajita, of the garment of hair, when asked what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, expound his theory of annihilation".

Part of this passage occurs in the Majjhima Nikāya also, in almost the same words. And along with it a view quite opposite to it is also described there, according to which, there does exist something like alms and sacrifices and offerings. A thing like the fruit or result of good or evil deeds does exist. This world is there and so also the other world. There is the father and the mother and so also the beings springing into life. (aupapāṭikāḥ sattvāḥ).

There do exist in the world, recluses (Sramaṇas) and Brāhmaṇas; who have reached the highest point and who, having understood and realised by themselves alone, both this world and the next, make their wisdom known to others.

The Buddha after stating the views, thus explains to his followers that those who believe that there is no such thing as alms or sacrifices or offerings, would give up the


(Dialogues of the Buddha. Vol. I. p. 70-74.)
good deeds of speech, mind and body and adopt the evil ones. They do so, because they do not see any sin in the evil deeds and any virtue in good deeds. Even if there is the other world, they are of the view that there is no other world. And this view of theirs is a wrong belief, it is a false view, a false thesis. Such a view is contradictory to the sayings of the Arhats who have known the other world.

And one who believes that there is something like alms and sacrifices and offerings, and abandons evil deeds of mind, body and speech and adopts the good ones; when he says that there is the other world, he is right and his view is the right view. He is praised by the wise people in this very birth as being one who has right conduct and faith and as a believer (āṣṭikavādin), and the former is blamed as being one who has a bad conduct and wrong faith and as a non-believer (nāṣṭikavādin).

The Āṣṭikavādin, after leaving this body, is born in heaven and is thus rewarded in both the ways (i. e. in this world, he gets the words of praise from the wise and in the other world he gets the joys of heaven). While the other one, i. e. the Nāṣṭikavādin is not praised but is blamed in this world, and after leaving the body also, he is born in hell. So he is a loser everywhere and does not gain anything by adopting the false view that there is nothing like alms and sacrifices and also......no other world.
In the Samyutta Nikāya; (24.5), there is a Natthi Dinna Sutta, where the Buddha speaks about the same view in the same words and in the end concludes that such a wrong view arises because of the existence of rūpa, because of the existence of Vedanā, Saṃjñā, Samskāra and Vijñāna.

But all the rūpa etc. are momentary and non-eternal and one who knows this is freed from doubts and hence does not adopt any such view. Gradually, by knowing the four truths, he becomes emancipated and is not born again.

From the Samyutta Nikāya (42.13), it becomes clear that the Buddha himself does not come to a final conclusion anywhere; he merely says that even if the view that "alms and sacrifice etc. are there" - be right, a religious person (Ārya Śrāvaka) is not affected thereby and even if the view that "alms and sacrifices etc. are not there" - be right, in that case also, he is equally unaffected, because he causes no evil and performs no evil. He gives up the false view and by adopting the right attitude, he experiences bliss and happiness.

But the Buddha does say that the view that there is no other world is a false view. In fact, the Buddha considered some problems as inexplicable (avyākata) - whether the Tathāgata exists after death, or not, or both exists as well does not exist or neither exists nor does not exist -
is an instance in point. Thus, many a time, he says in respect
of problems regarding this world, heaven, hell etc., that
these are avyākata problems, to which, it is not possible
to give an answer. From this, one may jump to the conclusion
that he was an agnostic. Or we can also say that he did not
answer such questions simply because their answers, in no
way, promote the good of man. We have seen above that he
admits the existence of paraloka. Could he have thought
that belief in Paraloka is more in the interest of mankind
than disbelief in it?

The Anguttara Nikāya (Vol. I. p. 249 and the
Dhammasarīgāṇī (p. 267) also refer to this view (diṭṭhi).
The words in which they refer to it are the same and the
view set out therein is obviously that of Ajita.

It is interesting to note the Buddha’s remark
in the Anguttara Nikāya (Vol. I. p. 266). Just as of all
kinds of woven robes, a hair garment is known to be the
least desirable, cold in cold weather, hot in hot, unpleasant
to the touch, so of all many assertions by recluses, the
Makkhali theory is the most undesirable."

The question here arises is that could the Buddha
have confounded Ajita Kesakambali with Makkhali Gosāla?
Or is he just giving a simile? Or could he be suggesting
that Gosala's theory is even more dangerous than Ajita Kesakambalin's, though the latter's garment was the most undesirable of all?

The Buddha, then stating the view of Makkhali, says that "according to Makkhali, there is no Karma and no action, so also no power, nor energy, nor strength, nor vigour. Eventhough all the Arhats and Sāmaññaphala (the enlightened ones) who flourished before, were believers in Karma, action and energy, yet Makkhali rejects this view; that is to say he does not believe in these. All those that will flourish in future, will also be believers in Karma, action and energy. Even I myself, am a believer in Karma, action and energy. But Makkhali rejects this view of mine, saying that there is no Karma, no action, no energy".

The Buddha thus seems to be a believer in Karma and this is quite a fact. Even though he establishes the non-existence of the soul, he does explain the origin of suffering in the light of the theory of dependent origination; where due to the impressions of the past, a man is presently involved in thirst (ṭhāna) and clinging (upādāna), which become the cause of rebirth and old age and death etc.

In the Sāmaññaphala Sutta, Ajita's view is called Ucchedavāda (the doctrine of annihilation). It is obvious from the above details that he regards the body and the soul to be one and the same and that soul is not something different
from the body. He speaks of the annihilation of the soul. No soul remains after death, because all the four elements viz. earth, water, fire, and air of which the body consists, finally return to the earth, water, fire and air and nothing remains, nothing is left. So when nothing remains, the talk of gifts and alms is a fool's talk, all the offerings end in ashes. No other world is there and not even this world. This is his view and in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, we find exactly the same description, the only distinguishing point being that the name given to this view there is Tājñāvataccharīravāda.

What was then the view of the Buddha? If he did not believe in the theory of annihilation (Ucchedevāda), then did he believe in eternalism (Śāsvatavāda)? No, not the least. The Buddha in fact, held the doctrine of the Middle Path. There is a dialogue in the Samyutta Nikāya, where he tries to establish his own view as against nihilism and eternalism. There Ācēla Kāśyapa asks the Buddha.

"Is sorrow Gautama due to oneself? (Sayamkatam?)"
"Not so, O Kāśyapa," said the Lord. "Is it then, O Gautama, due to another? (parakatam?)." "Not so, O Kāśyapa", replied the Lord. "Is it then due to oneself as well as due to another?"
"That is not the case," said the Buddha. "Is it, O Gautama, neither due to oneself, nor due to another?" "This also is not the case," said Gautama.
Kāśyapa then asks the Buddha whether sorrow is existent or not. Gautama says that sorrow does exist. And when Kāśyapa begins to doubt the very knowledge of Gautama regarding the existence and cause of sorrow, Gautama tells him that Kāśyapa should not doubt thus because he (the Buddha) rightly knows the truth. He thus explains it to Kāśyapa.

"If he, who suffers is the same as he who does, then O Kāśyapa, it is admitted that the sorrow is due to one who was existent and consequently, the agent is admitted as eternal (Śāśvata).

"If, again, someone does and someone else suffers, then, O Kāśyapa, it is admitted that one suffers due to the acts done by another and consequently, the agent is admitted as extinct (Ucchedam etam)." The Tathāgata avoids both the ends and preaches the law by adopting the middle course. Avidyā causes samskāra, samskāra causes Vijnāna and so on. Thus originates this Skandha (aggregate) of absolute sorrow. By the total cessation of Samskāras, Vijnāna (Consciousness) ceases and so on. Thus the skhandha of absolute sorrow ceases. (cf. Samyutta Nikāya 12.17).

In the Ānanda sutta of the Samyutta Nikāya, Vatsagotra asks Gautama if Astitā is existent. But the Buddha gives no answer. He again asks if Nāstitā is existent and

1. 44. 1.
the Buddha still does not answer. When Vatsagotra goes away, Ananda asks Buddha why he gave no answer to Vatsagotra. The Buddha, then, explains to him that if he had told him that there is Astitā, that would be eternalism. If he had told him that there is Nāsitā, that would be nihilism. "In accepting the former," says the Buddha, "I would not have been able to teach that all dharmas are devoid of soul (i.e. Anātmā). If I told him that Nāsitā is there, he would be more misled as he would be inclined to think that I had a soul before, which, now, is not there."

Thus, to avoid both the extreme views, the Buddha thought it proper to preach the middle path, which was devoid of these two extremes. This will be even clearer to us when we examine the Buddha's attitude towards the eight inexplicable problems (avyākata pañhā).

Ajita expounded Ucchedavāda, and he taught the extinction of soul, of the world and of acts. He denied the eternity of all these three things. Soul, according to him, lasts as long as the body does and not thereafter, and, when there is no soul after death, there would be no world also. And since according to Ajita, there are no alms or sacrifices or offerings in the true sense of the term, he also can be called an Akriyāvādin.
We now come to the Tajjīvataccharīravāda, the Nāstikavāda, and the Sāsvatavāda, which are closely connected with the Ucchedavāda of Ajita.

**TAJJĪVATACCHARĪRAVĀDA:**

Whether the soul and the body are one and the same or the soul is different from the body is an important problem in the field of philosophy. Buddha is always found in a mood to avoid giving an answer to this question. He brushes it aside as an inexplicable problem and believes that such questions are not at all useful for the final good.

Moreover, he says, "If one, O Bhikkhu, were to maintain that self is identical with the body, then there would be no use of endeavouring for release. And if one were to maintain that the self is different and the body is different, then also, O Bhikkhu, there would be no use of endeavouring for release. Having avoided O Bhikkhu, both these extremes, the Tathāgata preaches the law by adopting the middle course." (Samyutta Nikāya, 15.12).

The Buddha has thus evaded any definite answer to this question. But the Tajjīvataccharīravādins held that the soul is identical with the body. This was a very famous heretical doctrine; and it could possibly have been the view of the Carvākas, who held that after the body, no soul persists.
In the Jāliya sutta in the Dīgha Nikāya, Jāliya goes to the Buddha; and asks him whether the soul and the body were identical or were different from each other. There also the Buddha preached the futility of such a question as it was not important for an Arhat.

Poṭṭhapāda also asks the same question and the Buddha, giving the same answer adds that "This question is not calculated to profit, it is not concerned with the Norm (the Dhamma), it does not redound even to the elements of right conduct, nor to detachment, nor to purification from lusts, nor to quitude, nor to tranquillisation of heart, nor to real knowledge, nor to the insight (of the higher stages of the path), nor to Nirvāṇa. Therefore is it, that I express no opinion upon it.

(Dialogues of the Buddha I. 254-255).

NĀSTIKAVĀDA:

Nāstikavāda is a theory which seeks to establish that there is neither this world, nor the other world; because the dead do not return and alike the wanderers and Brahmins of moral and virtuous dispositions are fond of life and averse to dying; fond of happiness and shirking sorrow. Above all one cannot see the soul of a dead person, passing out of the body.
Ajita's view comes to mean that there is not the other world, nor are there beings reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there the fruit or result of deeds well done or ill done. Ajita's view is quite similar to the view of Pāyāsi. Pāyāsi was thus a materialistic thinker like the Cārvākas and the Buddhist as well as the Jaina Scriptures give, in detail, the arguments which he put forth to prove his view. Pāyāsi held that the soul is not an entity distinct from the body. As a man, drawing a sword from the scabbard, can say, "this is the sword and this is the scabbard," so, we are not able to separate the soul from the body. The Sūtrakṛtāṅga, as we shall see, describes this at length, giving a series of examples. We can say that Ajita and Pāyāsi, or the Ucchedavādins, the Nāstikavādins and the Vājīvataccharīravādins were all regarded as Akriyāvādins by Mahāvīra, as they upheld the doctrine of non-action.

In the Brahmajāla Sutta the view of some recluses and Brahmanas is described, who in seven ways, maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being. They held that, "Since this soul has form, is built up of the four elements, and is the offspring of father and mother, it is cut off, destroyed on the dissolution of the body, and does not continue after death; and then the soul is completely annihilated."
Some hold that "the whole soul is not then completely annihilated for there is a further soul, divine, having form, belonging to the sensuous plane, feeding on solid food. That you neither know, nor perceive. But I (i.e. the Buddha) know and have experienced it. And since this soul, on the dissolution of the body, is cut off, and destroyed, does not continue after death, then it is, that the soul is completely annihilated."

Five more views are also described according to which the whole soul is not then annihilated. But according to the first view, a soul made of mind, remains. According to the second view, there remains a soul, which reaches up to the plane of infinity of space. According to the third, there remains a soul which reaches up to the plane of infinity of Consciousness. According to the fourth, a soul, remains that passing quite beyond the plane of infinity of consciousness, knowing that there is nothing, reaches up to the plane of no-obstruction. And according to the fifth view, there remains a soul passing quite beyond the plane of no-obstruction. And when this remaining soul is annihilated, only then, one can say that the soul is completely annihilated and not before that. All these views are undoubtedly the views of the Ucchedavādins. As these Ucchedavādins preach the complete annihilation of the soul, they maintain that the soul and the world
are produced without a cause. According to them, no cause persists as everything results in complete annihilation. The holder of such views are called Fortuitous Originists in the Brahmajāla sutta and the Buddha describes them thus:

"There are brethren certain gods called Unconscious Beings. As soon as an idea occurs to them, they fall from that state. Now, it may well be, brethren, that a being, falling from that state, should come hither and having come hither, he might go forth from the household life into the homeless state. And having thus become a recluse, he, by reason of ardour and so on, (as in the other cases) realises up to such rapture of heart that rapt in heart, he calls to mind how that idea occurred to him but not more than that. He says to himself: "Fortuitous in origin are the soul and the world. And why so? Because formerly I was not, but now am. Having not been, I have come to be."

This is the first state of things, on account of which, starting out from which, some recluses and Brāhmaṇas become Fortuitous Originists and maintain that the soul and the world arise without cause.

In the second case, some recluse or Brāhmaṇa is addicted to logic and reasoning. He gives utterance to the following conclusion of his own, beaten out by his argumentations and based on his Sophistry: "The soul and the world arose without a cause."
We can see that the fundamental problem here is
"Is there any cause of the world? And if there is one, what is it?"

Many admit that the effect is produced only when there is a cause. But still, there are some who think that there is no particular cause, to which we could ascribe the production of the world. Similarly, according to them, the destruction of things is also without any cause.

It may be noted, that the Buddha opposed Ucchedavāda as strongly as he opposed Sāśvatavāda. "Such views," as he observes, "arise, because there is rūpa, because there is samjña, because there is sāmkāra, and also vedanā and vijñana." "But a true Āryaśrāvakā," says the Buddha, "is never inclined to such false views, because he sees and knows that rūpa is momentary, samjña is momentary and so also are sāmkāra, Vedanā, and vijñana. And because he sees and knows it, he is not affected thereby and is finally emancipated."

SĀŚVATAVĀDA: -

In the Brahmajāla Sutta, the Buddha describes the view of the Eternalists (Sāśvatavādins) in these words:
"There are recluses and Brāhmaṇas, brethren, who reconstruct
the Ultimate beginnings of things, whose speculations are connected with the ultimate past; and who on eighteen grounds, put forward, various assertions regarding the past. And about what, with reference to what, do these venerable ones do so?

"There are, brethren, some recluses and Brahmanas, who are eternalists (Sassatavādā); and who on four grounds, proclaim that both the soul and the world are eternal. And about what, with reference to what, do these venerable ones do so?

In the first place, brethren, some recluse or Brāhmaṇa, by means of ardour, of exertion, of application, of earnestness, of careful thought reaches up to such rapture of heart that rapt in heart, he calls to mind, his various dwelling places in times gone by, in one birth or in two, or in three, or in four, or in five, or ten, or twenty, or thirty, or forty, or fifty, or a hundred, or a thousand, or in several hundreds or thousands or lakhs of births to the effect that "There I had such and such a name, was of such and such a lineage and caste, lived on such and such food and experienced such and such pains and pleasures, had such and such a span of years. And when I fell from thence, I was reborn in such and such a name, in such and such lineage and caste, living on such and such food, experiencing such and such pains and pleasures, with such and such a span of years."
And when I fell from thence, I was reborn here. Thus does he recollect, in full detail, both of condition and of custom, his various dwelling places in times gone by. And he says to himself: "Eternal is the soul, and the world, giving birth to nothing new, is steadfast as a mountain-peak, as a pillar firmly fixed, and though these living creatures transmigrate and pass away, fall from one state of existence and spring up in another, yet they are for ever and ever. And why must that be so? Because I, by means of ardour, of exertion, of application, of earnestness, of careful thought, can reach up to such rapture of heart, that rapt in heart, I can call to mind in full detail, both of condition and of custom, my various places in times gone, by, by that is it, that I know this, that the soul is eternal; and that the world, giving birth to nothing new, is steadfast as a mountain peak, as a pillar firmly fixed and that though these living creatures transmigrate and pass away, fall from one state of existence and spring up in another yet they are for ever and ever."

"This, brethren, is the first state of things on account of which, starting from which, some recluses and Brāhmaṇas are eternalists and maintain that both the soul and the world are eternal."
In the second case, he calls to mind the previous births which extend over a still longer period up to ten world aeons and in the third case, such a period as extends up to forty world aeons.

And in the fourth case, as the Buddha describes, "some recluse or Brāhmaṇa is addicted to logic and reasoning. He gives utterance to the following conclusion, beaten out by his argumentations and based on his sophistry: "Eternal is the soul and the world, giving birth to nothing new, is steadfast as a mountain peak, as a pillar firmly fixed; and these living creatures, though they transmigrate and pass away, fall from one state of existence and spring up in another. Yet they are for ever and ever".

"This brethren, is the fourth state of things on the ground of which, starting from which, some recluses and Brāhmaṇas are eternalists and maintain that the soul and the world are eternal."

"These, brethren, are those recluses and Brāhmaṇas", says the Buddha, "who are eternalists, and in four ways maintain that both the soul and the world are eternal. For whosoever of the recluses and Brāhmaṇas are such and maintain this, they do so in these four ways, or in one, or in the other of the same, and outside these, there is no way in which this opinion is arrived at".
The above is the description, which occurs in the Brahmajāla Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya.

It is stated in the Majjhima Nikāya (I. 2.1) that the self (attā) according to the Eternalists (Sassatavādins), is the speaker, the feeler and the enjoyer of the fruits of good and evil actions, is permanent (nicca), steady (dhruva), eternal (sassata) and is unchangable (aparināmadhammā) and is stead-fast like the so-called eternal objects, viz: the Sun, Moon, ocean, earth and mountain.

Besides this, wherever the inexplicable questions are discussed, the view of the eternalists, is referred to. But as we have seen, the Buddha, not only disagrees with this view, but he also refuses to give an answer to the question, "Are the world and the soul eternal or non-eternal?"

When in the Samyutta Nikāya, Vatsagotra comes to him and asks whether there is Astitā (स्थितिः) the Buddha gives no reply. Explaining the reason why he did not reply, he says that if he answered him in the affirmative, that would be Eternalism and then it would be quite difficult for him to preach Anātmavāda.

Similarly, in the Samyutta Nikāya 44.8, Vatsagotra puts a question to Moggalāna, "Is the world eternal?" Moggalāna says that this, according to the Buddha is an unanswerable question.
The former then asks why the holders of the other views described the world to be eternal. Moggalana explains: "Vatsa, those heretics ('वत्स अतितिथियानं परिवाराकान्') thinks, "'The eye is mine, I am the eyes, the eyes are myself; the ears are mine, I am the ears, the ears are myself.' And the same is the case with the organs of smell, taste and with the body. And so, on being asked, he answer that 'The world is permanent.'

But the Buddha does not hold that eye is the soul ...... etc. so when asked, he gives absolutely no reply to the question.

Vatsa, then goes to the Buddha and asks the same question why he regards it as an unanswerable question and why the other heretics hold the world to be eternal. The Buddha says that those people recognise rūpa as the self, or know the self as having form or know the self in rūpa, and think similarly of Vedanā, Samjñā, Samskāra and Vijñāna. So, on being asked, they say that the world is permanent.

In the Samyutta Nikāya, 24.9, there is a Sassata, Diṭṭhi-Sutta where the Buddha explains that because there is rūpa, because there is Vedanā, because there is samjñā and so also, Samskāra and 'Vijñāna, a false view is created that the world is eternal.
But he, who knows, that in fact, rūpa is anitya, Vedanā is anitya and the same is the case with samjñā, saṃskāra and vijnāna, is not affected thereby and is finally emancipated.

This same is stated by the Buddha in Saṃyutta Nikāya 22,15 (Etam Mama Sutta) in the form of an answer to the question as to how this false view is created that some think in this way: that which is soul, the same is the Loka, "so after leaving the body, I will be permanent fixed, eternal, unchangeable"?

The Buddha upholds the doctrine of Kṣaṇikavāda. Therefore Saṃvatavāda is a doctrine, quite unacceptable to him. Yet he never says, that the world is non-eternal. Because that would result in Ucchedavāda, which is also quite an extreme view; and so unacceptable. Consequently, he adopted the Middle Path. In a dialogue with Kāśyapa, he, in answer to the question of Kāśyapa 'what is Dukkha?' says that if he who suffers is the same as he who does one may hold: "the sorrow is due to one who was existent (before)," then the agent is admitted as eternal, hence follows eternalism. Similarly, if that he who does and he who suffers are quite distinct, one may hold, "Someone else does it and another one experiences it; hence sorrow is not due to one's ownself, (which was existent before);
but due to another. " Here follows Annihilationalism. But Tathāgata, avoiding both these ends, preaches the law by adopting the middle path. Because of Āvidyā, arise saṃskāras .......... and thus all the Dukkha is created. And by the cessation of tendencies (saṃskāras), Vijñāna ceases and so on, finally the whole aggregate of absolute sorrow ceases.

In the Tripitakas, Baka Brahmā is described as an Upholder of Śāśvatavāda. In the Majjhima Nikāya (1.49.1-3) (Brahma Nīmantanika Sutta), the Buddha relates that once, when he was in the Subhagavana of Ukaṭṭhā; a Brahmā, named Baka, was inclined to the view that brahma-loka is permanent, fixed, eternal, pure and unchanging. It is liable neither to birth, nor to death there is no further going out to it.

The Buddha told Baka Brahmā that he was plunged in ignorance as he regarded what is impermanent as permanent, what is changing as fixed, what is non-eternal as eternal, what is impure as pure. Even if there was a further going out, he said that there was no further going out ".

Thus, it is quite clear that the Buddha was not in favour of the Śāśvatavāda. The Saṁyutta Nikāya, giving the same view of Baka Brahmā, adds that Baka Brahmā holds that the Brahmā-loka is neither destroyed, nor is it produced again, and this only is the final release. The Buddha calls
it a sinful view, pāpaḍiṭṭhi; and says that this (i.e. the Brahma Loka) is not the final release, but it is non-eternal and so liable to destruction; and the final release is quite different from it.

It is however, very interesting to compare the view of Baka Brahmā with that of the Pañcamahābhūtavādins, which is described in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga (chapter 14th).

The Pañcamahābhūtavādins hold that: "There are five elements........everything down to a blade of grass consists of them. These five elements are not created directly or indirectly, nor made, they are not effects, nor products, they are without beginning and end........ are independent of a directing cause or everything else, they are eternal.

They thus regard them as permanent, eternal and devoid of production or destruction. The Loka, according to them, consists of them and hence is eternal. Could it be that Baka Brahmā is here meant to Signify some ācārya, from among the Pañcamahābhūtavādins? The views are strikingly similar.

A K R T A V Ā D A :-

Akṛtavāda is the view held by Pakuda Kaccāyana. It is described by Ajātsatru in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta as follows:-
The following seven things are neither made nor commanded to be made, neither created nor caused to be created, they are barren, (so that nothing is produced out of them), steadfast as a mountain peak, as a pillar firmly fixed.

They move not nor do they vary, they trench not one upon another; nor avail ought as to ease or pain or both. And what are the seven? The four elements - earth, water, fire and air - and ease and pain and the soul as a seventh. So there is neither slayer nor causer of slaying, hearer or speaker, knower or explainer. When one with a sharp sword cleaves a head in twain, no one thereby deprives any one of life. a sword has only penetrated into the interval between seven elementary substances.

"Thus did Pakuda Kaccāyana, when asked what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, expound the matter by expounding something else."

"The Sāmyutta Nikāya 24.8; depicts the same view in these very words. Then it describes how Pakuda held that "Even if one may think that "by this virtue or this performance of duty, or this penance, or this righteousness, will I make the Karma (I have inherited), that is not yet mature, mature- or one may hope by the same means to get rid
of Karma that has matured, neither of them can do it. The ease and pain, are not measured out with a measure, there is neither increase, nor decrease thereof; neither excess, nor deficiency. Just as when a ball of string is cast forth, it will spread out just as far and no farther, than it can unwind, just so, both fools and wise, alike, wandering in transmigration, exactly for the allotted term, shall then make an end of pain ".

According to the Buddha such a view arises because there is rūpa, because there is vedanā, because there are Samjñā, Samskāra and Vijñāna. An Āryaśrāvaka knows them to be impermanent and hence is not affected thereby, till he finally gets emancipated.

The name given to this philosophy of Pakuda, is Akṛtavāda or Sattakāyavāda. He regarded seven things, viz. earth, Water, fire, air, ease, pain and soul as eternal, imperishable and immutable by their very nature. In this respect, Pakuda sounds to be an Eternalist. The Eternalists, as we have seen above, Regarded the world and the soul as eternal.

**ANISCAYAVĀDA** :-

This is the view of Saṅjaya Belaṭṭhiputta, who can be said to be a sceptic or an Agnostic. In the Sāmaṁphala
Sutta, Ajātaśatru describes what Sañjaya told him when asked about the immediate fruit of the life of a recluse. He thus replied:

"If you ask me whether there is another world - well, if I thought there were, I would say so. But I don't say so. And I don't think it is thus or thus. And I don't deny it. And I don't say there neither is, nor is not another world. And if you ask me about the beings produced by chance, or whether there is any fruit, any result, of good and bad actions, or whether a man who has won the truth, continues or not after death - to each or any of these questions, do I give the same reply. Thus Lord, did Sañjaya of the Belaţţha clan, when asked what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, show his manner of prevarication.

Buddha in the Brahmajāla Sutta, uses the expression "Eel wrigglers" (vācā vikkhepikaś) for the people who hold such a view. He there describes it thus: There are, brethren, some recluses or brāhmaṇas, who wriggle like eels and when a question is put to them on this or that, they resort to equivocation, to eel-wriggling and this in four ways."
In the first place, some recluse or brahmana does not understand the good in its real nature, nor the evil. And he thinks: "I neither know the good, as it really is, nor the evil. That being so, were I to pronounce this to be good or that to be evil, I might be influenced therein by my feelings or desires, by ill will or resentment. And under these circumstances, I might be wrong, and my having been wrong might cause me the pain of remorse, might become a hindrance to me. Thus fearing and abhorring being wrong in an expressed opinion, he will neither declare anything to be good nor to be bad, but on a question being put to him on this or that, he resorts to eel wriggling, to equivocation and says, "I don't take it thus, I don't take it the other way. But I advance no opinion. And I don't deny your position. And I don't say it is neither the one, nor the other."

This is the first case, and what is the second? He, thinking that I neither know ...... or resentment". Under these circumstances, I might fall into that grasping condition of heart which causes rebirth and the sense of remorse might become a hindrance to me”. Thus fearing and abhorring the falling into that state, he will neither declare anything to be good and so on, as above.

1. Dīgha Nikāya, Brahmajāla Sutta.
In the third case, owing to the same kind of thought, he thinks that I neither know the good, as it really is, nor the evil. Now there are recluses and brahmanas who are clever, subtle, experienced in controversy, hair splitters, who go about, methinks, breaking to pieces by their wisdom, the speculations of others. Were I to pronounce this to be good or that to be evil, these men might join issue with me, call upon for my reasons; point out my errors. And on their doing so, I might be unable to explain. And that might cause me the pain of remorse, and the sense of remorse might become a hindrance to me".

Thus fearing and abhorring the joinder of issue, he will neither declare anything to be good and so on.

In the fourth case, some recluse or brähmana is dull, stupid. And it is by reason of his dullness, his stupidity, that when a question on this or that is put to him, he resorts to equivocation, to wriggling like an eel and says, "If you ask me whether there is another world - well, if I thought it were, I would say so but I don't think it is otherwise. And I don't deny it. And I don't say there neither is, nor is not, another world." Thus does he equivocate and in like manner, about each of such propositions as the following:

1. Dīgha Nikāya, Brahmajāla Sutta.
"There is not another world. There are chance beings. There are no such beings. There both are and are not such beings. There neither are nor are not such beings. There is fruit, or result of good and bad actions. There is no such fruit. There both is and is not such fruit. There neither is nor is not such fruit. A man who has penetrated the truth, continues to exist after death. He does not continue, he both continues and does not continue, he neither continues nor not continues."

"These are those recluses and brahmāṇas who wriggle like eels and when a question is put to them, on this or that, resort to equivocation, to eel-wriggling and that in four ways. For whoever do so they do so in these four ways, or in one or the other way, in which they do so."

Jacobi is right when he says, that "It is evident that the Agnostics examined all modes of expression of the existence or non-existence of a thing and if it were anything transcendental or beyond human experience, they negated all these modes of expression."

1. Dīgha Nikāya;
   Brahma Jāla Sutta.
2. SBE. Vol. XLV, p. XXVII.
Dr. Barua says, Sañjaya may be called an "Intellectual coward" because, even when he was unable to form a clear theory he would not confess his inability to think, but he would instead say that, "if I were to know that it is such, I would tell it to be so to you but I don't hold it to be either this way or that way and therefore do not say that it is either this way or that way." Or may be we even he was very intelligent and critical in his outlook and must have been convinced that such questions are not capable of having any definite answer, and if they had a definite answer at all, they would have been solved at once and the whole process of philosophical controversies would have come to an end. But we see that it is not so, and different solutions are given by different philosophers and still the problems remain unsolved and continue to puzzle people throughout the ages.

Even the Buddha does not like to give any definite answer to such questions and he tactfully evades them as unanswerable; or so to say, useless for a monk in the path of getting final emancipation from pain.

Thus, when the great Buddha refused to answer such questions, Sañjaya is obviously justified if he refuses to answer the same; though the philosophical approach of the two thinkers is quite different. In fact, as Barua notes,
he by suspending his judgements on certain great questions of human mind, came to indicate that their final answer lay beyond the domain of speculation*. He further continues, "Both Mahāvīra and Buddha were unanimous in declaring that there are certain mooted questions of cosmology, ontology, theology and eschatology on which a man is unable, constituted as he is, to pronounce a bold, authoritative or dogmatic opinion."

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Buddha declared some questions as unanswerable (avyākata). In the Dīgha Nikāya, Paṭṭhapāda discusses about trance. Then, in the course of further discussion; Paṭṭhapāda asks Buddha several questions:

(1) Is the world eternal?

Is this alone the truth and any other view mere folly?
Buddha replies, "That, Paṭṭhapāda, is a matter on which I have expressed no opinion." Paṭṭhapāda then in the same terms, asks the following questions:-

(2) Is the world non-eternal?

(3) Is the world finite?

(4) Is the world infinite?

(5) Is the soul same as the body?

(6) Is the soul one thing and the body another?

(7) Does one who has gained the truth live again after death?

(8) Does he not live again after death?

(9) Does he both live and not live again after death?

(10) Does he neither live nor not live again after death?

And to each of these questions, the exalted one gave the same answer and said, "That too Paṭṭhapāda is a matter on which I have expressed no opinion".

1. Dīgha Nikāya, Paṭṭhapāda Sutta.
"But why has the exalted one expressed no opinion on that?" asks Potthapāda. To that, the great Buddha replied: "This question is not calculated to profit, it is not concerned with the Norm (i.e. the Dhamma), it does not redound even to the elements of right conduct, nor to detachment, nor to purification from lusts, nor to quietude, nor to the tranquillisation of heart, nor to real knowledge, nor to the insight (of the higher stages of path), nor to Nirvāṇa. Therefore it is that I expressed no opinion upon it."

In the Brahmajāla Sutta Buddha refers to sixty-two views out of which eighteen are regarding the past, and forty-four are regarding the future. As they are similar to the views expressed in these ten questions it is necessary to give a brief account of them.

Śāśvatavāda:

Among the eighteen views regarding the past, some hold that the soul and the world are eternal. The four grounds, on which they hold so, are already explained above in the exposition of Śāśvatavāda.

Śāśvata - Āśāśvatavāda:

Then there is the view of those who are eternalists with regard to some things and are non-eternalists with regard
to others. They also, on four grounds, maintain that "the soul and the world are partly eternal and partly not".

"There comes a time when sooner or later, after the lapse of a long long period this world system passes away. And when this happens, beings have mostly been reborn in the world of Radiance and there they dwell, made of mind; feeding on joy, radiating light from themselves, traversing the air, continuing in glory, and thus they remain for a long long period of time.

Now, there comes also a time when sooner or later, this world system begins to re-evolve. When this happens, the Palace of Brahma appears, but it is empty. And some being or other, either because his span of years has expired or his merit is exhausted, falls from that world of Radiance, and comes to life in the Palace of Brahma. And there he also lives, made of mind, feeding on joy, radiating light from himself, traversing the air, continuing in glory and thus does he remain for a long long time. Now there arises in him from his dwelling there so long alone, a dissatisfaction and a longing: "O would that other beings might come to join me in this place? And just then, either because their span of years has expired or their merit is exhausted, other beings fall from the world of Radiance and appear in the place of Brahma as companions to him and in all respects like him."
"On this, brethren, the one who was first reborn, thinks thus to himself: "I am Brahmā, the Great Brahmā, Supreme one, the Mighty, the All-seeing, the Ruler, the lord of all, the Maker, the Creator, the Chief of all, appointing to each his place, the Ancient of his days, the father of all that are and are to be, these other beings are of my creation. And why is that so? A while ago, I thought, "Would that they might come. And on my mental aspiration, behold that beings came."

"And those beings themselves, too think thus: This must be Brahmā, the Great Brahmā, the Supreme, the mighty, the All-seeing, the Ruler, the Lord of all, the Maker, the creator, the Chief of all, appointing to each his place, the ancient of days, the Father of all that are and are to be. And we must have been created by him. And why? Because as we see, it was he who was here first and we came after that."

"On this, brethren, the one, who first came into existence, is of longer life, and more glorious, and more powerful than those who appeared after him. And it might well be, brethren, that some being, on his falling from that state should come hither. And having come hither
he might go forth from the household state to the homeless state. And having thus become a recluse, he by reason of ardour or exertion of application, of earnestness, of careful thought, reaches up to such rapture of heart, that, rapt in heart, he calls to mind his last dwelling place, but not the previous ones. He says to himself, "That illustrious Brahma, the Great Brahma, the supreme... the chief of all, appointing to each his place the Ancient of days, the Father of all that are and are to be by when we were created, he is steadfast, immutable, eternal, of a nature that knows no change, and he will remain so for ever and ever. But we, who have been created by him have come hither, as being impermanent, mutable, limited in duration of life."

"This is the first state, starting out of which, some recluses and brahmans, being Eternalists as to some things and Non-Eternalists as to others, maintain that the soul and the whole world are partly eternal and partly not".

In the second state, some gods called the "Deva-baughted by pleasure" (सिद्धा पदोतिका देव) come hither on their falling from the former state. Here as in the first case, they become recluses and acquire the power of recollecting their last birth, but only the last one. And one such would say to himself: "Those gods who are not debaughted by pleasure, are steadfast, immutable,
eternal, of a nature that knows no change and they will remain so for ever and ever. But we who fell from that state, having lost our self-control, though being debauched by pleasure - we have come hither as being impermanent, mutable, limited in duration of life."

In the third case, the gods, "Debauched in Mind" (मनः पदुचिका देवा) on falling from their former state, come hither and having become recluses, should, as in the other cases, acquire the power of recollecting the last birth but only the last one. And such a one thinks to himself in the same way, that these gods who are not debauched in mind do not continually burn with envy against each other, so their hearts do not become evil-disposed one towards another's, nor their bodies feeble and their minds imbecile. Therefore they fall not from that state; they are steadfast, immutable, eternal, of a nature that knows no change and they will remain so for ever and ever. But we were corrupted in mind and fell from that state and have come hither being impermanent, immutable, limited in duration of life."

In the fourth case some Śramaṇa and Brāhmaṇa is addicted to logic and reasoning. He gives utterance to the following conclusion of his own, beaten out by his arguments and based on sophistry. "This which is called eye and ear and nose, and tongue, and body is a self which is impermanent, unstable, not eternal, subject to change. But this which
is called heart, or mind, or consciousness is a self which is permanent, steadfast, eternal and knows no change and it will remain for ever and for ever".

In these four ways, the recluses and Brāhmaṇas who are semi-Eternalists maintain that the soul and the world are in some respects eternal and in some, not". (Dial. of Buddha p. 30-35).

Sānta- Anantavāda :-

There are Extensionists who in four ways set forth the infinity or the finiteness of the world.

Some recluse or Brāhmaṇa, by means of ardour, of exertion, of application, of earnestness, of careful thought, reaches up to such rapture of heart, dwells in the world, imagining it finite and he says thus to himself: "Finite is the world so that a path could be traced round it. And why is this so? Since, I, by means of ardour, of exertion, . . . . . . . can reach up to such rapture of heart, that rapt in heart, I dwell in the world perceiving it to be finite - by that I know this." This is the first case the second case also is similar to this, differing only in conclusion which runs thus: "Infinite is the world, without a limit. Those recluses and Brāhmaṇas who say it is finite, so that a path could be traced round it, are wrong."
The third case is also similar, save that the conclusion there is that he imagines the world limited in the upward and downward directions but infinite across, and the person declares both the former conclusions to be wrong."

In the fourth case, some recluse or Brāhmaṇa is addicted to logic and reasoning. He gives utterance to the following conclusion of his own; beaten out by his arguments and based on his Sophistry: "This world is neither finite nor yet infinite. Those recluses and Brāhmaṇas who maintain either the first or the second, or the third conclusion are wrong. Neither is the world finite nor is it infinite". (Dial of the Buddha p. 35, 36).

These are the eight views regarding the past. Then there are forty four views regarding the future. Among them, those who hold the doctrine of a conscious existence after death maintain it in sixteen ways, that the soul after death is conscious. They say thus of the soul: The soul after death, not subject to decay and conscious, (1) has form, (2) is formless, (3) has and has not form, (4) neither has form, nor has not form, (5) is finite, (6) is infinite, (7) is both, (8) is neither, (9) has one mode of consciousness, (10) has various modes of consciousness, (11) has limited consciousness, (12) has infinite consciousness, (13) is altogether happy, (14) is altogether miserable, (15) is both, (16) is neither.
Then there are the recluses and Brahmanas, who in eight ways maintain that the soul after death is unconscious. They say thus of the soul: "The soul, after death, not subject to decay and unconsciousness (1) has form (2) is formless (3) has and has not form (4) neither has nor has not form (5) is finite (6) is infinite (7) is both (8) is neither.

Similarly there are those recluses and Brahmanas who maintain in these same eight ways that the soul after death is neither conscious nor unconscious.

Then there are Annihilationalists who in seven ways maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being. This same is the view of the Ucchedavādins, which we have discussed above.

So also there are the Eel-wrigglers who, when asked, wriggle like eels and do not give a definite answer in the affirmative or in the negative. Then there are some views regarding the doctrine of happiness in this life and regarding complete Salvation etc., of which we need not give details as they are not quite similar to the views we have to deal with.

We find in the Brahmajāla sutta all these views in detail. All are called extremists, who hold extreme views, e.g. - the world is eternal, or that the world is non-eternal and so on.
Buddha himself never suggests any solution to the disputed problems. For him, all these were equally heretical views. The relationship between these views and heretical views given in the Nyāya Sūtras will be examined later on.

The fifth and the sixth questions pertain to the Tājīvatācchārārvāda. Buddha hardly gives any details regarding it but we shall see that the Jaina canonical literature treats it at length and while dealing with it, we will show the characteristics of this view there.

The last four views are also mentioned in the Majjhima Nikāya (3.2), and in the Saṁyutta Nikāya, 16.12, 22. 36, 44. 1.

In the Potthapāda Sutta Buddha explains why he does not answer these questions. So also in the Cūla Mālunika Sutta in the Majjhima Nikāya (2.13), he says that it is not so that only after one forms a belief in the eternity or non-eternity of the world that righteous conduct (brahmācariyavāso) is possible. Buddha then declares that it is not on the truth of any of these alternatives that the practice of religious life depends. "There is still birth, there is old age, there is death, grief, lamentation, suffering, sorrow and despair of which I preach the destruction even in this present life".

1. Majjhima Nikāya 2.2.3.
Therefore, he asks his disciples to bear in mind, what he has not determined, as undetermined. And why did Buddha not say anything about these problems? The answer he himself gives is that he did so because "these are not useful, are not concerned with the principle of religious life, and do not tend to revulsion, absence of passion, cessation, tranquility, insight, enlightenment, and Nirvana."

In the same breath, Vatsagotra asks Buddha if he accepts any of the ten views which were then in vogue. The Buddha says that the view that the world is eternal is a false one and it is not useful for the final emancipation.

Then the Buddha says the same thing as regards the view that the world is non-eternal, that it is finite, that it is infinite, that the soul is different from the body.

In Majjhima Nikāya (2.22). Buddha giving an example explains to Vatsagotra that the body with which one might define a Tathāgata, passes away, is cut off the roof, uprooted like a palm-tree, made non-existent, not liable to rise again in the future. A Tathāgata (soul) released from what is called body etc. is profound, immeasurable, hard to fathom, like the great ocean. It does not fit in with the case to say that he is reborn or not reborn or both reborn and not reborn or neither reborn nor not reborn."

1. Majjhima Nikāya, 2.22.
The Majjhima Nikāya (3.2) gives different views regarding the condition of the soul after death. The views regarding the eternity or non-eternity of the soul and the world, regarding the finiteness of the world etc. etc., are also given there. But they need not be mentioned here as they are treated in almost the same way, as described earlier.

The Khuddaka Nikāya and the Dhammasangani also mention these views (ditthiṣṭhis).

In the Samyutta Nikāya 92.5, Vatsa asks Buddha, why some hold that the world is eternal or that it is non-eternal and so on. Buddha explaining this to him, says that, those people regard Rūpa to be the soul, soul as being endowed with Rūpa, soul as being in the rupa. This is the case with Vedanā, samjñā, samskāra and viññāna also. This is why when asked, they state that the soul and the world are eternal.

The Samyutta Nikāya describes each of their views in a separate Sutta. And then, in 33.1, it is stated that because of rūpa because of Vedanā, because of Samjñā,

because of Samskāra and because of Vijnāna such views arise. But these rūpa etc. are non-eternal and hence one should know that rūpa is not the soul, soul is not endowed with rūpa, soul is not rūpa.

In the Samyutta Nikāya (33.2.ff) Buddha states that because of the Ignorance of rūpa, because of the ignorance of rūpa - Samudaya, because of the ignorance of rūpa - nirodha, because of the ignorance of rūpa - nirodha- gāminī pratipad, such false views arise and the same is the case with Vedanā, Samjñā, Samskāra and Vijnāna. But in fact, all these five are non-eternal (i.e. anitya) and an Āryaśrāvaka who knows this, is not attached to it, not affected by it and is finally released, attains Parama Nirvāṇa and is not born again. Similarly in the Kathāvatthu some points of controversies are discussed. The discussion is between the Therāvādin (The Buddhist) and the Puggalavādin (a believer in the existence of a personal entity, soul).

In the course of the examination of Rebirth, the Therāvādin asks the Puggalavādin that, "Does a person or soul run on (or transmigrate) from this world to another and from another world to this?" The Puggalavādin accepts such a transmigration of the soul, but when asked if an identical or a different or both identical and also different or neither identical nor different soul transmigrates, he replies that, "that cannot be truly said".

The Puggalavādin then in course of further arguments admits that an identical soul transmigrates and transmigrates with feeling, with perception, with consciousness, and with that soul the corporeal and material qualities also transmigrate. When the Theravadin questions him as to if the body and the soul are the same or not, he does not give any answer. The Theravadin argues that, "If at the dissolution of each aggregate, the 'person' does disintegrate, then it becomes nihilism, and if at the dissolution of each aggregate, the person does not disintegrate then it becomes eternalism. But to the Buddha's mind, just as Nibbāna is neither reborn, nor dissolved, so is the soul".

Then another point of controversy is introduced regarding the problem whether the cause of things is predetermined or not, and the Theravadin shows that if a cause were predetermined by another cause, and this cause would in turn be predetermined by another cause and this cause would in turn be predetermined by yet another it would continue to be so on 'ad infinitum'.

So also discussions are raised on the points whether "Impermanence is predetermined," "all action (Karma) entails moral results (Vipāka)" (XI.2), "the sense-organs are the results (XII.4) of Karma (XII.4), " the causal elements in the law of causal genesis are unconditioned" (p.186).

The view of the Puggalavādin that "the doer and the instigator of ethically good and bad deeds and he who made the doer are existent." is then dealt with followed by the four questions, raised by the theravādin to him: (i) Is he who does the act the same as he who experiences the effect? (ii) Are doer and experiencer two different persons? (iii) Are they the same and also different persons? (iv) Are they neither the same nor different persons?

And four more questions the Theravādin asks the Puggalavādin are.

(i) Are happiness and misery self-caused?
(ii) Are they the work of another?
(iii) Are they both one and the other?
(iv) Are they, arising through a cause self-caused, or the work of another?

Now, in our search for parallel or allied views we may consider some early non-canonical works. Milindapāṇha, (Milindapraśna) is a non-canonical Pāli text but is as old as the first century A.D.

It is in the form of a conversation between a Greek king Milinda and a celebrated Buddhist teacher viz. Nāgasena. In the Bāhirakathā, it is noted that king Milinda knew many arts and sciences, the Sāmkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika,

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1. Points of Controversy, pp. 43-53 by Rhy Davids,
The names of the six masters, Purâna kassapa, Makkhali of the cowshed, the Nigaññha of the Nāta clan, Sañjaya the son of the Belattha, Ajita with the garment of the hair and Pakuda kaccāyana are also mentioned in this text.

In I. 34 it is stated that venerable Nāgasena preached to a merchant of Pātaliputra and by degrees as he did so, there arose in Nāgasena's heart, the insight into the Truth, clear and stainless, which perceives that whatsoever was has in itself the necessity of beginning, that too has the inherent quality of passing away.

In the second chapter, viz. Lakkhanapañho, the king asks Nāgasena, "Lord Nāgasena, when a man is reborn, is he the same or the other?" Nāgasena, the thera, replies, "He is neither the same nor is he another." To explain this, Nāgasena gives the example of a lamp, which while it burns through the whole night, has not the same flame in the first, second and third watch of night. Yet it is not one lamp in the first watch of night, another in the second watch of night and yet another in the third watch of night and then explains that "Exactly so, the

1. cf. SBE. Vol. XXXV. p. 6,
2. यदि कि नि: नि: समस्तस्य शब्दं तं निरोक्षयमेति ।
The continuity of the phenomena comes about, it is another who arises and another who passes away, but at the same time, there is something which unites them and therefore a man enters into his last union, i.e., into his last rebirth, with consciousness (Viññāna), neither as the same, nor as another.

The king asks Nāgasena, "What is it, Nāgasena, that is reborn?"

"Name- and -form is reborn." "Is it the same name-and-form that is reborn?"

"No, but by this name-and-form deeds are done, good or evil, and by these deeds (Karma) another name-and-form is reborn. "If that be so, sir, would not the new being be released from its evil Karma?"

The Thera replies, "Yes, if it were not reborn. But just because it is reborn, it is therefore not released from evil Karma."

Explaining the same with illustrations, Nāgasena says at the end of the talk of this topic, "Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form that finds its end in death and another is reborn. But that other is the result of the first, and is therefore not thereby released from its evil deeds."

1. cf. SBE Vol. XXXV, p. 71 to 75.
In the Madhyamaka Sāstra Nāgārjuna gives an exposition of Śūnyavāda.

After describing Pratītyasamutpāda, he says that one, who thus accepts the Pratītyasamutpāda (theory of dependent origination) is never inclined to accept the Pūrvānta or Aparānta views. The Pūrvāntavādin holds any of these views: "I was there before", "I was not there before", "I was and was not there before", "I neither was there nor was not there", that the world and soul are eternal. The Aparāntavādin in the same terms thinks of his future existence.

But Nāgārjuna says, "Because all things are void, among the views viz. Śāsvata and Aśāsvata etc., which one is possible of whom, where and why?" Nāgārjuna has also tried to refute these drstis throughout the 27th chapter of the Madhyamakaśāstra with his dialectical skill regarding which we need not enter into details here.

The Satasāstra of Āryadeva is a treatise where in the course of debating the follower of Buddha has tried to refute

1. समूहतिलेखानं नामौधिति ब्रह्मेऽः कृत्यः:

   यास्त्य: शास्त्रतलोकाय: पूवान्तिः समुपादित्ता: ॥
   हूष्टयो न भविष्यामि तिमिर्यांः नागान्त: अनि
   भविष्यामि तिमिर्यां वैनिः समासिता: ॥

2. क्यव्या सर्वावानं शृङ्खलास्तवाः श्चास्तवाः कृत्यः:

   वक्ष क्यव्या क्यव्या: क्षास्तवास्तवामिः ब्रह्मेऽः ॥
   - मध्यमकाप्रसंहारः ॥ ॥

3. The Original Sanskrit text of Satasāstra is lost. It is translated into English by Giuseppe Tucci from the Chinese translation, and I have used this English translation.
the arguments of his opponents. The opponent here relying on
the authority of Kapila and Vaiśeṣika pelts forth several arguments
based on Sāṁkhya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines respectively. Refuting
these arguments however the Buddhist tries to establish his own
view, and asserts that according to Buddhism all dharmas
(things) are void and animitta (uncaused). But the opponent
holds that because dharmas like the ātman (soul) and so on are
existent, the above principle is wrong. Kapila is said to
have recognised twenty-five substances and an ātman and he says
that the ātman is the rector (adhiṣṭhātṛ) and has the character­
istics of being eternal and intelligent ...........He eternally
remains and is neither destroyed nor does it perish so also
"Vaiśeṣika says : "(Really) there is an ātman eternal, because
of the characteristics of breathing out, (Prāṇa), inspiration
(apāna), (nimesa), Unmesa, Vitality, āyuh, and so on,
therefore it is known that there is an ātman. And again,
because of (the necessity of the existence of ) a place where
desire and hatred, joy and sorrow, and the intelligence might
adhere, it is known that there is an ātman. And therefore,
the ātman is really existential. It is taught in the Sāṁkhya
Sūtras also that there is an ātman, and this ātman is
characterised by intelligence (cātanyalakṣaṇa).

The Buddhist tries to prove that the Ātman does not
really exist. Even if Intelligence be the characteristic of

2. Śataśāstra, p. 20.
'the atman, the atman should be non-eternal.' In reply the opponent argues: "The disciples of Ulūka, explaining the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras, say that knowledge and the atman are different and that therefore, the atman does not fall into the condition of non-eternity, but also that it is not without knowledge. The Buddhist then says that we cannot see the atman either as having knowledge or as one not having knowledge. We cannot know it by inference also.... Therefore we must not assume that there is an atman only because knowledge exists.

The opponent then puts forth another argument. He says: "Surely there is an atman because he feels pain and joy;" and also, "Necessarily the atman exists, on account of the perception of the rūpa and so on".

He likewise advances a few other arguments:

"Because of the experience of a former life, a small child (as soon as he is) born, knows objects which bring joy and pain, although there is nobody to teach him. And in this present life, again he does many kinds of actions. Therefore

we know that there is an ātman and that it has the characteristic of eternity. So also, "there must be the ātman, because to the left, there is the vision, and to the right, there is the recognition".

The Buddhist refutes all these views, but we need not give his refutation in detail. We have noted the view of the opponent, as it is in full agreement with the Nyāya view. The Nyāya Sūtra gives almost the same arguments to prove the existence of the soul.

We must however, note here one statement of the opponent, viz: "It is not that the dharma does not last because, there is no birth of what is non-existent". In course of explaining his view (which is pre-eminently the Sāmkhya view) that the effect is always pre-existent in the cause and that nothing new is produced, he says: "If the effect is not in the cause, then the effect cannot be born. The effect is only a modification of the cause....... The effect pre-exists in the cause on account of the existence of the cause. If the pot does not pre-exist in earth, then, earth could not become the cause of the pot".

He says that if the Buddhist refutes the existence of the effect, then in his doctrine, there is the fault of annihilation (Uccheda).

1. Ibid., p. 34.
2. Sātasāstra, p. 25.
5. Ibid., p. 64.
The Buddhist then states his own view that, "Because of the continuity, there is no annihilation, because of the destruction, there is no eternity."

The Buddhist then refutes the view of the opponent that dharmas like ether (ākāśa), time, space, atoms and nirvāṇa are eternal. The Buddhist also refers to different views regarding Causality: "Some say that the effect exists in the cause. Others say that there is no effect in the cause, or some say that the dharmas are born without the law of causality". And when he refutes all the three, the opponent says, to him, "You refute existence, refute non-existence, refute existence and non-existence. Now you fall into the theory of neither existence nor non-existence. (And) this (doctrine) of not non-existence and non-existence cannot be explained. This is called a dharma which cannot be explained because it is not explained. This dharma is not explained because it is not found in the great books of the Vaiṣeṣikas, Śāṅkhyas, Nirgranthas and others. Because it is (everywhere) not existent, therefore, it can not be accepted". The Buddhist then urges that in the Vaiṣeṣika Sūtras, sound is not called great and is not called small, in the Śāṅkhya Sūtras, the cloud of clay is not a pot and not not-pot. Thus like all those books, there is a fourth

1. cf. Śataśāstra, p. 85.
2. Ibid., p. 87.
dharma, which is not explained. Void is such a dharma. And the teaching of good and bad dharmas etc. is in accordance with the worldly speech ......... On account of the refutation of the ātman, there is no individual. On account of the refutation of Nirvāṇa, there is no liberation, and how is it possible to say that man attains liberation? (We say that) there is liberation only according to the worldly truth.

Now we may consider Asaṅga's Yogācāra-bhūmi. Asaṅga, while treating 'Aṣṭaṣṭi maṇḍākara-prajñāpātim, quotes two verses, where sixteen paravādāḥ (the views of others) are enumerated. They are:

1. cf. Śatāśastra; pp. 87-89.
2. See Yogācārabhūmi, p. 118.

(1) Hetuphala-sadvādāḥ,
(2) Abhivyaktivādāḥ,
(3) Atitānāgata-dravya-sadvādāḥ,
(4) Atmavādāḥ,
(5) Śāsvatavādāḥ,
(6) Pūrvakṛtahetu-sadvādāḥ,
(7) Īśvarādikartṛkavādāḥ,
We will now deal with some of these vādās which are similar to the Prāvāduka dṛṣṭīs discussed in the Nyāya Sūtras, 4.1.11-43.

Hetuphalasadvādaḥ is, as noted by Asaṅga, the view of Vārṣagānyya, who holds that the effect is always inherent in the cause.

The Abhivyaktivādin believes that effects which are already existent, but unmanifested, come to be manifested.

The Ātmavadin is a believer in a soul over and above the body and recognises the Soul under one name or the other, either, 'Jīva', or 'Poṣaka' or 'Pudgala'.

2. cf. लो काल्पक: तीत्र्यं सत्यत: रिधित: बाल्या वा अवलोक: द जीवे का जेश्रेष्ठतै वा सत्यो वा इत्यादि (ब्रजति).
   याग्नवा र्युमिः, पृष्ठ ६२६.
The Buddhist refutes this view by putting forth arguments proving that atman is not known by any means of knowledge and it can be neither eternal nor non-eternal.

Then there is the Śāsvatavādin who believes that the soul and the world are eternal, indestructible and unchanging.

Those who are Purvāntakalpikas, Aparāntakalpikas, Śamjñāvādins, Asamjñāvādins and Naivasamjñānasaṃjñāvādins are the holders of Śāsvatavādah and they seek to establish this view on the basis of four arguments. The reasons given in these arguments, on the basis of which these vādins come to imagine Purvānta or aparānta etc., are very much similar to those given in the Brahmajālasutta of the Dīgha Nikāya, where forty-four kinds of Purvānta views and eighteen kinds of Aparānta views are described.

The Pūrvakṛtaḥetusadvādin believes that whatever misery or suffering the soul of a man (puruṣapudgala) comes across is caused to him by his previous deeds which are sinful. They say that we see that there are people who, eventhough performing good deeds, experience misery; and again, there are people, who, inspite of their performing

1. शास्कत वात्मा लोकशः | कृत्व: कृतकृत्व: | बनिन्ति: |
   बनिन्त्वानून: | कृत्य: | कृत्स्यायी श्रिष्कास्यायी
   स्थित: |
   - योगान्वयासूमि:, पृ ३३७.

sinful acts, experience happiness. If this result were to be caused by their present deeds, it should be quite the other way round and not the way it seems to be today, therefore, the results seem to be caused by previous deeds.

The Śvarādikartṛvādin believes that whatever the soul of a man enjoys or feels is caused by a person other than him or by some Īśvara. Because wishing to do good only, people are seen to be performing evil deeds; and wishing to get happiness, they get only misery instead. Because of whom, then does, this happens like that? There must therefore, be a Kartā, Sṛṣṭā, Nirmāta, who is like the father of all Jīvas, may be Īśvara or someone else.

In refuting this view of the Śvaravādin, certain arguments are put forth. Firstly, that the capacity of creation certain in Īśvara, can be due to association with some Karma; or it can be without any cause.

In both cases, it is not proper. If it be due to association with Karma, then that should be the cause of the world, so it is not proper. If it be without cause,
then the world should be without a cause and that is not proper.

Secondly, does he create the world with some purpose or without any purpose. If he creates it with some purpose then, He would have no control over that purpose and if would not be proper to call him 'Lord of the World'. If he creates it without any purpose, then it is not consistent to say there is no purpose behind creation"; and still "he creates."

Thirdly, if the world is caused by Isvara only, then there is the fault of mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya): He could create only if he is Isvara, and he could be Isvara only if he created.

The same is the case with his will, because of which, he creates. Because if the will has God as the cause, then the will would be there when God is there, and God would be there when will is there, and so creation would be eternal. If it has another constituent cause, that is not known by means of knowledge. And it be there, He would not have Control over

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1. यदि सार्वभौम निम्नाःपालकः तद्विद्विंशक्सि कर्मयोगेनुक्षेत 
वाक्यिकः वैश्वतिः कर्मयोगेनुक्षेत 
तत्त्वार्थोगेनुक्षेत ज्ञानिति 
न युज्यते 
रण्डङ्गेनुक्षेत 
तेन लक्षणेनुक्षेत ज्ञानिति 
न युज्यते 
- पृ. १०२४-१०२५, योगानाथस्वामी:।

2. किस्तिक्षक्सि सार्वप्रायोगिकः वा 
 सूक्तं प्रायोजिकः वैश्वतिः 
तत्त्वार्थोगेनुक्षेत 
 तत्त्वार्थोगेनुक्षेत ज्ञानिति 
 न युज्यते 
 तत्त्वार्थोगेनुक्षेत 
 तत्त्वार्थोगेनुक्षेत ज्ञानिति 
 न युज्यते 
- पृ. १०२४, योगानाथस्वामी:।
that constituent cause,
and so it would not be proper to regard him as the God of the world.

There are then the Antānāntikavādins who hold the views:

(i) The world is finite,
(ii) The world is infinite,
(iii) The world is both, finite and infinite;
(iv) The world is neither finite nor infinite.

These are obviously the views mentioned in the Dīgha Nikāya and we do not repeat the details.

The Amarāvīkṣepavādins also are described here, who, because they are afraid either of speaking untruth or speaking ignorantly, do not answer any questions and say that he is dumb-founded (पौरुषोद्धित दत्ति). On being asked any question, he consults someone else and then resorts to the practice of wriggling like an eel. (वाच विचारपापघाते)

The Ahetuvaśin believes that the world and the soul are produced without any cause.

1. सा चैव विस्वम् श्रवणलुक्तेऽव, यदेववर्त्तेऽव, यदेवता कदेवता
   हति नित्यं स्मरिति शाल्यित्यम्। सा वैद्योपावानहुँका
   बच्च नोपलम्यते। तत्र च नैव वाको वाकोर दत्ति न युक्तते।
   - पृष्ठ ३४५ योगावाचर्यमि; पृ. २४५।

2. वाहेतुच्छृपन्न वात्मा लोकः
   - पृष्ठ ३५५ योगावाचर्यमि; पृ. २५५।
Observing the strangeness of the things of the world, he says that "Without any fruit in view, the wind blows sometimes and sometimes not; just accidentally. Without cause, the rivers flow sometimes and sometimes not; just accidentally. The trees blossom sometimes and sometimes not; just accidentally."

There are then the Ucchedavādins who believe that as long as there is the soul, there is disease and the like but after the destruction of the body, the soul is destroyed. It does not outlast the existence of the body. We have seen in the course of the discussion of the Ucchedavāda in the Dīghanikāya that they recognise the destruction of the soul in seven ways. The same seven ways are mentioned here, so it is not necessary to go into those details again.

The Nāstikavādin establishes that there is nothing like alms or sacrifice, nothing like good deeds or evil deeds.

1. cf. कस्मादेवम् वाचिक्यमुदग्यम् वाचिक्यमुक्तिक्षतिः \( \text{स्वयं} \) कस्मादेवम् योगारमूनि 1, 2-2-2-2.

2. यावदात्मानंस्य वाचिक्यमुदग्यस्त: स्वयंस्यविवेकत्वम् सृजति स्वयंस्यबुद्धिक्षति सर्वम् योगारमूनि 1, 2-2-2-2.
and also their results, neither this world nor the other world; neither mother nor father nor the beings springing into life nor the Arhats. We have seen this above in connection with Ucchedavāda. Asaṅga seems to have here assembled the views of Pūrṇa (that there is nothing like alms and sacrifice etc. etc.) and Pāyāsi and Ajita (that there is neither this world nor the other etc. etc.) These, being alike in many respects, many earlier thinkers have done the same.

In the Mahābodhi Jātaka (23) of the Jātakamālā, some ministers are said to be endeavouring to win over the prince to various doctrines. According to the doctrine of one of them, there should be no causality (Ahetuvāda); he gives for instances where it is difficult to demonstrate causality. He said, "What is the cause of the shape, the colour, the arrangement, the softness and so on of the stalks, the petals, the filaments and the pericarps of the lotuses? Who diversifies the feathers of the birds in the world? In just the same manner, this whole Universe is the product of the work of essential and inherent properties, to be sure."

I have used J.S. Speyer's translation of Jātakamālā with changes where found necessary.
The Bodhisattva thus argues against this Āhetuvāda:

"...... If the arrangement, colour etc. of the stalks, petals etc. of lotuses were not the effect of some cause, would they not be found always and everywhere? But this is not so, they are produced from seeds being in water etc., where this condition is found; they appear, not where it is not found.

Moreover, he who denies the agency of cause by means of reasoning with arguments, does not such a one desert his own tenets?

And he, who, not perceiving the cause in some particular case, proclaims for this very reason, that there does not exist causality at all, will not such a one, when he learns the manifest power of causality in that case, grow angry at it and oppose it with invectives?

And if somewhere the cause is latent; why do you say with assurance, it does not exist? Though it is, it is not perceived for some other cause as for instance, the white colour of the sun's disc is not seen at sunset."

1. यदि फूलनालचनादिः च यदृ तवहृदं नन् सदं भवेत् ।
ललितादि बीघृतकथे तु तव ।
सति त्त्व सब्दवति न शृङ्खलति ।।
- जातकमाला, 23. 26.

2. See Jātakamāla. 23. 27-29.
Another minister recognised a Supreme Being (Iśvara) as the first cause and expounded to the prince his tenet thus:

"It is not probable that this universe should exist without a cause. There is some being who rules it, External and One. It is he who in consequence of the fixation of his mind on his transcendental volition, creates the world and again dissolves it."

The Bodhisattva refutes this view of the Iśvara-kāraṇika saying that "If however, you say, the sacrifice is performed by yourself, still you cannot disavow that he is the author of it. He who is self-acting out of the fulness, of His power, is the author of a deed, no other.

Again, if the Lord is the performer of all sins, however many there are committed, what virtue of His have you in view that you should foster devotion to Him? On the other hand, if it is not He who commits them, since He abhors wickedness, it is not right to say that everything is created by the Lord.

Further; the sovereignty of the lord must rest either on the lawful order of things (Dharma) or something else. If on the former, then the Lord cannot have existed before the Dharma. If effected by some external cause, it

1. Jātakamāla. 23. 35. 37.
should rather be called "bondage."

(For If it be said to have no cause, then everyone could be the Lord. The third one was a Pūrvakarmakṛtavādin whose doctrine was: This universe, is the result of former good and ill; personal energy has no power at all to modify it.

How, indeed may one being create at the same time, the manifold and boundless variety of the different substances and properties? No, this universe is the product of former actions for even he, who is skilled in striving for his happiness comes into sorrow." (Jātakāmāla 23.19).

The Bodhisattva's answer to this ādin is, "Verily, if something like this should be seen: happiness enjoyed by him who lives in circumstances productive of suffering, or sufferings visiting such a one whose circumstances are instruments of happiness, then we should have the right to infer that good and evil fortune depend exclusively on former actions.

But in fact this rule as to the appearance of happiness and sufferings is nowhere seen. Consequently, former actions are not the sole and entire cause of them. Further,  

1. See Jātakāmāla, 23.38-39, which runs thus:

वत्स स्वाभ्यास्तत् स्वाभिमानः पराभूते
जयेन यंदि त्रिस्पष्टवर: त्र्यतोपनुसन्
दास्तेव च वा स्वाभिमानः छृणीते परेण
स्वाध्यायिन्न हेतुः कस्य नैश्वर्यता स्वाच्छः
it is possible that there ceases to be new Karma. And this
lacking, whence should you get the 'old karma' indispensable
for the maintenance of the Universe ?

The last one was the Ucchedavādin who held that
"Pieces of wood differing in colour, properties and shape,
cannot be said to exist as the result of actions and yet
they exist, and once perished, they do not grow up again.
something similar is to be said of this world. For this
reason one must consider pleasures the main object of life."
(Jātakamāla 23.20).

This view is also refuted by the Bodhisattva and
then he says, "If there does not exist anything like a future
existence after death, why should we avoid evil actions;
and what have we to do with the folly of holding good actions
in esteem ? .........." (Jātakamāla 23.46)

1. See Jātakamāla - 29.43-44.

भवेच्छ सारेष्य यदि दुःसहस्तपु
स्थितस्य कुण्डु सुखसाधनयेषु वा ।
कालाधुरीयते सुसाधनं चुक्त
प्रकतेऽपूर्वकाशः कुलः ॥
न हुस्तवेद चुक्तेऽत्न्यं चुक्त
न पूर्वकाशः कारणम् ॥

प्रवेदमार्गाः नवस्थिरणा
सत्यप्राप्तयोऽचुरात्तं कुलः ॥
In the Lankāvatāra the thesis of the Buddha is propounded as follows:

"I state that all is unborn, because (such predicates as) cause or dependence are inapplicable here, the no-birth is constructed on (the truth of) the 'Mind-only'.

Here existence is thus regarded as unborn or uncreated, because, there is neither creating, nor created; and therefore, there is no creator either.

In the second chapter of the Lankāvatāra, the Buddha says to Mahāmati, "Further, Mahāmati, according to the teaching of the Tathāgatas of the past, present and future, all things are unborn. Because, they have no reality, being manifestations of mind itself and Mahāmati, as they are not born of being or non-being, they are unborn. Mahāmati, all things are like the horns of the hare, horse, donkey or camel, but the ignorant and simple-minded who are given up to their false and erroneous imaginations, discriminate things where they are not, therefore all things are unborn".

1. cf. Lankāvatāra Sūtra, p. 21. gatha 96, translated by D. T. Suzuki- The page numbers are according to Sanskrit text edited by Dr. Bunyu Nanjio

2. cf. क्रियाकारणकिता: सर्वेखा: नौत्पत्त्वेण कारकवाच ।
   तेनोऽविच्छेदनं कुत्तपना: सर्वेखा: ।
   - लङ्कावलासूत्र , पृ ६ ९५।

At another place, the Buddha tells Mahāmāti: "In order to cast aside the philosopher's thesis on birth by causation, it is asserted that all things are like Māyā and unborn. The philosophers foster the notion of deriving the birth of all things from that of being and non-being and fail to regard it as caused by the attachment to the multitudinousness which rises from the discrimination (of the mind) itself. In this light Mahāmāti, the term "unborn" is to be understood."

Thus as it is described every now and then in this Sūtra, the view of Tathāgata is devoid of oneness and otherness, bothness and non-bothness, being and non-being, assertion and refutation. And the religious teaching of Tathāgata is not fastened to the ideas like Prakṛti, Īśvara, causelessness, spontaneity, atoms, time and self-nature. The Nirvāṇa also therefore according to the Buddha, is free from the discrimination of eternity and annihilation, existence and non-existence.

1. Ibid., page 111.
2. Cf. पुनर्महाम च तृत्यविनिमुखता तथागताना
बधिष्ठा श्रद्धा स्रव्यान्ययानुपप्ताविविधिता
नास्त्यस्तित्समारोपितविनिमुखता। अस्त्यप्रत्येकानमुल्यानपरे विविधिता
तत्प्रत्येकानं सुपर्याप्तारोपितविविधिता ज्ञातवान तथागतानं
बधिष्ठा।  न प्रकृतिवर्तमानुपुकारस्तुवैपूर्विकं
प्रज्ञाते तथागतानं बधिष्ठा।”
- लक्ष्मिवारसूतिः, पृष्ठ ६६-६७.
Of course, "all is unborn," does not mean that objects are non-existent, but the Buddha regards them to be like the city of the Gandharvas, a dream, and Māyā, objects, thus, are there, but they are causeless.

The Buddha says that even if things are like Māyā, and have no self-substance, even if they are devoid of the relation of qualified and qualifying, even if they are born of the discrimination (Vikalpa) only of Mind, some ignorant people do not know them to be such and instead, assert that they are born ofĪśvara, time, atoms, or Pradhāna.

It is related in the 10th chapter (gāthā 232) that "(The philosophers) imagine the world to be of oneness and otherness; of both-ness (and notbothness) and to have risen fromĪśvara, or spontaneously or from time or from a Supreme Spirit, (i.e. Pradhāna), or other casual agency.

1. cf. Chapter 10, gāthās 27, 62, 65, 144 etc.
   cf. also especially III. 87, which says:
   यथावचारोऽवज्जते स न च भावः न सन्ति च।
   गन्धर्वसामस्यात्मक भावः विषयसूक्तिकः॥
   "That all is unborn does not mean that things do not exist, but that they are like a dream and māyā and that their existence is without cause".

2. cf. लक्षायतासुःतः —
   न्यंतथात्मको भूपमिक्षाराच्च यदवः॥
   कालवेदानविभिः प्रत्यंकल्पते जगतू॥
Only the ignorant, due to the discrimination of mind (Vikalpa) predicate the world as being, or as non-being, or as being and non-being; but in fact, this existence in the eyes of the Buddha, is neither being, nor non-being, nor being and non-being.

The Buddha, moreover, says, "Mahāmati, the philosophers may declare thus: 'What life (soul) is, that is body; or life (soul) is one thing, body is another. In these, they make inexplicable statements. Mahāmati entirely bewildered by the idea of a creator, the philosophers make an inexplicable statement.

But in order to dismiss the views of heretical thinkers, these inexplicables are not taken up for consideration by the Tathāgatas.

Similarly, the Buddha says, "Some Sramanas and Brāhmaṇas are there who assume something out of nothing, saying that there exists a substance, which is bound up in causation and abides in time and that the skandhas, dhātuṣ and āyatanas have their genesis and continuation in causation; and, after thus existing, they pass away. They are those who hold a

1. cf. Ibid. page 152 verse 21. chapter third. It is as under:

2. cf. Ibid. page 113, च तस्मात् सत्त्वस्य सवस्वः।

3. तीर्थकरे तत्र वानादिन्या: - यदुव स जीवस्तुक्तिरपुरुण, जन्मो शरीरसु , इत्यत्वम् स्थ वानान्तः।

4. Ibid  charter वानान्त: पु च महाय, तीर्थकरस्तु वानान्तः नोपिदेश्यते स्वतः ॥
destructive and nihilistic view concerning such subjects as
continuation, existence, Nirvāṇa, path, fruit of action, truth etc. Why do they hold such a nihilistic view? The
reason given by the Buddha is that they have not the actual
perception of truth; and no actual seeing of the origin of
things.

"People of this world are dependent on two things,"
says the Buddha, "they are dependent on the idea of being
and on that of non-being; and they are committed to these
views whereby they take pleasure either in Nihilism or in
Realism.

But the Buddha says, "I always preach emptiness
which is beyond Eternalism and Nihilism". And to the Buddha's
mind, true Nirvāṇa is that "Which is realised in the oneness
of Nirvāṇa and samsāra, absolute or Śunya in its nature and
above the relativity of eternalism and nihilism, (in which)
Samsāra is like a dream and Karma vanishes not.

It is meant to be stated that the world as it is,
is neither existence, nor non-existence. To say 'It is,'

1. Lāṅkāvatāra Sūtra; page 40-41.
2. Lāṅkāvatāra Sūtra; page 40-41.
4. Lāṅkāvatāra Sūtra; page 76

is Eternalism, to say 'It is not', is Nihilism. But the Buddhist reasoning avoids both of these two contradictory views. The predicates like 'sat' or 'asat', 'Sāśvata' or 'uccheda', 'nitya' or 'anitya' are not applicable to the world, but the world is such as it is, and what is termed an "error" (bhṛanti) for the ignorant, is Tathā (suchness) for the wise.

As D. T. Suzuki remarks: "Or we may say that an external, particularised world is an illusion as long as the ignorant are unable to break through the fetters of Vikalpa, wrong discrimination, whereas to the wise, the phenomenal world is true in its suchness. To repeat, the objective world is an error, there is nothing real about it, it is Māyā, it is empty (Śūnya), but this does not mean that it is altogether a non entity and merely a vast expanse of vacuity, the world, even if it is error, is there to the wise as well as to the ignorant, but the wise know that it is of an illusive nature and in this cognition, they are neither perverted, nor unperverted, they just see it in reality (yathābhūtam) they perceive the world as it truly is".

The Lāṅkāvatāra Sūtra mentions the views of several other heretics. It refers to the Sāmkhya and Vaiśeṣikas also:

The Sāmkhya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers teach birth from a being or from a non-being, all that are proclaimed by them are the inexplicables.

The personal soul, continuity, the skandhas, causation, atoms, the supreme spirit, the ruler, the creator, - (they are) discriminations in the Mind-only.

(The philosophers) imagine the world to be of oneness and otherness, of bothness (and not-bothness), and (to have risen) from Ḥśvara, or spontaneously or from time, or from a supreme spirit, or other causal agency.

That the world is born of a supreme soul and that changes are due to qualities, this is what the school of Kapila teaches its disciples but it is not the right way of thinking.

Thus the Sāmkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, the naked philosophers, the Brāhmaṇa theologicans, followers of Śiva, cherishing views based on being and non-being, are destitute of the truth of Solitude."

1. Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, 10. 723.
2. Ibid., 2. 139.
3. Ibid., 10. 232.
4. Ibid., 10. 558.
5. See Laṅkāvatāra; X. 627.
There is further said that "If it is said that originally the world was not and then evolved, it must have had a beginning, but my statement is that there is no primary limit to transmigration."

We should not fail to take note of the prophecy occurred in the last chapter of the Lankāvatāra. There it is said:

"After the passing of the Leader of the Śākyas, these will follow me: Vyāsa, Kaṇāda, Rāabha, Kapila and others. Then one hundred years after my passing, Vyāsa's Bhārata will appear, the Pāṇḍavas, the Kauravas, Rāma and then the Maurya, the Nanda, the Gupṭa and Mleccha, after the Mleccha will rage a warfare and then the age of vice and after this age of vice, the good Dharma will no more prevail in the world (x. 784-86). Siddhārtha of the Śākya family, Viṣṇu, Vyāsa, Maheśvara - such other philosophers will appear after my passing. Viṣṇu and Maheśvara will teach about the creation of the world..... (x. 796-797). There will be Pāṇini, Aksapāda, Brhaspati, Lokāyata will be found in the Brahma-garbha. Kātyāyana will be the author of a sūtra, and Yājñavalkya will be like him,

1. See .Lankavatāra X. 551 -
Bhudhuka will write astronomical works ....... Valmika, Mayurakṣa, Kautilya, and Āsvaṭāyana, who are highly virtuous ṛṣis, will appear in the future" (x. 813-816).

M. Winternitz says; "this chapter X of the Lāṅkāvatāra, might possibly be of historical significance, if few verses were clearer ....... At present, it is anything but chronological and can scarcely be of service in fixing any date."

The Upāyahrdaya, while explaining the 'Siddhantadharmaḥ', says that Siddhānta is of four kinds: Sarvasamaḥ, Sarvabhinnaḥ, Ādau samaḥ pascād bhinnah, Ādau bhinnah pascād samaḥ.

Now giving the example of the first, he says, "If the vādin (proponent) says that the soul and that which belongs to the soul ( वात्मा वात्माधिक्ष) does not exist, and if the prativādin (opponent) also says the same it is a Sarvasama Siddhānta, a theory common to all; but if the vādin says that all things are one this is the Sarvabhinna Siddhānta, a theory exclusively his own.

Then it is said that there are some Tīrthikas (heretics) who are Ekavādins and say that 'everything should

be known as one, because it is existent. And all things being possessed of characteristics, are one. Moreover, everything originating out of Prādhāna, should be known as one, because of having one source. Thus argue these heretical thinkers.

But in refutation of this, it is said in the text: "How can it be that 'whatever is there, is one, because everything is existent'? In fact, Sat is two fold, sentient and non-sentient, so how could it be one, because the causes should be different.

It is also established by some other Tīrthikas that everything is different, as for example, the head, feet, etc. are different from the body. Moreover, the characteristics are different, as a bull is different from a horse. So it should be accepted that everything is different.

This view noted here, is the same as the one quoted in the N. S. 4.1.34.

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\begin{align*}
1. & \text{ सर्वेः सहभागोऽयुतस्तत्त्वाशीवोऽयुतस्तत्त्वाशीवेऽपि} \\
& \text{सर्व्यतं सहभागोऽयुतस्तत्त्वाशीवेऽपि} \\
& \text{हस्तैःवेदाविन्नः तीर्थिकाः!} \\
& \text{ - उपायोऽवधस्य}.
\\
2. & \text{ कध कथव वस्मकः स्वभावकिति} \\
& \text{ तत्तथावेदाविन्नः स्वभाविन्नः स्वभाविन्नः तत्तथावेदाविन्नः एवत्} \\
& \text{ - पुनः, उपायोऽवधस्य।}
\\
3. & \text{ सर्व प्रचंदः कहत हति चेत्तः} \\
& \text{ यथा तत्र धर्मवाच्यं कायात्मकं} \\
& \text{ अपि च तत्तवमृत्युक्तकः यथा तत्र मोक्षवाच्यं} \\
& \text{ हति चौर्यवादान्तोऽधिकाः} \\
& \text{ - पुनः, उपायोऽवधस्य।}
\end{align*}
\]
In the fourth chapter of this text, faults (दूषण) of twenty kinds are explained. Among them the seventh one is named कार्यासमम and the example given therein is "whatever is constituted of five elemental substances, is non-eternal." The author finds fault with this.

(Saying that if it be so, the ether and the soul, which are constituted of five elemental substances, could not be regarded as eternal. Hence this should be considered as a कार्यासमा दुषणा.

Similarly introducing 'यिरुड्धाम', another kind of दुषणा, the example given herein is, "Everything, is non-eternal (सर्वम् अनियम); but the self is not everything, so it should be eternal. This is the argument. The self should be said to be non-eternal, because it certainly belongs to that 'everything'. A blanket which is only slightly burnt is said to be not-burnt, because a major portion of it is not burnt. This is विप्रद्धा.

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1. यत्व-चक्षुमूलख्यं कृतनिब्धम्
   पृष्ठ २४, उपायृवद्यम्

2. cf. दर्शननित्यम्। न त्वात्मा सवैं, तत्र नित्य हस्तिः महान्तः भविष्यति। राजन च त माधवनित्य हस्ति
   वत्क्रियाः, जिनिचंद्रक्षो हि रचयितौ प्रायोगिकतायद्वयम्
   हृदयमथे। सतिष्ठितम्।
   - उपायृवद्यम्, पृष्ठ २४.
Of course, the Upāyahrdaya is mainly concerned with dialectics, as can be seen from the above, mentioned arguments, and so is not likely to be of much help. Nevertheless, we have noted certain statements in it which correspond to some expressions in the portion of the Nyāya-sūtra with which are concerned.

Much dialectical discussion and references to a number of philosophical views can be found in later Buddhist works which are very rich in this respect. But we are mainly interested in finding the sources of the pravādukarṣṭis treated in the Nyāya-sūtra, IV. 1. 11-43, and so a consideration of this later literature would not be quite relevant or even useful. Even the Buddhist doctrine is included among the pravādukarṣṭis, but it is well known and so I have not given an exposition of it separately.