Chapter VI

BRITISH ACTION IN AND AROUND KASHMIR
1870-1900
In pursuance of the Article first of the Commercial Treaty of 1870, Dr. Henry Cayley was appointed, with the consent of the Maharaja of Kashmir, the first British Joint Commissioner, "to survey the trade routes through the Maharaja's territories from the British frontier of Lahoul to the territories of the ruler of Yarkand, including the route via the Chang Chenmoo valley". (1) At the end of the first season Cayley expressed his satisfaction on the dual system of control and survey of the road.

Chang Chenmoo Route

The road from Ligttee at Lahul border to Yarkand via Chang Chenmoo, Lugzi Thang, Rupsu, Qara Qash, and Shahidulla was surveyed and marked by Cayley and W.H. Reynolds. Certain repairs and improvements were carried out over a portion of the road. The jurisdiction of the joint commissioners over the territory along the road was decided. It was two miles (Kosa) where the road was passing through inhabited territory but where it was passing through uninhabited territory, the availability of water and grass determined the jurisdiction of the joint commissioners. Camping

grounds - a dozen in number - for the traders in the inhabited area were fixed at Gya, Upshi, Machalong, Chimri, Zingrul Tsaltak, Durgu, Tantsi, Muglib, Tsoar, Zukung and Chagra. Besides the four rest houses and supply depots at Tantsi, Sakti, Chimri and Gya, established by the Maharaja of Kashmir earlier, the joint commissioners had established six more at Gogra, Pamzal, Panglung, Lunkha, Chagra and Zingrul. They further suggested the establishment of eight more rest houses in the uninhabited territory upto Shahidulla. (2) Though Shahidulla was considered to be the most suitable place for having the last rest house Major Montogomerie, an officer in the Survey Department, expressed his doubts about it and stated:

... as the Maharaja has abandoned his guard house there, I do not see how it (the suggested plan) is to be carried out. Shahidulla would be the proper place for it, ... But I understand that is now considered to belong to the Yarkand side. ... But if it is not considered to belong to Yarkand I hardly think the Government could now recommend the Maharaja to resume its occupation, as it must necessarily be risky at such a distance, even if it were not always cut off in the winter from all possibility of being reinforced. ... (3)

Although the survey work of all the routes was completed, the final choice of the route was left for a later date. R.B. Shaw, the next Joint Commissioner at Leh, again submitted a detailed

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(2) Cayley to Griffin, 20 October 1870. Foreign Political A, June 1871, No. 572.

(3) K.W., Foreign Political A, June 1871, Nos. 560-97.
report pointing out the advantages of various routes passing through Ladakh to Yarkand and requested for the final choice of a free highway in 1872. (4) Baron Napier, the then acting Governor General and Viceroy, deferred the final decision and was of opinion that unless the traffic was fairly settled the period during which the joint commissioners were "to exercise the power on all the trade routes through Ladak" be extended. (5) Similarly almost all the joint commissioners laid stress on the selection of a free highway up to 1887, but at every occasion the final decision was deferred for a later date, (6) as it was observed earlier that the "Chang Chenmo route is one of those hobbies which have pretty well served their day...." (7) The provisions of the treaty of 1870 about the "free highway" and the joint commissioners jurisdiction along it remained unimplemented.

The Chang-Chenmo venture was a dismal failure, because despite the rest-houses, supply depots, guides and mail runners, only 408 men used the route in either direction inclusive of the two Forsyth missions, between 1870 and 1877. (8) However, it

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(4) R.B. Shaw to officiating Secretary to the Punjab Government. Foreign Political A, May 1872, Nos. 126-30.


(7) K.W., Foreign Political A, August 1873, Nos. 215-18.

(8) Ney Elias to P.D. Henderson, 28 March 1878. Foreign Political A, July 1878, No. 408.
proved highly beneficial to the British Government as it gave
an opportunity to it to survey the eastern portions of the terri-
tory of the Maharaja of Kashmir and to lower his position in the
eyes of his subjects. The Trade Agent at Leh became joint
commissioner with his extended sphere of activities at par with the
Wazir Wazarat of Ladakh. One was the agent to the British Govern-
ment and the other was agent to the Maharaja of Kashmir.

The British Agent at Gilgit 1877-81

At a time when the activity in regard to Chang Chenmo route
was in progress, the negotiations between Yakub Beg of Yarkand and
Russia were in progress; the Anglo-Afghan crisis was in progress;
it was felt by the British Indian Government to extend her area of
influence among the tribes of the western region of Kashmir
territory in order to check the Russian activities and to embarrass
Afghanistan. To this end, Forsyth suggested the establishment of
an agency at Gilgit like that of Leh in the Kashmir territory in
1874. (9) Much before the idea of an agency was mentioned to the
Maharaja of Kashmir, his co-operation was sought for the exploration
of the passes into Chitral and Yasin, in order to satisfy the
alarmist thinking in the British press. (10) John Biddulph who
went for the exploration discovered that the Ishkoman pass was

(9) Forsyth's Confidential Report of Yarkand Mission, 21 September
1874. Foreign Secret, August 1875, Nos. 68-81.

(10) Extract from Pall Mall Budget. Foreign Secret, July 1877,
Nos. 1-20.
really open only in winter and was practically of no importance, whereas Darkot Pass leading direct to Yasin was impassable for artillery, although open for the ten months in a year. Only the Baraghil Pass leading to Mastuj and Chitral was found easy and practicable for artillery for ten months in the year, but this too was closed on the south side by an easily defensible gorge of first rate importance. (11)

Despite the different strategical situations which the discoveries of Biddulph revealed, Baron Lytton, the then Viceroy of India went ahead with his schemes towards the Kashmir state. He met the Maharaja at Madhopur on 17 and 18 November 1876 and proposed to him that Chitral and Yasin should be brought under the control of Kashmir, that the British Agent should be appointed at Gilgit, and that an Officer on Special Duty should stay in Kashmir all the year round. For the accomplishment of these objectives Lytton promised an aid of five thousand rifles and suitable quantity of ammunition. Ranbit Singh readily accepted the proposal of extension of his territories, but demanded a "written authority to commence negotiations, in order that it may not be in the power of evil disposed persons hereafter to accuse him of entering into relations with foreign states for his own ends." (12) The other two proposals of the Viceroy were met with tough opposition of the Maharaja who


"have been most afraid of the sort of high-handed interference in domestic matters 'like what was done by Dr Cayley at Ladakh'..."

(13) At a stage the negotiations were about to break down, but the Maharaja reluctantly accepted the British Agent at Gilgit on the written assurance that there would be no interference by the Agent in the domestic affairs of Kashmir, while Lytton shelved his proposal for a British Resident in that state. (14)

Maharaja Ranbir Singh had accepted the British Agent at Gilgit with utmost reluctance. The appointment of Dr. Cayley at Leh a decade earlier was still fresh in his memory, and also its subsequent results of opening up of the entire eastern portion of Kashmir for British survey and supervision. The Maharaja was determined to put a stop to British encroachments, whereas, contrary to the written assurances to Maharaja in regard to scope of activities of the British Agent at Gilgit, Lytton charged John Biddulph, the Officer on Special Duty, with specific duties of "(1) obtaining trustworthy information in regard to occurrences beyond the border and (2) of gaining influence among the neighbouring tribes". (15) Thus, much before the departure of Biddulph to his isolated post at Gilgit, a hostile combination of the tribes in the area was reported by Major Henderson. (16) Not deterred by the news,

(13) Alder, n. 11, p. 118.


(16) K.W., Foreign Secret, August 1877, Nos. 80-95.
Biddulph marched to his post on duty, and after meeting on the way Bhai Gurbuksh Singh, the acting Kashmir Governor at Gilgit, reached on 30 November 1877. (17) Much before his arrival at Gilgit the people of the area were told that they might have to bear unendurable oppression from the residence among them of a British officer, and they were warned against offering services to him or meeting him without permission from the Governor. The headmen of the area were asked to cooperate in driving him from the place by spreading alarming reports and making things uncomfortable. On Biddulph's arrival the officiating Governor began to act on the lines laid down for him. So much so that his "baggage was openly plundered by an official without any attempt being made to enforce reparation or punishment". (18) Biddulph complained against the Governor of Gilgit. Maharaja immediately replaced the Governor, but expressed his apprehensions in regard to the safety of Biddulph at Gilgit. (19)

Unmindful of the hostile attitude of the local authorities, Biddulph began to interfere in the internal matters of the state. He entered into correspondence with Ghazar Khan, the Mir of Hunza, in regard to Mir's customary presents to Chinese Amban at Yarkand,

(17) Gilgit Diary, 7 December 1877. Foreign Political A, July 1878, No. 75.


(19) F. Henny to A.C. Lyall, 8 April 1878. Foreign Secret, July 1878, Nos. 68-69.
and Chaprot fort. This fort situated at the point where the Hunza, Nagar and Kashmir territories met and believed by the tribesmen to be impregnable, was obviously of some importance strategically. For Kashmir it was especially valuable because it dominated the route between Gilgit and Hunza, and safeguarded the Gilgit garrison against a flank attack from the North. This fort had been a bone of contention between Hunza and Nagar. In 1877 the fort was seized by Kashmir and was handed over to Azar Khan, the son of Jaffar Khan of Nagar. Since then it was garrisoned by fifty soldiers of Kashmir. (21) Ghazan Khan of Hunza wanted that the fort of Chaprot be taken over by Kashmir troops permanently. Both Biddulph and Henvey asked the Maharaja for action but he refused to take any action in face of acute famine in Kashmir valley. (22) The tribal population of the area showed threatening postures to recapture Chaprot. At last in 1880 Maharaja decided to take action. General Hoshiara, a competent Kashmiri officer was sent to Gilgit and he immediately began putting the defences in order. The garrison there was gradually increased to what Biddulph wanted. Azor Khan's subsidy was increased. Hunza and Nagar were warned in the strongest possible terms. (23)

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(20) F. Henvey to A.C. Lyall, 30 April 1878, Foreign Secret, July 1878, No. 79.


John Biddulph made a visit to Chitral and Yasin in October 1878. Contrary to the wishes of the Kashmir ruler, his efforts at having direct dealings with the chiefs on the Gilgit frontier, met with mixed response from the different rulers. At Yasin he met with Pahelwan Bahadur, the chief of that place. Pahelwan Bahadur told him frankly that "... he had not wished him to come but having come, he would spare no trouble to make me welcome." (24) Being sandwiched between Chitral and Kashmir, Pahalwan tried to establish direct contacts with the British Government through Biddulph. The latter expressed his inability to help him and rather advised Pahalwan Bahadur to send his vakils to Jammu for the yearly subsidy. For a while Pahalwan Bahadur adhered steadily to the course of friendship towards the British Agent at Gilgit. This friendly attitude of his soon changed into an open hostility in March 1880. (25)

In contrast to the conduct of Pahalwan Bahadur, Aman-ul-Mulk, the ruler of Chitral, tried to take credit for inviting Biddulph to his country. But soon he complained that his visit would prejudice his position in the eyes of Chitrals. The presents given by Biddulph were taken by Aman with little courtesy and he himself was treated with great contempt by the latter. He was asked for presents and money several times, and was subjected to

(25) Ibid.
many small vexations about supplies. Aman tried to prejudice Biddulph against Pahalwan and refused to discuss the treaty with Kashmir. Though he promised Biddulph for the severing of his connections with Kabul, he sent his vakils there within few days of the departure of the British Agent. In fact Aman's conduct varied from time to time towards British Agent at Gilgit. He spread rumours of British reverses in the Afghan war. But from the time of the death of Amir Sher Ali of Kabul, some steadiness came in his behaviour towards the Agent though his conduct remained always unreliable. (26)

The Maharaja of Kashmir on his part, paid no attention to these difficulties of the British Agent. He made no efforts towards the construction and repairs of the roads towards Gilgit. Chitral and Yasin both were having good relations with Maharaja, even before his meeting with the Viceroy Lytton at Madhopur in November 1876. From his meeting Lytton, Maharaja got written assurance from the British Government in his dealings with tribes beyond his borders. He was also benefited by the grant of five thousand rifles and an equipped mountain battery. (27) The Maharaja maintained his contacts with tribal people as usual and entered into a written agreement with Chitral to the following effect:

"I. I agree that I will always sincerely (from bottom of my heart) endeavour to be in submission and obedience to His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. I will inwardly and openly

(26) Ibid.
(27) Ibid.
consider the friend of the Maharaja as my own friend and the
deny of His Highness as my own illwisher. In recognition of the
superiority and greatness of His said Highness I will present
annually the following articles as Nazzerana - Horses 2, Hawks 2,
Hunting dogs 2.

II A confidential agent of the Sirkar shall always remain
in Kashkar and one at Yassin, and due respect and regard will be
shown to them. Similarly, an agent on my behalf shall always be
present at the Durbar of His Highness and an (agent) on behalf of the
ruler of Yassin shall remain at Gilgit to carry out orders.

III On condition of my abiding by the above cited Articles
and doing every act in accordance with the pleasure of the Sirkar, I
shall receive an annual stipend of Rs. 12,000 Srinagar currency from
the Sirkar. If instead of an Agent, my son attends the Durbar, he
shall receive a separate stipend from the Sirkar." (28)

This agreement with Chitral was communicated to the British
Government, but the tribes remained hostile to the British Agent at
Gilgit. The Governor of Gilgit added to this discontent by his
tyrannical attitude towards the people and underhand intrigues. The
situation became so critical that in October 1880, a one time friend
of Biddulph, Pahalwan Bahadur aided by a Hunza force seized Gakuch,
overran Piumial and besieged Sher Qila, a fort only twenty four miles

(28) Kashmir Chitral Convention. Foreign Secret, October 1879,
Nos. 315-19.
from Gilgit. Besides this Chilas was ready to attack Burgi and cut Gilgit off from the outside world. Without an exception every village on the Gilgit side of Indus was ready to join Pahalwan. The most suspected chiefs by Biddulph Jaffar Khan of Nagar and Amanul-Mulk of Chitral saved the situation by their timely actions. Jaffar sent a small force to aid Gilgit, and Aman launched an attack on Yasin while Pahalwan was before Sher Qila. This led Pahalwan to fly almost alone into Wakhan. Thus by the end of the year the main danger was over. (29)

The incident made British cautious and a search for a new policy for the Northern frontier began at once. By September 1880 the second Anglo-Afghan war was favourably concluded. Gilgit for a while lost its importance. The Viceroyalty of Lytton was over. Ripon, his successor was a great admirer of John Lawrence and thus was a natural opponent of Lytton's 'forward' policies in almost every sphere of Governmental activities. He decided to withdraw the Gilgit Agency and pointed out that

... The late rising of Yassin chief who had primarily been friendly, and whose conduct is still unexplained shows that the Political Agent had failed ... to secure any solid or durable influence over the petty chiefships with whom he has had dealings for three years past. Under these circumstances, it appeared to us that the British Agency at Gilgit could only be kept up at the expense of embarrassment and anxieties altogether disproportionate to the advantages which could be expected to result from its maintenance ... and to leave altogether in the hands of the Kashmir Durbar the local management of affairs upon the northern frontiers of the State. (30)

Colonel Tanner, who was officiating for the Officer on Special Duty at Gilgit was asked to march down before the end of July 1881 with his office establishment. He was however cautioned not to wind up or conclude any business or correspondence in haste. The Maharaja was greatly relieved by the departure of the British Agent at Gilgit. (31) But Biddulph, whose conduct was subject to severe criticism, warned the Government that

To merely withdraw the officer would, however, be to encourage the Maharaja to persecute his intrigues to greater advantage ... and he will be able to show the native princes of India that, following the example of the King of Burma and the Amir of Kabul, he has rid himself of the presence of a British Political Agent. (32)

This warning of Biddulph had its due effect on those who managed the affairs of the Government of India. The British became more cautious in their relations with Kashmir than with other frontier chiefships.

British Resident in Kashmir and the deposition of Pratap Singh

Withdrawal of Gilgit Agency gave an impetus to the long-drawn ambition of the British Government, to appoint a Resident in Kashmir, the efforts of which were initiated by Lord Hardinge in 1848. The matter was again raised in 1851, when an officer on Special Duty for summer months was appointed without any political functions. (33) Lord Northbrook in 1873 again recommended for the

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(31) Ibid.
(32) Biddulph’s memo, n. 12.
appointment of the Resident. But at that time it was thought unnecessary. (34) In the meantime the Officer on Special Duty was designated Political Agent and Justice of Peace in 1872. Certain rules were made by the British Government for regulating the powers of the British Officer at Srinagar in respect of civil and criminal cases, involving the British European subjects and the subjects of the Maharaja. Mixed courts were established under the authority of the Officer on Special Duty. (35) Prior to 1872, no European visitor to Kashmir was allowed to stay there after 15 October without the specific permission of the Maharaja. This restriction was removed by Northbrook, in spite of the remonstrances of the Maharaja. (36) Upto 1877 the affairs of Kashmir were conducted through the Punjab Government, but in that year Government of India took over the direct control of the state. All these efforts were well thought and were directed towards the breaking of the grip and sovereignty of the Maharaja of Kashmir over his own territory.

Ripon, who had withdrawn Gilgit Agency in 1881, proposed within three years that on the death of Ranbir Singh, the eldest son Pratap Singh should be recognized as a ruler of the state. On

(34) Kimberley to Ripon, 23 May 1884. Foreign Secret E, December 1885, Nos. 192-245.

(35) Aitchison, n. 1 (Calcutta, 1931), vol. 12, pp. 29-30; Foreign Political A, October 1872, nos. 374-377; Foreign Political A, April 1873, Nos. 187-196.

(36) Secretary Punjab to Secretary Government of India, 25 November 1872; Secretary Government of India to Secretary Punjab, 27 December 1872; Foreign Political A, January 1873, Nos. 88-89; Maharaja's remonstrances; Foreign Secret, August 1877, Nos. 73-75.
the succession of the new chief, a representation should be made for introducing substantial reforms into the administration of Kashmir. A Resident Political Officer should be appointed, who should exercise a general supervision over the affairs of the Kashmir state. (37) Earl of Kimberley, the Secretary of States for India accepted the proposals with an observation of the fact that

It may indeed be a question whether, having regard to the circumstances under which the sovereignty of the country was intrusted to the present Hindu family, the intervention of the British Government on behalf of the Muhammadan population has not already been too long delayed; but, however this may be, Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that, upon a fresh succession, no time should be lost in taking whatever steps may be requisite in order to place the administration upon a sound footing. (38)

Accordingly instructions were issued to the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir. (39) Maharaja Ranbit Singh died on 12 September 1885 at 4.30 p.m. Sir Oliver St. John, who upon the death of Maharaja became Resident reached Jammu on 15 September 1885. On the same day at five in the evening he met the new Maharaja Pratap Singh in the presence of Diwan Anant Ram, Babu Nilambar Mukerjee and Diwan Govind Sahai, as the new Council was not constituted, and the Maharaja was in mourning for thirteen days.

(37) Ripon to Kimberley, 7 April 1884. Foreign Secret E, May 1884, Nos. 354-57.

(38) Kimberley to Ripon, 23 May 1884. Foreign Secret E, December 1885, Nos. 192-245.

(39) H.M. Durand to Oliver St. John, 1 August 1884. Foreign Secret E, December 1885, Nos. 192-245.
Pratap Singh was informed that his succession to the Chiefship was recognized by the Viceroy, and that he will have to introduce reforms in the administration of the state with the assistance of a British Resident. In regard to the position of the Resident, the Earl of Dufferin intimated that "... I hope that Your Highness will not fail to consult him freely at all times, and to be guided by his advice in carrying those views into execution". (40)

This British interference into a native state of India, whose sovereignty they themselves guaranteed, led to a protest by the Maharaja. Pratap Singh requested the British Government not to change the status of an Officer on Special Duty to that of a Political Resident "and thus lowering me in the eyes of my subjects and in the estimation of public". He begged for a reasonable time limit for effecting reforms in the administration without any interference from any quarter. (41) This protest made no impact on the mind of Dufferin.

In the afternoon of 25 September 1885 Maharaja took his seat in the full Durbar. The British Resident announced the measures adopted. (42) A weak state had no option but to accept the changed status. Even the personal visit of the Maharaja to Calcutta in the

(40) Dufferin to Pratap Singh, 14 September 1885; Oliver St. John to Durand, 16 September 1885. Foreign Secret E, December 1885, Nos. 192-245.

(41) Pratap Singh to Dufferin, 18 September 1885. Ibid.

(42) Dufferin to Randolph S. Churchill, 19 October 1885. Foreign Secret E, December 1885, Nos. 192-245.
winter of 1885-86 resulted in a failure. Soon after the return of the Maharaja Sir Oliver St. John was transferred and was replaced by a more hostile T. Chichele Plowden in March 1886.

Deposition of Pratap Singh

Plowden paved the way for the removal of the Maharaja. He set himself so complete in opposition to the Maharaja that he obstructed every measure of the Maharaja toward the reforms in the administration. The Maharaja was anxious that his subjects should receive a liberal education. Plowden did not rest until he had secured possession of the educational rules which the Durbar had framed. The Maharaja was thinking for an equitable land settlement in Kashmir. In consultation with Sir Charles Aitchison, Maharaja wanted to appoint a native Muhammadan Settlement Officer as the population of Kashmir was mostly Muhammadan. But Plowden got appointed an Englishman named A. Wingate as Settlement Officer. Nilambar Mookerjee, the Finance Minister of the State, resigned in September 1886. The Maharaja thrice refused to accept his resignation but ultimately he had to accept it. Soon after the departure of Mookerjee, Dewan Govind Sahai was replaced by an incompetent man named Lachman Das as Prime Minister of the State. On assuming office Lachhman Das swept away most of the reforms that had been introduced during the preceding twelve months. The Maharaja was rendered powerless by Plowden and could not save his system from total wreck. He himself was reduced to a nullity. But the Plowden-Lachman Das ascendancy fell through on account of its own weakness. Raja Amar Singh the youngest brother of the Maharaja came to the side of his brother, to fish in the troubled waters
and got Lachman Das dismissed in 1886. All the efforts of the Maharaja towards the formation of a ministry of his choice were frustrated by Plowden. At this stage the idea of Council under Maharaja's Presidentship was conceived. But it was so constituted that the Maharaja could not secure the services of his trusted servants in the Council, and his wishes were ruthlessly overridden. Perfect strangers were thrust upon him as Members of his Council. (43) The recommendation of Plowden to deprive Maharaja of all 'real power', and that "He may reign, but not Govern" was turned down by Dufferin. (44)

Plowden was replaced by Colonel R. Parry Nisbet as Resident in Kashmir towards the end of 1888. Nisbet discovered on 25 February 1889 a batch of thirty four letters, said to be in the handwriting of the Maharaja himself. Some of them dealt with his relations with Russians while others related to removal of his two brothers, Ram Singh and Amar Singh and the former British Resident Plowden by murdering them. (45) Immediately after the discovery of the said


(44) Plowden to Durand, 5 March 1888; Dufferin to Sir R.A. Cross, Secretary of States for India, 18 August 1888, Foreign Secret E, March 1889, Nos. 107-200; Durand to Plowden, 28 May 1888, Foreign Frontier E, June 1888, Nos. 176-79.

(45) Nisbet to Durand, 27 February 1889. Foreign Secret E, April 1889, Nos. 80-98.
letters Pandit Suraj Kaul was called by Resident to Sialkot. The Pandit conferred with Resident for eight days and then came back to Jammu. The Maharaja was asked to send Amar Singh to Sialkot and the latter remained with the Resident for two days. After his return from Sialkot, Amar Singh informed the Maharaja about the letters and sought his permission to proceed to Calcutta with the Resident. The Maharaja refused permission and summoned Resident to Jammu. The Resident did not reply the call for two days, thus the Maharaja in his despair said, "Let them locate a cantonment and take any portion of my territory, but why do they trouble me in this way and put me to all sorts of disgrace." (46) The Resident ultimately went to Jammu and before meeting Maharaja, had a long talk with Amar Singh at the Residency. Ultimately he went to Maharaja and was most offensive in his behaviour towards him. Nisbet left a draft on the basis of which an edict of resignation was to be prepared by Amar Singh. In spite of several pressures on the Maharaja he refused to sign it. Failing in the efforts of his co-conspirators, Colonel R.P. Nisbet himself took the field, and obtained signatures of the Maharaja on a prepared draft of the so-called resignation on 8 March 1889. The appeal of the Maharaja reads thus:

With the information of these letters, and with the full confidence and strength of being supported by my own brother and his now strong party, Colonel R. Parry Nisbet dashed into my room at a fixed time and brought

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(46) Digby, n. 43, pp. 93-98; Pertap Singh to Lansdowne, 14 May 1889, Foreign Secret B, August 1889, Nos. 162-203. For Digby's details of deposition of Pertap Singh, see Appendix No. IX.
such a great and many sided pressure in all solemnity
and seriousness that I was obliged to write what was
desired, rather demanded by him, in order to relieve
myself for the moment, having full faith that Your
Excellency's Government will not accept such a one-
sided view of the case, and that full opportunity will
be given to me of defending myself. (47)

Marquess of Lansdowne rejected this appeal and obtained the
seal of approval by the Secretary of State for India, for the
deposition of Maharaja Pertap Singh. (48)

In reality the British Government coveted the Gilgit region
of the Maharaja's territory, the refusal of which brought his
deposition, so swift and so clean. (49) The echo of the criminal
deposition of Pertap Singh was loud, and it was heard everywhere.
In Jammu the Dogra Residents submitted a petition to C. Bradlaugh
M.P., who in India was considered as a friend, for help and
protection. (50) Webster, a Conservative Member of the House of
Commons, asked a question on 14 March 1889 which was disposed off
early by Sir John Gorst Chatham. Bradlaugh brought an adjournment
motion to the House of Commons on 20 June 1889 and demanded a Select
Committee of the House or a Judicial Committee in India to be

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(47) Pertap Singh to Lansdowne, 14 May 1889. *Foreign Secret B*,
August 1889, Nos. 162-203.

(48) Lansdowne to Pertap Singh, 28 June 1889; Cross to Lansdowne,

(49) Digby, n. 43, pp. 99-103.

(50) Ibid., pp. 20-21 footnote. For text see Appendix No. X.
appointed to make due enquiry. All the demands were finally rejected. (51) On the periphery of the Kingdom of Kashmir, the reaction to the deposition was all the more sharp.

**Tibet**

The news of the deposition of the Maharaja, alarmed Lhasa people immediately. Demo Rimpoche III, the Regent, issued an edict by which he prohibited the entry of any subject either of Ladakh or that of Maharaja, into Tibet. (52) The people of Gartok and Rudok were asked not to allow any foreigners in Tibet. Round the clock watch was kept up by the people of the area. (53) Simultaneously a person was despatched towards Sinkiang for obtaining the news of Russian activities in that quarter. (54) In the meantime Demo Rimpoche III ordered for the preparation of a probable war with the British. Some two lakhs troops were collected. War equipments, guns and grains were got ready. (55) At this time the Anglo-Chinese

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(52) Gulam Ahmad Kardar to Wazir Wazarat Ladakh dated 12 July 1890, Foreign Secret E, August 1890, Nos. 110-113; Foreign Secret E, December 1890, No. 182.

(53) Raja Amar Singh to Nisbet, 19-20 June 1890. Foreign Secret E, July 1890, No. 276.


(55) Nisbet to Durand, 10 June 1890. Foreign Secret E, June 1890, Nos. 530-31.
Convention regarding Sikkim was signed by the Chinese Amban on 17 March 1890, without the consent of the Regent, who refused to accept it, and sent a petition to the Chinese Emperor against it. He pointed out that wherever the Britishers went the grain became costly, and

... the friendship of English men is nothing but a trick, that it may be known to the Emperor how at first the Englishmen made friendship with all the Rajas and Nawabs of India, that afterwards they sent doctors and again appointed their commissioners and thus creating disunion among the Indias, took possession of their country, and that similarly they have taken all the native states into their possession and this was the result of their friendship. (56)

Chinese Position in Tibet

The petition of the Regent was accepted. (57) As a matter of fact the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was a complete myth. Though Tibet had been regarded as the Chinese Protectorate from 1720 to 1792, this Protectorate status began to decline with the conquest of Sinkiang in around 1758 by the Chinese. It was only at the event of Gorkha invasion of Tibet in 1792, a Chinese army was despatched to protect Tibet but never after that. (58) In the nineteenth century the Chinese authority in Tibet was non-existent. Not a single

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(56) Nisbet to Durand, 1 March 1890. Foreign Secret E., March 1890, Nos. 133-35.
(57) Nisbet to Durand, 10 June 1890. Foreign Secret E., June 1890, Nos. 530-31.
soldier fought against the Dogras' authority in 1841-42. (59) Similarly no Chinese protection was offered at the time of the Nepalese attack in 1856 or at the time of the British expedition under Francis Younghusband in 1904. Not only the Chinese failed to protect Tibet, but their commands were never respected in Tibet during the same period. In spite of having a valid passport from Peking authorities, the Russian explorer Przevalski was refused permission to enter Tibet in 1878. (60) In pursuance of the provisions of the Chefoo agreement of 13 September 1876, when a British Mission under Colman Macaulay in 1886 was commissioned, Tibetans looked upon it "as the first step in a British invasion of Tibet", and refused its entry into Tibet. (61) Apart from this factual position, the Chinese officers had denied their authority in Tibet on several occasions. In 1873 when the British Government desired the opening of communication with Tibet, the Chinese Government told the British Minister at Peking that they had not sufficient control in Lhasa to ensure the entry of European travellers into that country. At the time of the negotiation of an


(60) Ney Elias's Note on Tibet, 5 March 1887. Foreign Secret E, May 1887, No. 119.

additional article to Chefoo Convention in 1876, the similar
denial of authority was made by the Chinese and thus the phrase
"with due regard to the circumstances" was added to the article.
The similar denial of the authority in Lhasa was made by the Chinese
while issuing passports to Charles Ellias in 1883 and to A.D. Carey
in 1884. As a matter of fact, the Chinese would have been happy,
if somehow the exclusiveness of the Lamas might have been
abolished.

The appointment of the Chinese Amban (Resident) at Lhasa
was part of a reciprocal arrangement under which Lhasa used to send
certain Lamas to reside at Peking nominally to worship for the
Imperial family. The Ambans had no control over the Government of
Tibet and exercised no authority at Lhasa. In the matters of
official ceremonies and religious rites, concerning the reigning
family at Peking, Amban was only consulted by the Tibetan
authorities. Still they resided at Lhasa as the representatives of
the Emperor. From time to time they used to write memorials and
dispatches on the affairs of Tibet in such a style which gave the
reader, the impression that they were the masters of the situation
in Lhasa. In essence the position of the Chinese Amban in Lhasa
was just as that of British Resident in Kathmandu. Both having no
powers of interference in the affairs of the state where they were
stationed. The chief reason for the perpetuation of this fallacy
of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet lay in the works of the modern
writers who derive their information exclusively from the Chinese
sources. The memoirs of Chien Lung (1735-1796), the Manchu Emperor,
gives an impression of the degree of sovereignty which that ruler imagined or intended to have over Tibet, became the basic source material for the modern writers of Tibet. (62)

Inter-Frontier Relations

Tibet was not having an isolated existence prior to the advent of the British authority in Kashmir. There were most amicable inter-frontier relations between people and Government, specially manifested into border trade between Ladakh and Tibet. On governmental level there used to be exchanges of several missions. The two important missions, Lapchak and Ghaba, were originated in the treaty of peace between Ladakh and Lhasa in 1694. (63) The Lapchak mission went from Leh to Lhasa once every three years. Its object was in part trade and in part religion. It was headed by a prominent Ladakhi monk, and it was accompanied by a leading Ladakhi Muslim (Arghun) merchant of that class which had by long tradition been permitted to trade in Tibet. The mission carried letters and presents from the Gyalpo (King), of Ladakh to the Dalai Lama. The Lapchak always passed through Gartok on its way to Lhasa. The Tibetans, in return for the Lapchak, sent an

(62) Ney Elias's Note, n. 60; S. C. Bajpai, "China's Sovereignty Over Tibet a Historical Fiction", The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 21 December 1962; Captain R.L. Kennion to A.C. Talbot, Resident in Kashmir, 7 October 1900, Foreign Secret E, November 1900, Nos. 55-57.

annual mission to Leh known as the Chaba, or "Tea Man" mission. Its head, the Chaba or Zungtsan, was the Dalai Lama's personal trader to Ladakh. The Chaba mission left Lhasa each June, with tea for sale in Ladakh, and it arrived at Leh in December. It remained in Leh until the following April, when it set out once more for the Tibetan capital with Indian manufactured goods. (64)

Whereas Lapchak and Chaba missions were continued by the Kashmir Darbar, even after the advent of the British Resident, the entry of the British European subjects in Tibetan territory was a problem. (65) Tibetans were always vigilant and alert whenever any British European subject was reported travelling close of their boundary. (66) But if per chance anybody happened to cross into Tibet, he was subjected to hard punishment. A.H. Landor entered Tibet from Kumaon in 1897. Near Mansarowar he was arrested by a Tibetan patrol party. "He was beaten, tied up, deprived of most of his possessions, made to travel in bonds for several days and finally released when he had reached a state of physical collapse". (67)

(64) Captain H. Ramsay, Joint Commissioner Leh to Col. R.P. Nisbet, 23 June 1889. Foreign Secret F, September 1889, Nos. 211-217; Lamb, n. 61, pp. 55-57.

(65) Resident Kashmir to Foreign Secretary, 2 October 1899. Foreign External B, November 1899, No. 171.


(67) Lamb, n. 61, pp. 231-3.
But in spite of the difficulties, the search for the communication with Lhasa was continued. In 1898, there arose a dispute between Ladakh and Lhasa traders. To settle this dispute Captain R.L. Kennion visited the Tibetan Centre of Rudok on 4 September 1899. He stayed at Rudok and settled the issue with the Jongpen (officer). (68) Kennion's success in his journey to Rudok convinced him that he might profitably open some sort of negotiations with the Garpons at Gartok. In 1900 Kennion started for Gartok but failed to reach the destination due to opposition of Tibetans. He, however, delivered the letter of the Viceroy to Dalai Lama to Garpon who met him at Namku, about twelve miles west of Gartok. Though the conduct of his mission was praised, the results were nil. The letter was later returned unopened. (69) However, Lord Curzon was not to be disconcerted by this failure and, in 1904 he dispatched an expedition under Francis Younghusband.

Sinkiang

As in Tibet, the deposition of Maharaja Pertap Singh was immediately noticed in Sinkiang. Chinese, the new masters of the area, stopped the trade and intercourse with Kashmir. (70) The

(68) Kennion to Talbot, 8 November 1899. Foreign Frontier A, February 1900, NOS. 17-18.

(69) Kennion to Talbot, 7 October 1900. Foreign Secret E, November 1900, NOS. 55-57; Lamb, n. 61, pp. 245-50.

(70) Pandit Narain Kaul Wazir Wazarat Ladakh to H. Ramsay, 1 February 1890. Foreign Frontier A, April 1890, NOS. 44-54.
Chinese power in Sinkiang have always been very shaky. The area originally populated by an Aryan Race, came under the control of the Chinese in 94 A.D. during the Han Dynasty, for a short time. After about six hundred years the Tang Emperors sent expeditions to Central Asia. The sway of the Chinese rulers over Sinkiang lasted only for a while, till Islam appeared here in 712 A.D. Muslim rule flourished in Sinkiang for nearly five hundred years. At a time in eleventh century their rule extended from Caspian Sea to Gobi desert. It was only in the thirteenth century that Chingiz Khan made his appearance in Sinkiang. In 1220 A.D. Sinkiang became the part of the Mongol Empire. Chingiz Khan, his son Chagatai Khan and his descendants continued to rule the country up to about 1678. Jümgars who took over power from the Mongols ruled the country for about 78 years, after which Chinese became the masters of the area. In essence the history of Kashgaria from fifteenth century to eighteenth century affords an unbroken record of civil war between two religious parties. It is only on the death of Khan Haldan-Shirin, the struggle assumed menacing dimensions. Struggle in his family for the pre-eminence ended in the mutual overthrow of the direct heirs. (71) Amoorsana, a distant relation

(71) As a specimen of the evil deeds that were perpetrated by members of the house of Haldan in order to secure the supreme power, the following extract from an article by Mons. Abramoff, from the proceedings of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society for 1861, page 150 is worthy of note. The article was compiled from a translation of the Chinese work — entitled Su-Yuivivin-Loo (Chronicles of the countries laying near the western borders of China).

(contd. on next page)
of Halden's and a chief of one of the Kalmuck tribes thought that he would take the advantage of these dissensions to possess himself of the Jungar throne. Accordingly with the aid of the devotees to his cause, he made an attempt. Being unsuccessful, he and his tribe declared themselves to be the subjects of China. The sons of the Celestial Empire did not let slip this favourable opportunity afforded to them of gaining possession of Jungaria. A Chinese army was immediately advanced, and by the year 1758 Kashgaria was conquered by them. (72)

(contd. from previous page)

"In September 1745, Khan Haldan-Shirin died. In accordance with the terms of his will, his second son, TSAVAN-DORIZIATCCHA-NAMITIAL succeeded to the khanship, and he at once slew his younger brother TSAVAN-DJAIL. Haldan-Shirin's eldest son, LAMA-DARDJA, fearing a like fate, killed the successor to the throne, and assumed the reins of Government; LAMA-DARDJA's sister GOLAN-BAYAR and her husband having rebelled against him, were also killed. We must observe that all these murders were accomplished in the course of several years. In the year 1754, the Khan's two kin's men TAVATS and AMOORSANA, rose against him. AMOORSANA with 1,500 men came by night to Ili and killed LAMA-DARDJA in his palaces. The Djoongars then chose for a Khan TAVATSI (He being the nearest relative of the deceased) and not AMOORSANA, as he himself expected. AMOORSANA being offended at this, as we shall see further on, acknowledged himself as a subject of the Chinese and betrayed his own country to them."


The Manchu masters over an alien Muslim population in Sinkiang failed to preserve peace for long. Well within a century Jehangir Khan rose into an open rebellion in 1825. His revolt was so successful that he was practically the master of Kashgaria for a while. The effect of this revolt was so profound that it created a sensation throughout Central Asia. (73) It was soon followed by the revolt of Khoja Mohd. Yasuf in 1830, and later by that of the seven Khojas headed by Katta-Turra. The descendants of the dispossessed rulers of the country made repeated attempts to recover their lost patrimony from the alien Chinese masters. The last of such efforts was that by Vali Khan Turra in 1857. Vali Khan Turra was able to hold Kashgar and rule it for some months till he was driven out by the Chinese. In July 1864, a band of Tungans came from Urumchi to foment risings against the Manchu dynasty. This revolt of the Muslim population was such widespread that it embraced the western provinces of China, Jungaria and Yarkand. One after the other, Kuchu, Yarkand, Khotan and Kashgar fell to the Khojas. The Chinese garrison was cut to pieces at every place. Kucha and Yarkand were held by Rashid-ud-deen. Khotan elected Haji Habibulla as its ruler. In the meantime Bazurga Khan arrived from Khokand with a force of 500 men under the able command of Yakub Beg Kushbegi. After a number of successes against the Chinese, Yakub arrested his incapable master and then set about extending his own sway. His possessions extended as far as Manas and Urumchi on the north

(73) Kuropatkin, n. 71, pp. 120-1; Prasad, n. 72, p. 66.
east and to Khotan to the south. By 1869 this obscure minor
Kokandi official had made himself the absolute ruler of Sinkiang.
It was a remarkable achievement. "Yaqub Beg was virtually the
last truly independent sovereign of Central Asia and perhaps the
most outstanding ruler that Asia produced after Nadir Shah." (74)
The Chinese rule in Sinkiang was non-existent, after 1863 and the
major problem before Yakub was the maintenance of his rule against
Russian encroachments. (75) For a while China lost all her hope of
reconquering Sinkiang. It was only in 1874 that the Chinese General
Tso Tsung Tang attempted the reconquest. Kansu was subjugated and
the Chinese forces moved slowly in the direction of Urumchi. The
Chinese force was so ill equipped that great apprehensions were
entertained in regard to its success against Amir Beg Khusbegi. (76)
This army moved gradually towards Urumchi. On 16 August 1876 a town
Kumutu or Tsi-Hwai-Cheng was captured and the next day Urumchi or
Hung-Miao-Tse (Red Temple). The town of Manas was taken from
Tunganis on 6 November 1876. This success of the Chinese gave them
an assess to north side of Thian-Shan. (77) At this stage of the

(74) Alder, n. 11, p. 25.

(75) Forsyth, Report of a Mission to Yarkand in 1873, pp. 106-213;
W.W. Hunter, ed., Essays on the External Policy of India by
J.W.S. Wyllie, pp. 174-244; E. Molloy, A Narrative of the
Tunganis Insurrection in Eastern Turkestan in 1863; Kuropatkin,
n. 71, chapters 4-6; Alder, n. 11, p. 26; Prasad, n. 72,
pp. 65-66.

(76) Lord A. Loftus, Ambassador at St. Petersburg to Earl of Derby,
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 8 December 1875. Foreign Secret,
February 1876, Nos. 2-5; Alder, n. 11, p. 63.

(77) K.W. on T.F. Wade, British Charge d'Affairs in Peking, dated
campaign against Yakub, there was some difference of opinion in regard to continuance of the war. Prince King supported by King-Lien was in favour of the termination of campaign, but the militant group among the Council prevailed and the action was continued. (78) The Chinese forces met with a serious repulse at the hands of Yakub in the month of September 1877. (79) But soon they captured the cities of Karashar and Kucha on 7 and 18 October 1877. (80) In the meantime Yakub Beg Khusbegi died. It was rumoured that his son conspired with Haji Kuli Beg, Azar Khan Tora, and Niaz Hakim and poisoned him through the medium of one of his most favourite female slave. The death of Yakub was followed by a war of succession. (81) The Chinese immediately took advantage and captured the entire Kashgaria once again towards the end of 1877. (82) This Chinese re-occupation of Sinkiang, as the previous

(78) K.W. notes to Nos. 185-239. Foreign Secret, October 1877.

(79) Hugo Fraser Peking to Earl of Derby, Telegram 13 October 1877, Foreign Secret, April 1878, No. 82.

(80) Fraser to Baron Lytton, 4 December 1877. Foreign Secret, April 1878, Nos. 196-97; from Lord A. Laftus, Ambassador at St. Petersburg to Earl of Derby, Secretary of States for Foreign Affairs, 23 January 1878, Foreign Secret, May 1878, Nos. 21-30.

(81) Divan Govind Sahai to A.C. Lyall, 4 October 1878. Foreign Secret, February 1878, Nos. 73-78.

(82) Telegram, Canton, 27 May 1878, Foreign Secret, November 1878, No. 145; Ladakh Diaries, Henvey to Lyall, 26 September 1878, Foreign Secret, December 1878, Nos. 103-11.
one, failed to give positive stability. Constant Muslim rebellion was continued. One such rebellion was reported in the province of Kansu in 1894. (83) This was however suppressed. (84) Though "Sinkiang has lain within the political horizon of China for more than two thousand years, but only intermittently has it been under Chinese influence, control, or sovereignty". (85)

**Inter-Frontier Relations**

There has always been inter-frontier trade between India and Sinkiang. This trade was continued with intermittent gaps up to the arrival of Communist regime in Sinkiang. In ancient times there has been more stable and positive contacts with the people of Sinkiang. Archaeological expeditions of modern times have excavated many old sites situated in Sinkiang. These sites buried deep under the beds of sand, have revealed a new world of old times in Sinkiang. Pioneer among the explorers Sir Aurel Stein brought to light certain documents of administrative character which testify to the political authority exercised by Indians in this region. From Lop-Nor in the west to Tarim basin in the east, there were several Indian settlements in the form of small colonial

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(84) Sir Claude M. Macdonald, Charge d'Affairs Peking to Earl of Elgin, Telegram 18 November 1896. *Foreign Secret E*, Nos. 21-23.

(85) Lattimore, n. 72, p. 5.
kingdoms. "They introduced Buddhism and, along with it, Indian languages, script and other elements of culture which took deep root in the soil and profoundly modified the local culture and civilization of the vast region from Pamir to the borders of China". (86)

Two such colonies were Khotan and Kuchar. Khotan was colonised by Kunala, the son of Asoka, the great Maurya Emperor. (87) Details about the colonisation of Kuchar are not known. These Indian colonies flourished till the arrival of Islam to the area. During Muslim rule in Sinkiang it is said that there has been some migration to Sinkiang. Khan Badshah Habibulla of Khotan traced his origin from a certain family which migrated from Delhi during Mughal rule in India. (88)

In the later nineteenth century, with the disappearance of Chinese rule in Sinkiang, a fresh beginning towards political and commercial relations with the area was made. Yakub Beg Khusbegi, the new master of Sinkiang consciously reversed the restrictive policies of the Chinese. He encouraged merchants from all neighbouring states to trade with Sinkiang. In 1866, even before he had consolidated his position, Yakub Beg had sent Mohammad Nasir to the Maharaja of Kashmir proposing the establishment of friendly relations. (89)


(87) Ibid., pp. 141-2.

(88) Lepel Griffin’s Memorandum on the resources of the province of Khotan. Foreign Political A, April 1866, No. 157.

(89) Yakub Beg to Ranbir Singh, 18 July 1866. Foreign Political A, October 1866, Nos. 181-82.
British Government in India ever apprehensive of Russian expansion in Central Asia seized the opportunity. Restrictions on direct diplomatic relation of the Maharaja were placed, and he was advised to send Mohammed Nazir to Lahore. (90) While Mohammed Nazir was in Jammu, Jumma Khan, a representative of Khan Habibulla of Khotan, reached Calcutta, with a letter from his master. (91) Habibulla had requested for military force and equipment. (92) Jumma Khan after an interview with the Viceroy was dismissed with a present of Rupees five hundred. "I regret that it is out of my power", Lawrence told Khan, "to furnish you with arms and equipments. ..." (93) Early in 1870, Mirza Shadi, an accredited envoy of Yakub Beg, reached Calcutta via Lahore. He had an interview with Lord Mayo on 28 March, during which he requested arms aid against an expected Russian advance. He also requested for the appointment of a British representative to the court of Yakub Beg. To this Mayo replied to Mirza Shadi that although the British could not officially sell arms to Yakub Beg, they would not object to their purchase in open market. (94) To his other requests,

(90) Aitchison to Secretary Government of India, 25 December 1867. Foreign Political A, January 1868, Nos. 76-79.

(91) John Lawrence Governor General and Viceroy of India to Earl of Grey and Ripon, Secretary of States for India, 8 March 1866. Foreign Political, March 1866, No. 43.

(92) Ibid., Habibulla Khan to Lawrence, September 1865.

(93) Ibid. Lawrence to Habibulla, 17 February 1866.

(94) Thornton to Aitchison, 31 January, 1870; Political A Proceedings, June 1870, No. 208; Memorandum of the interview, Foreign Political A Proceedings, June 1870, No. 215; Frasad, n. 72, p. 71; Alder, n. 11, pp. 42-43.
Mayo did, however, agree to send an agent to accompany him back to Turkestan. Mayo promptly appointed Forsyth as his envoy, with Dr. George Henderson of the Indian Medical Service, and Shaw, was included in the party at his own request, to assist him. (95) Forsyth was instructed to proceed to Turkestan via Chang Chenmo valley, which Mirza Shadi wanted particularly to see so that he could report on it to Yakub Beg. While in Turkestan, Forsyth was to explain the nature of the treaty between the British and Kashmir to Yakub Beg. He was to explore the possibilities for trade between India and Eastern Turkestan and to reiterate the Viceroy's advice and warning in regard to Russia. Forsyth's mission was not a political one. He was, therefore, positively instructed "to abstain from taking any part whatever in the political questions that may be agitated or disputes that may arise further than conveying to Atalik Ghazee the general advice already given to him by the Viceroy." (96)

When Forsyth's mission passed through Ladakh, the necessary supplies were not on hand, causing a great loss of livestock. Cayley, the British Joint Commissioner in Ladakh, felt "convinced that the plan was intentionally formed of arresting progress of the mission to Yarkand and, still more, of preventing the opening of

(95) Mayo to Yakub Beg, 4 April 1870, 14 April 1870. Foreign Political A, June 1870, Nos. 216, 218.

(96) Aitchison to Thornton, 14 April 1870. Foreign Political A, Pp. 212-213, June 1870, No. 219; Prasad, n. 72, p. 73; Alder, n. 11, p. 43.
the Chang-Chenmo route. (97) From the start the mission was
impeded by intrigue from Mirza Shadi and the Kashmir authorities.
When Forsyth reached Yarkand, Yakub Beg was engaged in warfare at
a distance of 700 miles. (98) The mission had therefore to return
to India without achieving any results. The mission was a complete
failure, but was considered a success and large profits from the
Turkestan trade were confidently awaited. (99) Yakub Beg was not
inactive in the days following Forsyth's visit. The series of
exchanges of envoys took place. One such envoy, Ahrah Khan Tora,
came to Calcutta in June 1872. In the following year, Yakub Beg
sent another envoy Syed Yakub Khan to the British Viceroy in India.
This ambassador, in keeping with Yakub Beg's careful policy of
balance, had already visited St. Petersburg and Constantinople
before he reached Calcutta. In his audience with Lord Northbrook,
the Viceroy, Yakub Khan again asked for British support against
the Russians and was given the same answer as his predecessor.
He also requested the appointment of a British mission to accompany
him back to Turkestan. He asked for an increase in commercial
intercourse, and the exchange of permanent representatives. To all

(97) Dr. Cayley's Report, 23 July 1870. Foreign Political A,
December 1870, No. 465.

(98) Dr. Cayley's Report, 26 August 1870. Foreign Political A,
December 1870, No. 472.

(99) Dr. Cayley's reports, July to November 1870. Foreign
Political A, December 1870, Nos. 461-504; Alder, n. 11, p. 43;
Prasad, n. 72, p. 73.
the Viceroy agreed, and Forsyth was once more appointed to lead
the mission, which was to be much more impressive than the previous
one. (100)

The commercial treaty with Yakub Beg was the main object of
this mission of 1873-74. (101) But in addition Forsyth was
instructed to obtain as much scientific, geographical and strategic
information as possible. With the permission of Yakub Beg Forsyth
was to obtain full information regarding the boundaries of Eastern
Turkestan. Should Yakub Beg request the demarcation of his borders
with Russia and India, this information was to be forwarded to
Northbrook directly. (102) If it was possible to represent the
British Government in the court of Yakub Beg, R.B. Shaw, then
British Joint Commissioner at Leh, was the Viceroy's choice. (103)

Forsyth arrived in Kashgar in December 1873. He was
accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel T.E. Gordon, Second in Command;
Dr. W.H. Ballow, Surgeon-Major; Captain H. Trotter; Captain J.
Biddulph of the 19th Hussars and an aide-de-camp to the Viceroy;

(100) Northbrook to Salisbury, 25 August 1874. Foreign Secret;
     August 1874, Nos. 206-7; Prasad, n. 72, p. 74; Alder, n. 11,
     pp. 49-50.

(101) Northbrook to Argyll, 11 September 1873. Foreign Secret;
     September 1873, No. 134.

(102) Northbrook to Argyll, 30 June 1873. Foreign Secret;
     June 1873, No. 368.

(103) Northbrook to Argyll, 11 September 1873. Foreign Secret;
     September 1873, No. 134.
Captain E.F. Chapman, Secretary to the mission; and Dr. Ferdinand Stoliezka of the Geological Survey of India. Forsyth stayed four months in Kashgar and during this period he had five audiences with Yakub Beg. (104) He successfully negotiated a treaty of commerce and friendship with Yakub Beg (Atalik Ghazi), which was signed on 2 February 1874, and was ratified by the Governor General of India on 13 April 1874. The thirteen articles treaty provided, among other things, free trading and residence rights for the nationals of India and Eastern Turkestan on a most favoured nation basis. Trade was to be free and protected within both countries, although British merchandise could be charged a duty at entrance not exceeding 2½ per cent ad valorem. Goods from Turkestan crossing to India were to enter duty free. The usual appointment of high level representatives and such subordinate commercial agents as might be suitable, was stipulated. (105)

The treaty of 1874 required the ratification by the Viceroy and subsequently the signatures of the Amir, who had only placed his seal on it so far. The ratified copy from Calcutta did not reach Forsyth before his departure to India. As a result, a mission under R.B. Shaw, was sent to Turkestan, to carry the ratified treaty to Yakub Beg. In essence his mission was to


(105) Northbrook to Salisbury, Secretary of State for India, 17 April 1874, Treaty, 2 February 1874; Foreign Secret, April 1874, Nos. 44-49; C.U. Aitchison, n. 1, pp. 7-11; Boulger, n. 104, Appendix pp. 322-9; Prasad, n. 72, p. 76; Alder, n. 11, pp. 50-51.
ascertain, whether it would be desirable to station a permanent British official in Kashgar or Yarkand. (106) Although Yakub Beg wanted Shaw to remain in the country, Shaw reported that, according to Haji Tora, the amir "never entertained the idea of our [Shaw and his party] staying". (107) Subsequent to this visit of Shaw two Yarkand envoys visited Viceroy and impressed upon him the desirability of stationing a British Agent in Kashgar. (108) Lord Lytton, the successor of Northbrook, never wanted to risk either the dignity of the British Government or the life of their representatives. He, therefore, enquired the desirability of sending an envoy to Yarkand from Lord Salisbury. The Secretary of State for India was of the opinion that, "advantage is not worth the risk". (109) In the meantime Yarkand envoy had an interview with the Viceroy, and the project of sending an envoy to Yarkand was abandoned for the time being. (110)

By 1874, the kingdom of Yakub Beg became a real place for the extension of respective sphere of influence by Russia and

(106) Northbrook to Salisbury, 2 June 1874. Foreign Secret, June 1874, Nos. 81-87.

(107) Northbrook to Salisbury, 25 December 1874; Shaw to India, 10 October, 27 October 1874. Foreign Secret, December 1874, Nos. 64-74.

(108) P.D. Henderson to Lepel Griffin, 30 June 1876. Foreign Secret, December 1876, No. 83.

(109) Telegram Salisbury to Lytton, 17 August 1876. Foreign Secret, December 1876, Nos. 81-118.

(110) Memorandum on the conversation with Yarkand Envoy. Foreign Secret, December 1876, Nos. 81-118.
England. Both wanted to maintain the independence of Sinkiang. Russians were interested because they were committed to withdraw from Ili Valley only if the Chinese should re-establish their control there. British on the other hand wanted Sinkiang to be a stable buffer between their and Russian Empires. (111)

Meanwhile the Chinese forces under Tso Tsung-Tang entered Sinkiang. British made an abortive attempt to keep Yakub Beg's kingdom intact. Sir Douglas Forsyth met Li-Hung-chang in Peking on 9 April 1876 and raised the question. Li made it clear to Forsyth that the Chinese Empire was not prepared to recede except on the condition of submission of Yakub Beg to China. He was to remain only as a vassal and not as an independent ruler. (112) The triumphant army of Tso-Tsung-Tang captured the whole kingdom of Yakub Beg by the end of 1877. (113) Soon after the capture of Sinkiang the Chinese closed the trade routes to Kashmir and British India.

The British Government in India never rest contented with the changed conditions in Sinkiang. Johnson, the British Joint Commissioner in Ladakh tried to contact Chinese authorities in Sinkiang. He first sent one Mulla Mohammed Yusuf with a letter to

(111) Kuropatkin, n. 71, pp. 191-2; Wade to Forsyth, 6 April 1876. Foreign Secret., January 1877, No. 118.

(112) Forsyth to Wade, On Board the Steamer Shantung, 9 April 1876. Foreign Secret., January 1877, No. 120; Prasad, n. 72, pp. 78-79; Alder, n. 11, pp. 64-65.

(113) See n. 82.
Amban (Resident). But this letter was not even acknowledged. (114) In 1878 Johnson despatched Alum Jan with a letter and presents to Sinkiang. On his arrival at Kilian Pass, he was stopped by the Chinese. Alum wrote to Niaz Hakim of Yarkand who sent his servants to him. Hakim's servants escorted him to Yarkand, and there he met the Chinese Amban, who refused permission to foreign merchants, observing that it was against their rule to allow strangers to visit their new conquests until they had already settled down there. (115) Next year in July, Ney Elias officiating British Joint Commissioner went up to Kilian. He met the Chinese Amban and stressed upon him the desirability of opening of the trade routes. Amban, therefore, expressed his desire if he had any letters from the British Government and a passport from Peking. Elias had none and explained his position that he was only a border employee. In matters of trade, the Amban told Elias that it was all under the instruction of superior authorities at Kashgar. But he pointed out that it was temporary. (116)

In the spring of 1879 a news was published regarding the Russian advance from Samarkand to the Upper Oxus. Elias felt alarmed by it and immediately wrote to his government: "Would it not be advisable for me to go to Kashgar again this year and thence

(114) Abstract translation of a letter from Niaz Hakim to Johnson, no date, Foreign Secret, May 1879, No. 73B.
(115) Henvey to Lyall, 18 November 1878, Foreign Secret, May 1879, Nos. 69-76.
(116) Ney Elias to Henvey, 12 September 1879, Foreign Secret, November 1879, No. 270; Alder, n. 11, pp. 76-77.
to Badakhshan way, in order to report upon what is really going on". (117) Lord Ripon immediately accepted the proposal and instructed him to proceed with Godwin Austin, Extra Assistant Commissioner Andaman Islands. He was instructed to "visit Yarkand and Kashgar and collect information, especially with regard to the commercial position and proceedings of the Russians and the influence of the last Russo-Chinese treaty upon our trade interests." (118)

The dispatch of Elias to Kashgar on the excuse of trade was sharply attacked in the Council of the Secretary of State for India. Sir Erskine Peny remarked that, "... all this bash about the promotion of trade, of which we have heard so much before, is too flimsy to be repeated". (119)

Ney Elias reached Kiliian on 27 May 1880 and to Yarkand on 8 June. In his conversation with Hakim Beg he discovered that the Chinese were not much concerned with either trade or other matters, "... because the Indian frontier gave the Chinese no anxiety and involved no troublesome question". (120) On 10 June 1880 he met the Chinese Amban at Yarkand and impressed upon him the advantage

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(117) Ney Elias to Lyall, 2 January 1880, Foreign Secret, March 1880, Nos. 211-18, K.W.

(118) Lyall to Elias, 8 March 1880. Demi-official Foreign Secret, March 1880, Nos. 211-18, K.W.

(119) Quoted in Alder, n. 11, p. 78.

(120) Ney Elias's Diary, 8 June 1880, Foreign Secret, January 1881, Nos. 132-43.
of trade routes and the local trade. The Amban, although agreeing with Elias, was not in a position to do anything. He forwarded Elias to Kashgar. (121) On 19 June Elias met the Chinese Amban in Kashgar and discussed the commercial matters with him. The Amban replied:

If any of your people come whether for trade or to see the country, or to bring letters from your Government, I shall always be glad to see them, and will allow them to do whatever they please here and see that they are properly treated; this you may report to your government, and I do it because our two governments are friendly to each other, but I have no power to sanction arrangements or lay down any rules for intercourse, or to appoint officers to superintend trade. (122)

In the meantime Peking also permitted Elias mission to Yarkand. (122) Despite permission from Peking to travel extensively, Elias was met everywhere with humiliation and obstruction. He returned convinced that nothing could be achieved except by a properly accredited mission. In his report he stated that "$\ldots$ the whole of the trade with India is regarded as illegal by the Chinese authorities, and, being only allowed on sufferance, is liable to be stopped at any moment". (124)

Within a year of the departure of Elias from Kashgar, Russia signed a treaty with China on 12 February 1881 at St. Petersburg.

(121) Ney Elias’s Diary, 10 June 1880, ibid.
(122) Ney Elias’s Diary, 19 June 1880, ibid.
(124) Elias to Henvey, 31 August 1880, Foreign Secret, January 1881, No. 133.
By this twenty-article treaty, Russia virtually gained all desired commercial privileges in Sinkiang. These privileges included, a free zone along the western Chinese boundary; the remission of two thirds of duty on land-borne goods; the opening of thirty-six new points of entry; and new Consulates at Ili, Tarbagatai, Kashgar and Ourga. (125)

This was really a positive rebuff to the British position in Sinkiang. Some one was badly needed to watch the activities of Russia in Sinkiang, close to Indian border. Ripon's successor, Lord Dufferin made a positive departure to his predecessor's policy towards Sinkiang. The loss suffered by the treaty of St. Petersburg of 1881 were to be regained. Therefore the commercial-cum-political pattern of relations with the Chinese Sinkiang was changed to political-cum-commercial. In the meantime the political situation in the Upper Oxus was deteriorating and more reliable information about it was expedient. Consequently Ney Elias was once again in 1885 sent to Kashgar. He was instructed to negotiate with the Chinese authorities in Sinkiang for a permanent Political Agency and the removal of trade restrictions. (126) Elias met with a very unfriendly reception by the Chinese in Sinkiang.

The Chinese decline even to discuss the trade question and the minister has not thought it worthwhile to mention the main object of the mission i.e. the establishment of an Agent. He (Amban) says that he 'imagines' I might remain as long as I please under my passport, or even 'establish myself' there, but in what capacity and with what functions is not apparent. (127)

(125) Mayers, n. 61, pp. 271-7.
(126) Alder, n. 11, pp. 82-83.
Nicholas O'Connor, the Secretary of the British Legation in Peking, was having difficulty to deal with the authorities there. The Yamens (Chinese foreign office) flatly refused to send anyone to negotiate with Elias and argued that the trade was too small to justify any special regulation. O'Connor, however, remained optimistic. (128) Several attempts were made by Dufferin and his successor Lansdowne towards the installation of a British Consul at Kashgar, but with no results. (129) The Russian threat was increasing gradually. It was most desirable to obtain accurate information. Francis Younghusband was, therefore, deputed to Sinkiang for one year from 1 June 1890. He was accompanied by G. Macartney as his interpreter. (130) At the end of his term Younghusband returned to Calcutta, leaving Macartney in Sinkiang. By 1893 Macartney won some sort of local recognition, and was invested with the title of "Special Assistant to the Resident in Kashmir for Chinese Affairs". (131) Eleven years later, he became Consul. But on both occasions without Chinese consent.

It was not until the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 that the unremitting hostility of the Russian Consulate towards Macartney really died away, and it is probably

(128) O'Connor to Dufferin, 31 December 1885, Foreign Secret, March 1886, No. 301; Alder, n. 11, p. 83.

(129) Lansdowne to Viscount Cross, Secretary of State for India, No. 120 of 1889, Foreign Secret/Frontier, August 1889, No. 163.

(130) H.S. Barnes, Under Secretary to Younghusband, 20 June 1890, July 1890, Foreign Secret F, No. 221.

(131) Kimberley to Lansdowne, 8 February 1893, Foreign Secret F, February 1893, No. 207.
significant that only then did the Chinese recognize him as consul. The long-sought for Trade Convention was never obtained. (132)

GILGIT AGENCY 1889

Deposition of Maharaja Pratap Singh was followed by the installation of Second Gilgit Agency in July 1889. (133) From July 1881, when the first Gilgit Agency was withdrawn, the venue of the British activities was shifted from Gilgit to Jammu. In the course of eight years, not only a British Resident was appointed in Kashmir, but the ruler of the State was unceremoniously deposed. (134) The Gilgit region and the Russian activities in its neighbourhood was, however, never lost sight of by the British statesmen. Tribal activities and explorations were continued. (135) In 1885 while Ney Elias was sent to Kashgar, Colonel W.S.A. Lockhart in company of Colonel Woodthorpe as Surveyor, Surgeon Giles and Captain Barrow of the Indian Intelligence Department was sent into the tribal lands south of the Hindu Kush. He was to determine as to what extent India was vulnerable through the Hindukush range between the Kilik Pass and Kafiristan. He surveyed twelve thousand

(132) Alder, n. 11, p. 87. Macartney became Consul General in 1910.

(133) Nisbet to Durand, Telegram, 1 August 1889, Foreign Secret F, September 1889, No. 234.

(134) See above Deposition of Pertap Singh.

(135) Henvey to C. Grant, Secretary Foreign Department, Telegram, 27 April 1882, Foreign Secret, September 1882, No. 586; Oliver St. John, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir to Durand, 7 January 1886, Foreign Frontier A, January 1885, No. 64.
square miles of territory. In April 1886 he visited Hunza. (136) Next year in 1887, Andrew Dalgleish, a British trader, informed the Government that the Russians had already endeavoured to explore the region, but were stopped on the Hunza frontier. (137) A similar report was made by Captain E.G. Barrow, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Intelligence Branch, to the Government. (138) In the meantime, the Rajas of Hunza and Nagar with 2,000 men threatened Chaprot and Chalt forts. (139) Under such conditions Captain Algernon Durand, the younger brother of the Foreign Secretary, was deputed to Gilgit in 1888. He was instructed to "...examine the military position from a general point of view having regard to possible future complications with Russia..." (140)

Immediately after his arrival at Gilgit he formed his opinion that "Hunza and Nagar we should undoubtedly get at quicker. ..." (141) In the same year it was reported that a Chinese official

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(136) Lockhart to Durand, 24 April 1886, Semi-official, Foreign Secret F, July 1886, Nos. 450-551; Alder, n. 11, pp. 54-57.
(137) Dalgleish's Memorandum on the routes to Central Asia, 21 October 1887, Foreign Secret F, January 1888, No. 61.
(138) Memorandum on the political situation in Hunza and Nagar by Captain E.G. Barrow, 7 April 1887, Foreign Secret F, January 1888, No. 118.
(141) Captain Durand to H.M. Durand, 23 August 1888, Foreign Secret F, K.W. 2, October 1888, Nos. 102-121.
visited Hunza by the Kirish route. (142) Under these circumstan-
ces, Captain Durand, after careful survey of the area, proposed
the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency. (143) By then, the
British game at Jammu was accomplished. Maharaja Pratap Singh
was deposed and Raja Amar Singh, the Prime Minister, readily agreed to
the proposal. (144)

Captain Durand, thus armed with powers to deal with the
tribal chiefs reported at Gilgit on 27 July 1889. (145) Soon after
his arrival he began to establish contacts with the tribal chiefs.
He went to Nagar early in August and offered a subsidy of Rs. 2,000
yearly to Raja and his son. (146) On 25 August 1889 he reached
Hunza and offered the same terms to the Raja Safdar Ali as he had
offered to Jaffar Khan of Nagar. Safdar Ali at first agreed but
later demanded Rs. 500 extra for his minor son. This first mission
was partly successful as Safdar Ali agreed to allow Younghusband to
pass through his territories. (147) In the meantime Perry Nisbet,

(142) Plowden to Durand, 12 November 1888, Foreign Secret F,
May 1889, No. 550.
544-59; Lansdowne to Cross, 6 May 1889, Ibid., no. 559;
Cross to Lansdowne, 28 June 1889, Foreign Secret F, October
1889, No. 104.
(144) Raja Amar Singh to Nisbet, 6 June 1889, Foreign Secret F,
July 1889, No. 49A.
(145) Nisbet to Durand, Telegram, 1 August 1889, Foreign Secret F,
September 1889, No. 234.
(146) Nisbet to Durand, Telegram, 27 August 1889, Foreign Secret F,
September 1889, No. 240; H.S. Barnes, Under Secretary to
Raja Jaffar Khan of Nagar, 13 September 1889, Foreign Secret F,
September 1889, No. 252.
(147) Captain Durand to Mortimer Durand, 1 September 1889, Foreign
Secret F, September 1889, Nos. 231-252; H.S. Barnes to Safdar
the Resident in Kashmir, got the replacement of Wazir Gulam Haider by Mohammed Khan, a choice of Captain Durand as governor of Gilgit. (148) Francis Younghusband passed through Hunza safely. But in the meantime, it was reported by Durand that the deposed Maharaja of Kashmir had warned the chiefs of Hunza and Nagar, about the English designs. He had pointed out to them how he and his brothers had been ruined, and urged them to combine against the English penetration. (149)

Hunza Expedition, 1891

Tension between the British and tribal chiefs of Hunza and Nagar began to mount. They failed to send their vakils to Kashmir and the attack on the Kashgar trade was continued. Safdar Ali refused to pass mail through his territory to Younghusband. (150) Lt. Colonel Durand wrote to Safdar Ali and Jafar Khan of Hunza and Nagar, about the passage of troops and the construction of roads within their territory. He pointed out that:

You are well aware that a Russian force this year moved on to Pamirs and explored the passes leading from them southwards over the mountains. Your state lies to the south of these mountains, which here form the boundary of the Indian Empire and is within the borders of India. ...


The roads must be made. Unless you instantly compny with the demands of supreme government, troops will enter your territory, and the roads will be constructed in spite of any opposition that you may offer. Three days from this date [29 November 1891] will be allowed you, during which your answer will be awaited, and I warn you, should it not be completely satisfactory, the troops under my command will move forward and carry out the orders of Government. (151)

In the meantime sanction for the Hunza expedition was received from England. (152) On 1 December 1891 Lt. Col. Durand reported that the chiefs of Nagar and Hunza decided on fighting, and a force had crossed the river Hunza for making an attack on Nilt. (153) Next day the British troops were mobilised and Nagar was captured on 21 December and that Hunza on 22. (154) As soon as the British force entered Nagar, Safdar Ali, Wazir Dadu and Uzrkhani fled towards Sinkiang without any followers, and their territories were officially surrendered. (155) After the capture of these states the subsidy hitherto paid was stopped. Raja Jaffar Khan of Nagar who had not cooperated in the hostile acts of his son Uzr Khan was restored to

(151) Lt. Colonel Durand to Safdar Ali and Jafar Khan, 29 November 1891. Foreign Frontier A, January 1892, No. 51.


power, after he had made an unqualified submission. In Hunza no ruling member of the family was readily available. Therefore Humayun, the younger brother of Dadu, and a former Wazir of Ghazan Khan, the father of Safdar Ali was made governor temporarily. These states remained dependencies of Kashmir as usual. (156) In April 1892, Mohammed Nazim Khan, the half brother of Safdar Ali, and the likely choice of the successor of late Ghazan Khan, was installed ruler provisionally. (157) Later on Nazim Khan was confirmed to the Rajaship of Hunza. At this stage the Chinese tried to take part in the installation ceremony. They were told that "The Chinese delegate should attend as an honoured spectator taking no active part". (158) Peace and prosperity began to grow in the little kingdoms of Hunza and Nagar. The subsidies to the rulers which were stopped, were restored. Both Nagar and Hunza were granted a total subsidy of Rs. 4,000 each from 1895. (159)

**Hunza and Chinese**

The tribal states of Hunza and Nagar were one state in remote past. During the reign of Shah Jahan (6 February 1628 - 8 June

(156) Lansdowne to Cross, 16 March 1892. Foreign Secret F, March 1892, No. 194.

(158) Lansdowne to Cross, Telegram, 15 April 1892. Foreign Secret F, June 1892, No. 114.

(158) Lansdowne to Cross, Telegram, 28 May 1892. Foreign Secret E, June 1892, No. 186.

1658), (160) a prince of Nagar had visited Kashmir to seek assistance against his brother. The aid was granted. This precisely marks the beginning of tribal relations with the Mughal rule in India. (161) After the rise of Sikh rule and the annexation of Gilgit in about 1841, the tribal states of Hunza and Nagar agreed to become the dependencies of Kashmir. Both Hunza and Nagar had executed the deeds of surrender to Kashmir. (162) Shah Ghazanfar Raja of Hunza declared: "That at the time when the honoured Madame-ul-Mahrun (Prime Minister) Wazir Zorawar Singh taking possession of the country of Skardu annexed it to the Sarkar's State, I paid my respect to the above Wazir and accepted the Sirkar's rule." (163)

The state of Nagar used to pay a tribute of twenty-one tolas of gold and two baskets of apricots, to Kashmir state from 1858. (164) The state of Hunza was paying a yearly tribute of two horses, two pounds and twenty ounces of gold-dust to Kashmir from 1869. (165)


(162) Copies of Treaties, Col. W.F. Prideaux, Resident in Kashmir to Durand, 27 February 1892, Foreign Secret F, April 1892, Nos. 74-76. For text see Appendix Nos. VII and VIII.

(163) From the treaty of Shah Ghazanfar and Kashmir State, no date, ibid., No. 76.

(164) Biddulph, n. 161, p. 25.

(165) Ibid., p. 29.
The relations of China with Hunza began in 1847. At the time of the insurrection of seven Khojas in Yarkand, Shah Ghazanfar Khan of Hunza rendered assistance to the Chinese in overcoming the rebellion. In recognition of the services rendered, Chinese granted a jagir to him in Yarkand. (166) Besides the jagir a fixed subsidy was paid by the Chinese to the Raja of Hunza, who in return gave presents to the Taotai of Kashgar. It is evident from the correspondence that passed between King Ghazanfar Ali Khan and the Chinese Ambans of Yarkand and Kashgar between 1850-1863, that the relations between Hunza and the Chinese in Sinkiang were perfectly friendly based on equality and were not between a subordinate and a paramount power. Whenever the Mir of Hunza received less subsidy than was stipulated, he used to demand the balance from them. (167) But when the Chinese rule disappeared from Sinkiang in 1863, with the rise of Yakub Beg Khusbegi, this system of subsidy and presents was stopped. After the reconquest of Sinkiang by the Chinese in 1878, their Commander-in-Chief, Zunk-Tunk Daubaklo, addressed a note to the Mir of Hunza, to the effect that:

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(166) Ibid., p. 28; Alder, n. 11, p. 160; Total of Kashgar to Nizam Khan, 30 September 1897, Foreign Secret F, March 1898, No. 375.

(167) Jan-Wang-Sola, Amban ruler of Yarkand to Shah Ghazanfar Beg, 22 July 1850; this bunch of papers contains several letters to the ruler of Hunza to the same effect, but without date. One such is marked as "25th Dokwang year 18th day of the 2nd Month". Foreign Secret F, September 1892, Nos. 428, 434, 450, 454, 460; Cf. Captain A.H. McMoran, Political Agent, Gilgit, who wrote that, "China claims that Hunza has paid tribute to her since the time of the Emperor Chien-Lung (1736-1796)...." Foreign Secret F, July 1898, No. 327. For papers found in Hunza see Appendix No. XI.
From enquiries I learn that the district of Kanjut has been under the rule of China.... You are a wise man and therefore I have written this to you, so that you will consider and let me know distinctly, how many districts are under you, and whether you are willing to submit to and serve the Emperor of China. (168)

In the meantime a British Agency at Gilgit was posted under Major Biddulph in 1877. He tried to win over the rulers of Hunza, by entering into correspondence with him. (169) At this time perhaps out of fear of the English, the Mir of Hunza sent his presents to the Chinese Amban in Sinkiang. The first Hunza Envoy reached Kashgar in November 1879 with presents and a letter. The Envoy was well received and was sent back with presents and a letter to the Khan. During November 1879 and April 1880, the Raja of Hunza sent several messengers with letters and tried hard for a complete liaison with Chinese. In April 1880 Dilawar Khan, the Hunza envoy went to Kashgar with 9 miscals of gold and 9 fox skins. (170)


(169) Biddulph in a memorandum on the present conditions of affair in Gilgit wrote that "On one pitable occasion when an unexpected chance of exploration in Hunza [in 1876], which would have yielded valuable results, presented itself, pressure was placed on the Mir of Hunza to make him withdraw the offers he had spontaneously made, and he was threatened with the Maharaja's displeasure "for daring to make friends with the English". Dated 31 March 1881, Foreign Secret, July 1881, Nos. 314-99.

In his book Tribes of Hindoo Koosh published in 1880, he says that he had been to Hunza in 1876. See page 22. Cf. Alder, n. 11, p. 138.

Colonel Lockhart, the first European, visited Hunza in 1886. In the meantime the Russian activities became intense. Grum Girjimails visited Hunza in 1887. Captain Gromchevsky and a party of cossacks crossed over into Hunza territory in 1888. (171) Under such circumstances, China's relationship with Hunza attracted the British attention for the first time. Sir John Walsham, the British Envoy at Peking reported the publication of a memorial from the Governor of Chinese Turkestan in Peking Gazette on 13 November 1886, pertaining to the present of an ounce and half of gold dust by Hunza. (172) Walsham was told privately by Dufferin to maintain the British rights over Hunza. (173) In 1888 at the time of tribal attack on Chalt and Chaprot in Gilgit area, Tsungli Yamen alleged a British attack on Hunza. (174) Tsungli Yamen was told that

... the chief of Kanjut has also long been a feudatory of Kashmir, receiving a yearly pension and paying tribute. It would be impossible therefore the Indian Government to allow this petty border chieftain to create disturbance

(171) Translation from the Proceedings of Russian Imperial Geographical Society, vol. XXVI, 1890, No. 1, Foreign Frontier B, September 1890, Nos. 123-129; Alder, n. 11, p. 217.


(173) Dufferin to Cross; Telegram, 18 June 1888, Foreign Secret F, July 1888, No. 100.

(174) Walsham to Dufferin, Telegram, 9 June 1888, Foreign Secret F, July 1888, No. 98; Walsham to Dufferin, 24 July 1888, Foreign Secret F, October 1888, No. 102; Tsungli Yamen to Walsham, 7 June 1888, ibid., no. 103.
on Indian soil with impunity and in reliance on his pretension to be a tributary state of Chinese Emperor. (175)

After this final reply to China, every other Chinese pretensions were politely put off. Russians in Yarkand got a clue of the differences. They began to create gulf between the British and the Chinese. They scrupulously exploited every situation hereafter. (176) Therefore conquest to the British occupation of Hunza in 1891, the Chinese tried to represent at the installation ceremony of Nazim Khan with an accredited envoy of the Chinese Emperor. But were allowed only as an honoured spectator. (177) In December 1892, the Jokin wrote a letter to the Mir of Hunza for rehabilitating the family of Wazir Dadu who had fled the country during the British expedition of 1891. (178) Colonel Durand, the Political Agent, Gilgit, assured the settlement of the family in Hunza territory subject to good conduct of the members of the family. But he warned the Jokin "... it would be more convenient in future, should you write on matters relating to affairs in the territory of the


(176) G. Macartney to Lansdowne, 19 December 1891, Foreign Secret F, April 1892, No. 42.

(177) Lansdowne to Cross, 28 May 1892, Telegram, Foreign Secret F, June 1892, No. 186.

(178) Jokin of Yarkand to Mohd Nazim Khan, 18 December 1892, Foreign Secret F, April 1893, No. 23.
Government of India, if your letters were addressed to me and not officials subordinate to me." (179) The relations of Hunza with China were fully discussed in the Council of the Viceroy, and it was decided that "if a Chinese official is sent to Hunza I would decline to let him have any direct dealings with the Mir and would be civil to him and bow him out. . . ." (180)

Consequent to this positive reply by the British Government, the Chinese tried to instal a resident at Hunza. (181) But they were told that "this was an innovation, and one which was out of the question". (182) In the matter of presents from the ruler of Hunza, which the Chinese had always treated as tributes, the attitude of the British Government paved the way for strengthening the fiction of the Chinese rights over Hunza. It was decided that "... H.M.'s Government do not wish to interfere with any customary interchange of presents between Hunza and Kashgar". (183) This

(179) A.G. Durand to Taotai of Kashgar, 1 January 1893, Foreign Secret F, April 1893, No. 24.

(180) K.W. to Foreign Secret F, April 1893, Nos. 20-29.

(181) P.W. Currie, Under Secretary of States for Foreign Affairs to Under Secretary of States for India, 18 May 1893, Foreign Secret F, July 1893, No. 102.

(182) Earl of Rosebery, Secretary for Foreign Affairs to M.R. O'Connor, Minister at Peking, 5 July 1893; Asia Confidential, No. 1926, Foreign Secret F, October 1893, Nos. 129, 130, 132.

concession on the part of the British Government to China out of
sheer friendly relations, was used as an instrument by the Chinese.
They demanded every year from the Hunza a tribute and the receipt
of which they published in Peking Gazette yearly. (184) Prior to
1863 this present was only a token against the Hunza jagir in
Yarkand. (185)

The jagir of the Mir of Hunza in Yarkand consisted of five
houses at one place and eleven houses and seven stables with
cultivable land attached to them at another. (186) When Nazim Khan
demanded the produce of these lands and properties, he was told that
Safdar Ali the ex-ruler of Hunza with twenty six others were living
there and using their produce. This admission of the jagir came
from the Chinese after a great persuasion by the ruler of
Hunza. (187)

Raskam

Soon after the admission of the Hunza jagir in Yarkand, the
Chinese authorities on the instigation of M. Petrovaski, Russian
Consul-General in Kashgar, tried to stop the cultivation of Raskam

(184) Peking Gazette, 14 May 1895, Foreign Secret F, August 1895,
No. 206.

(185) K.W. 2. Captain H. Bower to W.J. Cunningham, 2 March 1895,
Foreign Secret F, May 1895, Nos. 207-10.

(186) Taotai of Kashgar to Nazim Khan, 30 September 1897,
Foreign Secret F, March 1898, No. 375.

(187) Taotai of Kashgar to Nazim Khan, 21 March 1897,
Foreign Secret F, October 1897, No. 325.
lands by Hunza people. (188) Raskam once a flourishing settlement, situated on one of the many branches which form the south western source of the Yarkand river. Kirghiz, Pakpooh and Shakshooh were the tribes who used to live there. They were paying tribute to the Mir of Hunza and were under the Hunza state. (189) After the re-occupation of Sinkiang by the Chinese, it appeared that the lands of Raskam seldom attracted any attention. Hunza had for a long time cultivated the lands of Raskam valley. (190) The correspondence found in the captured Hunza fort in 1891 revealed that exchanges about Raskam lands had taken place between Safdar Ali and the Chinese authorities in which the latter had not denied the claims of Hunza. (191)

Captain A.H. McMahon, Political Agent at Gilgit, advised the Mir to continue cultivation in Raskam on the best terms that he could obtain from the Chinese. (192) On the representation by the Mir, the Taotai wrote "Take over the land and cultivate it well."


(190) Nazim Khan to Taotai of Kashgar, October 1897, Foreign Secret F, July 1898, No. 326.

(191) Papers found in Hunza Fort, Foreign Secret F, September 1892, Nos. 396-472; Alder, n. 11, p. 293.

(192) W.J. Cunningham to Talbot, Telegram, 4 July 1898, Foreign Secret F, July 1898, No. 344. See Appendix in No. XI.
The people may come in to cultivate it. I ask you to consider this my order and carry it out." (193) But in the meantime Petrovaski protested to the Chinese authorities at Kashgar and threatened that "if China allows Hunza 'to take' Raskam the Russians will take 'something' too." (194) Consequent to this threat, the Chinese cancelled their earlier orders in regard to Raskam. (195) In lieu of the Raskam lands the Chinese offered grains to the increased population of Hunzaa. But the Mir objected to this offer and was not prepared to leave his inherited rights over Raskam lands. (196) Unfortunately the British Government in India decided to advise the Mir not to cultivate the Raskam lands forcefully against the desire of the Chinese Government. (197) In the meantime the British Government enquired from Russia about their threat in regard to Raskam. (198) Count Mouravieff replied that "... (Raskam) matter is between Indian Government and China, with which Russia had nothing to say". (199) In the meantime Sir C. Macdonald wrote to Tsungli

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(195) Charge d'Affairs Peking to Baron Curzon, Viceroy, Telegram, 18 April 1899, Foreign Secret F, May 1899, No. 191; Curzon to G.F. Hamilton, Secretary of State for India, 1 May 1899, ibid., No. 195.


(199) Scott to Foreign Office, ibid., No. 181.
Yamen regarding the boundary between Kashmir and Sinkiang. He proposed that if China withdrew her claims of sovereignty over Hunza, the British Government would not press for Raskam lands. (200) Box Ironside, the British Charge d'Affairs at Peking, pressed the matter several times to Yamen but no reply was given to him on that issue. (201) But the Taotai of Kashgar proposed the lease of Raskam lands to Hunza for cultivation without its sovereign rights. (202) This time also Petrovaski represented against the proposal and got the proposal for lease cancelled. (203) China, in the meantime, was undergoing serious disturbances. Therefore, the British Government decided not to press for the Raskam lands from China. Instead, it was suggested that Hunza should be compensated for the loss of Raskam lands. (204) But nothing came out of it, as the matter was considered to be under the jurisdiction of Kashmir State Council. (205) It was only after the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, that Hunza started cultivating Raskam lands. Aitchison observes:

(200) Sir C. Macdonald to Tsungli Yamen, 14 March 1899, Foreign Secret F, August 1899; Cunningham to Talbot, 28 July 1899, Ibid., No. 198.


(202) Taotai to G. Macartney, Telegram, 8 November 1899, Foreign Secret F, February 1900, No. 142.

(203) Macdonald to Curzon, Telegram 12 May 1900, Foreign Secret F, 1 June 1900, No. 90.

(204) Talbot to W.J. Cunningham, 15 June 1900, Foreign Secret F, September 1899, No. 19.

(205) Captain H. Daly, Deputy Secretary to Talbot, 29 August 1900, Foreign Secret F, September 1900, No. 25.
As regards Raskam the Chinese authorities have acknowledged the right of Hunza to cultivate the tract and in 1890, a small contingent of Hunza people started cultivating it. Subsequently replaced by Hunza in 1914, and have since then continued to cultivate the land without interference on the part of the Chinese authorities. In Taghdumbash the Hunza chief collects certain dues, with the consent and assistance of the Chinese. (206)

The signing of the commercial treaty of 1870 with Kashmir marked the beginning of the active British interference in the state. Soon after seven years, Gilgit Agency was established much against the wishes of the Maharaja of Kashmir. Although the British Government had to withdraw the Gilgit Agency, it centred its activities in the positive interference in the affairs of Kashmir state. The restrictions on the travellers for their winter stay in Kashmir were removed. The Officer on Special Duty was invested with judicial powers. After the death of Maharaja Rantbir Singh, his son and successor Pertap Singh suffered serious hardships under the Resident, who was appointed soon after the death of Rantbir Singh. Ultimately Pertap Singh was deposed on false charges in 1889.

With the deposition of Maharaja Pertap Singh on 8 March 1889, the British power came in direct touch with the people beyond the borders of Kashmir. The Tibetans were always apprehensive of the British designs towards their country. Therefore they never allowed any British personnel into their country. If per chance any one happened to cross, he was subjected to harsh treatment. Deposition

(206) Aitchison, n. 1, p. 15.
of Pertap Singh made the Tibetans even more vigilant. It was only towards the close of the century that Kennion happened to cross into Tibet and that too without any results. Whereas the native state of Ladakh and later Jammu and Kashmir were maintaining positive commercial and religious ties with Tibet. Chinese power in Tibet was non-existent. Ambans were mere officials whose sole function was to observe and to report to Peking. Their interference in the state affairs was neither desired nor welcomed. The writ of China was opposed in Tibet in every respect. This happened in the case of Macaulay Mission (1886), Petrovaski's passport affair (1876) and in Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 in regard to Sikkim.

Pertap Singh's deposition marked a positive change in the Chinese attitude towards the British. They were the masters of Sinkiang which they had regained from Yakub Beg in 1878. Prior to that their position in Sinkiang had been very shaky. They had gained control over Sinkiang in 94 A.D. but soon lost it. It was only in 1758 that the Chinese again established their rule in Sinkiang, which always threatened by the rebellious jugars and khojas. From 1863 to 1877 the Chinese rule was non-existent in Sinkiang. Their 'new dominions' were established only in 1878, that too, with always serious threats from its Mohammadan population.

The state of Kashmir had always maintained some sort of commercial relations with Sinkiang. In the remote past the Indians had their colonies in Sinkiang such as Khotan and Kuchar. But with the arrival of the British power on the frontiers of India and with
the reconquest of Sinkiang by the Chinese, the position became different. China which had a foretaste of British interference from the sea side and the consequences of the two wars of 1841-42 and 1857-58, and of the treaties of Nanking and Tiensin, had steeled her resolve to offer resistance to British encroachments in her new dominions. They obstructed every British move towards the establishment of relations with Sinkiang. Although the British gained some footing in Sinkiang during Yakub Beg’s regime, they lost all with his disappearance. The abortive effort of the British towards the creation of independent Sinkiang was also foiled. Every subsequent British mission headed by Ney Elias in 1880, 1884-85 miserably failed. Their efforts towards a commercial treaty with China in regard to Sinkiang were flatly turned down, and no trade Consul was allowed to stay at Kashgar. It was only in 1893 that G. Macartney was appointed Special Assistant to the Resident of Kashmir unilaterally and was stationed at Kashgar. The recognition of this British Consulate by the Chinese authorities came only after Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.

Russia gained the upper hand in Sinkiang. Though she had to vacate the Ili valley but she gained the consular representation in Sinkiang in 1882, with a right to trade.

The deposition of Pertap Singh was followed by the establishment of second Gilgit Agency in July 1889. Agent Captain A. Durand soon took steps towards the capture of tribal states of Hunza and Nagar in 1891-92. This action of the British on the confines of Empire drove Hunza to Chinese orbit. Hunza was a
dependency of Kashmir from the time of Zorawar Singh in 1841, and was tributary of Kashmir from 1869. The British encroachment resulted in a clash with China. Though the British Government politely put off the Chinese rights in Hunza, they got involved in Raskam dispute. Raskam had been a part of Hunza territory from ancient times. The Russian Consul M. Petrovaski was instrumental in the Raskam dispute. He instigated China with a threat that if the Chinese gave Raskam to the British, the Russians will also get some territory. Thus Britain ultimately proposed to China that they were willing to lose Raskam, if only the Chinese agreed to remove the fictitious sovereignty over Hunza. In spite of the repeated British pressures no reply came from China. Therefore it was decided that Hunza should be compensated in Kashmir territory for the loss of Raskam.

The British policy in and around Kashmir was based on the Russian apprehension, which in turn was having its roots in European politics. The Crimean War 1854-56 which was fought in Europe resulted in the neutralization of the Black Sea. This gave a positive check to the Russian expansion in Europe. Soon after Russia began to move in Central Asia. By 1864 the whole Kazakh Steppe was encircled by a line of Russian stations, and in 1865 the city of Tashkent in the Khanate of Kokand was captured. In 1866 Kokand came to terms with Russia. Next to Kokand, Samarkand was captured by General Von Kaufman in 1868. In 1873, Khiva, the last of the Central Asian Khanates, was brought to heels, and in 1876 the troublesome client states of Kokand was annexed.
This rapid march of Russia in Central Asia brought home to the British Government the basic point of imperial defence. Its fury was directed towards the only independent state in India, Kashmir. Dr. Cayley was appointed the British Commercial Agent at Leh in 1867. Three years later a commercial treaty was signed with Maharaja Ranbir Singh, giving the British a positive leverage in that state. The restrictions on the British European visitors to Kashmir were removed and the Officer on Special Duty was invested with judicial powers. Biddulph was posted at Gilgit to watch the Russian movement in 1877. Failing in their endeavour to control Kashmir, the British Government appointed Resident in 1885 and deposed Maharaja Pertap Singh on 8 March 1889. Though the last of the Indian states was brought within British political orbit, there was no end to the British problems in the north. They had to face the resistance of Tibet and China in the east and the north. Their efforts towards expansion in these regions failed miserably. They could enter Tibet only under the guard of arms in 1904-5. In Sinkiang the Russians gained the upper hand and the British diplomacy failed to hold the ground. Hence they had to adopt a policy of appeasement towards China, as it was decided to have a weak Chinese neighbour than a hostile and powerful Russia. In the struggle between Britain and Russia, Kashmir had to suffer. It lost its independence and its dependency, Hunza lost its jagir in Pamirs and the valuable, cultivable, Raskam Valley.