There is another extreme view:

All things must be regarded as diverse, because the symbols of things refer to diverse entities. (अन्तः भावथक्तानि लक्षणानि प्रत्ययानि | 4.1.34).

All things must be regarded as diverse and no unitary entity exists, why? Because the symbols of "entities" (भावस्य लक्षणम्) i.e., their names (abhidhānam) which denote the entity, refer to distinct entities; All names of things" denote combinations, e.g. the word 'jar', refers to the combination of odour, taste, colour, and touch and also to the combination of the bottom, sides and neck (which are the parts of the jar).

The jar has been mentioned only as an illustration and the same holds good with regard to the names of all things.

1. "But even if these are diverse, i.e., distinct from one-another, the jar is nothing apart from these qualities viz. colour etc. and from the component parts viz. bottom etc. This is the view of the Sastrāntikas and Vaibhāṣikas".

- remarks Vācaspati; NVTT. 4.1.34.
Uddyotakara, gives an argument put forth by the opponent to establish that a single word i.e. ja r, denotes different things, because it is a word, like the word 'Senā' (i.e. the army).

When we hear a single word, we understand several things signified by it, just as in the case of the word 'Senā'. Understand several things signified by it, just as in the case of the word 'Senā'.

Visvanātha remarks that the following argument is given by the opponent to establish that the symbol, i.e. the name refers to diverse entities. "Jar etc. are of the form of combination, because they are expressed by words, like army, forest, etc. And such an invariable concomitance between expressibility (Vyācyatva) and being of the form of a combination (Samuharūpata) is not proved indecisive in the case of Ether, Soul, Quality, Action, Viśeṣa, Īśamāvāya, and Abhāva. To wit, there is no proof which could establish

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1. अस्यः प्रयोगः - कुम्भस्वरूपः कोस्कविषयं एकसद्वातः
   सेनाशक्तीद्विद्विति ।
   - N. V. 4. 1. 34.

2. पदश्चविषयः अनेकाकारिकेः यद्यान्तरस्तरस्तरे अथवा वाक्येः
   यथा सेणेति ।
   - Ibid.

3. cf. कीर्तिन्ध्रेय गणानां मात्रामावातः ब्राह्मा: शरीरानिर्लिङ्गातः
   गुणमप्रकारश्च प्रयोगातः विशेषविषयायमावातः ब्राह्मात्मावस्य
   तुव्यत्वान्तः व्यभिचारः ।
   - Vṛtti, 4. 1. 34.
the existence of ether (as it is beyond the reach of senses). The soul (according to the Bauddhas) is nothing else than the body. Quality (guna) and action (karma) are non-distinct from their substratum. Besides, this, there is no proof for the existence of Viśeṣa and Samavāya, and Abhāva (negation) is itself a non-entity.

Or another interpretation is possible: a jar or the like is different from itself also, because, the characteristics of an entity (पाकलवण) viz. Odour, taste, etc., and its component parts are distinct, and the jar is nothing different from its qualities as well as from its component parts. To wit, jar is identical with the colour or also with the touch; now, colour and touch are different entities so it follows that jar is different from jar or itself.

The Naiyayika's answer to this is that what is urged cannot be accepted, because by the manifold characteristics, (colour etc.) one entity is produced. (न, अनेकलकारणि समाविष्टेः: 4. 1. 35).

1. Sāmānyā is just a conceptual construction (Vikalpa) according to the Bauddhas.
2. यशा - पदातिविक्रम स्वस्तमादिपि हृद्धभावजाप्नानां गन्धसाधारानां तत्तदक्षरायां क पृथक्काल वहतैव चतुर्दश कब्जसादिपिभाव। - Vṛtti, 4. 1. 34.
The compound "anekalakṣaṇaḥ" should be treated as one that has the middle word eliminated and as standing for "anekavidhalakṣaṇaḥ" by the manifold characteristics.

In fact, it is a single composite entity (e.g. the composite substance, jar), related to the bottom and other parts that comes into existence. The 'Substance' is something different from its qualities; and the 'whole' is something different from its parts. (See NS. 2. 1. 34 ff) 

Uddyotakara refuting the opponent's view says that the argument that a single word, i.e. jar denotes different things, because it is a word, like the word Senā - is not proper because there is no example that could support this as no word denotes many things and the word 'Sena' also denotes only one thing. The Naiyāyika has established that the whole is distinct from the parts. And when "everything" is included in the subject (pākṣa) (in 'sarvam prthak'), it is not possible to give any example in support. Moreover, since colour etc. and the substances having colour etc. are seen to be related as the supported and the support, (or substratum) this inference is contrary to experience; that is to say,

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1. कुम्भकुर्व (नेकविषयः, सक्षैकञ्च लेनाशक्तव।

- NUTT. 4. 1. 34.
instead of the diversity of the things and the unreality of the whole that was to be proved, the whole entity is proved as distinct from its components as also attributes and thus as one and real; because the colour etc. which are the 'supported' (Ādhāyas) and the substance which is the substratum are seen to be related to each other as supported and support.

Moreover, the 'naṁ' (i.e., नाम्) in the word 'Aneka' of the syllogism may signify either absolute negation (prasajya pratishedha) or negation by exclusion (paryudāsa pratishedha). Still the thing which it signifies is quite contrary to the view of the opponent.

If the word 'Aneka' means "Ekāṁ na bhavati iti;" "It is not one," then it proves that the oneness which is denied here does exist elsewhere; hence what you have said, viz. "Nothing is one," is contradicted. If it means that

1. Vācaspati here explains:
   Even though words like 'jar,' signifying genus, may refer to a number of individual jars, yet the opponent cannot be said to have achieved his aim because what he says is that each jar is in itself a non-entity and is just a combination of colour, etc. or of parts. Thus, it cannot be denied that words like 'jar,' etc. refers to individual jars which are unitary entities.

- यदि नानाथत्वमिच्छिन्नो घटाविशिष्टाः पद्धतिः प्रतिष्ठिताः प्रथममेकतं तद्धात्नामलक्ष्यमवस्तुमिति न पूर्णप्रभुत्वमिच्छिन्नो भिन्नतिविशिष्टिति।

- NVTT. 4.1. 35.
"Aneka" is 'Other than eka', even then the existence of eka, i.e. the one, is, in fact, established and the same contradiction is involved here also.

Viśvanātha explains this thus: "The existence of one entity is supported by the means of valid knowledge; such as perception, etc. A thing cannot be of the nature of colour, taste, etc., on which the contrary qualities, being liable to perception or the becoming the object of the sense of taste and the like respectively are superimposed. Moreover, the parts (potsherds, etc.) are the cause (e.g. of the jar) and the cause and the effect cannot possibly be one. So jar, etc., are neither of the nature of colour, etc., nor of the nature of parts.

Here is one more argument to refute the view of the opponent: "The above denial is not effective as the symbols of things are restricted in their application."

The denial that "there is no single entity" - is not proper. Because the symbols of things are restricted in their application.

1. तत्स्य च वाचु्श्चत्वासनत्चाविक्षिप्तमाज्यस्तल्पर्याचायत्तकल्चाभावात् कल्याणां च कारणतात्तवं कार्यकारणायोऽधारांसमस्यात् । न तत्तदात्तकत्त्वं घटतः संवतीति भवः ।

Vṛtti, 4.1.35.
The symbol of entities, i.e., their names are restricted in their application to single entities, and this is clear from such expressions as "I am touching that jar, which I saw before" or "I am seeing that which I touched before." We do not understand by this an assemblage of atoms and if a group of atoms is not grasped, that which is grasped can be one only. As Uddyotakara say, if you regard a thing as not one, but as a combination of parts, this will lead to infinite regress.

The smallest component or part that you accept, will have to be looked upon as a combination of different components. To avoid this if you stop somewhere, those individual parts will each be one and you cannot say that there is nothing like one entity, or one whole. And he who denies an entity will have to deny 'aneka' also, for the 'aneka' is an assemblage of 'ones.'

1. Uddyotakara explains that when we utter the word jar, we do not understand many entities signified by it, but we understand only one, because the word 'jar' (घट) is in the singular and not in the plural.

So also, when we order someone, 'Bring a jar,' it refers to one thing, and the other person also understanding by virtue of the word 'jar' one thing brings it. The very fact that the order and its meaning that is understood, refer to one thing, also shows that the word 'jar' (घट) signifies one thing.
It has been subsequently urged by the opponent that there can be no single entity, because all things are mere groups (of several things). But if there is no single thing, there could be no assemblage of things.

What the opponent means is that there is no single entity as the names of entities refer only to aggregates or groups.

But the fact is that if there is no single entity, there could be no groups. Because a group is nothing but a combination (समुच्चय) of several single things, or 'ones'. So the view that "there is no single entity" is contradicted and hence cannot be justified.

Vatsyāyana explains the contradiction in the syllogism from two points of view:

(A) The statement is contradictory to the reason (प्रतिज्ञाय ज्ञेतो व्याघ्तात्).

The opponent puts forth his argument thus: "There is no single entity, because names of things apply only to groups. But if there is no single entity, no groups could be formed; and hence, a single entity, which is intended
to be denied by him, is itself admitted when she says, "because names of things apply only to groups".

Why the opponent should necessarily accept a single entity, is then explained by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati. Uddyotakara says: "A single entity, viz. atom, must be accepted, which is the smallest possible component unit, when the division of the so-called combination is carried out to its farthest limit. When the group ceases to exist, the single atom is there, which cannot be denied."

If this be not accepted by the opponent, remarks Vācaspati, it would not be possible for him to point out any clear difference in things like the jar, the potsherd, sand, dust, and atoms, since he accepts them to be aggregates of innumerable component parts.

Similarly, in the case of the attributes (rāsa, gandha, sparśa etc.) who holds that the substances, earth etc., combine to form a paramāṇu, will also have to explain whether each of these four components is itself an assemblage or not. If he regards the process of combining as endless, then he contradicts the Sāstric statement that eight substances together form a paramāṇu. Conceding that the word "anu"
refers to something made of eight substances yet if one is not there, "aneka" could not be justified. Hence this view should be given up.

(B) The Bhāṣyakāra explains how the reason contradicts the statement (hetunā pratiṃṇāgah vyāghataḥ). When the opponent says that "names of things are applied only to groups;" he admits a group, and then in the proposition that "there is no single entity," he denies each component of the group.

Thus, as this argument suffers from the fault of the twofold contradiction, explained above (A and B), it must be rejected as a frivolous assertion.

Thus it is not true to say that everything is diverse, and words refer to assemblages and not to a unitary entity.