A Study of Islamic Perspective on Contemporary Civilizational Issues

CHAPTER 4

Islamic Responses
Islamic Responses

Islamic history received a major blow whenever the war against Islam through attacks on the principal doctrines of God, the Qur'ân, prophethood, jurisprudence, law, heritage, Islamic view of man, the world and life, nations, leadership, scholars and armies was fought¹ and oil was added into the fire when doubts were raised about their actions and motives.

If we look over the last two and a half centuries, we can come across the fact that the predominant challenge that Muslims faced was the invasion of foreign powers as held by Khurshid Ahmad².

Islamic responses to the West during the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty first century C.E. was a rather effective phenomenon both geographically and politically. Islam dramatically re-emerged³ in Muslim politics across the Islamic and non-Islamic world. Islam has always played a vital role in politics and encourages Muslims for more active and widespread involvement. Consequently, political phenomenon has been rooted in a deeper, widespread and profound religious response which has encompassed both the personal and the political sphere⁴.

³ J. L. Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam, p. 10.
⁴ Ibid., p. 11.
The resistance to Western expansion and internal decline gave birth to vigorous Islamic responses and reactions. These responses clashed with the European imperial expansion\(^1\) due to the neglect of the voice of Islam\(^2\) in the West.

Khurshid Ahmad states,

> The close contact of the West, particularly through colonial rule is relevant but not the most decisive factor in producing the Islamic response. Muslims constitute one-fifth of the human race, [more than] 900-1000 million in all parts of the world. There are forty-nine independent Muslim states. If they want to reconstruct their socio-economic order according to the values of Islam, it is bound to come into conflict with the international status quo. So conflict is there\(^3\).

These current Islamic responses have increased emphasis upon religious observances like prayer offerings, fasting, paying zakah to the needy, outlawing of crime, alcohol, gambling, etc, contribution to media, the proliferation of religious literature, birth and re-birth of Muslim organizations, student associations, *da'wah* (invitation) movements and most of all to Islamize the Muslim population\(^4\) by deepening their knowledge of and commitment to Islam.

---

The Islamic responses have always attracted attention and thus Islamic symbols, slogans, ideology and actors have become prominent fixture in Muslim politics.

There is a huge misconception about Islamic responses and that is these are considered to be a reaction to the technological development of the West\(^1\) and the "pressure of modernity"\(^2\). Modernization theorists have since long argued that "modern means being Western"\(^3\). Their main goal is to draw a sharp distinction between traditional and modern societies\(^4\) and for that reason they advocate implementation of Western models\(^5\) all over the world as the need of the hour. But "instead of curing the ill of underdevelopment", as stated by Noorbaksh, "these prescriptions have exacerbated the problems of development and disappointed their advocates"\(^6\).

According to writers diverse Muslim responses took place in the form of literature, Islamic modernism, reformation, contribution in various fields including media, rejection and reaction.


4.1 Literary Responses

The twentieth century C.E. has seen various thinkers (S. A. A. Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Iqbal, Ismail Raji al-Faruqi, Taha Husayn, Hassan al-Banna, Dr Shariati, Imam Khomeini and others) on Islam whose ideas have had a wide impact on their contemporaries as well as on this scholar’s contemporaries (S. H. Nasr, Hasan al-Turabi, Sayyid Vali Nasr, Qaddafi, Khurshid Ahmad and many others). The writings of all have been preferred in providing a comprehensive Islamic vision with their direct challenge to existing institutions and establishments.

Literary responses have inspired numerous movements throughout the Muslim world. In the words of Yvonn Y. Haddad, “They have captured the imagination and the commitment of young Muslims and transferred them into working for the cause of Islam in the world”.

4.4.1. Contribution through Writings: Books

Abdul Ali

1. Islamic Legacy to Life Sciences, Delhi: Idarah Adabiyat, 1993.
   This book discusses Life Sciences in an Islamic Approach and their place in Islam.

Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina


---

This is an analytical narrative work which clearly describes all aspects of democracy in Islam and how is it applicable in modern times.


The author discusses the notion of *al-sultân al-âdil* (the Just Ruler), who would assume political power to bring about the just order, came to be accentuated, with special reference to Iran.

**Ahmad S. Moussalli**


This book discusses the ideology and thought of both moderate and radical Islamic fundamentalists.

**Akbar S. Ahmad**


This book tells us about the presence of Islam in every part of the world.


This book tells us about the diversity of Islam and how can it help us in making our society and work for our history.
   
   This book discusses Islam vis-à-vis globalization and postmodernity.

   
   This book discusses the creation of Pakistan and about the man behind it.

   
   This book discusses about postmodernism as a difficult situation and Islam a promise to fulfill.

   
   This is about the models, economic development, and reinforcement of ideology, order, ideology, morality, different segmentary societies and their problems of definition in Pakistan.

Aly Khorshid

   
   This book discusses Islamic Banking with special approach towards Islamic Insurance.

Asghar Ali Engineer

1. *Islam and Sexual Equality*, When women were so aware of their rights in the time of the Prophet صلی الله علیه و سلم and were active on religious and social fronts, how can they remain passive today and
accept the role assigned to them by the orthodox ‘ulamā’ who refuse to take into account the new socio-economic dynamics?


This book discusses how Muslim women can present themselves in modern society.

Fatima Mernissi


The author makes clear that modern Muslims are not afraid of Western ideas, nor of democracy at all.


The author discusses the special rights Islam has given to women of all ages.

Ibn Warraq


The author understood the notions of Islam and misrepresentations specifically by Salman Rushdie and tried to clear them with providing the original sources.

Louay M. Safi


This book provides a systematic analysis of the Qur’ānic reference and the prophetic traditions on peace and war.
M. A. Muqtedar Khan

This book discusses those Muslims engaged in jihad over Jerusalem and their place at international level.

M. J. Akbar

This book discusses the components associated with jihad like the joys of death: a bargain with Allah, Islam in danger zone, circle of Hell, Jinnah and Usama and the Christian Holy Sea and Pepper.

Mahmoud Sadri & Ahmad Sadri

The author discusses the theological approaches of Islamic revival and reform, life and virtue, the sense and essence of secularism, reason and freedom, doctrine and justification and the need to learn from history.

Mishal Fahm Al-Sulami

The author delineates the differences between the Western democracy and the system of shura in Islam with special reference to Hasan al-Turabi.
Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi & Ashur A. Shamis


The author writes about the qualities and personality of an Islamic political leader through discussion with Hasan al-Turabi.

Naser I. Faruqui


The author describes the diversity of Islam specifically management of water system through conservation, environment, reuse, demand and water trade.

Osman Bakar


The author describes the types of knowledge in Islam and the benefit in studying the classified sources.


This is a collection of essays about science and Islamic Science.

Sayyid Hussein Nasr

1. *An Annotated Bibliography of Islamic Science*.

It is an edited work and presents the availability of material on Islamic Science.

466
2. *An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines.*
   This is a doctoral dissertation about Islamic Cosmology.

3. *Islamic Life and Thought,* 1981.
   This discusses that religion is above reason.

4. *Islamic Science: An Illustrative Study.*
   This contains the history, development and expansion of Islamic Science.

   This gives the evidence of Islamic Spirituality.

   This discusses the relationship between knowledge and its transmittance.

   This discusses the notion of nature and traditional Cosmology.

   This discusses the place and importance of Science and Technology in Islam.

   This discusses the consequences of environmental crisis.

    This book is about Muslim intellectuals in Persia.

    In this book the author stresses upon the need of Islamic Science.

   This book stresses young Muslims to understand religion and respond to the Muslim world.


   The author feels the need of Islamic Science.

**Sayyid Vali Reza Nasr**


   This discusses about the urgent need of an Islamic State.


   This book discusses Mawdudi as the man behind Islamic revivalism and the need of personalities like him.

**Sayyid Waqar Ahmad Husaini**

1. *Economics in the Quran: Indexes and Introduction*.

   This contains an index of Economics in the Qur'ân with some introduction.

2. *Islamic Thought in the Rise and Supremacy of Islamical technological Culture*.

   This book discusses the importance of Islamic Technological Culture in Islam.
3. Quran for Astronomy and Earth Exploration from Space.  
   This describes Astronomy and Earth Exploration from space with reference to Qur'ân.

   This provides the index of engineering of water resources in the Qur'ân and explanations of selected passages.

Shahram Akbarzadeh & Abdullah Saeed

   This book is about the political dimensions of Islam.

Tareq Y. Ismael

   This book discusses the vision of art from Muslim perspective.

Tariq Ramadan

   This book discusses the failure of Muslims in the West and their future.

Wael B. Hallaq

   This book discusses Islamic law and its implications.
Zaheer Baber

   This book gives the full detail of implantation of the Western-Scientific Institutions in the colonized subcontinent.

Ziauddin Sardar

   This book is about the future of knowledge in an Islamic environment.

2. *Beyond the Disease Model of mental Disorders.*
   This book deals with the psychiatric issues; their implications and treatment.

3. *Blinded Eye.*
   The author tells us about the working of a human eye and its blindness.

   This book is about the need of information network in Islamic world.

   This book makes reader feel the need to explore space in the light of Qur'ân.
6. **Distorted Imagination Lessons from the Rushdie Affair.**

   This book discusses distorted Muslim images throughout the world after Salman Rushdie affair.

7. **Explorations in Islamic Science (Islamic Futures and Policy Studies).**

   The author has discussed science as knowledge and the need to implement it in Muslim society.

8. **Information and the Muslim World: A Strategy for the Twenty-First Century.**

   This urges Muslims to attain knowledge and work accordingly.

9. **Introducing Chaos.**

   This book is about “Confusion”.

10. **Introducing Islam.**

    This is an introductory book on Islam.

11. **Introducing Learning and Memory.**

    This book analyzes learning and memory.

12. **Introducing Mathematics.**

    This is about Mathematics.

13. **Introducing Media Studies.**

    This is about the need of Islamic media.

14. **Introducing Muhammad.**

    This is about the dynamic personality of the last Messenger of Islam, Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم.
15. *Introducing Science Studies.*

This book is about the need of introducing Science as a subject in Islamic approach.

16. *Islam, Outline of a Classification Scheme.*

This enhances the need of contemporary classification scheme on Islam.

17. *Islamic Futures: The Shape of Ideas to Come (Islamic Futures and Policy Studies).*

This book gives the future alternatives of Muslim societies applying system analysis.


This book discusses various aspects of the life of last Messenger of Islam, Muhammad ﷺ.

19. *Orientalism (Concepts in the Social Science).*

This book is a short history about Orientalism.

20. *Postmodernism and the Other.*

This book describes the relationship between postmodernists and non-postmodernists.


The author warns Muslims to be conscious about their future.

22. *Science and Technology in the Middle East.*

This book discusses the need of science in the Middle East and its promotion in the area.

This book describes how Muslims can develop through science and technology but with an Islamic approach.


This book discusses the future of Muslim Civilization.


This book discusses environment in the view of Islam and the West.

26. *Why Do People Hate America?*

This book gives the reasons as to why America is the centre of hatred?

### 4.1.2 Contribution through Writings: Articles

**Akbar S Ahmed**

1. “Islam and Freedom of Thought”, Akbar Ahmed and Lawrence Rosen, “What was once an occasional event — silencing scholars — increasingly has become a way of life in most Muslim countries. From South Asia to North Africa, an entire generation of Muslim intellectuals is at this moment under threat: Many have already been killed, silenced, or forced into exile”.

2. “Islam and Judaism”, Akbar S. Ahmed celebrates the Jewish contribution to humanity and the shared core belief in the one Omnipotent, Universal God.
3. "Muslims in the West", Akbar S Ahmed considers the younger generation, the American versus the European Experience plus Muslim integration in Western nations.

The author discusses Islamic leaders and Muslim leadership in the coming future.

The author describes Jinnah as the man who felt the need of Pakistan.

The author describes as to how Muslims are being deprived off from their rights all over.

The author talks about the Islamic architecture.

Asghar Ali Engineer

The author presents an approach and a model for Islamic world to arise.
   The author gives the detail as to for what reasons, the World Trade Centre has been attacked.
   The author feels the need of *da’wah* through dialogue.
   The author discusses sexual equality in Islam within a particular context.
   The author describes modernism in Muslim world.
   The author defines the meaning of worship in Islam and its need.
   The author discusses the means and need of peace in the world.
   The author discusses the need of methodology in understanding Qur'ân.
   The author discusses religious and intercultural dialogue.
The author describes application of *jihad* in various different perspectives.

11. "Plurality or Polarity?"
The author discusses about pluralism.

The author discusses about Islamic approach towards politics.

13. "Islam and Pluralism"
The author discusses about pluralism in Islam.

Hasan Turabi

The author describes the meaning of democracy in Islam.

The author warns about the danger of Civil War in Sudan.

Muhammad Zaki Kirmani

The author criticizes science.

The author gives detail of contemporary science in an Islamic perspective.

   The author talks about the place of science in religion.

   The author feels the need of Islamic Science and the need of its implantation.

   The author feels the need of debates on Islamic Science.

   The author illustrates a new framework for Islamic Sciences.

   The author talks about various issues in Islamic Science.

   The author feels the need of Muslims in Science and Technology.
The author talks about the new ideologies on science.

The author talks about various aspects of Islamic Science and its limitations.

The author says that Islamic Civilization can flourish through Muslim scientists.

The author feels the need of Islamic Science and Technology.

The author discusses the place of science in the Qur'an.

The author discusses the place of science in the Qur'an.

The author discusses the need of science but within limitations.

478
Nasr Abu-Zayd
The author talks about Qur’ân and its literary approach.

Sayyid Hussein Nasr
The author discusses Muslims between Islam and Science.
The author discusses about the civilization and the need of hard work for development.
The author discusses the contributions of Ibn Sina in Science and Philosophy.
The author discusses the mistakes of the Muslim World.
4.2 Contribution through Media

Peace TV: “The Solution for Humanity”, 24-hour ‘spiritual entertainment’ international satellite TV-channel. The TV channel has been launched by IRF (Islamic Research Foundation), Mumbai, India. The main features are mentioned below:

1. Telecasting ‘Free to Air’ state-of-the-art TV programmes in English and Urdu.
2. Backed by the best available Media Technology, Creativity, Research, Programmes, Software and Operational Management.
3. Quest for promoting Truth, Justice, Morality, Harmony and Wisdom for the whole of Humankind.
4. The channel is received in more than 125 countries across Asia, Middle East, Europe, Africa and Australia. Very shortly the channel would be provided to the rest of the world as well.
5. The TV programmes feature internationally famous scholars and orators on religion and humanity like Dr Zakir Naik (India), Maulana Parekh (India), Dr Israr Ahmad (Pakistan), Dr Bilal Philips (Canada), Yassir Fazaga (U.S.A.), Abdur Raheem Green (U.K.), Hussain Ye (Malaysia), Dr Jaffar Idris (Sudan), Salem Al-Amri (UAE), Jamal Badawi (U.S.A.) and many others.

Some of the programmes telecasted by the channel are:

1. Dare to Ask
2. Crossfire
3. The Truth Exposed
4.3 Rejection and Reaction

Rejection means to reject the direct / indirect European colonialism and fight to defend and defeat the infidel — the enemies of Islam. Muslims simply refused to deal with their colonial masters. With the result rejection gave birth to reaction, many movements in action arose against the West especially the U.S. but in the global perspective the scholar tends to throw some light on two most important 'reactionary' movements of the late twentieth and beginning of twenty-first centuries C.E., i.e., Iran as a ‘moderate’ Islamic movement and al-Qa’idah as a ‘radical’ Islamic movement. Let us discuss them briefly.

---

4.3.1 Iran

Before the Islamic Revolution of Iran, as per Richard, Iran was nominally a constitutional monarchy based on the 1906 C.E. constitution and the supplementary constitution of 1907 C.E. that was adopted after the constitutional revolution of 1905 C.E. – 1906 C.E.¹

4.3.1.1 Islamic Revolution

Kaleem Siddiqui comments:

History does not move in leaps and bounds. Revolutions occur a long time after the development of new ideas. New ideas are first talked about among the few, then among the many before reaching the masses. New ideas are also tried out at various levels over long periods of time. This leads to the accumulation of experience. Gradually this build-up pressures for change. A new leadership begins to emerge. A deep sense of failure and frustration with things as they are is among the important building blocks of history. These building blocks begin to fall in place when mixed with a long history of past achievements, a prolonged sense of failure, a deep sense of loss, a strong memory of a golden era, and an even stronger sense of unfulfilled expectations. In the case of Muslims all these conditions have existed for a long time. An additional dimension of the Muslim mind and belief is an unshakeable confidence that no matter how deep their present

descent into decadence may be, Islam will eventually triumph over all other cultures, ways of life, systems, theories and philosophies\textsuperscript{1}.

Islamic Revolution, like any revolution is an event. It may also be described as a compound of many related events taking place simultaneously at all levels of a society. The Islamic Revolution is that point in time when changes in the outlook, values and preferences of a people, assiduously brought over a long period of time, suddenly change their collective behaviour as well. The mood of the populace demands and secures total changes in the values of the society, its structure and leadership. The old order is destroyed and a new order is established. The destruction of the old order is important, otherwise its germs may survive and penetrate the new order and seek to destroy it from within. Leadership must change hands totally and irrevocably. New institutions are created to define and defend the new values of the society. The collective effect of all these changes are consolidated in the structure of the Islamic State\textsuperscript{2}.

The revolution in Iran, as per writers, can be seen in terms of three periods: the prerevolutionary period\textsuperscript{3} — the long period before 1978; second, the first half of 1978 C.E.; and, third, the second half of 1978 C.E.\textsuperscript{3} The late 1960s and early 1970s dealt with political institutions meant to


\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 79.

keep pace with the rapid political, economic, and social change in the country\textsuperscript{1}, which the Shah overcame with his White Revolution.

The paradoxical and mixed nature of the political and social system in Iran is best reflected in its founder, Ayatullah Ruhullah Khomeini. Throughout the 1980s, Khomeini assumed the role of primus inter pares, and, as a result, this period has become known as the 'Khomeini decade'. Khomeini, as per writers, was a classic charismatic leader. As Muslims put it, he possessed \textit{barakah} (the gift of God's blessing). As one of his followers, Moghaddam Maraghe'i, notes, "In 1,400 years, Khomeini is an exception"; or as Makarem-Shirazi put it, "Several centuries may pass before a man with his superior qualities and characteristics and conditions of time and place, arise again"\textsuperscript{2}. As Arjomand explains, the revolutionaries accepted the "portrayal of the shah as the Anti-Christ and concomitantly took refuge in the comforting discovery of Khomeini as the messianic counter-image"\textsuperscript{3}. At various times he has been called the "Lofty Spirit", the "Idol Smasher", the "Unveiler of Secrets", the "Mahdi" (messiah) and even the "Father of the Islamic Revolution". Indeed, upon his death, massive crowds could be heard to chant, "We have been orphaned. Our Father is

\textsuperscript{1} Harold Saunders, "Iran: a View from the State Department", p. 222.


dead”. But of all the titles associated with Khomeini, the most important one has been that of Imam.

With the return of Khomeini from exile on February 1, 1979 C.E., in Iran, people fully expected revolutionary fervor would subside, that Khomeini would gracefully revert to the normal pattern of a prestigious religious scholar offering moral guidance to political leaders, and moreover the country would be governed by liberal and progressive personalities (members of the National Front). Khomeini, as noted, had a vision of the future of Iran that placed religious leaders at the very heart of political life and he had the overwhelming support of the masses of people. No one could even guess that he had come with an idea of the Islamic Revolution as inferred by Elton L. Daniel.

But for Ayatullah Khomeini, the concept of revolution was nothing more than restoration of the Islamic government that existed during the rule of Prophet Muhammad صلی الله علیه وسلم and during the pious caliphate starting from the seventh century C.E.

Ayatullah Ruhullah Khomeini, in September 1979 said:

I cannot believe and I do not accept that any prudent individual can believe that the purpose of all these sacrifices was to have less expensive melons, that we sacrificed our young men to

---


have less expensive housing. . . . No one would give his life for better agriculture. Dignity is better than full bellies. Iranian masses have fought only for God not for worldly affairs.

However, Khomeini was equally concerned about economic and strategic development of Iran. As Val Moghadam feels free to interpret this revolution as more economic, cultural, ideological and unique. The same view was held by various leaders of the revolution as well. Beginning with Ayatullah Khomeini who on October 1979 said:

They [left] did not contribute anything. They did not help the revolution at all. . . . They were not decisive for the victory, they were not responsible, they did not contribute anything. . . . for Islam. The people fought for Islam.

The entire discourse of Khomeini encouraged the powerful idea of Wahdat-i-Islam (Islamic unity) that was, in effect, an intense spotlight that illuminated one of the two logics of Islamic Revolution. The revolutionaries, as per writers, tasked for higher religious purposes and not simply their narrow national interests. M. Burns in his book, Leadership,

\footnote{From two speeches on Tehran Radio, September 8, 1979 and September 12, 1979, texts in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), September 10, 1979 and November 13, 1979, quoted in Hossein Zafarian, “Analytical Approach to Correlation Between Marxism and Iran’s Islamic Revolution”, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of International Relations, Claremont Graduate School, 1984, p. 162.}


states, "Khomeini’s value-driven leadership aimed at raising the Muslim Ummah to higher levels of motivation and autonomy"\(^1\). Islamic unity was the chief policy of the revolution as can be deduced from the following statement by Khomeini:

Muslims must be in unison with us. They should cooperate and integrate themselves with us. They should consider Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, Indonesia, and other Islamic lands as a single entity\(^2\).

The strength of the Islamic Revolution was its being, as noted by Peter, "deeply rooted" in the society and therefore a "permanent feature" of the region. Moreover the social groups were totally anti-American and called it by the name of, in the words of Khomeini, "Great Satan"\(^3\).

The younger generation of Iran was influenced by the writings of the great scholars including Mehdi Bazargan, Ayatullah Mutahhari, Ayatullah Taleqani, Shariat Madari and Dr. Ali Shariati. Their writings generated fervor for change within the sociopolitical structure. They were fundamental to this revolution both in terms of offering a model for change and designing strategy and organization for its success. The role of those thinkers was so crucial that Ayatollah Khomeini took their strategic


advice in framing the vision of Iranian government and Islamic Revolution.

The revolution, as per writers, had promised to create an economically developed and independent Iran in which the fruits of economic growth and prosperity were to have been combined with equity and social justice. Civil liberties as well as the right of citizens to petition their government through the formation of voluntary associations and political parties were supposed to have been assured. Above all, however, both government and society were to have become morally uplifted through piety and strict compliance with the dictates of Islam.

The revolution's goals emphasized the necessity of reclaiming lost cultural heritage, reincorporating concepts and practices from past traditions and promoting the notion of Islamic authenticity. The ultimate hope was the creation of a new Islamic society ruled by Islamic laws and precepts.

On the domestic side, the goals, as described, stressed the achievement of three interrelated desiderata: social justice (with a strong emphasis on justice for the underclass), economic self-sufficiency (autarky),

---

3 Farhad Kazemi, "The Precarious Revolution: Unchanging Institutions and the Fate of Reform in Iran Iranian Politics Is a System Made by the Clerics for the Clerics, and for Their Supporters Who Possess a near Monopoly on the Spoils of the Revolution and the Country's Resources", Journal of International Affairs, Vol.: 57, Issue: 1, Columbia University School of International Public Affairs, 2003, p. 82.

488
and the proper economic balance of public enterprise, private initiative and cooperative ventures. In the foreign policy arena, the proclaimed goal was to ensure an independent foreign policy that was not tied to the rules and dictates of the superpowers or other dominant states. The proposed foreign policy maxim and the guide for behavior was the concept of "Neither East Nor West, Only Islam". The interests of the Islamic state and its self-reliance were to serve as guiding norms. A corollary foreign policy objective, as per analysis, was to export the ideas of the Islamic Revolution to the world at large and to target the Muslim masses in particular.

The universal Islamic ideology based on Khomeini's vision helped thrust Iran into the forefront of world Islamic politics. The revolutionaries, as per Graham, fanned out over the entire Muslim world after the revolution, propounding the message of universal justice, and the struggle against imperialism, "global arrogance", and oppression. Moreover, Iran organized a whole series of regional and international conferences designed to "analyze the predicament of the Islamic world from the Philippines to Africa and even to the Muslims in Latin America in order to develop a common ideology and strategy".

1 Farhad Kazemi, "The Precarious Revolution: Unchanging Institutions and the Fate of Reform in Iran Iranian Politics Is a System Made by the Clerics for the Clerics, and for Their Supporters Who Possess a near Monopoly on the Spoils of the Revolution and the Country's Resources", pp. 82-83.

During the Cold War the Islamic Revolution maintained an "equidistance" from both superpowers and that was the clearest expression of an emerging multipolar world which divested itself of the omnipresent superpower parameters\(^1\).

As per writers, Khomeini did not choose sides in the Cold War competition not because of an equal distaste of both superpowers, as noted by writers; Khomeini always regarded the United States as a step worse than the then Soviet Union, although ideologically speaking, "he was more of an anti-communist than an anti-capitalist"\(^2\). One of the most important aspects of Khomeini's ideological leadership, as per Afrasiabi, was that he wanted to make Iran into the focus of a brave new Islamic world and that was to unshackle its subordinate status and compete as a "moral superpower"\(^3\).

Inspite of the fact that Iran was chosen as the principal instrument of Western security policy in the Persian Gulf against Iraq the shah's arrogant personal pro-Arab style on the Arab-Israeli issue by the mid-

---


1970's created tensions in Iran’s relations with its Western allies. Iran to the West was then a more of a nuisance than an asset\textsuperscript{1}.

With the result the West did not feel the need of Iran as much as it did in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As Hunter puts it, "In short, by the time of the revolution, Iran’s foreign policy orientation and its over activism were resented at home and created serious tensions in its relations with both its allies and its enemies"\textsuperscript{2}.

The foreign policy of Iran by the time of the Islamic Revolution was its strategic, political, and economic alliance with the West, especially the United States\textsuperscript{3}. Iran had succeeded in stabilizing its relations with the then Soviet Union through economy. A direct Soviet threat to Iran’s security, whether in the form of military incursion or active subversion, had diminished\textsuperscript{4}.

In late July 1985 C.E., Ayatullah Ruhullah Khomeini issued new guidelines for Iranian foreign policy, lamenting that Iran’s international friends could be “counted on the fingers of two hands”. There was no hint of a specific overture to the United States; however, as per Dilip, Khomeini said that if the Reagan Administration would accept the Islamic

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 105.
\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 102
\textsuperscript{4} Idem
Revolution as a firm reality, there were grounds for the two countries to talk\(^1\).

Thus the Islamic Revolution played a major role in changing Iran’s foreign relations considerably. It was due to the revolution that the ideological and universalist — as opposed to statist and nationalist — dimensions of its foreign policy were enhanced. The writers deduce that the primary and declared objective of Iran’s foreign policy — at least its stated goal was the spread of Islam vis-à-vis safeguarding the interests of the Islamic community, leaving national interests aside and creating a new Islamic order\(^2\). It was in this very context that Ayatollah Khomeini commented, “America cannot do a damned thing”\(^3\).

The revolution, as per writers, was ground in a ‘baldly’ anti-Western ideology due to the open mobilization against the Arab-Israeli peace process and the death threat against Salman Rushdie\(^4\).

Iran’s Islamic Republic as held by many of the Western writers is the modern world’s first and most celebrated example of conversion to theocracy. However, Islamic Revolution is ruled by elected representatives almost the same way as any of the celebrated democracies

---


492
in East or the West and it may be too gross a generalization to term it as a “theocracy”. Critics and supporters of Islam both cite Iran as an example of an Islamic government in action. The country is called by some a moderate force for stability in the region, and by others an “international outlaw” and a “dangerous state”1.

4.3.1.2 Iran, America and the West

The United States has objected to a variety of policies conducted by the revolutionary Iranian regime during the ‘Khomeini’ period, and, in turn, Iran’s Islamic Republic has consistently viewed America as an imperialist evil-doer deserving the name of “the Great Satan”2.

The Muslim world views the United States as the chief source of “imperialist oppression” over the past many decades, supplanting the British, and even the Russians in this capacity and Iran as per writers held the same vision of the United States which reflected the ideology of the leaders, who saw American culture as the single greatest threat to Islamic government and way of life3.

---


3 Graham E. Fuller, *The “Center of the Universe”* The Geopolitics of Iran, p. 248.
It is noted that the United States still remains the chief challenger to Iranian power in the region in any case. The United States is also the most likely power to intervene in the flow of oil from the region¹.

Global oppression by the West inspires a struggle with it for cultural supremacy. Members of Islamic revivalism and resistance see the rivalry as cultural and not merely political. “It is a struggle of cultures”, Islamists explain, “not one between strong countries and weak countries. We are sure that the Islamic culture will triumph”². But how is this victory to be achieved? By producing better music or coming up with a cure for, cancer or Aids? Hardly, as Kaleem Siddiqui, the pro-revolutionary spokesman in London, vividly said: “American GIs clutching photos of their girlfriends would be no match for the soldiers of Islam clutching copies of the Koran [Qur’ân] and seeking *shahadah* [martyrdom]”³. Islam will triumph, in other words, through will and steel as held by Daniel Pipes⁴.

The US involvement in Iran became part of the US global strategy after World War II, when Iran became one of the many cockpits of the

---

¹ Graham E. Fuller, *The “Center of the Universe” The Geopolitics of Iran*, p. 248


East-West struggle\(^1\). The U.S. relationship with Iran, as per strategists, was originally perceived as another third power relationship. This relationship was designed to buffer British and Russian influences, starting in the constitutional period of the early 1900s. By the end of World War II, however, the United States was coming gradually to replace Britain as the chief foreign state of recourse to protect Iran internationally\(^2\).

But the Europeans have a bit different attitude towards Iran\(^3\). They continuously, as per reports, called Iran for a “critical dialogue” but at the same time urged Iran to behave itself so that the expansion of normal political and economic ties would continue\(^4\).

According to the Jerusalem Report, Europe has a soft line towards Iran because Europe is hungry for export and jobs. “The American view”, as held by Peter, “is that Iran’s intentions are fundamentally hostile and that its economic strength will translate ultimately into a strategic menace”\(^5\).

Thus due to the soft and close ties between the West and Iran after the World War II, the West invaded the Iranian sphere of daily cultural life at the popular level, and bringing about major social and economic changes.

---

\(^1\) Graham E. Fuller, *The Center of the Universe*. *The Geopolitics of Iran*, p. 249.

\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 249-250.

\(^3\) Peter W. Rodman, “Mullah Moola: The U.S. Is Trying to Maintain a Firm Policy toward Iran, but European Loans and Trade Are Undermining It”, p. 67.

\(^4\) Ibid

\(^5\) Ibid., pp. 67-68.
upheavals associated with Westernization, modern media, Western education and technology, and an army of expatriate Americans and others were powerful vehicles for bringing non-Islamic ideas to the heart of the country. With the result there was a crushing dominance of sheer American culture within Iran and this, as per writers, was the greatest challenge of the West to Iran. This gave rise to the view that the United States itself is a greater danger to Islam than any other external power and certainly more than the then Soviet Union could ever be. Since there was only the threat of arms from Moscow whereas, as Charles P. Wallace put it, "There was no cultural threat at all from Moscow through which Soviet life was an enticement to Iranians as a whole. The United States, on the other hand, did represent a major cultural threat to Islam: American popular culture, secularist attitudes, emphasis on individualism over society, pursuit of self-gratification, lax and permissive sexual mores, and consumerist-oriented life-style, and the internationally pervasive character of the American media — all insinuated itself into Iran where it was often accepted as an eagerly sought commodity. Iranian students and Westernized elite were being seduced away from [their] Islamic cultural and traditional values through attraction to American-style life". As Ayatullah Khomeini stated in his will read after his death:

1 Graham E. Fuller, The "Center of the Universe" The Geopolitics of Iran, p. 252.
One of the conspiracies that has had a great influence in various countries including our own dear country — and whose effects to a large extent still remain — is the alienation of colonized countries from their own identity, so that they turn toward West or East; so that they see no value in their own culture and their own strengths, while they regard the two powerful blocs as a superior race with a superior culture; so that they regard these two powers as the point the whole world should turn toward. . . .

A more tragic fact is [the two blocs] have kept the oppressed and dominated countries behind in every way and have turned them into consumer countries. They have so overawed us with their progress and their Satanic tricks that we do not dare to take any initiative. We have surrendered everything we have to them, and we have entrusted our fates and the fates of our countries into their hands. . . .

[Our leaders] should prevent the import of wasteful and home-destroying commodities. . . . I ask all the young people. . . to preserve their independence, freedom and human values, even through hardship and toil, and not to respond to the call of the tyrants of arrogance and their decadence and obscene ceremonies, who invade you as if you are nationless1.

As Bernard Lewis notes, "It is the Tempter, not the Adversary, that Khomeini feared in America, the seduction and enticement of the

---

1 Khomeini letter to Gorbachev quoted in Charles P. Wallace, "Iran Warms to Soviets — But Not to America", *Los Angeles Times*. 

497
American way of life rather than the hostility of American power”\(^1\). Or, in Khomeini’s own words: “We are not afraid of economic sanctions or military intervention. What we are afraid of is Western universities”\(^2\).

The West, especially the US, had in the past profoundly affected the Middle East by introducing concepts of the modern rational bureaucratic state, political pluralism, social equality, popular electoral franchise, and other political and social values. But, as held by analysts, these same values did not necessarily guide Western behavior in dealings with Iran\(^3\).

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director James Woolsey in 1993 C.E. called Iran “the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism”\(^4\). Moreover, Iran was cursed for its intimate connection with Hezbullah in Lebanon. With the result, in March 1993 C.E., the U.S. State Department declared Iran “the world’s most dangerous sponsor of terrorism”\(^5\). The West raised the slogan that revolution in Iran was not meant for economic betterment, rather it is for Islam\(^6\).

---


3 Graham E. Fuller, *The ‘Center of the Universe’ The Geopolitics of Iran*, p. 252.


As a response, after four to five months of internal debate, the then US president announced on April 30, 1993 C.E. and signed on May 6, 1993 C.E. “an executive order that is an important reinforcement or strengthening of our policy towards Iran”. He announced “[F]rom now on, we will prohibit all trade, trade financing, loans and financial services to Iran. We will ban U.S. companies from purchasing Iranian oil overseas, even if it is for resale overseas. And new investment by American companies in Iran is prohibited”\(^1\). The president’s executive order also banned the re-export to Iran from third countries of those goods or technologies that are on controlled lists for direct export from the United States to Iran. In addition, it prohibited U.S. persons and companies from approving or facilitating transactions with Iran by their affiliates.

Clinton in 1993 C.E. boycotted ties with Tehran and believed in an objective “to counter Iran’s support of international terrorism and, in particular, its backing for the violent opponents of peace in the Middle East”\(^2\). The US imposed the oil embargo and claimed that Iran was hungry for acquiring and developing nuclear weapons and the missiles\(^3\). It is more important to mention that if for some reasons Tehran would have been


\(^3\) Idem
ambitious to develop its own nuclear weapons and long range missiles there was no imminent threat as claimed by reporters\(^1\).

All this was done and more recently is being done because the US, as per analysts, considers Iran as an obstacle to US and Israeli objectives in the Middle East and President Clinton gained credit to acknowledge the 'real' problem is not 'terrorism' but nuclear weapons\(^2\) possessed specifically by Muslim countries.

Toward the end of 2005 C.E., the United States, with its overwhelming nuclear superiority, made it clear to Iran (and North Korea) that any use of nuclear weapons by Iran — whether against the United States or against any U.S. interest, including Israel, Turkey, Afghanistan, or Saudi Arabia — would be met with a nuclear response so overwhelming that it would effectively destroy Iran as a functioning society as inferred by various writers\(^3\).

But the Pentagon, acting under instructions from Vice President Dick Cheney’s office, has already tasked the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) with drawing up a contingency plan to be employed in response to another 9/11-type ‘terrorist’ attack on the United States”, reported former CIA officer Philip Giraldi in the August 1, 2005 C.E., American Conservative. “The plan includes a large-scale air assault

---

1 “US Boycott of Iran Solves Nothing”, *The Middle East*, p. 5.

2 *Idem*

on Iran employing both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons”¹. As per writers it seems that the United States is always looking for excuses to crush all conscious Muslim nations.

Whatever the opinions of pundits in Washington, New York or San Francisco, the view in the Middle East, as reported, will be deeply cynical: that President Clinton had responded to the Oklahoma bombing by striking at Iran, which had absolutely nothing to do with the outrage².

In Iran’s case, the US policy is based on the theory that Tehran will remain an implacable U.S. foe. But, as reported, the strategy of denying sophisticated technology to Iran has been less successful than with Iraq, because the United States has failed to persuade its allies to follow suit. As a result, the Iranians have made major strides in their weapons programs³.

The US has been pressing its allies, especially, Germany, Italy and Korea, to cut off their ties with Iran and has been trying to persuade the World Bank and the IMF to cut funding to Iran, but efforts have not been especially effective⁴.

Although during the summer of 1985 C.E. the White House had provided some arms and had eased its pressure on third parties supplying U.S.-made weapons and parts to Teheran, Iranian leaders, as per reports, were not satisfied. They wanted the release of $300 million worth of

² "US Boycott of Iran Solves Nothing", The Middle East, p. 5.
⁴ Ibid., p. 15.
military supplies for which the Shah had paid but which President Jimmy Carter had blocked in 1979 C.E., during the hostage crisis.

Israel has also been interested in Iran and they according to reports informed US of Iran as a growing threat to Western interests. That threat, however, was bogus, as per writers. What Israel really wanted was U.S. pressure on Iran to stop supporting Hizbollah, the Lebanese Shi‘i political party so that Israel could occupy Southern Lebanon with more ease.

The antagonistic U.S. policy toward this revolution exacerbated the problems because the United States failed to recognize the Iranian Revolution as a needed and genuine change demanded by the masses. The Iranian government showed on several occasions its intention to establish good relations with Washington. But nothing proved fruitful in convincing the United States that the Iranian government was serious about establishing a positive image of Iran and that there were reasonable individuals involved in its politics. Their ‘sin’, as per writers, in the U.S. eyes, was their support for change of government through revolution.

The United States persisted in its rejectionist policies, although Ibrahim Yazdi and others in the provisional government warned

---

1 Dilip Hiro, “Sitting Down with Satan; Why Iran Pursued the Arms Deal”, p, 628.
Washington of the consequences of its actions\(^1\). But Americans have been continuously working hard to make sure that the arms ban, the limits on credit and aid, the ban on support for Iran from international financial institutions, and cooperation with Iran in nuclear matters continue rather than enjoy what they consider to be good support from most of the advanced Western countries in these areas, and would like to see more\(^2\).

Washington right now sees Iran as an unfriendly tyrant, an extremist and rejectionist state with aggressive, expansionist and hegemonic intentions toward its neighbors. Iran’s military buildup is considered beyond its legitimate defense needs. The Islamic Republic’s alleged efforts to acquire chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities are seen as a means of facilitating the export of Islamic Revolution by ‘violent’ means. In a word, Iran is thought ultimately capable of challenging U.S. interests in the Gulf\(^3\).

After the case for war in Iraq instigated confrontation within the United Nations, European countries seem to have joined together in attempting to avoid a repeat of the Iraq showdown between European countries and the United States and Britain. When the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the nuclear watchdog arm of the United Nations, reported that Iran had been engaging in covert enrichment and

\(^{1}\) Mehdi Noorbaksh, “The Middle East, Islam and the United States: the Special Case of Iran”, p. 94.

\(^{2}\) Richard Cottam, Ellen Laipson & Gary Sick, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran: from Containment to Relentless Pursuit?”, p. 2.

\(^{3}\) Jahangir Amuzegar, “Islamic Fundamentalism in Action: the Case of Iran”, p. 31.
reprocessing activities for 18 years, the Bush administration decided that negotiations were too conciliatory. As part of the administration’s more hard-line policy, as defined, it declared Iran part of the “axis of evil”. The United States pressured IAEA to declare Iran in “violation” of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and sought to bring the matter before the UN Security Council, which could authorize economic sanctions and military action. European countries acknowledged Iran’s breaches of nuclear treaties but believed that Iran could be pressured to cooperate. They resisted US diplomatic pressure and sought to obtain Iran’s compliance through economic incentives. In negotiations in Tehran in November 2003 C.E., three European foreign ministers (each from Britain, France and Germany) said that if Iran’s nuclear production is indeed intended for energy production, as the Iranian government claims, their governments would aid in the development of nuclear power for civilian use and strengthen economic ties with Iran. As such, Britain has aligned itself with France and Germany thus far, rather than with the United States as it did on Iraq. Additionally, the three European countries submitted a resolution to the IAEA to force Iran to suspend the enrichment and reprocessing of uranium. In the aftermath of the Iraq war, the powers of Europe seem to have found a way to show unity on the nuclear issues in Iran¹.

The supreme factor of the US policy against Muslims always has been to keep them away from seizing power\(^1\). James Fallows feels his responsibility in claiming, "We [Americans] must recognize their sovereign rights and their legitimate pride"\(^2\). The United States, as per Mehdi Noorbaksh, must realize that the Islamic world is in the midst of a transformation. They proudly adopted Islam as the ideology of their movements and do not hesitate to convey their positive feelings about this choice\(^3\):

Muslims seek to expel the U.S. and its influence from the Middle East, control the oil weapon, and take revenge against the West for centuries of domination. To those ends, they seek not only to expel Americans and Israelis from Muslim lands but to undermine all 'moderate' Arab governments friendly to America (such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia). Iran is the fountainhead of Islamic resistance, lending spiritual as well as material support to the rest of the Muslims in their socio-political revival.

Lastly since the beginning of President Bush’s second term, statements by US officials regarding Iran have indicated a non-peaceful attitude. Following a policy of intimidation and psychological warfare against Iran will, of course, be of no avail, and will not help in the establishment of peace and stability in the region. It should be believed

\(^{1}\) Daniel Pipes, "There Are No Moderates: Dealing with Fundamentalist Iran", pp. 49-50.

\(^{2}\) James Fallows, Arthur Z. Moss, Dan Reiter & Richard Wilson, "Will Iran Be Next?", p. 27.

\(^{3}\) Mehdi Noorbaksh, "The Middle East, Islam and the United States: the Special Case of Iran", p. 95.
that the new US administration needs to do away with its previous unilateral and failed policies against Iran and devise a realistic approach based on mutual respect.

4.3.1.3 Iran as a Global Power

The early 1990s gave birth to a power struggle between Iran and the United States. But the principal support of the mainstream, Arab countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as well as Israel and Turkey went to the US. Iran at the same time gained China, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria, and North Korea, as well as on the solidaristic movements throughout the Muslim World specifically all the Shi'ite groups in Lebanon as its primary supporters. Thereafter Russia was an unknown factor and Iran had lost the then Soviet protective cover which proved to be a profound geostrategic loss; it aggravated the geostrategic vulnerabilities of the country and exposed it to a potential limitless offensive by the Western superpower.

As a result Iran felt the need to establish a better system of alliance, to build a strong defense, and to extend their strategy of non-belligerency to protect themselves against their enemies.

---

2 K. L. Afrasiabi, After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran’s Foreign Policy, pp. 174-175.
3 Ibid., p. 175.
The newspaper *Jamhuri Islami* (The Islamic Republic), as per Adel Darwesh, saw the International sport arena as a dangerous conspiracy against Islam. "The Americans used sports to normalise relations with China and they are using the same tactics with Iran", the author warned. Iran is one of the champions in football but has been banned by the US time and again to participate in World Cup, thereby, weakening the country.

Iran's aim, as per reports, has been to establish a unified regime and support Islamic regimes in the world. Iranian leaders always opposed Arab-Israeli negotiations because they did not want Israel to control over Palestine or any part of it. Iran is one of the few countries in the world that has publicly condemned the 'peace plan', which it holds to be designed by Israel to perpetuate its domination over Palestine. In his October 4, 1993 C.E., speech to the U.N. General Assembly, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati stated: "We consider the signing of this accord as a conspiracy against Islam and Palestine and we disagree with it".

In 1994 C.E., Patrick Clawson and Henry Sokolski worked very hard for about a year on research and prepared a commentary of over 30 of the American nation's leading experts on Iran and nuclear proliferation. The report presented by them focused on Iran's nuclear program as a

---


3 Text of statement by Dr. Velayati before the Forty-Eighth Session of the U.N. General Assembly, October 4, 1993.
persistent danger and catalyst for other states to acquire nuclear weapons options of their own. As stated, “These nuclear programs along with Iran’s would confront the United States and its allies with intolerable long-term security dangers”. The report further remained undecisive and supported neither overt military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities nor suggested to cut a deal with Iran not to make nuclear weapons.

“An enormous amount [of Western technology] is getting through”, says Kenneth R. Timmerman, a former staff expert on the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on arms control, international security and science. According to Timmerman, U.S. policymakers are especially concerned about Iran’s acquisition of so-called “dual use” technology, such as machine tools and computers that encompass both civilian and military applications.

The regime of President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has, in fact, been pragmatic in the sense of its willingness to buy technology from the Western democracies it despises. As a result, Iran has seen its own military and political power rise. It will come as no surprise that Iran has been a major challenge for the Clinton administration’s foreign policy.

---


3 Idem

The response of Iran and of the international community so far indicates a measure of success for the three-state European initiative as complementary to the US approach. After diplomats from Britain, France, and Germany traveled to Tehran, Iran agreed to halt its enrichment of uranium and open suspected nuclear sites to IAEA inspections. Iran's cooperation, of course, may be due mainly to its own interests. Iranian diplomats, who adamantly claim to be developing nuclear technology for civilian power use, are keen on maintaining trade with Europe and avoiding economic sanctions. The European Union has strong trade ties with Iran, which amount to 28 percent of Iran's exports and imports in 2005 C.E. Moreover, Iran may also be seeking to use European conciliation to ward off confrontation with the United States. Still, whatever Iran's motives, greater transparency of Iran's nuclear program is now possible.

The saddest news, as per writers, is that the United States would soon find itself in a crisis with Iran and it will not be a replay of the 1990s where Iran depended specifically on Moscow.

4.3.1.4 Conclusion

Yet, as per strategists, Iran persists the belief that it could by virtue of its civilization and the dynamism of its religious ideology play a crucial

\[^{1}\] Tina Wang, "Conciliation: A New, Clear Iran Policy?", p. 12.

\[^{2}\] Peter W. Rodman, "Mullah Moola: The U.S. Is Trying to Maintain a Firm Policy toward Iran, but European Loans and Trade Are Undermining It", p. 68.
role in reshaping global politics. Of course, the ending of the Cold War somehow weakened Iran but with a new mystique, it has the potential to act as a global actor as held by various writers. Iran has been building up its network of international solidarity, and its ideological appeal has picked up momentum instead of waning.

4.3.2 Al-Qa'idah

Whether the 11 September, 2001 C.E. attacks in the United States were the delayed manifestation as some believe, or whether they were an isolated plan, it is clear that in effect world political situation is fundamentally changed.

4.3.2.1 History, Development, Ideology and Goals

Al-Qa'idah, as reported by writers, is an organization that has established and maintained a multinational presence in more than 50 countries. In addition to many multinational corporations, which have benefited from globalization, al-Qa'idah is also the product and beneficiary of globalization. The organization is said to have fully utilized the fruits of globalization and modernization — including satellite technology, accessible air travel, fax machines, the internet, and other modern conveniences — to advance its agenda. Globalization helped it to be no

---


longer geographically constrained within a particular territory or tied to a particular state. \textit{Al-Qa'\textquotesingle idah} emerged as the ultimate transnational organization\textsuperscript{1}.

\textit{Al-Qa'\textquotesingle idah} (the Base) traces its roots to Afghanistan specifically \textit{Maktab al-Khudmat li'l Mujahidin al-Arab} (MaK), the Afghan Bureau, established between 1982 C.E. and 1984 C.E. The MaK was responsible for co-ordinating the recruitment of "Arab volunteers" to the \textit{Mujahidun}\textsuperscript{2} and the pan-Islamic approach against the invasion of Afghanistan by the then Soviet Union in 1979 C.E. In 1982 C.E., as per reports, Usama ibn Laden, then a young Saudi Arabian national, joined the anti-Soviet \textit{jihad}. He traveled to Afghanistan where, after just a few years, he established his own military camps from which anti-Soviet assaults could be launched. In 1988 C.E., bin Laden and others established \textit{al-Qa'\textquotesingle idah}, as a reporting infrastructure so that relatives of foreign soldiers who had come to Afghanistan to join the resistance could be properly tracked\textsuperscript{3}. In 1989 C.E., the year the Soviets withdrew their last troops from Afghanistan, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia, where he began delivering public lectures about topics that were sensitive to the government — including predictions.


that Kuwait would soon be invaded by Iraq. When his prediction came true, he became bothered when the Saudi government ignored his advice (including offers of military assistance), and instead turned to the United States for military help.

Increasingly unhappy with bin Laden’s public activities and his ‘militant’ views, the Saudi government placed him under house arrest. But soon after, he left for Sudan where he was welcomed by al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah al-Qawmiyah — National Islamic Front (NIF) — leader, Hassan al-Turabi. Bin Laden’s time in Sudan was probably the most important in terms of al-Qa’idah’s development. During this period, al-Qa’idah forged alliances with militant groups from Egypt, Pakistan, Algeria, and Tunisia, as well as with Palestinian jihad and Hamas. Also while in Sudan, al-Qa’idah began to develop its signature transnational modus operandi by engaging in a range of international operations, such as deploying fighters to Chechnya and Tajikistan, establishing satellite offices at Baku in Azerbaijan, and funding affiliates based in Jordan and Eritrea. Under American pressure, however, Sudan wanted bin Laden to leave in 1996 C.E. He and other members of al-Qa’idah relocated their operations.

---

1 Paul J. Smith, “Transnational Terrorism and the Al Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities”, p. 33
3 Ibid., p. 85.
4 Ibid., p. 86.
5 Paul J. Smith, “Transnational Terrorism and the Al Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities”, p. 34.
Based on the concept of al-\textit{Ardu Lillah} (All Earth is for Allah), \textit{al-Qa'\textquotesingle idah} as a truly transnational organization expanded beyond the traditional venue of the Middle East, Western Europe, North America, and South Asia. Increasingly the organization has pursued Southeast Asia as a key basing and staging region as held by reporters. With the result, \textit{al-Qa'\textquotesingle idah} has long cultivated links with groups such as the Philippine-based \textit{Abu Sayyaf} Group and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Indonesian group \textit{Lashkar Jihad}. \textit{Al-Qa'\textquotesingle idah} is also held to have links to region-wide organizations, such as \textit{Jama'ah Islamiyah}\textsuperscript{1}.

\textit{Al-Qa'\textquotesingle idah} has also established links in Africa and South America. In South America, as per reports, the “triple border” area (where Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay — South America, meet) was viewed as a base for such Middle Eastern organizations as \textit{Hizbullah}, \textit{al-Jama'a al Islamiya}, and \textit{Hamas}, all \textit{al-Qa'\textquotesingle idah} constituent or affiliate groups\textsuperscript{2}. The organization has developed strong roots in Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia\textsuperscript{3}.

The United States, as inferred, emerged as a central enemy to \textit{al-Qa'\textquotesingle idah} almost from the beginning of the organization's existence for a variety of reasons, including \textit{al-Qa'\textquotesingle idah}'s unhappiness with US operations in the 1990 C.E. - 1991 C.E. Gulf War and the 1992 C.E. - 1993 C.E.

\textsuperscript{1} Paul J. Smith, “Transnational Terrorism and the Al Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities”, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Idem}

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. *Al-Qa'ida*’s overarching complaint against the United States has centered on its continued military presence in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Arabian Peninsula. To publicize its disdain for the United States, *al-Qa'ida*, as per reports, issued various *fatawa* (verdicts based on Islamic law) urging that US forces should be expelled. Thereafter, the group issued numerous *fatawa* urging that American forces in Muslim countries should be expelled. In 1996 C.E., the group issued a “Declaration of Jihad on the Americans Occupying the Country of the Two Sacred Places” \(^1\), which, as mentioned in reports, urged the expulsion of American forces from the Arabian Peninsula.

*Al-Qa'ida*, as reported, is not merely the wicked witch who just wants to kill Americans because they are “good” and “free”, as their president tells them. Rather, it is an extremely intelligent, ‘ruthless’, and ‘fanatic’ organization with a simple objective — to get America out of the Muslim world\(^2\).

*Al-Qa'ida*, as per writers, yearned for the establishment of unified Islamic *ummah* throughout the world. Early in its existence, *al-Qa'ida* developed the ability to penetrate Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to the point that it was “inseparably enmeshed with the religious, social, and economic fabric of Muslim communities worldwide”\(^3\).

---

Al-Qa'idah's goal, as mentioned, was to unite the whole Muslim world against all anti-Islam. Al-Qa'idah's strength lay in its reliance on a multi-cellular structure, spanning the entire globe, which as per reports gave the organization agility and cover. One French expert once lamented, "If you have good knowledge of the [al-Qa'idah] network today, it's not operational tomorrow"1. He compares its network to a constantly changing virus that is impossible to totally grasp or destroy2.

There is no longer a central hub for Islamists. But the Islamic worldview as practiced by al-Qa'idah is growing stronger and getting more currency every day. This radical internationalist ideology—sustained by anti-Western (anti-colonial, anti-imperial) and anti-Zionist rhetoric — has adherents among many individuals and groups who act in the style of al-Qa'idah, but they are only part of al-Qa'idah in the very loosest sense. That's why Israeli intelligence services now prefer the term "jihadi international" instead of "al-Qa'idah"3.

The central leadership of al-Qa'idah reportedly was small, comprising only some thirty individuals; its strength was derived from its


international network of about twenty-four constituent groups, with cells that spread across some sixty countries\(^1\). As writers have noted, *al-Qa' idah* was developed along "diverse, dispersed nodes who share a set of ideas and interests and who are arrayed to act in a fully internetted 'all-channel' manner"\(^2\). He observes further:

Ideally, there is no central leadership, command, or headquarters—no precise heart or head that can be targeted. The network as a whole (but not necessarily each node) has little to no hierarchy, and there may be multiple leaders. Decision-making and operations are decentralized, allowing for local initiative and autonomy. Thus, the design may appear acephalous (headless), and at other times polycephalous (hydra-headed)\(^3\).

"Vertically, *al-Qa' idah* is organized with the *amir*-general, at the top, followed by other *al-Qa' idah* leaders and leaders of the constituent groups. Horizontally, it is integrated with 24 constituent groups. The vertical integration is formal, the horizontal integration, informal"\(^4\).

Bruce Hoffman of the Rand Corporation has observed: "*Al-Qa' idah* works on multiple levels, which is what makes it such a formidable

---


\(^3\) *Idem*

opponent. Sometimes it operates top-down, with orders coming from the CEO, and sometimes it is a venture-capitalist operation, from the bottom up".

Al-Qa'īdah’s main strengths, as noted, are its dedication and number of volunteers willing to undertake fīdayīn (self-sacrificing) missions, its decentralization, and its popularity in the Muslim world (more than one billion human beings) and even in the Far East. In January, 2005 C.E., the Wall Street Journal reported that polls in Iraq showed that 90 percent regretted that Iraq hadn’t fought America harder and opposed Washington’s policies.

Thus in the words of Jason Burke, “Al Qaeda [al-Qa‘īdah] is a Global Organization”. It is less an organization than an ideology. The Arabic word Qa‘īdah can be translated alternatively as a “foundation”, or a “precept” or “method”. Islamists always understood the term in the latter sense. In 1987 C.E., Abdullah al-Azzâm, the leading ideologue for modern Sunni Muslim radical activists, called for al-Qa‘īdah al-Sulbah (a vanguard of the strong). He envisaged men who, acting independently, would set an example for the rest of the Islamic world and thus galvanize the ummah.

---


2 Jon Basil Utley, “Analyzing Al Qaeda and Protecting America”, p. 34.


517
(global community of believers) against its oppressors. It was the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) — during its investigation of the 1998 C.E. U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa — which dubbed the loosely linked group of activists that Usama bin Laden and his aides had formed as "al-Qa'īdah". This decision was partly due to institutional conservatism and partly because the FBI had to apply conventional antiterrorism laws to an adversary that was in no sense a traditional terrorist or criminal organization.

Islamists' main objective is not conquest, but to beat back what they perceive as an aggressive West that is supposedly trying to complete the project begun during the Crusades and colonial periods of denigrating, dividing, and humiliating Islam. The Islamists' secondary goal is the establishment of the caliphate, or single Islamic state — Global Islamic State — in the lands roughly corresponding to the furthest extent of the Islamic empire of the late first and early second centuries.

The Islamists believe that if all Muslims act according to the Qur'ān and Sunnah, an almost mystical transformation to a just and perfect society will follow.

---


2 Ibid., p. 19.

3 Idem
Radical militants such as bin Laden want to replace the state with something based on a literal reading of the Qur'an. However, other Islamists want to appropriate the structures of the state and, in varying degrees, Islamicize them, usually with a view toward promoting greater social justice and outflanking undemocratic and powerful regimes.

The roots of contemporary Sunni Islamism cannot be reduced to any single, albeit thorny, problem. Islamists feel the ummah is under attack. In their view, Israel is merely the West’s most obvious outpost—as it was when it became a Crusader kingdom in the twelfth century C.E. If the Jewish state disappeared, the Islamists would still fight against direct/indirect occupation and oppression in Chechnya, Kashmir, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, and Algeria. Their agenda is typically determined by local grievances, often with lengthy histories. For instance, although bin Laden was already calling for a boycott of U.S. goods to protest support for Israel in the late 1980s, he had never been involved in an attack on any Israeli target.

"The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Is Central to the Militants’ Cause." Televised images of Israeli troops violently repressing Palestinian protesters in the occupied territories certainly reinforce the

---


2 Idem

3 Idem
Islamists’ key message that the lands of Islam are under attack and that all Muslims must rise up and fight\textsuperscript{1}.

This turn of events should surprise no one. Islamic militancy predates Bin Laden’s activities. He was barely involved in the Islamic resistance of the early 1990s in Algeria, Egypt, Bosnia, and Kashmir. His links to the 1993 C.E. World Trade Center attack were tangential. There were no \textit{al-Qa’idah} training camps during the early 1990s, although camps run by other groups churned out thousands of highly trained Islamists. Even when Bin Laden was based in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, it was often Islamic groups and individuals who sought him out for help, not vice versa\textsuperscript{2}.

\textit{Al-Qa’idah’s} perspective of global issues is receiving immeasurably more support among the masses around the globe than it was some years ago, let alone in 1990 C.E. when he began serious campaigning. It seems to be closer inspite of the West’s deterrence\textsuperscript{3}. \textit{Al-Qa’idah} seems to weaken the United States and the West because they are both impediments in their own way\textsuperscript{4}. This is proved when we see that Muslims are getting more conscious about their Islamic values, culture and civilization.

\textsuperscript{1} Jason Burke, “Al Qaeda: The Mere Mention of Al Qaeda Conjures Images of an Efficient Terrorist Network Guided by a Powerful Criminal Mastermind. Yet Al Qaeda Is More Lethal as an Ideology Than as an Organization. ‘Al Qaedaism’ Will Continue to Attract Supporters in the Years to Come-Whether Usama Bin Laden Is around to Lead Them or Not”, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 19.
Indeed, the appeal of bin Laden among the Muslim masses draws on a kind of free-floating conviction that America is an impediment to the independent development of Muslim world\textsuperscript{1}. Bin Laden’s transnational network seems a symbol of international Islamic solidarity\textsuperscript{2}.

In light of that pan-Islamic sentiment, anti-Western enmity seems more like the result of a worldwide divide. For Islamists, the world is embroiled in a cosmic conflict between truth and falsehood, between light and darkness, between virtue and vice\textsuperscript{3} between exploiters and oppressed, unjust and persecuted.

Because it draws a sharp line between an individual’s private life and his or her outward public actions, the West inhabits the realm of enmity, and is judged guilty for having reduced religion to the level of the private and subjective while elevating politics and economics to the levels of public good and objective commitment. That, as held by Islamic thinkers and activists, has produced a culture of pornography, promiscuity, abortion, divorce and other vices, proof of the West’s guilt, and reason for waging a \textit{jihad} against the West. For a long time, the radicals have concocted from this index of Western decadence a coarse-grind revivalism that seeks to subdue the West as a corollary to extending the rule of truth and virtue. They maintain that believers are enjoined by God’s revelation


\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Ibid}, p. 32.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Idem}
to line up on the side of truth and virtue against the agents of Satan, God’s adversary¹.

4.3.2.2 United States

The attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 C.E., presented the US administration with many challenges. As reported the US at once felt the need to build an effective coalition of countries to wage a war on al-Qa’idah, the highly organized and elusive organization².

The United Nation Security Council’s unprecedented willingness on 28th September, 2001 C.E., to invoke and reaffirm the right of self-defense under Article 51³ in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks was an important act, in the eyes of the US, helping to legitimize the U.S. military response as a legal use of force and greatly assisting the United States in building a coalition against ‘terror’. For instance, at an emergency meeting of the European Union, Tony Blair, the UK Prime Minister, and the 14 other leaders “pledged total solidarity” with Washington in the fight against ‘terrorism’, concluded that “an American military riposte was

¹ Lamin Sanneh, “The Infidels Are Us”, p. 32.
³ U.N. CHARTER, Art. 51.
legitimate", and noted that "the UN Security Council had backed the principle of self defense"\(^1\).

While obtaining the U.N. Security Council's invocation and reaffirmation of the right of self-defense under Article 51 and the implicit finding that the United States had suffered an "armed attack", the United States, as per reports, was acting in another multilateral forum, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO.) In an unprecedented move, the nineteen member countries of the North Atlantic Council, NATO's governing body, issued a statement on September 12, 2001 C.E., agreeing that if it was determined that the September 11 terrorist attacks were directed from abroad against the United States, they "shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all"\(^2\).

Within two weeks of the attack, on September 22, 2001 C.E., the United States achieved another unprecedented multilateral success, this time at a special Washington D.C. meeting of the foreign ministers of the Organization of American States (OAS). At this meeting, the 22 states of the Western Hemisphere that are party to the 1947 C.E. Rio Treaty\(^3\) unanimously passed a resolution which declared: "These terrorist attacks

---

\(^3\) Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the "Rio Treaty," TIAS 1838, entered into force December 3, 1948.
against the United States of America are attacks against all American states, and ... in accordance with all the relevant provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) and the principal of continental solidarity, all states party to the Rio Treaty shall provide effective reciprocal assistance to address such attacks and the threat of any similar attacks”\(^1\).

While US State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher noted that 46 different international organizations including NATO, the OAS and the European Union (EU), had “passed multilateral declarations of support for the United States in the 13 days since the attack”\(^2\), then Secretary of State Colin Powell said that more than “rhetorical support” was expected of members of the U.S.-led coalition against ‘terror’\(^3\). President Bush (Jr.) made this position clear on the eve of his address to the United Nations by saying that “the time of sympathy is over ... now is the time for action, for coalition members to respond in their own way”\(^4\).

\(^1\) "Terrorist Threat to the Americas", RC.24/Res.01/01 (September 21, 2001). Article 3 of the Rio Treaty, which underlies the September 21 Resolution, specifically provides: "The High Contracting parties agree that an armed attack by any state against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations”.


\(^3\) "Bush to Press Coalition Partners for Concrete Support: Powell”, Agence France Press.

Stating that America would seek help with the military, law enforcement, intelligence, and financial fronts of the war, President Bush (Jr.) told other nations that, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists ...”¹ In addressing the U.N. General Assembly, President Bush (Jr.) reminded members that the responsibility for fighting ‘terror’ was “binding on every nation with a place in this chamber” and that, “Civilization itself, the civilization we share, is threatened”². Commentators observed that “Mr. Bush’s address seemed to affirm a new faith in multilateralism”³.

Earlier efforts by American presidents to build international coalitions against ‘terrorists’ and ‘terrorist’-supporting states did not enjoy the success associated with America’s response to the September 11 attacks, particularly in the case of America’s attack on Libya in 1986 C.E.⁴

President Bush (Jr.) and his administration could have pursued a number of possible courses of action. When Bush framed the crisis as a ‘war against terrorism’, the homefront became a battlefront, and the markers of an open society — a free press, individual protections in criminal proceedings, and privacy from government snooping — were


³ Idem

conceptually transformed by the administration into opportunities for the enemy.

President Bush (Jr.) put all that behind him after the attacks of September 11. He called the attacks "acts of war", and demanded that the Taliban surrender Usama bin Laden and other al-Qa’idah leaders on pain of being treated the same as "enemies" of the United States. When the Taliban refused, hailing Bin Laden as a Muslim "hero", Bush (Jr.) (with Congress’s support) attacked Afghanistan with military force and turned to the Department of Defense to lead the campaign. The attack was finally confronted as an issue of national security, rather than one of criminal law enforcement as per writers.

Phase One of America’s ‘war on terrorism’ was fought during the fall of 2001 C.E. against Afghanistan’s Taliban and al-Qa’idah forces.

The horrors of the 11 September 2001 C.E. attacks on the United States and the ensuing ‘war on terrorism’ galvanized the global community to come to terms with the reality of international coalition. While the focus of the ‘war on terrorism’ has been on Afghanistan and Pakistan, one of the key arena is now Southeast Asia. This has caught both states and individuals in that region by surprise. Though most states in Southeast Asia have a Muslim population, ranging from 5 per cent in the Philippines

---

to 85 per cent in Indonesia, the fact is that the region has always been considered the Islamic periphery.

A key feature of the American legal system is the presumption that a person is innocent until proven guilty by the state; in criminal cases, the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. However, since the attacks of 9/11, this presumption has been suspended as it applies to people — particularly younger men — who are Muslim and/or Middle Eastern.

As per rules within seven days of their detention, people must be placed in deportation proceedings or charged with a criminal offense, unless—in the attorney general’s opinion — “removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future” and if release “will threaten the national security of the United States or the safety of the community or any person”.

Eight weeks following the 9/11 attacks, the Washington Post identified 235 of the 1,147 people detained at that time, and found that three fifths were being held on immigration charges and 75 had been released. A small number were detained on material witness warrants and about ten, as per reports, were believed to have some link to al-Qa’idah or the hijackers. Despite the government’s formal position condemning profiling of Muslim or Arab Americans, most of those detained were from

---

1 Zachary Abuza, “Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network”, p. 427.
3 Ibid., pp. 547-548.
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan, almost all men in their twenties and thirties. A few were U.S. citizens.

"Most of the nineteen men who hijacked planes on September the 11", said Bush (Jr.), "were trained in Afghanistan’s camps". This was the most damning accusation the administration — or anyone else — had yet delivered directly linking the September 11 hijackers to al-Qa‘idah and Usama bin Laden.

But Bush (Jr.), as per reports, didn’t offer any evidence of his new claim during the address itself. Nor has he since. The administration apparently expects people to simply take the president’s word for it. And apparently, as noted, many have.

As per reports, by the end of September 2001 C.E., the Taliban was clearly feeling the heat. Its members were frightened, they pleaded for negotiations, and they showed an increasing willingness to surrender Bin Laden. All they asked for was a rudimentary display of evidence. Taliban officials, as noted, stated for the first time that bin Laden was under their control on September 30, 2001 C.E. — clearly suggesting that it was indeed within their power to turn him over. A few days later, Taliban representative Abdul Salam Zaeef practically pleaded the United States to

---


3 Idem
offer some proof: "We are willing to try him [ourselves] if America provides solid evidence of his involvement in the attacks". Then, going further, he stated: "We are willing to talk about [trying him] in another country but we must be given the evidence"\(^1\). But as reported, instead of providing it, the United States began bombing Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 C.E. And now years after, Usama bin Laden is still at large.

Bush's suggestion, as per writers, that the hijackers were owned, operated, and directly dispatched from Afghanistan by Usama bin Laden may well not be false. But the time demands proof. When President Bill Clinton bombed the Sudanese pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum in 1998 C.E., he claimed that it was engaged in the production of nerve gas. But he never produced the evidence. This is precisely the kind of arrogant transgression that generated the hatred and rage among Muslims. Now, as per Tad Daley, in response to September 11, 2001 C.E. the Bush (Jr.) administration repeated the same mistake\(^2\).

In the first weeks following the attack, leading officials from the three major coalition partners in the "War on Terrorism" — the United States, Britain, and Pakistan — couldn't seem to get their story straight regarding the sufficiency of the evidence against Usama bin Laden. Then U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell said on September 23, 2001 C.E. that he would soon provide tangible proof that Bin Laden was indeed the 'evil

\(^1\) Tad Daley, "Prove It, Mr. President: George W. Bush's Claim That the Hijackers of September 11, 2001, Were Directly Dispatched from Afghanistan May Well Not Be False", p. 9.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 6.
genius' behind September 11. "In the near future", Powell told *Sunday Morning* talk aficionados, "we'll be able to put out on paper a document that will describe quite clearly the evidence that we have linking [bin Laden] to this attack"¹. But, as noted, that document was never forthcoming, and that promise quietly forgotten. Powell, as per writers, himself admitted on October 2, 2001 C.E. that the evidence in U.S. possession wasn't good enough to present to a judge².

But Pakistan, as delineated, drew precisely the opposite conclusion. "We have seen the material that was provided by the American side", said Foreign Minister Riaz Khan. "This material provides sufficient basis for indictment in a court of law"³.

On October 4, 2001 C.E. British Prime Minister Tony Blair posted what he called "incontrovertible" proof of *al-Qa'idah's* guilt on the British government's website. But most of the "evidence" presented there, as noted, consisted simply of factual claims rather than proof for those claims:

Shortly before 11 September bin Laden told associates that he had a major operation against America under preparation.... In August and early September close associates of bin Laden were warned to return to Afghanistan ... by 10 September.... One of bin

¹ Interview of Colin Powell to *Sunday Times*, 16th September, 2001.
² Tad Daley, "Prove It, Mr. President: George W. Bush's Claim That the Hijackers of September 11, 2001, Were Directly Dispatched from Afghanistan May Well Not Be False", pp. 6-7.
Laden's closest lieutenants has said clearly that he helped with the planning of the 11 September attacks\(^1\).

All quite damning — if demonstrably proven instead of simply asserted. Other British government evidence, as held, was clearly circumstantial in nature:

The modus operandi of 11 September was entirely consistent with previous attacks.... Al Qaida operatives have described how the group spends years preparing for an attack.... The operatives involved in the 11 September atrocities attended flight schools ... and placed potential airports and routes under surveillance....\(^2\)

Britain's government, as reported, itself acknowledges that its own evidentiary document "does not purport to provide a prosecutable case against Usama bin Laden in a court of law". Finally, on December 14, 2001 C.E. U.S. officials released the Usama house tape, which appears to capture Bin Laden telling his cohorts that he had indeed planned the crime, that he had "calculated in advance the number of casualties", that he didn't foresee the cataclysmic effect of the flaming jet fuel, and that the collapse of the two towers was "more than we had hoped for"\(^3\).

Virtually all of Bin Laden's comments on the tape could have been derived from things all people heard in the days immediately following the

\(^1\) Tad Daley, "Prove It, Mr. President: George W. Bush's Claim That the Hijackers of September 11, 2001, Were Directly Dispatched from Afghanistan May Well Not Be False", p. 7.

\(^2\) \textit{Idem}

\(^3\) \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 7-8.
attacks. Many structural engineers observed that the collapse of the towers was “more than we would have expected”\(^1\) and that the full effect of a full tank of jet fuel was the one thing they never anticipated. Therefore, all that has been “proved” is that Bin Laden read the newspapers on September 12, 2001 C.E.

No one, as per history, has dared to ask what possible motive bin Laden himself might possess for saying such things on tape? We still know nothing of the circumstances of how the tape came into American possession, other than that it was found in “a house in Jalalabad”\(^2\). Does it mean that Usama bin Laden allowed himself to be videotaped saying these things and then absent-mindedly left such an incriminating item behind? In the words of Tad Dadley, “Oh fiddlesticks, we left the iron on and we forgot to pack the tape where I reveal all!”\(^3\)

It could be inferred that it seems much more likely to suppose that the house tape was meant to be made and meant to be found\(^4\). One interesting thing to note is that the U.S. government drew its conclusions about Bin Laden’s culpability long before the tape was discovered\(^5\) as held by reporters.

\(^1\) Tad Daley, “Prove It, Mr. President: George W. Bush’s Claim That the Hijackers of September 11, 2001, Were Directly Dispatched from Afghanistan May Well Not Be False”, p. 8.
\(^2\) Idem
\(^3\) Idem
\(^4\) Idem
\(^5\) Idem
Few U.S. commentators have bothered to question whether we possess real evidence that *al-Qa'ida* was behind September 11, 2001 C.E. But foreign voices—especially in the Muslim world—have repeatedly asked for such proof. "Why hasn't [the United States] shown us the real evidence that gave them the right in the first place to start bombing?" asked Nabel Saeed in Bahrain's *Gulf Daily News* in December. "Show us your proof, and we will defend America indeed".

"The interest of the U.S. in airing this tape worldwide to incriminate bin Laden", said Fahed El-Fanek in Jordan's *Al Rai* after the videotape of Bin Laden's conversation was released, "is proof that the U.S. went to war lacking any evidence against bin Laden".

The Bush (Jr.) administration's refusal to provide such proof, as per reports, may well be why the same calls are now being heard about the "axis of evil" claim during the State of the Union address. "We condemn the American accusations", said Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi the day after the speech. "We think Mr. Bush would do better by providing proof of his allegations.... The repetition of such accusations is not going to help him". "We should ... provide evidence to each other".

---

1 Tad Daley, "Prove It, Mr. President: George W. Bush's Claim That the Hijackers of September 11, 2001, Were Directly Dispatched from Afghanistan May Well Not Be False", p. 8.

said Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov in a February Oval Office meeting, "and assure all others that those threats really exist"¹.

It is inferred that the actual motto behind U.S. is to crush all conscious Muslims all over and leave them a dormant civilization. The then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recently acknowledged as much when he questioned in an internal Pentagon memo whether it was possible to kill militants faster than radical clerics and religious schools could create them². The West it seems is not winning the 'war on terror'³. It is only that when President Bush declared 'war on terrorism' by saying those who are not with the U.S. are on the side of the terrorists, he appealed to a familiar fundamentalist polarization⁴.

4.3.2.3 Conclusion

The growth and expansion of Islamic consciousness around the world, since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 C.E., has a lot to do with Islamic theology and more to do with the success of the domestic polity and economy of Iran. Decreasing gaps between the rich and poor,

¹ Tad Daley, "Prove It, Mr. President: George W. Bush's Claim That the Hijackers of September 11, 2001, Were Directly Dispatched from Afghanistan May Well Not Be False", p. 9.


³ Ibid., p. 21.

⁴ Lamin Sanneh, "The Infidels Are Us", p. 32.
equitable and justified distribution of wealth, consciousness of economic diversity, decrease in corruption, and the strength of Islamic democratic political institutions in Iran as successful Islamic experiment and model have all given rise to Islamic resurface all over the world. People literally have become so desperate that they have in masses turned to performing religious practices. In the words of Zachery Abuza, "The Iranian revolution, which took place in the most secular state of the Middle East, was clearly a catalyst".

President Bush (Jr.) stressed that the 'war on terrorism' is not directed at Muslims, and that Islam is a noble religion of peace and tolerance. Watched by suspicious Islamists, Muslim leaders find a poisoned chalice in the endorsement of the infidel West. Muslim conservatives and radicals alike view the West as an enemy that has few intrinsic virtues, though the West is seen as having many tactical uses. Typically, Islamists see their struggle as a war on two fronts: one against the compromisers within, and the other against the infidels without.

Burke argues that the battle between the West and men like Bin Laden is not a conflict about individuals; it is about ideas that are becoming more and more widely held. This is a battle for hearts and minds, one that America, and its allies in the Muslim world, are losing.

---

1 Zachary Abuza, "Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, pp. 429-430.
2 Lamin Sanneh, "The Infidels Are Us", p. 33.
3 *Idem*
4 *Idem*
The threat is grave, says Burke, and long-term success in the ‘war on terror’ will depend on countering the growing sympathy for all Muslims.

*Al-Qa’ida* is in no rush to “win”, unlike America. Its view is colored by Islam’s defeat of the Crusaders, which took over 100 years. In fact, its leaders can see great advantage in just letting US bleed economically and militarily for years to come. The recent shift of US from surplus budgets to deficits, as reported, can be blamed partly upon them; they remember that the British Empire was always conscious of costs. *Al-Qa’ida* has already scored tremendous success in generating policy conflicts between America, its European allies, and even much of Latin America.

### 4.4 Unity in Diversity

Islam is a universal religion and all Muslims irrespective of their regional or national ties, belong to a single community — *ummah*. Islamic responses discussed so far demonstrated diversity in geography, ideological and organizational orientation, tactics and foreign policy of the Islamic resurgence.

With regard to this the Qur’ân is firm on the issue of religious tolerance. Cultural diversity has been one of the most attractive features of

---

Islamic history and civilization. Nevertheless Islam's position is that all life outside Islam is rebellion against nature itself. Life in Islam alone is the normal condition or the 'state of nature'. All life must eventually return and accept the state of nature, which is the *dīn* of Islam¹.

J. L. Esposito states:

Despite distinctive differences in their blueprints for [Islamic] society, each reflects the belief that rectification of the plight of modern Islam requires the recognition and reappropriation of Islam as a total way of life².

As we have seen, both in their belief and activities, Islam as an ideology in the conduct of Muslim politics has occupied an important place. For all Muslims, Allah is the central fact of reality; He is the One who revealed Holy Books to all the Prophets (Dawʿūd: *Zabūr*, Mūsa: *Torah*, 'Isā: *Injīl*) and lastly and most completely to Prophet Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم, the last of the Prophets. In the words of Esposito, “Islam is a world religion with universal mission”³.

The behaviour of all involved in responses discussed in detail in earlier sections of this chapter teaches us that a Muslim's foremost duty is obedience and submission (Islam) of his will to Allah. They behave in the totality of the Islamic view of society. God is Sovereign Ruler and man is

---

¹ Kalim Siddiqui, *Stages of Islamic Revolution*, p. 47.
² J. L. Esposito, *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, p. 63.
His vicegerent and to implement the same is the goal of all Islamic responses.

They all believe that politics is not separate rather a part of religion and religion is not separate but an integral to every aspect of life viz., prayer, fasting, law and society. The believers are a part of an Islamic community where Allah is the Sovereign and His laws are embodied in the Qur’ân. As Khurshid Ahmad puts it, “Islam has to be a decisive factor in building our individual and social life”\(^1\).

Their effort is to re-discover their ideological personality and to seek for a new world order based on the ideas and values of Islam. They urge to carve out a new feature for an entire Islamic ummah and seek a place of respect and honour in the world. Moreover they have shown unwavering commitment to Islam and great capabilities to face the challenge of Western attitudes.

The most significant mission of these Islamic movements in the words of Khurshid Ahmad has been their “emphasis on Islam, not just as a set of beliefs and rituals, but as a moral and social movement to establish the Islamic state”\(^2\).

It is also noteworthy that these Islamic responses seek for comprehensive reform, i.e., changing all aspects of life and making faith the central point. It has been stated by various writers like Khurshid Ahmad:

\(^1\) Khurshid Ahmad, “The Nature of the Islamic Resurgence”, p. 220.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 222.
The relationship between the eternal and the temporal, the moral truth and the contemporary socio-political reality, is then a central issue\(^1\).

Another important aspect of these diverse Islamic responses is the thrust on non-nationalistic character. Even if at times impact is confined to a particular area, its approach is never nationalistic but an ideological and as put by Khurshid Ahmad, "international"\(^2\).

The comprehensiveness of Islam as an integral to various Islamic responses is something in contrast to the West where problems are studied piecemeal and in isolation because they are not seen as interrelated and are not grounded in an integrated view\(^3\).

To conclude it must be remembered that all Islamic responses lean towards unification of the \(\text{ummah}\). The precedent that al-Afghani re-discovered for Islamic unity and his ideas for pan-Islamism in the Muslim world are still at the core of all movements.

---

\(^1\) Khurshid Ahmad, "The Nature of the Islamic Resurgence", p. 223.
\(^2\) Idem
\(^3\) Idem