CHAPTER III

BRAHMAN

All the vedāntins accept Brahman as one prime principle. The root of this principle is found deeply rooted in the Vedic hymn: "One alone, the wise declare it many." This inquiry about the Highest being passed through number of stages and culminated in the Upaniṣads as a principle of Sat, Cit, Ānanda. Bādarāyaṇa describes the same principle when he says, "That from which the world originates, by which it sustained and in which it dissolves, in Brahman." This principle of Brahman inevitably attracted the attention of all Advaita thinkers. They gave a rational explanation of it.

Definition of Brahman:

Brahman being an attributeless being defies all description. A definition is of two kinds – definition per accidens (or indicative definition) and definition by essence, respectively known as tathāthālakṣaṇa and

1. जन्माकाश्य यतः।

- B.S. I/1/2.
Svarūpalakṣaṇa. The first type of definition defines a thing without the implication of the differentiation entering into its constitution, for example, in a sentence 'the person wearing a hat is our guest,' the hat does not form an integral part of a person. The definition of Brahman given by Bādarāyaṇa in his Brahma-Sūtra is this first type of definition i.e. tatasthālakṣaṇa. The universe has Brahman as its cause. Here the attribution of causality to the Brahman is for the purpose of distinguishing it from other cause such as Prakṛti etc. The tatasthālakṣaṇa enables one to identify the thing defined without in any way suggesting that the qualities are in intimate association with it. The definition by Svarūpalakṣaṇa is necessary to understand the full nature of Brahman. Brahman itself is full of Bliss. Bliss is not an attribute of Brahman but is its very essence. It is to be observed and experienced. Brahman is devoid of attributes and as such as term 'ānanda' found in the

1. तात्स्थलकर्णानाम् - यावलक्ष्यकलमवस्थलत् गति यद्य व्यावहैर्य तदेव । - Vedāntaparibhāṣā P: 115

2. तात्स्थलकर्णानाम् भौतिकत्वं व्यावहारस् । - तैः उपो ॥
Upanisads cannot be regarded as an attribute of Brahman only by assuming Bliss to be an attribute of Brahman, we may define Brahman as an entity qualified by ananda i.e. Bliss, which is adequate enough to differentiate Brahman from entities which are generally conceived as the source of the world such as pradhāna, atoms which are inert. What is to be understood from this definition is not what it explicitly states but what indirectly suggests.

Madhusūdana in his 'Siddhāntabindu' says that Ātman i.e. Brahman is not limited by space and time. It is existing everywhere. It is not the counter-entity of any one of the four kinds of negation. Brahman is imagined as body etc. falsely due to beginningless and indescribable avidyā, but it is itself without duality and is of the nature of Self-illuminated knowledge. Brahman is the

1. आत्मसाय देश्यालापरिर्चन्तन्त्वात् - : S.B. P:16
2. काल्याणाभावप्रतितियोगी - : S.B. P:17
3. स्वुक्ष्माश्चार्चुः आत्मस्ते तपायनात्वपितिक्यकल्पिता अनिष्कीया द्वैति सिद्धान्तर्हस्य - : S.B.P :18
object of Highest Love. While quoting the *Sruti
passages Madhusūdana declares that Brahman is neither
a doer nor an enjoyer but is full of Bliss. It is
devoid of qualities, imperishable, Self-luminous and
Bliss. It is changeless and full of light. It is
devoid of qualities. It is omnipresent, Secondless,
Highest Bliss and consciousness.

The definition of Brahman given by Madhusūdana
Sarasvatī in his ' Siddhāntabindu ' proves that he


1. परंपराप्रमाणपद्वेषन ।
   - S.B. P:35

2. अभिमोक्तपरमाणूंक्षमरुपताल्पनो ।
   - S.B. P:33

3. तत्त्वानुद्वर्तपत्त्रादिकमन्मकमन्मकशुभालम्कर्याप्रियादात्वपरमात्मात्।
   - S.B. P:35

4. आत्मनो निक्षेपार्जातु ।
   - S.B. P:37

5. आत्मनो निक्षेपात्ते ।
   - S.B. P:68

6. तैन सवैयाकानिद्यकतः परमाणुः-दबोध्यरुपः ।
   - S.B. P:82
accepts Brahman as of the nature of Highest Bliss, knowledge and Absolute light.

**Omnipresence of Brahman:**

Brahman is described as omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent in the Upanisadic passages. But an opponent points out that Brahman is not omnipresent, because first the Śrutis mention the atomic nature of Brahman. The Śruti passages in point are: "That which is the finest essence." (chān. Up. Vi/8/6); "More minute..."
Secondly, the Śruti lays down the non-distinction between the atomic
individual soul and Brahman. The Śruti passages in point
are: "The puruṣa of the size of a thumb" (Katha Up.
II/4/12.), "A lower one of the size of the point of a
goaḍi is also seen." (Śvet. Up. V/8). Madhusūdana refutes
the above objection with the help of Śruti passages.
While quoting Śruti passages-viz."This immortal Brahman
itself is in front, Brahman in the rear, Brahman has
spread towards the south and towards the north, below
(our feet) and over (our head); this universe is Brahman
itself; this (Brahman) is the most excellent (Munda. Ut.
II/2/11) etc. Madhusūdana states that the Śruti establi-
shes the omnipresence of Brahman. Although the jīva is
said to be 'great' because we perceive the consciousness
as pervading the whole body, he is said to be as small as
the tip of a spoke, on account of the superimposition of
of an attribute of a limiting agent. Similarly Brahman is
is said to be atomic because it is intended to point out the
subtle nature of Brahman.¹

¹. S.B. P:84.
Brahman: as not a Counter-entity of negation;

Atman has neither antecedent negation nor consequent negation, because (i) non-Ātman cannot apprehend the negation, due to unconsciousness. In order to know something, there must be a knower. The knower can be only self: Non-Ātman being of the nature of unconsciousness cannot be the knower. (ii) One cannot think another Ātman to be the perceiver, because the Ātman is one alone and the other different from the Ātman is nothing but the non-Ātman. (iii) The same Ātman itself cannot apprehend its own negation, because such apprehension involves an inconsistency viz. when the thing to be perceived (ātmabhāva) exists, the perceiver (ātmā) does not exist, and when the perceiver exists, the thing to be perceived does not exist.

Still if we suppose the Ātman to be the subject of negation, then also we have to face undesirable conclusions:

1. आत्मा ज्ञत्वात् — S.B. P:16
2. र्त्तमन्त्रय संत्र्वमानवात् — S.B. P:16-17
3. स्वेत्वं स्वमाविभं विरीक्षात् ग्राह्यात् ग्राह्याकस्तवाद्
   ग्राह्याकस्तवाय प्रमावात् — S.B. P:17
first what we do in the present life will pass unrewarded (कृत्यायाग) and secondly, the pleasure and pain which we experience in our present life are either results without any cause or results of actions done by another ātman (अत्याय) . The absolute negation of ātman is not at all possible, because it is present everywhere. 

The reciprocal negation also cannot be applied because the negation of ātman is to be proved. We have an experience of silver in a shell because shell does exist. The reciprocal non-existence can be asserted only between two things of the same nature of existence between the pot and the piece of cloth. But no such negation can be asserted between the asat silver and the Sat shell, so also between the asat duality and the Sat Brahman.

1. सूक्ष्मायान्त: सवैत्रायुगमच्च नात्त्वन्तराकारस्य:।

2. देवत्य भिक्ष्यायान्तकान्तादात्त्वारिः प्रशायान: सूक्ष्मायान्त:।

-S.B. P: 17
So Brahman is not the counter-entity of any of the four kinds of negation.

Brahman is self-self-illuminated knowledge.

Brahman : Witness of all Conditions:

Madhusudana has defined Brahman as 'स्वप्नाकाशवृषिलं'.

Against this, the objector argues that according to you, Ātman is knowledge, and knowledge, and knowledge is considered to be same at any stage; but in the deep-sleep condition we do not have any sort of knowledge. A person waking from his sleep experiences that 'I was stupefied and knew nothing in sound sleep.' This proves that Ātman is perishable.

Madhusudana refutes the above objection by saying that recollection that 'I was stupefied' itself explains that there is the existence of Ātman. If there were no Ātman in deep-sleep condition, then the experience of stupefaction would not have arisen.

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1. नात्मा नामा-प्रतिलोकी | S.B.P: 17
2. स्वप्नकाश-बौधसम अत्मनि | S.B.P: 18
3. अत्मन: सुषुष्यितात्मित्वान् तत्र संपत्ति: | S.B.P: 19
Although the perception, the means of perception, the perception and the object of perception are not invariably the same in all the three conditions; yet the self which is present in all these conditions and is therefore the witness of their existence and non-existence, does not vary at any time. Knower (प्रज्ञान) is the substratum of knowledge. Like a lamp it illumines itself as well as other things. Unlike pot it does not require something other than itself to reveal itself. This means that if it is existent or present, it will reveal itself at that very time. It does not require sākṣin to illumine or reveal itself. From this it follows that if it were present in deep sleep it would have revealed itself. But in deep sleep it is not revealed, hence it is absent in deep sleep.

Madhusūdana refutes the above objection by stating that your knower is liable to changes, and due to this, it is not possible for it to witness its own changes.¹

¹. कितैशैवेन स्वकितैशैवित्वातुपपेक्षायेत्य इष्टत्वाधाराः
-तप्पमातृश्च परिणामत्वेन इष्टत्वात।
-S.B. P:20
The self, according to the opponent is possessed of attributes such as doership etc. hence it is naturally liable to changes. Whatever is changing is a 'thing to be perceived.' Your perceiver is a thing to be perceived and as such it can not be the witness, because a thing to be perceived cannot be a witness.

The Brahman which is one and invariable can only be the witness in deep-sleep condition. 1

To sum up the whole argument, the objector had said that since the self could illumine both itself and the objects around it and was itself the doer and enjoyer there was no necessity to assume the existence of a separate witness. To this, Madhusudana replies that since the self is liable to changes, itself is an object of perception, it cannot be the perceiver of its own changes. so the one who is immutable is alone the witness of everything.

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1• एकत्र व्रतायति सत्यविशिष्टत्वात्।

-S.B. P. 20.
The opponent does not accept this. He further says that One (एकः), changeless (कृतस्थः) and attributeless (निर्मेयः) cannot be accepted as a Sākṣin, because he is unproved (अप्रामाणिकत्वात्).

While quoting the śruti sentences Madhusūdana refutes the above objection and states that Brahman is the witness.

Reflection of Brahman in Mind:

It has been said that the inner-organ becomes the support of right knowledge because the self is reflected therein as a thing in a mirror. So the objection has been raised that the Brahman being without colour (नीरूपः) and without parts (निरघ्नः) cannot be reflected.

To this, Madhusūdana replies with the help of the example of a crystal and a china rose. The china rose has a रूप: i.e. its redness, but this rūpa itself has no
rupa, and is impartite still it is reflected in a mirror. The redness and not the flower is seen reflected in a crystal.¹ Even in the case of sound which is impartite, we find a reflection called an 'echo'.² There seems to be no distinction between the reflection of the sound, and that of the colour of the china rose on the one hand and the reflection of the face in the mirror on the other.

To this also, the objection is raised. The objector says that there is possibility of reflection only in those things that can be perceived by organs.³ The sound is perceived by the ear, and the colour of the china flower is also perceived by the eye, so they can be reflected. But Brahman cannot have reflection

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1. जयाकुमार्य नीरहस्त निबलकथियोपि स्पृहितावृ प्रतिषिध्देषतात्।
   -S.B. P:22

2. शुद्धत्वमैत्र प्रतिश्वभावयः।
   -S.B. P:22

3. क्यापी द्वियाश्च यौ मैत्र प्रतिषिध्देषतं।
   -S.B. P:22
because it is not perceived by any sense-organs. Madhusūdana says that this is not a universal rule. There are such things which cannot be perceived by any of the sense-organs, and yet are seen to be reflected. The ether, which cannot be perceived by any organ, and is cognizable by the Sākṣin only, is seen reflected in water.¹ And if, we do not recognise the reflection of ākāśa in water, we cannot explain why we have the apprehension of profound depth in knee-deep water.²

The opponent maintains that ākāśa is perceived not by sākṣin but by visual sense organ. It is a general rule that a thing can be perceived by the same organ with which the reflection of the thing is perceived. Vedāntins accept that the reflection of ākāśa is perceived by the eyes. So they could accept that ākāśa itself is perceived by eyes. If ākāśa were not

¹ अनिन्द्रियास्य सातिप्रत्यक्षायण्याकाशाको जलादी पृष्टिविश्लेषभारत ।
- S.B. p:22

² कथ्या जातुमात्रेयुक्तिगमिकोरथसत्त्व स्यात् ।
- S.B. p:22-23
cognizable by the eye, but by the sāksin, then the reflection of ākāśa should be perceived even by a blind man.¹

Madhusūdana rejects the above view and states that ākāśa accompanied by light and clouds is reflected in water, this is the reason why we require eyes to cognise the reflection (of ākāśa) and what is reflected (ākāśa). Pure ākāśa is perceived by sāksin alone but the ākāśa accompanied by light and clouds as also its reflection is perceived with the help of eyes.²

Can Brahman have āvareṇa?

Madhusūdana has made a statement that Brahman though pure is covered over and therefore requires a

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1. वाकाश्यःप्रतिबिम्बितम्भयं सातिमास्यत्वेपि सालोकस्य सामप्रय क प्रतिबिम्बितचाचच्छिष्टायमिस्तानगृहः च चन्द्रोपेत्तात्।

-S.B. P:23

2. स्तैन कीर्ण नम हत्याविद्विशेषपरिनतुर्वयविद्विश्विण्यतुस्मात्। स्तैन सालोकस्याःहयाविष्णुनत्वात्। नमस्त्वाध्युप्रति-

-बिम्बमेव रूपाणि नान्याविद्यवेष्याम्।

-S.B. P:23
for establishing a relation between it and the knowing self.¹ The objector here doubts: how can a Brahman, who is omniscient and self luminous, can have a śvarāṇa?²

Madhusūdana answers the above objection as follows: It is true that Brahman is pure and self-luminous and hence omniscient. Such a Brahman cannot have any veil or covering of Ignorance (ajnāna). But it can be the object of Ignorance of individual soul that is limited by internal organ. In this sense only Brahman is said to have covering or veil of Ajnāna. In the cognition 'I do not know Brahman', 'I' i.e. Jīva is the subject to ignorance (ajnāna). While Brahman is the object of that Ignorance. Thus though Brahman has no veil of Ignorance, it is said to have it in the sense that it becomes the object of Jīva's ignorance (ajnāna).³

¹. स्वभौपि क्षणलय्य बावरणात् ।
   -S.B. P:60

². ननु क्षण: कथमावरणम् । निरवधवनप्रकाशेः सवैज्ञानीतः।
   -S.B. P:61

³. स्वसंबलमभैनाकत्या सवैप्रमपन्तः करणाविश्वाचित्मीतीम्
   -जानविषयत्वा भावृतपिंतिः व्यवदेशात् ।
   -S.B. P:61
Brahman: as the cause of the Universe:

If Brahman were the material cause of the world, an opponent argues, then since there obtains a relation of identity between the material cause and its effects, Brahman must be of the same nature as the wonderful world and being identical with the world. Brahman must be of the nature of misery. And if individual soul is identical with such Brahman, then the highest aim of man, namely the cessation of misery, will never be attained by the realization of its true nature.

To this, Madhusūdana answers that Brahman is self-luminous and it is itself the Highest Bliss. It is falsely said to be the material cause of the world, because Brahman is the substratum, (adhiṣṭhāna kāraṇa) of the whole worldly delusion. Brahman, the substratum, has got no connection with the world which is superimposed on Brahman.

1. ननु कश्चिदं वन्दुपापानादैनोपादानोपाध्योवायोऽद्विद्यत्तिविभिन्नकिन्नत्वेन
कश्चिदं द्वारकत्वान्त तद्विन्नत्वेन जीवलय परमपराप्राप्तिकतिविरियाश्चक्तः
...
-S.B. P. 84

2. कश्चिदं वन्दुपापानादैनोपादानोपाध्योऽद्विद्यत्तिविभिन्नकिन्नत्वेन
कर्माचार्यापदेशायाश्चतेन च सर्वं संबंधामावान् तत्रात्मादेशायाश्चा
-S.B. P. 84.
Brahman, the object of inquiry is defined as self-luminous and Highest Bliss in the 'Siddhāntabindu' by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. According to him, Brahman is the material cause of the world. He denies world but considers its existence at empirical level which we will see later on.

It will be interesting to note the different Vedāntins regarding Brahman as the cause of the world. Śaṅkara is of the opinion that Brahman is attributeless, immutable and nirguna. Saguṇa Brahmana (Īśvara) is the efficient cause of the universe. While Rāmānuja considers Brahman to be saviṣeṣa. It is endowed with all auspicious qualities. He considers Brahman to be a

1. ब्रह्म न सृष्टिकार्य जगद्यचिन्तितामात्मामात्मकारणमित्युक्तम्।
   - सतो मातो १।१४।

2. सृष्टिक निरस्त्रानिनिज्ज्ञानगर्भोपनाशिकाभिः
   अंतःक्रियान्याविद्यामात्मामात्मकारणां
   पुरुषोत्तमो नारायण एव
   निन्त्य जगद्यकारण विस्मयं ब्रह्मतं विषमाद।
   - भूमिक्ष्य १।१।१२।
personal God with attributes and believes it to be the efficient and material cause of the universe.\(^1\)

According to Nimbārka, Brahman is both the Upādāna (the material cause) and the Nīmitta (efficient cause) of the universe. It is the material cause in the sense that it enables its natural saktis, viz. cit and acit in their subtle forms, to be manifested in gross forms, and it is the efficient cause in the sense that it unites the individual souls with their respective actions and means of enjoyments. The universe is not unreal but is a true manifestation or parināma of Brahman.\(^2\) He gives an example:

1. न निमित्त कारणां ज्ञातं उपादाकरणं कृष्णेऽत्यतः। कुलः ॥
   प्रतिक्रिया दृष्टान्त-वातनुरूपं। ....... क्रिया उपादान-कृतं निविष्टमाइस्यानन्दनिःस्वस्तिक्षितस्वपि निधित्तमाकस्यम्।
   स्वत्सत्यादित्यतिक्रियानि कलानविनि संस्कृतामुपायेन। क्रिया कृतः कृतः तत्काये निलंक्षे अगंतविज्ञाति स्याते । ....... क्रिया उपादानः
   निमित्तभूपादानः।।
   - श्रीमाण्य १४।२३

2. क्रियानिमित्तभूपादानः। कुलः ॥ तदात्मानं रक्षकरुटं
   इत्यादिनावितः। नन्ति कृतः। कुलः कृतिविषयस्य। ॥ परिणामात्सवैः
   सबैशबितक्रियानि स्वस्वतितिक्रियापैण जगदार्शनात्मा परिणामाच्छ।
   ज्ञ्याकृति रक्षपैण सचित्तता कृतिविद्धा परिणामके महति ॥।
   - क्रियामाणासारम् - १४।२६
that just as milk transforms itself into curd, so also Brahman has transformed itself into the universe.¹

Vallabhacarya regards Brahman as the Samavēyi kāraṇa of the universe.² According to him the worldly objects are the manifestation (avirbhāva) and disappearance (tirobhāva) of the Bhagavat. Madhvacarya accepts Brahman only as the efficient cause and not as the material cause of the world.

Brahman: One alone.

The opponent quotes a Sruti sentence that 'Brahman is one alone, without a second,' and states that this sruti establishes that Brahman is One.³ Madhusudana rejects it by the phrase 'Na va Kevalatvam' Brahman is not one, because 'Oneness' is due to ignorance.⁴

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1. र्वनक्षिप्तायुक्तार्थाया गृह भरणामति स्वतां गार्तर्तांकलाब्राम्भात्।

². प्रकोपांतविष कर्ताराय भवे भवे भवेन्द्रे भवेन्द्रे भवेन्द्रे।

3. मनो एकयोगविशेष्यं द्वारा दिनः दिनः दिनः दिनः दिनः दिनः।

⁴. न हि भवाग्रं न प्रवर्त्ययमिति। कैलिकल्पकान: स्वायत्वध्रुवः।

- S.B P: 148

- S.B. P: 148
opponent further says that if oneness of Brahman is not propounded by the vedic text mentioned above, there would be manifoldness of Brahman, proved by the means of knowledge viz. perception etc. To this, Madhusūdana replies that that the phrase 'Na ca śūnyam' i.e. 'nor-non-absoluteness' denies your argument. He while, quoting śruti says that 'कौकल्व्यं' indicates 'manifoldness' i.e. कौकल्व्यं.

It is argued that if you deny everything of Brahman, there will be the situation of 'Śūnyatvam'! Madhusūdana refutes the above objection by the phrase 'Na ca śūnyam'. He gives reasons for that 'One' and 'Secondless' in a sentence, '(Brahman is ) one only without a second' deny all distinction in Ātman, yet the word 'only' is used to negate such distinction as is due to the relation of an attribute and the possessor.

1. यथात्मन एकलं शुच्याः न प्रतिपाद्ये, ताहि-प्रत्यज्ज्वातिक्षांकवादे।

- S.B. P: 148

2. न हि त्यां न कौकल्त्वमिति | कौकल्त्वमैकल्वसं |

of that attribute. The word 'only' in that sentence excludes the possibility of there being any internal difference.¹ The other Vedānta school admits that all this is Brahman, but further says that the world as well as individual souls exist inside it, and the former is an outcome of its infinite powers and the latter are related to it as sparks are to fire and therefore Brahman is a dharma (possessor of an attribute) and its 'Sarvaśaktimattva' and 'Sarvajña' are the dharmas residing therein. Due to this dharmadharma-bhava the bhedā-bhedatva also comes into existence. But Madhusudana says that the term 'Only' refutes such dharmadharma-bhava and bhedā-bhedatva and establishes the existence of the Brahman.²

That which is reduced to duality is called 'dvaitam' (द्वैतम्); the quality of being so reduced is dvaitam (कस्य भावो द्वैतम्).

¹. एकादीशमिति पदद्वैत स्वभावप्रतिष्ठेण अध्येयकर्ण
एकादशातिवदेशप्रतिष्ठेणात्। - S.B. P: 149

². Ibid.
In simple language, the term 'dvaitam' means 'reduced to twoness or duality' and the term 'dvaitam' means 'the idea of being reduced to twoness'. What is divided into two is 'dual', and the state of being dual is duality. Here Madhusūdana quotes Suresvara's Vārttika. "They say that what is divided into two is 'dual' and the abstract noun from it is said to be 'duality'."\(^1\)

Literally it means that in which there is no 'dvaitam', i.e. the quality of having been reduced to duality is advaitam.\(^2\) The Āruti also supports this, 'The seer is pure, one without a second' (Br. Up. 4/3/32).

If it is said that in that case, the existence of Self should be demonstrated by pointing it out with the finger.\(^3\) Madhusūdana states that it is not possible.

1. द्वितिमित्त्वान्तरत्मायात्मायान्तरर्योंतरम् ।
   - Br. Bha. Vā. 4/3/1807
2. न किम् तृतीयं द्वितीयात्मायोऽयं तद्वितीमित्त्वान्तरत्मायः ।
   - S.B. P: 150
3. तद्वितीयात्मायात्मानन्दिकर्षिनिविदन प्रतिविद्यतांतिपि ।
   - S.B. P: 155(194)
He says "Katham bravimi". Here 'katham' implies the impossibility of its description because Atman being void of duality is not an object of speech. The Vedic texts also support this view - 'He spoke without any words at all.' (Nṛ. U. Tap. 7). 'That from which speech together with the mind turns away without reaching it.' (Tait. U.P. 2/4/1).

Now if Brahman is not a subject of speech, how can the Vedic texts be regarded as authority for the existence of Brahman? The answer is that, the Brahman or the Self is not a subject of speech, the Upaniṣads are able to remove ignorance by giving rise to a state of mind in which one thinks of Brahman. That is why the epithet 'Sarvavedāntasiddham' has been used. Brahmānanda and Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, the commentators of 'Siddhāntabindu' are of the opinion that the authoritativeness of the Vedānta texts lies in being an instrument to give rise to right knowledge in the shape of a state of mind.

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1. अविष्णूगैत्यात्मनि तदाक्षरृशिष्टाः तदविष्णुविनिविष्वात्

-S.B. P: 152.
in tune with Brahman. They are not supposed to be an instrument to bringing about a fruit relating to it.\(^1\) Abhyankara explains it by saying that two kinds of अविन्दन’s take place when an object becomes known. They are वृद्धि or वृत्ति and विदामाम or फलयाविन्दन. The former dispels the ignorance with reference to a

\[\text{\underline{\text{1. अय्यल्लो वन्मुख्यविविषयत्वात् प्रामाण्यफलविषयः}}\]

\[\text{वृंच्छयोगश्रावरस्य र्वामाविकेन ब्रह्मसम्बन्धेन विशिष्टोऽद्विभिः०} \]

\[\text{द्रष्टाकांलिनं हृतं} \]

\[\text{फलयाविकायत्वाय शास्त्रकृद्धिविनविनिर्मलस्य} \]

\[\text{क्रामण्यानन्दशायं वृद्धिवायत्वविज्ञ्यो} \]

\[\text{तत्र वेदात्तानं प्रामाण्यं तदादात्तुच्यत्वप्रमाणविलाप्यं न तु} \]

\[\text{तद्विकायकलरस्यप्रमाणविज्ञ्यकलतवस्तिः} \]

\[\text{तद्विकायकलरस्यप्रमाणविज्ञ्यकलतवस्तिः} \]

\[\text{क्रामण्यानन्दशायं वृद्धिवायत्वविज्ञ्यो} \]

\[\text{तत्र नारायणिका : पृ ३४५ं पंक्ति-६} \]

\[\text{तत्र के दात्तानं प्रामाण्यं तदादात्तुच्यत्वप्रमाणविलाप्यं न तु} \]

\[\text{तद्विकायकलरस्यप्रमाणविज्ञ्यकलतवस्तिः} \]

\[\text{तद्विकायकलरस्यप्रमाणविज्ञ्यकलतवस्तिः} \]

\[\text{क्रामण्यानन्दशायं वृद्धिवायत्वविज्ञ्यो} \]

\[\text{तत्र नारायणिका : पृ ३४५ं पंक्ति-६} \]
particular object, while the latter makes the object which is inert, manifest. When the Brahman is to be realised, the first is required because there is ignorance to be dispelled. The second one is not required, because the thing to be known is self-evident.¹

The identity between Jīva and Brahman:

According to kevalādvaita Vedānta, Jīva is identical to Brahman. This point has been incidentally referred to by Śaṅkara and his followers, though not discussed. Śaṅkara has accepted the identity of Jīva and Brahman on the basis of the Śruti; he grammatically wrestles to extract the meaning of identity from it.

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¹ ब्रह्मचिन्तामणि गोपकुल महाराज द. पं. लिङ्गदयाल भारत सरस्वती विद्यानिकेय कालिका (कृपया ध्यान दें कि, ब्रह्मचिन्तामणि के हिंदी में यह उद्धेद ब्रह्मचिन्तामणि हैं क्योंकि यह ब्रह्मचिन्तामणि विद्यासागर जी के अनुसार हैं। इसलिए, यह उद्धेद ब्रह्मचिन्तामणि हैं क्योंकि यह ब्रह्मचिन्तामणि विद्यासागर जी के अनुसार हैं।)
His successors accept the absolute identity between the Brahman and jīva and regard that so long the jīva does not discard Nescience leading to duality and does not realize its own nature, it remains the individual self. When it knows its own nature by Ārati sentences, it becomes Brahman. As long as the false notion such as 'I am man, doer... etc. persists in jīva, it does not know its own nature. Realizing its own nature with the true knowledge, it becomes one with Brahman. The statement that jīva becomes one with Brahman is only a verbal statement, because it is always Brahman. A crystal, for example, is imagined wrongly to be red on account of a red flower placed near it. The Brahman is falsely imagined as jīva on account of Nescience.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī is of the opinion that Brahman (Saguna Brahman=God) and jīva are one and the same. Brahman is itself complete Bliss, Omnipotent and Omniscient. And the individual soul is identical with the Brahman, who is the cause of the universe. ¹

¹. तै जगत्कारणीयुत्तृत्तकविषयकविकिर्मणाः=कवित्रलक्षण ब्रह्मा सहस्त्रस्वरूपायिन्स पीवल इति सिद्धम्।

-S.B.P:74
The jīva is without any attributes but seems to be doer and experiencer due to Nescience. Avidyā is not real, so, the difference brought about by avidyā is equally unreal from the ultimate point of view. Avidyā veils jīva, the true nature of Brahman, which is self-luminous and eternal, and subjects it (=jīva) to illusion and provides enjoyment for it. So jīva experiences pleasure and pain. But, as soon as the jīva knows its own true nature with the help of śruti sentences like 'Tattvamasi' it discards its false nature, and realizing the true nature of its own, becomes Brahman.

While quoting Gaudapādiya Kārika and Brahmaṇḍaṇyaṇa Upaniṣad, Madhusūdana states that Jīva attains Brahman-hood by true knowledge.

1. तत्सन्निशचक्षुश्चत्तर्मकैशस्यायतन्तः करणतादालम्वय्याः च्यासाकर्मीभवेऽक्षतीतमोबलूत्त्वाध्यायाः उपपर्यते। - S.B.P: 66

2. क्या व खुनि: - न निरोधो न चौत्पर्वति कुश्चिं न च साक्षः।

न मुनुकृति मुक्तं हस्येषा परमायर्या || (- Gāoaka 1132)

इत्यतः द्वितीये ब्रह्मचर्याये प्रकटिः तपस्यास्त्यत्त्सत्सन्निष्ठे (को १४.१०) हस्येषा प्रकर्माये ब्रह्मचर्यप्रथमवव सतो जीवस्य ज्ञानं प्रकर्मां दृष्टान्तिः सृष्टि च केतु वायुः॥ - S.B.P: 87
Jīvas identity with the Saṅgaṇa Brahman (=God) has been established in the Upaniṣads by the statement 'Tattvamasi'.

'Tattvamasi'

Following Śaṅkara, all the kevalādvaitins agree in connection with the Lānt theory that the Self is neither doer nor enjoyer, but is by nature pure existence, knowledge and bliss. The knowership and doership are falsely attributed to the Self due to ignorance. As a matter of fact, the knowership as well as the doership are nothing but the products of māyā and are removable only by the true knowledge of the principal sentences of the Upaniṣads.

In fact, according to Kevalādvaitins all the sacred texts depict directly or indirectly the sole existence of unlimited and unqualified absolute Brahman. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī holds that the knowledge of the true nature of the self arises from the Upaniṣadic sentences such as 'Tattvamasi', 'I am Brahman' etc. These Upaniṣadic sentences remove ignorance of an individual. The final
emancipation takes place when complete identity between an individual Self and the Universal Self (Brahman=Saguṇa Brahman=God) is realized. And such realization follows the cognition of the meaning of the scriptural statement viz. 'tat tvam asi'.

These are said to be twelve of these great sentences, and their importance in the eyes of a Vedāntin may be judged from the statement of Sarvajñātma Muni. They are called great sentences i.e. Mahāvīkyas because they distinctly establish perfect identity between Jīva and Brahman. The principal sentences referred to in 'Siddhāntabāndhu' from the basis of the Advaita doctrine; they are 'Tattvamasi', 'I am Brahman...' etc. The aim of these sentences is to establish the great truth, that the soul of an individual is identical with Brahman.

The sentence "Tattvamasi" occurs nine times in Chandogya Upaniṣad. Chapter Six, para eight, where the sage Uddālaka impresses the above truth to his son Śvetaketu

1. निन्द्रामहावाक्यमात ृत्नीकृतिपूर्वतयांकलयित जन्तुः ||

- संज्ञापनस्तिस्तुः || III.303
by giving nine different illustrations.

Madhuśudana states that the great sentences generate directly the correct knowledge of the aforesaid identity. While commenting upon this, Brahmananda says that these sentences viz. 'Tattvamasi' etc. are the instrumental cause (kāraṇa) for the generation of direct knowledge of identity between jīva and Brahman. When there arises the antahkareṇa vṛtti of the identity of Brahman and Ātman, the identity no longer remains the object of ajñāna. Thus the object of this vṛtti is the object which is not the object of ajñāna. Hence this vṛtti is called pratyakṣa. This means that here the criteria

1. तत्‌ स्व प्राचीन स्मरणेऽविद्या तत्त्वमि प्रवर्तकस्‌।
   - S.B. P. 3

2. तत्‌ स्व प्राचीन प्रवर्तकस्‌ ‘तत्त्वमिः श्रीकृष्ण’ इत्यादि
   - S.B.P. 19
   - तत्त्वमिः प्रवर्तकस्‌।
   - स्मरणेऽविद्या तत्त्वमि।
   - न्यायरूपाली।

- पृ० ३०७-३१०। अं-१६
of pratyskṣa vṛttī is its having that object which is not the object of ajñāna.¹

The senses of the words which are to be established must be such as would suit the whole of the sentence, otherwise they are useless. Here, the senses of the words 'tät' and 'tvam' must be such as they would help to establish the fact from the sentence as a whole that the soul in the individual is the same as that in the universe.

As for an instance, the senses of Vedic words like 'Yūpa' (Sacred post) and 'Aḥavanīya' (a kind of domestic fire) can only be known from the scriptures. These two expressions are found in the Vedic statements as "the sacrificial animal is to be tied to the post (yūpe pāśum bāchānāti) and sacrifice is made in the domestic fire (Aḥavanīye juhoti). The meaning of the word 'yūpa' is a sacrificial

¹ ब्रजमेवयाकारमृत्तिकलितेऽवः ब्रजात्मक्याग्निविष्णुवत्वात्
	तद्विष्णुत्त्वे (क्ज्ञानविष्णुविष्णुत्वे) उष्णस्तः।
	pुल्लुत्वेति न कौटिप्रोष्ण हि ज्ञि भवः।

- न्यायरत्नाकर्ति : पृ २२
post made of bamboo or khadixf wood, which has been cut and properly shaped. This meaning is collected from the Vedic statements—like Yūpa takṣati, 'Yūpamastāśrikaroti' etc. (Tait. 3.1.1.). Similarly meaning of the word 'āchvaniya' is a domestic fire which has been duly propitiated by offerings made during the day time. This meaning is supplied by the śruti like कश्चन्ते ब्राह्मणोऽस्मिनान्तरोऽत गाह्यपत्यादायति विवाहकीयसः (Mund. 1.1.3). The meaning of the term 'गुप्तकनियपतति' is that, just these words are known by a reference to other cognate texts, similarly the words 't&t' and 'twam' should be understand. We have the same type of reference in the commentary of Samkṣepa-Śāńcīraka by Madhusūdana.¹

¹ लैक्षप्रियिश्वायचावतापि
सतीपकान्ताौपि शिविलेः
क्षणिशुभक्ष्य मुल्लाकोया
यस्य हि यूपाधिगर्भस्य || I-290. संज्ञापारीकः |

..... यथा “गृह त्वस्रिति
गुप्तमुख्याच्ये करौति। हृत्यादिप्रियाधारायकपपादिवा कपपक्षमिभवाहार
वामेऽन्त्यकपपादिकस्तकात्वाकः। कपपक्षानियम
dानवाच्चाात्यादिवाक्य भागान्त्यकाराधन्यकांवाहनकीयश्चति हि
निष्कीम्ये कौश्यपे; || स.५. || टीका of मुख्य on S.S.१.२१५.
When the sense of a sentence as a whole is gathered, the Mahāvākyas give rise to the Akhaṇḍākāra Vṛttī, and that is possible only when the senses of the words 'tat' and 'tvam' are ascertained with the help of the other Upaniṣadic texts. The word 'tat' directly means the omniscient God, who is the cause of the creation, preservation and destruction of the universe. This primary meaning is derived from the śrutis—"That from which these beings are born, that owing to which after having been born they live etc. But the secondary meaning of the word 'tat' is pure Brahman as described in the śruti as "Brahman is) truth, knowledge, and infiniteness." The primary sense of the word 'tvam' is the jīvātman which is possessed of limited powers and is capable of getting limited knowledge only.

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1. यत्र वा इमानि भवानि जायन्ते |४३.१.१ | हत्यादि
प्रत्यथादिविशिष्यवत्ततपवाच्याधिक्य समापितः | - सी.बी.पृ१०३

2. सत्यं ज्ञानमेतो भव। तैः २.१.१ | हत्याद्वस्तु लक्ष्याधिक्य |

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-S.B. P-3-4.
This jīva is the subject of the ā śrutis like—just as a big fish moves along both the banks (of a river); both here and there, just so this person goes along both these conditions, the condition of sleeping and the condition of waking (Śrīmad 4/3/19). The secondary sense of 'tvam' is however, the pure consciousness (or self). This pure consciousness is the subject of the ā śrutis like He who is of the nature of knowledge is this inner light inside the Prāṇas and the heart.

"Thou couldest not see the seer of the slight."

The primary senses of the said words are incompatible with the sense of the sentence as a whole, because jīva, being limited consciousness can never be identical with the omniscient God. Therefore, for the sake of

1. "कथा महामल्ल्य उभे कूले ज्युक्त्वर्ति पूर्व चापरं कैलेवारं पुरुषं रतामात्मान्त्यकल्याणां भव जिवानां व पुरुषं (बृहस्पति) इत्यादिभ जागृतवास्मुण्डेष्ट्याधिकारकस्त्वपदावर्याधिष्ठाय साक्षरति।"

S.B. P:4-5

2. "यों विज्ञानं: प्राणों वृक्षन्त्यसि: पुरुषं: 'न कृष्णस्वर्य इत्यादिवस्तु लक्ष्यार्थिः।"

- कितो कितो पृष्ट ४
consistency of the meaning of the sentence 'tat' and 'tvam' must be taken in their secondary senses. The recollection of the absolute or nirguna Brahman becomes only possible when the identity of primary senses of the individual soul and qualified Brahman (God) is found impossible. It is notable here, that not the fresh knowledge but the recollection takes place, because the knowledge of the absolute Brahman had previously arisen from the subordinate sentences like 'Brahman is) truth, knowledge and infiniteness' etc. The incompatibility of limitedness of knowledge on one hand, and omniscience on the other, indicated by the primary senses leads for the recollection which arises from the secondary senses.¹ Madhusudana has taken both the words 'tat' and 'tvam' in their secondary senses (laksyarthana). The laksana involved herein is known as Jahadosajahatsvattha. When the words are understood in this kind of secondary sense, the

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¹ ते तु प्रथमज्ञनातिरक्तकेल्या नृणाम: मुलके भ्रमणीस्तत्तत्तवाचितवाशी 
पुरुषाधी-व्याकुपपेक्षणया निकैलस्मरणोपपचिः।
- सिद्धांतिपुरुप ४
sense intended to be conveyed by the sentence becomes intelligible. Though both the words denote qualified consciousness and the difference of meanings of the two words lies in the difference of limitation (उपाधि) of consciousness. Yet by their secondary sense, they indicate Brahman as devoid of all attributes. \(^2\) Narāyana Tīrtha, a commentator of 'Siddhāntabindu' says that the realization of the absolute Brahman does not only arise from the subordinate sentences but is also experienced in the state of deep sleep. \(^2\) While referring to Vivaraṇa-pancārya, he says that in the state of deep sleep, the \(vṛttis\) of Nescience arises, namely, those of one's being a witness, of one's being happy and of one's being ignorant. The common experience of all men is that he slept so well.
that he did not know anything. Here, the Vrtti of being a witness is inferred from the fact that on arising from sleep one recollects his experiences he had while in deep sleep condition, of a past state of happiness and being ignorant of everything.\(^1\) There is a slight difference between the state of deep sleep and that of samādhi. In the former state, the Nescience is present, while in the latter, there is no place for Nescience, for in that state, the knowledge of the true nature of the self arises.

Thus we have seen that the knowledge of an identity of Saguna Brahma (God) and of the self is derived from the scriptures. Hence the question arises as to when the knowledge of the Self arises from the scriptures themselves, as also as to when we need philosophic discussion. Having those question in mind, Madhusūdana states that though the Self realization takes place in that manner, all men are

\(^1\) निषिद्धकाय व: सांतिवैशिष्ट्यविषयोऽपुनत्वोऽन्तराय:।
-किपिःपञ्चग्रहणमवैस्य: बुद्धविन्नश्चाश्चत्तत्रिष्ठ्य: स्नूत्त्यानुपक्ष:।
विचारवाचारांदिविदिस्य: स्त्रीपुक्तवाचित्यस्य:।
- नारायणि: पूव-३४: ॥
not endowed with powerful intelligence that lead to the realization of the unity of individual soul and God (Saguna Brahman).

Now the question is raised, how can a sentence produce direct knowledge? Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has deliberately dealt this question in his Vedāntakalpalatikā.¹ There he says that śabda may produce direct knowledge, but as a rule it generates indirect knowledge.* In connection with śabda producing direct knowledge, the following situation deserves consideration. Take an instance of ten persons counting all but himself. Somebody comes and says, you are the tenth. Here the indirect knowledge is first produced by the words and afterwards they produce the direct knowledge in mind.² The mistake which each one of

¹ See Vedāntakalpalatikā-ed. by R.D Karmarkar
² 'दशमत्वमधि- इत्यादावपि श्लेष्न पराजो जाने जानि, पश्चात्-पानभापराजान।
- केदारनाथकल्पिकाः = ५० ५०
The sentence 'tattvamasi' denotes aparoksha jnana by which the ignorance of a jīva is removed.1

Sarvajñatman has in his Samkṣepārāiraka, discussed the process by which the knowledge of the identity

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"तद्भाव्यविशेषाय्" सर्वज्ञातिनिविषयत्व: पारं दर्शयति त्वादि: " केदारन्त्रिष्णु- सुनिश्चितादि " इत्यदेशु मानस्यवाचु, पूर्ववाचु केदारन्त्रिष्णु- "ज्ञानस्योपदेशाच्यायत्वः" दिविक्षुतो शाख्योष्णस्य निपदेन विशेषविशयत्वः सामायू पुप्पेनापरोत्सचायतः।...

-Advaitasiddhi P: 875

2. कत्वम्याविविशेषायं अपरोपेश्यान्वयनकल्पवादिकाविनिरूप्तायाय- इत्यादिकावाक्यान्तरस्तराय भावाविपक्षं भवणमिचि

-Advaitasiddhi P: 877
of the individual soul with the Saguna Brahman (God) arises. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has in his commentary, called Sārasamgraha on 'Samkṣepāsārākā' explained it. He says that in a sentence 'Tattvamāsi' an anvaya called Sāmānādikaranya of the words 'tat' and 'tvam' takes place by Viśesanavīyabhāva which is something of abheda of the senses of these words, then a contradiction arises between these two, and having arisen this contradiction, the knowledge arises by लक्षण of the pure invisible ātmavastu which is the essence of both of them.  

1. - सामानाकिरण्यमहः भवति प्राथम्यमान-वयः  
   पश्चयेष विशेषणोत्तरत्या पश्चादिवरोधोऽधिष्ठित:।  
   तत्परेऽव विरोध एवंसे वसुन्धरंपरां  
   वृम्लिका-पण्य भवत्यविशिष्टस्य रूपः सुन्दरः।।  

2. - सामानाकिरण्यमहः पद्योपस्मलर्द्धयायेऽयोः  
   संक-क-ल विशेषणात्तत्त्वः सहस्त्रस्वम:।  
   संक-क-लच्य लघुलघुरंगणवा विशेष एवं हुँ  
   -रेतान्वप्रदानः वुष्टिणवलस्मारोहणीयानि तु॥।  

- S.S. I.196  
- S.S. I.197  

- वाक्यः सामानाकिरण्यायाः स्वर: प्राथम्यमहूः प्रथम  
   भवति, पश्चादिविशेषणोत्तरत्या विरोधाविशेष्यमाला वेदनेति यात्रुः।  
   एष: बन्यो भवति, पश्चात्त्व विरोधोऽधिष्ठित: विरोध-  
   स्वरूपति:। ततो विरोधे उत्पन्ने ज्ञाते वसुन्धरंपरात्मक: वसुन्धि  
   लक्षणया वृम्लिकाति, ततो वाक्यार्थे स्वरूपस्यन्त्यप्रसारतिक्रिया:।  

- S.S.कृप्याः पृ १६५