CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

INTRODUCTION

The present study falls in the area of motivation to work. Specifically, it is aimed at studying attribution theory of motivation in the context of performance efficiency. Motivation to work is one of the important dynamics of work behaviour since it, alongwith ability, determines a person's level of performance and other organizational behaviour. Also, as it is possible to improve motivation, its implications in the organizational context are all the more important.

Motivation has attracted attention of thinkers and researchers since the beginning of psychology. And like all other concepts, it has been enriched by the contributions from many sources. As the present work revolves around motivation it would not be out of place to briefly describe how it has been viewed by researchers.

The term 'motivation' was originally derived from the latin word 'movere', which means "to move". It has been used in the past, synonymously with terms like, internal urge, aspiration, need, motive, drive, instinct, want, desire, etc., (Cofer and Appley, 1964). But generally the term 'Drive' is used to explain infra-human behaviour and 'Motive' or 'Need' to explain human behaviour.
The concept of 'motivation', however, does not denote a single term; it is taken as a summary label that includes more than one variable and their relationships. Expectancy, drive, motive, need, valence and incentive or goal are all motivational concepts. Motivation in a single word is referred as "deprivation level", "effort expended" or "general activity level". But this overall meaning of motivation is generally incomplete and therefore misleading. Many definitions of motivation have been set forward to shed light on the meaning of motivation.

Jones (1955) defines motivation as "How behaviour gets started, is energized, is sustained, is directed, is stopped, and what kind of subjective reaction is present in the organism while all this is going on". For Atkinson (1964), motivation is "The contemporary (immediate) influence on the direction, vigor and persistence of action". Vroom (1964) defines motivation as "A process governing choice made by persons or lower organisms among alternative forms of voluntary activity". According to Berelson and Steiner (1964) "A motive is an inner state that energizes, activates or moves (hence, 'motivation') and that directs or channels behaviour toward goals". For Gellerman (1963), "To steer one's actions toward certain goals and to commit a certain part of one's energies to reaching them" is motivation. Sanford and Wrightsman (1970) "A motive is restlessness, a
lack, a yearn, a force. Once in the grip of motive, the organism does something to reduce the restlessness, to remedy the lack, to alleviate the yearn, to mitigate the force".

The above mentioned definitions conceive three major components of motivation process. These are: (1) Energization or initiation of behaviour in particular direction. The energizer or initiator may be the force of particular need or motive, which directs behaviour in a particular direction toward achieving a particular goal or objective; (2) Effort expenditure or effort amplitude i.e., the degree of effort expenditure in a particular direction to achieve a particular goal or objective; and (3) Persistence of behaviour until particular goal or objective is achieved. In other words, motivated behaviour is: (a) the choice to initiate effort on a certain task, (b) the choice to expend a certain amount of effort, and (c) the choice to persist in expending effort over a period of time. The label of determinants of these three kinds of choice is called 'Motivation'. Thus, in short, motivation has to do with a set of independent/dependent variable relationships that explain the direction, amplitude and persistence of an individual's behaviour, holding constant the effects of aptitude, skill and understanding of the task and the constraints operating in the environment.
Theories of Motivation

The above mentioned components of motivational behaviour together with the inter-relationships among them partly or fully have been hypothesized to be determined by certain variables in various motivation theories. On the basis of the way of theorizing, the focus of emphasis, and addressed set of questions, two major distinctions of motivation theories have been proposed by Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler and Weick (1970) as Process vs. Content Theories. This dichotomy of motivation theories tries to explain certain motivational questions differently i.e., process theories first try to define the major variables which are necessary for explaining choice, effort and persistence. Incentive, drive, reinforcement, expectancy and valence are major variables appearing in process theory models. These theories, then, attempt to understand the process of interaction between the various variables which in turn generate motivation. The roots of these theories lie in early experimental works of Thorndike, Hull, Spence and Tolman on animal behaviour in laboratory setting. The reinforcement theory and drive theory proposed by them are early process theories. These early process theories of Thorndike and to some extent, theory of Hull are known as 'Mechanistic Process Theories' as they explain motivation as determined by simple automatic or mechanical processes which have very little to do with cognitive aspect. Contemporary process theories like expectancy-valence theory,
equity theory, achievement motivation theory, attribution theory, etc., are more concerned with cognitive factors and, therefore, are called "Cognitive Process Theories".

In contrast to process theories, content theories have their roots in clinical and personality fields and are more concerned with trying to specify the substantive identity of the variables that influence behaviour and have less concern with the process of interaction of variables. Thus content theories focus on the taxonomy of existing job, organizational or personal factors which affect motivation. However, it does not mean that these theories altogether neglect dynamic relationship between the motivational variables. Murray's Need-Press theory, Maslow's Need Hierarchy theory, Alderfer's ERG theory, Herzberg's Two-Factor theory and Job Enrichment theory are all content theories.

Extending the ideas of Tolman, Vroom (1964) developed "Expectancy-valence" (VIE) theory of motivation which is one of the major cognitive-process theories. The main components of VIE theory are 'Expectancy' i.e., the subjective probability of a person that effort on his part will lead to better performance, 'Instrumentality' i.e., better performance is instrumental in getting the rewards, and 'Valence' i.e., the attractiveness of rewards (outcomes) to the person. Although the VIE is a much researched theory, certain limitations in
the enumeration of the concepts of 'Expectancy' as well as the role of personal experiences with outcomes (rewards) limit its value.

In an organizational setting a person's level of performance is influenced by many factors besides the 'effort' expended by him, not only that but the history of successes and failures experienced by him also plays an important role in determining his future levels of effort. Such limitations of the VIE theory are overcome in the attribution theory of motivation in a way that it throws light on the antecedents of 'Expectancy' component of VIE theory and also incorporates the element that helps in understanding how a person behaves over a period of time.

Thus, it becomes important to view an individual's expectancy estimate as being influenced by his or her explanations of the various components influencing his performance in a given situation. Therefore, attributional processes can be considered as the antecedents of the expectancy variable, and other variables of VIE theory; and also attributional processes provide means for hypothesizing what happens to behaviour (i.e., effort) over a period of time as an individual experiences successes and failures under various conditions.

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The theory which is the focus of the present study is attribution theory of motivation which is one among the
cognitive process theories. It considers man as a thinking entity and goes on to explain the interaction between various psychological processes in order to understand the phenomenon of motivation. This theory is based on the simple notion that people attribute their performance to various causal factors and put forth the processes by which individuals attribute characteristics or causal relations to various objects as an explanation of their behaviour and what happens to them.

The attribution theory in its present form has evolved over the years, and it should be interesting to see how this development has taken place.

**Historical Development of Attribution Theory**

Heider (1944) planted the seeds of the attribution theory in his classic paper on phenomenal causality. This contribution was hailed as an extension of Gestalt principles to social perception. However, in an experiment by Thibaut and Reicken (1955), the idea of using naive causal analysis as a basis for theoretical prediction bore little empirical fruit. Thereafter, Heider (1958) in his book on "Psychology of Inter-personal Relations", transplanted the attribution seed into a richer soil by mixing gestalt notions with cognitive functionalism and proposed the notion of the causal unit formation process. The results was an accelerated
interest in the processes and consequences of causal attributions for social behaviour.

The root of attribution theory lies in person-perception, the area of social psychology, because Heider's concern was with the interpretation of other person's behaviour. Heider (1958) considers his work as an investigation of common-sense psychology inasmuch as he is concerned with how the common man thinks about causality. The language he employs for his conceptual analysis and of many of the basic concepts in attribution theory is taken from common vernacular. Heider (1958) states that his goal is to clarify some of the basic concepts that are most frequently encountered in an analysis of naive descriptions of behaviour.

(1) Causal Unit Formation

Heider (1958) proposed two main concepts in his book. The concept of balance and the concept of causal unit formation. The latter is concerned with attribution theory. The importance of psychological investigation of this theory has been supported by the fact that man structures his world in terms of cause and effect relationship and acts on the basis of these constructions. The concept of unit formation conceives man's tendency to reduce the diversity of the stimulus manifold. This tendency leads a person to connect individual objects and events in causal units. This unit
formation is concerned with the phenomenon of perception and hence gestalt principles of perceptual organization are applied here also.

From the point of view of causal analysis, the perceptual process may be conceived of as a perceptual arc encompassing two end points - The object, toward which perception is directed; and the percept, i.e., the way the object appears to us. Object has also been referred to as the 'distal stimulus'. The distal stimulus does not, however, directly affect the person but it is mediated by factors like light or sound wave patterns that excite person's sense organs. This stimulus pattern, impinging directly upon the sense organs can be called sensation, is the 'Proximal Stimulus'. It is this stimulus that is physically in direct proximity to the person e.g., with touch or taste the object comes in direct contact with the sensory receptors. The perceptual process thus involves distal stimuli (i.e., objects) and mediation (i.e., sensation) ending in the proximal stimuli (i.e., percepts).

In person perception, the other person with his psychological processes such as need, wishes, attitudes, traits and intentions, functions as the distal stimulus. He is the 'object' toward which person's perception is directed. The mediation here consists of the manifestations of the personality of the other, as they determine the proximal stimulus pattern.
Often the manifestations of other person's psychological processes are behaviours like gestures, the tone of voice and similar expressive features. This raw material leads the person to the perception (or awareness) of the other person.

Now, person's tendency to reduce or simplify stimulus manifold reflects the operation of one system of the mediational complex. The primary manifestation of the operation of this system is the organization of raw discrete sensory data into coherent wholes of object and event end-products, a secondary manifestation of the operation of this system is the organization of individual objects or events into higher order units. Heider refers to this second operation as the process of unit formation. The end-products of this process are units in which individual objects and/or events become parts or elements of a larger whole.

Within the framework of attribution theory the linkage of an object or event with a second effect event in a cause-effect relationship is one type of unit end-product which results from the interaction between the unit formation process and a stimulus manifold.

Elaborating upon the nature of unit relationships, Heider suggests that the elements of all unit formation exhibit in invariant relationship to one another. This relationship is defined as a type of cognitive organization in which the
object and/or event elements of the unit (or whole) are connected to one another to a greater extent than to any other object and/or events, and in the case of cause-effect units, the nature of this belonging is easily illustrated. This concept of cognitive organization of Heider is greatly influenced by Gestalt phenomenological laws of perceptual organization.

Thus, attribution of causality is a function of the phenomenological characteristics possessed by objects and events, which is based on unit formation process and people's intuitive perceptions of causality, specifically their attributions of reasons for the occurrence of behavioural events is the central concern of attribution research. Attribution model sees man as in a constant process of making sense out of his environment. In this theory man is viewed as a scientist, using attributional rules to infer causality in an otherwise chaotic world of social stimuli. Heider (1958) defined the attribution process as the organization into meaningful units of a continuous stream of information from another's behaviour, as our experience of the behaviour of others is discrete, rather than continuous, that is, we see persons perform a series of discrete actions rather than seeing continuous behaviour, these discrete actions constitute units of the stream of information. Heider (1958) emphasized that the perceiver responds to the meaning of other's actions and not to overt behaviour. That is, person perceives the distal
object, the psychological entities, psychological properties or dispositions like needs, wishes, intents, etc., that bring consistency and meaning to the behaviour and not the ones mediating those properties. These units of meaning, then, constitute the perceptual input to subsequent causal inference.

(2) **Naive Analysis of Action**

In his 'Naive analysis of action' Heider was mainly concerned with the actions of another person, in particular, with the basic constituents of an action sequence which lead us to know that another person is trying to do something, intends to do something, has the ability to do something, etc. These concepts also can be applied to one's own actions but Heider emphasized the actions in inter-personal relations. He was also concerned with how people utilize knowledge of the basic constituents of actions in interpreting action and in predicting and controlling it. Heider's analysis of action is "Naive" not because it is shallow or unsophisticated but only because it deals with what is typically called "common sense psychology" - the system of relatively unformulated concepts and principles which guide the everyday behaviour of the man on the street.

Heider points out that in common sense psychology, as in scientific psychology, the outcome of person's actions is seen as deriving from two sets of factors: factors within
the person and factors within the environment. His postulation is -

\[ \text{Outcome} = f (\text{effective personal force, effective environmental force}). \]

The postulation was elaborated as:

\[ \text{Personal forces} \]

\[ \text{Outcome} = f (\text{Trying, Power, effective environment}) \]

The formula also can be expressed as -

\[ \text{Outcome (X)} = f (\text{trying, can}). \]

The within person factors which affect a person's outcome are referred to collectively as his "effective personal force". The two major components of effective personal force are a 'power' factors, usually represented by ability and a motivational factor, 'trying' represented by effort. This 'trying' has also two properties - one is directional or cue aspect of motivation and another is quantitative aspect of strength of motivation. First is designated 'Intention' i.e., what a person is trying to do and the second one is designated 'Exertion' i.e., how hard a person is trying to do it. It is the intention, whatever its source, which gives trying the characteristic features of personal causality; as for exertion, it varies directly with the difficulty of the task and inversely with the power (often taken as ability) of the person. Ability is generally characterised as dispositional
in nature; it refers to a relatively stable attribute which the person possesses and can use to influence his outcomes. Effort, however, is viewed as a variable or unstable attribute which fluctuates according to the person's momentary intentions and the amount of exertion which he manifests.

As conditions of action, both ability and effort are assumed to be necessary while neither alone is sufficient. In other words, the personal constituents of action - power and trying - are related as a multiplicative combination rather than an additive one. Thus, a person with sufficient ability but no motivation will exert no personal force toward obtaining a goal, and the same will be true of a person with high motivation but no ability.

However, even when the value of a person's effective personal force exceeds zero, he will not necessarily obtain his goal, for the final outcome of the situation may also depend upon the amount of effective environmental force which facilitates or hinders his goal attainment. According to Heider, the two major factors which combine to determine this effective environmental force are the 'difficulty of the task' in which the person is engaged, and 'luck'. Task difficulty is seen as a relatively stable, dispositional property of the environment, just as ability is a relatively stable property of the person. Similarly, luck as a variable environmental factor may be compared to effort, a personal factor which is also variable.
Both 'can' (which comprise environmental forces and power or ability) and 'try' are necessary conditions for action outcomes, and neither one alone is sufficient for explaining action outcome. That is, if a person can do something and he tries to do it, then he will do it (Barring temporary circumstances like fatigue, etc.) Here 'can' includes all the relatively permanent factors which influence the effect.

**Correspondent Inference Theory of Attribution**

Influenced both by Heider and the empirical tradition of person perception research, Jones and Davis (1965) introduced correspondent inference theory. Their particular interest was in identifying the variables governing inferences that an act of a person reflects his internal, personal disposition. This process in fact involves two steps of inference. First step is to infer intention from the behaviour (effect) and the next step is to proceed from the transient intention or emotion to a dispositional inference. It is at this step that causal allocation decisions become critically important.

The main problem that Jones and Davis (1965) wanted to attack was the perception of another person's personal attributes. The accurate attribution of intentions from behavioural effects assumes knowledge, ability and behavioural freedom i.e., when the actor has behavioural freedom (no physical or social constraints), one should be able to infer his inten-
tions from the consequences or effects of his behaviour. This should follow, if the actor is believed to have the knowledge that the particular act will produce the consequences observed, and that an actor has the ability to achieve the consequences observed when he desires.

A dispositional inference is correspondent to the extent that an act and the disposition are similarly described by the inference e.g., one's domineering behaviour reflects an underlying trait of dominance. Jones and Davis also distinguished between common and non-common effects. They stated that many times chosen and rejected alternatives by persons have similar effects. These are called "common effects" and any given action is uninformative with regard to such "common effects", since they do not provide a discriminating reason for the choice. Thus, the only information about intentions is contained in the "non-common" effects of action. Because, something in the combination of non-common effects chosen and rejected guide the actor's behaviour.

The use of correspondent theory as a rational base-line model can best be seen in the attitude attribution research, that attitudes in line with behaviour are most strongly inferred when the actor has choice.

Kelly's Work on Causal Schema

Shortly after Jones and Davis (1965), Kelley (1967) attempted to formulate another variant of attribution theory that made
more immediate contact with such central areas of social psychology as 'attitude change' and 'social comparison'. Not only did Kelley made effective use of Heider's (1958) and Festinger's (1954) ideas, but he explicitly extended the concern of attribution theory to 'self- attribution', how one knows his own states and dispositions.

Kelley's theory is oriented towards allocating causal attributions to either person or the environment, that is determining locus of causality.

The four attributional criteria for decisions about causal allocation discussed by Kelley (1967) are: (a) distinctiveness - whether the individual (self or target person) responds differently to different entities (or stimuli), (b) consensus - whether or not the same response is produced by other people in the presence of the given stimulus, (c) consistency over time - whether the target person responds similarly to the stimulus whenever it is presented in similar circumstances, and (d) consistency over modality - whether the target person responds similarly to the stimulus regardless of the type of situation in which the stimulus is presented.

Kelley has used these criteria both with respect to self-attribution as well as other attribution. In either case the perceiver wishes to determine whether his (or the other's) response to a stimulus is caused by properties inherent in
the stimulus, by properties of the actor, or by circumstantial factors. Person attribution was predicted to be most frequent when a response was characterized by low distinctiveness, low consensus and high consistency. Stimulus attribution was predicted to be maximized when a response was characterized by high distinctiveness, high consensus and high consistency. Attribution to the specific circumstances in which the response occurred was predicted in case of low consistency.

In subsequent essays, Kelley (1971, 1972) has elaborated on the determinants of attribution, especially emphasizing the dichotomous possibilities of self vs. other and person vs. situation as causal loci. In his discussion of "Attribution in social interaction", Kelley (1971) emphasized the covariation principle that underlies the effects of distinctiveness. An effect that occurs in the presence of particular entity and not others is presumed to be caused by that particular entity.

Thus, Kelley's theory was designed to provide global attributions either to the person, the stimulus, or the circumstances in which the behaviour occurred. According to his conception of ANOVA, people organize behavioural information as they receive it into a data matrix whose three dimensions are entities (stimulus), time and persons. People base their attribution upon the stored covariation information.
The uniqueness of Kelley's theory lies in employing analysis of variance procedure to ascription of causality. According to this procedure, to attain a valid picture of the world, the distinctiveness of the responses represents the numerator in a typical F-ratio and consistency overtime, modality and persons represent the denominator or error term. A person is surest of his understanding of the world when the response is distinctive (high numerator, or between entity variance), and when there is greatest consistency (agreement) over the other three variables (low denominator, or little within entity error variance).

Contribution of Heider, Jones and Davis; and Kelley to Attribution Theory

Kelley's (1967) definition of what constitutes the unit of input to the process is not the same as Heider's. In Kelley's view, the primary datum for the attribution process is an "entity-effect covariation". Basically, an effect is said to be attributed to that entity which is present when the effect is present and which is absent when the effect is absent. This primary datum is converted into internal or external attribution.

While, Heider (1958) focussed on attribution as the active construction of meaning in behaviour, Kelley (1967) focussed on causal analysis after the perceptual organization of events.
Jones and Davis (1965) focussed on a different aspect of attribution. While Kelley (1967) was most concerned with \"the allocation of causality between the environment and self\", Jones and Davis (1965) were most involved with the attribution of personal causality to actors. They addressed themselves to the problem of specifying the antecedent conditions for the attribution of dispositions to the actor. In contrast to Kelley, Jones and Davis (1965) were concerned with the analysis of a single attribution.

However, correspondent inference theory of Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley's (1971) ANOVA cube make a number of similar or at least complementary conceptions. Kelley's theory provides global attributions either to the person, the stimulus or the circumstances in which the behaviour occurred. Thus, dependent measures result in attributions that \"something\" about the person, stimulus or environment caused behaviour. The \"non-common effects analysis\" of correspondent inference theory provides a mechanism for determining what specifically the \"something\" is. That is, specific causal (non-common) factors are focussed upon in the non-common effects analysis, particularly specific causal factors residing in the person. Moreover, in ANOVA jargon, the variance is allocated between entity, circumstances and person. The greater the variance assigned to the person, the greater the correspondence between inferred intention or inferred disposition and behaviour.
Internal Versus External Locus of Control

The first systematic examination of individual differences in causal attribution was undertaken by Rotter and his colleagues (1966). Rotter's concern with causality followed the development of a "social learning theory". Rotter focussed on an individual difference variable labelled "internal versus external control". That is, there seem to be stable individual differences in the degree to which people feel they control or are controlled by their environment.

Rotter has investigated the effects of luck versus skill situations on the formation of general and specific expectancies. In a chance or luck situation the reward is externally determined. Thus, the probability of a reward is unaffected by the response of the organism in chance or luck situation. On the other hand, in skill situations the reinforcement is contingent upon the organism's behaviour; reward here is, in part, internally determined. Hence, the attainment of a reinforcement in situations perceived as determined by chance may result in changes (shifts) of expectancy that differ from the changes (shifts) of expectancy regarding goal attainment in a skill-defined setting. Rotter indicated that the expectancy of success generally rises following an experience of success and declines following a failure. He suggested, these shifts in a person's expectancy
may be due not only to the evaluation of his past experience, but also the perception that the outcome derived from internal versus external causes. More specifically, Rotter (1966) proposed that shifts in expectancy would be minimal following an outcome perceived as externally caused (due to chance or luck) but maximal following an outcome perceived as internally caused (due to ability or skill).

Weiner (1974) is critical of the Rotter type distinction between internal and external control because it is confounded with the stability dimension. For example, skill is internal but stable factor while luck is external as well as unstable factor. Weiner and his colleagues have conducted a number of laboratory type studies (e.g., Weiner, Heckhausen, Meyer and Cook, 1972) which suggested that attribution of causality to stable factors results in a much greater change in subsequent expectancy judgements than attributing causality to unstable factors. Weiner (1979) also distinguished the concept of "locus of control" into two separate concepts "locus" and "control".

The Concept of Origin and Pawn

de Charm's (1968) "origin-pawn" distinction appears quite similar to the Rotter's (1966) "Internal vs. external locus of control". An "origin" who is similar to an "internal" is postulated to be a person who perceives his behaviour as determined by his own choosing and a "Pawn" who is similar to an "external" is theorised to be a person who perceives his behaviour as determined by external forces beyond his control.
Feeling like an origin has strong effects on behaviour as compared to feeling like a Pawn. de Charms (1968) stated that the origin-pawn distinction is continuous, not discrete, that is, a person feels more like an origin under some circumstances and more like a pawn under other conditions.

An Attributional Model of Action

Weiner (1971, 1972) led in shifting the emphasis of attribution theory from person perception to self-perception by systematizing the concepts of attributional process through a general attributional model of action. He studied attribution mainly in the context of a person's achievement behaviour, mostly through laboratory studies. He distinguished two approaches. One research paradigm links causal ascription to affective expression (Nisbett and Schachter, 1966; Schachter and Singer, 1962; Valins, 1966). The second paradigm relates causal attribution to expectancy of success (Phares, 1957; Rotter et.al. 1961). A general attributional model of action by Weiner (1972), therefore, incorporates, the influence of causal ascription on both affect and expectancy. The model has been postulated as:

Stimulus $\rightarrow$ Causal Cognitions $\rightarrow$ Affect $\rightarrow$ Response

Goal Expectancy
The model indicates that a stimulus arouses cognitions about the cause of a behavioural outcome. The cognitions determine affective responses and goal expectancies as well as subsequent behaviours.

The attributional model of motivation has been presented in three stages:

**STAGE I: TASK EVALUATION**

- **Affective anticipations**
  - Stimulus $\rightarrow$ Causal cognitions
  - Expectancy of success; that task

**STAGE II: GOAL DIRECTED BEHAVIOUR**

- **Affective anticipations**
  - Behaviour $\rightarrow$ Outcome
  - Expectancy of success (if approach)

**STAGE III: TASK AND CAUSAL ASCRIPTION RE-EVALUATION**

- **Affective response**
  - Outcome $\rightarrow$ Causal cognitions
  - Expectancy of success; future task

The mediating ascriptions in the above cognitive model of motivation are both predictive and postdictive. Within achievement-related contexts, for example, a task stimulus gives rise to anticipations concerning the causal determinants of success and failure. If a task is perceived as completely
decided by chance, then luck is inferred as the only causal determinant. On the other hand, in situations believed to be skill determined, power (ability) and effort may be included among the determinants of outcome. The "can" factors (ability and favourable environment, here, task difficulty), in conjunction with effort (trying) and 'luck' determines the expectancy of success at the task, as well as influencing affective anticipations.

After the instrumental action is completed, the outcome of the behaviour is evaluated as a success or a failure (in achievement setting). The processing of the outcome information results in a reconsideration (postdiction) of the causal determinants.

Task evaluation stage influences the behaviour toward the particular task initiating the causal cognitions. The task and causal ascription re-evaluation stage influences behaviour toward future tasks. Both the affective response (pride or shame, for instance) and the goal expectancy determine subsequent behaviour; however these affective effects and expectancy effects are conceptually and operationally distinct, and need not positively covary.

Weiner (1980) proposed a revised model in achievement setting and also empirically tested this model in helping behaviour context. The model is as follows:

Event ➔ Causal Attribution ➔ Affect ➔ Action
The model denotes that an event gives rise to causal cognition which in turn generates particular affects, and effects ultimately determine a person's behaviour.

The present study is aimed at testing the above mentioned model of attribution presented by Weiner (1980) in the context of actual performance in organizational setting.