CONCLUSION

The Soviet policy towards communist movement in general and the third world and Asia in particular differs from leader to leader. Each leader pursued a different policy in accordance with the demand of time and Soviet national interests. Though there was broad ideological continuity in their policies, the major shift was witnessed during Gorbachev, with his policies of Perestroika, Glasnost and new thinking. The continuity and change in Soviet policy influenced its policies towards Afghanistan and its communist movement also. Gorbachev admitted that the world revolution perspective of Lenin, rivalry against United States and imperialism, the vanguard role of CPSU to make other revolutionary parties in the third world and other parts of the world etc. were perceptions of different times and needs of the Soviet Union. But to stick on to these ideas for ever is wrong.

The Afghan communist movement was partially of spontaneous origin and partially a result of external influence. Inspired by the October Revolution of 1977 in Russia, there came up a progressive movement for modernization without any Marxist ideological leaning, even much before the formation of a communist party in Afghanistan. This movement which produced many future
communist leaders shows the spontaneity of the movement. The outside influence and inspiration from other communist parties lies in the fact that an organised communist party (PDPA) in 1965 came up when many of its leaders turned Marxists.

The Soviet Union followed a wait and see approach towards Afghan communist party, though they encouraged and funded for communist activities. Even when the split took place, the Soviet Union tried to please and support both the factions. Parcham and Khalq - keeping its choice to act on its own; if one fails to materialise their motives, other can be instrumentalised.

The circumstances in which the April revolution took place ensure that there was covert Soviet help in the revolution. Because the social situation in the country was such that it would not allow anything alien to Islam to come forward spontaneously. Therefore, a chance of clandestine Soviet help appears strongly.

The revolution which took place in 1978 was not considered as a revolution as it had characteristics more of a coup than of a revolution. It was organised by a few people who were Marxists and the event occurred only in Kabul city, and the villages remained very clam and untouched by the revolution. The series of peasant and
other movements that took place on the eve of Russian Revolution was absent in the case of Saur Revolution.

The Soviet Union always wanted to keep Afghanistan in its own orbit so that it would not go into the hands of the West. All its policies towards Afghanistan reflected this main concern.

After the April developments, the Soviet influence in Afghanistan increased manifold. Huge military and economic aids were given to Afghanistan. The signing of the 1978 Friendship Treaty made Afghanistan fully dependent on Soviet Union. Due to this, Afghanistan was unable to follow its 'bi-tarafi' policy as Amin tried. This created distrust and contempt among the Soviets towards Amin. It was the Soviet dislike which resulted in the murder of Amin and installation of Babarak Karmal as President. After this, no policy was followed in Afghanistan without the approval of Soviet Union.

During the communist regime several progressive policies were tried; but this provoked all sections of the Afghan society. As a result resistance to communist reforms started and it got more strengthened due to the repressive activities of Khad, the secret police which was an important instrument in the functioning of the communist government. When the resistance got strengthened and Amin
turned toward west and its allies as part of his later neutrality policy, Soviet Union labelled him as a CIA agent and started moves to eliminate him. The fear of Soviets that Afghanistan would go into the hands of West forced the Soviet Union to militarily intervene in Afghanistan in 1979 on the pretext of the 1978 Friendship Treaty with a justification that they were 'invited' by the legal head of Afghanistan government (i.e. Amin) to save the country from external and imperialist threat.

The invitation by Amin is unlikely because he was aware of the Soviet plot to kill him. He would not invite his execution for help. The contradictory statements by Babrak Karmal and Brezhnev made one to feel that the 'invitation' was an afterthought, a face saving device, of the Soviet Union.

The intervention was condemned all over the world and the resistance to the Karmal's puppet government at home increased. The demand from the international community led United Nations to start attempts to settle the Afghan crisis through negotiations since 1981. But the US-Soviet rivalry and Soviet firm stand on conditioned withdrawal did not make any progress. The problem remained unsettled till 1985.
Gorbachev came to power in 1985 with a grand reform package of Perestroika and Glasnost. In his policies, Soviet domestic economic development got top priority. He effected changes in his foreign policies also so that it could help the Soviet economic progress. He sought international peace and co-operation. He was for the 'peaceful interdependence' of different social systems. Third World got low priority in his policies. He tried to establish good relations with major countries in the Asia-Pacific region. For international peace, he favoured disarmament. To achieve all these things, Afghanistan was a bargaining point. Therefore, Gorbachev was compelled to settle the issue at any cost.

In the Soviet domestic front also, several kinds of problems arose due to Afghan conflict. The worsening of military conflict, nationalist problem in Central Asia, Soviet public opinion against the Afghan war, protest of 'Afghantsi' (the Afghan war veterans), Soviet economic and human resources drain due to war, etc. were the domestic reasons which compelled the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. The crisis in the Soviet bloc East European countries also influenced Soviet policy. Gorbachev declared that the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' was abandoned in relations between socialist countries.
On April 1988 Geneva Accord was signed between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and USA and the USSR were guarantors to it. But when Pakistan started air violations, the Soviets had to suspend their pullout for some time by late 1988. However, the situation became uncontrollable and Soviets decided to complete the troops withdrawal by 15 February 1989 itself. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was the application of 'Brezhnev Doctrine' in a third world country. But in the case of Afghanistan it is criticised as an aggression, because 'Brezhnev Doctrine' was to 'defend' the socialist countries. Afghanistan was not a country with a socialist base. Therefore, the intervention in Afghanistan can be viewed as interference in an independent sovereign country, undefendable even within the logic of Brezhnev Doctrine.

As a whole the Afghan communist movement was not a movement which existed in other third world countries. Though communist reforms were tried in Afghanistan, nothing could be implemented properly due to people's resistance. The communist government was protected by Soviet military till February 1989. Such a protectorate government was neither people's nor proletarian, and least national. Soviet Union understood its folly very late.