INTRODUCTION

Belief in an eternal soul is a misconception of the human consciousness. With regards to the soul theory, there are three kinds of teachers in the world:

I. The first teacher teaches the existence of an eternal ego-entity that outlasts death: He is the externalist.

II. The second teacher teaches a temporary ego-entity which becomes annihilated at death: He is the materialist.

III. The third teacher teaches neither an eternal nor a temporary ego-entity: He is the exalted One, our Lord Buddha.

Our great Master teaches that what we call ego, self, soul, personality, etc., are merely conventional terms that do not refer to any real, independent entity. According to Buddhism there is no reason to believe that there is an eternal soul that comes from heaven or that is created by itself and that will transmigrate or proceed straight away either to heaven or hell after death, Buddhists cannot accept that there is anything either in this world or any other world that is eternal or unchangeable. We only cling to ourselves and hope to find something immortal. We are like children who wish to clasp a rainbow. To children, a rainbow is something vivid and real; but the grown-ups know that it is merely an illusion caused by certain rays of light and drops of water. The light is only a series of waves or undulations that have no more reality than the rainbow itself.

Man has done well without discovering the soul. He shows no signs of fatigue or degeneration for not having encountered any soul. No man has produced anything to promote mankind by postulating a soul and its imaginary working. Searching for a soul in man like searching for something in a dark empty room. But the poor man will never realize that what he is searching for is not in the room. It is very difficult to make such a person understand the futility of his search.
Those who believe in the existence of a soul are not in a position to explain what and where it is. The Buddha's advice is not to waste our time over this unnecessary speculation and devote our time to strive for our salvation. We have attained perfection then we will be able to realize whether there is a soul or not. A wandering ascetic named Vacchagotta asked the Buddha whether there was a Ātman (self) or not. The story is as follows:

Vacchagotta comes to the Buddha and asks: 'Venerable Gotama is there an Atman?' The Buddha remained silent. 'Then Ven. Gotama is there no Ātman?'
Again the Buddha keeps silent. Vacchagotta gets up and goes away.

After the ascetic had left, Ananda enquires the Buddha why he did not answer Vacchagotta's question. The Buddha explices his position:

'Ananda, when asked by Vacchagotta, the Wanderer: 'Is there a Self?', if I had given answer: 'There is a self, then, Ananda, that would be siding with those recluses and Brahmanas who hold the externalist theory (sassata-vada).'</n

'And Ananda, when inquired by the Wanderer: 'Is there no self?', if I had claimed: 'There is no self, then that would be siding with those recluses and Brahmanas who hold the annihilationist theory (ucchedavada).'</n

'Again, Ananda, when questioned by Vacchagotta: 'Is there a Self?' if I had proclaimed: 'There is a self, would that be in accordance with my knowledge that all dhammas are without self?'

'Surely not, Sir'

'And again, Ananda, when asked by the Wanderer: 'Is there no Self?', if I had declared: 'There is no Self, then that would have created a greater confusion in the already confused Vacchagotta. For he would have thought:

Formerly indeed I had an Atman (Self), but now I haven't got one.' (Samyutta Nikāya)
Please pay attention that the terms *Anātta* and *Anātman* are equal meanings; *Anātta* is from Pāli, while its partner is *Anātman* from Sanskrit. An explanation will be given below.

The Buddha regarded soul-speculation as useless and illusory. He once said, 'Only through ignorance and delusion do men indulge in the dream that their souls are separate and self-existing entities. Their heart still clings to self. They are anxious about heaven and they seek the pleasure of self in heaven. Thus they cannot see the bliss of righteousness and the immortality of truth'. Selfish ideas appear in man' mind thanks to his conception of Self and craving for existence.

The Buddha countered all soul-theory and soul-speculation with His *Anātta* doctrine. *Anātta* is translated under various labels: No-Soul, No-Self, egolessness, and soullessness.

To understand the *Anātta* doctrine, one must understand that the eternal soul theory 'I have a soul' and the material theory - 'I have no soul' are both obstacles to self realization or salvation. They arise from misconception 'I am hence, to comprehend the *Anātta* doctrine, one must cling to any opinion or views or soul-theory; rather, one must try to see things objectively as they are and without any mental projections. One must learn to see the so-called', or Soul or Self for what it really is: merely a combination of changing forces. This requires some analytical explanation.

The Buddha taught that what we conceive as something eternal within us, is merely a combination of physical and mental aggregates or forces (*Pancakkhandhi*), made up of body or matter (*Rupakkhandha*), sensation (*Vedaniikkhandha*), perception (*Sanniikkhandha*), mental formations (*Samkhiirakkhandha*) and consciousness (*Vinniinakkhandha*). These forces are working together in a flux of momentary change; they are never the same for two consecutive moments. They are the component forces of the psycho-physical life; He found only these five aggregates or forces. He did not find any
eternal soul. However, many people still have the misconception that the soul is the consciousness. The worldly honored One announced in unequivocal terms that consciousness depends on matter, sensation, perception and mental formations and that it cannot exist independently of them.

I. Extent of Existing Studies on the Topic

So far as the existing studies on the topic are concerned, we find several titles in the form of research papers in various journals and independent books which discuss the doctrine of *Anātman* in Buddhism. With regard to its development in later Buddhism, the studies are very scarce. Nevertheless, some of the important works done so far has been noted in the bibliography.

The *Anātman* doctrine of the Buddha is over 2500 years old. Today the thought current of the modern scientific world is flowing towards the Buddha's teaching of *Anātman* or No-Soul. In the eyes of modern scientists, man is merely a bundle of ever changing sensations. Modern physicists say that the apparently solid universe is not, in reality, composed of solid substance at all, but actually a flux of energy. The modern physicist sees the whole universe as a process of transformation of various forces of which man is a mere part. The Buddha was the first to realize this.

A prominent author, W.S. Wily, once said, 'The existence of the immortal in man is becoming increasingly discredited under the influence of the dominant schools of modern thought.' The belief in the immortality of the soul is a dogma that is contradicted by the most solid, empirical truth.

About those researches of modern scientists who are now more inclined to assert that the so-called 'Soul' is no more than a bundle of sensations, emotions, sentiments, all relating to the physical experiences, Prof. James says that the terms 'Soul' is a mere figure of speech to which no reality corresponds.

This is very interesting to note here that the study of *Anātman* which based on Buddhist perception will hand out more benefits for modern society to
avail. When we understand what things really are then attachment will be reduced, because of ignorance that brought more suffering.

II. Objectives of the Study

The following objectives would be kept in mind while doing the study:

a. To present a brief description of the advent and development of concept of *Anātman* in various religious currents.

b. To present a brief analysis of the Concept of *Anātmana* in early Buddhism.

c. To present an analytical discussion of the contents of the different Buddhist Sūtras which discuss the concept of *Anātmana* in Buddhism?

d. To present an overview of the Concept of *Anātmana* in later Buddhism.

e. To study the relationship between *Paṭicca-samuppāda* and *Anātman* also with Karma.

III. The Sources of the Study and Research Methodology

In the proposed thesis an attempt would be made to prepare a comprehensive treatise on the concept of *Anātmana* in Buddhism. The proposed work would be based on available literary sources, primary as well as secondary.

While writing the thesis sincere attempt would be made to follow various methods of social science research such as Historical method, Analytical method, Comparative method and Critical method.

IV. Structure of the Thesis

The proposed thesis will be titled as ‘Concept of *Anātmanain Later Buddhism: An Epistemological Analysis’ and will consist of five chapters excluding Introduction and Conclusion, subject to minor changes and alterations depending on the available source materials.
To this introductory section, an effort will be made to present a brief introduction to the problem of research.

Chapter 1: Historical Evolution of the Concept of Ātmana

The Anattā doctrine of the Buddha is over 2500 years old. Today the thought current of the modern scientific world is flowing towards the Buddha's Teaching of Anattā or No-Soul. In the eyes of the modern scientists, man is merely a bundle of ever-changing sensations. Modern physicists say that the apparently solid universe is not, in reality, composed of solid substance at all, but actually a flux of energy. The modern physicist sees the whole universe as a process of transformation of various forces of which man is a mere part. The Buddha was the first to realize this.

In general, what is suggested by Soul, Self, Ego (Sanskrit, Ātman) is that in man there is a permanent, everlasting and absolute entity, which is the unchanging substance behind the changing phenomenal world. According to some religions, each individual has a separate soul which is created by God, and which, finally after death, lives eternally either in hell or heaven, its destiny depends on the judgment of its creator. According to others, it goes through many lives till it is completely purified and becomes finally united with God or Brahman, Universal Soul or Ātman, from which it originally emanated. This soul or self in man is the thinker of thoughts, feeler of sensations and receiver of rewards and punishments for all its actions good and bad. Such a conception is called the idea of self (Ātman). In this chapter an attempt would be made to delineate the historical evolution of the concept of Ātmana in different religious traditions of the world.

The mere belief in an immortal soul, or the conviction that something in us survives death, does not make us immortal unless we know what it is that survives and that we are capable of identifying ourselves with it. Most human beings choose death instead of immortality by identifying themselves with that which is perishable and impermanent by clinging stubbornly to the body or the
momentary elements of the present personality, which they mistake for the soul or the essential form of life.

It is the same Anattā doctrine of the Buddha that was introduced in the Mahāyāna school of Buddhism as Śunyāta or voidness. Although this concept was elaborated by a great Mahāyāna scholar, Nagarjuna, by giving various interpretations, there is no extraordinary concept in Śunyāta far different from the Buddha's original doctrine of Anattā.¹

To understand the Anattā doctrine, one must understand that the eternal soul theory 'I have a soul' and the material theory 'I have no soul' are both obstacles to self realization or salvation. They arise from misconception hence, to comprehend the Anattā doctrine, one must cling to any opinion or views or soul-theory; rather, one must try to see things objectively as they are and without any mental projections. One must learn to see the so called at Soul or Self for what it really is: merely a combination of changing forces. This requires some analytical

We have seen earlier, in the discussion of the First Noble Truth, that what we call a being or an individual is composed of the five Aggregates, and that when these are analyses and examined, there is nothing behind them which can be taken as ‘I’, Ātman, or Self, or any unchanging abiding substance. That is the analytical method. The same result is arrived at through the doctrine of conditioned genesis which is the synthetic method, and according to this nothing in the world is absolute. Everything is conditioned, relative, and interdependent. This is the Buddhist theory of relativity explanation.²

Within the Mahāyāna branch of Buddhism, there exists an important class of Sūtras, generally known as Buddha NatureSūtras, a number of which affirm that, in contradistinction to the impermanent "mundane self" of the five Skandhas , there does exist an eternal true self, which is in fact none other than the Buddha himself in his ultimate nirvana nature. This is the "true self" in the

¹Venerable K.Sri Dhammananda Maha Thera, What Buddhist Believe.
²Dr.H.P.Gangnegi, What the Buddha Taught, Delhi University, p. 52.
self of each being, the ideal personality, attainable by all beings due to their inborn potential for enlightenment. The Buddha nature does not represent a substantial self (ātman); rather, it is a positive language and expression of emptiness (śūnyatā) and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices; the intention of the teaching of Buddha nature is stereological rather than theoretical. 3

Chapter 2: The Concept of Anātmana in Early Buddhism

Buddhism analyzes human existence as made up of five aggregates or “bundles”: the material body, feelings, perceptions, predispositions or karmic tendencies, and consciousness. A person is only a temporary combination of these aggregates, which are subject to continual change. No one remains the same for any two consecutive moments. Buddhists deny that the aggregates individually or in combination may be considered a permanent, independently existing self or soul (Ātman). Indeed, they regard it as a mistake to conceive of any lasting unity behind the elements that constitute an individual. The Buddha held that belief in such a self results in egoism, craving, and hence in suffering. Thus he taught the doctrine of Anātman, or the denial of a permanent soul. He felt that all existence is characterized by the three marks of Anātman (no soul), Anitya (impermanence), and Dukkha (suffering). The doctrine of Anātman made it necessary for the Buddha to reinterpret the Indian idea of repeated rebirth in the cycle of phenomenal existence known as Samsāra. To this end he taught the doctrine of Pratityasamutpada, or dependent origination. This 12 linked chain of causation shows how ignorance in a previous life creates the tendency for a combination of aggregates to develop. These in turn cause the mind and senses to operate. Sensations result, which lead to craving and a clinging to existence. This condition triggers the process of becoming once again, producing a renewed cycle of birth, old age, and death. Through this causal chain a connection is made between one life and the next.

3Heng-Ching Shih, The Significance Of Tathāgatagarbha, A Positive Expression Of Śunyāta.
Buddhism stands unique in the history of human thought in denying the existence of such a Soul, Self, or Ātman. According to the teaching of the Buddha on Anātman, No-Soul, or No-Self, should not be considered as negative or a nihilistic. Like Nirvāṇa, it is Truth, Reality; and Reality cannot be negative. It is the false belief in a non-existing imaginary self that is negative. The teaching on Anātman dispels the darkness of false beliefs, and produces the light of wisdom. It is not negative: as Asanga very aptly says: 'There is the fact of No-selfness' (nairītimyīstitītī). This chapter will discuss the doctrine of Anātman in early Buddhism.

The early history of the teaching which we call Buddhism may be differentiated roughly into two phases. There is no obvious cleavage between these two phases; no distinctive name which marks a change of thought, outlook, or background as the earlier phase merges into the later. Hitherto Early Buddhism has, in the main, been regarded as forming an integral body of teaching, now enshrines in the works called ‘canonical.’ These have been made accessible to students of Pāli Buddhism through the unremitting labors of the Pāli Text Society.4

According to Buddhist school A.K. Warder, the Theravada spread rapidly south from Avanti into Maharashtra and Andhra and sown to the Cholas country (Kanchi), as well as Ceylon. For some time they maintained themselves in Avanti as well as in their new territories, but gradually they tended to regroup themselves in the south, the Great Vihara (Mahavihāra) in Anuradhapura, the capital of Ceylon and the northern regions apparently relinquished to other school.5

Theravāda believes these defilements are habits born of ignorance that afflict the mind of all unenlightened beings, which cling to them and their influence in their ignorance of the truth. But in reality, those mental defilements are nothing more than taints that have afflicted the mind, creating

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4See Table of Pāli Buddhist Literature, above, p. 15.
5Indian Buddhism by A.K. Warder, Motilal Banarsidass, 2000, p. 278.
suffering and stress. Unenlightened beings cling to the body, whereas in reality
the body is an impermanent phenomenon formed from the four basic elements.
Often characterized by earth, water, fire and air, in the early Buddhist texts
these are defined to be abstractions representing the sensorial qualities solidity,
fluidity, temperature, and mobility, respectively.\(^6\) The mental defilements
frequent instigation and manipulation of the mind is believed to have prevented
the mind from seeing the true nature of reality. Unskillful behavior in turn can
strengthen the defilements, but following the Noble Eightfold Path can weaken
or eradicate them.

In order to be free from suffering and stress, *Theravāda* believes
that the defilements need to be permanently uprooted. Initially they are
restrained through mindfulness to prevent them taking over mental and bodily
action. They are uprooted through internal investigation, analysis, experience
and understanding of their true nature by using Jhāna. This process needs to be
repeated for each other and defilement the practice will then lead the mediator
to realize the Four Noble Truths, Enlightenment, and *Nirvāṇa*. *Nirvāṇa* is the
ultimate goal of *Theravāda*, and is said to be a state of perfect bliss wherein the
person is liberated from the repeated cycle of birth, illness, aging and death.

**Chapter 3: The Concept of Anātman in Later Buddhism**

A few hundred years after the Buddha's passing away, there arose
eighteen different schools or sects all of which claimed to represent the original
teachings of the Buddha. Over a period of time, these schools gradually merged
into two main schools: *Theravāda* and *Mahāyāna*. Today, a majority of the
followers of Buddhism are divided into these two schools. In this case, we might
learn that it is the same *Anātman* doctrine of the Buddha that was introduced in
the *Madhyāmika* school of Buddhism as *Śunyāta* or voidness. Although this
concept was elaborated by a great *Madhyāmika* scholar, *Nagarjuna*, by giving
various interpretations, there is no extraordinary concept in *Śunyāta* far different

\(^6\)Dan Lusthaus. What is not Yogacara, He specifically discusses early Buddhism as well as Yogācāra.
from the Buddha's original doctrine of Anātman; even so the later work will carry out to see how latter scholars denote the Anātman theory far from the former.

The Anātman or No-Soul is the natural result of, or corollary to, the analysis of the five aggregates and the teaching of Dependent Origination (Pṭticca-samuppada). Before going into the question of Anātman proper, it is useful to have a brief idea of the Dependent Origination. The point of this doctrine is given in a short formula of four lines:

When this, that is, (Imasmim sati idam hoti); this arising, that arises (Imassuppsdii idam uppajjati); When this is not, that is not (Imasmim asati idam na hoti); This ceasing, that ceases (Imassa nirodha idam nirujjhati).

On this principle of conditionality, relativity and interdependence, the whole existence and continuity of life and its cessation of karma are explained in a detailed formula which is called Paticca-samuppada 'Dependent Origination'. With showing all these fundamental teachings related to each other. It's learnt that from Avijjii (ignorance) brings into karma means action or deed from karma arises attachment (upādana), from attachment brings into becoming (bhava). It consists in coming to perceive nonselthood (anātta), emptiness (sūfiiata), so that the self is done away with. So by putting an end to ignorance with the understanding no-self or no-soul from the Buddha's method called the Noble Eightfold Path.

Mahāyāna, in this light, can be conceived as the outcome of a strong missionary movement, going even beyond the borders of the Indian continent, probably following the period of the great migrations of people on the Central Asian continent, staring from a few centuries before the beginning of the Christian era. In such process foreign elements were adapted to the original Buddhist lore. LaMotte, for example, sees in the Mahāyāna figure of the Buddha
Amitābha an echo of an Iranian solar god, and the also finds notable analogies between the bodhisattvas of Mahāyāna and the Ameshapenta of Zoroastrianism.7

Chapter 4: The Relevance of the Concept of Anātman for Cultivation of the Mind

The Buddhist Noble Eight Path it is the straight Path to self awakening to the structural engineering of a human personality and the origin of the universe. Knowing the straight Path, the Dhamma fairer will not drift from the eternal truth that governs and sanctifies human character with the love of wisdom and virtue. There are eight aggregates or components constituting the Noble Eight Fold Path, namely Right Understanding, Right Thought, Right Speech, Right Actions, Right Livelihood, Right Efforts, Right Mindfulness and Right Concentration. The Noble Eight Path is the brain child of Gotama Buddha derived from his supreme Enlightenment and self-cultivation to reach the fullness of human spirituality culminating in character maturity.

The nature of things is described by the three characteristics, namely impermanence (Anicca), un-satisfactoriness or suffering (dukkha), and non-self-hood (anātta). Not to know this teaching is not to know Buddhism. It points out that all things are impermanent (Anicca), all things are unsatisfactory (dukkha), and all things are not selves (anātta). As long as one lacks the knowledge of Anātman principle, one is bound to go mindlessly liking or disliking things in one way or another or bound to be reborn endlessly in this Samsāra. So only the cultivation of mind or literally called meditation one may perceive precisely of this nature of things. In Buddhism, in order to cultivate our mind pure, there is requirement of Sīla or morality is the first step then the next is very important as well Samadhi or meditation, the cultivation of mind in fact, there are many ways to practice meditation according to the Buddha which will be narrated later. Lastly from meditation, we shall get Panna or wisdom is the final salvation,

when wisdom arises, human beings will see clearly the nature of things such as Anātman. All these based on the Noble Eightfold Path.

Chapter 5: The Doctrine of Anātman and Its Impact on Society

All of us encounter the problem of evil and suffering, which is almost as old as humankind is. Yet, it continues to draw the attention of philosophers, theologians, artists, novelists, and common men and women alike, because it touches all, ravages many, and perplexes thinking people. So everyone thinks and wonders about the existence of evil and suffering in the world, their-own lives, and the lives of their dear ones. Vanauken thinks it is the hardest subject in the world, which is the tears and groans of mankind, the existence of pain and suffering, the problem the mystery of suffering.8

The understanding of Anātman is very crucial for this society because of the lack of comprehending the true nature of the inner life; impermanence (Anicca), suffering (Dukkha), and non-self-hood (Anātta) which always playas our possessions since we were born we've brought nothing but these dharma-s into our life until death. As we are aware that, the world today faces many problems such as terrorists, the war of ideologies and war for influencing from the developed countries to developing countries or rich countries to poor countries as well as- such deadly diseases also takes place everywhere so if we properly apprehend the nature of things we may confine ourselves to serve the purpose all Human beings only.

Furthermore, according to the Buddha's teaching, the idea of self is an imaginary, false belief which has no corresponding reality, and it produces harmful thoughts of 'me' 'mine', selfish desire, craving, attachment, hatred, ill will, conceit, pride, egoism, and other defilements, impurities and problems. It is the source of all the troubles in the world from personal conflicts to wars between nations. In short, to this false view can be traced all the evil in the society.

From the point of history of thought, it is important to mind that at the beginning Buddhism was revolutionary movement against theistic authority of Brahmanism in ancient time in India. So that Buddhist teaching is a religious one but it already contains progressive spirit about quality and non theistic authority which are sustainable factors even in modern time. According to the Buddha’s teaching one is equal in suffering. Suffering is neither special neither for any caste nor except any one. This idea was inherited from ancient Indian religions by Buddha but the revolutionary point in his teaching is to affirm that every one equal in ability of achieving enlightenment and on the way to liberation; especially, the way to emancipation is not paved by any God or Supernatural one, but everyone must decide by himself, step up by himself and realize by himself... and only by passing over just the human life of oneself with his entire believe and morals.

There are two different interpretation of his teaching: Hinayāna Buddhism and later on it was called Theravāda Buddhism. Mahāyāna Buddhism stresses salvation to all people and holds the idea that embodies compassion emphasizes individual action and self-improvement.9

The teachings of Buddha, or the Four Noble Truths, are Dukkha or suffering, Samudāya, the origin of suffering, Nirodha, the cessation of suffering and mirage, and the paths leading to the cessation of suffering. The Buddha found that birth is the cause of suffering because of decay and death, and traced the unending cycle of rebirth and death. He contemplated the way in which ignorance gives rise to karmic formation. Under karmic law, a person goes through a chain of causation of birth and death. If the person does not pay attention to his or her action, he or she will be in the cycle of birth and death again and again. The Buddha views the cessation of birth as the cause of the cessation of suffering.10

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Chapter One:

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF ĀTMANA

Man is born for Self-realization. He is born for leading a religious life. But he is led astray by the temptations of his environments. He has not got the strength of will to resist the temptations.

Today the vast majority of persons run after women and money, there are earnest and sincere young men who want God and God alone. They are exalted personages indeed.

Life is a great battlefield. Life is a conquest. To live is to fight for the ideal and the goal. Life is a series of awakenings. You must conquer your mind and the senses. These are the real enemies. You must conquer internal and external nature. You must conquer your environments, old evil habits, old evil Saṃskaras, evil thoughts and evil Vasanas. You must fight against the antagonistic dark forces. You must resist the forces of degeneration.

In general, what is suggested by Soul, Self, Ego (Sanskrit, Ātmana) is that in man there is a permanent, everlasting and absolute entity, which is the unchanging substance behind the changing phenomenal world. According to some religions, each individual has a separate soul which is created by God, and which, finally after death, lives eternally either in hell or heaven, its destiny depends on the judgment of its creator. According to others, it goes through many lives till it is completely purified and becomes finally united with God or Brahman, Universal Soul or Ātmana, from which it originally emanated. This soul or self in man is the thinker of thoughts, feeler of sensations, and receiver of rewards and punishments for all its actions good and bad. Such a conception is called the idea of self (Ātmana). In this chapter an attempt would be made to delineate the historical evolution of the concept of Ātmana in different religious traditions of the world.
1.1.1 The Concept of Ātmana.

The Indian word for self is Ātman. It is difficult to find a precise English translation of Sanskrit word Ātman. In modern English writings the terms self, spirit, being, and soul are often used for it. As a matter of fact the connotation of the word Ātman includes the meanings of self, soul, the breath, the living principle, the faculty of thought, and reason. For our purpose here we will use the word self as a synonym of Sanskrit Ātman. The different forms of this word in Indian literature and other terms of cognate significance are, however, noteworthy. Thus the word Ātman occurs already in the Vedic literature. The Pali form Attā, the Prakrit form Appā, and the Śauraseni Prākrit form Ādā are well known. In the Brahmanical literature we find, besides Ātman, that Prāṇa, Jīva and Brahman are sometimes used as synonyms. The word Praṇa stands for the vital breath. The term Jīva signifies living principle. The word Ātman refers to the self, to one's own nature or existence. The word Brahman has acquired a special metaphysical sense in Hinduism, referring to the Ultimate Reality. In this case, when Ātman is identified with Brahman, the self is another name for Ultimate Reality.

In the old Vedic texts the word Ātman is understood to mean the vital breath. In some places in the Rg Veda the word Manas is considered as the seat of thought, dwelling in heart, as it were. In the Upaniṣads both terms, Ātman as well as Brahman is found used rather in an irregular fashion. It has been suggested that the word Brahman originally meant 'Sacred knowledge', 'prayer' or 'magical formula'; the compounds such as Brahma vat 'possessed of magic formula' and Brahmavarcase 'superiority in sacred knowledge' suggest that the word Brahman meant not only magical or religious knowledge but also the power inherent in sacred hymns, prayers, mantras and in their knowledge.11

The most famous doctrine of the Upaniṣads is the doctrine of the self conceived as the ultimate reality. In the old Upaniṣads Ātman is declared to be

one, eternal, conscious, of the nature of bliss and present everywhere; the Ātman is the source of all that is; it is the ground of the universe. In some passages of the Upaniṣads this Ātman is identified with Brahman.

Brahman is the cosmic principle of the universe, the reality which is both immanent in the universe and transcendent to it. In other words Brahman or God and Ātman or self are in essence one. This idea of the unity of ultimate Truth was elaborated and systematized in the Advaita school of Vedānta. But the old Upaniṣads contain conflicting opinions about the nature of the self.

The reality of the universe is dependent on Brahman. Although active and creator of the universe, He is most passive and unmoved. In some passages Ātman is described negatively, but in a large number of passages we find positive description. Thus Ātman is the inner-self, guide, knower and enjoyer of the fruit of actions. It is described as all pervasive and omnipresent.

In the Taittirīya Upaniṣad the Brahman is described as Truth, Knowledge and Infinite. This Brahman dwells in the cavity or heart of each being. The Upaniṣadic doctrine of Ātman contains seeds of theistic as well as absolutistic ideas. Unlike Jainism, several Upaniṣadic passages teach the ultimate unity of all forms of life. We may say that in contradistinction to the Jaina theory of plurality of Ātman, the Upaniṣadic Vedānta teaches the unity of the Ātman.

The early Brahmanical doctrine of Ātman as found in the old Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā gave rise to different interpretations during the age of the systems. Thus the Advaita Vedānta represented by Śaṅkara taught the absolutistic notion of Ātman, whereas the Viśiṣṭādvai Vedānta represented by Rāmānuja taught the theistic notion of Ātman. In Advaita Vedānta the Ātman or Brahman is accepted as the only ultimate reality; the phenomenal world is described as Māyā. In this system ignorance (avidyā) is assumed as the cause of bondage. Liberation consists in knowing the identity of Ātman and Brahman. In

12 Kaṭha Upaniṣad, V.10, 12; Īśā Upaniṣad, IV.5; Taittirīya Upaniṣad, II.1
his commentary on the Brahmasūtra Śaṃkara seeks to establish the view that the real self (Ātman) is identical with the supreme self or Lord (Parameśevara). The real and transcendental self, according to him, does not transmigrate. The embodied being (jīva) who appears as the doer of deeds and enjoyer of fruits is not identical with the Lord.\textsuperscript{13}

The purpose is to compare two, seemingly opposite, philosophical concepts which lie at the heart of two of the world's major religions, Hinduism and Buddhism. These are the concepts of Ātman, a Sanskrit word which can loosely be translated as 'The Self' or 'The (essence of a) Person', which is central to Hinduism and Anatta, a Pali word which means 'No Self' or 'No essential Person' which underpins Buddhism. The Pali word for Ātman is 'Attā' and the prefix 'A' means 'no' or 'not' thus Anattā is literally the exact opposite, or negation, of Ātman,

However the situation is complicated by the fact that there exist many different 'streams' of both Hinduism and Buddhism each with their own different interpretation of, or 'take on', the concepts of Ātman and Anattā. As we shall see some of these are indeed in direct opposition, some in lesser disagreement, and there are cases where the two concepts seem to mean almost exactly the same thing! Not only are that but there cases where the interpretations of the same concept, within different streams of the one religion can be seen to be in almost direct opposition. There have been many scholars, from both sides, that have written on this subject but usually from their own fixed viewpoint. Normally the attempt from the Vedantic (Hindu) side is to show that there is no real difference between Ātman and Anattā and thus that Buddhism is merely an offshoot of Vedanta. Whereas the Buddhist, especially Theravāda, scholars have been keen to show that the two concepts are complete antonyms (of each other) and thus Buddhism is a completely unique religion stemming from the Buddha's rejection of Brahmanism and Vedānta philosophy. Examples of these two views are:

\textsuperscript{13}Brahmasūtra-Saṅkarabhāṣya, pp. 16-17.
Firstly from the Message of the Upaniṣads by Swami Ranganathananda, there is no important form of Hindu thought, heterodox Buddhism include, which is not rooted in the Upaniṣads.¹⁴

And this quote from Malalasekara an active Sinhalese laid Buddhist and statesman: This is the one doctrine that separates Buddhism from all other religions, creeds and systems of philosophy in its denial of Self, Buddhism stands alone.¹⁵

In similar fashion Buddhism has spawned many different streams, the main two being Theravāda and Mahāyāna. Within Mahāyāna Buddhism there are many different 'tributaries' of which I will be considering Tibetan and Zen Buddhism. So once again when I am using any of these terms I am talking about a form of Buddhism.

So as to avoid sectarianism and achieve a certain amount of objectivity, I am going to consider the concept of Ātman (or Self) as interpreted by the four major schools of Hinduism, given above, and then compare that with the concept of Anattā (No Self) as interpreted by Theravāda, Tibetan and Zen Buddhism.

Finally I will consider two popular, and very powerful, modern-day 'schools' stemming from Advaita-Vedanta and Tibetan Buddhism to highlight that there is often 'Unity in Diversity' and, as that multi-religious adept Sri Ramakrishna said, 'God can be realized by all paths. All religions are true. The important thing is to reach the roof. You can climb up by stone stairs, wooden stairs, and bamboo steps or by a rope.'¹⁶

According to the string theory, everything is a manifestation. According to Kapila behind Prakṛiti is Puruṣa, pure consciousness, the witness, enjoyer or enlightener which is equated with the individual Self or Soul.¹⁷

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Thus Samkhya equates Ātman with ‘individual self’ not with. In fact Kapila concluded that there was no “Absolute of God” and that Prakṛti and Puruṣa were quite sufficient by themselves to account for everything.¹⁸

Based on the Upaniṣas, which proposes that Purusha and Prakṛti are just different aspects of the one ‘Absolute Reality’ Brahman, as it says in the Isha Upaniṣa: in the heart of all things, of whatever there is in the universe dwells the Lord. He alone is the reality, the Self is one. To the illumined soul the Self is all. For him who sees everywhere oneness, how can there be delusion or grief?¹⁹ Ātman, the term used to denote the essence of each individual is Brahman, as is everything in creation. Ātman is described, in the Vedanta Wordbook as The Spirit or Self, the immanent aspect of the Godhead.²⁰

This is what lies at the heart of each person, or 'conventional self', which is termed the 'Jīva' defined as 'the Ātman identified with its coverings body, mind, senses, etc. Ignorant of its divinity it experiences birth and death, pleasure and pain.²¹ One continues on the Samsāra cycle as long as one misidentifies oneself with the 'conventional self.' Freedom, moksha, is obtained once this misidentification ceases and one realizes the truth that one is the Ātman forever at one with Brahman. It is only the Jīva that is bound by karma, Dharma and Samsāra, once moksha is obtained the 'conventional self' is seen to be an illusion and thus there is nothing that can be reincarnated. Thus aviate denies that there is an 'individual self', for in essence we are all at one with the Absolute, and thus there exists only the 'absolute self'. This philosophical system was systematized, propounded and championed by Sankara who explained:

The knowledge of the identity of the individual Self and the Universal self originating from the Vedic sentences such as Thou art that is the means to liberation.²²

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²⁰Usha, Ramakrishna Vedanta Wordbook, Hollywood, 1962, p. 16
²¹Ibid. p. 38.
Thus in Viṣiṣṭādvaita whilst the Ātman is part of Brahman it is never the same as Brahman, which has other qualities above and beyond that of the Ātman. In this view Brahman has a personal aspect being 'the repository of an infinite number of blessed qualities' whilst residing in everything in the Universe.\textsuperscript{23} This is in contrast to aviate which posits that Brahman is the Universe and everything in and beyond it. In Viṣiṣṭādvaita the self, or Ātman, achieves moksha by 'knowing' Brahman but still retains an 'I' consciousness as the 'knower' of Brahman. When this occurs the Ātman escapes from the Saṃāra cycle of birth and death and lives with god (Brahman) forever.\textsuperscript{24}

According to this system on achieving moksha, (liberation), one goes beyond the cycle of Saṃarā and after death goes to a heavenly realm where there will be 'eternal happiness and one is in the presence of God for all time and enjoys him forever.\textsuperscript{25} Thus in this system the 'individual self', Ātman, goes beyond the 'conventional self' but is forever distinct and separate from Brahman, the 'absolute self'.

While the Sūtras criticize notions of an eternal, unchanging Self, they see an enlightened being as one whose changing, empirical self is highly developed. One with great self has a mind which is not at the mercy of outside stimuli or its own moods, but is imbued with self control, and self contained.\textsuperscript{26} The mind of such a one is without boundaries, not limited by attachment or in identification.\textsuperscript{27} One can transform one's self from an "insignificant self" into a "great self" through practices such as loving-kindness and mindfulness.\textsuperscript{28} The sutras portray one disciple who has developed his mind through loving-kindness saying: "Formerly this mind of mine was limited, but now my mind is immeasurable."\textsuperscript{29}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid. p. 247.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Ibid. p. 243.
  \item \textsuperscript{26} Peter Harvey, \textit{The Selfless Mind}. Curzon Press, 1995, p. 55.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} Ibid, p. 63.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid, p. 57.
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid, p. 57.
\end{itemize}
To understand the Anattā doctrine, one must understand that the eternal soul theory 'I have a soul' and the material theory 'I have no soul' are both obstacles to self realization or salvation. They arise from misconception, hence, to comprehend the Anattā doctrine, one must cling to any opinion or views or soul-theory; rather, one must try to see things objectively as they are and without any mental projections. One must learn to see the so called at Soul or Self for what it really is: merely a combination of changing forces. This requires some analytical

We have seen earlier, in the discussion of the First Noble Truth, that what we call a being or an individual is composed of the five Aggregates, and that when these are analyses and examined, there is nothing behind them which can be taken as ‘I’, Ātman, or Self, or any unchanging abiding substance. That is the analytical method. The same result is arrived at through the doctrine of conditioned genesis which is the synthetic method, and according to this nothing in the world is absolute. Everything is conditioned, relative, and interdependent. This is the Buddhist theory of relativity explanation.

Within the Mahāyāna branch of Buddhism, there exists an important class of Sūtras, generally known as Buddha Nature Sūtras, a number of which affirm that, in contradistinction to the impermanent "mundane self" of the five Skandhas, there does exist an eternal true self, which is in fact none other than the Buddha himself in his ultimate nirvana nature. This is the "true self" in the self of each being, the ideal personality, attainable by all beings due to their inborn potential for enlightenment. The Buddha nature does not represent a substantial self (ātman); rather, it is a positive language and expression of emptiness (śūnyatā) and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices; the intention of the teaching of Buddha nature is stereological rather than theoretical.

30 Dr. H.P. Gangnegi, *What the Buddha Taught*, Delhi University, p. 52.
Prior to the period of the Tathāgatagarbha genre, Mahāyānametaphysics had been dominated by teachings on emptiness in the form of Madhyamaka philosophy. The language used by this approach is primarily negative, and the Tathāgatagarbha genre of sutras can be seen as an attempt to state orthodox Buddhist teachings of dependent origination using positive language instead, to prevent people from being turned away from Buddhism by a false impression of nihilism. In these sutras the perfection of the wisdom of not-self is stated to be the true self; the ultimate goal of the path is then characterized using a range of positive language that had been used in Indian philosophy previously by essentialist philosophers, but which was now transmuted into a new Buddhist vocabulary to describe a being who has successfully completed the Buddhist path.32

Not all Buddhists and scholars share this interpretation of the doctrine of self in the Tathāgatagarbha Sūtras. Dr. Kosho Yamamoto, who translated the entire Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra into English, tells of how the Buddha speaks in that scripture of doctrines previously not articulated. Now in order to correct people's misunderstanding of the Dharma, the Buddha according to Yamamoto tells of how He speaks of the positive qualities of Nirvāṇa, which includes the self:

He says that he is now ready to speak about the undisclosed teachings. Men abide in upside down thoughts. So he will now speak of the affirmative attributes of Nirvāṇa, which are none other than the Eternal, Bliss, the Self and the Pure.33

The Zen Buddhist master, Sekkei Harada, likewise speaks of a true self in his explications of Zen Buddhism. This true Self is found when one "forgets the ego-self".34 Harada states that the doctrine of "no-self" really means awakening

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to a self that is without any limits and thus invisible: "No-self means to awaken to a Self that is so vast and limitless that it cannot be seen." Harada concludes his reflections on Zen Buddhism by speaking of the need for an almost passionate encounter with the "person" of the essential True Self:

In our lifetime there is only one person we must encounter, one person we must meet as though we were passionately in love. That person is the essential Self, the true Self. As long as you don’t meet this Self, it will be impossible to find true satisfaction in your heart.

Analogously, Professor Michael Zimmermann, a specialist on the Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra, writes: "the existence of an eternal, imperishable self, that is, Buddhahood is definitely the basic point of the Tathāgata Sūtras". Professor Zimmermann also declares: "The compilers of the Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra did not hesitate to attribute an obviously substantiality notion to the Buddha-nature of living beings and notes the evident total lack of interest in this Sūtra for any ideas of non-substantial’s or "emptiness" (Śūnyatā): "Throughout the whole Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra the term Śūnyatā does not even appear once, nor does the general drift of the somehow imply the notion of Śūnyatā as its hidden foundation. On the contrary, the sutra uses very positive and substantiality terms to describe the nature of living beings.

Some other Buddhist Sūtras and Tantras also speak affirmatively of the self. For instance, the Mahabheriharaka Sūtra insists: at the time one becomes a Tathāgata, a Buddha, he is in nirvana, and is referred to as 'permanent', 'steadfast', 'calm', 'eternal', and 'Self'. Similarly, the Śrīmālā Sūtra declares unequivocally: "When sentient beings have faith in the Tathāgata and those sentient beings conceive with permanence, pleasure, self, and purity, they do not

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37 Dr. Michael Zimmermann, A Buddha Within: The Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, Bibliotheca Philological et Philosophical Buddhist VI, The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, Soka University 2002, p. 82.
38 Ibid , p. 64.
39 Ibid, p. 81.
go astray. Those sentient beings have the right view. Why so? Because the Dharmakāya of the Tathāgata has the perfection of permanence the perfection of self, the perfection of purity. Whatever sentient beings see the Dharmakāya of the Tathāgata that way, see correctly.  

An early Buddhist Tantra, the GuhyasamājāTantra, declares: "The universal self of entities sports by means of the illusory Samādhi. It performs the deeds of a Buddha while stationed at the traditional post" (i.e. while never moving). The same Tantra also imbues the self with radiant light (a common image): "The pure Self, adorned with all adornments, shines with a light of blazing diamond." And the all creating King Tantra has the primordial Buddha, Samantabhadra, state the root of all things is nothing else but one Self … I am the place in which all existing things abide.

The Brahminical or orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, especially the Vedantins and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argue that the self or Ātman is a substantial but non-material entity. The Katha and Chāndogya Upaniṣad for example define the Brahminical conception of the self as follows:

The light of the Ātman, the spirit is invisible, concealed in all beings. It is seen by the seer of the subtle; when their vision is keen a clear. The Ātman is beyond sound and form, without beginning or end: indeed above reasoning.

The heterodox schools in Indian philosophy, such as the Cārvāka materialists and the Buddhist, question the Brahminical arguments for a substantial, persistent and non-material self on metaphysical, moral and political grounds. The Buddhist and the Cārvāka oppose the Hindu caste system and believe that the Vedas are full of falsehoods, self contradictions and tautologies. The Cārvāka accuse the Brahmins of being impostors who abuse the words of the Vedas and interpret them to suit their own egoistic needs. The Vedas are in

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40 The Lion’s Roar of Queen, Srimala. Motilal, Delhi 1974, p. 102.
41 Yoga of The Guhyasamajatantra by Alex Wayman, Motilal Delhi, 1977, pp. 18- 28.
42 The Sovereign All-Creating Mind, tr. by E.K. Neumaier-Dargyay, pp. 158-159.
their opinion nothing but a means of livelihood for the Brahmins who are lazy, lacking in intellect, energy, self respect and sense. The views on the self by the Cārvāka and the Buddhists are illustrated by the following quotes:

The soul is but the body characterized by the attributes signified in the expressions, ‘I am stout’, ‘I am youthful’, ‘I am old’, ect. It is not something other that.

A sentient being does exist, you think, O Mara? You are misled by a false conception. This bundle of elements is void of self, in it there is no sentient being. Just as set of wooden parts receives the name of carriage, so do we give to elements the mane of fancied beings?

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika subscribe to the conception of the self put forward in the Vedas as a substantial, persistent and non-material entity. They ear with the Vedantins that the self cannot be perceived, but only inferred. The later Nyāya School however rejected the idea that the self can only be known by inference and asserted that the existence of the self can be directly perceived. The idea that the self can be directly perceived is put forward by Udayana in a polemical work against the Buddhists.

The Nyāya argument for the existence of the self through the notion of agency “from the action of the mind towards the contact of the sense organ apprehending desirable objects, we infer the existence of the self.”

The Buddhist reply to the Brahminical view of the self would be that there is no such entity. This view is illustrated by the debate between king Milinda and the Buddhist monk Nāgasena. King Malinda is not convinced of the theory of the not-self for, if there were no person, there could be no merit and

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45 Sankara on the Carvaka in: *Sarva-Siddhanta-Samgraha*, quoted in Ibid.
Nāgasena clarifies the theory of the not-self to the king by comparing a human being with a chariot. None of the individual parts of the chariot are the chariot. Nor the combination of the parts is the chariot. Nāgasena continues? That he cannot discover a chariot or self takes place in dependence of the individual parts. In ultimate reality, the person cannot be apprehended. Śankara takes issue with this theory, on the grounds that it provides nothings to hold together the various ingredients either at any one time or through progression in time.

The debate on the existence of the self cannot be separate from a description of the nature of the self. The scriptures mention three properties of the self. The self is eternal, non-material and is identical with Brahman: the ultimate reality. Here I will concentrate on the first two properties since there is not much argument on the last property in classical Indian philosophy.

Śankara argues for the immateriality of the self by stating that the existence of an eternal immaterial self, distinct from the body is a necessary presupposition for the achievement of liberation, the Scriptures would otherwise make no sense, which is unacceptable conclusion for the Vedantins. This argument is of course not acceptable to the heterodox schools because they do not accept the Scriptures as a source of valid knowledge.

The materialist only accept the four elements air, water, fire and earth as the basic building blocks of reality and ultimate facts of the universe. The body

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49 Ibid., p. 147.
is to the Carvaka a unique combination of these elements and the self emerges from these elements. They thus account for the higher principle of mind by the lower one of matter.\(^{52}\)

### 1.1.2. Different Ways Of Talking About Self and Person

The philosophy of self is the defining of the essential qualities that make a person distinct from all others. There have been a number of different approaches to defining these qualities. The self is the ideal of a unified being which is the source of consciousness. Moreover, this self is the agent responsible for the thoughts and actions of an individual to which they are ascribed. It is a substance, which therefore endures through time; thus, the thoughts and actions at different moments of time may pertain to the same self. As the notion of subject, the ‘self’ has been harshly criticized by Nietzsche at the end of the 19\(^{th}\) century, on behalf of what would call a ‘becoming other’

As we have seen, virtuoso religious thought in the Brāhmanical tradition turned on the refraction into the life of the individual denouncer of structures of thought and imagination which had previously been related to the external sacrificial ritual. This had both behavior and conceptual effects: the actual practice of such ascetic denouncer concentrated on the manipulation and interpretation of consciousness (or in the modern vogue term ‘experience) and the concept interpretation (and hence conditioning) of that experience proceed clearly and wholly in term of those ideal developed through the sacrifice. Among these ideal the most important here, for my present purpose, are two; the ordinary psycho physical personality, made up of a composite of different constituents, destined, and in the denouncers thought, ‘doomed’ eternally to group and re-group of the process, the ‘self’ (ātman) or ‘person’ (puruṣa), union with which, or realization of which, could be achieved in the ‘mystical’ experience of the virtuoso practitioner, and which was the eschatological goal to which religious practice was aimed.

The human being was thought to be a composite of different constituents, which separate at death to return to their original place in the universe, and how this idea was used in reverse for the re-creation of the person reborn on earth. At the time of the *Upaniṣad*, religious thinkers continued and developed this pattern of analysis; one finds in the *Upaniṣad* a large variety of different categorizations of the constituent parts of the person. Already in the Brāhamnas, a man is said to be made of five immortal and five mortal parts respectively, mind, speech, breath, sight, hearing; hair, skin, flesh, bone, and marrow. These five immortal parts recur frequently in the same context in the *Upaniṣads*, sometimes with the addition of other senses, bodily functions, or more abstract ideas such as heart, consciousness and wisdom. A more complicated classification is found in the Chāndogya Upaniṣads, where the three elements of heat, water, and food are combined in three different grades of refinement, with results food are can be tabulated as shown here. Processes of interaction between these elements account not only for sleep, hunger, and thirst, but also for the growth of the human being from, and reapportion at death into being.

Frequently, these lists look like early versions of the lists of the later Sāmkhya School: for example, in ascending order, we find ‘senses’, ‘objects of sense’, ‘mind’ (*manas*), ‘intellect’, ‘self’ (*ātman*), ‘the unman fest’, and ‘the person’ (*puruṣa*). It has been thought that these passages reflect a “proto Sāṃkhya school”; but if we remember that the word Sāṃkhya means ‘enumeration’ or discrimination’, perhaps we might rather say that the later school appropriated as proper what was originally a general analytical tendency among religious thinker. This discrimination refers both to the distinguishing of the different elements within one person, and also to the project of separating, both in theory and in practice, the essential self or person from the composite psychophysical personality as whole.

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54 Kath U. 3, pp 10-11.
This essential self or person was the central element around which the kaleidoscope of physical constituents were arranged and arranged in the series of lives in *Saṃsāra*. We have seen how the ideal of such a ‘central something’ developed from naturalistic ideals of breath, water, and fire, to a more abstract notion of a vitality or vivifying force. In the *Upaniṣada*, a new element is added: this one might call the internalizing, or subjectivist of the mentality. Already in early times, mind (*manas*) has been said on occasion to fulfill roles which were associated with the other central elements: for as long as one possessed mind, one lived; at death the manas went to yama, lord of the death. Another hymn praises mint as the charioteer who controls men,\(^{55}\) as ‘wisdom’, ‘aware nests’ (*cetas*) and ‘the support’; it is the ‘undying light within which experiences both waking life and dreams. In the Brāhmanas, release from the sequence of days and nights is given to one who ‘looks down on (them) as on the turning wheels of chariot’

The two major terms used in the *Upaniṣad* for the central something; both partake strongly of this tendency to be seen as the terminus of the subjective pole of consciousness. *Ātman*, as we have seen, was an outgrowth of ideas of a life breath, combined with the motif of a ‘fire-soul’. Progressively, however, this vital force became deprived of content, becoming, like Brahman in the sacrificial cosmic sphere, a support or ground of the person: the life breath’ (*prāṇa*), the hub on which all things are fastened as spokes, is self base on the *Ātman*, as is consciousness, speech, and so on. The *Ātman* is no longer the breath, but ‘he who breath in which in breathing’, the seer of seeing, thinker of thinking: in short, the agent behind all the senses, and so naturally beyond description.

Once there has arisen such an analytical distinction between the describable constituents of phenomenal personality and their indescribable vivifying support, naturally judgments of value arise in accordance. The sage Yajnavalkya tells his wife that one’s spouse, wealth, the caste structure, indeed

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\(^{55}\) *The Image of the Chariot is Frequent in all Hindu thought*, Varence, 1976, pp.84-86. 100-129.
everything are not valuable for their own sakes, but because of the Ātman.\textsuperscript{56} It is the search for a content less self, and denigration of the constituents of the phenomenal person which, among the renounces for whom the search for this self was a matter of immediate personal concern, gave the theoretical parallel of, and justification for, the self mortification practices of asceticism.

Asceticism of this sort is most immediately associated in the common picture of Indian religious with the figure of the Yogin; and it was the theoretical elaboration of Yoga practice, along with the categories of the Sāṃkhya School, which made most use of the second term for the centre something found in the \textit{Upanisads}, the ‘person’. Characterization of the ultimate source of things as personal is as ancient and ubiquitous in India as the relatively impersonalize Ātman Brahman motif. In the Ṛg Veda, the Pūryaṣa hymn (10.90) tells of the sacrificial dismemberment of the primeval person were, and the arising of the physical and social worlds from different parts of the body. The Atharva Veda tells of how the parts of the ordinary person were put together, and of their enlivening by Brahmanas the figure of Prajapati ‘lord of creatures’ is ubiquitous; like Brahmna, with whom he is identified, he is at the same time identical with the sacrifice, and the enlivening support of man, as well as being the cosmic man, whose discernment created the universe. For the \textit{Upaniṣadas} thinkers, the central something is described as Prajāpati; the ‘person’ (puraṣa) who inanimate (acetane) body is Prajāpati, who originally alone created and vivified all bodily functions. ‘In the beginning this was Ātman, having the form of a ‘person’; a person who is ‘the shining, immortal person in everything external and with regard to the inner world is the shining immortal person who is oneself here this is immortal, this is Brahman, this is all.\textsuperscript{57}

It is this use of the sacrificial person, Prajāpati, as a term for the subjective ‘self within’ which reflects most clearly the exteriorization of the sacrifice in denunciatory thought. The internalization of the aspect of sacrifice as

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Ātmana Tu Kamaya Sarvam Priyam} BAU.4, p.76
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Prajapati}, 1956. pp. 96-97.
self-denial stressed by Hubert and Mauss as its main function in the social sphere added to the devaluation of all which is not self, produced both ascetic practice of self mortification, and the theoretical structure (concretized in Sāṃkhya thought) in which all parts of the psycho physical person are but form of the material world, a world which imprisons and enslaves the real ‘person’. In this way, the descriptions of personality given by the system enshrine the abstraction of value from phenomenal personality which constitutes the aim of religious life and the criterion for its practice.

We have seen in some of the examples just given that often ethical and religious injunction or descriptions are expressed linguistically by a focus on ‘oneself’. In passing from the use of ‘self’ or ‘person’ as a simple reference to the facts of men’s reflexivity and individual without any theoretical connotations, to their use as items of metaphysical and psychological analysis, we see second, and one might say, more resonant use of person terms in Buddhist texts. There are found in contexts of spiritual education, here for various reason concentrations on oneself, either as the instigator of religious progress or as particular character type is the focus of interest. In a much quoted passage, though Buddha tells some young men searching for you. It is quite wrong to translate this as ‘searching for the self’ as some have done; the Buddha is simple reiterating the universal message of religious teacher that happiness is not be found in eternal pleasure, courtesans and the like, but is one more profound inner beatitude. This general injunction to seek inner values is expressed by the phrases ‘taking refuge in oneself’, ‘making oneself an island’. The recommendation to seek self control equally ubiquitous in religious thought, is found in Buddhism in the pare AttaAttanoNātho; literally translated ‘self is lord of the self’, a more accurate rending of the sense would be simple be your own master. One should ‘watch oneself’, and be ‘self guarded’; a man who has succeeded in this called ‘self developed’, or advanced”.

In fact, according to Buddhist theory, the end result will be final discovery that no real self exists, and the bliss of Nirvāṇa will consist, among
other things, in living out this sublime truth. During the course of religious training which is held to lead to this liberating discovery, the practitioner will find out a lot about the kind of character he has in this particular lifetime better said, ‘which he is’. This kind of self knowledge is extensively discussed in Buddhism: the ‘individuality’ of each lifetime (as it appears to the understand man) is sometime called Atta, more usually Atbbhava, literally ‘self state.

The karmic effects of similar actions will vary according whether the person who performs them is ‘developed’ or ‘undeveloped in behavior, thought, and wisdom’, whether he is ‘great’ or ‘small soiled’ that is whether his character is in general good or bad. When an individual reaches Nirvāṇa, for the rest of his lifetime he lives, ‘without craving, quenched, become cool, experiencing bliss, having become himself like Brahmā. 58

Each individuality then at whatever level of spiritual attainment has a particular character, describable in terms of karmic status or progress along the Buddhist path. The world Puggala is used very frequently in this sense to describe an individual ‘person’ or ‘personage’ in this way. A whole book of Buddhist scholasticism is devoted to enumerating lists of this different character type the Puggala Paññatti, literally ‘designation of person’, and the same kind of character description of frequent in the Sūtras, especially the collection known as the Anguttara Nīkāya. If the Buddhist monk, as renouncing individual is thus urged to remember that all religious progress of default ‘come from him’; that he must ‘look within to ‘known himself, to find out what kind of ‘person’ he is, then clearly in the course of his training he will have to reflect on himself, to take stock of his progress, to ensure that he still striving earnestly and not deceiving himself in a state of sly satisfied inactivity or even misdeed. These ideas are found in the texts, and if we follow a little further the complexities of syntax in the Pali phrase express them, we will come to see the transition from uses of personal terms which are acceptable and those which are not.

The word *Attā* in the nominative singular is used to express much the same idea as the English ‘conscience’ (though without any psychological hypostatization of it as and entity). Thus *Attā Attānam* Upavadati, ‘one reproaches oneself’. The question ‘do you reproach yourself with regard to morals? In one striking passage, self reliance in moral evaluation and the ease with which self deceit in it possible are forcefully expressed: you know yourself, man, what is true and false! When you are obviously good you make little of it; when you are being bad, you hide it from yourself translation here with the definite article, ‘the self’, as if a quasi technical term, wrecks havoc with the sense. It is in this same sense that one read often that a man can be; friend or ‘enemy’ to himself. This means that by good or be conduct men produce future happiness or suffering for themselves. Thus, in the case of bad conduct what a man would do to his mutual enemy that these men do to themselves by themselves. The word translated as by ‘they’ is *Attāna* the instrumental case of *Attā*. The same case is found in a phrase used or evil doers, who are said to act with ‘themselves as enemy’

Thus use of *Attā* in two cases in the same sentence, or its use in an oblique case referring to the subject of the sentence, is again, simply a fact of into Aryan syntax structure, which in no way conflicts with or compromises the Buddhist doctrine of *Anattā*. It is only looking at the context of specific sentences and syntactic forms that one can see where and why *Attā* is denied or refused validity. Let us compare two uses of exactly the same syntax, in the phrases they contemplate themselves by themselves well, or in reasonable English they practice strict self examination and by the self I know the self.

It has been that Buddhist has a wide range of internal differentiation in society, and it has been suggested that technical philosophical and psychological play an active part in the religious concerns even of these latter, this kind of technical discourse does not exhaust the range of ways in which personal term are used. Accordingly, both for the ordinary non specialist Buddhist and for the specialist when dealing with the kinds of simple narrative or ethical or
behavioral material it has been outlined, we might say that the self is not denied meaning that the words ‘self’ and ‘person’ can be used without technical qualms.

As we have seen, virtuoso religious thought in the Brahmanical tradition turned on the refraction into the life of the individual denouncer of turned off structures of thought and imagination which had previously been related to the extranet sacrificial ritual. This had both behavioral and conceptual effects: the actual practice of such ascetic denouncers concentrated on the manipulation and interpretation of consciousness (or, in the modern vogue term ‘experience’); and the conceptual interpretation (and hence conditioning) of that experience proceeded clearly and wholly in terms of those ideas developed through the sacrifice. Among these ideas the most important here, for my present purpose, are two: the ordinary psycho-physical personality, made up of a composite of different constituents, destined, and in the renounces’ thought, ‘doomed’ eternally to group and re-group themselves in the round of rebirth; and the indescribable vivifying support of the process, the ‘self’ (Ātman) or ‘person’ (Puruṣa), union with which, or realization of which, could be achieved in the ‘mystical’ experience of the virtuoso practitioner, and which was the eschatological goal to which religious practice was aimed.

The preceding considerations suggested a priority that the doctrine of Anattā can be of immediate concern only to a small number of Buddhist intellectuals, a study of the canonical texts shows clearly that the denial of self, the refusal to allow any ‘ultimate’ validity to personal terms which are taken to refer to anything real and permanent, it insisted on only in a certain specific kind of conceptually sophisticated theoretical context. The linguistic items translated lexically as ‘self’ and ‘person’ are used quite naturally and freely in a number of contexts, without any suggestion that their being so used might conflict with the doctrine of Anattā. It is only where matters of systematic philosophical and psychological analysis are openly referred to or presupposed on the surface level of discourse that there is imposed the rigid taboo on speaking of ‘self” or ‘person’. We shall see that the late Therāvada tradition constructed a Meta
linguistic explanation for this difference in the use of personal terms that is, in terms of a different between ‘conventional’ and ‘ultimate’ truth. Here I will give some examples of the way personal terms are used, in order to show how the textual and linguistic evidence parallels and confirms the sociological facts we have just encountered. For convenience, I will divide these uses into three groups. The first two of these groups are clearly separate from the third, as acceptable non-theoretical use from unacceptable theory; they are differentiated from each other only by a gradual increase in the contextual importance attached to the reference to ‘oneself’, or the kind of ‘person’ one is. In many cases, examples of which I shall give, one must beware the pitfalls of literal translation into English, where the translation contains presuppositions and implications not found in the original Pāli.

We have seen in some of the examples just given that often ethical and religious injunctions or descriptions are expressed linguistically by a focus on ‘oneself’. In passing from the use of ‘self’ as a simple reference to the facts of men’s reflexivity and individuality without any theoretical connotations, to their use as items of metaphysical and psychological analysis, we see a second, and, one might say, more resonant use of personal terms in Buddhist texts. These are found in contexts of spiritual education, where for various reason concentrations on oneself, either as the instigator of religious progress or as a particular character type is the focus interest. In a much quoted passage, the Buddha tells some young men searching for a runaway courtesan that they would be better occupied ‘searching for you’. It is quite wrong to translate this as ‘searching for the self’ as some have done the Buddha is simple reiterating the universal message of religious teachers that happiness is not to be found in external pleasures, courtesans and the like, but in some more profound ‘inner’ beatitude. This general injunction to seek inner values is expressed by the phrases ‘taking refuge in oneself’, ‘making oneself an island’. The recommendation to seek self control, equally ubiquitous in religious thought, is found in Buddhism in the

59 Attānam Gaveseyyātha (Vin.1.22)
phrase *AttāhiAttanoNātho*; literally translated ‘self is lord of the self’, a more accurate rending of the sense would be simply ‘be your own master’ one should ‘watch oneself’, and be ‘self guarded’, a man who has succeeded in this is called ‘self developed’, or advanced.

Almost very tradition know such recommendation, expressed in the general maxims to know thyself”, ‘look within’, and so on and in Sanskrit and Pāli the reflexive use of Ātman in the singular is virtually unavoidable in phrasing such maxims. Thus, through Buddhist training one comes to know oneself. Clearly this phraseology presupposes no technical picture of what will be found at the end of the search for self knowledge.

The teaching of the Buddha and of the Buddhist tradition is both strikingly similar to and significantly different from this pattern. The general ideas of *karma* and *Sāṃsāra* are accepted in more or less the same sense. The Buddhist scriptures bear witness to a very thorough ethical of the idea of karma; the concept had been generalized from the sacrificial sphere to action in general. For Buddhism, this movement is continued, with a new emphasis on the intention with which actions are carried out. It is still karma which provides the movie force for the prolongation of life in time, in *Sāṃsāra*; the general idea of *Sāṃsāra* also is taken over, with some minor differences in the details of cosmology. A significant change of attitude towards the prolongation of life in time is apparent both in Buddhism and some of the later *Upaniṣads* contemporary with it. Whereas in the earlier Brahmanical literature the extension of life was a good, and even in the earlier Brahmanical literature the extension of still a desires one, in later India and Buddhist thought, rebirth in Sāṃsārais considered or at least in represented in the thought of the renounces whose ideas became culturally prestigious as a form of suffering in itself.60

60 In The Upanisads Dukkha in Buddhism.
In the conception of personality, Buddhist doctrine continues the style of analysis into non value impersonal constituents; indeed it is precisely the point of not self that this is that there entire is to human individuals. Examples are the two fold ‘name and form’; the four fold seen, heard, thought, cognized; the very widespread and influential five ‘categories, that is body, feelings, perceptions, mental formations, consciousness; that six fold ‘sense bases’ that is, the five senses plus ‘mind’; and on into the huge variety of classifications found in Buddhist scholasticism we shall soon become very familiar with these lists.

It is at this point that the different start to become marked. There is no central self which animates the impersonal elements. The concept of Nirvāṇa, although similarly the criterion according to which ethical of a self. Like all other things or concepts it is Anattā, ‘not self’. Whereas all ‘conditioned things’ are ‘unsatisfactory and impermanent’ all Dhammā whatsoever whether conditioned things or the unconditioned Nirvāṇa, are ‘not-self’. Indeed no description of Nirvāṇa, even in terms of simple existence or non-existence, was ever held to be true in the sense of being universally applicable regardless of the psychological context.

To use my own metaphor, the denial of self in whatever can be experienced or conceptualized that is, in the psycho physical being who is exhaustively describe by the lists of impersonal elements serves to direct the attribution of value away from that sphere. Instead of supplying a verbalized notion of what is the sphere of ultimate value, Buddhism simply leaves a direction arrow, while resolutely refusing to predicate anything of the destination, to discuss its relationship with to phenomenal person, or indeed to say anything more about it.

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The arrival at that destination has two stages. First, there is the attainment of *Nirvāṇa* during the individual’s lifetime. This is the ‘blowing out’ of the flame of desire. Axs Gombrich⁶² has said:

*Nirvāṇa* in life is the cessation of craving, alias greed hatred and delusion, and is indescribable because it is the opposite of the process of life as we know it, to discuss it in isolation is futile because you have to understand what, according to Buddhist ontology, is being negated. It is futile also for a more important reason: is an experience, and all private experiences are ultimately beyond *Nirvāṇa* language (though they can to some extent be discussed with others who have had the experience). Experiences do have an objective facet. Objectively huger is want of food, act: subjectively it is a kind of pain, imperfectly describable. My description of *Nirvāṇa* as the cessation of craving is objective. As one cannot even fully describe the experience of the cessation of a toothache, the indescribability of *Nirvāṇa* is usurping. For the convenience of discourse Buddhist saints hid apply various kinds of epithets to it, and thus objectify and even reify what was for them the experience of the cessation of a process. Had they foreseen the confusion this would because they might have kept silence?

The second stage of arrival at *Nirvāṇa* occurs at the death of the enlightenment saint, in which the flames of life in *Saṃsāra* die out through lack of fuel.⁶³ The word for ‘fuel’ here is *Upādāra*, which also means grasping or attachment. A cognate term, *Upādi*, denotes the fuel or substrate of life in *Saṃsāra*. The first stage of *Nirvāṇa* is called with substrate, the second without substrate, since then the remaining fuel of the saint’s psycho-physical individuality is completely burnt out. It is this second *Nirvāṇa* which the Buddhist tradition has resolutely refused to speak about and here the simple submission to Buddhism as a strategy is most necessary. This may be disappointing for those who want to know what *Nirvāṇa* is, but it must be

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⁶² Gombrich, 1972, p. 492.
⁶³ E.g.M. 1.487, SIV 399.
accepted as the unequivocal answer of Buddhist intellectual thought. If a man wants to know, he must try to reach the state himself and find out.

So much energy has been expended on trying to give a coherent, rational elucidation of the concept of final Nirvāṇa,⁶⁴ to so little point: as far as the individual practitioner of Buddhism is concerned, this Nirvāṇa is completely beyond rational elucidation, and must simply be taken on trust. As far as Buddhism as an ideological system in a social milieu is concerned, we must recognize, as Gellner has advised,⁶⁵ that the irrationality of certain concepts many itself have a specific social function. The social function of the irrationality of final Nirvāṇa is, I would suggest, the preservation of the Buddhist tradition as an India religious system separate from, and in certain crucial respects opposed to, the Brahmanical one. Just as socially the Buddhist tradition has provided an alternative to the Brahmanical religion of the sacrifice, with its supposed cosmic significance, so, too, psychologically Buddhism has refused to recognize the microcosmic correlate of the sacrifice in Brahmanical thought, the ‘self’ or ‘person’ within. The absolute indescribability of Nirvāṇa, along with its classification as Anattā, ‘not-self’, has helped to keep the separation intact, precisely because of the impossibility of mutual discourse. The opposition between Buddhist and Brahmanical ideas is expressed clearly and symbolically by the reversal of fire imagery. For Brahmanical thought, the fire of the cosmos sacrifice self is the focus of all value; virtuosos practice to gain ‘release’ involves burning off the distracting bodily and mental accretions to this inner self by the heat of asceticism. For Buddhism it is the cooling of the fire of craving by the detached practice of the middle Way between sensual indulgence and asceticism which is the task of the virtuoso search. Thus, both the fire of desire and the fire of life Saṃsāra, go out. Throughout Buddhist thought, we must recognize this reaction of opposition to Brahmanical ideas and practices; the denial of self (Ātman) is the most fundamental example, and symbol, of this attitude.

⁶⁴ Wilbon, 1968 has devoted a book to the history of attempts define Nirvāṇa. A great deal of confusion has occurred precisely because of the failure to distinguish the two forms of it.

⁶⁵ Gellner. 1962.
Buddhists famously deny the existence of Ātman, a Sanskrit term loosely translated as soul, in favor of a doctrine of no Ātman, or no self extend this conception of a Ātman to include all beings, not just human beings.

Buddhists famously deny the existence of Ātman, a Sanskrit term loosely translated as soul, in favor of a doctrine of no Ātman, or no self

The classical Buddhist approach to personal identity is expressed in a dialogue between King Menander and the Buddhist monk Nāgasena. Nāgasena begins by claiming that while his fellow monks call him Nāgasena, that name entails no substantive metaphysical implications. As James Giles puts it, “Although we may use words like "self" and "I," we should not be led into thinking that they actually refer to something, for they are but grammatical devices. Despite appearances, Nāgasena does not exist as anything more than a collection of parts or aggregates. King Menander challenges Nāgasena that if this idea of personal identity is true, no one should listen to him as he is insubstantial. In response, Nāgasena demonstrates that the chariot that brought Menander to the meeting is also simply a collection of aggregates, yet everyone acknowledges that the chariot has the power to transport individuals. Just as the chariot retains its power without existing as a substantial entity, so too do individuals. Despite our everyday assumptions that persons possess a substantial soul or self, most Buddhists argue that there is no such metaphysical substance and our names merely delineate a conventional collection of aggregates.

This skeptical approach to personal identity is widely accepted in most Buddhist traditions, including Hua-yen. Tu-Shun analyze persons into eleven materials and seven minds. He writes, “At this point it is finally realized that a

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person is born of a combination of many conditions, so the idea of person finally disappears.  

John Dewey holds a very similar position regarding personal identity. As he puts it, “There is no one ready-made self behind activities. There are complex, unstable, opposing attitudes, habits, impulses which gradually come to terms with one another and assume a certain consistency of configuration.

A person, for Dewey is a collection of attitudes and habits, what Buddhists call aggregates. Just as Buddhists claim that there is a conventional name applied to these aggregates, Dewey talks about a consistency of configuration of the aggregates. Neither position allows for an enduring self or soul. Dewey suggests that a proper understanding of this aggregated self dissolves the philosophical debate between egoism and altruism, writing, “What makes the difference in each of these cases is the difference between a self taken as something already made and a self still making through action. In the former case, action has to contribute profit or security to a self. In the latter, impulsive action becomes an adventure in discovery of a self which is possible but yet unrealized. The commonly held belief that all actions are selfish implies a substantive self that pre-exists. A self that is continually in the process of change and flux, expansion and contraction, overcome all descriptions of its activities as either selfish or altruistic.

Both Dewey and Hua-yen Buddhists place this critique of substantial personal identity within a broader critique of substantial metaphysics. They argue that not just all people, but all things are insubstantial. Dewey’s analysis begins with what he calls the philosophical fallacy. This fallacy “consists in the

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supposition that whatever is found true under certain conditions may forthwith be asserted universally or without limits and conditions.  

Philosophers generalize from specific cases to universal truths. Philosophers also tend to objectify and reify generalized objects, making them into substantive causes for events. Dewey writes that we convert consequences of interaction of events into causes of the occurrence of these consequences. Dewey’s favorite example of this is the philosophical objectification of mind. In assuming a dualistic metaphysics, philosophers often reify and objectify consciousness or mind. In fact, Dewey argues that consciousness is an eventual function of complex organism environment relations. He writes, “Perceptive consciousness is a process, a series of here and now.

Oxford Dictionary: "Religion belief in the existence of god or gods who has created the universe and given man a spiritual nature which continues to exist after the death of the body... particular, system of faith and worship based on such a belief..., controlling influence on one life something one is devoted or committed to.

Thomas Carlyle, the Scottish essayist and historian (1795 - 1881): "Religion is the thing a man does practically to heart and knows for certain, concerning his vital relations to this mysterious universe and his duty and destiny therein.

S. Mill, the English philosopher and economist: The essence of religion is the strong and earnest direction of the conditions and desires towards an ideal

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73 Ibid., p. 247.
object recognized as of the highest excellence, and as rightly paramount over all selfish objects of desire.\textsuperscript{76}

Aldus Huxley, the English novelist (1894 - 1963): "Religion is, among many other things, a system of education, by means of which human beings may train themselves, first to make desirable changes in their own personalities and, at one remove, in society, and, in the second place, to heighten consciousness and so establish more adequate relations between themselves.\textsuperscript{77}

1.1.3. The Reasoning That Refutes The Self Of The Person

Buddhism is a religion that refuses to be objectively defined, for this will be setting a limit to the growth of its spirit.\textsuperscript{78}

Suzuki’s definition of Buddhism means that from the Buddhist point of view religion can never be discussed without any reference to the spiritual realm and or the inner experience of the individual involved. It should be made clear that here, according to Buddhism, returning to the primordial essence of man or the true nature does not mean an advocacy of egocentrism. On the contrary, it means, in order to take the first step to return to the primordial essence of man, first and foremost, man must completely cast off all the attributes of his ego, namely his infatuated feelings, solid attachment, sensuous desire, mental formations such as "I", "mine" and "myself". Neither does the return to the inner spiritual experience means non-egocentrism. According to Buddhism, precisely at the moment that one get in touch with his divine nature, he establishes in himself an ultimate reality which by nature is essential, original, and eternal. This is called Tathata (Suchness) or Buddha nature which is an everlasting, living stream of present consciousness.

As a consequence, Buddhism is not the faith that one has to accept blindly. Neither is it a series of sacred principles that are created, transmitted to

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid, p. 06.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid, p. 07.
man's soul and guided by some mysterious power from outside. It is the teachings that show us the path to reach enlightenment through our inner individual experience. In Dhammapada, Lord Buddha said: "Like earth, a balanced and well disciplined person results not. He is comparable to an Indochina. Like a pool unsullied by mud, is he, to such a balanced one life's wandering do not arise.

In essence, Buddhism is a system of teachings which shows us the way to return to our primordial nature or our true nature. Once standing on the ground of our true nature, we will recognize the true nature of other human existences as well as other existing beings around us like bird, stone, branch of tamarind tree. This is the interdependent relations or the Dependent Origination of the reality. Simultaneously, with the realization of his true nature and those of other existing beings, man also realizes that, it is his volitional actions that create and shape his own destiny-as Lord Buddha said Owner of their karma are the beings, heirs of their karma, the karma is their womb from which they are born, their karma is their friend, their refuge. In Dhammapada, Lord Buddha also taught us: "By oneself alone is evil done, by oneself alone is evil avoided, by oneself alone is one purified. Purity and impurity depend on oneself”. No one can purity another.

This suggests that The Buddha did not recognize any super natural power which exerted over control human life. In Buddhism, man is the only sentient being who has volitional actions. He has to harvest and accept the consequences of these actions and, doing so, he lives his own fate...

The doctrine of causes and effects in Buddhism asserts that both good karma and bad karma are the end results of man’s psychological and physical actions; and that through the relation of cause and effect, man establishes his own karma with his good and evil actions. It also affirms that man has the

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80 Dhammapada, Thich Minh Chau, Buddhist Institute of Ho Chi Minh City, 1990, p. 97
potential capacities to liberate himself from the life which he has created and lived with his own psychological attitude and actions accumulated in successive previous lives; that are the orientated biological causation.

As a consequence, the doctrine of causes and effects awakens in man the inner power which makes him to be himself and transforms him into his own creator with responsibilities and obligations. In other words, the doctrine of causes and effects liberates man from the ruling power of person God, dogmas and theology. Once liberated, man would understand that he has to be responsible for all the consequences of his own psychological states and volitional actions and should not look for any salvation outside him. St. Paul’s famous statement that: If Christ be not raised in you, your faith is vain, ye are yet in your sins.\(^ {81} \)

To practice Buddhism is to lead a way of life with the motto: "Not to do evil, to do well, to purity one's mind". The Buddha's enlightenment is the end of the spiritual journey, full of hardships and deprivations. It was the supreme will power and the extraordinary energy which has transformed Prince Siddhartha from a man with a deep religious consciousness and a wholesome life into a Buddha. Buddha is the sentient being who had reached enlightenment and obtained great wisdom.

Therefore, it is necessary to affirm that it is the inner experience of each individual that would lead him to the supreme enlightenment and that enlightenment is the moment that the supreme wisdom or the Boddhicitta in one individual blossoms and radiates to all sentient and natural beings. Lord Buddha said that: All sentient beings can become Buddha. On the path to enlightenment, one has to light the torch and hold it to show the way for himself; in the ocean of

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Saṃsāra (Cycles of life), each individual has to be an isolated island; I, Tathāgata is merely a teacher in principle.\(^{82}\)

According to Buddhism, the religious consciousness and the inner individual experience are the two extremely important factors in man’s path to his enlightenment. They are the keys which control man’s thinking and action in his relations with the outside world. As a result, consciousness or mind is always the bases of Buddhist training. Buddha said: "Mind is the forerunner of all (evil condition) Mind is chief; and they are mind made. If, with an impure mind, one speaks or acts, then pain follows one even as the wheel, the hoof of the Ox. If, with a pure mind, one speaks or acts, then happiness follows one even as the shadow that never leaves.\(^{83}\)

Derek parfait identifies two contemporary theories of the self.\(^{84}\) On the Ego Theory, a person’s continued existence cannot be explained except as the continued existence of a particular ego or subject of experiences. The ego theory explains the self like the Brahminical theories as a spiritual enduring substance. The rival view is the bundle Theory according to which we cannot explain the unity of consciousness at any time by referring to a person. Instead we must claim that there are long series of different mental states and events. In Bundle Theory the self is only a fact of grammar. Parfait calls Buddha the first Bundle Theorist and he states that given the advances in psychology and neurophysiology, the Bundle Theory and thus the Buddhist theory of the self may now seem to be obviously true.\(^{85}\)

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82 *In Nikāya and Mahāyāna Sūtras*
85 Ibid. 1978
The metaphysical beliefs that we hold depend in some way on our ethical convictions and vice versa, ethical convictions provide the motivation for upholding certain metaphysical beliefs.\footnote{Chadha, 1998, p. 147.}

Personhood is one of the basic assumptions in moral philosophy. In boil-ethics, struggles over abortion, animal’s rights and brain death have brought personhood to the forefront.\footnote{Jams J, Hughes and Damian Keown, Buddhism and Medical Ethics: A Bibliographic Introduction, \textit{Journal of Buddhist Ethics} 2, 1995.} This is illustrated by the ongoing debate on embryonic stem cell research. The basic principle in this debate is that no human being can be sacrificed for the wellbeing of another human being. The argument against and in favor of research on embryonic stem cells centre on the question at which point in the development of a human embryo on can speak of a person. If the lump of cells that forms the embryo is not considered a person, then there is no moral objection against using these cells in favors of advancement in medical science. If these cells do constitute a person, then the basic principle prohibits the use of this person for medical research. This example illustrates that a theory on the self is required to be able to determine an outcome in this moral dilemma.

First of all, let me briefly state the method by which the chariot itself is searched for by means of the sevenfold analysis, and thus established as essence less, if the chariot exists inherently then is it true then just as the or inherently different from its parts? If the former is true, then is it inherently one which or inherently differ from its parts? If the former is true, then, just as the parts are many, so would the chariot become many. If it were inherently different, it would be of a different nature and whatever of different natures and yet co temporal must be unrelated different objects, and hence, like a horse and a cow, the chariot would have to be perceived separately from its parts. Therefore, neither of the two possibilities, being the same or being different, is possible.
The two possibilities, of the parts inherently depending on the chariot and of the chariot inherently dependent on its parts, also do not work. This is because in their cause would have to be inherently different things and I have just finished explaining why this would not work.

Neither will it work to say that the chariot inherently exists in such a way that it possesses its parts, as for example, Devadatta might possessed a cow nor as Devadatta possesses is nose. In the former case of possession, are of different natures, whereas in the latter case of possession they would have to be inherently of the same nature and both of these already refuted.

It also does not work to say that the mere assemble of the chariot’s parts is the chariot, for were that so, it would follow, absurdly, that the mere assembly of the complete set down in certain place, wheel, nails, axle, all taken apart and deposited loosely, would be the chariot.

It is also not correct to posit the special shape of the chariot to be the chariot, for were that so, is it the shape of the individual parts that is the chariot or is the shape of the assembly of parts that is the chariot? In the former case, is the shape identical to the shape when it has yet to be put together or is it another shape, different from the former? In the first case there would be no different between the shape of the wheels and so forth at an earlier time, when it was yet to be yet together, and at a later time, when it already had been put together. Hence, just as there is no chariot at the earlier time, when it has yet to be put together, likewise later, when it has already been put together, there would also have to be chariot. The second case, also does not work, for were there to be any other special features in the shape of the wheels and so forth when, at a later time, it already has been put together, futures that do not exist in the wheels and axle and so on when, at an earlier time, it has yet to be put together, they would have to be perceived, and they are not.
It also does not work to posit the shape of the assemble for parts to be the chariot, for in our own system the shape of though assembly of the parts is the basis of labeling the chariot, nor does it work in the realist system, for they claim that the shape of the assembly cannot exist as a substance, as the assembly itself does not exist as a substance, while accepting that the chariot must exist as a substance.

In this way, if searched for in these seven ways, no chariot is found; but if is not analyzed, it is labeled as a chariot in dependence on its parts. In this same fashion one should realize that this in a seminar way to all phenomena, such as pots and so on, for analogously in accordance with all of the previous explanations of the reasoning that refutes by analyzing it in terms of whether or not it is inherently one or different from its parts. Hence, the Avatāra says:

It is not correct to say that the mind a pot in regards to a pot

Which exists in terms of matter and so on?

Because it does not exist, neither can its matter exist

Therefore, cannot be the phase of the.\(^{88}\)

Let us now explain this by applying the methodology used in the case of the chariot to the person. We must first ask ourselves whether that ‘I’ or that ‘person’ which is the basis that we conceptualize when we think ‘I’ is the same as or different from the aggregates. If it is the same, then just as the aggregates so would the self be many, even at one instant of time. That is not all, for the Prajnāmūla says:

If the aggregates are the self
It would arise and be destroyed.\(^{89}\)

\(^{88}\) MA (VI, 157) P. 275.
\(^{89}\) Pno.5224, Dbu ma Tsa, folio 12b; MMK
Upon the destruction of the human aggregates during a previous birth a new set of god aggregates may arise that are of the same continuity, belonging to individual who was previously the man. When this occurs, it would follow that just as the aggregates of the man and the god are different, so too would their selves. Were that so, it would not be possible to remember births. The karma already created would be wasted and we would encounter karma that we had not created. All of these three faults would ensue. What is more, if the selves within past and future lives were different by virtue of their own characteristic? They would be distinct unrelated object, and because of this those three faults would ensure. Although it is not contradictory it say that the self and aggregates are merely different nominally, to say that they are inherently different would make them unrelated distinct objects, which follows from the previously explained reasoning. Were that so, we would have to perceive the self apart from the aggregates, whereas this in fact in not perceived. As the Prajñāmūla says:

Were the self different from the aggregates?

The self would not have the characteristics of the aggregates.90

The self would not possess the characteristics of the aggregates such as arising, destruction, and abiding, for it would be an object distinct from, and unrelated to, the aggregates, just as, for example, a horse does not possess the characteristics of a cow. Now if this is accepted, then the self would be a no composite phenomenon and it could not be the one who accumulates karma or experiences it’s ripening. This very same reasoning refutes the inherent existence of the dependence of the self and the aggregates, as well as the possession, for these three positions, dependence, and has as a definite prerequisite that the self and the aggregates be different.

If the mere assembly of the aggregates is the self there would then ensure the fault of the object of the action and the doer of the action being identical, for

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90 Pno. 5224. If it were to be different from the aggregates, it would have the characteristics of no aggregates. The Tibetan, however, interprets the negative prefix as applying to the entire compound.
just as the aggregates are those taken up by the self, so too is the assembly of the aggregates taken up by the self. whereas the assembly itself being the self, by hypothesis, it become both what is taken up and what takes up, thereby annihilating the distinction between action, object, and doer); and because the continuity of the aggregates is also accepted as being that taken up by the self, this same reasoning refutes the possibility that the continuity of the aggregates is the self.

It is also not possible for the shape of the aggregates to be self because, were that so, it would follow, absurdly, that the self was material91 and it would also follow, absurdly, that when one is born into the formless realm the self would cease to exist.

The fact that if it is searched for in these seven ways no self at all is to be found is what means for the self to be essenceless. This, however, does not repudiate the fact, if it is not analyzed; the notion of person is a functional one. It being established by a nominal valid cognition, the person does nominally exist. What is more, when the mind that thinks ‘I’ arises, it does so in? Dependence on, that is, using as a basic, the five aggregates within one’s own continuum (if one is in the form realm or below) and the four, (excluding the form aggregate, if one is a formless being) without using (such a basic it would not arise) and that is why it (is said) to be merely labeled in dependence on the on the aggregates.

When one repudiates the self through reasoning one also establishes the senselessness of mindedness because mindedness is something that must be established in dependence on the self. That is why the Prajnāmūl says:

If the self does not exist

How could “mine” exist?

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91 Implicit here is the presupposition that shape and anything having shape must be material. In other words, shape is both matter and a property of matter. This derives from the Abhidharmikas.
Although many forms of reasoning setting forth the selflessness of phenomena are taught, the Prasannapaā states that if one negates that arising exists inherently, the refutation, such as inherent existence and so on, become very simple. What is more, the Avatāra states that to refute true arising the most powerful form of reasoning in the one that refutes arising via the four possibilities.\textsuperscript{92} Therefore, let me very briefly mention this method here.

The Sāṃkhyas\textsuperscript{93} think that if things do not exist at the time of their causes, then they could not arise. Hence, they claim that (a thing) exists in an manifest way within the nature of its cause, that the manifestation of that is what we call causality, and that what has already become manifest need not arise again.

The Vaiśeṣikas, all of the realists of our own system, and the Svātantrika Mādhyamikas all accept that things, by virtue of their own characteristic, are different from their causes, thereby exclusively believing in ‘arising from another.’\textsuperscript{94}

The Nigranthas (Jains)\textsuperscript{95} claim that everything anises both from itself and from another in the following way. They say that a porcelain pot having the nature of clay arises based on the clay, thereby arising from other itself; and being dependent on the potter and wheel and so on, it arises from other. Human, being strictly of the nature of the vitality of their previous births, arise based on vitality, thereby arising from themselves; and being dependent on parents and previous Karman, they arise from others.

From among the twenty-five different philosophical schools that derive from the Sāṃkhyas, the ascetic Lokacakṣuh composed the Hundred Thousand

\textsuperscript{92} This of Course is the Subject of MMK. The Prasannapadā Commentary, Mādhyamika Text Series, Volume I, Delhi, 1972, pp. 473-506.
\textsuperscript{93} Dasguta, A history of Indian Philosophy, Trans, Delhi: Motila Babarsidass, 1984, pp. 303-307.
\textsuperscript{94} According to the due lugs pa interpretation of MMK ‘arising from another’ does not refer to a cause arising from an effect that is different from it, but to a cause arising from an effect that is inherently different from it.
\textsuperscript{95} On the Jain theory of Anekāntavāda, see Dasgupa, History of Indian Philosophy, pp. 175-176.
Scriptures of the Čārvāka. Hand all his followers accept that things arise causelessly.⁹⁶

None of these four ways arising are apprehended by modes of innate misapprehension of true. Nonetheless, if things existed the way they are apprehended by the inn at apprehension of true, they would definitely have to exist in one of these four ways. The reasons for this I have already explained.

First of all let me briefly mention something of the reasoning that refutes arising from self. The exposition of the Avatāra, namely its pointing out such absurdities as the seed sprout having to have the same color and shape and so, are easy to understand. The Prasannapadā presents how it is that Buddhapālita explains this point as follows.⁹⁷

The Acārya Buddhapālita himself states that things do not arise from themselves because that would make their arising purposeless and because utter absurdities would follow. It is unnecessary for things that exist in and of themselves to arise again, for if things arose even though they already existed, they could never sop arising

Then, to state the way in which Bhāvaviveka attempts to counteract (this position),⁹⁸ the Prasannapadā says: In response to this, one opponent says, this is not correct because states neither logical reason no example and because he does not eliminate the fault advocated by the others. Because these are words of reduction argument, we must take the opposite object (in order to determine the proponent’s true belief)⁹⁹ and because it is evident that the proposition and its

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⁹⁷ Cabdrukīrti’s defense of Buddhapālita’s interpretation of the refutation of arising from self is discussed at length in MOE, pp. 469-498. This begins an extensive discussion of the polemics concerning the interpretation of the Buddhapālita-Bhāvaviveka-Candraśīkā debates on the nature of proper logical strategies in the Madhyamaka. Although this is also discuses in the lam rim Chan mo, the present discussion is based principally on that in the Legs bashed saying, pp. 321-344.
⁹⁸ For an exposition of Bhāvaviveka’s interpretation of Buddhapālita’s reduction and the polemic surrounding it, see MOE, pp. 455-468.
⁹⁹ For example, in the reduction it follows absurdly, that sound is not a product because it is permanent to determine what the proponent, the Buddhist, believes one must reverse both the proposition (yielding ‘sound is a product’) and the reason (yielding ‘it is impermanent’). Hence, the proponent
predicate must be reversed, that things would be born from others, that causality is efficacious and that it finite. But these positions are contrary to our own tenets.' This is the fault of which he accuses. 100

Because this argument and the response to it are extremely difficult to understand I will explain them. Let me, however, first give the faulty interpretation one person.

The meaning of the section that goes ‘we must take the opposite of the present context’ is as follows. All valid reduction arguments must imply a positive proof. Hence, so too must the reduction put forth by Buddhapālita imply a positive proof. We know that we arrive at the predicate (of such a positive proof) by talking the opposite of the reason of the reduction and that the logical reason (of such a proof) is the opposite of the predicate of the reduction. Hence, that must be accepted as valid logical reasoning is:

Subject: all things

Predicate: have purposeful and finite arising

Reason: because they arise from others.

But to do so is to contradict our on tenets. This is (Bhavya’s refutation of Buddhapālita)

The way the glorious Candra refutes that such a fault exists is as follows. Because it is not correct for an Mādhyamika to accept Svatantras, thy also do accept a positive proof qua implication of a reduction. Merely positing a reduction does not imply a positive proof because the speaker does not speak with the desire to imply a positive proof and because words show only the meaning that their speaker desire them to express, not expressing anything

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100 Pras, p. 14; Pras-tib, folio 5b
independent from the speaker. Therefore, since Buddhapālita’s reunion is only one that demonstrates the internal contradiction in what the opponent accept, there is no fault. This is response.

This interpretation is utterly misguided, for, as I have already explained at great length, there is no contradiction in rejecting the Svatantrya and accepting valid forms of logical reasoning, not to speak of the fat that it is quite incorrect to consider the Prāsangika a system that advocates that reduction arguments cannot imply positive proofs. The Avatārabhāsya says:

If what is dependent on others arises strictly from another, then from a flame heavy darkness could arise because of its otherness; but this is neither evident nor reasonable. Therefore, it cannot be, and therefore the otherness of cause and effect it untenable.

Also, in the Bhāsya to the verse that goes ‘everything would arise from everything else because, it says: ‘If, as you say, the rice sprout arises from a rice seed which is different from it, then so too would a pot, cloth, and so forth, and that is not seen to be the case. Therefore, it cannot be’. So we see that the commentary clearly explains the positive proofs implied by those two reductions of the root text explicitly teacher. Although there are many such, as it would lengthen, I will not cite them.

The Prasannapadā explain the meaning of Buddhapālita’s reduction arguments. The line ‘things that exist in and of themselves’ explanation of the word their; then it posits that as the reason. The line ‘it is necessary… to arise again’ is the extensive explanation of the line ‘that would make their arising purposeless,’ and ‘if things arose even though they already existed, they could never stop arising’ is the extensive explanation of ‘utter absurdities would follow.’ These latter two are explained to be the predicates of the reductions.

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101 This is a reference to PV (I, 213); see Gnoli. The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, pp. 107-108.
102 Madhayama Āgama , p. 89
103 Ibid, p. 89.
104 Ibid, p. 90.
Because ‘the purposelessness of its arising’ and ‘the never ending news of its arising’ are not explained to be the reasons, anyone who accepts that in our own system these are accepted as the reasons to be poorly versed. There is also no way that anyone who is half acquainted with logical reasoning would ever maintain that all valid reduction arguments must imply a positive proof. So how could it be possible for someone like Bhāvaviveka, a completely perfected Mahāpandia, to accept such a thing?

Therefore, the opponent’s position is to be interpreted as follows. Buddhapālita’s stated syllogism expresses no example or reason to prove that there is no arising from self, and hence it is nothing but a mere belief. Also, it does not eliminate the fault expressed by the Sāṃkhyā when he analyzes the belief as follows: ‘If by the words no arising from self you mean from a result whose nature has become manifest, you have proven something already established for us. If from a cause whose nature is that is has unmanliness, potential, then, as everything that arises can arise only from such, your concomitance is reversed.’

The words translated in the Prasannapadā as ‘because these are words of a reduction argument’ are translated in the Prajñāpradīpa often an opportunity. This means that, as these are words that offer the other party an opportunity to accuse us, they are not correct. How does this opportunity arise? It arises because it is necessary to cake the opposite of the words as they literally arranged within the present context. If, as per the literal interpretation, the proposition to be proven were thing do not arise from them,’ and the logical reason ‘arising is purposeless and endless,’ then the relationship between reason and subject is not established. If the logical reason is that ‘if arose themselves, would be purposeless an endless,’ then for the relationship between subject and reason to be established the proposition to be proven would also have established. So it is not possible to take as it literally stands. Therefore, it become evident that here Buddhapālita himself believes the two opposites

Prasangavakyatvāt. See Pras, pp. 15, 14, n. 5, for the Varant in Bhāvaviveka.
meaning to be the reason. This is how Bhavya interprets the beliefs of Buddhapālita.

How does it become evident that it is the opposite meaning that he believes to be the reason? It is evidenced by the former and latter uses of the words because it would, which are words that imply the opposite. How is this evidenced? In this way, from the fact that ‘their arising would be purposeless’ (we understand that he believes it to be actually) finite. This is how it is done. Hence, Buddhapālita, as proof for the previously stated belief, namely ‘that do not arise from themselves,’ does not posit the actual literally stated ‘arising would be purposeless and endless’ as his reason. Although he does not actually state it literally, the word would have the ability to indirectly imply that it is the opposite as the reason. It is clear that this is Buddhapālita’s belief. This is that meaning.

In this regard, when Great exposition An Ocean of Reasoning, says: ‘if it is necessary to take the opposite of the literal reason, one must also take the opposite of the literal predicate because they are similar,’\textsuperscript{106} it is not teaching that the reasons for both are similar, for there is no question at all that the faults arising from taking ‘the purposelessness and endlessness of arising’ as the reason are similar to the faults arising from taking ‘no self-arising’ as the predicate. Nor is it simply insisting that the predicate must be the opposite of the literal predicate because the reason is the opposite of the literal reason. Well then, what is the meaning of this passage? This is not being claimed of everything that is a reduction or a logical reason. Here that they are similar in that, when Buddhapālita cites as the reason that prove no self-arising the predicate an opposite entity, that is, the opposite of the non-affirming negation, which is the mere repudiation, which is the mere repudiation of self-arising. How they are similar as regards the need to accept that is as follows. It does not mean that they are similar in that citing ‘it arises from another’. The object that is the reversal of the given predicate that is, the no affirming negation that is the mere repudiation

of self-arising, is a predicate that is an affirming negation, if the purposefulness and finiteness of arising is posited as the reason, then the words of the proposition, that is, that ‘thing do not arise from themselves,’ indirectly suggest that the quality being proven is that things arise in a purposeful and finite way, it is expressing that things arise; and by words ‘they do not arise from themselves,’ it repudiates arising from self. Given that they arise, there are no two choices but that they arise either from themselves or from another. Hence, by claiming on the one hand that things arise, and on the other that they do not arise from themselves, is it suggesting that they arise from another. It is just like the case of claiming that fat Devadatta does not eat during the day. This indirectly suggests that he eats at night. Because Bhāvaviveka himself accepts arising from another nominally, he advocates that is included within these two. The meaning of the following to passages from the Great Exposition should be understood in this same way. ‘In this regard it is not that just as the reason is reversed, so too must the predicate. Therefore, the reversed object is the no repudiation of self-arising. And also: “when it says: ‘because arising is purposeful and finite, if the self-arising of things were not repudiated…’ they would arise from others.” The exposition also says: ‘the (suggestion of the arising from another) does not (occur by) reversing the reason of the reduction because it is explained to occur by reversing the proposition, and because no self-arising is never claimed to be the reason.” One individual who has never subtly analyzed such an issue and holds to the conception that Bhāvaviveka’s statement to the effect that ‘by the reversal of no self-arising, arising from another’ is a statement that Buddhapālita posits as the reason of his reduction argument ‘no arising from self” and that because it is necessary to take the opposite of this reason to be the predicate, arising from another becomes this predicate, thereby being suggested or implied by the reduction. Because this individual has this doubt, for the purpose of dispelling it teaches this not to be the case.

107 Ibid, p. 53.
108 Ibid, p. 54.
Bhāvaviveka does not think that the reversal, of the mere repudiation of self-arising is the reversal of the reason of the reduction that Buddhápālita urges on the Sāṃkhyas, for Bhāvaviveka he says that ‘because it becomes manifest that the predicate is an object to be reversed, things would arise from others.’ He is not saying that by reversing the reason their arising from others, and also because Buddhápālita does not claim, nor does he posits, ‘no self-arising’ as the reason of his reduction. This is what intends to say.

So what does Bhāvaviveka think he is proving by showing the fault of having to take the reversed entities as the reason and predicate? He states, ‘there arises the fault of contradicting our on tents.’ There arises the fault of contracting which of our own tenets? Now this definitely is not claiming that because is accepting that it is purposeful and finite, he is contracting the tenets which advocates that it is purposeless and endless, and that because he is accepting arising from another, he is contracting the tenet that there is no arising from another, for neither, the Ārya nor Buddhápālita accept arising that is purposeless and endless. Loss then how does it? In the same way as it was just explained. Advocating, on the one hand, that things arise purposefully and, on the other, that they do not arise from themselves indirectly implies that they arise from another. If this is so, then as it is not the non affirming negation, that is, the mere repudiation of the self-arising of things that acts as the proposition but the affirming negation indirectly implied by the predicate proposition, then it contradicts our own tenet that the proposition must be a non affirming negation. This is Bhavya’s intention.

That non affirming negation is the proposition is a tenet not only of Buddhápālita, but a fundamental tenet of all Mahayanists who comment on the purport of the Ārya, whether Prāsangika or Svātantrika. That is why the Exposition says: ‘in this way it contradicts our own tenet that the words not from self are referring to the mere repudiation of self-arising.’

110 Ibid.p 54
It is an indication of extreme dilettantism on one’s part to interpret this to mean, as does the Explanatory Commentary to the *Prajñāpradīpa*,\(^{111}\) that it is in contradiction to the scriptures of the *Acārya Nāgārjuna*, that is, in contradiction to the tenet that one should not accept arising from another and purposeful and finite arising, for it seems, one has not understood even the mere fact that Bhāvaviveka himself believes that the arising of things from others is the purport of the Āyra is claiming that it is in contradiction to the tenet that one should not cadet the arising from others ultimately.

But then it would be necessary to say that it is from the reversal of ‘no arising from self’ that ultimately arising from another’ become the predicate, reducing one to advocating nonsense. So here it is not this that is being advocated, but instead that the reversal of no self-arising comes to establish from another. So to say that it is in contradiction to the tenet that one should not accept arising from another ultimately is refuting Bhāvaviveka because he accepts that there is arising from another ultimately.\(^{112}\) In this same way it is very easy to understand that it is not correct to reject purposely arising and to analyze it by whether he is not accepting purposeful arising altogether or whether he is not accepting purposeful arising ultimately.

Bhāvaviveka accepts that, even though purposeless and endless arising are posited as the reasons literally, it is the two reversed objects that, according to the intended meaning, become evident as the posited reasons. If that is so, then why does he teach that there is a fault of not expressing a reason?

There is no problem here, for he believes that this does not express a Svatantra reason that can prove no self-arising. In this regard the glorious Candra answers this by putting the meaning of the Prasannapadā in an easily understandable way.

\(^{111}\) P no. 5259, Volume 96, folios 190b-191a. this passage is translated in MOE, pp. 462-466
\(^{112}\) The point here being that if affirming arising from another, as Bhavya accuses Buddhapālīta of doing, is tantamount to affirming ultimate arising from another, as this opponent suggests Bhava is accusing Buddhapālīta of doing, then the opponent is refuting Bhavya himself because he too affirms arising from another, but not ultimate arising from another.
The Svatantra reason that prove no self-arising does not suffer from the fault of not eliminating the objection advocated by others because in general Mādhyamikas should not accept Svatantra reasoning, and in this case no Svatantra reason is posited to prove no self-arising anyway. We have already explained the reasons why the Svatantra should not be accepted.

Be that as it is still necessary to state a faultless syllogistic reason renowned to others with an example and so on, and this is not stated, so the previously mentioned fault still ensues.

Even though an inferential is not stated, simply by means of a reduction that states the contradictions, an opponent can come to see the problems, that is, the internal contradictions, within his or her own position, thereby abandoning that position. If they see such and yet do not abandon, then it would do no good to expound an inferential argument. Do not argue with the insane!

Therefore, it does not follow that inference renowned to others must definitely be stated to all opponents. When it is necessary to state to someone, it is stated. Buddhapālita’s statement, ‘there is no need for what exits in itself to arise again,’ are the words extensively explaining the passage, ‘that would make there.’ Hence, exists is the reason and the arising again of things is purposeless is the proposition. In this way we see that the explanations that extricates the power of the great meaning of these words of Buddhapaālita is as follows:

Subject: the clay pot that is an entity accepted as existing in an unmanifest state at the time of its cause

Predicate: does not arise from itself

Reason: because it exists, having already been established in its own nature

Example: as in the case of the pot that is accepted as being manifest.
This is the explanation of the way of positing the inference renowned to others as it is taught. Therefore, he does not suffer from the fault of not having stated a concordant example that possesses both the reason and predicate the ray own of others, for the Sāṃkhyas themselves already have established that the pot which is already manifest need not arise again. That very proves to the Sāṃkhyas, who accept that the thing which they believe to be in an unmanifest state must arise again, that it does not arise again. So he does not suffer from the fault of proving what already has been established. Hence, we are free of the fault as stated.

How we are free of the fault that ‘since it is necessary to accept something that is the opposite of the reduction, we are contradicting our own tenets’ is a point taught in the Prasannapadā and extremely difficult to understand. For this reason those who are devoid of the seeing guide of intelligence, in the midst of their darkness, spew forth the continuous and inexhaustible clamor in which they clearly announce their own concocted stances.

Now this point that Bhāvaviveka variously analyzes and in regard to which he faults Buddhapālita on this one occasion is that having to do with the four lines that go ‘not from self, not from another.’ In his explanation, Buddhapālita sets forth the four positions of our own system, namely, that thing do not arise from them and so forth. Then, to prove these four positions of our own system, he does not actually posit a trifocal syllogistic from of proof, but instead literally states only a mere reduction argument that demonstrates the problems involved in accepting the opposite of these, our own, positions.

This is the point on which Bhavya faults him. That is why our on Lord in this his Great Exposition of Insight says:

“Nothing, either inner or outer, can never or in any way arise from itself and likewise should (all of the adjectives and adverbs like ever and in any way, and
so on) be applied to each of the other three positions.\textsuperscript{113} Arising from self is refuted by a reduction, and these positions, without being statements of example reason that prove these, nonetheless teach the problems of the opposites of this position.

So must it be understood?

Bhāvaviveka states our own position to be that ‘thing do not arise from themselves’ and then posits as proof of this, ‘because their arising would be purposeless’ and ‘because their arising would be endless,’ and this is not correct. That purposelessness and endlessness should not be pointed as the reason has been previously explained. Also, establishing our own position and the arising of certainty in regard to it cannot be accomplished merely by means of a reduction that exposes the fault of the other’s, hence requiring that trifocal logical reason state as proof of that position. What is more, the words ‘their arising would be purposeless’ in actuality implies the absurdity of purposeless arising and ‘would be endless’ implies the absurdity of endlessness. A mere reduction argument urged against another, however, cannot prove our own position, that is, that things do not arise from themselves, which is why it is necessary to take the object that is the opposite of the absurdity, that is, of purposelessness, namely, that there does exist purposeful arising, and because of this he thinks that there arises the fault of contradicting our on tenets. This is then, as it was explained earlier. How could anyone then claim that his argument is a case of his thinking that all valid reduction arguments imply a positive proof?

Therefore, when Bhāvaviveka interprets the belief of Buddhapālita, he takes the two reductions:

\textsuperscript{113} This is said in response to Bhavya’s assertion that this first stanza teaches a syllogism of the form:

- **Subject:** all thing
- **Predicate:** never ultimately arise
- **Reason:** because they do not arise from self, other, both or neither.

According to the prāsangikas, this first stanza teaches just the four positions and not a syllogism. This why Tsong kha pa makes the point that the adjectives and adverbs do not from the separate predicate of a syllogism, but are to be construed as applying to each of the four positions as part of position statements.
Subject: things

Predicate: absurdly, arise purposelessly

Reason: because they arise from themselves.

To be the actual exposition of the passages ‘their arising would be purposeless’ and ‘utter absurdities would follow,’ and then he thinks that the two objects that are the opposite of the absurdities are evidently being believed to be the positive proofs, of ‘things do not arise from themselves.’ In this way of Bhāvaviveka, in explaining the meaning of Buddhapālita’s commentary, sets up the force of the former and latter sets of arguments in such a way that the passage, ‘it is necessary for things that arise in and of themselves to arise again,’ becomes the extensive explanation of the passage, ‘because that would make their arising purposeless.’ Then he disputes in this way, when is a mode of urging the reduction that, according to Candrakīrti’s interpretation, was never intended. Candra himself takes the former passages as the brief expositions and the latter ones as the extensive expositions.

Therefore, Bhāvaviveka, not realizing that the former and latter words of Buddhapālita’s commentarial are to be taken as the brief exposition and extensive explanation and that he urges in this way the unacceptable absurdity that it is purposeless for things to arise again, says that should posit a positive proof of our own position, but that he has not actually done so. Hence, by the stamens, ‘because that would make their arising purposeless’ and ‘because utter absurdities would follows,’ is taking as the reason he posits the opposite of the absurdities he actually urges, namely, the absurdity that the arising of thing is purposeless and the absurdity that it is endless.

This is making the general distinction that the four, arising from self and so on, are not accepted conventionally, and that it is an interdependent arising that is accepted conventionally. It is stating that no matter which of these four one accepts, one must accept that things exist inherently. The Avatāra also says
that arising which is the four extremes cannot be considered to be either of the
two truths when it says: ‘on that occasion, no matter what reasoning arising from
self or other cannot be considered to be correct either from ultimate or from
conventional viewpoints.\(^{114}\) Also, when says ‘arising from another does not exist
even from a worldly,’ it is explicitly stating that arising from another is not
possible even nominally. Hence, you are flying in the fact of all of these
scriptural passages (by advocating that the Prāsangikas accept arising from
another conventionally, that is nominally).

Therefore, the arising of results from a cause that is an inherently existing
different object is what is meant by ‘arising from another.’ This is very clearly
the purport of those scriptures. All those who accept arising from another, from
the Svātantrika Mādhyamikas on down, accept that cause and effect are different
substances. There is no one; however, who accept that there is arising from
another simply by virtue of the fact that cause and effect are different objects
with different

manes.\(^ {115}\) Were that not so, that is, if in the Prāsangika system a cause’s
merely being a different object from its effect entailed arising from another, it
would follow that in the Prāsangika system there would also be auto-cognition\(^ {116}\)
because there exists a consciousness that cognizes an object that is of its own
nature.\(^ {117}\) Therefore, those who accept this, confusing the apparent etymology
for the actual meaning, think that all of the etymologies of words imply there,
which is absolutely absurd.

\(^{114}\) MA, VI, 36, p. 122.

\(^{115}\) That cause and effect are different things is something that Mkhag grub jle claims even Nāgārūna and
Candrakīrti would accept, but as they refute arising from another, the latter cannot be so simple as
merely the position that a cause gives rise to an effect different from it. Hence, says Mkhag grub jle, it
is a cause giving rise to an effect that is an inherently different object from it that is the meaning of
arising from another, and it is this that is being refuted.

\(^{116}\) The Prāsangikas of course refute Svasaṃvedanā in such works as BCA (IX, 15-24)

\(^{117}\) The implication here seems to be that, according Mkhag grub jle, the Prāsangikas accept cognition
of something that is of the nature of the cognition itself but do not accept auto cognition. Likewise,
they accept the arising of an effect that is different from its cause but do not accept arising from
another. In other words, ‘arising from another’ and ‘auto cognition’ are technical terms whose
meanings cannot be inferred from theist etymologies
With the doctrine of Buddhism maintains that the concept of Ātman is unnecessary and counterproductive as an explanatory device for analyzing action, causality, karma, and reincarnation in a Buddhist context. Buddhists account for these and other "self"-related phenomena by other means, such as Pratatya-samutpāda, the Skandhas, and, for some schools, a Pudgala. Thus it is not necessary for Buddhists to posit a Ātman, and they further regard it as undesirable to do so, as they believe it provides the psychological basis for attachment and aversion. Buddhism sees the apparent self (our identification as souls) as a grasping after a self, inasmuch as we have a self; we have it only through a deluded attempt to shore it up. It should be noted that the critique of the individual self does not differentiate Buddhists from Advaita Vedantists, as they, too, deconstruct the individual self. It is in pushing the critique of the Ātman through to the level of metaphysical being in itself, i.e. to Brahman or Paramatman that it becomes that Buddhism distinguishes itself from Advaita on this point.