There is also a view that:

All things must be of the form of negation (i.e. non-entities), because all things are known to be the negations of each other. (सर्वसुन्दर्णातिनिरकरणाप्रकरणम् 4.1.37).

'All' here signifies the totality of things viz. means of valid knowledge, (pramāṇas), objects of knowledge (prameyās), knowers (pramātrās) and knowledge (pramiti); and these are non-entities.

Things are mere negations of each other. The Bull is non-existent in the form of 'Horse', and hence it is 'not-Horse'. Similarly, the Horse is non-existent in the form of "Bull" and hence is 'not-Bull'. Because the notion of non-existence and negation refer to the same thing as a word denoting an alleged positive entity does (e.g. aṇasa vau gauḥ), that is to say, are in opposition, all things are non-entities or of the form of negation.

1. सर्वभिवर्ग प्रभाणः प्रभणिनिर्भूपमभावस्युच्चाः

NVTT, 4.1.37.
Vācaspati expounds this as follows: "All things, Pramāṇa and the rest, because they are not of the nature of each other, are found to be objects of the notion of non-being; and also are spoken of in negative terms (with the use of "non"). Hence it follows that the names of those things are in apposition with these (the notion of non-being and negation). So these Pramāṇas and the rest should be regarded as non-existent or negations like the cloth which is not yet produced or which is destroyed.

As Uddyotakara says: When we say that the jar is non-existent the question arises as to how and when it is non-existent. It is non-existent in the form of plate, as well as before its production and after its destruction. That is to say, the word 'jar' is concomitant with the notion of non-existence (asat gatam) and hence establishes absolute non-existence (atyantāsattvam) of the jar. Therefore it is to be concluded that because all things are concomitant with the notion of non-existence, they are all of the form of negation.

Moreover, argues Vācaspati, "Are these things viz. Pramāṇa etc (mentioned above) eternal or non-eternal? The Śūnyavadin would say that if they are eternal, they must be non-entities, since they cannot have any capacity or efficiency;
ternal things can never bring about a product, because no sequence is possible among them. And if they are non-eternal, they would be non-existent at the first moment, as at the second moment, because they are of the nature of destruction.

Moreover, if things be existent they could not be of the nature of destruction and then they could not be destroyed even in another moment. For example, the blue colour which is brought about by its own cause, can never be turned into yellow even by thousands of causes. Hence he who regards a thing as non-eternal (or perishable) will necessarily have to regard it as of the nature of destruction.

Therefore, all things are mere negations of each other and it is only due to imaginary construction that they appear as 'existing'.

The Bhasyakara, without relying on the wording of the sūtra offers the following answer to the above view the Jñhilist or Negationist:

The argument put forward is not proper because there is contradiction between (i) the two terms of the proposition, (pratijñāpadayorvyāghātaḥ) and (ii) between the proposition and the statement of the probans (pratijñāhetvavyāghātaḥ). To
explain (i) The term 'all' (Sarvam) signifies the totality of many things, and the term 'non-entity' (abhava) signifies the negation of existence.

The former has some character while the latter is devoid of it. So how could that which has character be negation which is devoid of any character? Certainly, negation which is devoid of any character cannot be said to be either 'many' or 'totality'.

Uddyotakara explains that Sāmāndhikaranyā (being in apposition) signifies that the two words are in the same case, that is to say, take same case affix. Thus this very predication of abhava presupposes a positive existence of things.

1. अनेकस्यारैणो स्वेदिष्टस्यार्थः।
2. भावार्थार्थः भावार्थस्यार्थः।
3. पूर्वे दोषपाठमयार्थ निरुपाध्याय।
4. भावार्थार्थस्यार्थः स्वादिष्टिः।

N.B. 4.1.37.

4. Yacaspati remarks that there, being of the same case means being of the case (vibhakti) which refers to one thing (meaning) and not just being of a non-different vibhakti, because sometimes, words having different vibhaktis are seen to be in apposition e.g.: Chaitra reads', 'I do not take you for (even) a straw.'

- अभिन्नार्थविभक्तिकल्पः अभिन्नार्थविभक्तिकल्पः न अभिन्नार्थकल्पः
-विभक्तिकल्पः, अभिन्नार्थविभक्तिकल्पः सामान्यकल्पः।

N.B. 4.1.37.
as also the use of words to denote them.

The opponent, in order to avoid the contradiction may say: all this is negation, that is to say, what you (i.e. the other logicians), call the 'all' is what is really only negation*.

But, as Vātsyāyana says, the contradiction remains here all the same. Because the notion of many (aneka) and totality (āśeṣa) cannot possibly arise in respect of what is mere negation. And yet it is just this conception that is expressed by the term 'all', hence it follows that this 'all' cannot be a non-entity. That which you regard as 'all' is 'abhāva', but if that (sarvam) is not there, this idea (that all is abhāva) could not be there at all. Nor would there be the notion of existence (which certainly is there as can be seen from the use of the word 'Sarvam').

That is to say, if the thing denoted by the uttarapada is not a possibly existent entity, 'na' (nañ) cannot be used. If the 'nañ' in the word 'abhāva' signifies absolute negation and means: 'It is abhāva as it is not bhāva',

1. पाब्ध फलति फलि अभाव: ।
   - NV. 4. 1. 37.
"bhāva" itself becomes established. And if this 'naṁ' signifies negation by exclusion, it would mean " bhāvad anyat", "something other than Bhāva" and here also bhāva becomes established as it is presupposed.

(ii) The Bhaṣyakāra then explains the contradiction between the statement and the reason given to prove the statement. "All things are non-entities" (negation) is the statement and it denies the existence of all things and the reason given in the same breath is: "(all things are non-entities) because, all things are known to be mere negations of one another".

This reason admits the mutual negation in the things that are existent and it is after recognising that mutual negation that they assert: "all things are non-entities". If all things be non-entities, then the reason "things are negation of one another", could not be justified. And if "all things are negations of one another", then the statement "all things are non-entities" cannot be tenable.

Uddyotakara adds:

If the opponent regards everything as non-existent, he must explain the nature of the case (vibhakti). If all things are negations, then what is the nature of 'Vibhakti'?
If vibhakti is also non-existent, the definition of Sāmanādhikaraṇa viz. 'being of non-different vibhakti' is contradicted.

So also, it is said by the opponent that the word denoting a positive thing is in apposition with the notion of non-existence and with negation. Here he accepts a thing which is referred to in common by two words (anāśvo gauḥ) and when he says 'Sarvam abhāvaḥ' he turns it out or denies it. Now what is non-existent cannot be the adikaraṇa (that to which the words in apposition refer). The adikaraṇa must be there in order to render possible the apposition but it could not be there in the view of one who asserts that all things are non-entities and hence the reason given by him is not proper.

The following is the Sūtrakāra's answer to the negationist:

"What has been alleged is not proper, because things are by their very nature, positively existent entities" (नेहेकरमण-4, न, स्वाभाविकसमस्थितिः I. 38.)

All things cannot be non-entities. Why? Because things are existent by virtue of their very nature. What is the essential characteristic of positively existent things? Being an entity, or 'existence' and the like are the common characteristics of Substances, qualities and actions. Having
action and the like are the peculiar characteristics of substances. The qualities ending with touch, belong to earth and so on and so forth; there are endless characteristics peculiar to the several things of the world. We find specific characteristics in Sāmānya, Viśeṣa and Samavāya also. This difference of things does not enable us to conclude that there is negation alone as negation is devoid of any character. But such distinctions exist among things and hence it follows that all things are not non-entities.

The Bhāṣyakāra gives another interpretation of the sutra: "Or the words of the sutra may be construed thus: 'what is urged is not proper, because each thing is not proper, because each thing is recognised as having its own distinct-individuality. That is to say, when the word 'Bull' is used, a substance, qualified by a particular genus is apprehended and not a mere negation or non-entity. If all things were

1. सम्राय निःस्वत्वा सम्प्रत्यायकः अभिधि: न स्वातः।

2. अभिधि तथापि (अभिधि:।) तस्मान सम्बन्ध इति।

3. अथवा "त व्याख्यासिद्धशास्त्रानामपि ज्ञानसिद्धार्थितिः।

4. गौरिति प्रत्युत्पले शब्दे ज्ञातिविशिष्ट ब्रह्मोऽर्थायेन न

कामानात्।
The opponent may ask: How do you say that the word Bull does not signify non-being? The answer to this is that when the word "Bull" is used, it brings about the notion of a particular substance. Hence, the opponent's argument is not tenable.

Still a third interpretation of the sutra is thus given by the Bhasyakara:

Or the words of the sutra mean: "when you say that "the Bull is non-existent in the form of the horse", why do you not say that the Bull is non-existent in the form of the Bull? And because you do not say so, it follows that the Bull is existent in the form of Bull and hence 'Svabhava' is established. (If you really mean that things are non-existent), why cannot you say that the Horse is 'non-horse' or the Bull is 'not-Bull'? Since it is not said so, it follows that the substance exists in its own form.
In fact, whenever there is denial of avyatireka, we find the notion of non-existence with regard to a positive thing, e.g. the berries are not in the pot. Vyatireka signifies relation other than conjunction etc. That is to say, absence of all sorts of connections, and so avyatireka signifies here the relation known as non-difference. When this non-difference is negated, we have the apposition of the notion of non-existence with a positive thing.

The non-difference of the Bull and the Horse is denied in the expressions noted above, viz. "The Bull is non-existent in the form of the horse", "The Bull is not-horse", what is meant is that there is no identity between the Bull and the horse as the non-difference of Bull and horse is negated.

And when this identity is denied, the notion of non-existence is in apposition with the positively existent thing viz. the Bull as is seen in the expression, "The Bull is non-existent in the form of the Horse". In the other expression, viz. "Berries are not there in the pot" the conjunction of

1. व्यातिरेकप्रतिष्ठो व (अवयोगाशिलिः) व्यतिरेकोपः व्यतिरेको-नेतानिरस्वः। तत्प्रतिष्ठोऽथ भावेनाशश्चत्वत्वस्य सामानानिक्षिप्य॥

यथा न वान्तु कुण्डे बदराणाति ॥ -

- MB. 4. 1. 38.
the fruit with the pot is denied and here we have a case or sāmaṇḍhikaranya between the notion of non-existence and the fruit which is positively existent.

As Vācaspati clarifies: "The word asat signifies an existing thing only which is the qualifier of abhāva ( 'Kuṇḍe badarāṇi na santi' means ' kuṇḍe badaraḥbhāvaḥ & and what is meant is that the pot exists). As the word ' white' signifies something which is qualified by the attribute ' white', so the notion of asat (non-existence) and the statement of asat can be justifiably in apposition with a word signifying a positively existent thing.

Moreover, positively existent things are of two kinds - some of them are eternal and some are not-eternal. The eternal things also have the efficiency of bringing about 2 successful activity. And even such a thing as is non-eternal is not a positive thing of the nature of destruction ( i.e. it does not perish by itself). It is produced from its own causes as of the nature of existence, but perishes due to some other cause."

1. तथा-सामालेपणविशेषणस्य भाववाचिकम् पदेन सामालेपणविशेषणस्य

2. See NVTT, 3. 2. 10-12.

3. सत्त्वस्य ज्ञाते कारणाद्वारः सत्त्वस्य ज्ञाते कारणाद्वारः

- NVTT 4. 1. 38.
And as to the argument that the blue colour cannot be changed into yellow, the answer is that it is possible to change the blue colour of the cloth into yellow as the black colour of the unbaked jar can possibly be turned into red due to its conjunction with fire. And if blue could not be changed into yellow, then varily, being could not be turned into 'not-being'.

As in the Substratum (adikaraṇa) jar, Śyāmatva (blackness) and ākrtatva (redness) are found in succession (paryāyenā), Similarly, existence and non-existence of the jar can be there in the adhikaraṇa viz. pots hereds one after the others.

The Śūnyatāvādin might not agree with the above argument based on Svabhava-siddhi. He would urge: There is no such thing as character in entities because the character which regarded as such is only relative. (न स्वभवसिद्धिर्मिभिन्नत्वात् 4.1.39).

Relative is that which is so in relation to another thing or in expectancy of another thing. A thing

1. अपि नीतिः न पीतिः क्षुच्छ शक्यत्स न भवोपि नास्मादः।

- NVTT. 4.1.38.
can be spoken of as 'long' in relation to what is short and
a thing can be spoken of as 'short' in relation to what
is 'long'. In relation to what is 'long', and neither of
these two has any fixed character of its own. Why so? By
virtue of relativity (apeksāsāmarthyāt). Hence things
do not have a character of their own.

As Vācaspati explains, all things are of different
natures and this difference of theirs is in relation to others.
As for example, 'blue' is different, in relation to 'yellow',
'long' is so in relation to 'short', 'Paratva' (poster-
iority) is so relatively to 'Aparatva' (priority) and the
'father' is so relatively to the 'son'. And that which is
so relatively to some other thing cannot be said to be so by
virtue of its own nature, e.g. the redness of the crystal
is there in relation to Japākusuma and not by virtue of its
own nature. This is what is urged by the opponent, the Prāvāduka.
Visvabhaṭha also expresses the same idea in his remarks: "That
which is dependent is a non-entity, e.g. the redness of the
Crystal which is dependent on the Japā flower."

The answer to this argument is: What is urged is
not proper, as it involves self-contradiction (व्याहतत्वाद-
शुन्तम् | 4.1.40).

1. यन्त्रापेशाः तद्वपशु ज्ञातापेशाः स्फटिकाययम् |
   - Vṛtti, 4.1.39.
If a thing is 'long' in relation to the 'short', then the 'short' should be 'non-relative', since to what could the 'short' be known as relative? Similarly if a thing is 'short', only relatively to the 'long', then the 'long' should be non-relative, since to what would the 'long' be known as relative? And if the two be depended upon each other, the negation of either would imply the negation of both. Hence this system of dependence is not tenable.

And if there is no such thing as 'character', why do we not have the relative notion of 'length' and 'shortness' in respect of two atoms or of any two objects of equal size?

Thus, the two things remain the same whether considered relatively or not; there is no difference in either case due to this. But if the character of things were purely relative, then there should be some addition of peculiarity by virtue of relativity.

What then is the efficacy of relativity? It only accounts for the cognition of excellence when two things are perceived. When a man sees two things and notices some kind of excellence in one of them, he recognises it as 'long';
And what he finds as lacking he judges as 'short'. This is the efficacy of 'relativity'.

How the atisaya in one thing is perceived is thus explained by Uddyotakara: "It might be urged by the opponent. If two substances do not have any difference then there is no possibility of the knowledge of 'length' and 'shortness' arising in respect of those two things, whether they be taken relatively or not'. The answer to this is: "such a possibility does exist there; because while one perceives two things, 'atisaya' is also perceived and thus there arise two cognitions with regard to the respective things. So, he perceives the atisaya (Superiority of length) existent in one and the 'shortness' existent in the other, and then combines the two perceptions and due to the cognition thus assimilating two perceptions, there arises in him the knowledge, "This one is longer than the other one, and the latter is shorter than the former'. But this does not mean that 'length' and 'shortness' are either produced in the thing or not produced in the thing. And if there were no such thing as 'character', there would not have been relativity. If without there being the natural character of things, the

1. ब्योक्षतावृत द्रष्यम्: प्रत्येकनिष्ठे हेतु वृद्धि मयः।
   - NV. 4. 1. 40.

2. न चु पनकविन्धु: उत्पादनूत्पादाविदि।
   - NV. 4. 1. 40.
differences of long, short, etc. were there just due to the
difference of relativity, then there would have been every­
where such a notion in respect of all, in relation to all.
But relativity has no efficacy in respect of the notion
of colour, taste, odour and touch.

And God, perceiving the very minute atoms, does
not have the notion of long, short, etc. in respect of some
atoms relatively to others. Hence such notions do not arise
because of relativity.

Vācaspati says that the different measurements of
length, shortness etc. (of things) are there as they are
produced in things right from their origin. Only the excellence
(atiśaya) viz. length or deficiency (anatiśaya) viz. shortness,
stands in the context of relative perception of the two things.
The sugarcane stick is shorter than the bamboo-stick in terms
of the two units of measurement qualified by a number which comes

1. यदि स्वाभाविक दिवसन्तरेण प्रतिपादिता दीर्घादिशेषः परविन्नः
   सर्वमेव विभिन्न वर्तन्त तथापूर्वः प्रत्ययः स्वातः।
   न च सुप्रसाधनं सर्वविश्लेषणं अपेक्षासामसंविनिष्टः।

   - NV. 4. 1. 40

2. न परिमलोऽपरामणु उपलब्धिः ईश्वरः परमाणूपक्षः
   परमाणवत्तरे विश्लेषविद्ययाः कारोलिता अतो नापेक्षाकृतः:
   प्रत्ययत श्वतः।

   - NV. 4. 1. 40.
earlier in the case of the sugarcane stick and later in the case of bamboo stick. This is what is meant by the non-excellence and the excellence of the one or the other. Thus the expression of this length or shortness of the one or the other is dependent on the expression of the measurement of the counter-entity. But the production of the respective measurements is not so dependent.

Hence the characters of things are not mutually dependent. Difference means distinction and it is an attribute of things (sa ca vastuvisesānām). It does not stand in expectancy of another thing for its production but only for being defined.

Similarly, Pitṛtva signifies the generative capacity which is already there. Only its verbal exposition is made dependent on the existence of what is created thereby (viz-son).

1. यथा हीचुङ्खयेऽऽकुणयति:  हर्षच्च  पुर्वम्यायोग्यहस्तपरिमतत्त्वनिषिद्धः । केत्यायते:  दीर्घच्छवनिषिद्धः पपुर्वम्यायोग्य-हस्तपरिमतत्त्वः । तवेद प्रतियोगिनिक्याधीननिनाश्यन । न व प्रतियोगिनीनाच उत्पत्तिथिति न व वास्तवमुप्यय परावर्तिताः।

- NVT. 4.1.40.

2. एवम पितृदथि अवभूतता जनकशिक्षितः ।
प्रति जन्यनिक्याधीननिनाश्यन । न तत्त्वीनोत्पत्तिः।

- NVT. 4.1.40.
In the case of paratva, aparatva etc. it must be admitted that these are produced as mutually interdependent, due to the instrumentality of the notion of relativity. Still, they successfully carry out worldly dealings. And so in that sense, they cannot be denied. But simply because of this, things that have paratva or aparatva and the like do not become not-independent. That is to say, they have a reality of their own independently of others.

Further, Uddyotakara says that the view that 'all things are negations' is in all respects self-contradictory. For, firstly, no proof can be given in favour of such a view. He who holds that all things are negations should at least give proof to justify that view. Only then could he prove that all things are the negations of one another. If he gives such proof, it is proved that all things are not negations since a proof should exist positively; in this case the holder of that view himself recognises this and so gives the proof. If he does not give such a proof, his view could not be said to have been established for want of any proper proof.

Secondly if his assertion that "all things are negations" conveys the intended meaning, his view itself stands self-contradicted because he employs a statement to establish his view.
If he recognises the positive existence of the meaning conveyed, he contradicts himself. And if this statement fails to convey any meaning, then just the utterance of its syllables becomes meaningless. Thirdly, if he accepts the existence of a man who puts forth the view that all things are negations of one another, and also that of another man who grasps that view, the contradiction underlying his assertion stands ipso facto confirmed. Moreover if he accepts the difference of meaning in the two sentences 'Sarvam abhava' and 'Sarvam bhava' his view stands self-contradicted, as such a difference of meaning does exist positively, and in case he does not accept such a difference of meaning in those two sentences he should not insist on asserting that in a particular way.

Thus the more one examines this view, viz. All is negation, the more it becomes evident that it is defective and that it does not stand the test of logic and so is untenable.

1. वणोन्यारणानामाण्यपरिप्रमा ।

- NV. 4. 1. 40.