Here is another dogmatic standpoint:

All things must be eternal because the five elemental substances are eternal. (सबिः नित्यम् पञ्चमूलनित्यत्वादः ।

4.1.29).

All the things of the world are constituted of just the five elemental substances. And these elemental substances are eternal because the destruction of any of them is not possible.

"The five elemental substances are " as Vācaspati notes, "eternal, since the Naiyāyika himself does not recognise their destruction." - This is the view of the opponent. But

1. Vācaspati explains:

पञ्चमूलत्वम् सत्यैलं गौत्तरिदिव्यमुपलम्येते व्यपदिशनिति हि मृत्य पद्धो मृत्यस्तिरिमिति । \( \text{The effects viz. cāw, jar etc. are created from the five elemental substances, because it is said that the jar is earth, body is earth, etc. etc.} \) -

- NVTT, 4.1.29.

2. वृक्षविचारं च नित्यानि, तेषामुच्चेष्टस्य निर्माणिकः अनुपुष्पमात् ।

- NVTT, 4.1.29.
Vācaspati refutes it only thus: The things which are produced from the elemental substances are different from the elemental substances themselves. We can cite the cow and the jar as examples; they are not the atoms themselves which are very subtle (paramasūkṣma). If they be regarded as super-sensuous (atīndriya), then there would be the contingency of nothing being perceived. Thus, the bhautika (elemental) things have the characteristic of being perceptible and in contrast to these, the bhūtas (elements) are not perceptible, hence the bhautikas are different from the bhūtas. And because of this, they cannot be regarded as eternal even though the bhūtas be eternal.

Visvanātha, showing the consistency of this discussion here, remarks: "If everything be eternal, pretyabhāva (Rebirth) could not be established, hence such a theory is refuted here.

He adds "Meyatvāt" as a reason to prove the eternity of everything over and above, 'Bhūtatvāt'. The eternity of the five elemental substances is only meant to give an illustration and the eternity of atoms, ether etc. is signified thereby. Visvanātha remarks that the inference should be in the

1. 1.1.29. NVTT.
2. This is clarified in NS. 2.1.25.
form "Sarvam nityam, bhūtātvāt"; "everything is eternal because it is made of elemental substances; or because it is cognisable ( meyatvāt)'. The Sūtrakāra has given the reason "pañcabhūtanityatvāt" just to suggest illustrations, so atoms and other are known from this to be examples for this reasoning.

The Siddāntins answer to the opponent is:

That which is urged is not proper since we actually perceive the cause of the production and destruction of things. (न, उत्पत्तिकिलीरकांग्रापलिये: | 4.1.30).

We perceive the cause of production and destruction. If everything be regarded as eternal, what is perceived would be contradicted. Because as Uddyotakara explains; an eternal thing cannot be produced or destroyed. Visvanātha gives the examples of the conjunction of potsherds (-cause of production-) and the blow of a hammer (-cause of destruction-) as the causes of production and destruction, respectively of a jar.

It might be objected: "Inasmuch as all things possess the characteristics of elemental substances the denial is not right (तत्त्वप्रलयायरोचायालक्षणोऽविव्याख्ये: | 4.1.31).

The thing of which you think you perceive the cause of production and destruction is not found to be devoid
of the characteristics of the elemental substances and hence it is not a different thing from those substances. And because a thing possesses the characteristics of the elemental substance (that is say, it is just the elemental substances) the denial stated above is not proper.

Uddyotakara answers the pūrvapākṣin by saying that he who accepts that everything is 'nitya' has to accept that nothing is produced or destroyed. And then his own efforts to acquire the thing desired and to avoid the thing not desired, would be meaningless. Besides, as he includes 'everything' in the subject (pakṣa), it would not be possible for him to give an example. So also, he cannot use a syllogism to establish his theory. By the syllogism, "Sarvam nityam, pañcabhūtānitya-tvāt" what does he do? Does he prove the things which is not yet proved, or disprove what is established?

If the former, what is this Siddhi which is brought about by this syllogism? If it be knowledge, (Viññānam), it would be contradictory to the theory that everything is eternal because it would mean that the knowledge is produced by the use of the syllogism. If the knowledge is not brought about then what is the Siddhi brought about by the means that are operating? A causal factor (kāraka) should certainly bring about something new. If it brings it about there would be contradiction, because if everything be eternal nothing could
be produced. Or it would cease to be a kāraka (causal factor), because nothing could be regarded as required to be done in an eternal thing.

If the latter alternative be accepted that the syllogism given above disproves what is established, here also the contradiction is there all the same. Because a thing which is eternal is said to be destroyed.

It might be urged that the thing is not destroyed but disappears. But this is not proper. Even in disappearance, one will have to accept the production of a new thing or the destruction of the former entity. The contradiction is still there and is not avoidable because whenever something which was not perceived before is perceived, the production of a new entity or the destruction of the former entity must be accepted.

And that "everything is eternal because it has the characteristics of the elemental substances" — is not proper because this latter can be explained in a different way. How the possession of the characteristics of the elemental substances is explained by Uddyotakara in his Vārtika on Sūtra 32. We shall come to this later.
Visvanātha explaining Sū. 31 thus: The Sāṃkhya argues that denial is not proper. The characteristic, viz. bhūtātva, etc. of the eternal atoms and the like are found in jāt etc. as they are present therein. So the concept of production and the like is an erroneous one.

The answer to this is: "What has been urged is not proper, because we actually perceive the cause and the production." (न, उत्पत्तितत्त्वादं शरणापि: । 4. 1. 32.)

We actually perceive the cause and the production of things possessing qualities similar to the qualities of the causes. Both of these are not possible in regard to an 'eternal' thing. So also, we cannot deny such a perception of the cause and the production (of the thing, i.e. the effect). And no perception could possibly be without a real objective basis. On the strength of this perception, it is inferred that the effect is produced as possessing qualities similar to those of its cause, and this effect is the real objective basis for the said perception. And the presence of the characteristics of the elemental/in the effect can be thus justified.

1. उत्पत्तितत्त्वादं शरणापि: । न, नित्यसं परमाणवादे: वल्लकाण ।
ूलबधि, घटादो तवराणाः तत्सत्त्वाः । लक्ष
च उत्पादादिप्रत्यथं भृतं शस्ते भावः ।

- Vṛtti, 4. 1. 31.
Moreover, we find that effort on the part of the cognitive agent is seen only when he is urged by the desire to obtain the cause of production or destruction.

Furthermore what has been urged by the opponent is not applicable to Sound (śabda), Activity (karma), Cognition (buddhi) and such things. The two reasons put forth viz.: (i) everything is eternal because the five elemental substances are eternal (Sūtra 29) and (ii) because everything is possessed of the characteristics of the eternal substances (sa.31) are not applicable to such things as Sound, Activity, Cognition, pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, and Effort, hence the reason is inconclusive because it is not found in all the things included in the pakṣa (subject).

1. Vācaspati remarks:

If the production and the destruction of entities were not really there, how could intelligent persons make efforts to obtain the cause of the production of a thing desired or the cause of destruction of the thing not desired - यथृत्पत्तिविनासाः भावान् न वस्तुभावः कं प्रेक्षान्तामिथार्थपतिविनासाः कथितपतिविनासाः कथितं तदर्थिता प्रवृत्तिः?]

And as Uddyotakara notes, such an effort would not be possible if everything be regarded as eternal.
How the reason is inconclusive is explained by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati a bit differently.

Uddyotakara says: The things included in the pakṣa are of two extreme kinds—some having the characteristics of elemental substances and others not having them. Hence if we say that all things are eternal and they are possessed of the characteristics of the elemental substances—this turns out to be inconclusive.

In respect of Sound, Motion, etc. we find that they are not possessed of the characteristics of the elemental substances. So all things are not possessed of the characteristics of elemental substances.

Vācaspati explains:

"The subject of the probandum is that all things (are eternal). The reason, being possessed of the characteristics of elemental substances, is found in some of the things included

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1. कथनायापि: कौशानतः पदार्थान्तः स्वस्थानातः।
   पञ्चाशी: हि सवः हि नित्यः व्रतः, तत्थ सवः मूलचारणः।
   वन्यथा च तत्पदार्थान्तः भवस्थानातः।
   न सवः मूलचारणः गुत्तिनित्यनेकातः।
   - NVTT, 41.32.
As Vātsyāyana expounds it, the opponent's view comes to mean: "The production and destruction is of the same character as the cognition of things in a dream". But if it be so, this might be said of the perception of the elemental substances also and then as the cognition of things in a dream is wrong (i.e. erroneous), similarly, the perception of earth etc. also would have to be regarded as erroneous.

The opponent's answer to the Siddhāntin could be: "If the perception of Earth etc. be regarded as illusory there would be then the absence of earth, etc., and the particular usages of men and their inspired behaviour would come to an end."

But as the Siddhāntin says, if it be so, the same would be the case in respect of the origination etc.; being regarded as illusory. If it be so, the same would be the case in respect of the origination etc., being regarded as illusory. If there were no objective basis for the perception of Earth etc., the same would be the case in respect of the origination etc., being regarded as illusory. If there were no objective basis for the perception of Earth etc., the same would be the case in respect of the origination etc., being regarded as illusory.

1. पञ्जारे हि स्व नित्यमिति | तत्सिद्ध स्तत्त्वात् नात्मायामनेकान्तः न
   बक: स्तत्त्वात्त्वचनां: क्षण: अस्त्य इति कोकान्तः। | क्रूरि हेतु:.
   जर्जवे स्तत्त्वात्त्वचनांपण्यै स्तत्त्वात्त्वचनानां इति योजना ।
   - NVTT, 4. 1. 32.

2. But as Uddyotakara notes, there is no proof which could establish that the cow and the jar etc. which are possessed of production and destruction are non-existent, and a thing cannot be accepted without any proof. And it is explained elsewhere how the objects are distinct from the consciousness itself, and hence are true. - - NV, 4. 1. 32.
of the cause of production and destruction, then also, the particular usage of men would come to an end.

The pravādaka's argument is as follows: Since (i) the internal substances are beyond the reach of senses (i.e. supersensuous) and (ii) are not the objects of production and destruction, the said conception of production and destruction is like the cognition of things during dreams."

But this is not a valid argument at all. As Uddyotakara says, he who talks of the conception of utpatti and Viṇāśa must show the object which passes through the process of utpatti and Viṇāśa. But in fact he who holds everything to be nitya, (eternal) cannot show such an object. And if he denies the object, he will also have to forgo the idea of the erroneous perception along with it. (No other thing could be erroneously

1. Uddyotakara here remarks:

यदि व्यवहार-रेखाधार्मक मूलानि प्रतिपत्ति तथा स्वरुप उत्पत्तिनिर्माणाय प्रतिपद्य न हि उत्पत्तिनिर्माणन्तरं कथाना व्यवहारः सिद्धांतिति।

- If the opponent accepts the elements in order to avoid the contingency of there being an end to every particular usage and behaviour of men, he must accept, because of the same reason, the production and destruction also since without both of these, no particular usage or behaviour is possible.

- NV, 4. 1. 32.
perceived as ākāśakusuma as the latter cannot be perceived). If a thing cannot be perceived no error is possible in respect of it. If production and the like are never seen, there could not be even illusory knowledge pertaining to them.

Here, it might be argued:

"What really happens is that the original substance remaining constant, one property of it, ceases and another is produced and this is the meaning of the destruction and production of the thing. It might be opposed that if the substances are possessed of the two characteristics viz. birth and cessation it means that before the birth, they were non-existent and so also, they will be non-existent after the destruction and hence no one can prove that everything is eternal. The answer to such an argument of any opponent is that in fact, a thing which is said to be "produced" has been already in existence even before that production. Similarly when a thing is said to be "destroyed", it continues to exist even after that destruction and in this manner, all things are eternal Vācaspati holds that this doctrine is that of the Svāyambhūvas. It is thus summed up by him:

The modification undergone by substances is of three kinds: (i) modification of properties (dharma) (ii) modification of condition (lakṣaṇa) and (iii) modification of age (avasthā). For example (i) The original
substance gold becomes modified into ear-ring, bracelet, etc. and here we have the modification of property (shape) of the gold, (ii) when the ear-ring is broken up and made into the bracelet, we have modification of condition, i.e. the ear-ring has renounced its present and reverted to the past condition, and the bracelet has renounced its "future" condition and reverted to its "present" condition and (iii) the bracelet which is present is new in the beginning and with the passage of time, it becomes old, so here we have the modification of age (See Yoga-sūtra, 3. 13). This three-fold modification belongs to the thing and are both different and non-different from it. Thus being non-different from the thing they are eternal; and being different they can be subject to origination and destruction.

This doctrine is refuted in the next sūtra:

"This cannot be right, (because under this theory), there would be no possibility of differentiation. (न व्यवस्थानुपालसः 4. 1. 33).

There would, under this theory, be no possibility of any such differentiation as "this is birth" and "this is cessation"; because here (in the theory put forth); that which is born and that which has ceased are both existent. In regard to properties also, there could be no differentiation,
viz. this property is born and that property has ceased - because both are equally existent.

There would not be any differentiation as to time also, that there are birth and cessation at this particular time and not at that time - because birth and cessation are existent during all the three points of time.

"But", says the Naiyāyika, "these drawbacks or faults are not there in our view as, under our theory, birth consists in the coming into existence of what has not been in existence; and cessation consists in the ceasing to exist of what has been in existence before. Therefore, we conclude that what is stated by the opponent that "a thing exists before it is born and it exists also after it has been destroyed" is not proper."

The meaning of this passage in the Bhāṣya is thus clarified by Uddyotakara: He who holds that a thing which ceases is existent even after the cessation, should be asked as to what he means by such an assertion. If he means that a thing which was perceived before is not perceived after the cessation, he should explain only why the thing is not perceived even when it is existent. If it is due to an abstractive factor, such a factor should be perceived.
So also, he who holds: "A thing is perceived now which was not perceived before" must accept the production of some new peculiarity and the loss of the earlier peculiarity in that thing. And if this be accepted, his own view would be contradicted that everything is eternal and hence no production or destruction is possible. It is not proper to say that a thing which is manifested was existent even before that manifestation. Because the contradiction is there all the same; as it is said that it is manifested and in the same breath it is said that it was already present. Even if the manifestation be regarded as perceptibility, the contradiction still remains; because, the perceptibility is now created which was not there before. Thus it cannot be said that everything is eternal.