CHAPTER-III

MEANING IN INDIAN AESTHETICS

Term ‘aesthetics’ has its origin in the Greek language. According to Hegel, it means ‘philosophy of fine art’. In India it means ‘science and philosophy of fine art’. The Indian aesthetics begins from Bharata’s Nāṭyaśāstra. Though we cannot say that Indian literary theories started with Bharata, the literary discourses had started in his Nāṭyaśāstra. Thus starting from Bharata’s Nāṭyaśāstra, it reached the zenith in the Dhvani Sidhānta of Ānandavardhana and before maturing in Jagannātha Pandita’s Rasagangādhara it had many ups and downs. Kāvyāśāstrakāra-s are

in search of the soul of kāvyās through alankāra, guṇa, rīti, dhvani, vakrokti, aucitya, anumāna and rasa theories.

The literary theories are dealing mainly with the rasa theory. But how this rasa is originated is what that sheds light on the new theories. Thus Indian theories which is a complex of vyākaraṇa, darśana and sāhitya is led by the discussion of rasa. In Vyaktiviveka Mahimabhaṭṭa says:

kāvyasyātmāni saṃjñīni rasādi rupeṇa kasyacid vimatiḥ

There is no difference of opinion that the soul of kāvya is rasa. The controversy is regarding the sprouting of rasa (rasāniśpathy), the feeling of rasa (rasānubhūtiprakriya) and the mode of transit of rasa.

By the time discussions starting from Bharata’s rasa theory reached Ānandavardhana according to whom rasa is

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2 Vyaktiviveka,1.26
dhvani and dhvani is kāvyā, it has changed its direction to the modern linguistics. During this development through centuries it has matured to scientific stature. But in Sanskrit the terms like poetics, literary criticism etc. are introduced by Bhoja in his Sarasvatīkaṇḍhābharanā in the 16th century.

\[ kāvyam śāstretihāsau ca kāvyakahāstraṇaḥ tadhaiva ca kāvyetihāsa; śāstretihāsastadapi ṣadvidham\]

Before and after Bhoja, the other scholars were using the term kāvyalankāra only. In Nāṭyaśāstra Bharatamuni says:

“the śāstrās are formed by words, they are latent in words and thus there is nothing above or superior to words. Word is the cause for everything.” More over “there is no śabda. Nāṭya is produced by the combination of śabda and chandas that enlighten the nāṭya.” Thus Bharata brings out the importance of śabda.

\[3\] Sarasvatīkaṇḍhābharanā, 1.139
vāṅgmayāniha śāstrāṇi vāṅgniśṭāni tadhaiva ca
tasmādvacaḥ param nāsty vāgkhi sarvasya kāraṇaṁ

Again he says that this group of types of śabdās consists of five hundred dhātūs

chandohīno na śabdostī na chandaḥ śabdavarjitaṁ
evaṁ tūbhayaśaṁyogo nātyasyodyōtakaṁ smṛtaṁ.

The śabdās are five types- nāmapada (nouns),
kriyāpada (verbs) upasarga, nipātās and taddhitās.

pancaśatadhātuyuktam pancaguṇam pancavidhamidam vāpi
swanyadyadhikāraguṇairardha viśeṣairvibhūṣitanyāsam

500 roots were known in the days of Bharata. Now there are around 2000 of them. Each of the five śabdās has its own

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4 Nāṭyaśāstra, 15.3
5 Ibid, 15.45
6 Nāṭyaśāstra, 15.29
characteristics in application. I (aham) is first person, he (saḥ) third person and you (tvam) is second person. This categorization is called svanyadhikaranāgūṇās. Vibhakti, subject, predicate and object are meant by arthaviśeṣās.

Though Bharata gave scientific support to kāvyās, his discussions were centered on rasas related to visual arts (drśyakāvyās). He had used the discussions on literature mainly to enrich the aesthetics of nāṭya (drśya). Thus though Bharata initiated the discussions of literary theories in his Nāṭyaśāstra he did not proceed further.

But the inseparable relation between literature and grammar, the fact that Yāska’s Nirukta and Nāṭyaśāstra had enriched the Sanskrit language and more over they were popular in those days can be learnt from the Pāṇinīya.

Daṇḍi was one of the early authorities of kāvyāśāstra. But he called it kāvyalankāra. He put forward the
relevance of śabdārtha with the statement

\[\text{idamandhaṃ tamaḥ kṛtsnaṃ jāyeta bhuvanatrayam} \]
\[\text{yadi śabdāhvayaṃ jyotir āsamsāranna dīpyate}^{7}\]

If the light of śabda is not lit the three worlds will sink in darkness. In short sound is the lamp and meaning, its light.

\[\text{śarīraṃ tāvadiṣṭārdhavyavachinnā padāvaliḥ}^{8}\]

The body of kāvya is the collection of words enriched by deep and beautiful meanings. We can see the early discussions about the relevance of sound and meaning in the Kāvyalankāra of Bhāmaha.

**Light of Linguistics in East**

There is a belief that linguistics or bhāṣāśāstra is a western contribution. It is said that the comparative linguistics was

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7. Kāvyādarśa, 1.4

8. Ibid, 1.8
born when the Sanskrit language was brought to the notice of the West by Sir William Jones. But when we go through the old Indian works on kāvyasaṃstrās, it can be seen that comparative linguistics had taken shape here as applied to regional languages. Thus Daṇḍi says in Kāvyādarśa that the kāvyā is classified into four as samskrta, prākṛta, apabhramśa and miśra.

\[\text{tadetadvāngmayam bhūyasaṃskṛtam prākṛtam tadhā} \]
\[\text{apabhramśaśca miśraṃ cētyāhursrya ścaturvidhanī}^9\]

Again he says that the language of Mahārāṣṭra is considered to be perfect prākṛta. The basis for this opinion is the rich literature including Pravaraṇa’s Sethubandhana.

\[\text{mahārā strāśrayam bhāṣāṃ prakṛtam prākṛtam viduḥ} \]
\[\text{sāgarāḥ suktiratnānaṃ setubandhanādiyanmayaṃ} \]
\[\text{sāuraseni ca gaudi ca lādi cānya ca tāḍrśi} \]
\[\text{yati prākṛtamityēvaṃ vyavahārēśu sanndhiṃ}^{10} \]

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9. Kāvyādarśa,1.32
Śauraseni, Gaudi, Lādi, Māgadhi and Avantija

were the languages referred to as prākṛta in Nāṭyaśāstra and other literature.

In addition to Sanskrit, in the chapter Bhāṣāvidhāna in Nāṭyaśāstra, Bharata divided the languages into seven regional languages as Māgadhi, Avantija, Prāchya, Śauraseni, Arthamāgadhi, Bāhrika and Dākṣiṇātya. This was based on regional and social aspects. In addition to this, while dealing with chandas he told that there are 13,42,17,726 vṛttās all together.

prayogajāni sarvāni prāyaśo na bhavanti hi\(^1\)

Though it is mentioned that not all these chandas were in application, the statement shows how advanced was linguistics in those days. Though kāvyā was not defined in

\(^{10}\) Kāvyādarśa,1.34&35

\(^{11}\) Nāṭyaśāstra,15.54
Kāvyādarśa, this together with Bhāmaha’s Kāvyalankāra gave relevance of alankāra which later became a branch of kāvyasāstra.

šabdārthau sahitau kāvyam

The kāvyasāstra was led to šabdārtha sidhānta by Bhāmaha who defined kāvyā as originated by the combination of šabda and artha.

Bhāmahālaṅkāra

At the end of Kāvyālankāra Bhāmaha says that by sixty (verses) the body (of poetry) was set, by one hundred and sixty the alaṅkārās, by fifty the conception of doṣās, by seventy the determination of nyāya (logic) and by sixty the purity of words. These five subjects have been dealt with in six parichedās, in order, by Bhāmaha for you (i.e., readers benefit).

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12 Kāvyālaṅkāra, 1.15
Thus Bhāmaha concludes his Kāvyaḷaṅkāra stating that he has dealt with kāvyam, alamkāram, kāvyadoṣās, nyāya and padās in that work. It shows how darśanās and kāvyasastras are related to each other. Moreover it can be understood that the branch of kāvyasastra had grown to deal with poems scientifically.

**Kavi, Pratibha, Kāvya**

Bhāmaha discusses kāvya in his Kāvyaḷaṅkāra as follows:

śabdachandobhidhānārdha itihāsāśrayah kadha

lokoṣṭikā kalāśceti mantavya kāvyavaikhara

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13 Kāvyālaṅkāra, 6.65&66

14 Kāvyālaṅkāra, 1.9
Those who resort to kāvyā should regard the following as essential — grammar, meter, the nature of words (both primary and secondary sense, meaning of words, the stories in epics, the way of the world logic and the arts.

For a poet for his creation-

śabdābhidheyevijnāyakrtvatadvidupāsanaṁ
vilokyanyanibandhāmsca kāryaḥ kāvyakriyādara.\textsuperscript{15}

Before starting his composition a poet should be equipped with grammar. He should learn the meanings of words to be used and should acquaint himself with major kāvyās by great poets.

For that he should be pratibhāvān (talented). According to Daṇḍi the three causes for the creation of a kāvyā are

\textsuperscript{15} Kāvyālaṅkāra, 1.10
naisargiki ca pratibhā śrutam ca bahunirmalam

amandaścābhīyōgōśyaḥ kāraṇam kāvyasampadaḥ\textsuperscript{16}

Inborn talent, clear and unambiguous scientific outlook and continuous exercise (abhyāsa) are the assets of a poet.

Mammaṭa expounds these as follows:

śaktirnipuṇatā lokaśāstrakāvyādyavekṣanat
kāvyajñāsīkṣayābhyyāsa iti hetustadbhave\textsuperscript{17}

The latent talent, experiences, the expertise acquired by dealing with śāstra and kāvyā, and the lessons acquired from an authority - these four are the reasons for the creation of kāvyā.

Rudraṭa saw the poetic talent as inborn.

pratibhetaparairudita sahajotpādy a ca dvidha bhavat\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} Kāvyālaṅkāra 1.103

\textsuperscript{17} Kāvyaprakāśa, 1.3

\textsuperscript{18} Kāvyālaṅkāra 1.103
Again Daṇḍi described it as follows:-

\[
\text{navidyateyadyapipūrvavāsanā -}
\]

\[
guṇānubandhipratibhānāmadbhutaṃ
\]

\[
śrut ēna yattēna ca vāgupasita dhṛuvaṃkarotyēva -
\]

\[
kamapyanugrahāṃ¹⁹
\]

Even if one is not having inborn talent, because of continuous practice one can become a poet (vāgdevata), bestow upon him the expertise to write poems. The definition of talent by Bhaṭṭatauta is most relevant:

\[
\text{navanavōnmeśaśālini prajñā pratibhā.}²⁰
\]

The ever new prajña is pratibha.

Kuntaka says in Vakrōkti-

\[
yatkimcanāpi saundaryaṃ tatsarvaṃ pratibhōdbhavaṃ!²¹
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¹⁸ Kāvyamīmāṃsa, 1.16

¹⁹ Kāvyādarśa, 1.104

²⁰ Tatvācintāmaṇi, p.481

²¹
All that beautiful are born out of talent. The poems created by such a great poet are "niyatikṛta", not bound by set rules.

The following words in Dhvanyāloka underline this

\[ \text{apāre kāvyasamsāre kavirekaḥ praśāpati} \]
\[ \text{yadhāvai rocate viśvaṁ tadhedaṁ parivartate}^{22} \]

In the limitless ocean of kāvyā the poet is the emperor. He formulates the world as he wishes.

In Ghaṭakarparakāvyā Abhinavagupta says (Kashmir ed.):\(^{23}\)

\[ \text{na vai doṣa doṣa na ca khalu guṇa eva ca guṇaḥ} \]
\[ \text{nibandhas vat antryaṁ sadapi guṇadośān vibhajate} \]
\[ \text{iyaṁ sa vaidagdhi prakṛtimadhurā tasya sukaveḥ} \]
\[ \text{yadatrōtpādadyatīṣubhabhavaḥ pariṇataḥ} \]

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\(^{22}\) Dhvanyāloka, 1.20

\(^{23}\) The Language of Poetry, K. Kunjunni Raja, Karnataka University, 1978
The most important asset of a poet is šakti or the imaginative power which is same as vyutpatti or learning of a transcendental nature. This vyutpatti is same as kāvyāśakti. He was also aware that mental activity could be classified into two, the imaginative and the intellectual, that is, the synthetic and the analytical which are concerned with the emotional appeal and the objective truth respectively.

Thus according to Abhinavagupta the imaginative power (śakti) is the most important asset for a poet. This is the same as vyutpatti or learning of a transcendent nature.

Bhaṭṭatauta has also referred to these two aspects of the mental activity, prajñā referring to the śāstra and pratibha referring to poetry.

At the end of first paricheda of Kāvyādarśa Daṇḍi says that in the absence of pratibha also, by continuous exercise one
may be blessed by *vāgdevata*.

But at the very beginning of *Kāvyalankāra* Bhāmaha says

> gurūpadeśādhyētuṃ śāstraṃ jadadhiyopyałam
> kāvyāṃ tu jāyate jātu kasyacitpratibhāvata.²⁴

Thus even the dull-witted can learn *śāstra* (science) with the help of a teacher; however one can be a poet only if he has a natural capacity, though itself might not be sufficient.

After this Bhāmaha leads us to

> rūpakādimalankāraṃ bāhyamācakṣate pare
> supāṃtingāṃca vyūtpattim vācaṃ vānchatyalamkṛtiṃ
> tadetadāhuḥ sausābdyaṃ nārthavyutpathirīḍrśi²⁵

Some people maintain that the proper dispositions

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²⁴ *Kāvyalāṅkāra*, 1.5

²⁵ *Kāvyalāṅkāra*, 1.14&15
of noun and verbs constitute the real ornaments of speech and figures of speech like *rūpaka* are external. The excellence in the disposition of words is the beauty of a poem. The meanings are not so.

Bhāmaha continues:

If sound, meaning, logic or art are not parts of a poem they are meaningless. For a poet to create a beautiful poem he should know indivisible bond connecting sound and meaning. The *mahākāvyās* are big in size and deal with great events. It is made of civilized words having great meanings, *alankāra* and *sadvastu*.

In poems, words should not be used with obvious meaning. The same word should not be used with opposite meaning. It should be used only because some authority has used earlier and as far as possible technical terms should be avoided. According to the *sūtra* ‘*chandovat sūtrāṇi bhavanti*’, words from *Vedās* also should not be used. Then which are the sounds allowed? They should be popular, should have beautiful meanings and sweet to hear. A poem
in which the sound and meaning is blend to the perfection is best.

While arguing whether śabda is eternal or not, Bhāmaha asks whether one knows ‘dhvan’ of that argument. Logicians say that sound is born and dies out, while Mīmāṃsaka-s say it is eternal. But only when sound is familiar the question whether it is eternal or not arises. Here one can see the starting point of śabdārthasiddhānta.

A newly formed sound is valid if it is meaningful and grammatically bound. Otherwise it will end in the opposite. A perfect, alankārayukta, poem is born when sound and meaning are perfectly mixed. Otherwise an imperfect poem is born, though it may be long and chandobaddham.

To know the inseparable relation between sound and meaning, poet should know language and linguistics. Bhāmaha knew this fact and that is why he bowed down in front of those wise men who knew this relation between word and meaning. Bhāmaha
closes his Kāvyālaṅkāra accepting Pāṇini as an authority.

Pāṇinīya grammar and Patañjali’s Bhāṣya find place in the last chapter of Kāvyālaṅkāra. Bhāmaha deals with the view that a sound is having a meaning because it is so chosen instead of all other words. This implies that one avoids its other meaning.

But a sound to attain its goal should have an intended meaning. Thus the question arises how a word can have two meanings. The words are different because their alphabets are different. They differ by structure also.

According to him the search for śabdārtha is endless. The fact that even after centuries the search is going on validates his argument.

Bhāmaha divides sounds according to meaning into four based on dravya, kriyā, jāti and guṇa. Since languages are abundant, the śabdārthās are also uncountable. So on what bases they
can be contained? To this question Bhāmaha suggest that the words can be classified into two as those which could and could not be used in poems. Perhaps we can see the traces of *dhvani, anumāna* and *vakratā* which paved the base for *Bhāratīya kāvyāśāstra* in his Kāvyālaṅkāra.

In Dhvanyāloka locana quoting Bhaṭṭodbhata Abhinavagupta says as follows,

*Sabdānāmabhidhānamabhidhāvyāpārō mukhyō gauṇavṛttiśca*

‘the *abhidyāna* of *śabda* in its application in primary meaning is called *abhidyāvyāpāra*. This *vyāpāra* is both *mukhyā* and *amukhyā* (*gauṇi*)’.

From this we can understand that the discussion on *śabdaśakti* had started prior to Udbhata.
Śabdaśaktis

Naiyāyika-s definition on pada is “śaktam padam”. In this sense the relation between śabda and artha was discussed as śabdaśakti.

The author of Kāvyamīmāṃsa Rājaśekhara says as follows:26

Vyākaraṇasmṛtinirṛīḥ śabdoniruktanīghanṭa-
vādibhiḥ nirdiṣṭastadabhidhēyoḥ arthahstau padaṁ.

Padānāmabhidhitsitārthagrandhanākaraḥ sandarbho vākyam.

śabda is the result of combining the prakṛti and pratyaya according to vyākaraṇa. The abhidheyartha of a śabda is the content of the object which is defined by the śabda using nirukta, nikhantu, kośa and vyavahāra. Śabda combined with artha forms

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26 Kāvyamīmāṃsa, Chapter.1
pada. The completion of pada resulted by the combination of artha, obtained by abhidheya, is vākya.

Mahimabhaṭṭa in his Vyaktiviveka explains vākya swarūpa as follows:27

sākāṅkṣāvayavaṁ bhedē parāṅkāṅkṣaśabdakaṁ
kriyāpradhānaṁ guṇavadēkārtham vākyamisyate

‘vākya is that in which there are different parts, which are distinct but have mutual ākāṅkṣa, in which the śabda applied does not have the ākāṅkṣa, of any śabdās not applied in which kriyā is important and in which along with the unimportance of anyapada, the tātparyārtha of all śabdās are same.

Samudraguptās tīkā in Alaṅkārasarvasvasāraḥ

‘Glorified śabdārtha is kāvyā.’ The glory of śabda

27 Vyaktiviveka, Chapter I
and artha may be achieved in three ways- dharma, vyāpāra and vyangya. Among these three the first two have two branches for each one. Dharma śabda gives rise to two dharmās, alamkāra and guṇa. Thus the glory obtained by dharma has two branches. They are the śabdārthavaiśīṣṭya obtained by alamkāra and śabdārthavaiśīṣṭya obtained by guṇa. They are called alankārasampradāya and guṇasampradāya respectively.

While the followers of Bhaṭṭodbhata emphasize alaṅkāra sampradāya, Vāmana and his followers emphasize guṇasampradāya. Another name of guṇasampradāya is rītisampradāya. There are two classes of people who accept the importance of śabdārtha according to vyāpāra - bhanitivaicitryakṛta and bhogakṛtva or bhojakatva. The other name of bhanitivaicitryakṛtabhede is vakrokti. Its exponent was Kuntaka. Bhaṭṭanāyaka was the exponent of the second one, bhojakatva. Bhojakatva is a fifth class of people who believes that the
śabdarthavaiśṛṣṭya is obtained by vyaṁga. This is called dhvani sampradāya whose main proponent was Ānandavardhana.

Vāmana’s Kāvyālankārasūtravṛtti

Vāmana divides the kāvyāṅgās into three as loka, vidya and prakīrṇa. The movable and immovable objects are included in loka. Vidyā includes śabdasmṛti (vyākaraṇa), abhidhānakośa (dictionary), chandovichiti (vruttastra), kālaśāstra (the science of 64 arts and their 18 subdivisions) kāmaśāstra and daṇḍanīti. Śabdasmṛti leads to sabdaśakti. The current meanings of words are defined by abhidhānakośa. The knowledge of vrutta (meter) is obtained by chandovichiti. The knowledge of art is obtained from kālaśāstra and kāmaśāstra deals with all aspects of kāma. The knowledge about naya and apanaya is obtained from daṇḍanīti.

28 Kāvyalaṅkārasūtravṛtti,III.1
Prakīrṇa includes lakṣyajnatva, abhiyoga, vṛddhāseva,

avekṣaṇa, pratidāna and avadhāna. Rudrata who succeeded Vāmana also said about kāvyahetu. By vyutpati we mean the knowledge of both relevant and irrelevant by the deep knowledge of vṛttta, vyākaraṇa, kala, lokasthitī, pada and padārtha. In the wide sense vistharavyutpati is all encompassing knowledge (sarvajñatva). Because there is no word or sentence in this world which is not a part of a poem (kāvyāṅga), the result of knowledge is to brighten language with the help of extensive grammar and tarkaśāstra. Its result is the beautiful poem. A similar description can be seen in the Tattvacintāmaṇi of Mathurānātha-

śaktigrahaṁ vyākaraṇopamānakośāptavākyād vyavahārataśca
vākyasya śeśād vivṛttvavadantī sānnidhyata siddhapadasya vṛddhāḥ\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{29}Tattvacintāmaṇi,p.481
Śabdārtha According to Kuntaka

If what spoken is artha and the sentence is śabda, dyotaka and vyañjaka can be śabda. Even if there are many words with same meaning (paryāya) there is only one word which gives the implied meaning. That is śabda. Thus among all the words with same or similar meanings the only one which brings out the meaning with all its details can be called śabda in kāvyā. In like manner the beautiful meaning which with its vibrant character enchants the reader or listener is the true meaning of the word in the case of kāvyā. A word which has got all characteristics akin to poem is the one which deserves the name śabda in kāvyā.

The unique sentence which embodies the implied meaning or in other words the vācaka pada which fully carries the meaning that the poet wants to convey is śabda in the context of kāvyā. While there are many words with similar meanings, the one which fully conveys the intended meaning of the poet is śabda.
It is the application of (the four) *Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsa, Nyāya* and *Sāhitya* which takes place in each sentence.

Eg: - *gauḥ (g+ au+ḥ)* Thus the content of *vyākaraṇa* pada as *gakāra, aukāra* and *visarjanīyātmaka* is the meaning of *prātipadikertapāṅcaka* (*prātipatika, linga, parimāṇa, vacana, kāraka*) or *vākyārthaśtaka* (*vyāpāraśrayakarta, bhalāśrayakarma, kāla, puruṣa, vacana, bhāvarūpa*) etc. The *vākyārthaśtparya* which depends on the relation between words in the form of *parasparānvaya* is the application of *vākyavicāraśāstra* (*mīmāṃsa*). The *pramāṇaśāstra* establishes this rationally as the result of *pratyaksādi pramāṇa*. It enchants one by its characteristic beauty. That is, it enchants one by its structural beauty without going into its meaning like music. Once the meaning is clear independent of the words, it enchants one like sweets.

**Dhanika and Dhanañjaya on Rasa and Śabdaśakti**

The question arises whether *rasāswādana* is
different from \textit{vācyārtha} (word meaning), \textit{lakṣyārtha} or something different from these. According to dhvanivādins one cannot say that \textit{kāvya} and \textit{rasa} has the relation based on \textit{vācyā-vācakabhāva}. \textit{Rasa} is not \textit{vācyā} and \textit{kāvya} is not its sentence. \textit{Śabda} acquires only two powers (\textit{sakti})- \textit{abhidhā} and \textit{lakṣaṇā}. Along with them the \textit{vākyavṛtti} called \textit{tātparya} also enters. \textit{Vākya-vācaka-bhāvasambandha} is the relation between \textit{śabda} and \textit{artha} established by \textit{abhidhā}. The word \textit{gau} is the definition of \textit{sāsnādimān} cow. The cow thus defined is its \textit{vācyā}. But the relationship between \textit{kāvya} and \textit{rasa} is not like this. \textit{Kāvya} and \textit{rasa} cannot acquire the \textit{lakṣya- lakṣaka} relation because it is the application of \textit{sāmānyārtha} of a \textit{śabda} in a particular sense (as \textit{viśiṣṭārtha}). If the object of \textit{kāvya} is \textit{rasa} there should have application of \textit{lakṣakaśabdās} not with \textit{mukhyāvṛtti} but by \textit{lakṣaṇa} itself. But it is not done in \textit{kāvyās}. Therefore it cannot be said that the effect or enhancement of \textit{rasa} is obtained by means of \textit{lakṣītalakṣaṇā} (ajahallakṣaṇa).
Dhvanikāra says as follows:

\[
mukhyām vr̥ttiṁ parityajya guṇavṛtyarthadārśanaṁ
yaduddīśya bhalāṁ tatra śabdo naiva skhaladgatiḥ\]

Even if we think that the effect of \textit{rasa} is obtained by \textit{kāvya} by means of \textit{abhidhāsakti}, \textit{kāvya} or \textit{kāvyopāttaśabda} and \textit{rasa} is \textit{vācyārtha}, everyone who knows the technical meaning of each \textit{śabda} obtains \textit{rasacarvaṇa}.

But \textit{arasika} cannot enjoy \textit{rasa} merely by \textit{vācyā-}\textit{vācakabhāva}. Because of these it follows that \textit{rasa} is not \textit{vācyārtha} and both \textit{kāvya} and \textit{rasa} do not have \textit{vācyā-}\textit{vācakabhāva}. If we think that \textit{rasa} is the product of imagination (\textit{kālpanika}), only those who know which technique the poet applies correspond to which \textit{rasa} can enjoy \textit{rasa}. But \textit{rasa} is enjoyable to all \textit{rasikās} uniformly. Therefore the argument that \textit{rasa} is the product of imagination also becomes

\footnote{Dhvanyāloka,II.7}
unfounded.

Dhvanivādins accept kāvyārtha in three forms-rasa, vastu and alankāra. Rasa does not arise through kāvyopātaśabdās. It is only by the combination of vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāriḥbhāva. Where not only rasa but vastu and alankāra are also experiences in the sense of pratīyamāna their effect is experienced even if they are not the śabda of sentence.

This dhvani has two divisions vivakṣitavācyā (abhidhāmūlakadhvani) and avivakṣitavācyā (lakṣaṇāmūlakadhvani). The second one has again two branches- atyantatirakṣtavācyā dhvani and sankramitavācyā dhvani. Vivakṣitavācyadhvani also has two divisions called asaṃlakṣyakrama and saṃlakṣyakrama. When rasādipratipatty is in primary form in kāvyā it is said to have asaṃlakṣyakramadhvani. When rasās appears themselves as parts there is no dhvani, but rasavadalaṃkāra. Against this pūrvapakṣa of dhvanivādins, that is rasa is vyaṅgya and vyaṅjana śakti is the
content, Kārikākāra says as follows:

Either by reading or hearing we know about its prakaraṇa, vākya, śrota, deśa and kāla. Through this prakaraṇa with the help of kārakās applied in it we know about kriya as the true sentence meaning of the śabdās (vākyārtha). At times the śabda which is the sentence of the kriya may not be explicitly present in the vākya. Even then the meaning of the kriya which corresponds to the prakaraṇa can be obtained. Thus the kriya, whether explicit or not, gives the meaning of the sentence. Like this the sthāyībhāva will be expressed as the vākyārtha of kāvya through vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārins. This also may not be explicitly present as in the case of kriya.

In wordily sentences the application of words occurs in two ways, kārakapada and kriyāpada. These are called siddhapada and sādhyapada by grammarians like Bhartṛhari. The tātparya of vākya is not obtained from kārakapada. It cannot be
obtained only from kriyāpada. So the intention of the vākya is latent in kriya. Thus in any sentence the vākyārtha or intention should occur as kriyārūpa. Whether the sentence meaning of the kriya is applied or not it is implied. As an example we shall take two laukika vākyas- in one the kriya is vācya or audible and in the other it is only implied by prakaraṇa. As specific examples we have ‘gāmabhyaṇja’ and ‘dvārampdvāram’. In the first one the kriyāpada abhyāja is explicitly present. In second one though the words open or shut is not explicitly present, the listener understands by prakaraṇa itself. In both the sentences the meaning is given by the kriya enriched by kāraka. Thus the meaning or the intention of the sentence is given by kriya. Same is the case with kāvyā also.

Any sentence whether wordily or vaidyaka is uttered with an intention. The realization of that intention is the object of that sentence. Without this intention the vākya is of no use and it will not produce any interest in listener. Thus any sentence should carry an
intention. In kāvyās the effect of meaning like vibhāva is through śabdās. There vibhāvās give rise to the effect of sthāyibhāva and rasa. In this sense the śabdās of kāvyā have anvayavatireka relation with vibhāvādi meaning. If poetic words are applied in kāvyā, it will not occur, like this. Poetic words only will produce vibhāva etc. In the way of rasa experience the meanings of poetic words are vibhāva etc. The sthāyibhāvās like rati created by this vibhāvās etc. is the vākyārtha of the poem. Like this the poem is the vākya, its word meaning is vibhāva and its sthāyibhāva is vākyārtha. Thus it is proved that the sthāyibhāva and rasa experience are not merely implied. Further, it occurs that the vākyārtha and its experience are dependent on the imaginary power called vyaṅjana; they belong to the domain of intention.

The relation between kāvyā and rasa is bhāvyabhāvaka. Kāvyā is bhāvaka and rasa etc. are bhāvya. The saḥrdaya experiences in his mind the sthāyibhāva or rasa. This experience is
called bhāvana. In this sense kāvya is bhāvaka and rasa is its bhāvya. Rasa is spontaneously created in the sahrdaya. Kāvya creates the bhāvana through the viśiṣṭavībhāvās relevant to the rasa. The pūrvapakṣa may express a doubt about the bhāvya—bhāvaka relation. In the case of other śabdās and their meanings this bhāvya-bhāvaka relation is not seen. Since kāvya śabdās are also like other śabdās why can't it happen that the bhāvya-bhāvaka relation is not present in the case of kāvya and its meaning? But this doubt is baseless. The Mīmāṁsaka-s who accept the kriya called bhāvana have also accepted the bhāvya-bhāvaka relation in kriyās. According to the śruti-‘svargakāmōyajeta or putrakāmōyajeta’- the salvation is possible through rituals like yajña. Thus the Mīmāṁsaka-s apply bhāvana in the attainment of salvation. The yajñās are bhāvakā and salvation is bhāvya. In the case of other words this bhāvya-bhāvaka relation is not achieved. It occurs only in the case of kāvya and the rasa. It is established by the anvayavyatireka relation of kāvya and
rasa. In the absence of bhāvya -bhāvaka padās, the bhāvana of rasa will not take place. When it is present rasa etc. will be created in the mind. From this anvayavyatireka relation it follows that there is bhāvya -bhāvaka relation between kāvyā and rasa.

Bhoja’s Śṛṅgāraprakāśa

Keith in his ‘Sanskrit Literature’ says that “we have no real knowledge to disprove his (Bhoja’s) claim to polymathy exhibited in a large variety of works”. 31 According to V. Raghavan ‘Bhoja in his own way, brought in all the śāstras as much as possible and wherever he came into contact with śāstric ideas, he did not satisfy himself with a mere mention of or allusion to them but went into them deeply as if he was writing special treatises on those subjects’. 32 In Prakriyāsarvasva of Melputhur Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭatīry

31 Keith, Sanskrit Literature, p. 53

32 Śṛṅgāraprakāśa, p. 704
and Gañaratnamahodadhi of Vardhamāna we can see examples of Bhoja’s Śrīgārāprakāśa(S.P).

The first eight chapters of S.P. deals with śabda, artha and sāhitya. All over these chapters he has relied heavily on the sūtra, vārtika, bhāṣya and the kārika, but has not given references except in a few cases. The greatest authority he accepted was Bhartṛhary and his Vākyapadiya. He quotes largely from Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjari also without mentioning him while discussing padārtha, vyakti, jāti and ākṛti.

In the first chapter of S.P. following Bhāmaha’s ‘śabdārthau sahitau kāvyam’, Bhoja explains sāhitya as the combination of śabdārthas. He defined śabda as yenochāritēnapratīyate33 quoting Mahābhāṣya. According to him there are twelve types of śabdās and twelve types of arthās also.

33 Mbh,I.1
What is conveyed by śabda is artha and sāhitya is a combination of śabda and artha. But they are also only twelve types, quoting from Sphoṭasiddhiḥ.

In S.P, śabda is defined as a collection of varṇas.

To the question what are meant by prakṛtyādi śabda, quoting Upavarṣa he says ‘gakāraukāravisarjaniyaśśabda’ and negates it. If śabda is what conveys the meaning then the word gau is not conveying the meaning but only jāti, kriya etc. Then what is śabda?

If śabda is that whose utterance conveys the meaning, then varṇa is śabda. Śabda is that, which is the cause for the expression of meaning. That which causes the expression of śabda is dhvani. To summarise, śabda is that which causes the expression of artha whose soul is the artha with sphoṭalakṣaṇa which is expressed by the collection of dhvani made up of prakṛtipratyādi varṇās.

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34 S.P,Vol.1,p.190

35 S.P,Vol.1,p.190
In the discussion of śabda he divided dravya into six parts as Karta, karma, karaṇa, sampradāna, apādāna and adhikaraṇa and in this he followed Pāṇini and Bhartṛhari.

_Swatantraḥ karta_\(^{36}\)

The agent is independent (swatantraḥ) in relation to the other accessories as he is the one who employs them. The following reasons are given for this independence of the agent.

1) The agent acquires his capacity from some other source earlier to the operation of the other accessories.

2) He keeps the others subordinate to him and they act according to his direction.

3) He can hold back the others already engaged.

4) There is no other substitute for him.

\(^{36}\) Pāṇiniya, I.4.54
5) He is present even when the others are not even though he may be helping in the accomplishment of the action from a distance.

*Karma – karturīpsitatamam karma*\(^{37}\)

Again he quotes Vākyapadīya:

`yadasajjāyate sadvā janmanā yat prakāśate`

`tannivārya vikāraṇaḥ tu karma dvedhā vyavasthitaḥ`\(^{38}\)

The object (*karma*) which is newly produced and so did not exist before is called *nirvartya* (product); that which existed before but is manifested by its birth is called *vikārya*. This *vikārya* is divided into two.

He quotes Mahābhāṣya also

`‘kālabhāvadhvagandavya: karmasapjnā hyakarmanām’\(^{39}\),`

\(^{37}\) Pāṇinīya,,1.4.49

\(^{38}\) VP,3.7.49
that is, words expressive of time, action and distance to be covered are also to be \textit{karma}.

\textbf{Karāṇa}

\textit{Kriyāyāḥ parinispatti yadvyāpārādanandaraṃ}

\textit{yadā vivakṣyate tasya karaṇatvaṃ tadā smṛtaṃ}\textsuperscript{40}

The instrument is that, after the activity of which the action is meant to be conveyed as accomplished.

\textbf{Sampradāna}

\textit{Hetutvē karma saṃjñāyāṃ śeṣatvē vāpi kārakaṃ}

\textit{rucyarthānāṃ śāstreṇa sampradānākhyamucyatē}\textsuperscript{41}

It is one of the factors in the act of giving which means parting away of something without taking anything in return.

\textsuperscript{39} MBh.1.4.51

\textsuperscript{40} VP,3.7.90

\textsuperscript{41} VP,3.7.130
Here the receiver in this action is called *sampradāna*, when he does not prohibit the giver or requests him or gives his consent.

**Apādāna**

*Nirdiṣṭaviśayaṁ kincidupāttaviśayaṁ tadhā*

*apeciṣitakriyaṁ cēti tridhāpādānamucyate*\(^{42}\)

**Apādāna** means the starting point in a movement. A starting point is of three kinds; 1) that a relation to which a movement is mentioned 2) that in relation to which the verb expresses the movement only partly and 3) that in relation to which some movement is required.

He quotes Padamañjary also.

*Apāye yadudāsīnaṁ tadrūpam yadi vā calaṁ*

*dhṛuvameva tadāvesāt tadapādānamucyate*\(^{43}\)

\(^{42}\) VP,3.7.136

\(^{43}\)
Adhikaraṇa

Kartṛkarmavyavahitāmasākṣād dhārayat kriyāṁ

upakurvat kriyāsiddhau śāstredhikaraṇaṁ smṛtaṁ

A thing is called *adhikaraṇa* when it helps in the accomplishment of an action by doing the service called *dhāraṇa* (holding). Action is directly connected with the agent or the object. That which holds these two is called *adhikaraṇa*.

Abhidhā or Primary meaning

The essential nature of a word lies in its significative power or *śakti* which is defined in the Tarkasangraha as conventional made by the will of god relating a word to its meaning. Since this conventional relation or *sanketa* is established by the will

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43 Padamañjari, 1.4.24
44 VP.3.7.148
45 ITM, P.19
of god it is permanent and is called *abhidhā*. When the relation is not permanent but is established by the will of man as argued by *Naiyāyika*-s it is called *paribhāṣa*.\(^{46}\) Bhartṛhari also refers to these two types of *saṅketās* as *ajānīka* or permanent and *ādhunīka* or modern. In both *abhidhā* and *paribhāṣa* the relation between the word and the meaning is direct. When the relation is indirect it is called *lakṣaṇā* or *gaṇi*. It has no direct power to convey the sense intended as it is based on the similarity or contiguity of the actual intended sense in the original primary sense.

**Multiple meaning: Homophones and Homonyms**

The binary semantic relationship between a word and its sense is one -to—one, i.e., a word has only one sense and a sense has only one word to denote it. But natural languages have many words not following this one-to—one correspondence. In other

\(^{46}\) Šabdaśaktiprakāśika,p.122
words there are words with multiple meaning and more than one word with the same sense. These are known as nānāṛtha śabdās or homonyms and paryāya śabdās or synonyms respectively. Patañjali has drawn attention to this feature of natural languages. Yāska attributes the origin of homonyms to the verbal derivation of nouns according to which all nouns are derived from verbal roots. Since verbs denote action every object will have as many names as the actions with which it is concerned and on the other hand each noun could be applied to as many objects as are concerned with the action indicated by the verbal root.

In the case of synonyms it may be noted that there will be slight differences in the meanings of different synonyms though used in the same sense. A new form of an old word is taken as its apabhrāṃśa or corrections and will be considered synonymous.

\[47\] Mbh.under Sūtra 1.3.1: bahavo hi śabdā ekarthā bhavanti. Tad yathā īndraḥ śakraḥ puruhūtaḥ puraṇḍaraḥ. Ekaś ca śabdo bahvarthaḥ tad yathā aksāḥ pādāḥ māśāḥ iti.
though the emotive value associated with the words may be different.

In the case of homonyms an interesting question that arises is whether homonyms are to be considered as the same word with different senses or as different words having the same sound. They are respectively known as *ekaśabda darśana* or one word theory and *anēkaśabda darśana* or many words theory. These are analogous to the homonyms and homophones of modern linguistics.

Homonyms are result of divergent sense development. Bhartṛhary has discussed these two theories. When a word has more than one meaning the distinction is based on the relative frequency of usage. That which is well known through constant usage is called the primary and normal sense and the less frequently used sense is called secondary. A word cannot have more than one meaning at a time. It is the context or the collocation of other words that determine the meaning at a context. On the other hand if one holds that a word can have only one sense, the word
having the primary sense and the word having the secondary sense are actually different though they sound the same.

Bhartṛhary has also discussed homophones which is the result of convergent sound development. Here also he refers to two theories. According to the first theory it is the same word that gives the various senses, and according to the second one they are different words having the same sound and in both cases the sense or meaning is cleared by various contextual factors.\(^{48}\) A word which was originally associated with only one sense could have been applied to another sense through metaphorical transfer or slight shift in meaning. In course of time this transferred sense also could have gained the status of primary meaning.

The Indian scholars were mainly concerned with

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\(^{48}\) VP,II.316: \(\text{šabdārthāḥ pravibhajyante na rūpād eva kevalāt}\).

II.318: \(\text{bhedapakṣe pi sārūpyād bhinnārthaḥ pratipattiśu}

\(\text{niyatā yānty abhivyaktiṇī śabdaḥ prakaraṇādibhiḥ}\)
the descriptive and synchronic study of language dealing with each
as it exists and so were not concerned with the distinction between
homonyms and homophones which needs a historical diachronic
study of language. Thus they studied the problem of shifts in
application under metaphor or lakṣaṇa and discussed the problem of
nirūḍha –lakṣaṇa where the acquired sense becomes the normal
sense.

Among the literary critics Udbhaṭa subscribed to
the many words theory.⁴⁹ In discussing paronomasia (śleṣa) Udbhaṭa
says that when two expressions are exactly identical in form, clearly
only one of them need be employed as it can carry both the
meanings. But he says that even if they differ in minor details one of
them need be employed since the other is also brought forth through
the similarity of forms. According to Mammaṭa in śleṣa we have two

⁴⁹ Kāvyālankārasārasaṅgraha, IV.50: ekaprayatnoccāryāṇāṃ taccāyāṃ caiva bibhratāṃ

Svarīdādīgūnair bhinnair bandhaḥ śliṣṭam ihocayate
different expressions identical in sound, uttered simultaneously.\(^{50}\)

Since an expression can give only one sense at a time it is to be assumed that in śleṣa two expressions similar in form are uttered simultaneously. This simultaneous utterance of two identical expressions is indicated by the term tantra. In fact the conveyance of two different senses by the same expression is by repetition or āvṛtti.

It is to be noted that if the synonyms were substituted for the words in a sentence the effect could be lost. Therefore Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha maintained that śleṣa based on homonymous expressions should be classed among the figures of speech depending on sound. These types of śleṣa is divided into two classes, abhaṅgaśleṣa (double meaning with the same word-division) and sabhaṅga-śleṣa (double meaning with a different word division). In addition there is a third class of śleṣa depending on sense called

\(^{50}\) Kāvyaprakāśa,IX.84, vācyabhedena bhinnā yad yugapad bhāṣaṇaspṛśaḥ

śliṣyanti śabdaḥ śleṣo’ sau, ..................
arthā śleṣa, a single meaning with different applications.

According to some Naiyāyika-s the words are divided into four classes,51 yogika (etymological), rūḍha (conventional), yoga-rūḍha (etymological and conventional) and yogika rūḍha (etymological or conventional). The expressive powers of the words corresponding to these are called yoga, rūḍhi, yogarūḍhi and yogikarūḍhi respectively.

**Yogika or derivative**

In this case a word retains its signification according to its etymology. Here its meaning is determined by those of its component parts and nothing more or less than this. **Yogika** words are also classified into three as kṛḍanta, taddhita and samastapaṇa. In kṛḍanta a word is obtained by the addition of suffixes to verbal roots. In the case of taddhita word is formed by the addition of

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51 Siddhāntamuktāvali, p.282: saktam padaṇa, tac caturvidhaṃ, kvacid yogikaṃ kvacid rūḍham kvacid yogarūḍham kvacid yaugikarūḍham.
suffixes to nouns and *samasta padās* are compound words. *Kṛdanta* and *taddhita* are also called primary derivative and secondary derivative respectively.

**Rūḍha or conventional**

Here the meaning is conventional and not directly connected with its derivation. Thus the meaning of the whole word is independent of the part meanings. Underivable simple words (*avyutpannās*) belong to this class. Though such words can be derived with the help of *upādi* suffixes their meaning is not based on the derived sense.

**Yogarūḍha or derivative-conventional**

In this case the *samudāyaśakti* or the meaning determined by the whole word taken together agrees with that determined by the parts. Thus the derivative meaning and the conventional meaning coincide and refer to the same object. Thus it
is partly derivative and partly conventional.

**Yougikarūḍha**

Also referred to as *rūḍha yaugika*, here the meaning is derivative or conventional. In other words the meaning of the word can be ascertained either etymologically from the meanings of its component parts or conventionally from usage by the whole word taken together. Both the meanings are determined independently of each other and understood separately. In conventional sense and as a derivative the same word gives entirely different meanings. The above classification is mainly applicable to the nouns only. Later one more group was added to this class by Jagadīśa\(^{52}\). These are called *niruḍha lakṣaṇa* which include words used in their metaphorical sense.

\(^{52}\) Šabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 16: *rūḍham ca lakṣaṇam caiva yogarūḍham ca yaugikam taccaturdhā, parai rūḍhayaugikam manyate’ dhikam*
Ākāṅkṣā

The most important contribution of ancient India to general linguistics next to the sphota theory is the concept of ākāṅkṣā brought forward by the Mīmāṃsaka school. They introduced this concept to explain how syntactic unity is achieved among the various isolated words forming a sentence. For this they introduced three more concepts - saṁnidhi, yogyatā and ākāṅkṣā. Of these, ākāṅkṣā is most important as it is used in the definition of a sentence.

While we find a simple definition of a sentence as a mere collection of words in the Bṛhaddevata\textsuperscript{53} a precise definition is first given by Jaimini in his Mīmāṃsā sūtra. Though first applied by the Mīmāṃsaka-s in dealing with the prose passages of Yajurveda it found much more extended applications. Thus by the

\textsuperscript{53} Bṛhaddevatā,II.117: padasaṁghātajam vākyam.
time of Bhartṛhari this has become a well known definition of a sentence.

Though ākāṅkṣā was used in the definition of a sentence first by the Mīmāṃsaka-s, the necessity for inter-dependence of words to give a unified sense in a compound word or a sentence was recognised much earlier by the grammarians. According to Pāṇini words can form a compound word only if they have sāmarthya or capacity⁵⁴. The word sāmarthya is interpreted by some commentators as vyāpeka or mutual connection pertaining to the meaning in which sense it is same or similar to the condition of ākāṅkṣā. According to some others, sāmarthya is to be explained as ekārthatva which could be compared to the condition of arthaikatva given by Jaimini. The difference is that while Pāṇini dealt with compound words, Jaimini was dealing with sentences. Patañjali has brought out this difference clearly. While he held these two views as

⁵⁴ Pāṇini,II.1.1 : samarthah padāvaliḥ
mutually exclusive, he accepted the *ekārthībhāva* point of view as the correct one.

The syntactic unity of a sentence rests on the *ākāṅkṣā*, the mutual expectancy of a word. We know that a single word in a sentence cannot convey complete sense in the absence of other words. A word is said to have *ākāṅkṣā* for another if it cannot without the latter produce knowledge of its inter-connection in an utterance. For example, a noun in the nominative case requires a verb to convey complete meaning. Similarly a verb like ‘bring’ has expectancy for a word denoting something that is brought.

The concept of *ākāṅkṣā* introduced by Mīmāṃsaka-s is not only grammatic but a psychologic one.\(^{55}\) This is clear in their interpretation of the Vedic injunctions. There are two

\(^{55}\) Vākyārthamāṭṭkavṛtti,p.7:

\begin{quote}
*anvitasyābhidhānārthaṁ uktārthaghaṭanāya vā*

*pratiyogīṇi jijñāsā yā sākāṅkṣetī giyate*
\end{quote}
schools of thought led by Prābhākara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. According to Prabhākara every Vedic injunction is to be considered as a nīyoga or command involving a person who is to follow the command, a law on the basis of which the command is given, and an action to be performed by him. He considered them as psychological ākāṅkṣās. Thus according to this school the three essential psychological ākāṅkṣās are for the viṣaya or the act involved, for nīyojya or the person who is ordered to do it and for karaṇa or the means of doing it. According to the Bhaṭṭa school of Kumārila the content of an injunction is the realisation that the action involved is productive of some beneficial result without which not even a fool will perform it. Thus there is no special ākāṅkṣā for the person who is to do it. Anyone interested in the fruit will do it. Therefore instead of the nīyojya of Prabhākara, he introduced phala or the fruit of the action as an object of ākāṅkṣā. An extension of the psychological expectancy can be found in the Mīmāṃsa definition of a
mahāvākya.

The Naiyāyika-s have later made a clear distinction between the psychological ākāṅkṣā and the grammatical ākāṅkṣā. According to them there should be mutual expectancy between the root or the stem on the one hand and the verbal or nominal suffix on the other. But it was Nāgeśa who interpreted ākāṅkṣā truly as psychological.56 According to him ākāṅkṣā is the desire on the part of the listeners on hearing a word in a sentence to know the idea which can be related to its meaning in order to get a complete sense. Therefore the expectancy is on the part of the listeners and not on the part of words or their meanings.

Yogyatā

According to Tarkasangraha and Paramalaghumañjuṣa

56 Paramalaghumañjuṣa,p.33f: sa caikapadārthajñāne tadarthānvayayogyārthasya yaj jānām tadviṣayecchā;asyānvaya arthaḥ ka ity evaṁrūpā puruṣaniṣṭhaiva, tathāpi tasyaḥ svaviṣaye’the āropaḥ.
yogyatā is the logical compatibility or consistency of the words in a sentence for mutual association.\footnote{Tarkasāṅgraha.p.30: \textit{arthābādho yogyatā} \; Paramalaghumañjuśā,p.36: \textit{parasparānayaprayojakadharmavatvam.}} This logical compatibility or consistency is to be conceived on the basis of a judgement of the sense created by the sentence. In other words there is yogyatā between the constituent words of a sentence when its meaning is not contradicted by experience. A well known example for lack of yogyatā is ‘agninā siṇchat’. At the same time we have to distinguish between inconceivable combinations like the circular square and the conceivable combinations like rabbits horn. In fact it is not the lack of correlation with the actual facts but the impossibility of connecting the word meanings that puts obstacle in the way of verbal comprehension. This has been pointed out by Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Whittgenstein\footnote{Vārttika, quoted in Khaṇḍanakahāṇḍakāhyā,p.168: \textit{atyantasaty api hy arthe jnanam sābdah karoti hi}}. There is difference of opinion about the exact
function of yogyatā also in the comprehension of meaning. While some Naiyāyika-s argue that the knowledge of yogyatā is a prerequisite for verbal cognition, others argue that what is required is only the absence of a decisive knowledge of the absence of incompatibility with the experience. While the first one is a positive condition the latter one is a negative condition.

Saṃnidhi

It is clear that the words uttered at long intervals cannot bring out the inter relation among them even in the presence of ākāṅkṣā and yogyatā. Same is the case when irrelevant words are present in the sentence. Saṃnidhi or āsatti is the condition that such situations are avoided and that the words in a sentence should be contiguous in a time. Kumārilabhaṭṭa explains saṃnidhi as the

\[ \textit{abadhat tu pramam atra svatahpramanyaniscalam.} \]

Philosophical Investigations, 282: ‘But the fairy tale only invents what is not the case : it does not talk non sense’. 
continuous moving about of the words or their meanings in the mind and distinguishes it from anataraśruti or mere immediate sequence of utterance.\textsuperscript{59} According to him the lack of saṃnidhi is of two kinds, not being uttered together and not being signified by words. While the first one refers to the contiguity in time the second one refers to the absence of significant words.

According to Prabhākara saṃnidhi is only the contiguity of cognition of the sense and not necessarily of words actually uttered. An example is elliptical sentences where the intended meaning is understood by the context even though some of the words necessary for syntactic completeness are not actually expressed. Further Prabhākara says that saṃnidhi does not mean even simultaneous mental comprehension of the words and as in the case of ākāṅkṣā it works step by step in the order of sequence in

\textsuperscript{59}Tantravārttika,p.455:

ākāṅkṣā saṃnidhānām ca yogyatā ceti ca trayam
saṃbandhakāraṇatvena klptaṃ nānantaraśrutiḥ
which cognised.

According to the early Naiyāyika-s the recollection of the meanings of individual words to comprehend the meaning as a whole is simultaneous. On the other hand the Navya Nyāya school defines āstti or sannidhi as an immediate recollection of the meaning of words through their expressive power or lakṣaṇa. Even if the words are separated because of āstti they are recollected without any interruption. This recollection is explained as samūhālambanajñāna or collective cognition. The perception of each word leaves its impression on the mind and when the last word is uttered its last letter acts as a stimulus and a collective recollection follows.

Tātparyajñāna

Language is a medium of communication. So one utters or writes a sentence only when he intends to convey its content or meaning to its listener or reader. Thus it may be argued that the
meaning of any utterance is the notion actually present in the mind of the speaker or the meaning of any sentence is what the speaker intends to be understood from it by the listener. Thus according to some Naiyāyika-s a general knowledge of the meaning intended by the speaker or ātparyajñāna is an essential factor in all cases of verbal comprehension. But the Vedāntins reject this view. They argue that when a parrot or a gramophone repeats human expressions or when an illiterate brāhmin chants the Vedic hymns without understanding the meaning, though there is no real intention on the part of the speaker the listener can interpret them. To this Naiyāyika-s argue that the intention need not be that of the actual speaker and could be traced to the original author of the statement.\(^6^0\) In the case of Vedic hymns Naiyāyikās attribute the intention to god. But this is refuted by Vedāntins and Mīmāṁsaka-s pointing out that the existence of god is not accepted by all people. In any case the

\(^{60}\) Nyāyakośa,p.326: prayoktā cābhisaṁdhāpayitrātraṁ na tu vaktaiva.
Vedāntins admit that the knowledge of the speaker’s intention plays an important role in the comprehension of meaning in the case of ambiguous expressions. On the other hand the Mīmāṃsakā’s habits of attending too exclusively to the revealed texts of the Vedās probably encouraged them to formulate a theory of verbal comprehension without the reference to the speaker at all.

It is to be noted that even among the Naiyāyika-s there is difference of opinion regarding the importance of tātparyajñāna. Some of them believe that it could be considered as a part of ākāṅkṣā itself. According to some others it is essential for verbal comprehension only in the case of equivocal terms and ambiguous expressions.

It can be seen that the importance of tātparyajñāna in the understanding of speech is recognised by almost all schools of Indian thought and the difference is mainly only on the degree of emphasis given.
Anvīabhīdhāna

While discussing ākāṅkṣā we have seen the definition of a sentence as "a group of words serving a single purpose if on analysis the separate words are found to have ākāṅkṣā or mutual expectancy." The question arises whether a word has an independent meaning or only as part of a sentence. Though we know that each word has a definite meaning the purpose of the word is to serve as a part of a sentence. When we hear a sentence we get a unitary sense which is the meaning of the sentence. The problem is whether this unitary sense arises directly from the collection of the words as a whole or as sum total of the meanings of each individual word comprising it. The anvīabhīdhāna theory holds the first view while the latter view is held by the abhihitānvaya theory.

According to the anvīabhīdhāna theory both the individual word meanings and their mutual relation are conveyed by
the words themselves.

The ancient Mīmāṃsaka-s seem to have held the anvitābhidhāna theory. Though Prabhākara and his followers do not deny the existence of individual words and their isolated meanings, it is impossible to comprehend the isolated meaning of a word apart from their relation in a sentence. In practice the words convey their meanings only as related to one another on the strength of the factors ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and saṃnīdhi. The words convey not only their individual meanings but also their syntactic relations. In other words the sentence meaning is directly conveyed by the words themselves.\(^{61}\)

Abhinavagupta refers to this theory as dīṛghavyāpāravāda in the sense that there is no limit to the extent of the meaning that an expression can convey according to this theory.

\(^{61}\) Vākyārthamāṭkāvṛtti, p.5

ākāṅkṣāsaṃnīdhiprāptayogyārthāntarasāṃgatān

svārthān āhuḥ padāṇīti vyutpattiḥ saṃśritā mayā.
Not only the word meaning but also the syntactic relation is conveyed by the function of *abhidhā*.

*Anvitābhidhāna* theory holds that the sentence has a unitary meaning of its own while the constituent words possess meaning only as they are related to this unitary sentence-meaning. Though there are many words and therefore many meanings in a sentence the unity of the sentence meaning is achieved through the unity of purpose. The syntactic relation gives an extension to the meaning of each individual sentence. Rāja points out that “the common place statement in modern linguistics that the sentence is the unit of speech is comparable to the *anvitābhidhāna theory*” and Wundt seems to represent this theory.

*Abhihitānvaya*

*Anvitābhidhāna* theory was strongly criticised by the Mīmāṃsaka-s of the Bhāṭṭa school. According to them the
words convey only the individual word meanings. Their mutual relation is conveyed not by the words but by their meanings. Even though we see the words only as applied in sentences and may have different contextual meanings we are able to understand the isolated meanings of the words separately also. This is clear from the fact that we are able to use a word learned from its use in one context in other contexts also. Moreover the very principle of recognising is based on our capacity to recognize a word taken out of context. *Abhihitānvaya* theory holds that the meaning of a sentence is a concatenation of the individual items expressed by the words each of which meaning can be comprehended separately. Unlike the words the sentence does not have a meaning of its own independently. The meanings of individual words in a sentence thus comprehended are born together the three factors ākānkṣa, yogyata and sannidhi constituting the binding relationship leading to the meaning of the sentence.

*Abhihitānvaya* is supported by Naiyāyika-s also. If
we hold that words are the meaning holding basic elements of a sentence, the individual words have exhausted their function by conveying their own isolated meaning. So they cannot be expected to perform the additional function of conveying their mutual relation leading to sentence meaning. The words cannot convey the mutual relation because the word meanings lie between the words and the sentence meaning. So it is the word meanings that convey the sentence meaning in the form of their mutual relation. There is a slight difference between the Naiyāyika-s and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s regarding the way in which the mutual connection is conveyed. According to Naiyāyika-s the sentence meaning is only the mutual relation of the word meanings. But for Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s the sentence meaning is always conveyed by the secondary power of words. In a sentence the isolated words are by themselves unintelligible since they refer to the generic form without any syntactic relation. This is against the very function of the
sentence that is conveying a unified sense. So it is the general sense of the words which through secondary implications gives the particular senses consisting in mutual syntactic relation. The abhihitānvaya theory finds justification by the following factors:

if the words of a sentence have no separate meanings of their own, their classification into nouns, adjectives, verbs etc. has no meaning. Further without a previous understanding of the words one cannot understand the meaning of a sentence.

Lakṣaṇā

Each word has a meaning or a normal and primary referent. But it is common in all languages to use a word to denote a referent other than its normal one but in some way connected with it either through similarity or through some other relation. This secondary significative function of words is called lakṣaṇā or upacāra. Other terms used are gauṇi vṛtti and bhakti. There are three
essential conditions generally accepted by the later ālankārikās necessary in a lakṣaṇā. They are

1) the inapplicability or the unsuitability of the primary meaning in the context,

2) some relation between the primary and the actual referent of the word and

3) sanction for the transferred sense by popular usage, or a definite motive justifying the transfer.

Of these while the first two are accepted by all writers third one is given great prominence only by literary critics. The term upacāra is applied by Gautama in his Nyāyasūtra. He gives a list of ten relations between the actual referent and the normal referent. Patañjali also discusses four such relations with examples as

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62 Kāvyaparakāśa,II.9:

mukhyārthatadhe tadyoge rudhito’rtha prayojanāt
anyo’rtho lakṣyate yat sā lakṣaṇāropitā kriyā
location, quality, proximity and association. Later Nāgeśa added one more relation named purpose to the four given by Patañjali.

In all cases of metaphorical transfer of meaning there should be some intimate relation between the primary and the actual referents. Based on the degree of this intimacy three kinds of laksanās are identified. They are jahallakṣapaṇā, ajahallakṣapaṇā and jahadajahallakṣapaṇā.

In some cases if we take the primary meaning of the words in a sentence the syntactical relation between the terms will not be intelligible. In such cases we may have to accept another sense connected with it to suit the context. This type of laksanā is called jahallakṣapaṇā. Another term used by Mammaṭa is laksanalakṣapaṇā.

The primary sense is not completely excluded in all cases of metaphorical transfer. Instead of substantially modifying the
primary sense it is only specified by context, restricted by syntactic function or extended by the inclusion of another sense. In all such cases the secondary sense includes the primary sense also. This type of transfer is called \textit{ajahallakṣaṇā}. Mammaṭa calls it \textit{upādānalakṣaṇā}.

The third variety of \textit{lakṣaṇā} called \textit{jahadajahallakṣaṇā} was added to this list by Vedāntins. Here only a part or an aspect of the primary meaning is preserved and the rest is rejected.

In a forth type of transfer the relation between the primary and the actual reference is not direct but indirect through some other word. It is called \textit{lakṣītalakṣaṇā}. According to the modern Naiyāyikās this also could be included under \textit{jahallakṣaṇā}.

\textit{Śuddhā, Sāropā and Sādhyavasānā}

Another classification of \textit{lakṣaṇās} was given by
Mukulabhaṭṭa in his *Abhidhāvṛttiṃāṭṛkā*. It is based on the degree of distinction between the primary and the real reference. The *lakṣaṇa* is called *suddhā* or pure type when the actual referent appears to be clearly distinct from primary referent. When the difference is not clear and there is superimposition one on the other it is called *sāropā*. The *lakṣaṇa* is called *sādhyavasānā* when the apparent closeness of the two referent is so great that there is no apprehension of the difference at all.

It is seen that Bharata initiated discussions on meaning much before Bhartṛhary. Though the discussions were based on aesthetics, they also form a part of semantic aspects of even visual arts.

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63 *Abhidhāvṛttiṃāṭṛkā*, p.9

*tatāsthe lakṣaṇaḥ suddfā syād āropas tv adūrāge*

*nigṛṣṇe dhyavasānaṁ tu rūḍhy āsannataratvataḥ.*