Chapter II
Emergence of the mission mode of state-fabrication in India

Introduction

The dominant narratives surrounding development and the state in India posit the postcolonial conjuncture as a significant transition point. They also posit the dichotomy and frictions between democracy and development as the most important dynamic that governs the logic of politics in postcolonial India (Bose 1997; Chatterjee 1997a; Kaviraj 1988, 2010a, 2010c; Nayyar 1998). Broadly the history of development and the state in India has revolved around the debates that surrounded specific projects such as big dams (D’Souza 2006), histories of specific policy institutions such as the Planning Commission, or reflections on broader political processes (Bardhan 1998; Chatterjee 1997b; Frankel 2005; Kaviraj 2010a, 2010c). Apart from focusing on certain key institutions of the developmental state such as the Planning Commission, these and other similar accounts do not provide narratives of how the state itself was fashioned in the aftermath of decolonisation.

The aim of this chapter is to try to begin to offer a different narrative of state, politics and development in India. If one wants to tell a different story, or open up the possibility of other kinds of narratives, then one way of doing this is to introduce a different temporality. There were significant continuities across the colonial divide in India if one shifts the analytic gaze from politics to the state, and tries to map out the actual processes of state-fabrication. This chapter argues that one can locate the markers of a shift in the history of state-fabrication in India during what this researcher calls the ‘long 1980s’ (stretching between 1977 and 1991) and not during the immediate aftermath of decolonisation during the period of 1945–52.

For accounts of the planning process in India and its institutions, see Hanson (1966) and Chakravarty (1993).
The long 1980s: the need for a refocusing

Because this chapter is looking at the changes in the formal architecture of the state in India and its modalities of operation, the long 1980s assumes salience. This is the period between 1977, when Indira Gandhi’s emergency regime was democratically thrown out of office and the first non-Congress government was established at the Centre, and 1991, when the first non-Gandhi/Nehru family Congress party member headed a government at the Centre. It is towards the end of this period that the then Finance Minister Manmohan Singh paved the way to removing regulations that had purportedly stymied economic growth, and took India out of the license-permit raj into the era of liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation.

The key events that marked the two ends of this period are significant both in a material and in a symbolic sense. The decision by Indira Gandhi to hold elections, the subsequent electoral losses suffered by the Congress in the 1977 general elections, and the peaceful transition of regimes marked the maturing of democracy in India and the widespread acceptance of the idea and practices of republican, representative democracy, if not of its institutions. This meant that it was now possible to see the workings of the state at the national level as different from the workings and politics of one political party (Guha 2007). But the long 1980s have not been discussed as an important period of our recent history, as is warranted.

For example, Nivedita Menon and Aditya Nigam in their well-argued volume *Power and contestation: India since 1989* (2008) provide us with a picture of the changing dynamics of various aspects of politics and economics in contemporary India including caste, ethnicity, region, international relations and religion. They also frame one significant strand of ‘the economic’ in this new India as being marked by ‘accumulation by dispossession’, which is a reworking of Kaviraj’s (1988) formulation of the dialectic between democracy and development/bureaucracy as overdetermining the experience of the Indian political. However, this volume completely leaves out the tumultuous 1980s.
While 1991–92 was a significant marker of a new era of liberalisation, a large part of the changes that marked this period had been underway since the time Rajiv Gandhi became prime minister in 1984 (Balakrishnan 1990). So in some sense P.V. Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh did not start a radically new phase but merely consolidated a process that had begun much earlier. The long 1980s marked not only changes that were political in nature, but also changes involving a restructuring of the terrains of the social. The relationships between the social, the political and the economic were renegotiated along with changes in the structuring of the state. So far, the focus of dominant scholars has been to look at the fracturing of the national project/project of the nation-state (Chatterjee 1999b), and then posit why and how the nation-state in India has stayed together as a coherent entity (Guha 2007).

Even when the 1980s get discussed, for example, in India after Gandhi by Ramachandra Guha (2007), the focus still remains on political history, and this particular account by Guha stops at a critical marker—the year 1989. Discrete histories exist of the 1980s. For most historians/sociologists the dominant trend of the 1980s was twofold—the extension and deepening of democracy through a process of electoral churning through which a large number of hitherto underprivileged communities came to participate in formal politics (Jaffrelot 2003; Chandra 2000; Kohli 2001) and the almost simultaneous growth of the Hindu Right (Jaffrelot 1998; Nussbaum 2008; Narayan 2009). Thus, the long 1980s have been generally framed by narratives around the restructuring of the terrain of politics in which the Nehruvian consensus surrounding the language and grammar of politics in India seems to be radically disintegrating through various populist attacks.

There is a need to focus on the long 1980s as a lost decade, a decade lost not to action/practice, but to academic theorising in sociology/anthropology/political science/history of the present. There is an urgent need for scholarship on this decade to make sense of our contemporaneity. It is the 1980s that mark a significant acceleration in the growth trajectory achieved in the 1950s (Nayyar 2006). The mid-1980s also mark a
regime change with respect to the Indian stock market, especially the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) (Basu and Morey 1998). This is sometimes attributed to a change of policies starting from the late 1970s that resulted in shifting the economy to a different growth, performance and productivity trajectory (Rodrik and Subramanian 2004; Nayyar 2006). The IT industry also took off during this period, with IT exports growing from a mere $3 million in 1980 to $128 million in 1990 (Dedrick and Kraemer 1993). This is also the period in which the service sector begins to play an important role in economic growth and the imaginary of the Indian economy (Jadhav et al 2005; Joshi 2004).

The 1980s marked the growth of ‘techno-populism’—the growth of the telecom industry and the ubiquitous STD booths—often attributed to the policy changes and programmatic interventions of Sam Pitroda, a key technocrat in the Rajiv Gandhi regime during the period 1984–89 (Chakravartty 2004). This period also marked the growth of the television industry with momentous impact as chronicled by Rajagopal (2001). This was paralleled with the rapid growth of the industries related to cultural production, for example, the expansion and maturing of the audio cassette industry (Sundaram 2009). The long 1980s were also the ‘decade’ in which the Indian middle classes—politically assertive, socially conservative and economically ambitious—grew in number as well as in importance (Mishra 2006).

As has been chronicled by many commentators, this period marked a certain tectonic shifts in Indian politics. India moved away from a single ruling party democracy (at the national level) to a genuine multiparty democratic system through a process of churning that included many hitherto marginalised caste groups getting shares in political power at the state and national levels through opportunistic coalition building exercises (Yadav 1999). Tied to this story has been a radical interrogation of the ‘secular’ Indian state by the Hindu Right. In the beginning of the long 1980s, BJP had only single digit number of members in the Indian Parliament and marginal political power; towards the end of this it had become the pole around which Indian politics revolved (Hansen 1999). This is also the period that saw challenges to and interrogation of the Indian state from hitherto marginal areas and actors, and various social movements. Challenges to the state
also came from other national imaginaries, most important of them being the Punjabi, Kashmiri and the Naga ones. The long 1980s were the high noon of ‘terrorism’ with the late 1980s marked with especial viciousness (Metcalf and Metcalf 2006; Guha 2007).

There are partial accounts of all these processes; but all these accounts are accounts of politics, or of political history. There is no single account that sees the long 1980s as a conjuncture that marked a significant restructuring of the Indian social. This thesis tries to argue that one of the important markers of such a restructuring of the Indian social was a reengineering of the formal architecture of the state in India. The geographical point of departure for doing this in this thesis is the district of Kalahandi, and the thematic point of departure is the sector of watershed development.

There to here: regimes of visibility and tactility

As already mentioned in Chapter I, Kalahandi came into public attention in the mid-1980s with the publication of a series of news reports about hunger, starvation deaths and distress sale of children. It is instructive to remember that this happened in the middle of the period of the long 1980s and the transformations in the Indian social referred to earlier in this chapter. To be able to understand the links between these processes, one has to look at the broader terrain of development in India that preceded the long 1980s. One of the dominant tropes that governed actions of the colonial state and the various ‘enlightened’ native rules of the various princely states was one of ‘improvement’ (Zachariah 2001; Mann 2004; Gowda 2010). This started morphing into a discourse surrounding development towards the end of the colonial era in the country (Zachariah 2001, 2005; Chatterjee 1997b).

The logic of colonialism in India was based on utilitarian philosophy that justified the colonial occupation of the country by appealing to the material and moral benefits that apparently flowed to India and Indians through such colonial association (Mann 2004). The nationalist challenge in the first quarter of the 20th century produced cracks in such a project, and development started growing as a discourse that helped the late-
colonial governments contain nationalist articulations based on the principles of representative democracy and responsible government. The nationalist position commonly identified with Nehru—that of planned/mixed economy—emerged out of a particular negotiation with colonial modernity. The self-representation of colonialism was that of a modernising force; this meant a large extent of resistance to colonialism was articulated from the terrain of what was seen as tradition. Nehruvian nationalism can be identified with another route to modernity—socialism—which was self-consciously against colonialism and capitalism. Thus, a development imaginary, of the socialist/planned variety, was used against colonialism by the nationalist elite quite successfully. If bringing progress and improvements was the reason colonialists gave for their continuing presence despite nationalist challenges, the nationalist challenge itself became premised upon the promise that a social democratic, national government would be able to deliver development better. The argument against colonialism was as much based on ‘ethical’ reasons such as the morality of one people ruling over another as it was on the promises of democratic socialism (Kaviraj 1988, 2010a, 2010b; Bose 1997; Zachariah 2005; Gidwani 2008). Thus, there was no necessary discursive opposition between democracy and development at the time of Indian independence; in fact, the very promise of independence and democracy would have been incomplete without ‘development’ no matter how tentatively defined.

Therefore, during the time of independence the broad conceptual frame of development had already been set up in India. There was consensus amongst the nationalist elite that development was a desirable goal. The socialist experience with planning was seen as a desirable route through which rapid economic growth could be achieved. The Indian National Congress itself had formed groups for economic development plans even before independence. So by the time of independence the development imaginary had become an essential part of the democratic aspirations as articulated by a dominant section of the nationalist elite. This was reflected by a certain institutional architecture as exemplified in the formation of the Planning Commission (Bose 1997; Chatterjee 1997b).
The development imaginary as it congealed during independence saw the whole country as its site and the whole population of India as its target. The first five-year plan that took off in 1952 lacked a clear focus. But by the second plan there was greater alignment between the national development imaginary in India and the international development discourse. The second plan document clearly focused on a dual-sector growth model and focused on industry as the driver of economic growth. Agriculture was ‘necessarily’ neglected (Bose 1997). This period was characterised by heavy investments in sectors that made the state visible.

As Roy (2007) argues, too much attention has been paid till now to beliefs—or the shared sentiments—that create fictional entities such as nations and the politics attendant upon such creation. But once one focuses on processes of state-fabrication something striking emerges—this process in the immediate aftermath of independence is premised upon creating a certain regime of visibility. Although the investments in capital goods industries and heavy industries (especially steel), large and prestigious higher education institutions and big dams were couched in the language of modernisation and development, their effect was in terms of creating a regime of visibility. The logistics of state-fabrication involved in creating this regime was what this researcher calls the symbolic logistics of state-fabrication. In the immediate aftermath of decolonisation the postcolonial state did not reach too deep into village society; instead telltale symbols of its potency and majesty were manufactured through symbolic logistics. These involve, as Roy (2007) details, processes as different and varied as the creation of steel towns such as Rourkela, creation of new public rituals such as the Republic Day parades, and the creation of big dams as part of multipurpose river valley projects as all too visible symbols of the existence and majesty of the state.

The actual number of people who might have worked in these steel towns and big dams and other such visible developmental interventions might have been small, and their immediate impact might have been limited. But these structures, in a physical, sensory way, made the state available to people. The state that was distant and almost invisible or rarely visible in a material sense during the colonial era (apart from its
coercive apparatus) was still distant for most people, but it now became increasingly visible through its developmental interventions. From a distant and invisible state there was now a state that was distant, yet visible. Thus, the state was shifted into the regime of representations in a double sense: first, the legitimacy that the state now drew for rule was predominantly through a process of representative democracy. Second, and perhaps equally important, the body of the state morphed in a manner so as to configure a regime of visibility in which the state and its majesty is re-presented through gargantuan public works programmes such as multipurpose dams over rivers (Klingensmith 2007) or public sector steel plants and steel townships. In fact, as some scholars have argued, the steel townships (Roy 2007; Parry and Struempell 2008), and the new higher educational and scientific institutions such as the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) (Deb 2004) and the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) labs (Roy 2007) were as much an investment towards development as they were towards creating a new kind of citizenry for the new democracy, the new citizen who was free of the narrow confines of region, religion and caste and could contribute significantly towards the nation-building process. This regime of visibility could function by redefining the whole of India as a dark land characterised by divisive forces and ignorant masses that needed to be developed. But the act of development was not carried out through consensus or participation of the masses.

The project of development was operationalised through a bureaucratic apparatus inherited from the colonial state. For example, district-level administration was still carried out through the older structures of bureaucracy, with the collector as the district in-charge. The bureaucracy for development multiplied in number, new departments were created under the older ministries, and sometimes even new ministries were created. There was increasing governmental activity in almost all spheres of life; but the form of the state that carried out these activities still operated through the old colonial structure, primarily comprising of departments and boards, despite some ruptures (Chatterjee 1997b; Kaviraj 2010b). Over a period of time, the sheer multiplication of the developmental bureaucracy and overall changes in the Indian social produced certain
morphings of the state that by the long 1980s changed the very logic and logistics of state-fabrication.

Development functioned as a homogenising field during this period in the immediate aftermath of decolonisation in which the whole of India was represented as underdeveloped and as needing improvement and development (Zachariah 2001). By the 1980s cracks started appearing in this discursive field (Gidwani 2008)—the geography of development started being disaggregated into developed and underdeveloped regions. The process of identifying backward districts started from 1960 onwards, but it congealed into official discourse only in the long 1980s. The Planning Commission formed the National Committee on the Development of Backward Areas (Sivaraman Committee) in 1978 that submitted its report in 1981 (Bandyopadhyay and Datta 1989).

With this the process of mimesis through which development operated was drawing to its logical conclusion in some respects. The post-war development regime functioned by dividing the world into the First, Second and Third worlds (Escobar 1995) and India was definitely a part of the Third World. By the long 1980s, the development geography of India no longer appeared as uniformly backward. The development regime had morphed through a logic of differentiation. The same logic of differentiation that converted a teleology of progress into a contemporaneous differentiated spatial geography at an international level, now operated on a national stage dividing the Indian geography into backward districts and non-backward districts. The Sarma Committee report identified the 100 most backward districts in India (Planning Commission 2005).

This was part of a broader restructuring of the Indian social. This restructuring had an important impact on the functioning of the state in India. It meant that the regime of visibility no longer saturated the imperatives of development as representation; the imperatives had changed, and a new mode of state-fabrication had emerged.
Emergence of the mission mode of state-fabrication

In the long 1980s one finally sees the emergence of what this researcher calls the mission mode of state-fabrication. The assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984 brought Rajiv Gandhi into office—the youngest prime minister of India till date. He tried to undo the past legacy of corruption and the initial period of his regime was characterised by promises of introduction of a new era in Indian politics based on a freer economy and rapid technological modernisation (Chakravartty 2004). A significant aspect of this approach was the creation of six technology missions in sectors such as drinking water, immunisation, literacy, oilseeds and telecommunications (Pitroda 1993). The technocrat Sam Pitroda played a key role in this process. This changed approach to governance is termed as ‘managerialism,’ and the period 1980–89 as an era of techno-populism (Chakravartty 2004). In contrast to such a reading this chapter argues that the growth of missions instead of ending in the eighties has led to the emergence of a specific mode of state-fabrication, even intensifying after this period of time.

Under the prime-ministership of Rajiv Gandhi, the Government of India started the National Literacy Mission for increasing literacy rates in the country (Bordia and Kaul 1992). The older ways of doing development were seen as not producing results fast enough, in a time-bound fashion. The growth of the mission mode has to be seen in this context. Over the last 25 years or so missions at the national, state, and district levels have been formed to govern sectors as diverse as health, education, water and sanitation, horticulture and livelihoods.

With the goal of provisioning safe and accessible drinking water to backward rural areas, the National Drinking Water Mission (NDWM) was started in 1986 that was renamed as the Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking Water Mission (RGNDWM) in 1991 (Planning Commission 2010). The National Horticulture Mission was started in 2005–06 by the Government of India to promote horticulture in India in an integrated manner.
Although technically not a mission, the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan\textsuperscript{9} was launched in November 2000 to universalise primary education, following a conference of state education ministers in 1998 that recommended pursuing this goal in a mission mode. Because it was seen as a special measure, it was funded from a two per cent cess levied on all taxes collected that was later increased to three per cent in March 2007 (Kainth 2006).

The National Rural Health Mission was initiated on 12 April 2005 to address needs of the rural health sector. A key objective for the creation of this mission was to provide support to the creation of the primary healthcare structures in the laggard states. It also tried to factor in the apparent need to incorporate the non-governmental sector to strengthen the public health system to improve access to healthcare by the poor. By 2008–09 the central government had released Rs 28, 408 crore under this mission (Sharma 2009).

The National Solar Mission was launched by the Government of India in 2007 to augment solar powered electricity generation and reduce carbon emissions (Harriss-White et al 2009) that was later renamed as the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission. With the urban poor increasingly in focus and cities being seen as the drivers of economic growth the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) was launched by the new Congress-led coalition government on 3 December 2005 with a proposed investment of Rs 50,000 crore. This was budgeted to be spent in the mission period of seven years beginning with the year 2005–06 (Mahadevia 2006; Kundu and Samanta 2011).

As these examples show, almost all aspects of doing government have been brought under various missions and increasingly large amounts of money have been routed through these missions as opposed to the older organs of the government. The mission mode of state-fabrication is changing the very form of the state on the ground. It

\textsuperscript{9} It is a programme of the Government of India. The literal translation of the word ‘abhiyan’ is ‘campaign’, and, therefore, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan can be literally translated as the ‘Campaign for Education for All’.
has also meant significantly changing the operational conceptualisation of development; instead of a teleology of progress mapped onto some indefinite future, missions are attempts at domesticating developmental time. They have fixed time horizons through which they try and attempt fulfilling specific quantifiable goals.

The mission mode of doing government has involved changing the configuration of the ways in which government functions on the ground and the state is fabricated through quotidian logistics. Detailed accounts of such a process are provided in Chapters IV, V and VI of this thesis. But to discuss briefly here, governmental organisations have started functioning like NGOs in the mission mode of state-fabrication, and there has been a certain provisionalisation of the state. The mission mode radically increases the number of state functionaries on the ground and nodes of contact between state and society. A regime of tactility now started overlaying the extant regime of visibility. The premise of governmental action for development seems to be to ‘reach out,’ and ‘touch’ as many lives as possible. What this means is a new focus on hitherto unreached communities and ‘backward’ regions such as Kalahandi that are then ‘targeted’ with the deployment of governmental tactics. The increasing nodes of state–society interaction seem to be premised upon the logic of creation of a regime of tactility.\(^{10}\)

The logistics of state-fabrication, therefore, seems to have shifted from a symbolic to a quotidian one, involving tactics that allow the state to shed its symbolic majesty and come into routine contact with marginal communities and regions. While the symbolic logistics of state-fabrication was dependent on ‘scientific’ technologies, the emergent logistics of state-fabrication was dependent on ‘scientific’ technologies, the emergent

\(^{10}\) It of course does not mean that one mode of state-fabrication has completely supplanted another mode. As opposed to the structuralism implicit in the passive revolution formulation and its extension with respect to political society, this thesis has taken a deliberately non-structuralist approach. This approach deliberately takes the present and the most immediately available layer of state-fabrication as the starting point and then works downward. Each passing layer shapes the understanding of the subsequent one. So in terms of legibility of social practices and processes, this approach presupposes that institutions and processes do not supplant each other. Each layer, to use a visual metaphor, refracts our understanding of the other and thus contains the other. Thus, the argument offered is that, the mission mode of state-fabrication, the regime of tactility, and the quotidian logistics of state-fabrication have not supplemented the departmental mode of state fabrication, the regime of visibility, and the symbolic logistics of state-fabrication associated with it. The emergent modes have added just another layer to the fabrication of the state. Because our vantage point is the present, the modes with more recent temporal points of origin assume a slightly greater salience.
quotidian logistics depends upon social technologies such as self-help groups, microcredit, and microwatershed development committees for its operation.

The narrative that has framed the processes discussed in this and the previous two sections is the failure of the older developmental state (Gidwani 2008). The 1980s were the decade that bought forth criticisms (nationally as well as internationally, from academic and activist quarters) that development is a god that had failed (Sachs 1992; Escobar 1995; Scott 1999). A central claim was that despite more than around four decades of development planning, matters on the ground in significant parts of India and in many key sectors had not changed much (Byrd 1990).

**Watershed Development in India: growth of the mission mode**

As detailed earlier in this chapter, the period around the gaining of independence in India was characterised by the growth of statist interventions in science and development. Spectacular developmental initiatives such as multipurpose river valley projects became one of the dominant ways through which the state was visibilised (Klingensmith 2007). Over the last two and half decades or so the canal-oriented, water resources development framework based on big dams in the water sector has been increasingly critiqued by social scientists and social movements (Dhawan 1989; Singh 1990). The watershed approach is increasingly important as an alternative to mitigate the adverse effects such as loss of biodiversity and large-scale displacement of communities that characterised the water resource development approach involving big dams (Mehta 2000, 2005).

In 1974, following the recommendations of the National Commission on Agriculture, the Desert Development Programme (DDP) was started in 1977 – 78 (GoI 1994). During the 1970s and the early 1980s, the performance of watershed development programmes was measured primarily through biophysical indicators such as vegetative cover and water tables. The second half of the 1980s saw changes in the priorities with focus shifting from measuring progress through mostly biophysical indicators to the more overtly social concerns such as ensuring livelihoods, and broadening participation.
The Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) at the national level became the nodal ministry for watershed development in the early 1990s. One of its chief initiatives was the notification of Common Guidelines for Watershed Development in 1994. This was part of a larger change in orientation towards participatory watershed management in India. Many NGOs such as MYRADA and donor agencies such as DFID played an important role in this change. The new approach emphasised community participation, promotion of livelihoods, and poverty alleviation (Chhotray 2007). The Common Guidelines were revised in 2001 and again in April 2003 which were then renamed as the Hariyali Guidelines. With these modifications in place watershed development has become of pivotal interest to governmental initiatives in rural development (GoI 2006). Priorities in watershed development have shifted from their biophysical moorings towards a strategy for livelihood protection in dry-land areas of the country (Hanumantha Rao 2000).

This has been parallel to the growth of watershed missions at the state and district levels for the delivery of these new generation watershed development projects (Baviskar 2004). The implications of such a change of focus needs to be understood. The thesis attempts to do this by drawing upon ethnographic fieldwork done in WORLP, a project with an explicit livelihood focus handled by the state-level OWDM being implemented in Kalahandi. The following three sections give some background information about OWDM, and DWM, Kalahandi as organisations, and about WORLP as a project.

**OWDM**

OWDM was formed as a society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 under the Department of Agriculture, Government of Odisha (GoO) to manage all watershed projects in the state of Odisha. OWDM has managed watershed development projects under various central government schemes such as the IWDP, DPAP, ACA, NWDPRA, EAS and WORLP with more than 3000 watersheds being managed by it as of March 2007. The majority of these watersheds are located in the undivided Kalahandi, Bolangir,
and Koraput districts in South-West Odisha, popularly known in civil society and policy circles in India as the ‘KBK belt’ (WORLP nd).

OWDM is supposed to play an advisory and guidance role to facilitate programme execution. It is headed by a director who is the executive head of the Mission and he is helped by experts in various subject matters, management experts, and consultants with thematic expertise. At the district level, the Collector of the district is the leader of the District Watershed Mission (DWM). But the effective head of the DWM is an executive person designated as project director (PD) who is expected to implement watershed development activities at the level of the district and below supported by the Assistant Project Directors (APDs). At the block level the various watershed projects are implemented by the various Project Implementing Agencies (PIAs). The Watershed Development Team (WDT) is supposed to be a team consisting of members with technical expertise in areas such as agriculture and civil engineering in order to facilitate the implementation of the various projects being handled by the PIAs. Below the level of the block, committees are formed for microwatersheds by the PIAs incorporating one or more villages with some involvement by the local communities (ibid).

**WORLP**

Increasingly, watershed development, especially with the new focus on livelihoods, is seen as an appropriate developmental intervention in regions perceived to be predominantly consisting of dry-land areas such as Kalahandi. In such a context WORLP, a watershed development project that is operational in Kalahandi and is promoted by the Government of Odisha (GoO) and the UK Government’s Department for International Development (DFID). It follows a watershed plus approach. It is a ten year project that started in the year 2000 in 14 blocks in Bolangir district and five blocks in Nuapada district. In January 2004 the project was expanded to four blocks in Bargarh district and six blocks in Kalahandi district. Thus, the project has been operational in 29 blocks across four districts in Western Odisha. In these 29 blocks, a total of 290 microwatersheds were covered, with ten microwatersheds in each block. Theoretically,
each microwatershed is supposed to have an area of 500 hectares, and the total funds available for watershed related activities for this area are Rs 4.75 million. According to the provisions of the project Rs 6000 per hectare is available for watershed activities whereas Rs 3500 per hectare is available for the watershed-plus/livelihood-related activities. The total cost of the project is Rs 2300 million; of this Rs 1400 million have been budgeted for watershed and watershed plus activities whereas Rs 900 million have been budgeted for other activities such as capacity building, monitoring and evaluation, and project management (CRD n.d.).

The project is managed by OWDM at the state-level whereas at the level of the district the DWM, Kalahandi manages the project, with the PD as the head. WORLP is operational in six blocks in Kalahandi; these six blocks are Bhawanipatna, Golamunda, Kesinga, M. Rampur and Narla and Koksara. Out of these six, in three blocks the PIAs are NGOs and in the other three the project is being managed by governmental PIAs. Each PIA manages ten microwatersheds, and the total number of microwatersheds being managed by DWM, Kalahandi under WORLP is 60. Since some committees incorporate multiple villages the total number of villages under WORLP in Kalahandi are 124, and the total treatable area in the district under the project is 33464.18 hectares. The project team at the level of the PIA has Watershed Development Team (WDT) members and Livelihood Support Team (LST) members. One of the WDT members is in charge of the ‘social’ aspects of the project, and is primarily involved in managing the livelihood and social aspects of the project’s activities (ibid).

Each microwatershed (consisting of one or more villages) is managed by Committees that are the primary level of the project responsible for the execution of the watershed development work. These Committees have been registered legally as societies under the Societies Registration Act of 1860. Each Committee has a president, a secretary and committee members. Each Committee is required to have four community link workers (CLWs) in functional areas such as agriculture and natural resource management to assist it in the work; one of the CLW posts is that of the CLW social.
The households in the project villages are divided into four categories before the commencement of the actual project activities; these categories are - very poor, poor, manageable, and well off. Using these categories the households are given numbers and are colour coded. The project has four broad heads under which activities take place - administration, community development, natural resource management (NRM), and the watershed plus component comprising of revolving fund (RF) and grants. In the last category of project activities, SHGs of women get loans at zero percent interest for livelihood generation activities. Grants ranging from 4,000 to 7,000 rupees are supposed to be given to households under the very poor and poor categories in order to help them enhance their livelihood options.

**DWM, Kalahandi**

DWM, Kalahandi is a district-level mission in Kalahandi that has the overall charge of overseeing and implementing watershed-related projects in the district. It has a three tier structure. At the district level the mission manages all the watershed-related projects in the district and is headed by a PD. The PD is supposed to be supported by four Assistant Project Directors (APDs) who deal with specific aspects of the mission’s work such as Monitoring and Evaluation (MnE). In addition, the PD is supported by members of the Capacity Building Team (CBT). The CBT is not a feature of all the district-level watershed missions. They are a part of the project architecture of WORLP, and are expected to build capacity of the mission to specifically deal with the watershed-plus component of the project. But in actual practice the CBT members end up doing work for the non-WORLP projects as well.

At the block level the various watershed projects are implemented by the Project Implementing Agencies (PIAs). Each agency is headed by an officer who is referred to as the PIA-in-charge. If the PIA is a governmental one then the officer in charge is, more often than not, an officer on deputation from the soil conservation department. If the PIA is a non-governmental one, then the officer in charge is the head of the local field office of the NGO. At this level the PIA-in-charge is supported by a Watershed Development
Team and a Livelihood Support Team. A large part of the work of DWM, Kalahandi consists of overseeing the works of the PIAs and the Committees.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has tried to challenge a key assumption behind the passive revolution formulation surrounding the state in India and its political society extension. This scholarship locates a significant morphing of state and politics in India during the period of decolonisation, that is, during the period 1945-1952. This chapter has shown that more momentous changes happened during the period 1977 to 1991, a period that the researcher calls the **long 1980s**. The emergence of the mission mode of state-fabrication is a significant aspect of the changes that have taken place during this period. This morphing of the state and the emergence of the mission mode of state-fabrication can be located within a broader process of morphings in the regimes involved in the functioning of the developmental state (from a regime of visibility to a regime of tactility) and the logistics of state-fabrication governing governmental tactics (from symbolic to quotidian logistics).

The mission mode of state-fabrication can be seen at work in varying sectors of governmental activity including that of watershed development. In the context of Odisha this has involved the formation of OWDM, a state-level mission for the delivery of various governmental projects and programmes in watershed development. A large number of these watershed development projects now focus on marginalised areas and communities. This includes the project WORLP specifically targeted at four districts of Western Odisha, including the districts of Kalahandi and Nuapada that formed a part of the undivided district of Kalahandi till the early 1990s. This chapter has provided brief introductions to OWDM and DWM, Kalahandi as organisations and WORLP as a project.

Parallel to the organisational changes with respect to the state and the emergence of the mission mode of state-fabrication have been processes of framing of specific
regions and communities as sites of governmental activity. In this respect certain regions such as South-West Odisha and within it the district of Kalahandi are especially important. Kalahandi, over the last two and half decades has been used as a metaphor for starvation and destitution in India. The next chapter studies the various narratives that have framed Kalahandi as a deprived region ripe for governmental developmental interventions, especially in the mission mode.