The relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe emerged after the Second World war. The old regimes, which ruled over East European countries collapsed along with the defeat of Nazi Germany. Soon after, these countries were overrun by the Soviet troops. As a result, the entire region fell under the hegemony of the Soviet union. The onset of the cold war led Stalin to impose communist party rule of the Soviet type in all the countries of Eastern Europe by replacing non-communist parties.

In reality, the communist regimes were propped up and controlled not only by the presence of Soviet troops but also by justifying them by the concept of people's democracy. In the economic sphere the Soviet model of command structure was ruthlessly imposed.

These authoritarian monoliths could hardly sustain themselves on a permanent basis. The first to raise standard of revolt was Yugoslavia in 1948. It was quickly excommunicated from the Cominform dominated by the Soviet Union. The year 1953 saw workers' uprising in East Germany. In 1956 and 1968 the revolt in Hungary and Czechoslovakia respectively took place. All these political unrests were suppressed by the force of Soviet army.

The next landmark was the political unrest in Poland in the year 1980, which threatened not only the socialist stability in Poland but also the other East European countries and the Soviet Union itself. The deteriorating economic crisis
caused by years of communist mismanagement and especially by the price rise of meat products resulted in a wave of worker's strikes, which encompassed the whole of country. This political unrest was led by the interfactory committee, which later on took the form of the solidarity.

The Soviets perceived the polish crisis as not only a threat to their regional domination, but also an ideological and political challenge to the orthodoxy of Marxism-feminism. The Soviet Union, therefore, adopted the most hostile attitude towards the solidarity and its movement. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union seemed to have preferred a conciliatory approach rather than military intervention, but at the same time giving an impression that they were ready to use their power to restore political discipline in Poland. It appears that the Soviet Union adopted the policy of conciliation and implied threat due to various internal as well as external forces and factors. On December 31, 1981, General Jaruzelski imposed martial law and the top leaders of the solidarity were arrested and the trade union was outlawed.

The Soviet Union's diplomatic response to the polish crisis remained unchanged even during the leadership of Yuri Andropov and Chernenko. They continued with the earlier "conciliatory approach" thereby preserving the political myth of an autonomous Poland.

In 1968 Soviet Union felt confident to organise total military intervention to crush the Czechoslovak reform movement, but it could not afford to repeat the feat in Poland in early eighties. Quite obviously, the combination of internal and
external circumstances on one occasion was different from that of other. During 1968 Prague spring, the international situation was different from that of polish crisis in 1980s. In 1968 Soviet Union was free from any external threat particularly from the USA because of its involvement in Vietnam in 1960s. Apart from this Soviet military intervention aimed at not only upholding socialist principle in Czechoslovakia but also to maintain Soviet hegemony in order to keep security intact in the entire East European country.

The proposed study entitled “soviet policy towards crisis in Eastern Europe : A Comparative study of Soviet Policy towards Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1981-84)” is organised into five chapters. The first chapter traces the historical background of Soviet relationship with East Europe during inter-war period with reference to policies persuade right from stalin to Brezhnev.

The second chapter deals with Soviet policy towards crisis in Eastern Europe. This chapter enunciates the nature and causes responsible for the crisis and the role played by the Soviet Union during the political unrest.

The Third chapter discusses soviet attitude towards the Czechoslovak crisis. This chapter has enumerated the domestic causes responsible for the crisis and subsequent soviet military intervention by invoking what was known as “Brezhnev Doctrine”.

The fourth chapter remains confined to the Soviet Union’s response towards polish crisis of early 1980s. This chapter elaborates the factors responsible for the crisis and external constrains to show as to why the Soviet
Union adopted what has been called the "conciliatory approach" rather than taking recourse to military might.

The fifth chapter lays a particular emphasis on the comparative assessment of Soviet policy behaviour with regard to Czechoslovakia and Polish crises. This chapter analyses a qualitative difference between the nature of Soviet responses on the two occasion in a given situation.

Sixth, and the final chapter deals with the conclusion of proposed study by elaborating on approaches, by the Soviet Union towards each crisis. It has also examined the factors and forces responsible for resorting to different approaches to crises.