Chapter One

The Thought of Friedrich Nietzsche:

An Introduction

Introductory Remarks

Nietzsche's deep knowledge and both his creativity and critiques of different established institutions as long as his sophisticated style are all revealed in a string of books which have stood the test of time. The reader of his works is confronted with a huge number of various subjects and his specific way of treatment of those subjects. When discussing the works of Nietzsche, one often finds himself writing the phrase "what Nietzsche says is true, but perhaps he goes too far!" For example, ironically referring to the philosophers, he says:" To live alone one must be an animal or a god-says Aristotle. There is yet a third case: one may be a philosopher."(1) Moreover, bitterly showing his disdain for Christianity, he states:" One does well to put on gloves when reading the New Testament. The proximity of so much uncleanness almost forces one to do this."(2) These instances reveal not only his harsh criticism of allegedly holy traditions but also his radical system of philosophy.

Friedrich Nietzsche's rather irrational, anti-realist and Romanticist way of encountering distinct issues has ultimately led to his unique style of writing. He applies an irrational approach to different subjects because he is against the whole bunch of "rational" tradition of western philosophy. As it will be explained vividly in this chapter, Nietzsche criticizes that philosophical tradition first founded by
Socrates, and he has also rebuked the founders of and the major contributors to the philosophy of Modernity who had a semi-mathematical style of argumentation. Furthermore, Nietzsche's way of presenting his discussions is stylistically different from the dominant literary school of the middle part of the nineteenth century which was Realism. Nietzsche's subjective treatment of various subject matters as against the objective attitude of the realist writers of that time will be more elaborated in the last part of this chapter which is dedicated to Nietzsche's Creativity not only as a philosopher but also as a writer with an idiosyncratic style of writing. Finally, his Romanticist mode of approaching different contents is evident from the frequent uses of aphorisms and metaphors, and it shows the direct relationship between his philosophy on one hand and his style on the other hand.

Nietzsche's fragmentary style of writing and his frequent use of aphorisms are in direct relationship with his worldview and his philosophy. Nietzsche did not certainly want to have an elaboration and interpretation of the whole existence consistently and based on the logical and rational tradition of western thought-making. He is different from his predecessors in this regard; for example, what Kant, Hegel, Schelling and even Schopenhauer had tried to do and present cannot be found in Nietzsche's thoughts. Nietzsche, it should be mentioned, was not a systematic philosopher with a familiar way of thinking and a simple and straightforward style.

Nietzsche's use of aphorisms and his metaphoric approach to different subjects and his ostensible lack of presenting a coherent system are not accidental. Nietzsche was not only a part of the traditional philosophical system of the west but also against such a system. Accordingly, he applied a new methodology which at first glance seems to lack any coherent framework of thought. This
indifference and even opposition to the existing systems of philosophy is reflected in his writings and especially on his last works. With the exception of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, all of Nietzsche's later works embody aphorisms, short and often witty and sometimes sarcastic sayings, and a figurative language including a frequent use of metaphors. His style of writing and his method of presentation reflect his disgust with the previous philosophical systems, and remind the reader of his tendency towards Eastern way of contemplation, especially the sayings in Zen and Buddhism.

Each aphorism in his last works can be regarded as a whole while being a part. In other words, although there is apparently no systematic consequence between the succeeding aphorisms and the meaning of each saying is not dependent on the next one, each aphorism is a separate semantic unit that effectively contributes to the ultimate meaning and theme of the work. Therefore, a book or part of a book by Nietzsche, especially the later works, is a whole consisting of different parts each another whole itself.

Discussing the philosophical system of Friedrich Nietzsche as a revolutionary framework of thought and as a main stage in the development of western philosophy, the present chapter attempts to give a detailed account of the major books of Nietzsche in terms of his spectacular concept of man and his definition of the "ubermench" (i.e. "the superman" or, as some might translate, "the overman"). The explanation of his frequently referred term, that is," will to power", constitutes the other part of this chapter. On the other hand, Nietzsche's critical standpoint in dealing with Christianity and western philosophy is another section of this chapter. The reader of his works confronts his radical refusal of Christianity and his doctrines as opposed to the philosophical system of Plato. Moreover, one can
observe Nietzsche's criticism of that tradition of European philosophy from the beginning of seventeenth century to the latter part of the nineteenth, generally referred to as the philosophy of Modernity. Finally, the ultimate part of this chapter is concerned with Nietzsche's attitudes towards creativity and his discussion of the state of modern man, his problems, nihilism, and his rather implicit and particular definition of creativity as the only spiritual solution for modern man.

A. Nietzsche's Concept of Man

a. The Morals

The first step in discussing Nietzsche's idiosyncratic perspective towards 'man' and the definition of his ideal man is to know the background of his ideas on the morals and how he looks at them. In Genealogy of Morals, he concentrates on the shortcomings of the Judeo-Christian tradition. This book, which is sometimes translated as On the Genealogy of Morality, consists of three essays, each on a related theme.

The dominant theme of the book is about the origins of morality in Christian tradition. One can propose this argument that the main discussion of the book is its refusal of those moral concepts descended from a Christian tradition. Nietzsche had mentioned the death of God in his earlier book, The Gay Science: "God is dead; but given the way of men, their may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown" (3). Consequently, Genealogy of Morals is a work based on this statement, and it puts forth this question that what are the consequences for morality if God is dead?
Nietzsche criticizes Christian tradition based on two main weak points of such tradition: the passivity and reactivity rather than creativity, and its glorification of suffering rather than activity. He argues that these characteristics have led the western man to live in a state of passivity and negativity rather than creativity and activity.

By 'genealogy' Nietzsche means "tracing the origins of particular concepts, largely by examining the history of the changing meanings of words" (4). Hence he first establishes the origins of Christian values. He believes that slavery has been an inseparable part of this tradition. Christian tradition has been itself, ironically, enslaved during an important period of its development when these values were shaped. Such a slave morality is analyzed by Nietzsche in this way:

The slaves’ revolt in morals begins with this, that ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of those who are denied the real reaction, the deed, and who compensate with an imaginary revenge. Where as all noble morality grows out of a triumphant affirmation of oneself, slave morality immediately says No to what comes from outside, to what is different, to what is not oneself: and this No is creative deed. (5)

The above extract, which is from the first essay of the book, "Good and Evil Versus Good and Bad", shows Nietzsche's attitudes towards the origins of moral approvals (i.e. Yes) and disapprovals (i.e. No). The factual motivation for such reactivity is, however, hidden in the western man's state of slavery. He states that the word 'good' was first used by the nobility, who applied it to themselves in order to set themselves apart from the people. The word 'bad' was the not first the antonym of 'good'; it was, however, the opposite of how the nobility class of those societies behaved.
The other term that needs to be explained more is 'ressentiment', which is a particular kind of resentment. The important concept of ressentiment appears frequently in the works of Nietzsche. This French word is almost the equivalent to the English word "resentment". Most of critics believe that Nietzsche uses this term because there is no exact German word for it. One can have a better understanding of the resentment of the slave or the ressentiment in the slave morality by contrasting the contempt felt by the master towards the slave. According to Nietzsche, the "bad" of master morals is an afterthought for the master's value system because he does not take it much seriously. The slave, but, is resentful and this characteristic, ressentiment, becomes the energetic source for the later revenge of the slave.

The man of ressentiment, that is the slave, becomes ultimately cleverer than the noble man. Ressentiment is the emotion felt by the oppressed. According to Nietzsche, resentment is an imaginary revenge by those groups of the society who has been oppressed by the nobility. This feeling of having an enemy generates the most important creation of ressentiment which is the evil.

This binary opposition, that is, good and bad, was thus reversed later on. The common people, who could not adopt the aristocrats' style of life, overturned this opposition in their frustration. Subsequently, the good/bad value system was reversed, and the morality of the common man was announced to have a greater value whereas the morality of the nobility was declared to be 'evil'. Nietzsche narrates this genealogy as follows:
The reverse is true of the noble way of evaluating: it acts and grows spontaneously, it seeks out its opposite only in order to say Yes to itself still more gratefully, still more jubilantly; and in its negative concept, “base,” “mean,” “bad,” is only an after-born, pale, contrasting image in relation to the positive basic concepts, which is nourished through and through his life and passion: “we who are noble, good, beautiful, happy!” (6)

This slave culture, that is the culture of the common people, celebrates this "after-born" reversal of values, and, ultimately, glorifies its own existence. The Christian tradition celebrated negative values in this way which, adversely, affected the world. In Nietzsche's idea, morality should celebrate "noble, good, beautiful, happy" activity, but, as he argues, the slaves refuse this way of life: "salve morality immediately says No to what comes from outside, to what is different, to what is not oneself: and this No is its creative deed". (7) As a result, this tradition is not creative; it is instead reactive to negative impulses.

Nietzsche's radical and harsh refusal of the moral system of the slave is mostly because of this hidden fact that it grows out of hatred, self-denial and a favorite reversal of the present realities. The attention of the slave was first focused on the nobility who hardly thought of him. The wishes of the slave are fulfilled when the value system of the nobility is reversed. As a result, this reversal of values was originally a negative act produced by ressentiment. In Nietzsche's idea, this is exactly what has come true in the history of the dominant moral tradition of Europe which has been a Judo-Christian cultural system:
Conversely, imagine “the enemy” as conceived by a man of ressentiment – and here precisely is his deed, his creation: he has conceived “the evil enemy,” “the evil one”—and indeed as the fundamental concept from which he then derives, as an afterimage and counterinstance, a “good one” – himself. (8)

Nietzsche elaborates on how different the concepts of "bad" and "evil" are, and these two concepts are, just in an opposite way, regarded by common people as the opposite of "good". He deals with this difference by mentioning that the concept of "good" has two distinct meanings: The nobility's 'good' is what the slaves call the "evil". Nietzsche's harsh critique of the slave morals is mostly based on this fact that it makes progress because of hatred and denial by the slaves. One should mention this characteristic feature of Nietzsche's criticism that his judgments on the value system of morality are not based on particular values he appreciates or refuses; they are, however, the insight of a philosopher created by the different systems of morals.

On the other hand, in Beyond Good and Evil, especially sections 200 and 212, Nietzsche seems to be more careful in his explanations of the nobility and the slave culture. Here he appears to be a much more profound philosopher whose definition of such concepts as "greatness," "Good," and "Evil" is more sophisticated than his other reflections. He characterizes both the dominant slave morality and the exceptions of the modern world as arising from a complex mixture of drives and values:

Confronted with a world of “modern ideas,”…, a philosopher—if there could be any philosophers today—would be forced to define the greatness of man, the concept of “greatness,” in terms precisely of man’s comprehensiveness and multiplicity, his wholeness in manifoldness. (Italics mine) (9)
b. The Question of Suffering

The primary aspect of the concept of "good" in the morality of common Christian people changed into their own "suffering". This psychological transformation was indeed parallel to the old Christian concept of suffering. According to Christian doctrines man is due to suffer on Earth because of the First Sin committed in Heaven, which was the eating of the fruit of the forbidden tree (the Tree of Knowledge). Perhaps the most monumental narration of this myth is that composed by John Milton (1608-1675), the English poet:

Of man's first disobedience, and the fruit
Of that forbidden tree whose mortal taste
Brought death into the world, and all our woe,
With loss of Eden, till one greater Man
Restore us, and regain the blissful seat,
Sing, heavenly Muse. (10)

Christianity's attitude towards man is that he is originally a sinner, and the Fall of man from Heaven down on Earth was because of such a sin. Accordingly, man has innately tendency to commit sin. Man should suffer on Earth and that "greater Man" (i.e. Jesus Christ) was sent to him as the sign of the mercy of God to "restore" him "the blissful seat". The original passivity of man on Earth is, therefore, one of the direct consequences of such a belief. Based on this religious myth, man is not and can not be "creative" and "powerful."

The feeling of being a sinner leads psychologically to a sense of guilt and suffering in Christian culture which deprives man of his creativity. Nietzsche mentions that this high rank of suffering in Christian tradition should not be taken as part of human nature since it is only a part of the dominant system of values. In Christian moral system, however, man is regarded as originally sinful, and Christ was
sent as a sign of the mercy of God to reduce this range of suffering, and he also suffered more than anybody else.

Nietzsche's concept of "asceticism", which has been presented in the third essay of *Genealogy of Morals*, is useful in understanding his concept of Man. Asceticism means that way of life in which man is interested in helping others, self-denial and forgetting one's interests and concerns because of complete devotion to the problems of others. This attitude towards life advocates poverty and chastity, and ultimately avoids any rebellion. Those people who have belief in asceticism turn away from those pleasures and ambitions that life embodies.

According to the above-mentioned points, the Christian tradition celebrates suffering and brings it to the life of the western man from three different sources: first it was the result of Eve's temptation and Adam's consequent sin of eating the fruit of the forbidden tree, and the immediate Fall of man. Second, it was founded in the mind of the western man because of a psychological transformation of guilt sentiment. And finally, suffering was one of the results of asceticism.

Nietzsche has written about the relationship between man and suffering in the prologue to his *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in another way. He also has the answer to life that seems suffering. Nietzsche's attitude towards life makes man overcome the feeling of the meaningfulness of life. It starts with the idea that life has no beginning and no end and it is a repetition of the very same life over and over again. With all sufferings and unhappiness in life, one feels despair if he is to repeat the same life. As a result, the concept of suffering in Nietzsche's attitude is not so general and imposed as in Christianity.
Nietzsche criticizes the Christian sense of suffering, pity, passivity and lack of creativity and even freedom. Whereas Christianity focuses on the myth of the creation of man in Heaven and the consequent suffering on Earth, Man, for Nietzsche, is a free creature that should do his best both to be creative and to enjoy himself. As a result, man's creativity and also his instincts are restricted and suppressed according to the dominant set of values in Europe. That is why he referred to Eastern religions, as Buddhism and Hinduism, which have, in his attitude and especially in *The Anti-Christ*, a better understanding of man and his capabilities.

According to his *The Birth of Tragedy*, passions and emotions are the characteristics of the Dionysian principle which he advocated. Nietzsche's attitude on the nature of the emotion is that it is natural, and, therefore, it should not be repressed. The repression or suppression of the emotion is disastrous and brings about psychological disturbance to life. That is why he, once more, attacks Christianity for its traditional set of values that limits the emotions. Depressing the emotions, including sexuality, is what Nietzsche considered as an example of self-denying. One of the findings of this study is that there is a destructive dialectic between Christian self-denial on one hand, and its belief in the inevitability of the suffering of man on the other. The present study elaborates more on Nietzsche's critique of Christianity and its concept of suffering later in this chapter.
c. Ubermensch (the Superman)

Ubermensch, the Superman, or as some might translate it into the Overman, is a term coined by Nietzsche and explained in his *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. This term, as Nietzsche believes, is the opposite of the Last Man. Maintaining that there was no example of the Superman in his lifetime, Nietzsche, however, declared that there were many examples of the Last Man. Zarathustra was Nietzsche's prototype for the Superman.

One should know Nietzsche's definition of the Superman unless he cannot understand his concept of man. The word superman, some critics believe, is not a literal translation of Nietzsche's original German term. They propose that this term should be translated into Overman or even into "over-and-above-man". In other words, the Overman is the man who stands over and above Man as he exists at the present time. On the other hand, we should not attach the recent connotations to this term which have reduced its profound meaning. In the following paragraphs we attempt to show the characteristics of the Superman, or the Overman, and the mental and subjective procedure he should go through.

First of all, Nietzsche's view of man and his attempt to redefine the concept of man are based on his radical critiques of that dominant religious system that has so far tried to underestimate man. Christianity, which has exerted a deep influence on western culture, aims at restricting the abilities of man on one hand, and his different joyful experiences on the other hand. Nietzsche's concept of man is dependent on his new attitude towards morality which is "beyond good and evil" of the Christian tradition.
Nietzsche was partially under the influence of Schopenhauer's view on the "reality," that is, in his idea, a concretization of the "will". The world, and, accordingly, all the objects and the creatures, can be understood as the revelation of will. Nietzsche, however, is concerned with the concept of will in another way. For him, the will is characterized as a characteristic feature of man, which can manage and change human's life. Nietzsche's account of the concept of "will" and "will to power" will be discussed fully in this chapter.

There is a similarity between Nietzsche's concept of man and his belief in the 'natural' nature of man. This essential characteristic of man was nearly forgotten in the rationalist philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. The emergence of the rationalist philosophy was simultaneous with the beginning of the enlargement of the European cities and the consequent separation of man from the nature.

Man, in Nietzsche's view, is considered as passionate, free, creative, and full of emotions and enthusiasm. These characteristics of man are to be found in nature. In other words, man's potentialities can be exactly like those of nature. Moreover, the same trends can also be clearly observed in Nietzsche's style of writing. His mode of writing is full of ups and downs, his tone is enthusiastic, and his way of presentation is free from the general and dominant style of writing. Having mentioned these views on man's capabilities, Nietzsche, in his later works, presents his concept of the Superman.

As it was mentioned earlier in this study, Nietzsche, in his The Gay Science, declared the death of God. Such a death, first of all, designates the death of that subjectivity that can be called Christian conscience. The first death is, therefore, the subjective destruction of the Church (to be more discussed at the end of this chapter).
Moreover, the other philosophy of life to be rejected by the Superman is asceticism which was defined above. The mental destruction of Christian conscience and asceticism is really the declaration of a new war against these eternal idols, referred to in the Preface of his *Twilight of the Idols* as follows:

This little essay is a great declaration of war; and regarding the sounding out of idols, this time they are not just idols of the age, but eternal idols, which are here touched with a hammer as with a tuning fork. (11)

Once these mental changes occur, Man has overcome himself. Man's overcoming of man is done by the means of his "Will to Power" (to be explained below). Having belief in anything "common," "weak" and "transcendental" is nihilistic to this world and would lead to the failure of the Superman.

This thought has been the cause of several misunderstandings among both the critics and especially the ordinary reader since they think that Nietzsche's philosophy is nihilistic. It is, however, not only nihilistic but also, just ironically, against nihilism. A close reading of the characteristics of the Superman and a detailed account of Nietzsche's attitudes towards "creativity" (done at the end of this chapter) would clarify Nietzsche's perspective towards nihilism and wash out the usual misconceptions.

The Superman is hard, strong, forceful and creative. The Superman is "beyond good and evil". He is not under the influences of the existing traditions, institutions and value systems. The Superman, because he is creating a new value system, is courageous enough to behave without attention to the dominant systems of values and norms. The Superman should first overcome himself, and he should
increasingly create thoughts and objects, and not to let himself be under the impact of "all beings hitherto":

*I teach you the Superman*. Man is something that is to be surpassed. What have ye done to surpass man?

All beings hitherto have reacted something beyond themselves: and ye want to be the ebb of that great tide, and would rather go back to the beast than surpass man? (12)

In order to "surpass" man the Superman is supposed to revaluate all values. In other words, Zarathustra says that man, that is the value system of man, shall be surpassed and overcome. "What have ye done to surpass man?" That means, however, to reshape the value system of man, and to overcome oneself; that is why he points to his concept of "overman".

Nietzsche, explicitly, refers to the concept of the Superman by consideration of the general nature of the evolutionary process. Nietzsche, in this prologue, states that all men have created something beyond themselves in the history up to now, and there is no reason that this process will stop with man. For example, the "ape" created man, and, in the same way, or even in a higher way, man himself must now create the Superman by surpassing himself. The critical step here is first to form a new system of values, a system which is based on "beyond good and evil" of the dominant tradition. It is almost inevitable to mention that Man's situation would not become better automatically by the mere passage of time; he can and should make it better if he, successfully, goes through the process of becoming a Superman. Man should not remain as a worm, and the Nietzsche criticizes Christian tradition based on two main weak points of such tradition: the passivity and reactivity rather than creativity, and its glorification of suffering rather than activity. He argues that these
characteristics have led the western man to live in a state of passivity and negativity rather than creativity and activity. The transference should happen not only from the ape to man but also from man to the Superman:

What is the ape to man? A laughing-stock, a thing of shame. And just the same shall man be to the Superman: a laughing-stock, a thing of shame.
Ye have made your way from the worm to man, and much within ye is still worm. Once were ye apes, and even yet man is more of an ape than any of the apes.(13)

Nietzsche, in the above extract from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, considers man as a rope stretched out between the beast on one hand and the Superman on the other. Man, he argues, is something transitional. He is not only a rope but also a bridge. Being a rope or a bridge and not an end, Man should live for something other himself. This something, for the sake of which each individual should go on an internal struggle, is the Superman. Nietzsche does not present a simple contrast between the beast and the man. He goes further and points out the differences between Man and the Superman. He distinguishes between man as animal and man as human being. The important turning point, in Nietzsche's view, is not the transformation of the beast into man but the process of becoming a Superman out of the present man, the man who is no longer an animal and is truly a human being.

Unlike Kierkegaard, one of Nietzsche's fundamental principles is that traditional value systems, particularly Christian values, have lost their power in the life of the individuals of this tradition. As mentioned earlier in this study, Nietzsche believed that traditional values represented a "slave morality," that is, a moral system created
by the resentful and weak individuals who advocated such behavior since it served their interests. The propagators for such a value system are referred to as "poisoners" and "despisers of life":

I conjure you, my brethren, remain true to the earth, and believe not those who speak unto you of super-earthly hopes! Poisoners are they, whether they know it or not. Despisers of life are they, decaying ones and poisoned ones themselves, of whom the earth is weary…(14)

As described by Zarathustra, the Superman is the one who wants to risk whatever he has for the sake of the progress and enhancement of humanity. Completely opposite to the "last man" whose only wish longing is his comfort and cannot have a sense of creation. The Superman's actions, on the other hand, help to establish his own values. Subsequently, the Superman can influence the life of others. In Nietzsche's opinion, the Superman is also able to affect the history and change the world.

One of the other characteristic features of the Superman can be observed in Nietzsche's still implicit way of discussion in his earlier books and especially in The Birth of Tragedy. In this work, the Greek Mythological attitudes towards Apollonian and Dionysian principles are cited and evaluated. They represent two essentially different principles men generally use in thinking. Apollonian principle is that of order, rationality and thought, while the Dionysian is the principle of disorder, irrationality and emotion. The Apollonian, as a result, has no passion or emotion but pure reason and order whereas the Dionysian is passionate and dynamic. Although Nietzsche believes that an equal mingling of the two principles is necessary in a normal life, he advocates the Dionysian principle explicitly in his later works.
He regarded different artistic creations as mostly the product of the Dionysian principle. He mentions that the highest state attainable by a man is felt when life becomes a context for the fulfillment of the Dionysian ideal of the Superman. One can propose this hypothesis that if an artist, in its general usage of the word, realizes and accepts his own Dionysian nature and uses it in his artistic creativity by avoiding ordinary and middle class rationality, logic and manners, he has approached Nietzsche's concept of the Superman.

The other part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* that can be helpful in understanding Nietzsche's attitudes towards the Superman is the reference to the "three metamorphoses" that the Superman must go through: "Three metamorphoses of the spirit do I designate to you: how the spirit becometh a camel, the camel a lion, and the lion at last a child". (15)

The camel is taken as the symbol of the patience of the spirit, which in Nietzsche's words, is called the "load bearing spirit". The camel can undergo difficult atmospheres in the "deserts," and is also capable of helping those who have first created 'loads' for him, that is "to love those who despise us."(16) This characteristic of the soul, however, is not enough and it is supposed to have also strength which is found in a lion: "But in the loneliest wilderness happeneth the second metamorphosis: here the spirit becmeth a lion; freedom will it capture, and lordship in its own wilderness."(17)

The lion has no fear of the other animals and he even can destroy all the previous values symbolically represented in the character of the "dragon." "To create itself freedom, and give a holy Nay even unto duty" the lion assumes "the right to new values."(18) The next stage in these metamorphoses happens when the lion is transformed into the
"child": "Innocence is the child, and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a game, a self-rolling wheel, a first movement, a holy Yea". (19)

Therefore, according to the above-mentioned points, the Superman must go through these three metamorphoses. The significant point here and in the works by Nietzsche is that the persona of his works always uses metaphors and speaks symbolically. In other words, the Superman, Nietzsche's ideal man, is first supposed to go through the process of mental changes. Summarizing, one can propose that he should have patience; his subjectivity should be overcome by himself, and finally he is regarded as a man of innocence. The process of these mental changes can also be called the road of the "revaluation of all values."

Nietzsche's definition of the Superman can be applicable to every man. It is not the property of certain men. Each man, in his attitude, can promote himself to the state of the Superman. Some characters in the history have been able to meet partially Nietzsche's viewpoint of becoming a Superman. One should discuss this crucially important point that man, in Nietzsche's philosophy, is not a Superman; he is rather supposed to become one. Thus man must be transformed from his existing state to a higher one which is the realm of the Superman.
B. Will to Power

a. Arthur Schopenhauer's Concept of Will and Nietzsche's Criticism of It

The first step in understanding Nietzsche's attitude on "will" and his spectacular definition and usage of this term, that is, "will to power," is to Schopenhauer's view of the "will" and Nietzsche's criticism of it. Schopenhauer was first under the influence of the famous post-Kantian philosopher, Fichte, and attended his classes at the University of Berlin. He opposed Hegel's philosophical system and called himself a 'Kantian'.

Schopenhauer began to form his framework of thought by referring to Kant's attitude of the world as consisting of the 'phenomenon' and 'noumenon.' Noumenon, or the thing in itself, is an object or a reality that underlies phenomena; that is, a phenomenon is an observable event that is something particular and really seen. Schopenhauer, however, criticized Kant on the basis of this hypothesis that Kant had defined the "noumenon" in an incorrect way. In his "Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy" he writes:

But it was just this difference between abstract knowledge and knowledge of perception, entirely overlooked by Kant, which the ancient philosophers denoted by noumena and phenomena. This contrast and utter disproportion greatly occupied these philosophers... But Kant who, in an unwarrantable manner, entirely neglected the thing for the expression of which those words phenomena and noumena had already been taken, now takes possession of the words, as if they were still unclaimed, in order to denote by them his things-in-themselves and his phenomena. (20)
Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant in this regard gave birth to his conception of the will. According to Kant, "things-in-themselves" constitute the phenomenal representations in our mind. Schopenhauer, on the other hand, argues that phenomena and noumena are two different sides of the same coin. In other words, a noumenon does not create the phenomenon; the phenomenon is the way by which the mind of man perceives a noumenon.

For Schopenhauer, the noumenon is the same basic reality in man that is called the "will." The will, Schopenhauer maintained, was the inner content and the motivating force of the universe. It means that human will is ontologically superior to his intellect, and, subsequently, the desire should be taken as prior to thought. In the same way the will becomes prior to being.

These ideas, in opposition with those of Hegel, paved the way for the rise of a new interest the real art. It means that art, including a metaphoric style of writing, becomes, based on Schopenhauer's opinion, more important than such fields as logic or philosophy (the influence of such a doctrine can be easily seen in the works of Nietzsche).(21) Furthermore, Schopenhauer believed that the discursive thought could not touch the nature of desire.

In his *The World as Will and Representation* Schopenhauer used the term "will" as its most familiar connotation of the word for the common reader. Here the word will comes close to other concepts like "desire," "wanting," and "effort." According to his ideas, man is forever tortured by his desire in the realm of objects. It should be noted that Schopenhauer's view here, especially on the function of desire, is similar to Vedanta Hinduism, a major branch of Hinduism, as well as Buddhism.
**Will** is one of the most controversial terms in philosophy. Simply speaking, one can say it is that conscious mental act which generates different actions. The problems arise when man is both the observer and the observed of his own actions. Schopenhauer has a penetrating attitude towards will which is also relevant to his idea on *representation*, or the *idea*, as some have translated it. *Representation*, from Schopenhauer's view, is that mental image of different objects that is experienced as something external to the mind.

One can propose this fact that Arthur Schopenhauer was the first western philosopher who thematically referred to the oriental thought. Such a reference is considered as a turning point in the history of the western philosophy. Schopenhauer's affirmation of the major premises of Buddhism and its belief in the Four Noble Truths is really a rebellion of the traditional western thought which used to ignore the Eastern philosophy and especially Zen and Buddhism. (22)

Schopenhauer's refusal of much of the western systematic thinking was also influential in Nietzsche's harsh criticism of such a tradition. But, it does not necessarily mean that Nietzsche's attitude on different issues and especially the nature of the will is exactly similar to that of Schopenhauer. For example, while Schopenhauer emphasizes his concept of the "will to live," Nietzsche presents his ever controversial concept of "will to power."

According to Schopenhauer's concept of the "will to live" all the living creatures are motivated by sustaining and developing their own lives. On the other hand, Nietzsche's "will to power" is considered as much higher and more serious than the concept presented by Schopenhauer. The living creatures, especially man, are not just the means of their own survival; they possess, however, a more important characteristic which is the "will to power." Therefore, for Nietzsche
the will to power is taken as much more significant and necessary than Schopenhauer's "will to live."

The concept of will came to the mind of Nietzsche through the reading of Schopenhauer's *The World as Idea and Representation*. In this book Schopenhauer states that the individuals, as conscious and reflective beings, interpret the world. Such a notion is established a priori because:

No truth is more certain, more independent of all the others, and less in need of proof, then this: that all that is there for the knowing—that is, the whole world—is only object in relation to the subject, perception of the perceiver—in a word, idea. (23)

Since the world is the subject of its perceiver, the world is, thus, nothing but the will. Based on such an attitude, Schopenhauer argues that: "the world as idea is a mirror which reflects the will. In this mirror the will recognizes itself in ascending grades of distinctness and completeness, the highest of which is man." (24) As a result, in Schopenhauer's view, the only logical ground for philosophy is the combination of idea and will.

Although one of the most significant key words in the philosophical attitudes of both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche is the "will," Nietzsche attempts to approach this concept in a different way. As Bryan Magee writes: "Nietzsche's philosophy developed in such a way as to retain Schopenhauer's insistence on the primacy of the will as its cardinal point, but to adopt an attitude towards the will which was the diametrical opposite of Schopenhauer's". (25)

According to Nietzsche, Schopenhauer's definition of the 'will' is based on his attitude that the will is "really known to us, absolutely and completely."(26) Nietzsche refuses such an approach towards
'will' and believes that the 'will' is not only "absolute and complete" but also "complicated". Nietzsche says that the 'will' is not known absolutely and the act of willing is not a single entity as Schopenhauer believed. The "will," Nietzsche argues, "is a unity only as a word." (27) Nietzsche claims that Schopenhauer's definition of the 'will' is based on his acceptance of what others said of it. That is why Schopenhauer, in Nietzsche's words, came to explain his concept of will as something simple and flat.

b. Nietzsche's Concept of Will to Power

The concept of 'will to power', like the term 'superman,' has been much misunderstood. The current misrepresentation of this term has occurred in those readings which tend to create a link between Nietzsche's 'Power' and the political-military designations of such a term. On the contrary, by 'Power' Nietzsche does not mean a material being and brute force that is usually found in the physical power of the soldiers of the state. Nietzsche, just ironically, was against the collective nature of the state and he presented such terms as the means of the promotion of man and not in a narrow, dogmatic political sense.

Nietzsche argued that all human behavior is motivated by the will to power. The will to power, as some have misunderstood, is not the power over others; it is, however, the power one needs to overcome oneself. It is the power over oneself that is necessary for creativity. This power can be traced in the creativity, originality and independence of the Superman. But it should be mentioned that the manifestation of the will to power has no relationship with the rise of a master-slave system, as some might have thought so.
Power, in Nietzsche's ideas, especially in his concept of 'will to power,' means a higher, more active and more creative degree and mode of life and being. It is the will to a higher mode of mentality and reflection, which is a sublime and qualitatively different aspect of life. This higher mode of life is attainable only when the existing modes are left behind. Thus, Nietzsche emphasizes that the lower degree of life should be negated so that the higher mode can be achieved. This is done by the Superman's Will to Power.

Although the centrality of the will to power in Nietzsche's framework of thought is almost undisputed, this term has been subject to several different understandings. For example, is the will to power a force for order or does it shoe the chaos of the modern era? Is Nietzsche's concept of the will to power ambiguous? Does Nietzsche, as Heidegger asserts, relapse into metaphysics? Lind L. Williams has summarized these tensions in this way: "Ultimately… a wholly univocal answer to the question 'what is will to power?' is not only impossible but also undesirable."(28) She finally comes to a conclusion in this way:

Interpreting will to power as Nietzsche’s empirical principle to which all experience can be reduced, or interpreting will to power as Nietzsche’s science have the benefit of being in this world, but in my view they suffer from the implication that will to power somehow transcends Nietzsche’s perspectivism. (29)

As the above-mentioned points indicate, the concept of the will to power has paved the way for the emergence of essentially different readings. One might interpret it as a means of controlling others; the other one may consider it as a way to defeat one's enemies, and another reader may regard it as an inspirational source for the establishment of an ideal state.
The present study believes that one of the main causes of such misunderstandings is to be traced back in the confusion of Nietzsche's two essentially distinct views: the first one is his view on the history of the changes in the morals; that is, the genealogy of morals which was explained before. And the second one is his view on the characteristics of the Superman, who is supposed to be a man possessive of the will to power. These two different attitudes which are about two different subjects should not be converged as some have attempted. The confusion of these two views is, however, that recurrent mistake made by the readers and scholars.

Although these two views are on man and his conditions and abilities, each one of them refers to a different stage in the development of man: the first one, which is to know the genealogy of morals and man's reversal of values in the Christian tradition takes place before becoming a superman. The second one, on the other hand, occurs when one is supposed to overcome himself and begins the mental process through which he should go. Consequently, this study does not want to apply Nietzsche's views on different stages of life to the whole aspects of the life.

Nietzsche's concept of will to power is at first a critique of Schopenhauer's concept of the "will to live," which was discussed in the previous section of this chapter. Nietzsche, however, refers to his favorite term as follows:

All that is a living and not a dying body... will have to be an incarnate will to power, it will strive to grow, spread, seize, become predominant—not from any morality or immorality but because it is living and because life simply is will to power… ‘Exploration’ belongs to the essence of what lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the will to power, which is after all the will to life.(30)
As a result, the will to power is something more than the normal and natural behavior of an individual or animal. It is the desire to exert one's will in self-overcoming. The will to power should not be reduced to biological organism. It is that motivating energy that is the cause of self-mastery. Summing up, one can propose that since the will to power is fundamental, the other drives are supposed to be reduced to it.

Another interpretation of the will to power is that it is a process of expansion of creative energy that, Nietzsche believes, is to be the fundamental casual power in the world. This is the driving force of all natural phenomena. The will to power, accordingly, is not to be understood in a psychological or biological way. Hence Nietzsche states that the physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength—life itself is will to power, self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results. (31)

Furthermore, the will to power is central to man's existence, and man would die without it. That is why Nietzsche refers to it as the "essence of life." (32) But these words signify only the importance of the will to power, and designate nothing about its function and operation. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the will to power does not have a physiological and biological designation. There is not a political purpose behind the function of such a will either. Finally, having different connotations, the will to power is best understood as the instinct for self-preservation as mentioned above.
Nietzsche's most obvious reference to the 'will' can be found in his instructions of the section 19 of *Beyond Good and Evil*:

In all willing there is, first, a plurality of sensations, namely, the sensation of the state ‘away from which,’ the sensation of the state ‘towards which,’ the sensation of this ‘from’ and ‘towards’ themselves, and then also an accompanying muscular sensation, which, even without our putting into motion ‘arms and legs,’ begins its action by force of habit as soon as we ‘will’ anything. (33)

For Nietzsche, activity itself is the only consideration of the will to power when he argues that "the doer is merely the fiction added to the deed." (34) In other words, he separates the 'subject,' that is, the 'doer' from the action. Considering the will as an absolute entity neglects its true nature and real effects. In Nietzsche's ideas, this was exactly the error made by Schopenhauer. In other words, Nietzsche believes that Schopenhauer treated the 'will' as an objective fact whereas it is a subjective precept.

The will sometimes has a psychological dimension; it means that our will can sometimes be only psychological and without any action. It can also be sometimes physical because we need to move our bodies in accordance with the sensation. The physical follows the psychological through "force of habit," where every movement is directed by an act of the will. (35) Because the will necessarily contains an action or movement, it is impossible to 'will' and not to 'act.' Similarly, it is not possible to 'act,' or to move, and not to 'will.' The will, as the "essence of life," means that life is action, and without the will man is as good as dead.

The will, in Nietzsche's thought, is more than a series of sensations and thoughts. It is also an instance of command: " a man who wills commands something within himself that renders obedience, or that
he believes renders obedience." (36) The extreme form of this doctrine is the assertion that the will is free. Nietzsche, however, refuses to analyze the concepts of the free and unfree will; he, rather, mentions "strong and weak will" when he writes: "unfree will is mythology .... In real life it is only a matter of strong and weak wills." (37)

Although Nietzsche argues that the will to power is the most fundamental fact of nature, some believe that the violation of the moral order would ultimately result in a kind of instability or even chaos. Nietzsche has put forth an opposite consequence of the will to power in that the real chaos exists in using an absolute goal as the foundation for the moral order: "It is not conflict of opinions that has made history so violent but conflict of belief in opinions, that is to say conflict of convictions." (38)

The negating of the will to power throughout the history has always been advantageous to the dominant moral order and what man has thought to be 'true'. There is a direct relationship between the will to power and the truth. In other words, the will to power always criticizes the generally held truths. Nietzsche points to this relationship in this way:

> The methodical search for truth is a product of those ages in which convictions were at war with one another. If the individual had not been concerned with his 'truth,' that is to say with his being in the right, there would have been no methods of inquiry at all. (39)

Correspondingly, the search for truth changed into the demand for truth, and, thus, the desire to prove the truth of our claims replaced our search for truth. The will to power functions to activate man's criticism of those supposed truths.
The will is the driving force of for different activities, and all other forces, like physical, psychological and biological, are all reducible to will. One the other hand, although the will has various social, religious, cultural and epistemological aspects, its essence, for Nietzsche, mainly lies in Power. That is to say that the will functions and manifests itself in the form of Power. Nietzsche mentions that all human actions, sensations and feelings are the manifestation of the will to power. For example, man's basic emotions, pains, pleasure, and even such items as 'knowledge' and 'change' are all the expression of the will to power.

C. Critique of Institutions

a. Christianity and the Church
The year 1888 was the last productive year of Nietzsche's life, and it was a year of unbelievable creativity for him. He composed five books during six months, and after that he wrote nothing. The first written in 1888 was *The Case of Wagner* which was Nietzsche's manifesto of objection to the art of Wagner, a leading figure in anti-Semitism and German nationalism. The next book was *The twilight of the Idols*, which is discussed in the next section of this chapter. *The Anti-Christ* was written in September of 1888, which was the first part of his project called *Revaluation of All Values*. The other two titles of the same year are *Ecce Homo* and *Nietzsche contra Wagner*.

Walter Kaufmann summarizes the theme of *The Anti-Christ* in the following manner:
The Anti-Christ is Part One of the Revaluation, and one of its main themes is the reversal of the traditional appraisal of the relationship between Christianity and Judaism—an appraisal that had reached an extreme form in the self-styled “Christian” anti-Semitism of those days. (40)

The Anti-Christ is a work of exceedingly clear prose and very rare polemics. Nietzsche's use of delicate ironies is really challenging, and, as Kaufmann says, "Voltaire and Shaw might well have envied him such passages." (41) In this book Nietzsche's criticism goes beyond the familiar attacks on religion because it is the value system of the Christian society which has been carefully scrutinized in this book.

The book begins with a warning that "this book belongs to the very few." (42) This preliminary sign shows that the content of the book has been presented in an idiosyncratic way and its theme might be rejected by different groups of readers. Nietzsche states that only those who have already been able to decode the symbolism of Thus Spoke Zarathustra can appreciate the present book.

He then begins by presenting his famous refusal of the "decadent" individual and "decline" as the consequences of Christianity that tends to set itself up in opposition to the instincts of man. Hence Christianity in an expression of decadence; it is the negation of the will to life:

I call an animal, a species, or an individual corrupt when it loses its instincts, when it chooses, when it prefers, what is disadvantageous for it... Life itself is to my mind the instinct for growth, for durability, for an accumulation of forces, for power: where the will to power is lacking there is decline. (43)

The above denunciation of Christianity as a religion which limits and underestimates man's instincts can be easily seen in Nietzsche's other works. Nietzsche begins to denounce not only Christianity itself
as a practice and a belief but also to refuse its ethical-moral value system. Similar standpoints can be seen in *Beyond Good and Evil* and *The Genealogy of Morals*. This is particularly true concerning his view that the present system of morality is an inversion of the noble moral values (it was fully discussed in the first section of this chapter).

Nietzsche then concentrates on the concept of 'pity' and calls Christianity the religion of pity. "Pity," says Nietzsche, is "practical nihilism." It is the contagion of suffering. By elevating pity to a value its depressive effects restrict those instincts that preserve life:

> Christianity is called the religion of pity. Pity stands opposed to the tonic emotions which heighten our vitality: it has a depressing effect. We are deprived of strength when we feel pity. That loss of strength which suffering as such inflicts on life is still further increased and multiplied by pity. Pity makes suffering contagious. (44)

According to Nietzsche pity is nothing less than the multiplication of suffering since it makes us suffer along with those for whom we feel pity. Pity, moreover, is the cause for depression. It is interesting to know that the German word for 'pity' means 'suffering along.' Therefore, to feel pity for some body means to suffer along with him.

Christianity, in Nietzsche's idea, has made people nihilistic, depressed and weak throughout concerning 'pity' as a high virtue. Here, like his *The Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche traces the origin of this value system to the ancient Jews who lived under Ancient Roman Empire. Ultimately, pity is a nihilism which has historically been put into practice. Pity makes life seem more miserable and "decadent."
Some critics believe that the most influential cause for Nietzsche's attacks on "pity" can be traced back in his harsh criticism of Wagner's opera *Parsifal*, where Wagner, supposedly irreligious, turned to once again to pious Christian themes. A series of calamities occur in *Parsifal*, and according to a prophecy the situation cannot be remedied unless there should be an act "through pity made wise, a pure fool." Nietzsche criticized this part of the opera severely and the Dionysian Nietzsche became forever the antagonist of his once close friend, the Apollonian Wagner.

In the same section of the book Nietzsche focuses on the pessimistic attitudes of Schopenhauer, which are, like Christianity, good examples to show the "negation of life." He also repudiates the influences of Schopenhauer's philosophy as appeared in some of the artistic works of the nineteenth century like Wagner's *Tristan and Isolde*. This opera deals with the unsuccessful love affair between Tristan, the nephew of King Mark of Cornwall, and Isolde, the princess of Ireland. Nietzsche believes that this opera is another manifestation of Schopenhauer's nihilism, especially when the lovers sing of the impossibility of the earthly happiness.

Another criticism of Christianity made by Nietzsche in his *The Anti-Christ* is that "in Christianity neither morality nor religion has even a single point of contact with reality." (45) The religion is concerned with imaginary causes (such as God, soul, and spirit) and imaginary effects (sin, grace, and so on), and the relationships between imaginary beings (i.e. God, angels, etc.).

The Christian concept of God, Nietzsche argues, is one of the most contradictory of any God that has ever been thought of:
The Christian conception of God—God as god of the sick, God as a spider, God as spirit—is one of the most corrupt conceptions of the divine ever attained on earth. It may even represent the low-water mark in the descending development of divine types. God degenerates into the contradiction of life, instead of being its transfiguration and eternal Yes! God is the declaration of war against life, against nature, against the will to live! ... God—the deification of nothingness, the will to nothingness pronounced holy! (46)

Nietzsche attempts to show how the God of Israel, that is the God of the Old Testament, was a God of a very proud Jewish People. This image of God is to Nietzsche, however, much healthier than the Christian God. This God was the expression of the Jews' self-proclaimed virtues. The idea of the God was at that time exactly the idea of nature, that is, both helpful and hurtful.

When the Jews' land was occupied by the Ancient Roman Empire, their God, too, underwent a change. Instead of being powerful and noble the God of the Jews then became a God who embodied the sentiments of the oppressed and resentful. Hence they transformed the God into the God of the poor and the weak. This God was all good, whereas the God of their enemies became evil. In Nietzsche's view, this is a very poor type of God because it is always subject to change as the worshippers want.

This Christian God, the God of "everyman," becomes ultimately a life-denying God. It represents a denial of "this life," as opposed to the powerful, yes-saying and life-affirming God of the ancient Jews. The Christian God becomes finally a nihilistic one that repudiates the existing situation and hopes for a better condition of man. The Christian God, therefore, is involved in the rejection of the world, and regards everything in it as "sinful" and "decadent." That is why in
Christianity the instincts are more and more devalued and thus restricted.

In succeeding sections of The Anti-Christ (sections 20-23) Nietzsche tries to have a comparison between Christianity and Buddhism. He is careful not to confuse these two religions in his critiques. Both, he says, are religions of decadence, but Buddhism is

a hundred times more realistic than Christianity: posing problems objectively and coolly is part of its inheritance, for Buddhism comes after a philosophic movement which spanned centuries. The concept of “God” had long been disposed of when it arrived. Buddhism is the only genuinely positivistic religion in history. (47)

In contrast with the Christian, who is always trying to avoid sin, the Buddhist's major purpose is to reduce suffering itself. Buddha does not demand prayer or asceticism and, instead, is in favor of cheerfulness. The Buddhist thus is not engaged in the practice of moralizing and making judgments about others. A Buddhist does not become angry or resentful. He takes measures which will help him to avoid exiting his senses, while the Christian, on the other hand, goes through an ascetic lifestyle and maintains an emotional relationship with his God in his prayer.

Buddhism is most at home even in the higher classes, but Christianity represents the revengeful instincts of the oppressed. Europe is not ripe for Buddhism since it is a religion of mature and old cultures:

Buddhism is a religion for late man, for gracious and gentle races who have become overspiritual and excessively susceptible to pain (Europe is far from ripe for it): it is a way of leading them back to peace and cheerfulness, to a diet for the spirit and a certain inuring of the body. (48)
The Buddhist, in his avoidance of suffering, aims to maintain a steady peace, calm, and mildness, in his lifestyle and temperament. The Buddhist succeeds in pursuing his aim, whereas the Christian does not succeed in removing sin, and, therefore, is always in a state of wanting "redemption" and "forgiveness."

Nietzsche later on paints a picture of the Jesus of history as being a true evangel. In his view, the true Jesus is different from the Jesus depicted by the church. The true Jesus did not subscribe to the concepts of guilt, punishment, and reward. He was not involved merely in faith, but only in actions. These actions are like those ways Nietzsche would call a Buddhist way of life. For example, the evangel does not become angry, does not pass judgment, and he does not feel hatred or resentment for his enemies. Moreover, he rejects the idea of the sin and repentance:

This “bringer of glad things” died as he had lived, as he had taught—*not* to “redeem men” but to show how one must live. This practice is his legacy to mankind: his behavior before the judges, before the catchpoles, before the accusers and all kinds of slander and scorn—his behavior on the *cross*. (49)

This picture of Jesus is completely alien to the one which the church has shown to us. Surprisingly, Nietzsche expresses some degree of admiration for the character of Jesus, at least the way he faced his death. Jesus expressed no hostility towards those who arrested and tormented him. He was above this hostile manner of life and died graciously in order to convince others of the correctness of his mode of life.
Nietzsche here criticizes those apostles and followers of Jesus who were filled with a want of revenge. Christ's disciples were not as willing to forgive. In Nietzsche's opinion, the worst of them was Paul who was the real founder of the Christian Church.

The followers of Christ thought that Jesus was the Messiah whom was prophesized in the Jewish scripture. That is why they elevated him to a high status: the Son of God. Confused with this question that how God might kill his son, they soon believed in this point that God sent down his Son as a sacrifice for man's sins.

On the other hand, Nietzsche also believes that the Gospels are not so spiritual as so far have been considered. He sees the Gospel as a proof for this fact that the corruption of Christ's ideals had already happened even in early Christian societies. He then elaborates on this issue that how the Gospel is a good example to show the morality of ressentiment. Hence he advises the reader to "put on gloves" when reading the New Testament because there is "so much uncleanness" in it:

I have looked in vain through the New Testament to descry even a single sympathetic feature: there is nothing in it that is free, gracious, honest. Humaneness did not even make its first beginnings here—the instincts of cleanliness are lacking. There are only bad instincts in the New Testament and not even the courage to have these bad instincts.(50)

According to the above-mentioned points, one can come to this conclusion that Nietzsche believed that Christianity, as we know today, came to existence only after the death of Jesus Christ, and it evolved completely opposite to what Christ had thought and done. Christianity is really a religion made of Christ's Apostles, and the
Church, the center for Christian propaganda, was built after the death of Christ.

In the following centuries the whole European countries were under the direct control of the church. A hierarchy of clergymen and the different kinds of priests were formed to carry out various functions and responsibilities. The social behavior, the ethics, the norms and the metaphysics were all under the inevitable impact of the church.

Christianity, in Nietzsche's attitude, devalues man and this world by considering it as the result of the Original Sin (the Fall of Adam and Eve). Therefore, our lives are a kind of punishment. According to Nietzsche, our goal in Christianity is to get out of this world and into heaven. We should get rid of our passions (which cause us to sin), and, hence, our bodies. Based on such a view, bodies are bad and souls are good.

Concluding this section, one can propose that Nietzsche criticizes Christianity mainly for its incomplete and improper understanding of man. Considering man as originally sinful, having pity in life and manners, neglecting this world and dreaming of a better world, restricting man's freedom, neglecting his instincts, emphasizing revenge and producing resentment and finally the slave morality are, in Nietzsche's view, the major weak points of Christianity.
b. Western Philosophy

I. Socrates

The third section of Nietzsche's *The Twilight of the Idols* is dedicated to the discussion and "problems of Socrates." This book was first regarded as an obvious parody of Wagner's *Die Gotterdammerung*, that is, *The Twilight of the Gods*. Nietzsche criticizes several concepts and issues in this book like Schopenhauer's pessimism, German culture, Christianity, and Socrates.

Socrates' battle with the Sophists constitutes one of the most significant polemics in the history of the philosophy. His insistence and rely on the power of man's reason, his tendency towards centrality and, subsequently, his hatred for relativity were among his frequently referred doctrines in his philosophical controversies with the Sophists. Socrates' trust in man's rational understanding of the world finally brought about what later on was called the rational manipulation of the understanding of the world.

Socrates, on the other hand, was the founder of western ethics. His famous three reasons for not to escape from the prison are referred to as the first principles of ethics. Socrates, the father of western metaphysical philosophy, always attempted to arrive at conclusion when having dialogues with the Sophists. Moreover, he was the master of that rhetorical figure known as Socratic irony, whereby he pretended to know nothing in his dialogues and throughout asking questions tried to employ the other side's rationales against itself.

Nietzsche first considers Socrates to be a decadent. He believes that Socrates went against the Homeric virtues of his time as embodied in the ideal character of Odysseus. Odysseus was the symbol for power, cunning, bravery, nobility and manly beauty. Odysseus wants to be with his friends, and see Penelope and Telemakos. He even likes his
dog and cries when he sees him. He gets as much as he can from this life—both the suffering and the joy. This world, the real world, was valuable for him and he chose to live in it and not to spend his life far from the reality (for example, he refused to live eternally with Kalypso in a safe and detached place).

On the other hand, according to Nietzsche, Socrates devalued this world by supposing that the true world is the world of the Forms. Plato, for example, considered the World of Ideas as much Superior and higher than the real world in which we dwell. Furthermore, Nietzsche believes that Socrates neglects man's passions, instincts and concerns in favor of a kind of rational restraint whose only aim is to seek knowledge. That is why Nietzsche regarded Socrates as a man of decline:

This irreverent thought that the great sages are types of decline first occurred to me precisely in a case where it is most strongly opposed by both scholarly and unscholarly prejudice: I recognized Socrates and Plato to be symptoms of degeneration, tools of the Greek dissolution, pseudo-Greek. (51)

According to Nietzsche, Socrates wanted reason and knowledge to be the criteria of greatness, and he himself to be the model of such a virtuous man. This character is in direct opposition to the Homeric one. The other irony regarding Socrates' philosophy, in Nietzsche's view, is that his drives and not his thoughts were irrational since he knew exactly what he was doing. Hence Nietzsche calls Socrates the "absurdly rational animal" in order to reveal the fact that his praise of rationality comes from his irrational drives and instincts for power. Nietzsche asks several rhetorical questions in the following passage in order to show Socrates' sense of revenge for those whom he wanted to defeat:
Is the irony of Socrates an expression of revolt? Of plebeian ressentiment? Does he, as one oppressed, enjoy his own ferocity in the knife-thrusts of his syllogisms? Does he avenge himself on the noble people whom he fascinates? As a dialectician, one holds a merciless tool in one’s hand; one can become a tyrant by means of it; one compromises those one conquers… Is dialectic only a form of revenge in Socrates? (52)

Referring to the definition of the term ressentiment (provided in the first section of this chapter), the present study wants to point out that the sense of ressentiment felt by Socrates, as Nietzsche here implicitly argues, was among the first causes which led him to reverse the accepted moral value system of the Ancient Greece. Socrates established a philosophical discourse not to search for the truth, but to win the war with the Sophists and to elevate his status as a rational thinker.

Socrates succeeded in convincing enough people that to be great means first to be wise, and to be wise first means to be rational, and to be rational and wise is nothing else but to think and behave exactly like Socrates. Thus he himself became the first model for his self-founded system of ethics. Plato, too, was a devoted follower of Socrates who was first influenced by his personality rather than the "truth" as defined in his framework of thought. Plato regarded Socrates as a kind of brave and true hero that replaced the Homeric heroes.

The Homeric notion of the world and image of the character is that man should attempt to be strong, clever, dignified, noble and passionate. For Homer, there are noble, virtuous and strong characters, and there are also weak, dumb and ugly people. It is better to be a king than a slave, a warrior than a beggar.
Nietzsche believes that Socrates thinks of the world and life in terms of knowledge and ethics, that is, what is good and what is bad — knowledge, of course, being good. Nietzsche, on the other hand, thinks that the significant distinction is not between good and bad, but between healthy and unhealthy. In other words, what is good for one person is not necessarily good for the other one since human being are not one and they are different.

Nietzsche describes the reality and reveals the differences. He is not imposing his views, and, correspondingly, his style is descriptive. The style of Plato, on the other hand, tends towards being prescriptive and he appears to be a philosopher who gives orders. Nietzsche analyzes the way things have changed and the way the reality is, but Socrates believed in the truth of the reality he wants to establish and he did.

There are some similarities between Jesus Christ and Socrates from Nietzsche's point of view. First both approached very closely to the characteristics of a Superman, but none of them can be called a true superman. This idea by Nietzsche seems almost unbelievable to the readers of Nietzsche's works. It is true that Nietzsche criticizes both Christ and Socrates, but he argues that they were the highlights of their epoch, and mostly succeeded in their goals.

Secondly, both could have escaped execution but did not do such a thing. Socrates was offered a chance to escape, but he refused. He first tried hard to provoke the authorities to give him the death penalty (as reflected in *The Apology* and *Phaedo*). In Nietzsche's opinion, a philosophy which devalues the world and the body leads ultimately to decadence. Similarly, Jesus could have escaped persecution, but wanted to fulfill the prophecies. He did not want Pilate to let him go, but let Pilate allow the masses to decide. They wanted Jesus killed, and Jesus knew this.
The other similarity between Jesus and Socrates, not mentioned by Nietzsche and to be elaborated more in the third chapter of this research study, is that both employed the oral method and neglected the writing. In other words, whatever Socrates said was written by Plato, and whatever Jesus said was written by the Apostles. Moreover, the other similarity between them, not mentioned by Nietzsche, is regarding their influences (to be more discussed in Chapter Three). That is to say that both were influential in establishing discourses which were penetrating in every aspect of the life of the western individual.

II. Modernity

Although the word 'modern,' or its Latinate origin, 'modernus,' has a long history in different languages, the term "modernity" was first coined by the French Symbolist poet, Charles Baudelaire in 1846. Baudelaire used this term in one of his essays about a French painter in which he simply wanted to say that the painter was involved in painting objects relevant to modern times and characteristics; that is, the "modernity." So far this term has been subject to several different and, sometimes contradictory, connotations. In the present study attempt is done to first present a clear-cut and, at the same time, academic definition of this term which makes it different from the other relevant concepts like modernism and modernization.

By "modernity" the present research means that wide and international (European) philosophic movement which began at the beginning of the seventeenth century and, though criticized severely by Nietzsche, continued to be practiced even in the first years of the
twentieth century. Among the founding thinkers of this philosophical wave were, to name only few, Francis Bacon and Raines Descartes. Spinoza, Thomas Hobbes and John Lock were the major contributors to this philosophical framework, and its climax can be seen in the works of Kant and Hegel.

Modernism, on the other hand, was a literary and artistic movement in Europe that began in the middle and latter part of the nineteenth century and lasted until World War II. Modernism, one can propose, was itself a criticism of the culture and thought created by modernity. Modernism criticized modernity's depiction of man and the world.

And finally, the term 'modernization' refers to that industrial and its subsequent social process which took place in the beginning and middle part of the twentieth century in the developed countries. Modernization was based on the philosophy and logic of modernity which began to become prominent after the Renaissance.

Although Arthur Schopenhauer was the first western philosopher to show some of the deficiencies of the western man's trust in his intellect, it was really Friedrich Nietzsche who directed a major part of his philosophical system against the recent tradition of western philosophy generally called the philosophy of modernity. Nietzsche's *The Twilight of the Idols* is partially dedicated to discuss the shortcomings of the thought of the different philosophers of the modernity. In the third section of this book, "Reason" in Philosophy, Nietzsche tries to foreground the limitations of the pure reason of man on which most of the philosophers of modernity have relied. He first begins by satirizing this instrument, that is, the reason:
And what magnificent instruments of observation we possess in our sense! This nose, for example, of which no philosopher has yet spoken with reverence and gratitude, is actually the most delicate instrument so far our disposal: it is able to detect minimal differences of motion which even a spectroscope cannot detect. Today we possess science precisely to the extent to which we have decided to accept the testimony of the senses. (53)

One part of Nietzsche's criticism of modernity goes back to modernity's interest in the separation of man from nature. Descartes referred to man as "subject" and nature as "object." Descartes separated the mind from the body, the reason from the emotion and, ultimately, the man from nature.

This separation of man from nature was much more expanded in the latter of the seventeenth century when the Neo-Classical theory in arts and the Humanities advocated the life of the cities and neglected the natural village life. Although this doctrine was attacked by Jean Jacques Rousseau, the manners of citizenship and the high class modes of city life were more followed in the eighteenth century. The immediate consequence of such a way of life was the sudden separation of man from the spiritual and inspirational nature.

Nietzsche believed man to be an inseparable part of nature. Man is and should be productive and powerful like nature. On the other hand, modernity ignored the feelings of man, satirized his emotional relationship with nature and finally gave an artificial dimension to the natural instincts of man.

Modernity called for the more domination of man over nature, while Nietzsche argued that there should be unity between man and nature. Furthermore, Nietzsche thought that man is full of ups and downs like nature, and one should not try to rationalize man and nature. In Nietzsche's view, man can be inspired by the natural and pure spirituality of nature.
The process of the rationalization of nature in modernity took place by the industrial domination over nature the result of which, for example, was to give shape and order to the shapeless and disordered nature (the building of modern Parks is based on such an attitude). The process of the rationalization of man, however, occurred when man was completely deprived of his emotions, and his reason, instead, was emphasized. These two processes were the negative aspects and consequences of modernity.

Nietzsche criticizes the second process in his works. In other words, he is mainly concerned with the position of modern man and how he thinks and behaves. Nietzsche is against the rationalization of man, a project done in modernity. Nietzsche's bitter satires and his startling ironies are the result of such a refutation of this kind of philosophy which reduces man to a machine.

Modernity, Nietzsche believed, deprived man of his "humaneness." The mere trust on man's reason and intellect, without having sympathy for his emotions, was catastrophic. Nietzsche was among the first to feel such a catastrophe. Thus the major part of his harsh criticism is against the vulgar rationality of modern man.

The ninth section of his *The Twilight of the Idols*, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, constitutes one of Nietzsche's severe attacks on the issues and figures of modernity. The title of Part 39 of this section is "Critique of Modernity," in which Nietzsche is involved in the negative aspects of some of the dominant issues of modernity. "Modern democracy," "modern spirit," and "modern marriage" are those concepts that Nietzsche attempts to reveal their misused employment of rationality.
Nietzsche's concern regarding the problems and conflicts of modern man led him to deny his contemporary thinkers' sense of passivity and pessimism. He has presented a psychological analysis of the main problems of modern man like materialism, passivity and disillusionment with the religion. He has also provided some genealogical documents for the present system of the morality in the west. Nietzsche's radical denunciation of modernity is taken as the first sustained and systematic critique modernity's belief in rationality in the western philosophy.

D. Nietzsche's Concept of Creativity

Considering Nietzsche's concept of creativity, the present study is first concerned with the backgrounds in air of the nineteenth century regarding man's creativity. The preliminary step in such a discussion is to explore into the attitudes of Nietzsche's contemporaries towards the concept of pessimism. The second stage is to explain Schopenhauer's opinions regarding pessimism, and the concluding point is to analyze Nietzsche's views on creativity.

The middle part of the nineteenth century is often considered as the climax of the Industrial Revolution, man different scientific achievements and modernity's sense of the absolute. The Industrial Revolution took place when, in 1851, Prince Albert, Queen Victoria's husband, inaugurated the Great Exhibition in London. It was for the first time that man used iron and glass in the windows of the buildings of this Exhibition. Moreover, it was for the first time that, because of the development of industry, man could use different artifacts made of iron in the kitchen of those buildings in the Exhibition.
No the other hand, the nineteenth century was the era of several extraordinary discoveries in different fields of science. Geology and biology as long as with chemistry and physics had an unbelievable development that, ultimately, made people farther and farther from religion. The employment of the stream power in the locomotives, on the other hand, had changed the atmosphere of this age completely. Furthermore, the Evolution Theory of Charles Darwin was another startling event of this period which resulted in a deep disillusionment with the Bible.

The absolute morals mentioned by Kant in the eighteenth century gave its place to the Theory of the Absolute Spirit in the philosophical system of Hegel. The philosophy of modernity had really come close to its end by its different senses of the absolute. The first criticism of Hegel began to shape in the hands of Schopenhauer.

Schopenhauer is regarded as the first western philosopher to emphasize modern man's incapability in knowing the world. He was also a pessimist towards the character and the potentials of man. Although he was the first western thinker to speak highly of the philosophical optimism of the East, he suffered from his pessimism till the end of his life. He hoped for a return to the Eastern Wisdom from Western Reason, but he himself could not succeed in a perfect fulfillment of such a hope. He remained a pessimist till the end of his life.

Schopenhauer's pessimism was simultaneously parallel to the pessimism of Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin. The direct influence of these theories in the arts and literature finally produced what is usually referred to as Naturalism in arts and literature. Naturalism, a pessimistic school which does not believe in the salvation of man, was the dominant literary school at the end of the
nineteenth century. Summarizing this part, one can say that pessimism was the dominant attitude in the air in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

The immediate result of such pessimism was a belief in Nihilism. Nietzsche's philosophy has ever been troubling for the majority of the readers regarding its possible "nihilistic" motifs. The present study aims at the refusal of such a belief, and believes that this issue has been one of the most ironic misunderstandings concerning the philosophy of Nietzsche.

It is interesting to note most of the readers of the works of Nietzsche are likely to call him a nihilist. The truth is that Nietzsche was not only a nihilist, but also radically against it. Nietzsche criticizes Schopenhauer for his pessimism and his mistrust in the power of man to know himself and the world. Although the stylistic features of Nietzsche's works are close to Schopenhauer's definition of the original art, it should not be forgotten that their works are thematically not only different but also contradictory.

Concluding the above mentioned words, one can propose that while Schopenhauer was involved in a negative nihilism, Nietzsche was dealing with a new type of Positive nihilism. Negative nihilism does not believe in man's potentiality and knowledge. It does not believe in the salvation of man. It is bitterly and severely pessimistic towards the future of man and the world. It despises the life on earth, and does not believe in any possible life after death.

Positive nihilism, on the other hand, believing in most of the ideas of negative nihilism, relies on human and humaneness. The dignity, honesty and humanity of man are to be taken as important in positive nihilism. Positive nihilism calls for respecting man and his capabilities. It regards every human attributes as respectful and
dignified. Positive nihilism believes in man's gift and power creativity.

Thus, creativity plays a major role in the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche. It is the last and the purposed stage in the development of man. In Nietzsche's views, man is and should become creative. Passivity, for Nietzsche, is the characteristic of the lower men; the last, most difficult and most significant stage in the development of the Superman is creativity.

Creativity happens after several stages that were mentioned in the first sections of this chapter. Some of these stages, in Nietzsche's thought are, to name the most important, self-overcoming, courage and energy, refusing the existing morality, revaluation of values, thinking beyond good and evil, suffering, learning, transformation, the will to power, and finally creativity. Testing and questioning are two other main steps before creativity:

A testing and a questioning hath been all my traveling—
and verily, one must also learn to answer such questionings!
That, however, is my taste. (54)

One of the designations of creativity in Nietzsche's thought is the creation of a new set of values. Although Nietzsche is against Christ and Socrates, he believes that they were creative since they were successful in creating a new value system. Other persons in the history who have come close to Nietzsche's definition of the Superman have all been creative regarding the establishment of a new ethical and value system.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a work in which Nietzsche tried to encounter the world-historical crisis posed by nihilism. Zarathustra's most significant characteristic is his being creative and active. Zarathustra, Nietzsche's model for the Superman, is energetic, Dionysian and creative. He says:

Creating—that is the great salvation from suffering, and life's alleviation. But for the creator to appear, suffering itself is needed, and much transformation. (55)

Creativity has another meaning in the thought of Nietzsche, which is an especial kind of artistic creativity. Such an artistic creativity is based on the Dionysian principles and tends to ignore the Apollonian treatment. The characteristics of this kind of creativity are found in Nietzsche's own works: they are enthusiastic, metaphoric, aphoristic, ecstatic and symbolic.

The fictitious world reflected in such an artistic creativity is the end and the truth itself. It is at the same time an escape from the ugliness of the present world. In The Birth of Tragedy he writes:

There is only one world, and this is false, cruel, contradictory, seductive, without meaning—a world thus constituted is the real world. We have need of lies in order to conquer this reality, this 'truth,' that is in order to live. (56)

Therefore, in order to escape life's "cruel" and "seductive" sides one is supposed to quest in an artistic world made by man's creativity. Nietzsche's concept of creativity is, however, in opposition to the attitudes of the middle class members. If they are in fond of a realistic art and literature, Nietzsche calls for an anti-realistic creation which is not a mere copy of this "false" world. Nicholas Davey thus describes Nietzsche's antagonism to nihilism by emphasizing creativity:
What Nietzsche fears even more is the despair that might seize humanity when realizes that the enormous sacrifices undertaken in quest of the ‘truth’ have been in vain. The optimistic side of his analysis concerns the revaluation of humanity’s ideals which an understanding of nihilism facilitates… Nietzsche sees the critical need for the creation of a new set of values which would enable humanity to confront actuality as it is, to take delight in actuality \textit{per se} rather than to hanker after another true world of Being. (57)
Notes:

2. This is one of Nietzsche's famous disdains of Christianity.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p.452.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p.21.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
21. Nietzsche's style of writing and the tendency to rank him as a poet and not as a philosopher is under the influences of the ideas of Schopenhauer towards both art and philosophy.
22. Buddhism teaches The Four Noble Truths: 1. There is suffering. 2. Suffering results from desire. 3. Desire can be eliminated (Nirvana) 4. Following the Eightfold Path leads to Nirvana. Schopenhauer, instead of The Four Noble Truths, described a twofold path. Denial of Will is attained by either the experience of an extremely great suffering that leads to loss of the will to live, or the knowledge of the essential nature of life in the world.
24. Ibid., p.54.
27. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p.129.
31. Ibid., p.13.
35. Fredrich Nietzsche, Beyond *Good and Evil*, p.19.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p.21.
39. Ibid., p.634.
41. Ibid., p.567.
42. Ibid., p.568.
43. Ibid., p.572.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., p.581.
46. Ibid., p.585-6.
47. Ibid., p.586-7.
48. Ibid., p. 590.
49. Ibid., p. 608-9.
50. Ibid., p.625.
52. Ibid., p. 476.
53. Ibid., p. 481.
55. Ibid., p.83.