Abstract

The assessment of a democratic form of government in a particular nation-state cannot be carried out merely by evaluating its electoral practices. Contemporary democracy being complex and intricate, various institutions come into play and interface with the elected government. The civil-military relations in a given nation-state often determine the efficacy of its democracy. As such, the study of civil-military relations is crucial to the study of democracy in any political system. The increasing presence of military in peace-time political space has lead to the ‘militarization of politics’ and the ‘politicization of military’, both of which adversely affect civil-military relations.

This thesis seeks to examine, comparatively, the interface between the role of the armies in India and Pakistan, and the growth of democracy in the two nations. It is therefore necessary to study the relationship between the civilian and military leadership in both countries, and particularly the reasons for there having been no military coup in India and the reasons for the frequency thereof in Pakistan. This would determine the correlation between the success of democracy and the role of the army in political theory.

The conclusions could highlight the noxious subversion of democracy by the military as a caution to young nation-states. Equally, the conclusions could highlight the importance of apolitical institutions such as the army in the growth of democracy.