Others on the other hand hold that

All things are transient (non-eternal) because they are liable to be produced and destroyed (सर्वनिश्चित्व; उत्पत्तिशिक्षा; विनाशकल्पताः | 4.1.25).

That which exists only for a limited time is called transient. That which is liable to be produced is one which is non-existent until it is produced. And that which is liable to be destroyed is one which is non-existent after it has been destroyed.

So, since it is non-existent in the beginning and in the end and existent only in the middle, it can be said to be non-eternal; that is to say, existent only for some time because it is capable of being produced and destroyed.

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1. तस्मात् पुरापीतायः कालयोऽभवाय मध्ये य
   महावात् सिद्धे कालिक्रियादमित्याचः
   उत्पत्तिशिक्षाय विनाशकल्पताः ||

   - NVTT, 4.1.25.
What is the meant by the term 'Sarvam'? All the material things, e.g. body etc. and the non-material things, e.g. cognition etc., are denoted by this term. Both kinds of things are found to be liable to production and destruction, hence it follows that they are all transient.

The Vārtika clarifies that the sutra "Sarvamanityam, utpattivinasadharmakatvat" must be supported by an example. Because as the Tātparyaṭīkā says, no probans can prove the thesis without a proper example.

But here 'all things' are included in the Subject (pākṣa) and hence it is not possible for the opponent to give an example to establish his theory.

Moreover the reason, "Utpattivinasadharmakatvat" which is given to prove the probandum is 'avyāpaka', non-pervasive. If the opponent includes all the things in the pākṣa and then tries to prove their non-eternity by giving the above reason, he cannot prove that because the reason is 'avyāpaka' as the liability to production and destruction is not found in several such things as Atoms, Ākāśa (ether) and in some qualities of these and in (universal) (Sāmānya) etc. so the probans is non-pervasive.
The Vṛtti, while introducing this Sūtra, says:

If everything be regarded as evanescent, then the soul could not be eternal and pretyabhāva (rebirth) would not be there, hence this section is introduced here; and the theory that everything is evanescent is refuted.

There may occur a doubt whether prameyatva could serve as a reason for anityatva, by being invariably concomitant with it.

Here the opponent holds as under: The word 'evanescent' means 'destructible', because a thing which is originated is surely destructible. And since other etc. are cognisable (prameya), they must be originated. The other party regards other etc. also as cognisable and hence as originated.

"Or, we may put forth another interpretation", says the opponent, "that utapttivināśadharmākānāṁ mānasiddhatvāt' i.e. only those entities that have the characteristic of being

1. सर्वस्वैवनित्यत्वात् न वात्माद्भवति प्रत्यत्वत्व
   स्वाभाविक: सर्वनित्यत्वनिहितारण प्रकारणति।
   - Vṛtti, 4. 1. 25.

2. Ibid. प्रत्यत्वप्रत्यत्यनिहितारणाः न वैति।
   - Vṛtti, 4. 1. 25.
originated and destroyed are established by pramāṇas and so the things that are not such can not be recognised as 'pramanika', or known to be existent.

Some hold that there are two reasons intended here in the Sūtra, viz.: The entities are evanescent because they are liable to be produced or because they are liable to be destroyed.

The Buddhists argue that "Sarvam anityam, sattvāt. (Everything is non-eternal because it is existent)." Visvanātha seems to be here making an effort to explain that sūtra 25 does not differ in respect of content from this 'sarvamanityam, sattvāt'. Vācaspati, on the other hand, understands by 'anitya', not permanent, produced and lasting only for some time. The Ekadesin ( - according to Vācaspati - ) answers.

What has been urged is not proper, since the 'evanescence' itself is eternal (नानित्यतानित्यत्वात् 4.1.26).

If the evanescence of all things is eternal, then everything cannot be regarded as evanescent since the evanescence itself is eternal; otherwise, while it would be nonexistent, everything would be everlasting.

1. परे तु नानित्यत्वात् कादानित्यत्वात् उपतित्यक्षत्वात् विनाशयक्षत्वात् हलि खैते शाल्यमित्यत्वात्: ।

- Vṛtti, 4.1.25.
According to the Vṛtti the argument by way of refutation is as follows: the liability to production cannot prove the liability to destruction because if we accept such a vyāpti, it would prove to be inconclusive in the case of Pradhyamgaṅbhaṅga or posterior negation which itself is nitya as it is not destructible, though it does originate.

The above argument can be refuted as follows:

In fact, evanescence is (certainly non-eternal. In its case it is like the destruction of fire after having destroyed the thing burnt by it."

The said ' evanescence ' is also non-eternal. How so? Just as fire, after having destroyed the thing burnt by it, itself perishes, Similarly, the evanescence of all things, after having destroyed all things itself perishes.

The Vṛtti clarifies the argument in the Bhāṣya as follows: That ' evanescence ' also is transient. Just as the fire is destroyed after having destroyed the fuel, and it does not outlive the thing destroyed; so the destruction of the jar etc. perishes, it does not outlive the jar etc. And the destruction of destruction also perishes because the
Destruction of destruction also is the destruction of the Counter-entity.

Others argue here that the vyāpti that the time which is not the substratum of posterior negation and prior negation is the time which is the substratum of the pratiyogin (counter entity) of these negations. (2) — is ineffectual and cannot prove that even after the destruction of the jar the destruction itself remains.

The author of the Nyāya sūtra established here his own view:

A thing which is eternal, cannot be denied because the determination of the eternity or evanescence of a thing must be in accordance with the actual perception of it. (निर्देशस्यप्रत्येकायस्य निर्देशस्य एव व्याप्तिः । ४. १. २८).

The theory propounded (in sūtra 25) totally denies the eternity of all things, but such denial of the eternity of all things is not proper. Why? since the

1. यथा बिद्यादिक्षेत्रं न्यायविद्यात् स्वपन्निष्ठः पश्चात् नस्यति न तु दशान्नकवनस्य न च घटावपि नाशो नस्यति न घटास्य न्यायान्तरात् अवसंख्याति प्रतियोगिण्यत्वात् ।

— Vṛtti on 4. 1. 27.

2. अविद्यान्तरात् प्रतियोगिण्यत्वात् स्वपन्निष्ठ घटास्य न्यायविद्यात् नाहो नन्यात्त व्याप्तिः ।
determination must be in accordance with our actual experience, the actual perception of things. Things whose liability to production and destruction can be proved by pramāṇas can be regarded as non-eternal; and those in whose case, such liability is not cognised should be regarded as the contrary, i.e., eternal.

And in fact, such liability to production and destruction cannot be proved by pramāṇas in respect of such things as the elemental substances in their subtle form; and is respect of Ether, Time, Space, Soul and Mind and some of their qualities and in respect of Genus (Sāmānyā), particularly (Viṣeṣa) and Inherence (Samavāya). Hence it can be concluded that all these entities are eternal.

Uḍḍyotakara explains this at length: He who uses the word, 'anitya' must accept something which is 'nitya'. Because the 'na' can signify either absolute negation (prasajya āpratīṣedha) or negation by exclusion (paryudāsa-āpratīṣedha). Here the 'Na' (in the word

1. The Vārtika adds:

If you accept 'Aānityatva' as without any cause, then the reason which is given: because they are liable to be produced and destroyed is contradicted and hence is no reason at all.

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अक्षरपूर्वैः अनित्यम प्रतिपदे,
व्याहतस्तर्हि हेतु: उत्पत्तिविनाक्षरपूर्वदः।
'Anitya'), used in either sense, presupposes the uttarpada, i.e. a 'nitya' thing. If the word 'Anitya' means 'nityam na bhavati iti' 'not eternal,' it signifies the absolute negation and then the aternity which is in one thing (anyatra) is negated in this other thing and thus, the thing signified by the uttarpada nitya, eternal is there. Hence the view that all things are non-eternal is not proper.

If the same word 'anitya' means a thing other than nitya there also it does expect the existence of the thing signified by the uttarpada, viz. eternal, since in its absence, the word 'anitya' would not be there and thus the view stated above stands refuted.

Now the opponent may hold: We do not establish everything as anitya what we mean to say is that all the things having the attribute of (non-eternity) are non-eternal.

And then even if ether etc. be eternal, our view does not in any way suffer. But this is acceptable to the Naïyāyika also. So it involves the fault of proving what is already established. (Siddhasādhana) Non-eternity is an attribute and it cannot be there if the substance (dharmin) is non-existent. This being so it is no fault if everything having the attribute of non-eternity is non-eternal.
It being admitted (by both the parties) that whatever is liable to be produced and destroyed is non-eternal, the opponent might try to prove the non-eternity of all things, on the ground of their being existent things. On knowing that jar etc. are liable to be produced and destroyed one regards them as non-eternal because of the attribute of non-eternity in them. By the same example he could prove the remaining things whose non-eternity is being doubted, or which are contrarily known to have eternity to be non-eternal on their ground of being existent. But for such a person also, nityatva is an established fact, for 'nitya' is the uttarpada in the term 'anitya'. This has been explained above. Thus the pratijñā (statement) (viz. sarvam anityam utapattināśadharmā katvāt) is faulty and so the reasoning of the opponent is a failure. (See Vārttika and Tātparya-ālikā 4.1.28).

Visvanāth adds that the eternity of Ether etc. is proved in accordance with the means of cognition cognising the thing in which eternity resides and as this approach has the simple and not at all advantage of lāghava that is to say is cumbersome, it is established beyond doubt that some things like ether are eternal. Thus it cannot be said that everything is non-eternal.

1. यथोपलक्षिष्य उपलक्षिनित्क्रियेण तथा च धिर्ग्राहकमानेन लक्ष्यहल्कोत्तैः कायारणित्यत्थवस्थापनादिति ।

- Vṛtti on 4.1.28.