CHAPTER IV
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NIEO - A PLEA FOR CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVES

The call for New International Economic Order is based on the assumption that the prevalent international economic order perpetuates and aggravates international inequalities which explained in previous chapters and that new relationship of interdependence should replace the older patterns of dependence and unequal exchange. It is argued by the advocates of NIEO that the rich developed countries are morally obliged to facilitate the flow of resources to less developed countries and that it is in their self-interest to encourage the promotion of growth and development of the poor countries in order to expand their markets. The developing countries hold the view that the developed countries must recognise the growing power of the commodity producers as evident from the success of Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in raising oil prices and accept that the laws of power have inclined in their favour. Developing countries thus naturally started feeling that there was the need to reform the world economic system so that it could take specific cognisance of the needs of developing countries and develop such rules and institution which would meet the requirements of these countries.

IV.1 BROAD NIEO DEMAND

The demands for NIEO, expressed at the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in May 1974, represent the culmination of years of attack on international trading system, which, embodied in the principles
and rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), aims at progress towards free international trade. Since its inception at Bretton Woods in 1944, this system has seen enormous progress towards liberalisation of trade and finance, but progress has been concentrated on manufactured products, mainly produced in the industrialised nations. No comparable progress has been made in either agricultural trade or trade in manufactures of special interest to developing countries. Along with the multiple tariff and non-tariff barriers set up by the Western industrial countries, the economic power of the Transnational Corporations (TNCs) further deteriorated the position of developing countries in the field of trade. Such a disturbing picture of an unjust and unequal world underscored the reality of the post-war economic order which continued to be directed to the attainment not of global but sectorial ends.

The Agenda of specific reforms of the international economic structure advocated by the developing nation is by now well known. Of longest standing are initiatives to increase the price and volume of developing country exports; indexed prices for commodities to guarantee stable and favourable terms of trade and preferential access to markets of developed countries. A second category comprises of measures to regulate and enhance the beneficial consequences of in-flows of foreign private capital limitations on the scope of activities of multinational corporations; development of independent sources for the transfer of modern, but appropriate, technology; and improved access to capital markets for development finance on more satisfactory
terms. A third set of demands relates to the flow of public resources at a minimum, fulfillment of the goal agreed to, by the developed nations that 0.7 percent of GNP be allocated to aid; and a debt moratorium for hard-pressed developing countries burdened by debt service and amortization payments. Fourth area comprehens new rules for the International Monetary System; linkage of IMF special drawing rights to needs for development finance and more abundant compensatory finance from the IMF on more generous and less supervised terms. A last group of reforms calls for modifications of the very decision-making structure of international economic institution to enhance the role of the South: revised voting allocations in the IMF, World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and serious, direct negotiations encompassing the fall, interrelated agenda.²

At the first level of analysis, the NIEO is a series of specific proposals for reorganizing the character of world economic relations. By stabilizing and raising raw materials prices, by providing increased tariff preferences to the less developed countries (LDCs), by expanding aid and waiving debt payments, by making more technology available at lower prices, and by allowing host countries to nationalize foreign assets on terms decided by their own judicial systems, the Group of 77³ hoped to use the international system for their own internal development needs. Thus, it is essential to start with examining the predominantly economic aspects of the NIEO. In these terms, the NIEO is concerned with the world distribution of wealth and income. The group of 77 and its theoreticians argued vehemently that the structure of international trade and monetary relations was biased against the low-income countries and that the purpose
of changing the system was to get it to yield an adequate flow of benefits.

At the second level, the NIEO is concerned with the world distribution of power. For the political elites of the LDCs, the arguments of Neo-Classical economics are inherently frustrating because they ascribe the outcomes of much economic interaction to that ineluctable force, the market. Though a large part of twentieth-century economics deals with market imperfections and how to compensate for them, most LDC political leaders are unwilling on either a personal level or as a matter of policy making to acknowledge the advantages of designing market oriented systems for producing and distributing goods. Systems that are to open could limit the control over resources the elites possess, and it is increased control that these leaders seek. If the international economic system is produced inadequate results, then these leaders favor exerting political control.

At the most fundamental level, however, the NIEO debate is about restructuring the international economic system. The rhetoric in the name NIEO would be more than verbiage if the basic proposals were implemented. If the international economic system became an explicitly agreed mechanism for international redistribution of income, it would be as fundamental change in structure as occurred with the establishment of the Bretton Woods system or the shift from mercantilism to liberal trade in the nineteenth century. From this "systems perspective", the focus of attention is on economic results; but the political and psychological elements of the present system that have
contributed to the LDC resentment need to be dealt with simultaneously, so that an overall system can be developed; that is perceived as legitimate by an increasing number and range of actors.

Poor countries have been urging decolonisation and greater assistance from richer countries for decades. What is new about present condition is, that the poor countries are presenting highly coordinated plans and programmes of action to the rich countries. The programmes themselves are made not so new, but if they become implemented they certainly would entail a quite new and unusual world order because they asked for a substantial redistribution of the benefits of the world's wealth. Although the demand for NIEO is many-faceted it essentially entails a substantial increase in the transfer of real resources from rich to poor countries.

The industrial countries were confronted with the design at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, which due to massive and, to some extent political pressure from the developing world, adopted demand programme to establish a new international economic order. The demand programme contains a wide-ranging list of demands and is aimed generally at a redistribution of wealth in favour of the developing nations. The demands include:-

1. Orientation of the international monetary system towards the interests of the developing world.

2. Production cartels along the lines of OPEC;

3. Commodity agreements to regulate prices and quantities;

4. Linkage of export prices in the developing countries to the prices they have to pay for imports;
Extension of preferential treatment in trade;

6 Recognition of developing countries' permanent sovereignty over their natural resources, covering also the issue of exploiting the ocean floor and the related question of territorial waters;

7 Structural policies in the industrial countries to promote the industrial development of the developing nation; and

8 Transfer of advanced technology to the developing countries.

Thus, the NIEO is a reaction by the South against a framework that has seemed inadequate to reflect the reality they faced and has seemed to serve best the interests of the principal and already dominant acts.

IV.2 THE FUNDAMENTAL AIMS OF NIEO

The demand for a New International Economic Order is basically a demand for more efficient and equitable management of interdependence of the world economy. The advocates of NIEO accept the necessity and inevitability of inter-dependence. What they seek to negotiate relates to terms of interdependence. The objective is to create external economic environment conductive to accelerate social and economic development in the countries of the Third World and to facilitate the pursuit by these countries of an autonomous path and style of development suited to the genius of their people.

The basic philosophy of NIEO is frankly-interventionist. It involves interference with the working of the free market forces both at the national and the international level. The aim of NIEO emphasises that accelerated growth in
countries of the Third World requires massive structural changes in the operation of the domestic economy of these countries and further that these structural changes in turn require a vigorous mobilisation of domestic policy measures are necessary condition of any sustained acceleration in the pace of development. The NIEO proposals emphasise that the effectiveness of domestic policy measures can be greatly influenced by the external economic environment faces by the developing countries.

The NIEO proposals recognise that, in the present day world, external trade cannot be expected to be an engine of growth and also that sustained development must, therefore, be rooted in the discovery of some other leading sector in the domestic economy. If in spite of this recognition the reform of the international trading system figures most prominently in the NIEO proposals, it is due to an awareness that a steady and orderly expansion of international trade can greatly facilitate the process of structural change and accelerated growth. In a large number of developing countries, exports form a significant proportion of the country's national income and account for a major proportion of government revenues. As such, the overall sluggishness and instability of export earnings can have profound effects on the functioning of the economy as a whole. There are, of course some large developing countries where exports from only a small part of national income. However, experience shows that even in such countries export growth is often necessary so as to pay for essential imports whose volume inevitably increases in the process of development. Thus export growth being a major determinant of a country's import capacity, can have a
significant impact on the overall growth of the economy. It is for this reason that reform of the international trading system gets priority attention in the NIEO action programme. The NIEO proposals also stress that notwithstanding increased emphasis on financial and technological resources from abroad to achieve an adequate growth rate. For this reason, a reform and restructuring of the international market for capital, money and flow of technology also figures prominently in the NIEO proposals.

Roots of the NIEO lay (i) in the realization among Third World countries that their regained political sovereignty was seriously compromised by an economic backwardness which kept them dependent on the affluent industrialized countries for meeting even the minimum demands of modernization; and (ii) in the discovery that their chances of developing to the point of self-generated economic growth were likely to worsen, under the prevailing market condition for goods, services, and credit. An understanding of these grim realities, dawned slowly and spread gradually among the developing countries in the years falling roughly between the holding of the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 and the fourth summit meeting of non-aligned nations held at Algiers in September 1973. At the first UNCTAD some core ideas, objectives, and strategies for development were drafted; the Algiers meeting expressed disillusionment with the pace of international development efforts and, in its economic declaration, sketched out a framework for the NIEO. As part of such positive action the NIEO proposals call for an active intervention in the commodity markets viz., the international commodity agreements to
secure stable, just and remunerative prices of primary products exported by the developing countries. In the area of manufacture, the emphasis is on redeployment of world resources in the light of dynamic comparative advantage. To facilitate a more rational international division of labour, developed countries are asked to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers which affect exports of developing countries and in particular to modify those features of their tariff regimes which discourage processing of primary products in the developing countries. As is well known, the effective protection for processed primary products implicit in the tariff structure of many developed countries is much higher than may be suggested by nominal tariff rates. In addition, developed countries are asked to adopt positive measures such as provision of adjustment assistance to facilitate phasing out of those industries and processes in which the developed world no longer enjoys comparative advantage. Finally, as an extension of the classical infant industry protection argument, developed countries are asked to give preferential treatment to exports of developing countries by adopting a system of generalised non-discriminatory tariff preferences in favour of developing countries.

The NIEO proposals also envisage a basic reform of the arrangements for the flow of international capital to the developing countries. The objectives in this area are both to increase such flows and also to strengthen the capability of the developing countries to pursue autonomous paths of development. The existing mechanisms for transfer of capital from developed to developing countries are subject to varying degrees of political control and manipulation which reduce their effectiveness as
instruments of genuine development. Bilateral official aid flows are largely influenced by political considerations. Such considerations cannot altogether be ruled out in the operations of multilateral institutions in which the system of weighted voting gives the developed countries a disproportionate influence in the decision making processes. As regards private direct investment, apart from the market power enjoyed by the transnational corporations there are indications that investment decisions of these corporations can also be influenced by political considerations. The rapid growth of the Eurocurrency markets in recent years and the intense competition among international banks for lending has no doubt enhanced the maneuverability of those middle income developing countries which have access to these markets. However, as a result of a rapid increase in indebtedness of several developing countries to international banks, there is a growing degree of nervousness among bankers about the credit-worthiness of their clients. The NIEO proposals seek to reduce the role of extraneous political considerations in international capital transfers and also to secure larger flows on more favourable terms and conditions.

The NIEO proposals also visualise major restructuring of the international monetary system. Recognising that trading arrangements alone cannot reduce the uncertainty in external payments to a tolerable limit, they envisage a single significant improvements in the volume, terms and conditions of balance of payments support made available by the IMF to the developing countries. These proposals also involve the adoption of more equitable and symmetrical mechanisms for the creation of
international liquidity, for adjustments of payments imbalances and for ensuring that international monetary arrangements subserve the cause of growth. The proposals for making the SDR as the central reserve asset of the monetary system and for establishing a link between the creation of international liquidity and development assistance are major elements of the NIEO action programme. In order to 'depolitize' the process of assistance from the IMF, greater role is demanded for the developing countries in the decision making process of the fund.

The clue to the distinction can be found in various passages of the Declaration in Assembly resolution 3201(S-VI) (See Appendix) which, in calling for a NIEO in order to "correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, states that it has proved impossible to achieve an even and balanced development of the international community under the existing international economic order which, perpetuates inequality. "Moreover, a new order is necessary to reflect the "irreversible changes in the relationship of forces in the world" necessitate the active, full and equal participation of the developing countries in the formulation and application of all decisions that concern the international community."

The central aim of the NIEO is thus "politico-economic" to change the way in which the international economic system functions, so as to provide developing countries with far greater support for their development efforts, and thus to reduce, it not to eliminate the built-in inequity of the system, and to do this on the basis of a democratic approach to international economic decision making in which developing countries would have full
and effective participation. In support of this objective, the Programme of Action in Assembly Resolution 3202 (S-VI) calls, interalia, for: effective sovereignty by developing countries over the use of their natural resources; the regulation and stabilization of world markets for primary commodities; appropriate adjustments, in the economies of developed countries to permit a rational, just and equitable international division of labour; the reform of the international monetary system; the regulation of the activities of transnational corporation; the support of producers' association; and the promotion of economic co-operation among developing countries, based on the principle of collective self-reliance.

It bears repeating, therefore that the quintessence of the NIEO is structural change of the international system so as to allow the developing countries the opportunity to generate a level of economic capacity in the modern age which can be self-sustaining. To reach that central goal, the NIEO advocates two strategic objectives: to improve the conditions of international co-operation for developmental purposes, and to create a greater measure of self-reliance among the developing countries themselves. Neither objective is realizable without changing the psychological, political, and economic environment of the world.

In short NIEO objective of improving international co-operation between the developed and developing countries calls for regulation and amendment of the international market system so as to bring about: (i) improved terms of trade for developing countries (ii) increase in, and stabilization of, earnings on exports of raw materials and primary commodities;
(iii) better access to the markets of developed states for processed and manufactured exports of developing states; (iv) increase in, and automaticity of transfers of financial developmental resources from the rich to the poor countries; (v) the creation, guaranteed access, and significant transfer of technology appropriate to the expressed needs of the developing world; (vi) increase in international liquidity available to developing countries and protection from the effects of inflation in the industrial economies; (vii) some sharing of decision-making powers in the international financial institutions through which many of the transfers from rich to poor are made, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Pursuit of these objectives necessitates constant negotiation and possible confrontation between developing countries, on the one hand, and the corporations and governments of the advanced economies, on the other.

The other strategic objective of the NIEO is individual and collective self-reliance within the developing countries. This necessitates long-term and extensive cooperation among them in all fields so as to reduce their individual dependence on the centre and prevent penetration by the centre. Communiques issued from their many joint meetings urge Third World countries to expand their trade with each other, to identify areas of common interest and mutual benefit for joint action, and to increase the levels of scientific, intellectual, and technological exchanges among themselves. In short, the developing countries are urged to make their own cooperation substantive within regions and across continents to achieve self-reliance. Self-reliance may also
justify assertions of sovereign rights over natural resources on land and under sea, protection of domestic industry by regulation of foreign investment and corporate activity, and an expanded share in the infrastructure of international trade, shipping insurance, and credit. Once again, solidarity and coordinated action among developing countries would obviously enhance their chances of narrowing the gap between assertion and achievement of these rights. Thus, fundamental aim of the NIEO is contain any single nation or region from unilaterally exploiting others. The rules and balances on which the world economic order was built cannot and, what is more should not be restored in their existing firm. To establish such rules, mechanisms and code of behaviour in international relations which will permit for the development of national economies without foreign interference and involves a redistribution of the world's wealth in favour of developing countries and equal participation in the management of the international affairs to obtaining greater control over world decision making.

IV.3 GUIDING ELEMENTS FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL AIMS

The focus during the 1950s on the 'gap' in the incomes, living standards and wealth of the developing and the developed countries and on the gearing of international targets to narrowing and eventually eliminating such differences, was probable helpful in leading animation to the development decades and the attendant programmes for developing countries. But it was also to lead inevitably to frustration. Such gaps cannot possibly be narrowed in any significant manner in the foreseeable
future despite any optimism as to the prospects of the developing countries growth rates\textsuperscript{5}. Thus, despite the fact that the developing countries, as a group, grew at the historically remarkable rate of 5.5 percent per annum during the first development decade of the 1960s, the awareness grew that these rates of growth could neither help measurably in 'catching up' with the developed countries nor could they adequately diffuse the fruits of growth to the poor in the developing countries.\textsuperscript{6} And to accelerate development for developing countries, eliminate the inequalities between the developed and developing countries and eradicate poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy in the developing countries. It underlines the economic and political interdependence of the international community and makes a justifies and necessary case for reforming the existent world order so as to bring the world economy back to the path of sustained growth and to secure the benefits of advanced technology in all aspects of their lives.

The erosion of faith since the 1950s in the ability of developing countries to catch up with the developed countries has surely contributed to their present 'trade unionist' demands for greater shares in world income through the creation of a new international economic order\textsuperscript{7}.

The fundamental aim formulated on previous pages has its root in the conviction that all human being have an equal rights to a life of dignity and to satisfaction in their threefold capacities as citizens, producers and consumers. The scenario in the early 1970s was deepening disillusionment for the developing countries as the inadequacies of the existing economic

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arrangements became more obvious and the inequalities relationship between the North and the South more disquietening. Along with the multiple tariff and non-tariff barriers set up by the Western industrial countries, the economic power of the transnational corporation (TNCs) further deteriorated the position of developing countries in the field of international trade. Such a disturbing picture of a unjust and unequal world underscored the reality of the post-war economic order which continued to be 'directed to be the attainment not of global but sectorial ends.8

Significantly, the contradictions and constraints of the post-war economic order came to the fore in early 1970s when the main props of the Bretton Wood system began to crumble in quick succession particularly when the US the king pin of the existing framework-pulled down the shutters of the "gold window" on August 1971. All short term emergency measures and reform moves were overwhelmed by disruptive developments in the international economic arena. The skepticism about the efficiency and efficacy of the existing order along with the perception of it's structural inequality and inadequacy was as such no longer confined to the spokesman of developing countries only. The more enlighten ended sections of public opinion and ruling elites in the developed West could see, "the fundamental incompatibility" between the existing international institutional framework designed for a firmer era, and global realities and problems which it was no longer able to control.9

The Group of 77 nations came to realise the need for renewed efforts, in a more concerted and cohesive manner, to
confront the rich nations with their demands for a profound mutation in the existing economic system. Thus a serious confrontation between two sides—one demanding radical changes and the other insisting on the status quo become inevitable. It is revealing that how the developing countries more singularly became conscious of the reality of the existing economic order in which, as the Declaration on the NIEO has proclaimed:—

"The benefits of technological progress are not shared equally by all members of the international community. The developing countries, which constitute 70 percent of the world's population account for only 30 percent of the world income. It has proved impossible to achieve an even and balance development of the international community under the existing international order".10

They have, therefore, persistently demanded structural changes in prevalent system. But all their efforts, which, for obvious reasons, were made within the framework of the UN, to create a genuine mechanism for international economic cooperation germane to their needs of economic advancement yielded no meaningful results. The key factor in the failure of all such attempts has been the callous indifference or evasive attitude of the major industrial power of the North. Despite the developing countries incessant pleas that the unjust inequalities in existing order ought to be radically restructured, the Western market economy countries, particularly the US, continued to argue, to quote US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that "the present international economic system has served the world well" and as such, "future prosperity in the US and throughout the
globe depend on its continued good performance.\textsuperscript{11}

Subsequently, as noted earlier, they have sought to placate the all the demands of developing countries for changes in the prevailing order and promote their vested interest through its continued existence by preaching such facile theorise of 'interdependence', 'stages of growth' and the like.\textsuperscript{12}

Reflected in the change in orientation was a changing perception of the political dimensions of the resource problem and a reassessment of the nature of the problems of economic development. Shifts in the distribution of economic power in the world\textsuperscript{13} the emergence of new independent states, increasing First World reliance on Third World resources, heightened political sensitivity to patterns of economic interdependence\textsuperscript{14} the proliferation of enterprises doing business abroad, and shifts in the bargaining power of foreign investors in the raw material sectors vis-a-vis developing host countries altered the context of development. The fundamental issue of achieving a better distribution of the gains from international economic transitions remained, but development policies were revised, and the means for achieving a redistribution of the world's economic opportunities were reassessed. Now the question is What combination of factors turned the New International Economic Order from an avalanche into a glacial advance:

First, the oil price increases proved to be a mixed blessing most of the LDCs were quick to discover that, despite the pride they look in seeing OPEC exert its economic muscle, they were not oil exporters and they were going to have to pay four times as much for their imported oil.
Second, the oil price jump had led to a massive redistribution of income from the oil-consuming to the oil-producing countries. This wrenching change had triggered almost panic levels of inflation in the developed countries, and their governments responded with tight monetary and fiscal policies. The world's major trading economies, therefore, moved in a period of two years from a widespread boom to a major recession.

Third, it became more and more widely recognized that the rapid increase in raw materials prices that had occurred in the 1971-73 period was the result, not of any fundamental scarcities, but rather of the highly unusual coincidence of business peaking in each of the major industrial markets. It thus became important to distinguish between oil prices that were maintained at high levels by the OPEC cartel and other raw materials prices that would continue to fluctuate given more normal cycles of supply and demand. This forced those LDCs that relied primarily on raw materials exports to put their main effort into negotiating commodity price stabilization schemes like the Common Fund.

Fourth, tension between the moderate Arab states and the West diminished considerably after 1973 as (i) the United States began to put increasing pressure on Israel to negotiate, and (ii) the Europeans and Japanese turned actively supportive of Arab position. More important, the less militant Arabs recognized that extra income was far less critical to them than world political stability and a smoothly expanding world economy.
Fifth, the actual brokerage among the LDCs in the political arena proved exceptionally difficult. The belaboured CIEC discussions in Paris were a good example of how intractable the negotiations became. The talks concluded with two tangible results: (i) an agreement in principle on the establishment of Common Fund; and (ii) a pledge on the part of the rich to provide an additional $1 billion in aid to the poorest countries. The industrialized countries were unable to get any concessions on energy issues: the developing countries, on the other hand, did not get the agreement on debt relief that they wanted. On the surface, these two result seem like some evidence of North-South compromise.

The developed states had come to recognize "the need for positive action" and the developing states to recognize what's possible. Despite, or perhaps because of, the deterioration in the world situation, ideas and attitudes have evolved. Both sides now seem to avoid temptations to turn inward or to allow conflict between cartels of producers and consumers, tendencies which were such a threat at the end of 1973 and the beginning of 1974, "Third World representatives, on the other hand, credited both the world economic situation and the pressures of Third World solidarity with having brought about closer convergence of view points. According to the Venezuelan Minister of International Economic Affairs, Manual Perez Gurerrero, the change in attitude stemmed form the developed states' "renewed sense of solidarity with the international community," and from the firm position taken by the countries of the Third World supported by the existence and the actions of the OPEC countries. The shift from "confrontation" to
"conciliation" must be seen rather as a tactical shift that stemmed from perceptions of the limitations of continued confrontational politics. The objectives of neither the developing states as a group nor the United States would be advanced, it had come to be thought, by continued confrontation.\textsuperscript{17}

For the United States, whose performance at the Seventh Special Session was key, the shift from confrontation to conciliation represented a tactical move that implied no more of a fundamental commitment to Third World development than the Third World's compromise implied retreat from the demand for equity and political status, such a change in tactics was not motivated by a fear of threats from the Third world in the form of further producer's associations action as various analysts have argued\textsuperscript{18}. That explanation simply fails to hold up under scrutiny of the resource situation and under consideration of the strains on developing states of world inflation and recession. In fact, U.S. government's perception of the supposed producer threat had been informed well before the United Nations meeting. In a report presented to the board of Governors of the World Bank as the opening of the Seventh Special Session, Robert Mc Namara warned, in fact, that the poorest nations of the world now faced a decade of economic stagnation. Their import prices were rising faster than their export prices. Per capita incomes of the poorest countries had declined by 0.5 percent in 1974, and were expected to decline further. Even in the middle income developing countries there were signs of rising trade deficits and declining per capita incomes.\textsuperscript{19}
Even with the decision of the rich OPEC states to continue to ally with the rest of the developing world, the Group of 77's deficit problems were unalleviated and their ability to influence international political and economic affairs remained limited by the general asymmetry of international economic and political power and by the Group's lack of command over particular leverage points other than control over a large share of the world known reserves and exports of oil. The industrialized world were likely to suffer serious supply shortages in the next few decades nor were they likely to be faced with proliferation of producers' association capable of embargoing supplies to increased price.

To an alternative explanation, the conciliatory gesture made by the United States at the Seventh Special Session was made merely as an attempt to take the wind out of the Third World's sails, to confuse and divert the conference from the developing states' proposals and to play on time and the diversity within the Group of 77.

The U.S. initiatives at the Seventh Special Session reflect a recognition that the earlier attempt to "divide and conquer" had failed. To pursue it further would be counterproductive to the United States' basic objective of strengthening the efficiency of the world economy through improved international market mechanism. An objective which the United States had come to view as requiring some accommodation with the developing states within the framework of reformed, but not transferred, international economic structures. Not only had OPEC not been shattered, but no developing state had openly
turned against the association. The persistence of the Third World's solidarity was, in other words, one of the factors which influenced the U.S. shift in tactics. This does not mean, as developing states insist, that Third World cohesion compelled the developed states to alter their position; for, in fact, few positions were changed. Rather, what one sees is that with the third world having demonstrated by their linking of oil and other raw materials, that an open attempt to split them would only encourage a stronger sense of solidarity, the United States shifted to a readiness to talk about specific economic issues of concern to different countries with the hope that this would cause them to divide themselves.

Three months after the signing of the Lome Convention, at a meeting of the Commonwealth heads of state, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson put forward a suggestion for a "general" agreement on commodities. "And at the conclusion of the Commonwealth meeting a group of experts was appointed to draw up a "comprehensive and interrelated programme of practical measures directed at closing the gap between rich and poor countries.22 An interim report of this group of experts was submitted to the Commonwealth in August 1975. It called not simply for a narrowing of the gap but for measures that would secure for all people a "minimum tolerable standard of existence.23

"It was "Dependency School that provided the major theoretical underpinnings for the New International Economic Order proposals. By strongly asserting that the existing structure of international economic interaction was biased
against their interests, the LDC intellectuals and government were pressing for what they termed "a fair distribution of the benefits from trade." In essence, their argument was: "the systems too important to be left to the market". This theme was persistently pushed at the first three United Nations Conferences on Trade and Development\(^{24}\), and it had a modest effect on the wealthy countries through their agreement to establish the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for tariffs. Yet the LDCs had bigger stakes in mind. It came to be recognized that the developing countries could face a balance of payments crisis for circumstances wholly beyond their control. Similarly, it is worth noting that same, progress was achieved in a friendly atmosphere within the GATT itself.

**IV.4 INTERFERENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN NEGOTIATING NIEO**

However, the attempts to reform the International institutions from within was fraught with one serious difficulty. Countries which had joined them, whether it was the GATT or the Fund or the Bank, were bound by their Articles. Often when pleading for a change which developed countries did not like, the point was made that when all members had ab-initio subscribed to a certain discipline, it could not be easily relaxed and there had to be a very strong case indeed for a change to be made. Further to carry through a change, the voting procedures were such that despite their numerical majority, developing countries could not have their way unless they could enlist the support of the developed countries. The Articles could not be changed by a simple majority. In the case of the Fund and the Bank, there was
weighted voting with a heavy concentration of the voting strength in the hands of the richer countries.

Of late, no single proposal for international economic reform has received as much attention as the Programme of Action suggested under the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The programme, as initiated by the Non-Aligned Nations in their 1973 summit meet at Algeria, was later endorsed by the Group of Seventy Seven at UNCTAD 1973, and eventually adopted by the UN in its Special Session of the General Assembly which was held in Spring 1974.

The evolution of the NIEO proposals can be traced back to a certain awakening of the LDCs during the neo-colonial period. The articulation was in the form of a set of demands felt necessary by these nations in the face of difficulties they experienced as trading partners to the developed nations. Thus the ECLA group came out with proposals for structuralist reforms. These got some attention as the United Nations made gestures to launch a 'Development Decade' with a resolution adopted in its 'General Assembly of 1962. Specialised international bodies such as the UNCTAD and its offshoot, the group of 77, came up during the following few years. However, the concern expressed by similar bodies, over the shrinking LDC share in the world market and the adverse terms of such trade continued to co-exist with the dominance if not the revival of protectionist trends. Proposals for a more thoroughgoing international reform, while mooted, were not launched before Spring of 1974, when the UN General Assembly formally endorsed the NIEO 'Programme of Action.' The Programme was sponsored earlier both by the non-
aligned countries in their summit meet at Algeria (September 1973) and by the Group of 77 at its annual general meeting in 1973, and pitted against the opposition by UK, USA, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Denmark. The programme was eventually endorsed by a majority of nation in the UN Assembly. The opposition, however, reflected very well the manner in which the North looked at the NIEO proposals from its very beginning. In spite of the concern expressed by the South, such action actually hardened over time as is evident from the rejectionist moves the North seems to have made in its recent deliberations at the Lima Convention or in the UNIDO resolution of 1975.

A slogan emerged for 'Global Equity' in terms of 'Basic Human Needs' and it even dominated the discussions of the club of Rome, the Tinbergen Group on 'Reshaping the World Order' (RWO) and the Hammerskjold Foundation. The position taken by the North, as summed up very aptly by the last mentioned Foundation, demanded that "Countries which do not respect human rights should not benefit from transfer". A statement from Jimmy Carter, the Presidential, candidate in 1975 similarly announced, in a similar spirit, that "Americans were tired of taxing the poor of the rich countries in order to support the rich of the poor countries". Incidentally, such views on equity as distribution amounted to a position very different from the World Bank view on the problems which viewed equity as a non-poverty issue. Paying more attention to the real nature of the third world polity and its elite dominated ruling alliances, such position differed from the World Bank notion of a 'trickle-down' theory for growth.
At the meeting of UNIDO\textsuperscript{29} consensus had been achieved on a certain increase to be brought about in the share of developing countries in the processing of primary products, in industrial production, and in international trade in processed and manufactured products. In February 1968, UNCTAD-II met in New Delhi in an atmosphere of hope and fear.\textsuperscript{30} The developing countries had crystallised their position in the Charter of Algiers.\textsuperscript{31} They pressed UNCTAD-II to decide on launching a modest programme for implementation and action. Apart from a few half-hearted decisions in some limited sectors of co-operation, a time table for negotiation and implementation was accepted only in respect of the practical application of the principle of preference for the expansion of the trade of the developing countries in manufactures and semi-manufactures. For the rest, the opportunity to move in the direction of co-operative action for common goal was missed.

To the countries struck by the combined fury of inflation, recession, and deteriorating terms of trade, the future looked to be full of fear and foreboding. Their worries engaged the earnest attention of the entire membership of Group 77. A pragmatic way was soon found to revive the dropping spirits of the NODCs and thus to paper over the emerging cracks in the Group. A special programme for the benefit of the MSACS was hammered out and added as a separate self-contained item in the resolution presented before the U.N. Special Session. This special programme was welcomed by the entire membership, without any reservation. It helped assuage the fears of the MSACs and enable them to join in the common endeavour to secure unanimous approval of the Declaration and the programme of Action of the
New Order. It was, of course, hoped that, in due course, means would be found to make it possible for the MSACs to derive appropriate benefit from and make their due contribution to, the New International Economic Order (NIEO).

In order to evolve an agreed approach on matters of common interest the developing countries set up what has come to be known as the 'Group of 77' - reflecting the membership of developing countries when the UNCTAD-first met. The name has continued even though the number of developing countries in the U.N. has gone up substantially a some what similar group was formed by the developed countries belonging to the West who are members of the 'Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.' Another group of the U.S.S.R. and other members of the COMECON also began to function collectively in dealing with the agenda of the UNCTAD. As a result of this kind of collective approach, it became a common practice to refer to the developing countries either as the 'Third World' because most of them were non-aligned and not identifying themselves either with the East of the West or to designate them as countries of the 'South'. Endeavors began with the formation of a Third World caucus group—the Group of 77 within the framework of the first UN Conference on Trade and Development.

Initially, the adoption of a united negotiating position could be seen as a form of "pressure group" tactics as distinct from" "confrontational" tactics the difference being largely one of whether or not decisional outcomes were based on compromise and consensus. The common front was, in other words, a means to focus negotiations around a series of concrete issues.
defined as important by the developing states and to impress on
the developed the importance of taking progressive action on
these issues. The inability of the developing states to make
significant gains through negotiations with the developed states,
carried out on a consensus basis, led, however, to hardening of
the Third World's common position; to the use of their majority
voting strength in UN meetings; to a linking of issues as a
method through which they collectively could exert pressure in
support of their development demands and to a consolidation of
their demands around a call for the establishment of the New
International Economic Order (NIEO).

An early version of this call for a new order was
expressed in the "Charter of Algiers"—a series of
recommendations prepared by the Group of 77 in 1967 prior to
UNCTAD-II. This document written well before the Organization of
Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) Oil embargo. It should
be noted that pre-figured the third world's formal demand for a
fundamental transformation of those existing structures that
maintained a persistence disparity of benefits. Four years
later, at the Group of 77's preparatory meeting for UNCTAD III,
an expanded statement of the demand for a new order was issued in
the form of the "Declaration and Principles of the Action
Programme of Lima". And at the full UNCTAD Session in April 1972,
Maxico's President Luis Echeverria proposed the drafting of a UN
"Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States." (See Appendix-
IV)

In a separate forum, the Fourth Conference of Heads of
State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Algiers in
September 1973, officially endorsed, inter-alia, the call for a new and just international division of labour and a new monetary system, and reaffirm the right of states to full exercise of national sovereignty over natural resources. These and other demands of the Non-Aligned countries together with the work of the Group of 77, directly informed the formal Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the programme of action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order adopted at the Sixth Special Session in 1974. The essence of this official demand for a new order is a call for the redistribution of the world's wealth and economic opportunities, reparations to foreign-dominated states, and restructuring of the international economic system and its institutions to guarantee that the interests of developing states are directly taken into account. The new order is to be based on the principles of "equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and co-operation among all States."

The Second endeavor of the developing states the translation of their economic positions and leverage into economic influence and political leverage took its most dramatic and compelling form with the embargo declared by the Arab oil-exporting states in October 1973. It should be noted however, that in the Lima Declaration of 1971 and in the Algiers Declaration of 1973 the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Countries, respectively, had already recommended various forms of collective action. The Lima Declaration urged the establishment of united negotiating positions on resource exploitation and trading. And the Algiers Declaration strongly recommended the establishment and strengthening of producers' associations; urged
that "all possible means" be used to achieve the objectives of Non-Aligned Countries; and outlined an action programme for economic co-operation among developing states in an attempt to give form to the non-aligned movement's principle of "collective self-reliance".36

Buoyed by the dramatic actions of the OPEC nations, the Dakar documents urged, inter alia, that other producers' associations be formed and voiced support for the establishment of a "solidarity fund" for the financing of buffer stocks and related collective commodity action.

In the month of March 1975, following the Dakar Conference and preceding the collapse of the Paris Conference preparatory talks, the Second General Conference of the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) was held in Lima, called on the Third World's initiative to contribute to the establishment of the NIEO, the conference concluded with the adoption of resolutions that called for the establishment of an industrial development fund; recommended an increase in the developing states' share to total world production from the existing 7 percent to at least 25 percent by the end of the century; and expressed support for such principles as permanent sovereignty over natural resources, conservation of nonrenewable nature resource, and improved terms for licenses and equipment transferred from abroad. The final document as a whole was adopted by a roll-call vote of 82 for and a resounding "No" from the United States with seven abstentions.
IV.5 ORGANIZED EFFORTS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AT VARIOUS STAGES

As the years went by and as developing countries began to face the grim difficulties that be set them in their effort to fight poverty, some of the inequities of the Economic Order to which they had subscribed, began to cause them concern, and as more and more developing countries joined Group of 77 and UNCTAD they could voice their grievances with some strength.

The first opportunity for a concerted effort to bring about changes which the developing countries had was in 1954. It was a part of the understanding when the GATT came into being that if Havana Charter was not ratified and if an International Trade Organisation was not created, the Articles of the GATT would be reviewed in order to convert it into a long-term instrument, instead of a make-shift temporary arrangement. They wanted greater freedom to place restrictions on imports in the interests of their development. They emphasised the ways in which their economy was hurt by commodity price fluctuations and wanted facilities for negotiating agreements to stabilise their prices. They also made the point that the GATT tradition of equivalence between concessions given and concession received, operated against the interests of developing countries, who were in no position to offer as much as they received because of the disparities in the income levels of the developed and the developing countries.

The bloc voting at UNCTAD conferences, increased rancor in UN General Assembly debates on Economic questions, and even LDC aggressiveness in IMF and World Bank meetings all were signs of dissatisfaction with the end results. The politization of
what formerly were technical discussions fit with other extant trends in the late 1960s. The confrontation of the rich and the poor has been framed in the language not only of economics but also of ethics; with striking rapidity it has become the the classic struggle between the privileged and the dispossessed, between the advantaged and the exploited. Thus Geoffrey Barraclough proclaimed, "it has become obvious if it was not obvious before that we stand at a water shed of history.\(^{37}\)

For the first time in 1964, representatives of 120 nations assembled in Geneva to hold serious discussion on the needs, processes, and patterns of trade and development.\(^{38}\) The states participating in the Conference expressed their determination "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom" and seek a more effective system of international economic co-operation "whereby the division of the world into areas of poverty and riches may be banished and prosperity achieved for all". The conference found that the gap between the import expenditures of the developing countries and their export earnings might be expected to become wider towards the end of the decade, unless structural changes were effected meanwhile in financial flows, production patterns and trade trends. The need for comprehensive and purposeful efforts to promote these changes was recognised. A set of general principles to govern international economic relations was recommend new institutional arrangements were proposed, and a programme of constructive work was agreed upon. Paragraph 5 of the first section of the Final Act adopted at the Conference sums up the principal elements of international co-operation and development thus:

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"The developing countries recognise that they have the primary responsibility to raise the living standards of their peoples but their national exertions to this end will be greatly impaired if not supplemented and strengthened by constructive international action based on respect for national sovereignty. An essential element of such action is that international policies in the field of trade and development should result in a modified international division of labour which is more rational and equitable and is accompanied by the necessary adjustments in world production and trade. The resultant increase in productivity and purchasing power of the developing countries will contribute to the economic growth of the industrialised countries as well, and thus become a means to world wide prosperity".

With the endorsement by the General Assembly of the provisions of the Final Act, a three-tier mechanism consisting of the Conference, the Board, and the Committee was set up to foster development cooperation and monitor development action at the international level. The unity of the developing countries, forged in the days of UNCTAD-I, the developing countries had constituted themselves into a separate group, the Group of 77. It has, despite numerous difficulties, so far succeeded in presenting a united front on almost all occasions in almost all organisations of the U.N. family.

In Lusaka, in 1968, the Non-Aligned nations defined the economic content of non-alignment. As a result, the Group of 77
has within it a catalytic force for exerting political pressure on the course of discussions pertaining to the international economic order. The Group has, however, been unable to develop its potential for successful negotiation/confrontation. Its group action continues to lack credibility and coherence. Therefore, at the same time the intellectual underpinnings for the Bretton Woods system were being challenged, the process of international governance for economic matters was becoming less centralize and more politicized. In combination with this broad background, several specific events raised LDC confidence to the point where it appeared possible to fundamentally reorganise the system into a New Order.

The contradictions and constraints of the post-war economic order came to the fore in early 1970s when the main purpose of the Bretton Woods System began to crumble in quick succession. The skepticism about the efficiency and efficacy of the existing order along with the perception of its structural inequality and inadequacy was as such no longer confined to the spokesman of developing countries only. The group of 77 nations came to realise that the need for renewed efforts, in a more concerted and cohesive manner to confront the rich nations with their demands for a profound mutation in the existing economic system. Thus a serious confrontation between the two-sides, one demanding radical changes and the other insisting on the status quo become inevitable.

On 16 September 1975, the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for new initiatives on a broad range of development
issues. The significance of the Seventh Special Session must be measured in political terms. As representatives to the session remarked at the time, in comparison to the Sixth Special Session was marked by a shift from "confrontation" to "conciliation".

In the short run, the shift from confrontation to conciliation facilitated negotiations on concrete measures that took place in a number of different forums e.g., the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation, the Geneva multilateral trade negotiations, and the Fourth UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) session. From a longer-range perspective, the interesting question is whether the Seventh Special Session can be said to mark the beginnings of a new phase of relations between developed and developing states.

Further the United Nations Conferences on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) began with UNCTAD-I gathering in Geneva in 1964 made an important landmark in this direction in so far as it gave rise to the 'Group of 77'. Another landmark in this direction has been the Summit of Non-Aligned at Algiers in September 1973 when it adopted an "Economic Declaration" and an "Action Programme for Economic Cooperation" which called for thorough reorganisation of the international economic system. Eight months later the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly which was also the first special session to deal with economic issues adopted resolutions on "Declaration of on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order". And "the Programmes of Action on the Establishment of New International Economic Order." These resolutions together with the 'Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of State' adopted in December 1974 by
the regular 29th session of the General Assembly and the resolution of 'Development and International Economic Cooperation' adopted in September 1975 by the Seventh Special Session constitute the basic documents of the New International Economic Order.

Apart from the content of the NIEO what is significant is the emergence of non-aligned movement as international economic pressure group, the politicisation of the development issue and the growing assertiveness of the developing countries. The demand for a new economic order similar to the demand for political liberation of 1940's and 1950's have to be viewed as a part of historical process rather than a set of specific proposals.39

IV.6 THE OPEC ACTION AND ITS SEQUEL

After October 1973 the dramatic emergence of "OPEC Power" which promised a unique opportunity for, and a new dimension to, the developing countries' challenge to the industrialized countries of the West. The quintupling of oil prices and selective embargo on its supply had far-reaching impact on the world economics and politics. The OPEC action exacerbated the strains of an already ailing world economy and brought into sharper focus the inadequacy of the existing system.

In a vastly changed environment the developing countries with their collective courage and confidence boosted by the OPEC action adopted more active and aggressive stance in their international economic relationship with the developed countries than hereto fore. The demand for a subsequent adoption
of the declaration and programme of action on the NIEO in the Sixth Special Session, convened in the aftermath of all oil crisis, was perhaps the highest manifestation of unified developing countries attempt to seek of radical amendment of old economic order or as to make it more consistent with the contemporary realignments in international politic-economic relations and create a restructured and reliable global framework for its economic development.

Not surprisingly, the oil price hike had serious repercussions on the economies of many non-oil producing developing countries (NODCs). They were, in fact, worse hit then by the developed countries. But psychologically and politically the developed countries' perception of North-South economic relationship underwent a profound change. The evolving awareness of collective action on the part of developing countries as crystalized in the Group of 77 and its activities in the UNCTAD "was now transformed into an act of faith". On 1st May 1974 in a historic resolution proclaimed the "United Determination" of the member states, the UN General Assembly. In its sixth special session conclude its deliberations by committing itself, in the immediate aftermath of the petroleum crisis:

"To work urgently for the establishment of a new international economic order based on equity, sovereign equality, common interest and cooperation among all states, irrespective of their economic and social systems, which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the
widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice for present and future generations.⁴¹

This momentous decision of the Assembly was, of course the cumulative outcome of a long-drawn struggle which the less developed countries have had waged for many years to create a suitable international framework geared to their developmental needs and aspirations. The issues related to the NIEO, buttressed by massive build up in the world mass media, have come to dominate the international conferences circuit so much as to relegate other issues to the background.⁴² A vast spate of studies, reports and declaration by variables bodies have further emphasized the significance of the subject.⁴³
REFERENCES

1. UN General Assembly, Sixth Special Session Document A9556(part II), 'declaration on the establishment of a NIEO, programme of action', part(i) part II, and I(f).


3. The group of 77 is the formal name for the caucus of developing countries when they need in U.N. forums. Although the group now has 114 members, it was originally formed at the Third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Session (UNCTAD-III) where the LDC representative concluded their only chance for increased powers would come through various forms of collective action.


5. The consequent need to redefine the goals of international efforts at development in the developing countries has been stressed by several writers. For example, the contributions by Pitamber Pant, Goran Ohlin, and J.Bhagwati in Bhagwati (1972).

6. One can only agree with Little, however, in the judgment that the so-called statistics on income distribution for developing countries, which suggest absolute improvishment of millions during the 1960's are totally unreliable.

7. An alternative view is that the demands for the NIEO have resulted from the 'revolution of rising expectations' following the high rates of growth in the developing countries.


13. From the vantage point of the developing states the important change in the distribution of economic power in the Postwar Era has been the diversification, of sources of overseas investment capital, technology transfers, expanded market, and aid.

14. There is a large and growing literature on the development and the significance of economic interdependence in the postwar world. What seems important about the phenomenon of interdependence analyzed in this literature is not the increase in the actual quantity of interstate interaction or a change in quality (which has been much-debated) but rather the increased political saliency of economic interdependence in a world in which national governments have become increasingly responsible for conditions of citizen welfare.


17. Reference is made here to the United States alone, because the Western European states had already made efforts to reach accommodation with the developing states, as noted, and because the United States' position at the Seventh Special Session was the key to the outcome of the Session.

18. Much has now been written about 'threats' from the Third World based on new found "commodity power". The leading U.S. proponent of this view is C. Fred Bergsten who argues that a number of new cartels can be expected in the 1970s. His two articles: C. Fred Bergsten "The threat from the Third World. "Foreign Policy 11(Summer 1973), pp.102-24; and "The New Era in World Commodity Markets," Challenge, September-October 1974, pp. 32-39. A rather different, highly interesting, interpretation of the impact of resource scarcity fears on development assistance politics is to be found in John P. Lewis, "Oil, Other Scarcities and the Poor Countries," World Politics, (27 Oct. 1974), p.63-86.


21. Council On International Economic Policy, Special Report: Critical Imported Materials (Washington: Government printing office, 1974). As the report noted, the vulnerability of the U.S. to price-gouging, supply interruption, or other cartel action is limited by the fact that (1) the U.S. is relatively self-sufficient; (2) U.S. dependence on imports, where it exists, is highly concentrated on other developed countries, and (3) market forces are effective enough and cartels hard enough to organize to case even the problems of Western Europe and Japan, which are considerably more dependent on imported raw materials that the United States.


26. Roger D. Hansen, op. cit., p. 73.


29. UNIDO-II was held on 12-26 March 1975, at Lima (Peru).

30. UNCTAD-II was held on 1 February-29 March 1968 in New Delhi.

31. The Charter of Algiers was adopted by the Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 on 24th Oct. 1967 at Algiers.
32. For a provocative analysis of the ethical questions raised by the developing states call for the New International Economic Order, see two articles by Robert W. Tucker, "A New International Order and "Egoitarianism and International Politics" Commentary 59 (Feb 1975); pp. 28-50 and 60 (Sept. 1975). pp. 27-40.


34. United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 3201(S-VI) and 3202(S-VI), respectively.

35. United Nations General Assembly, Declaration. Ibid.


38. UNCTAD-I was held on 23 March 1964 in Geneva.


41. See UN General Assembly Resolution 3201(S-VI), 1 May 1974, as reported in the UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. XI, No. 5, (May 1974) p. 66.

42. A large number of important international conferences following the Sixth Special Session have underscored the significance of different issues having direct or indirect bearing on the goals of the NIEO: World Food Conference (Bucharest, Aug. 1974), World Food Conference (Rome November 1974) the On-going Third Law of the Sea Conference (since December 1974); Rome Conventions between EEC and ACP Countries (1974-75) UNIDO Conference on Industrialization of the LDCs (Lima, 1975) the Commonwealth Conference (Kingston, May 1975) the several meetings of the CIEC (North South dialogue) beginning since May 1975 at Paris); Third Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 (Manila Feb. 1976) The UNCTAD-VI (Nairobi, May 1976) The Fifth Summit of Non-aligned Nations (Colombo, August 1976), etc. studies, reports and Declarations by various International bodies have further.
43. Some important examples are: "Report of Jan Timbergan's Group and The Club of Rome: "Reshaping the International Order" (London, 1979), the Report of Group of Exports appointed by the Jamaica Conference of Commonwealth Nations) "Towards a New International Economic Order" (Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1975); The Dakkar Declaration of the Conference of Developing countries on Raw Materials (February 1975) "The Lima Declaration" of the Second General Conference of the UNIDO (March, 1975) "The Manila Declaration" of the Group of 77 (Feb. 1976) etc. The UN and the UNCTAD secretariats have also produced a vast mass of documents and background papers for various UN and other international meetings.