CHAPTER ONE

The October Revolution And The Brief Experiment With Multi-Party System
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Although the Communist Party was accorded recognition for the first time in the Fundamental Law of the land by the 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union as 'the Vanguard of the toilers' that 'represents the directing kernel of all organizations of toilers both public and state' (Article 126), its all pervading function in the scheme of political power was never denied. "Here in the Soviet Union, in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat", said Stalin, "the fact that not a single important political or organizational questions is decided by our Soviet and other mass organization without direction from the party must be regarded as the highest expression of the leading role of the party".¹ This role flowed from the acknowledged position of the party as supreme institutional embodiment of the class principle with the proletariat itself having been regarded all along as 'the vanguard of the toilers' and the party as 'the vanguard of the proletariat', the party stood out as vanguard of the vanguard, or the "chief leader in the system of proletarian dictatorship".² The very endurance of the dictatorship was related to the existence of the party as the initial and continuing reservoir of the leadership. "The workers themselves', said Lenin on 23 January 1921, 'did not know as yet how to rule and would have to go through years of schooling". Hence, "in order to rule, an army of revolutionaries -- Communists hardened in battle, is necessary. We have such; it is the party... were the party to be set aside, there could in fact be no dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia".³

Institutionally the key elements of the party's position in society also entailed a thorough and radical application of the principle of one-party government. Crucial to the maintenance of the party's pre-eminent 'vanguard' role in society was:

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¹ J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (New York: 1934), p.34.
² ibid., pp.29-33.
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i. the licensing of other, 'non-party' organizations and meetings.
ii. the centralised control by party officials of all staffing, party and non-party, under the so-called *nomenklatura* system;
iii. the penetration of other organizations and meetings by party members and the obligation of the latter to meet separately as a group;
iv. the control of communications by means of standardised curricula and censorship of the media.  

As most of these procedures underpinning the party's vanguard position in society had to be worked by ordinary party members, the maintenance of party's position was linked closely with the maintenance of internal discipline and cohesiveness among party members. In fact the institutions for promoting the latter were many:

1. the ban on groups with a distinct, organized platform within the party. The word coined for it was 'factionalism'. Although the original ban was on organized platforms (1918-21 period), its effect in practice seemed to have been to inhibit the ordinary party member from canvassing or lobbying for positions before meetings. This meant handing over the dominant role in policy planning and steering of decisions to party officials whose job was to draft policy and to organize its formal acceptance.

2. the doctrine known as *Democratic Centralism*. This amounted in practice to the centralised, hierarchical management of party appointments and party communications with permanent officials, processing important documents at all levels.

3. the careful regulation of admission to the party through a system of fourfold checks: references from party members of at least five years standing; approval

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by a party meeting usually at one's place of work; approval by party officials at the next highest administrative level; and a period of a year's probation.  

The status of monopolized legality enjoyed by the Communist Party was not as a consequence of accident or artifice. It was a position acquired by the party historically. The history of the revolutionary movement in Russia, of which social democracy was an integral part began with the Decembrists. Although this uprising was crushed easily, its political ideas continued to inspire the future revolutionaries. The majority of the Decembrists were 'Jacobin' in politics with more concern for social reform than with liberty. Their goal automatically meant the overthrow of autocracy as a necessary means for achieving social reforms. The aspirations of the reformers were conditioned by the existence of a large peasant population. On the eve of the emancipation of the Serfs in 1861, out of the total population of seventy-four million, the peasants formed the overwhelming majority. Nearly half of them were privately owned serfs. 

The reign of Aleksandr II (1855-81) witnessed the rise of the 'populist movement' (narodnichestvo), its main inspiration coming from Aleksandr Herzen (1812-70). The doctrine of Herzen that Russia could, by virtue of its traditional Peasant Commune, travel a separate path to Socialism, and thus avoid the evils of Capitalism, received a more detailed exposition from N.G. Chernyshevsky (1828-89). Chernyshevsky, also known as the Father of modern Russian Radicalism, had influenced a generation of

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5 ibid., pp.3-4.
revolutionaries including Lenin. "A free and prosperous Commune", he believed, "would provide the basis for the society of the future". 8

Even after it had begun to disintegrate as an institution, the Commune (Obshchina) continued to remain the lodestar of populist thinkers. The Emancipation Act of 1861 had further strengthened this traditional form of land-tenure, which also included a primitive form of self-government by peasant households. The Commune system tended to preserve the peasants as a separate social group. Three features distinguished the Obshchina: first, that within it the peasant had no rights of property, but merely a right of user, within the Commune and as determined by the Commune; secondly, that he was restricted in his right to withdraw from the Commune; thirdly, he was subjected to a form of state paternalism, due partly to sentiment and partly to a desire to maintain an efficient system of tax collection. 9

Both the autocracy and the populists for altogether different reasons tried their best to preserve the peasant in a world apart. The autocracy perceived these ancient peasant institutions as the support base for the Tsar and the Church. On the other hand, the populists, following Herzen and Chernyshevsky, saw in the Commune the germ of the future socialist society.

Till the 70's, populism remained more a social philosophy than a policy for revolution. But signs of more violent activity began to appear with the formation of a short-lived conspiratorial society called Zemlia i Volia (Land and Liberty) in 1861. It was P.N. Tkachev (1844-85), who finally evolved an ideology of revolutionary activity (1844-85). He became the first Russian to teach that the 'revolution should be made by a small conspiratorial body of professionals, acting in the name of the people'. The revolutionary minority, or party, would have to first seize political power, and then


transform society. The resemblance to Bolshevism, such as it was eventually to become, was very much striking in much of Tkachev's thought and it is with justice that Tkachev has often been described as the 'originator' of many of Lenin's ideas. A different but important element in the development of more violent revolutionary activity was contributed to populism by M.A. Bakunin (1814-76), who rejected not only the idea of a constitutional order, but of any order. He saw the salvation of the people in the overthrow and destruction of all existing society.\(^\text{10}\)

It was in the 70's that the populists took the first steps towards creating an organization. They began by taking steps to set up circles for discussion and propaganda among the workers and peasants. These efforts led to the emergence of the first Russian revolutionary party, Zemlia i Volia (Land and Liberty) which was founded by M.A. Natanson, A.D. Mikhailov, and G.V. Plekhanov. The first programme adopted by Zemlia i Volia contained social rather than political demands: all land to the peasants, self-determination for all parts of the Russian empire, transfer of self-government functions to the peasant Communes. The programme accordingly called for agitation in order to arouse and stimulate revolutionary feeling. Of civil liberty there was no mention.\(^\text{11}\)

Although there was strong populist tradition against any kind of political objectives, pressure grew inside Zemlia i Volia for more concrete and immediate political action. This became evident at a Congress of the party held at Voronezh on 24 June 1879. The programme adopted at this Congress declared that the immediate objective was the overthrow of the regime in order to hand power over to the people: thereafter a freely elected Constituent Assembly would decide the future course of action. The Party would have to take the lead in overthrowing the autocracy, and preparing the people for the elections that would follow. The task of organization was left to the conspiratorial

\(^{10}\) Fainsod, n.6, p.13.

\(^{11}\) Schapiro, n.9, p.2.
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party centre - the Executive Committee. But towards the end the only activity of Narodnaia Volia or 'People's Will' proved to be the assassination of Aleksandr II.\textsuperscript{12}

The Voronezh Congress of Zemlia i Volia was significant for another reason too. It led to Plekhanov's break with Zemlia i Volia and the founding of a separate organization, Chernyi Peredel (Repartition of the Land) by him along with a few supporters prominent among whom were P.B. Aksel'rod, Vera Zasulich and Leo Deich. In the first issue of Chernyi Peredel (the organ of the movement), Plekhanov and his supporters argued that it was only through economic struggle that the people could gradually learn the meaning of and the need for political struggle. The future founders of Marxism were thus preaching for over a year the very heresy, which under the name of 'economism' they would soon condemn.

On 25 September 1883, Plekhanov announced the publication in Geneva of a series of popular political pamphlets for workers to be called 'The Library of Contemporary Socialism'. Thus came into existence the first Russian theoretical Marxist group which came to be known as the Group for the Liberation of Labour and Plekhanov came to be rightly regarded as the Father of Russian Marxism.\textsuperscript{13}

There were many reasons as to why Marxism attracted many of these former populists. It shared with traditional populism a belief in social change as the ultimate aim, with political liberty as a means to that end. But, unlike populism, it offered a scientific basis for the belief in the future revolution: the evolution of capitalism on the model of Western Europe must lead Russia successively through the historical phases, first the 'bourgeois' phase of democracy, to be followed in time by the next phase, the social revolution. There were other reasons too. Marxism, in its interpretation, rejected any form of Jacobin conspiracy, of which the assassination of March 1881 had only proved the futility. Moreover, the foundation of Marx's teaching was that the ultimate

\textsuperscript{12} Fainsod, n.6, p.15.

\textsuperscript{13} ibid., pp.33-38.
'socialist revolution' would be brought about by the working class, which in the years of preparation that lay ahead would acquire the necessary consciousness for its task. To men who had lived through the disillusionment of trying to bring political consciousness to the Russian peasants this doctrine, with its reliance in a more educated class, more receptive to modern ideas, had an understandable attraction.\footnote{Schapiro, n. 9, p. 10.}

For more than ten years, the \textit{Group for the Liberation of Labour} remained largely isolated from working-class political activity inside Russia. There were three main difficulties in applying Marxist analysis to Russia. First, in comparison to Western Europe of 1848, the development of capitalism in Russia had just began, making the prospect of a proletarian majority very remote. Secondly, the peasants, who were the overwhelming majority of the population, were interested not in socialism but in land. This desire of the peasants would be inconsistent with the fundamental aim of the social revolution -- the national ownership of the means of production. Thirdly, in contrast to other developed countries of Europe, there were no political or civil freedom in Russia. This meant that the modern workers' party, which Plekhanov and Aksel'rod were hoping to create, would have to come into being without the advantages of political or civil freedom, thus making the task of the new workers' party more difficult.

Inside Russia too, Marxist theory was being discussed. With the appearance of the First volume of \textit{Das Kapital} in Russian translation, discussions started on this novel analysis of Russia. The debate was 'legal' in the sense that it was carried on in strictly academic terms. The main issue which emerged was: can Western capitalism, with its consequences both good and bad, develop in Russian conditions? The intellectuals, following the populist tradition argued that it could not. The Marxist intellectuals, who contested this \textit{populist} view included P.B. Struve, S.N. Bulgakov, N.A. Berdyaev and M.I. Tugan-Baranovskii. They acquired the name of '\textit{Legal Marxists}'. Meanwhile, Lenin was fast emerging as a leader in his own right. His early writings, particularly \textit{The Development of Capitalism in Russia}, completed in exile in 1899 was very influential in
destroying much of the populist argument. Likewise, Plekhanov’s *Development of the Monist View of History*, legally published in 1895 exercised great influence in arguing the case for Marxism.

The populists were the first to organize workers circles in Russia. In 1875 E.O. Zaslavksii founded the first large organization called the *South Russian Union of Workers*. The second large organization called the *Northern Union of Russian Workers* was formed in December 1878 by Stepan Khaltuin and Victor Obnorskii. Though shortlived, these two groups are rightly considered the forerunners of the future social democratic organizations.\(^{15}\)

By the 80’s working men’s circles calling themselves Marxist or Social Democratic began to spring up in Petersburg and in some of the provincial cities. Their main activity was the discussion of the elementary economic and political questions from the Marxist point of view. The first of these circles called the Blagoev group was directly influenced by Plekhanov’s *Group for the Liberation of Labour*. Towards the end of the 19th century, social democratic groups could be numbered in dozens.

The primary aim of Plekhanov and his companions was the formation of a social democratic party in Russia. The first to attempt to put this idea into practice, were not the Russians, but the Polish and Jewish inhabitants of the Russian Empire. The success of the Jewish organization (*the Bund*) in defending the interests of the workers gave considerable impetus to the development of the Russian movement. The successful experience among the Jewish workers was set down in a pamphlet entitled *On Agitation* by A. Kremer a leading *Bundist*. The main theme of this influential pamphlet was --

First, the proletariat must on no account wait for the bourgeoisie to win freedom for it. Second, the masses could not be induced to take up the cudgels for abstract ideas. Third,
the development of proletarian consciousness was a gradual process, evolved in a succession of battles for small, concrete demands.\textsuperscript{16}

Late in 1895, Lenin who was already active in one of these circles joined forces with Martov to form the \textit{Petersburg Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class}. The joint political activity of Lenin and Martov did not last long and in December 1895, they were arrested and sent to Siberia. By this time, Lenin had already authored several pamphlets and essays which had attracted wide attention. He joined hands with Plekhanov and the 'Legal Marxists' arguing that the capitalist development in Russia was inevitable and the proletariat had the historical role of waging a political struggle culminating in revolution. But unlike the others who visualized the need for a joint struggle by the proletariat and the democratic intelligentsia, Lenin emphasized on a full and final break with the ideas of the democrats.\textsuperscript{17} The Union organized a number of successful strikes from mid-1896 onwards. \textit{Rabochaia Mysl' (The Workers' Thought)} the first issue of an illegal workers' paper appeared in October 1897. A year later, it became the organ of the Petersburg Union. By April 1901, the paper declared that economic aims were simply not enough and that the main fight was for the freedom of assembly, of person, of press and for the right to strike.

In the midst of all these developments, the \textit{All-Russian Social Democratic Labour Party} was founded. Its First Congress met in Minsk on 1 March 1898. The Congress was far from representative -- there were nine delegates representing the \textit{Bund}, a Kiev group which edited a small illegal paper \textit{Rabochaia Gazeta}, and the Petersburg, Kiev, Moscow and Ekaterinoslav Unions of the \textit{Liberation of Labour}. \textit{Rabochaia Gazeta} was declared the party newspaper, with Lenin still in exile, designated as editor of a series of pamphlets. The Congress elected a Central Committee of three -- A. Kremer, B.L. Eidel'man of Kiev and S.I. Radchenko. The Congress adopted a broadly democratic

\textsuperscript{16} For details see, Fainsod, n.6, pp.41-42.

party statute with the Central Committee being made responsible to periodic Congresses. The Congress also issued a manifesto which was largely the work of Peter Struve a Marxist intellectual.

The First Congress did not exercise much practical influence as most of its delegates were arrested immediately after it. Conflicts among the ideological leaders too caused much damage to the party. These conflicts centred around two questions: organization; and to what was called ‘economism’ in party polemics. So far as organization was concerned, the older party intellectuals were more concerned with the professional side of the revolution - security, unity of action and efficiency of organization. In contrast, the newer social democratic leaders were more intent on practical action such as strikes. They wanted the centre of political activity to be located in the much more open local factory and district circles, and in the mutual aid organizations.

In party polemics, ‘Economism’ was the label attached to over-concentration on immediate concrete needs to the neglect of the main task -- the winning of political freedom by the overthrow of the autocracy. The supremacy of the ‘political’ as against ‘economic’ struggle was advocated by the older party intellectuals for two reasons. Not only was it dictated by Marxist orthodoxy it was also closely linked with their theory of ‘hegemony’ of the proletariat. 18

Meanwhile in course of his exile Lenin evolved the idea of creating a newspaper which would be printed outside Russia. It was hoped that this newspaper, besides safeguarding the Russian Social Democratic movement from ideological contamination, would also form an organizational centre for unifying the Russian underground committees. This idea was first formulated by Lenin in an article written in 1899, which remained unpublished. 19 The scheme was discussed at length with Plekhanov.

Aksel’rod and Vera Zasulich in Switzerland. By the end of 1900 an agreement had been reached on policy, and on the composition of the editorial board -- Plekhanov, Aksel’rod, Vera Zasulich, Potresov, Martov and Lenin, with two votes for Plekhanov. This scheme was put into effect when the first issue of the newspaper ‘Iskra’ (Spark) appeared in Leipzig on 24th December 1890.20

The occasion was of symbolic importance. It was about this time that Lenin first began to emerge head and shoulders above the others by his energy and by the clarity of his ideas. He knew exactly what he wanted: to establish an accepted body of revolutionary doctrine and an organized revolutionary party. The first of these aims required the promulgation of a party programme; the second, the summoning of a party Congress to take up the work begun and abandoned in 1898.21

By the middle of 1902 Iskra was able to lay before its readers a ‘Draft Party Programme’. About the same time, Lenin published his first major original work on revolutionary doctrine and revolutionary organization, ‘What is to be done?’. Also, preparations were made to summon a party Congress to meet in Brussels in July of that year.

"Bolshevism as a stream of political thought and as a political party’, Lenin was to write twenty years later, ‘has existed since 1903".22 Its character was determined by the controversies of the period in which it was conceived. Before the Congress met, three ideological battles had been fought and won. As against the narodniks, the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party regarded the proletariat and not the peasants as the driving force of the coming revolution; as against the ‘legal Marxists’, it preached revolutionary and socialist action; and as against the so called ‘Economists’ who over - concentrated on immediate concrete needs to the neglect of the main task -- the winning

20 Carr, n.18, p.18.
21 ibid., p.19.
22 ibid.
of political freedom by the overthrow of the autocracy, it put forward in the name of the proletariat political as well as economic demands.\textsuperscript{23}

Since the foundation of Iskra, Lenin became more and more the pace maker of advanced ideas and it is in his writings that the evolution of party doctrine can be most clearly traced. The view consistently propounded in Iskra of the character of the party rested on two propositions to which Lenin returned over and over again. The first was that "without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement". The second was that ‘social-democratic consciousness’ or ‘class political consciousness’ was not a spontaneous growth and could come to the worker only from without.\textsuperscript{24}

The first proposition, which insisted on the supreme importance of theory, called for a party created by intellectuals. Lenin strongly believed that the working class by its own resources were in a position to generate only trade-union consciousness. The second proposition which envisaged the party as a revolutionary elite imposing a revolutionary consciousness from outside on the mass of the workers, drew a sharp distinction between the proletariat and the party. The class was an economic unit, the party a political or ideological unit. It was Plekhanov who in the columns of Iskra coined the term ‘hegemony’ to express the relation of the party to the proletariat. No one insisted more powerfully than Lenin himself, that without the masses no serious political action was possible. But the party was never conceived by Lenin as a mass organization. Much of its strength was due to the fact that it was concerned to exclude than to include. Quality rather than quantity was its aim.\textsuperscript{25}

In laying down the principles of party organization, Lenin was clearly influenced by the autocratic nature of the Russian state which precluded the formation of any kind of socialist or even democratic party on a Western model and drove every democratic or


\textsuperscript{25} Carr, n.18, p.32.
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socialist movement into secret conspiratorial channels. Thus the whole emphasis came to rest on the need for a small, closely knit party under a strong central leadership to act in the name of the proletariat as the spearhead of the revolution. The methods of the revolutionary struggle varied and had to be determined empirically from time to time. What remained fixed and consistent was the central plan built upon a sound basis of theory, and executed, with the support of the masses, by a highly organized, disciplined and centrally directed party of professional revolutionaries.26

Lenin advocated these views with considerable success at the Party's Second Congress, held in Brussels and London during August 1903. *Iskra* became the Party's central organ, with Lenin as editor, and a Central Committee was elected. However, the Congress was marked by controversy over the definition of a party member, over how much autonomy local party organizations would have, and on the issues of national self-determination and cultural development of non-Russian nationalists. When seven delegates walked out of the Congress, Lenin and his followers were able to claim a "majority" and as a result of this fateful act, Lenin's faction became known as the 'Bolsheviks' (members of the majority). The opponents who remained at the Congress were called the 'Mensheviks' (members of the minority), and Lenin subsequently was to claim that his Bolsheviks were the majority even when they were in the minority in a badly divided party.27

Lenin also sought to reduce the editorial board of *Iskra* from six to three members, with the *Mensheviks* having but one representative, L. Martov. When Martov refused to serve, the other member (Plekhanov) deserted Lenin and advocated the reinstatement of the ousted *Menshevik* members of the editorial board. Lenin, outmanoeuvred resigned as editor of *Iskra* and had himself appointed to the Central

26 ibid.
27 ibid., pp.44-46.
Committee; he soon began publishing another newspaper, ‘Vperyod’ (Forward), organ of the Bolshevik faction.28

Meanwhile, in Russia the revolutionary movement had started. The defeat of the autocracy in the Russo-Japanese war raised a revolutionary storm. With little prospect of support from any section of the society, the autocracy hesitated between repression and concession. On 22 (9) January 1905, the firing on a peaceful unarmed crowd led by priest George Gapon enroute to the palace to petition the Emperor caused horror all over Russia. Gapon’s open call to revolt was answered throughout the country. Following Bloody Sunday, [22 (9) January 1905] industrial strikes and disturbances of all kinds continued for most of the year throughout the length and breadth of the country. In a situation completely out of control, the Emperor was forced to sign a manifesto on 30(17) October which promised full civil freedom - of person, of speech, of conscience, and of association; and a State Duma with full legislative powers, elected on a wide suffrage. It was a promise if fulfilled would transform the autocracy into a constitutional monarchy.29

The revolution of 1905 encouraged the formation of several progressive parties, broadly designated as liberals. The Constitutional Democrats or the Kadets which was the largest of these, emerged out of the fusion of the two movements -- the Union for Liberation and the Zemstva Constitutionalists.30 Unlike the Zemstva Constitutionalists who were moderate in temperament, the ‘Liberationists’ were radical reformers. In a Congress in Moscow in the middle of October 1905 the future Kadety met and emerged as an organized party. The party set for itself the task of fighting the forthcoming elections to the State Duma with the object of forcing the autocracy to accept the Duma as a fully sovereign legislature, and to set up a government responsible to it. A number

28 ibid., pp.18-19.
29 For details see, ibid., pp.57-74.
30 Fainsod, n.6, pp.11, 52-53.
of other groups emerged, the most important being the ‘Union of 17 October’ (also known as the ‘Octobrists’). They believed that the only safe road for Russia was cautious progress towards freedom which automatically involved the acceptance of the October Manifesto. They called on the other progressive parties to moderate their demands and to work towards building a legal order as a secure foundation for reform.

The period immediately after the revolution saw the emergence of Soviets throughout the length and breadth of the country particularly the provincial cities. The most noteworthy of them all was the Petersburg Soviet of Workers’ Deputies. This Soviet though non-party in composition was largely proletarian. In its short period of existence, from 26(13) October until 16(3) December, the Soviet not only led strikes in the capital but also worked with success for such measures as the defiance of censorship. Within its limited budget, it also endeavoured to provide the workers with subsistence during strikes.

The first reaction among all the social democrats was to boycott the Duma elections as there was no guarantee that electoral canvassing and agitation would be free from police interference. For the Bolsheviks, the Duma was a reactionary body which would merely encourage false illusions among the workers. The best course for the social democrats was to boycott the elections and after the Duma had assembled to exploit the conflicts which would arise between the Duma and the people. The Mensheviks, though divided in their views believed that the Duma could serve as a valuable source of experience for the workers by teaching them that only a democratic Constituent Assembly could satisfy their demands. Like the Bolsheviks, the Socialist Revolutionaries too decided to boycott the elections. This policy resulted in the complete disorganization of the workers. Left to themselves, the workers in some cases returned candidates with social democratic sympathies. The peasants, in the absence of socialist candidates voted

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31 Carr, n.18, pp.59-60.
for the Kadety resulting in its emerging as the strongest single party in the Duma, with 179 out of 478 seats. Eighteen Social Democrats were also elected.\textsuperscript{32}

Under the impact of the revolution of 1905, attempts for reunification had developed among the Bolshevik and Menshevik party organizations. In April and May of 1905, the Bolsheviks held their own party Congress in London, which was boycotted by the Mensheviks. Efforts to heal the breach at the Stockholm Unity Congress in April-May of 1906 were unsuccessful when the Bolsheviks were out-voted. A subsequent Congress was held in London in May 1907 and was attended by both factions but did not end the schism in the party.\textsuperscript{33}

The division between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks involved differences of degree on many issues, which subsequently became differences of kind. Both factions were Marxist and Socialist and believed that capitalism, although temporarily beneficial for Russia, would be replaced by the revolutionary order. However, the Mensheviks did not share the importance of the Bolsheviks to overthrow the regime and were willing to let the bourgeois Capitalist epoch run its course and fulfil its purpose in Russia by establishing conditions conducive to the advent of Socialism. The Bolsheviks emphasised illicit conspiratorial organization and a tightly organized party of professionals, while many of the Mensheviks favoured a mass party of workers, less centralism and reliance upon legal means. The two factions also disagreed over tactics towards and within the Russian quasi-parliament -- the State Duma, and also on the issue of electoral alliances with other parties. Another source of controversy was the Bolshevik method of obtaining funds and the Bolshevik faction's practice of maintaining its separate treasury apparatus and newspaper. Thus both the factions in the RSDLP disagreed largely over methods and tactics rather than over ultimate socialist goals.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{32} For details see, Fainsod, n.6, pp.52-53.

\textsuperscript{33} For details see, Carr, n.18, pp.59-63.

\textsuperscript{34} Reshetar, n.24, p.98.
The demand of the Kadety for a full constitutional government with a ministry responsible to the Duma led to a constitutional deadlock which was resolved by the Emperor dissolving the Duma on 8 July. The Social Democrats had not played a very active role in the First Duma. With no Bolsheviks in the Duma, the tactics of the Social Democrats was more like that of the Mensheviks. As the time for the elections to the Second Duma approached, Lenin who had earlier called for a boycott of the elections decided to reconsider his views. He declared that history had demonstrated that the Duma was a valuable forum for agitation. An electoral compromise with the Mensheviks worked well with the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks co-operating fairly harmoniously in the electoral campaign.

The Second Duma, (1907) in its composition reflected the conflicts of the previous year. While the moderates had lost, the extremists at either end had gained. The number of the Kadety was halved and the Social Democrats as compared to the tally of eighteen, now numbered sixty-five. Nearly one-third of the deputies were workers and peasants. The Social Democrats constituted themselves into a 'faction' which was to act as a party organ, under the constant leadership and control of its central institutions. The Mensheviks were in the majority with thirty-six members as against eighteen Bolsheviks. The remaining eleven generally voted for the Mensheviks. The 'faction' of the Social Democrats maintained constant contact with the proletariat. It organized meetings and investigations and was flooded with petitions and directives of every nature. Its activities outside the chamber in the four months of its existence came near to laying the foundations of a broadly based workers party and to providing a political organization which the workers could look upon as their own.


37 ibid.
On 3 June 1907, the Tsar issued a manifesto dissolving the Second Duma. A new electoral law considerably restricting suffrage was promulgated. The immediate cause of the dissolution was the refusal of the Duma to surrender for trial the members of the Social Democratic ‘faction’ on a charge of fomenting an uprising among the armed forces.

The effects of the revised electoral law was clearly evident in the composition of the new Duma which met on 1 November 1907. The majority of the deputies were right-wing, or liberal-conservative Octobrists. Of the radicals, the Kadety now numbered only fifty four, and the Social Democrats eighteen of which the great majority were the Mensheviks with only five Bolsheviks.38

In January 1912, Lenin gathered his followers in Prague for a conference, as a result of which his organization came to be called the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (of Bolsheviks) and the division of the Russian Marxists into two parties was final. In 1912, each group was publishing its own daily newspaper and that of the Bolsheviks was named Pravda.

The elections to the Fourth Duma was fixed for September with the expiry of the Third Duma’s term in the summer of 1912. The elections were fought in an atmosphere of co-operation. Candidates were discussed and the Bolsheviks proved to be the tougher bargainers. Initially, although the policy of unity was favoured by the two groups in the Social Democratic faction, this policy could not be sustained for long and resulted in a split with the Bolsheviks declaring themselves a separate faction.

With the beginning of the 1st World War, the first reaction of the Russian proletariat was a patriotic upsurge. However the situation soon changed when rising costs, shortage of commodities, economic depression, defeat and disorganization started having its effect. Major workers unrest were witnessed in Moscow and Petrograd.

Among the radical parties, the Kadety supported the war effort. The Socialist Revolutionaries were far from united in this matter: some supported it, while the others

38 Carr, n.18, p.60.
opposed it. Inside the Duma, the Russian Social Democrats refused to vote for the war budget and issued a declaration in August (July) 1914 repudiating the war, and calling on the international proletariat to work for its termination. Inspite of the split, both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks agreed on the declaration.\footnote{Fainsod. n.6. pp.463-64.}

On his part, Lenin believed that the war would speed up the revolution both in Russia as well as in the other countries of Europe. On August 1915, he wrote that the unequal economic and political development of different capitalist systems inevitably meant that socialism would at first be victorious in a few countries or even in one isolated country.\footnote{h.3, pp.44-46.} Lenin sketched the main lines of the Bolshevik policy after the revolution in a series of ‘Theses’ published in October 1915. He argued that more important than the summoning of the Constituent Assembly was the question as to who was in power when the elections to it took place. On no account would the social democrats participate in a Provisional Government, along with the Mensheviks or Socialist Revolutionaries.\footnote{ibid., pp.311-13.}

On March 1917, the Russian monarchy and the old regime collapsed in the largely spontaneous and virtually bloodless February Revolution. Both the Bolshevik and Menshevik underground committees thoroughly disorganized by arrests played virtually no part in this revolution. The old order collapsed not because new claimants for power were pushing it aside but through its own inherent weakness. Out of this void, two potential governments emerged; the provisional government of the liberal intelligentsia, pledged to some form of constitutional government, and the Petrograd Soviet, a revival of 1905, claiming to speak in the mystic name of the revolution. To the Provisional Government the revolution stood for democratic freedoms, for liberation from oppression and for a chance to prosecute effectively a war which the inefficient monarchy had
hampered. The Soviets in which the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries predominated until September 1917, viewed the imperialist war with disgust and the bourgeois Provisional Government with suspicion. They demanded conclusion of peace on just, democratic terms. 42

Neither of these forces were united or determined enough to govern a nation at war, facing economic and military crisis. From February to October 1919, Russia lived under the so called "dual-power". By September, the Bolsheviks who were at the outset a tiny minority in the Soviets, obtained a majority in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviet. Lenin returned from exile to Petrograd in April 1917 and came round independently to the same view as that of Trotsky - that the socialist and bourgeois revolution should be telescoped into one. The record of events between the February and October revolution of 1917 reveals that the Bolsheviks seized power, not because this was part of their original intention, and not because they had at first any large measure of support for such a policy. They seized power because the immediate democratic regime which they, in common with all the other revolutionaries had expected see established proved impotent. 43

Like the February revolution, the October revolution was almost bloodless. In Petrograd there was no resistance worth the name. The Bolsheviks won because, once the Tsar was overthrown, they were the only group who consistently showed confidence in their ability to seize and maintain power. 44 Moreover Lenin, besides displaying singleness of purpose and dedication, preached a simple and readily understood doctrine in a time of confusion and despair. There were other reasons too which contributed towards the victory of the Bolsheviks. Besides singleness of purpose, they possessed a superior organized and disciplined armed force - the Red Guard. Their slogan of -

42 Schapiro, n.19, p.38.
43 ibid.
44 For details see, Carr, n.18, pp.82-83.
'bread, peace and land' - brought them considerable support among the workers and sections of the army nearest the capital. Also, they had ample funds which they skilfully used to suit their purpose.45

The decree of 26 October/8 November 1917, of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets established the Council of People's Commissars. It was described as the 'Provisional Workers and Peasants Government', exercising authority until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The vital first steps of the regime were taken under the banner not of socialism but of democracy.46

THE BRIEF EXPERIMENT WITH MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM

Among the political consequences of the October Revolution must be counted the demise of parliamentary democracy even before it could begin to develop its institutions. What had appeared to be the natural development of the February Revolution withered away and the experiment with democracy, for which the Constituent Assembly was supposed to lay firm foundations, was supplanted by Bolshevik rule. The victors promised to institute the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' within a newly founded Soviet Socialist Republic. The events preceding the revolution clearly indicated that 'bourgeois' democracy had only limited prospects for success. The bourgeois parties were supported by only a tiny fraction of the population. Revolution as a mass event overturned many political plans. Not only was the Autocracy destroyed but even hopes for a constitutional monarchy, the intermediate form of government under which Russian liberals hoped to nurture political freedom. The politically informed sector of transit society was forced to embrace democratic policies whose underlying concepts and standards were not its own. Due to its narrow social base, this sector was unable to assimilate the huge, liberated populations and to channel their political energies into institutions which did not yet even exist. The Revolution was necessary to spark the development of democratic.

45 ibid.
46 Schapiro, n.19, pp.
parliamentary institutions; once unleashed, it possessed an inner dynamic which could not be controlled. This dilemma was in evidence from the outset in the confrontation between the Soviets and the Provisional government.47

These pessimistic conclusions about the prospects for parliamentary democracy in Russia was not beyond dispute. It is noteworthy that both the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Menshevik Social Democrats - powerful groups within the Soviets -- favoured democracy and a parliamentary republic. After the February Revolution, republicanism became the sole hope of the liberals and was also supported by most politically organized socialists during the spring and summer of 1917.

The Council of People's Commissars, created by the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets was all Bolshevik in composition. The Left Socialist Revolutionaries, (who had now become a separate party) although having refused the seats offered to them in the Council, still hoped that the Bolsheviks would come to an agreement for a broader coalition with the Mensheviks and (right) Socialist Revolutionaries. With both these socialist parties having denounced the Bolshevik 'coup', the prospects for such a settlement did not seem very bright. The Congress also set up a new All-Russian Central Executive Committee. It was set up in place of the old one elected by the First All-Russian Congress on which the Bolsheviks were in a minority. In the new All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Bolsheviks were allotted 62 seats, and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries 29. Various small left-wing political groups of no influence shared the remaining 10 seats.48

Soon after the October uprising, it had become evident to Lenin's followers that refusal to share power with the two socialist parties having considerable support among the majority of the population, would have made the prospect of a civil war inevitable. The approaching elections to the Constituent Assembly which had been fixed to begin on

47 For details see, Carr, n.18, pp.92-95.
48 ibid., pp.100-21.
12 November by the Provisional Government further complicated the situation for the Bolsheviks. Both the Provisional Government and the majority in the Soviets (i.e. Liberals and Socialists alike) believed that the great decisions about the revolution should not be taken in the streets but should be held in abeyance until the All-Russian Constituent Assembly could meet. In fact, the demand for a Constituent Assembly was so general that there was good reason to believe that it would indeed lay firm foundations for Russian democracy despite all the divisions in society. However, the truth remained that the various parties had very different motives for urging for a Constituent Assembly. The apparent democratic consensus was not very profound. The Provisional Government (in all its changing phases and compositions) found its own legitimacy reinforced by the fact that a Constituent Assembly was to be convened. As long as no elected parliament existed, the government could justify its inaction by claiming that all vital questions had to be postponed until they could be finally resolved by the supreme authority, the Constituent Assembly.49

The fact that the elections were repeatedly postponed was not without any reason. A programme of sweeping reform could not possibly have been undertaken while the war was still in progress. As long as continuation of the war remained the highest priority of the government, it had no desire to evoke the Constituent Assembly.

The delay in the elections to the Constituent Assembly was successfully used by the Bolshevik agitators to accuse official policy-makers of purposely deceiving the people and flouting their will. Interestingly, the very party which rejected parliamentarians in principle as a reactionary form of government could heap blame on Republicans who hesitated to place Russia in the hands of a democratic parliament. After the Bolshevik seizure of power, Lenin realised that denouncing the future parliament would have proven very unpopular at that time. Lenin was therefore obliged to declare publicly the day after the seizure of power that the new regime was simply a provisional government - the same formula used by the government which had just been overthrown. The

49 ibid., pp.100, 121.
declaration stated that the Council of People's Commissars was a 'Provisional Government of Workers and Peasants' which would take over the government only until the Constituent Assembly was convened. Like the preceding governments, the Bolsheviks wished to avoid any measures that might have undermined their still unconsolidated powers. 50

Thus free elections to a Constituent Assembly were held in Bolshevik Russia three weeks after the Red October. They were the first universal, equal, direct and secret elections that Russia had ever seen. There is no doubt that those who permitted them did not find the situation very tasteful. On 17 (30) November Pravda was already proclaiming that the Constituent Assembly had but one duty: to proclaim the Republic of Workers' Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies and then dissolve itself. In no uncertain terms, Lenin announced 'the strongest, fastest, most decisive and energetic measures' if the Assembly failed to recognise unreservedly "the Soviet government and the Soviet revolution". 51 The announcement of the election results only increased the Bolsheviks discomfort. The vast majority of the electorate had voted for an assembly in which out of the 707 deputies, 370 were Socialist Revolutionaries, 175 Bolsheviks, 40 Left Socialist Revolutionaries, 17 Kadets and 16 Mensheviks. The Bolsheviks had secured just under one-quarter of the total of all votes cast. The results seemed to indicate that at this time the people favoured a parliamentary republic or at least were opposed to the dictatorship by the Bolsheviks. If districts in the Ukraine are included, more than half of all electors, as upwards of twenty million people, gave their vote to the Socialist Revolutionaries. Only about 1.3 million voted for the Menshevik list and almost two million supported the Kadets, the only surviving bourgeois party. The Bolsheviks drew almost ten million votes. The distribution of seats revealed that a government drawn from the centre of the Constituent Assembly would have formed a solid majority faced with strong

50 ibid., pp.200-22.
51 For details see Fainsod, n.6, pp.134-35, 351.
parliamentary opposition from the Bolsheviks. Three hundred and seventy Socialist Revolutionaries allied with the small Menshevik and Kadet groupings and supported by the non-Russian deputies, could probably have rallied an impressive majority of 480 deputies as opposed to 175 Bolshevik deputies and their Left Socialist Revolutionaries sympathisers. If this could be read as a verdict on the government set up by the 'October Revolution', it was a crushing vote of no-confidence.\(^{52}\)

The defeat convinced Lenin of the necessity of a compromise on the issue of a coalition. At the All-Russian Congress of Peasants Deputies, Lenin and the other Bolshevik delegates were successful in bringing about a split in the ranks of the Social Revolutionaries resulting in an agreement for a coalition between the Bolsheviks and the left wing Social Revolutionaries. The agreement with the Left Social Revolutionaries not only reinforced the position of the Bolsheviks, but also provided them with the strongest argument to explain away the results of the elections to the Constituent Assembly - the potentially deceptive character of the Social Revolutionary vote.\(^{53}\) The Social Revolutionaries had gone to the polls as a single party presenting one list of candidates. The people according to Lenin, had voted for a party that no longer existed.

While reviewing the whole issue, two years later, Lenin found another argument. It was noted that in the large industrial cities the Bolsheviks had almost everywhere been ahead of the other parties. In the two capitals taken together, they had secured an absolute majority, the Kadets and the Social Revolutionaries being second and third respectively. But in matters of revolution the well-known principle applied 'the town inevitably leads the country after it; the country inevitably follows the town'.\(^{54}\)

The 'Thesis on the Constituent Assembly', published in Pravda on 13/26 December 1917 brought uncompromisingly to the open what had been implicit in

\(^{52}\) For details see Carr, n.18, pp.121-28.

\(^{53}\) ibid.

\(^{54}\) ibid., p.120.
everything Lenin had written since the famous April Thesis\textsuperscript{55} - the conviction that the bourgeois revolution in Russia was a spent force and the right course was to turn one's back resolutely on it and pursue the road to socialism. The only option left for the Constituent Assembly was an unconditional acceptance of the Soviet power failing which, the emergent crisis could be solved only by revolutionary means.

For the Bolsheviks, Lenin's 'Thesis on the Constituent Assembly' was a final tearing asunder of the veil of bourgeois constitutionalism. Two practical results emerged out of the acceptance of the thesis. In the first place it made irrevocable the breach between the Bolsheviks and the Socialist parties, which adhered to the view, that the revolution was still in its democratic stage. Once the proletarian character of the revolution was accepted, those who maintained the democratic view logically and inevitably became counter-revolutionaries. Secondly, it sealed the fate of the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly opened on January 1918. When the Bolsheviks failed to have their declaration, endorsing the legislation passed by the Second All Russian Congress of Soviets passed, they broke the meeting with the help of the Red Guards. Lenin justified his action on two grounds: first, that the elections had taken place too soon after the social transformation effected in November for the voting to reflect it, and secondly any election which had taken place before the 'workers' were in control, of the state power was nothing but a farce.\textsuperscript{56} This whole incident was treated with indifference throughout the country. The political immaturity of Russia as often in her history, favoured the most resolute, if not the most unscrupulous, political force of the time.

The Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets opened at the Tauride Palace on 10/23 January 1918. Finding itself to be the natural, though self constituted heir to the Constituent Assembly, it at once confirmed its formal dissolution.

\textsuperscript{55} For details see, ibid., pp.90-91.

\textsuperscript{56} V.I. Lenin, Sochineniya. Vol. XXIV, p.634, quoted in Carr, n.18 p.122.
The October Revolution had another important constitutional result. Slowly and steadily, it led to the destruction of the unique brand of parliamentarians who had developed in the Soviets after the February days. The Soviets represented a form of worker, soldier and peasant self-government in which the bourgeoisie could not interfere. These institutions were viewed by their supporters as the organized expression of 'revolutionary democracy' or direct democracy. With Central Executive Committees and the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, representative organs were created at the national level over and above the local Soviets. These assemblies of deputies functioned in a highly parliamentary manner. An important feature of Menshevik and Social Revolutionaries policy was the desire not to replace the state with Soviets but instead to enshrine self-government for the working class in the forthcoming democratic parliamentary constitution. This would give the masses strong institutional representation, free of bourgeois influence and the Soviets thus constituted would provide additional control over the activities of the state.  

Lenin went far beyond this plan. In his April Thesis, he pointed out that the Bolshevik slogan of 'all power to the Soviets' implied that they would not simply exist alongside the state but would develop an entirely new form of government which as the revolution proceeded, would displace and destroy the bourgeois government. With the replacement of the bourgeois government by the Soviet government a transitional form of state would emerge on the road from Capitalism to Socialism. But in order to perform their appointed functions, the Soviets would have to be 'restructured'. This comprised their being liberated and cleansed of those forces (most Mensheviks and SR's for example) who clung to parliamentary democracy and refused to accept a Soviet Socialist republic in place of democratic republic. So far as Lenin was concerned, a Soviet republic was only of value if the Bolsheviks were at the helm.  

57 Schapiro, n.9, pp.161-79.  
58 ibid.
TOWARDS A MONOLITHIC PARTY

The evolution of the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party soon to be renamed Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), after October 1917 was a process both of continuity and change. The three main developments which marked the period between the October revolution and the death of Lenin were the increase of authority in the hands of a small central party leadership, the transformation of the party from a revolutionary organization directed to the overthrow of existing institutions into the directing nucleus of a governmental and administrative machine; and finally, the creation for it of a monopoly through the elimination of other parties.  

The transformation of a revolutionary party into a governmental party has been a marked feature of all victorious revolution, resulting in consequences so familiar that they may be called stereotyped. The party, turning from the task of destruction to that of administration, discovers the virtue of law and order and of submission to the rightful authority of the revolution. It is often attacked from the Left by those who wish to carry on the revolution in the name of former revolutionary principles which the government of the revolution is alleged to be betraying. This pattern was followed in the history of the Russian revolution too. Another distinctive feature resulted from the new interaction of the Party and State. The association between Party and state directly involved the party in every national crisis, and transformed every call for national unity and national leadership into a call for party unity and loyalty to the party leader. Lenin the party leader became inseparable from the leader of the nation. The authority which he exercised was more moral in nature rather than of external powers. It set a tradition of personnel leadership which was difficult to shake off in the times to come.

The third important change was the acquisition by the party of what was in effect a political monopoly in Soviet territory. Before the revolution, dissenting Bolsheviks could and did become Mensheviks or joined other parties as political groups. In fact, even in the first months after the revolution the fluidity of membership between the surviving

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59 Schapiro, n.19, p.38.
of the political parties - Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, Left and Right Social Revolutionaries was still operative to some extent. But after the summer of 1918 other political parties existed only in name, with their status becoming more and more precarious; and from 1921 onwards they virtually disappeared.

These changes developed in stages. Inspite of Lenin's long standing insistence on conformity of doctrine and on party discipline to enforce it, the original party statute adopted by the Second Party Congress of 1903 and confirmed in a slightly revised form by the Third Congress of 1905, left implicit the obligations on members to submit to party decisions. The revised party statute adopted by the Sixth Congress in August 1917 made this obligation more explicit. 60

Closely connected with the conception of the party as a monopoly was its conception as a 'monolith', resting on the premise that no monopoly of political power can exist if torn within itself. Complete unity and solidarity in the party ranks, from the lowest rank to top leadership, were considered a basic and absolute prerequisite for the success and survival of Soviet rule and the Party's directing role, whose very strength was ascribed to "its coherence, unity of will and unity of action. 61

Towards this end, the Bolsheviks had from the very start provided themselves with effective instruments of action. The Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet contained a section for combating counter-revolution, headed by Dzerzhinskii. This section acted as the punitive arm of the party until the establishment of the Secret Police (Vecheka) on December 1917. For the first few months, terror however, remained sporadic. It acquired an organized character much later.

It was in attempting to find a lasting solution to the two burning problems of peace and land that the new government hoped to win over the peasants. The crucial question of peace raised the wider issue of relations between the Bolsheviks and their

60 Schapiro, n.9, pp.212-14.
61 Carr, n.18, p.191.
allies, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, and affected relations among the Bolshevik leaders themselves.

In October 1915, Lenin, in the event of a Bolshevik victory, had linked his peace policy with a 'revolutionary war'. He had hoped that the Russian example would kindle revolutions in the capitalist countries and revolt in the colonial and semi-colonial territories. This policy was repeatedly reaffirmed even after the February revolution with the Bolsheviks continuing to preach peace and a 'revolutionary war'. However, the severe terms of peace offered by the Germans and its acceptance by the Central Committee on 23 February 1918, shook the party to its foundations. For the advocates of revolutionary war the acceptance of the unequal peace treaty imposed by the Germans seemed a betrayal of their duty as revolutionaries.

The acceptance of the German peace terms marked the end of the coalition with the left Socialist Revolutionaries who walked out of the government to rouse the country to revolutionary war. Within the party emerged an open opposition movement, led by Bukharin and known as 'Left Communism'. The alliance of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries with the Bolsheviks had been due to two main factors: a desire to ensure peace and to give land to the peasants. With the failure of the immediate goal, the alliance automatically came to an end. Their agitation against the peace with the Germans grew in intensity and culminated on 6 July 1918 in a small-scale revolt in the streets of Moscow and Petrograd. The revolt, although easily suppressed, served as a useful lesson to the Bolsheviks that unless they remained united, they were liable to be swept away.

Although initially the 'Left Communists' enjoyed considerable support in the rank and file, at the Seventh Party Congress, which met between 6 and 8 March 1918, Bukharin's resolution against the treaty of peace was easily outvoted. A week later, at the Fourth Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets, members voted

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63 Schapiro, n.9, pp.187-88.
overwhelmingly in favour of ratification of the treaty. For Lenin, the harsh terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had provided the Bolsheviks with the much needed breathing space.

But this breathing space did not last long and by the early summer of 1918 the new Soviet regime was in the throes of a civil war. This civil war left a lasting imprint on the Communist Party and the victory of the Red Army in the civil war was one of its major success. The organisation of the Red Army was mainly Trotsky's achievement and its supplies were directly linked with the policy of the Communists towards the peasants and towards the industry.

In regard to land, the party was largely guided by expediency. During the period of civil war, no attempt to put its doctrine of nationalization of land was put into effect. Even the unleashing of class war in the villages in the form of 'War Communism', though consistent with doctrine was mainly a by-product of compulsory exaction of food. In the case of industry, the situation was different with the measures of expediency getting intermingled with the measures dictated by doctrine - the desire to introduce Communism. On 14 November 1917, the new government decreed the workers' control of industry. Within a few months, the disastrous results, were evident. For the workers, this new system was nothing more than a method of settling scores with the owners and management in complete disregard to the repercussions of their action on the enterprise as a whole. From mid-1918 onwards the Communists struggled to counteract some of the anarchy which workers' control had unleashed, and to restore such features of capitalist management as workers discipline, one-man management and modern efficiency systems.

All the extremes of 'left' theory were embodied in War Communism and Lenin admitted after its abandonment that it was a mistaken attempt at an immediate transition to Socialism. Its main elements were: highly centralised control; the rejection of commercial market or monetary forms of distribution in favour of production for direct

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use, and distribution by rationing of basic goods and services free, or at nominal prices; and an egalitarian wage policy in industry.

The combined effect of these factors had a catastrophic effect on industry. The food shortage produced near starvation in the towns resulting in drain of industrial workers to the villages in search of food. This migration from the towns to the villages halved the industrial proletariat by 1920 as compared with 1917. By 1921, the overall production had fallen drastically. Hunger, lack of incentives coupled with the inability of the government to procure food challenged the patience of the proletariat. Strikes and disorders soon took the form of political protests against the Communist rule.65

Within the Communist Party too, internal dissensions became the order of the day with party organs being powerless to enforce strict discipline. The Party Rules, adopted at the Eighth Party Conference in December 1919, permitted free discussion inside the party on all questions until such time as a decision had been reached. Insipce of all repressions, the two Socialist parties had managed to survive the civil war. Both the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks because of their opposition to the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917 were branded 'counter-revolutionaries' and were made the target of arrests and administrative repression. The Socialist Revolutionaries continued to be regarded by the Communists as the potential source of peasantry unrest. The Mensheviks too, after the civil war rapidly increased their support base. As late as 1920 the Mensheviks secured the election of 45 delegates in the Moscow Soviet, over 225 in Kharkov and substantial delegations in about two dozen other Soviets. Even in the trade unions, the Menshevik supporters were fast outnumbering the Communists. The time had come when either the socialist parties would have to be given legal recognition or destroyed.66

Victory in the Civil War shattered the so called unanimity to party rule. The peasants were in open revolt and the discontentment among the proletariat began to

65 Schapiro, n.9, pp.192-94.
66 ibid., p.196.
assume threatening proportions. Within the party too, opposition to the leadership acquired new importance. Among the two centres of discontentment that had been building for some time, one was the 'Workers' Opposition' lead by Shliapnikov.67 These Trade Union Communists had ensured for themselves a dominant position in the leading organs of nearly all trade unions. Three matters found these Trade Union Communists in conflict with the policy of the Party leaders. The first cause of conflict was the practice of employing non-Communist experts and specialists in factories. This concession to the practical needs of the industry was interpreted as granting concessions to the class enemy, founded on lack of faith in the working class. The second source of conflict was the growing tendency of the Central Party organs of disregarding party democracy by substituting nomination for the methods of election prescribed in the Party rules. Thirdly, there were major differences between the rank and file Communist trade unionists and party leaders on the question of the function of the trade unions. Refusing to believe that the voice of the appointed trade union leaders in the counsels of the central party and government organs, was the voice of the organized labour, the rank and file trade unionists demanded direct participation.

The second centre of dissent was among the Democratic Centralists, who objected to the increasingly authoritarian practices of the party.68 The leading Democratic Centralists were in the majority of the cases former Left Communists (Bukharin was no longer a part of them). Their interpretation of the party principle of 'democratic centralism' differed from that of Lenin and they advocated reforms which would allow more real powers to the executive committees of the local Soviets.

The immediate cause of crisis within the party was Trotsky who firmly believed that the basis of the 'proletarian dictatorship' was iron discipline, and that the trade unions would be subjected to this discipline in the interest of production. Appointed People's Commissar of Transport and later Chairman of the Central Transport Committee

67 Fanisod, n.6, pp.143-46.
68 ibid., p.142.
The October Revolution and the Brief Experiment with Multi-Party System

(Tsektran) he immediately started putting his theories into action resulting in widespread discontentment in the rank and file.\textsuperscript{69} The Central Committee, itself was broadly divided on this issue of more or less discipline. The liberal faction of ten was headed by Lenin and included Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin besides the two trade union leaders Tomskii and Rudzutak. Trotsky's supporters included Bukharin, the head of the Vecheka Dzerzhinskii, and the three men at the head of the party secretariat organization - Krestinskii, Preobrazhenskii and Serebriakov. A proposal for the immediate abolition of the unpopular Tsektran led to a division of opinion among the members of the Central Committee.

In view of the open split among the party leaders a debate on the basis of rival policies was inaugurated. Taking advantage of this invitation issued by the Central Committee, The Workers' Opposition and the Democratic Centralists and several other minor groups published their platforms. Aleksandr Kollontai of the Workers' Opposition gave a clarion call for freedom in the party. The party was also accused of losing its proletarian composition and becoming a caste of self-seeking officials. In contrast, Trotsky's programme advocated the fusion of trade union organs with the state machinery and military discipline and compulsion as the normal methods of maintaining industrial efficiency. Lenin's Theses (also known as the 'Platform of the Ten') held out hope that more freedom would be tolerated. He declared that the state functions of the Union would gradually increase and the principle method for ensuring discipline in the industry would be through persuasion. The trade union organs would be elected but under the overall control of the Party.\textsuperscript{70}

On 8th March 1921, six days before the Tenth Party Congress was to meet, the sailors of the Baltic Fleet and the garrison of the naval base at Kronstadt openly rebelled against the Communist regime and set up a Provisional Revolutionary Committee. The Kronstadt revolutionaries put forward a series of radical demands characteristic of the

\textsuperscript{69} Schapiro, n.9, p.203.

\textsuperscript{70} ibid., p.205.
mood of 1917. The Revolutionary Committee demanded among other things the immediate re-election of all the Soviets by secret ballot; freedom of speech for workers, peasants and all left-wing parties; the freeing of all political prisoners and the abolition of the special Communist terror detachments in the army and the villages: freedom for trade unions; and freedom for the peasants in the use of the land. The revolt was immediately branded as 'counter-revolutionary' and the Red Army was sent to put down the rebels and execute the survivors.

The Tenth Party Congress which met on 8 March 1921 was faced with simultaneous revolt of both the proletariat and the peasants. The appeasement of the peasants on which the very survival of the regime depended necessitated the reversal of the economic policy. This meant the replacement of 'War Communism' by a policy based on free market. The Congress voted for the abolition of the forcible exaction of produce from the peasants and replaced it by a graduated tax in kind. It also sanctioned a limited form of local trade. The adoption of the New Economic Policy (NEP) created deep divisions in the ranks of the Communist Party. Although Bukharin immediately shifted to Lenin's views, other theorists like Piatakov and Preobrazhenskii retained their doubts. Their objections were primarily two. One was the apparent sacrifice of a planned economy to the natural enemies of Socialism - the peasant smallholders. The second objection went to the very roots of Marx's doctrine of political 'superstructure'. If the economic base was now to become the free market, it was inevitable that sooner or later the political superstructure would have to change in conformity with the base. The followers of the Workers' Opposition regarded the NEP as a betrayal of the workers cause.

For Lenin, the economic reforms were only a subsidiary to the political reform if the supremacy of the Communist Party and its monopoly of power was to be preserved. He argued that the attempt at direct transition to Communism had been a grave mistake. The proper road was from small scale production to State Capitalism and

71 Schapiro, n. 19, p. 39.
then to Socialism, and only thereafter to Communism. Lenin's 'Platform of Ten', won their victory over Trotsky on the popular issue of more democracy in the party. The resolution on Party Democracy stressed that the military form of centralization was dictated by the civil war conditions and was no longer applicable. This resolution went a long way to meet the criticisms of both the Workers' Opposition and the Democratic Centralists.

In dealing with the discipline inside the party, Lenin had his own plans. On the second day of the Congress, Lenin asserted that time had come to put an end to the opposition within the party. On the last day of the Congress, Lenin produced two new resolutions on Party Unity, and on 'The Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in our Party'. The first resolution on Party Unity went on to suggest that the existence of opposition inside the party had given encouragement to the enemies of the revolution, as the Kronstadt rising had shown. The resolution called for the immediate dissolution of all groups with a separate platform, on pain of immediate expulsion from the party.72

The second resolution condemned the views of the Workers' Opposition on the role of the trade unions in exercising control over industry as inconsistent with the membership of the party.73

The Tenth Party Congress was a milestone in the development of the power of the party machine. The resolution adopted stated in no uncertain terms that factions, groupings, independent platforms, clusters of opinion or any other manifestations of deliberate aloofness and separatist activity in the party would not be tolerated. The Congress ordered 'the complete annihilation of any factionalism', demanding of all party organizations constant vigil against factional doings. The Central Committee was given 'plenary powers' in case of violation of discipline to apply all the measures of party penalties, up to expulsion from the party. In regard to the members of the Central

72 Schapiro, n.9, p.214.
73 ibid.
Committee - "their transfer to the status of candidates and even as an extreme measure, their expulsion from the party".  

It was repeatedly stated that the violators of this law would not be allowed to shield themselves in the name of 'intra-party democracy'. Intra-party democracy meant the carrying on of a constant struggle against bureaucracy, against the method of 'administering' in lieu of persuasion in the party and against decision making in a family fashion, i.e., by failing altogether to criticize one's colleagues for fear of upsetting comradely relations. It meant the electivity of the leading party office holders, widespread self-criticism and the colossal activity of the party masses guided by the party. It involved more participation of the rank and file in meetings that elect party organs, more speeches, reports and proposals of candidates. It signified the enlistment of thousands of workers for mass control over the Soviet apparatus, that is the combatting of red tapism, slothfulness and nepotism through factory patronage of Soviet offices and the recommendation of factories for removal of bureaucratic officials; and it also meant the promotion of host of workers to positions in the state machine and to leading work in the party.

The Tenth Congress of the Party set the pattern of party rule which remained in force for a very long time to come.

THE MIDDLE PERIOD OPPOSITION AND STALIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE CPSU'S MONOPOLY OF POWER

The oppositions of the 'Middle Period' began with the bitterly fought opposition of Trotsky whose following was augmented by remnants of the above mentioned opposition groups. His proposals to utilize 'toil armies' in industry for the reconstruction of Russia (1920), his views on the relationship of the party to the trade unions (1921) and

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75 As quoted, ibid., p.125.
his plan for industrial organization submitted against the then proposed monetary reform and price policy (early 1923), were rejected in succession by the majority of the Politburo.\(^{76}\) His differences with the others of the top leadership began in earnest in the autumn of 1923, with his 8 October 1923 pronouncement and subsequent letter and brochure on 'The new Course'. In these statements he accused the party of degeneration, juxtaposed it to its leading apparatus and posited the thesis that the younger generation - the student and youth - are the best barometers of sentiment within the party. He defended the freedom of factions and prophesied the doom of the revolution with the continuation of the policies pursued.\(^{77}\) The controversy revolved around current questions as well as fundamental postulates: concessions to foreign capital, assessment of blame for Comintern failures in 1923, the interrelation between proletariat and peasantry, industry and agriculture, the party and state and economic organs; and the nature of the party - the conception of its total unity and the impermissibility of factions or of assertions positing a 'struggle of generations' within it. It also embraced the question of correct historical evaluation of the role of the party and of its central committee, of Lenin, and other leaders in the October Revolution.\(^{78}\) Last and most important, it concerned the view of the primary nature and programme of that revolution - the crucial question of the possibility and desirability of building 'socialism in one country', the USSR, as against Trotsky's thesis of 'Permanent Revolution'.\(^{79}\) Over these multiple issues with their manifold angles, the debate with the Trotsky opposition grew progressively tenser and sharper.

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79 For details of the debate on Trotsky's, 'Theory of Permanent Revolution', see Schapiro, n.9, pp.290-93.
Trotsky was subsequently joined in opposition by Zinoviev and Kamenev. Questioning the possibility of erecting a socialist system of economy in such a technically backward country as Russia, without the aid of sustaining revolutions abroad, Zinoviev and Kamenev broke with the others in the Politburo in April 1925. By the time of the Fourteenth Party Congress in December of that year, they emerged as the ‘New Opposition’. They criticized the policy of winning over the middle peasantry on the ground that it left intact the might of the kulaks, denied that the state industry was socialist in nature, and demanded freedom of grouping and discussion in the party. In April-July 1926 an association or ‘bloc’ between the Zinoviev and Trotsky groups was effected. This was followed by a number of secret cells denouncing the leadership in control and eliciting mass discussion on policy. In consequence Zinoviev, Trotsky and Kamenev were removed from the Politburo (July 1926-23 October 1926). Zinoviev was also relieved of his post in the Executive Committee of the Communist International. All three were warned against further factional work.

Professing to see greater danger in the existing party regime than in an external threat of war, despite the mounting tension in Anglo-Soviet relations at the time, the opposition expressed doubt over the desirability of organizing the defence of the country unless the leadership was changed. In reply, the Central Committee denounced the oppositions activity as a road leading to a new party in the country and a split in the Comintern. On 11 November, Trotsky and Zinoviev were excluded from the Party, Kamenev from the Central Committee and a month later the Fifteenth Congress (December 1927) made a clean sweep by expelling from the party, seventy-five members of the opposition, including Kamenev, Piatakov, Radek and Rakovsky.

80 ibid., p.296.
81 ibid., pp.301-04.
82 ibid., p.310.
The Left Opposition struggle had barely died down when a new 'Right Opposition' headed by Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov, began to emerge prior to the July 1928 Plenum of the Central Committee. This platform advanced contentions that domestically current policies had resulted in tribute bearing by the peasantry and in the planting of a bureaucracy in the party. These policies had also brought about a split in the Comintern. They pressed for a slowing down of the tempo of industrialization, for a liberalization of the trade and especially the Kulak taxation policies and also for a modification of the policy of weeding out Social Democratic and other non-Communist elements within the Comintern. 83

Rejecting these contentions as based on wrong evaluations of the total situation at home and as flowing from Bukharin's erroneous theory of 'the Stabilization of Capitalism' abroad, the majority of the party's leadership condemned the opposition pronouncements and actions. In July, the Executive Committee of the Communist International followed suit by removing Bukharin from its Presidium, and by November he was divested of his membership in the Politburo. Tomsky and Rykov were also expelled from the Politburo. 84

THE ATTAINMENT OF MONOLITHISM

All major opposition seemed to have collapsed by 1930 and Stalin was able to state at the time that the "the Sixteenth Congress is one of the few Congress in our party at which there is no longer any crystallized and solid opposition capable of opposing its own line to that of the general line of the party". 85 That all was not well, despite the new atmosphere of unanimity was soon revealed by the assassination of Kirov, an outstanding leader of the party. This was followed by the purges and trials of 1936-38

83 ibid., p.373.
84 ibid., pp.365-81.
which involved the total liquidation of the various leaders of the opposition.\textsuperscript{86} The Party Congress which met in March 1939, reflected a complete all round unity of purpose and policy at all the branches and levels of party domain.

Stalinism meant, above all else, the victory of the organization man - of the party apparatus. Stalinism led to the creation of a titanic bureaucracy of state and party, together with a vast hierarchy in which no one could be certain of his position from one hour to the next. Stalin obtained from Lenin the centralist, anti-factional conception of the party as well as the Tenth Congress resolution on party unity, with its provisions for expulsion. Stalin also inherited from Lenin the principle of periodic purges of the party membership. It was Lenin who established the Central Control Commission which proved useful to Stalin. The practice of enlarging the Central Committee, which Stalin employed for his own personal advantage had been actually initiated by Lenin, under whom the membership increased from fifteen members and eight candidates in 1918 to twenty seven members and nineteen candidates in 1922. Stalin's frequent use of the practice of co-option of members to the Central Committee in place of election by the Party Congress was based upon solid precedent: Lenin had Stalin co-opted to the Central Committee in 1912. Both men employed the threat to resign - Lenin in 1918, and Stalin in 1924 and 1932. Both Lenin and Stalin invoked the argument of ‘Capitalistic encirclement’ and the bogey of a restoration of the White Guards in order to throttle their critics within the party. Both believed in the ultimate Victory of Communism on a world-wide scale, and in the use of strategic retreat and maneuver in order to attain this goal. Lenin’s obsession with political orthodoxy and doctrinal loyalty made it easy for Stalin to carry the process to its logical outcome: \textit{“the shedding of blood within the party”}. Way back in the Fourteenth Party Congress on 23 December 1953 Stalin mentioned, “We are not liberals. For us, the interests of the party are above formal democratism”.\textsuperscript{87} Lenin had never hesitated about shedding the blood of the “class enemy”. He had even believed that the

\textsuperscript{86} ibid.

\textsuperscript{87} Stalin quoted in Towster, n.74.
enemies would attempt to infiltrate the party's ranks. Once it was conceded that the class enemy had penetrated the party's membership, it was relatively easy for Stalin to pose as the righteous executioner.

Anyone who disagreed with Stalin was charged with favouring the growth of 'capitalism' in the villages. By equating the 'Right' with the 'Left' and labelling each as "petty bourgeois" in origin, Stalin could deny that his own position was that of a 'Centrist'. In this way, Stalin meant to demonstrate that his position was the only true Leftist one representing the "Leninist line".

POST - STALIN PERIOD: KHRUSHCHEV'S DESTALINIZATION

Six main features could be distinguished in the CPSU as it appeared to an observer in 1952. It had in the first place become a mass party, yet at the same time selective. It was no longer, as it had been in Lenin's lifetime, a small band of zealots, but an assembly of the nations' elite in all walks of life. It sought talent where it could find it, having long freed itself from the doctrinal preference for proletarian membership, to which in theory it owed its origin and indeed the very reason for its existence.

The second feature was the predominance within the party of the apparatus of officials and secretaries, who formed a small minority of around 3 per cent. By virtue of the authority which they had acquired in the course of years, not without bloody conflict, these officials could dominate elections, discussions and decisions inside all party organizations throughout the country. The overt efforts which the party leadership made from time to time to stimulate greater democracy in the party rank and file, whether genuine in intention or not, had repeatedly come to nothing. The members of the party had learned from experience that the only safe course was to follow the lead which came from above: to vote for the list which the leaders of the party organization proposed; to criticize only those who had already been censured from above, and then

88 Schapiro, n.9, pp.555-58.
to criticize with vigour; and to vote without question for proposals which came from those in authority.\textsuperscript{89}

The third feature of the party was the centralization of the apparatus itself. At the top of the hierarchy of secretaries and officials were the secretaries of the Central Committee, controlling through their subordinate officials the several departments of the secretariat. Experiments in administrative devolution had always proved shortlived. The party had repeatedly returned to the form of administration which left the threads of control firmly in the hands of the Central Secretariat.

This centralization of the apparatus, observable at the time of Stalin's death was not a new feature. Much of it was derived directly from Lenin's conception of the party, even if in Lenin's life time complete centralization was not attained. But the personal ascendancy of Stalin - the fourth feature - gave a particular character to traditional forms. Stalin was a great deal more than leader of the party. He could govern either through the party or without it, as he thought fit. He could and did ignore the formal party organs when he chose - he summoned no Congress for over thirteen years, allowed meeting of the Central Committee but rarely, and even apparently avoided summoning the full Politburo.

This personal ascendancy of Stalin over the party gave rise to the fifth feature which was discernible in the last years of his life: a corresponding decline in the influence of the party. The reason for this decline was that the party apparatus was faced with competition from the expanding government apparatus, deliberately fostered in the interest of the safety which the dictator sought in the duplication of his instruments of control.

The sixth feature of the party at the time of Stalin's death was one which had become firmly established and progressively developed at any rate since the 1930s: the interpenetration by party members of all institutions and activities within the state.

\textsuperscript{89} ibid.
The period after the death of Stalin, saw something like a collective leadership. The object of this division of power represented a common desire among the party leaders to prevent the re-emergence of a new dictator with powers comparable to those once wielded by Stalin. Within four years this collective oligarchy had given way to a system in which the First Secretary of the Party (the title was officially conferred on Khrushchev in September 1953), having eliminated from the Presidium all but three of its original members, had become, if not an autocrat like Stalin, at any rate to all appearances the unchallenged leader of policy. The reason why the experiment in oligarchy proved short-lived can at present only be conjectured. There were genuine disagreement of policy between Khrushchev and the rivals whom be defeated, and it is conceivable that his victory over them was due to real support for his views which he could muster in the Central Committee. Also in a system where policy was largely formulated independently of public opinion and where genuine representative organs for resolving differences of view between several leaders of equal status did not exist, a dictatorship of one man offered the advantages of efficiency and convenience. Above all, the victory of Khrushchev over rivals like Malenkov symbolized and was in fact the reassertion by the party of its predominance over the government machinery, which under Stalin had been eroded.

Khrushchev's position was to be somewhat shaken by the repercussions of the momentous Twentieth Party Congress which met in Moscow from 14 to 25 February 1956. The gradual relaxation of tension which had been allowed since Stalin's death, the impact of the curbing of the powers of the security forces, and the fact that the Congress was meeting somewhat before its appointed time, all lent an air of expectancy to the proceedings. Khrushchev's main report with which the proceedings opened, did not however produce very startling surprises. He listed three main tasks in the ideological sphere: preservation of the unity and authority of the party and above all of the principle

90 For details of the disagreements between Khrushchev and his rivals see, ibid., pp.561-72.
91 ibid., p.569.
of collective leadership, harnessing the directing activity of the party towards practical tasks, and increase of vigilance in ideological work in order to overcome the influence of bourgeois ideology. On the third day of the Congress, Mikoyan's (one of the three new First Deputy Chairman created in 1955) speech shocked the audience by its open criticism of Stalin. He went on to criticize Stalin's 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR' and even criticized the 'Short Course on the History of the Party'. In the morning of 25th February, the Congress went into a closed session to hear a second speech by Khrushchev, 'On the Cult of Personality and its Consequences'. With a frankness which had long disappeared from party life Khrushchev sketched Lenin's conflict with Stalin at the end of his life. He described with full facts and figures, the assaults made on party members and leaders.92

1 The most important development affecting the Party during the period of Khrushchev's office was its changed relationship to the government, to agriculture and to industry. The rivalry between Khrushchev and Malenkov which ended in the victory of Khrushchev was in a sense as much a conflict between the party machine and the government machine, in which the party machine won, as a pure struggle for power. The predominance of the party secretaries in the highest councils of the party, the policy-making Presidium, achieved by 1957, symbolized the fact that the party had and now arrested its primacy and would not tolerate rival counsels. The decline in authority of the Council of Ministers and the assumption by the First Secretary of the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers were merely the final touches in a victory already achieved.93

4 The Party Programme adopted in October 1961, at the Twenty Second Congress bears the imprint of Khrushchev in every line. It was debated, glorified and voted before his authority entered on its decline. The Programme ranged over the past and future,


93 For details see, Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev (London; Collins, 1966), pp.175-201.
covering all aspects of Soviet ambition both at home and abroad. Khrushchev’s theory of the nature of the party was his main contribution to ideology. His first innovation was the claim that the party had already become a party/vanguard of the whole people and no longer, as hitherto the party/vanguard of the ‘Ruling class’ i.e., the proletariat. This novel view was difficult to reconcile with anything that Marx wrote: if there are no longer any classes, but only a whole people there can, according to Marx, be no place for any kind of party or indeed any kind of state or government at all. The programme at no point in the future envisaged the disappearance of the party, and constantly stressed the need for the party to play an increased role in the future Communist stage. The state, Khrushchev asserted in the Programme, would progressively wither away in the shape of its institutions. In practice this would mean that various functions carried out by government organs would be taken over by public organizations. This process made some headway when under Khrushchev, some functions of the militia were taken over by bands of ‘volunteer’ vigilantes, and extensive use was made of ‘volunteer’ services in many branches of administration. Some of the functions of the law courts were taken over by the ‘Comrades’ Courts’. These developments were a far cry from the utopia of Marx, but it corresponded to the vision that Khrushchev had of a society in which force would give way to a process of self-organization.94

This new spirit was alive among the intellectuals. Voices were raised among the writers calling for sincerity in literature and freedom for the artist to write what he saw and not what was demanded of him. Such voices had not been heard since the early 30’s. The party leaders reacted to this new mood with apprehension, which became more marked after the attempted revolution in Hungary in October 1956, in which writers and intellectuals played a leading part. The Party did not discourage all criticism but insisted upon two things: first, that all creative art must be consciously directed towards the furthering of the aims for which the party stood. Second, that while criticism might be

directed at individual abuses within the system, there must be no criticism of the system itself. Loyalty to party policy and party control must always be emphasized.\textsuperscript{95}

Greater liberty was also allowed in other intellectual fields. In particular, scientific research was no longer subject to the dead hand of Stalin's personal whims and accordingly made remarkable progress. But the party continued to show extreme sensitiveness to at least one field of research - 'the history of the Party'. In his speech to the Twentieth Congress in closed session Khrushchev had been careful to emphasize that his strictures on Stalin applied only to the last years of his life. Stalin's battle with the followers of Trotsky and with the 'Right Opposition' had been quite correct in principle, even if there had been some exaggerations in practice. The position of Khrushchev when faced with the new tide of unwanted intellectual freedom was necessarily somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, a man bred in the party apparatus and in the traditions of Stalin was hardly likely to welcome even the most circumscribed freedom of criticism, on the other hand, Khrushchev had identified himself with the denunciation of Stalin and could not go back on that without playing into the hands of his enemies. Thus for the intellectuals, two great conquests remained. In the first place writers and scholars were free to criticize Stalin and his era. (It was Khrushchev who personally authorized in 1962 the publication of 'One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich' by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Secondly, it was the Party that dealt with the intellectuals and not the KGB.\textsuperscript{96}

The determination of the party to retain its grip over the population remained as great as it had ever been before. The party paid more heed than before to the voice of the 'masses', but it held on to its conviction that it must lead them and wherever necessary try to force its will upon them.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{95} For similar arguments, see, Lars Ohlsson, "Glasnost and Perestroika", in ibid., pp.46-64.

\textsuperscript{96} ibid.

\textsuperscript{97} Schapiro, n.9, p.616.