CHAPTER II

REGIONAL ACTORS: A STUDY OF THE ROLES OF VIETNAM, CHINA AND THE ASEAN

Though the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia ended the dreaded role of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, it was not the end of Cambodia's travails. By the year following Vietnam's military action, Cambodia had become a pawn on the global chessboard. What had been an aberration in the internal political developments now assumed a global perspective and drew international attention to the conflict within and outside Cambodia.

Taking into consideration these external manifestations, it is significant to bear in mind that they occurred at different levels. At the regional level were the roles and interests of the actors within that sphere, namely, Vietnam, China and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Since the crisis emerged in this region, these countries were to experience the immediate repercussions of this problem. In this chapter an attempt has been made to study the roles of the three groups involved at the regional level. The role played by Vietnam, the responses of China and ASEAN to the Vietnamese military
action and their efforts, both at isolating Vietnam and at
diplomatic negotiations are discussed below.

Vietnam's Role in the Cambodian Conflict

The seriousness of the Cambodia-Vietnam disagreement emerged fully only in 1977. The outbreak of warfare was on a scale which could not go unnoticed by the international press, together with serious accusations by both sides towards the end of that year. Kampuchea broke off diplomatic relations and Vietnam in turn charged the Democratic Kampuchea regime with atrocities similar to the worst refugee stories appearing in the Western press since 1975.¹ The border clashes which had occurred since 1975, developed into serious fighting in 1977 and continued throughout the first eight months of 1978.²

According to Vickery, the common thread in most of the refugee accounts is the emphasis on the Cambodian responsibility for initiating the conflicts. Vickery believes that the reliability of refugee accounts is probably very high as they were both anti-Democratic

Evidence on the early hostilities between Vietnam and Cambodia is somewhat sparse. Examination of the Cambodian situation proves that the question of a Vietnamese intervention even in early 1978 was doubtful. It became a possibility after May 1978 because of the defeat of an uprising in the East Zone which had been ruthlessly quelled. Some of the rebels from this uprising helped to form the KNUPNS. Once this faction, which had been friendly with the Vietnamese had been put down, the Vietnamese intervention cashed in on the unpopularity of the Democratic Kampuchea regime and the discontent of the Cambodian population which paved the way for their own role within Cambodia.

The conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam can be traced to an earlier period and can probably offer a background to the one that was to follow after 1975.

Between 1960 and May 1975, there had been tensions as well as negotiations over territorial issues of both land and sea boundaries. During the Summit Conference of the

Indochinese People in April 1970 it was stated that the three countries would abide by the five principles of peaceful co-existence and agree to recognize and respect the territorial borders as per those laid down in the Geneva Convention of 1954.5

It is evident that there were land and sea skirmishes immediately after 1975, but they did not lead to serious warfare and appear to have been defused by early 1976, even though the causes of the conflict were yet to be resolved. It is widely believed that the escalatory round of clashes probably began when the Kampucheans attempted to drive away the Vietnamese from the illegally occupied zones in question. By April-May 1977, Cambodia began to initiate military activities in both the disputed areas as well as Vietnamese territory to which Vietnam retaliated by sending several thousand troops to the border.6 From July to September, the Vietnamese apparently trespassed on Cambodian territory. In September the latter retaliated and this led

to a large Vietnamese onslaught in December 1977. The conflict continued till the outbreak of a full-scale war at the end of 1978, which called for the overthrow of the DK regime. At first glance, the border question seems to be the basis of the conflict. However, this was more of an immediate cause in an overall contrasting political perspectives between the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese leaders. The actual issues of conflict were multifold and are discussed below.

First, the Vietnamese remained in possession of some of their wartime holdings. It was alleged that large tracts of Eastern Cambodia still remained in Vietnamese hands after April 1975. According to the Democratic Kampuchea regime's claim, only a part of the Vietnamese had withdrawn from Kampuchea while another part, which comprised of soldiers and civilians remained in Kampuchea and hid among the


The objective seems to have been "Vietnam's aim to control Kampuchea, the party and the people", by "creating difficulties for Kampuchea's revolution". In their efforts to remove the Vietnamese the Cambodians did not distinguish between civilians and soldiers. Their only focus was against the Vietnamese who had been sent to "Vietnamise Cambodia".

Second, the implications of the issue over the Wai Islands in the Gulf of Siam, had to be dealt with. In 1966, these Islands had been claimed by the Phnom Penh government and this had been recognized by Vietnam. Later the Saigon government occupied them and stationed its troops at Paolo Wai. Retaliating to this, the Phnom Penh government attacked the Vietnamese islands of Phu Quoc and Tho Chou. But by May-June 1975, they were driven out. In August 1975, after negotiations Paolo Wai was returned to Kampuchea.

With the discovery of oil, the value of these islands increased. As regards the sea border there was no legal

11. ibid., p.74.
12. Evans and Rowley, n.9, p.87.
text delineating the border. The Phnom Penh government agreed to the Brevie Line which had been laid down by the French Governor-General in 1939. During the period of US influence, the Lon Nol government and the Saigon government had not used this as the actual demarcation line. Therefore, the Vietnamese were unwilling to accept the Brevie Line as the settled border. The Vietnamese claimed that the Brevie Line was to be adhered to only for the resolution of disputes over administration and jurisdiction. This had been clarified in Brevie's original statement which reads,

"of course, only the matters of administration and the police are considered here, the question of whose territory these islands are, remain outstanding."

Hence, the Brevie Line only demarcated administration and police zones and was not the final statement on the sea border issue.

Third, while trying to understand the nature of the animosity in Vietnamese-Cambodian relations, it becomes obvious that the actual issue over the land borders was intensified with claims, counter claims and rhetoric rather

14. ibid.
than any existence of real tension. Actually the Vietnamese Communists had already recognized the existing borders in 1967. Ambiguities which remained were to be eliminated by an agreement to accept the French map of 1954 as authoritative.¹⁵ Apart from this, it is important to remember that the actual area under dispute was less than a hundred square kilometers.

As far as the above three aspects of the Cambodia-Vietnamese conflict are concerned, both sides remained intransigent, which resulted in the failure of negotiations. The Phnom Penh regime stated that Vietnam's territorial gains had been made at the expense of Cambodia, and accused Vietnam's nature as one of 'aggressor, annexationist and swallower of other countries' territories'.¹⁶ Since the DK regime enjoyed the backing of China, the Cambodian attitude was one of unwillingness to compromise. They approached the entire issue as the sole aggrieved party and expected certain recompense for their historical losses. Even in this they refused to negotiate over the issue and wanted

¹⁵. Evans and Rowley, n.9, p.88.
unilateral resolutions. However, the Cambodian demand for a unilateral claim to an exclusive privilege to readjust border questions does not have any validity in international law, and military action undertaken to enforce such claims are hostilities pure and simple.

On the basis of norms laid down in International Law, boundaries are recognized as at the time of independence. It does not recognize the acquisition of territory as a result of conquest by an aggressor. The conclusion reached by most authorities is that modern notions of international law cannot be applied respectively to past conflicts in order to cast doubts on the validity of present day boundaries. This is particularly so in the case of former colonies where the frontiers and boundaries have been changed in conjunction with the policies of divide and rule. In this regard the principle of 'uti possidetis' plays a significant role.

17. Heder, n.6, p.169.
19. Evans and Kelvin, n.9, p.92.
20. ibid.
With respect to the above principle, the Cambodian-Vietnamese position becomes notable. While the Vietnamese position was in conformity with the accepted norms of international law, that of the Phnom Penh regime was not. In fact, as regards the border conflict, Vietnam felt that the existing land frontiers as drawn on the 1/100,000 map printed by the French and used before 1954' should be taken as the land borders. So the conflict remained unresolved and after 1977, it became more complex. This could be attributed to the changed scenario within Cambodia in which the Khmer Rouge had consolidated its power. Moreover, the situation in Indochina was of vital concern, because in the post-1975 period Vietnam tried to further its influence vis-à-vis its other two neighbours.

The Question of the Indochina Federation

One of the allegations against Vietnam by the Phnom Penh government was that Vietnam sought to annex Cambodia by forcing it into a Vietnamese dominated Indochina Federation. The Democratic Kampuchea authorities accused Vietnam of having 'had strategic design of turning Kampuchea into a

member of the Indochinese Federation and a slave of Vietnam.\textsuperscript{23} Vietnam, thereby sought to establish its authority in the region through only 'one party, one country, one people.'\textsuperscript{24}

The concept of the Indochinese Federation seemed to emerge from the idea of a Unified Indochinese Communist Party of the 1930's. Apparently, it was conceived to include the whole of Indochina and was not confined to that brand of communism which was peculiar to Vietnam alone. The idea behind this choice of name seems to indicate Vietnam's objective to dominate this region and with this view Vietnam's strategic programme had been designed.\textsuperscript{25} In fact the Kampucheans believed that inspite of the past solidarity, Vietnam would 'carry out their strategy of the Indochina Federation in order to annex and swallow Kampuchea'.\textsuperscript{26} As such, the border conflict was viewed as a means by which Vietnam could subvert Cambodia, thus forcing

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} ibid., p.94.
\item \textsuperscript{24} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Black Paper, n.10, pp. 14-15.
\item \textsuperscript{26} ibid., p.19.
\end{itemize}
it to join the Indochina Federation. 27

The Indochina Communist Party had been started as the Vietnamese Communist Party, where policies had been formulated at the Unification Conference. Later under the instructions of the Comintern, changes were made which also included the Party's appellation. It was believed that the earlier name would have 'promoted narrow national chauvinism while down playing the importance of proletarian internationalism'. 28 The name suggested by the Comintern was adopted with the view that although the three countries were different with respect to race, language, traditions and so on, they were concentrated in their efforts against a common united force which therefore made it impossible for the existence of separate, independent, revolutionary movements. 29 The stance taken by the Comintern falls into the pattern of the movement which it tried to initiate. The incorporation of a larger area would serve to bring about

27. Evans and Rowley, n.9, p.94.


the social and political change which it espoused as its philosophy. Further, the question of the Indochina Federation seems to have evolved from a common colonial heritage.

Understandably, during the period of the nationalist movement and subsequently, at the time of the American intervention, the concept of Indochina as an entity seemed to acquire some significance. With the disappearance of the 'common enemy' the traditional hostilities and mistrust reemerged. Under these circumstances, the Vietnamese emphasis on a 'special relationship' was viewed with suspicion. For Vietnam's part, it believed that the nationalist movements in Indochina had been initiated by its own independence struggle and that the success and security of the Vietnamese revolution was dependent upon its relations with its two neighbours, which it tried to secure at all costs.30

Another source of tension was the contrasting models of revolution and the varying global views of the two countries. It was believed that there was 'a fundamental contradiction between the Cambodian revolution and the

30. Evans and Rowley, n.9, p.96.
The idea of such a contrast 'probably meant that the Cambodian revolution was given lower priority rather than the Vietnamese, who sought to control the Khmer movement'. The Vietnamese looked to the Soviets and advocated the cause of an international movement while the Khmers followed the Chinese course of self-reliance. The dependence of the Khmer Rouge upon the authorities in Peking had been one of the major issues of conflict. The Vietnamese situation and its security interests were hinged upon an anti-China view. Democratic Kampuchea's closer ties with China were viewed with concern and fear. In retrospect this fear may seem exaggerated and even self-serving, but in 1978 it was all too real.

These were the issues which formed the basis of the Kampuchea-Vietnam conflict. The intransigence and unwillingness on the part of the Democratic Kampuchea authorities to negotiate its differences with the Hanoi regime worsened the situation. The constant deadlock on

33. Evans and Rowley, n.9, p.99.
various issues and the intensification of the border conflict led to the Vietnamese support of the KNUFNS and Vietnam's subsequent intervention in Cambodia. In the eleven years which followed the Vietnamese military action, the internal developments remained in the hands of the pro-Vietnamese Heng Samrin regime. What is more significant was the crystallisation of the conflict and the deadlock among the international powers.

One of the most vital questions that has been discussed in the period after Vietnamese intervention is one which relates to the nature of the action. The need to specify Vietnam's role in the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge rule, has suffered from the lack of total objectivity.

**Vietnamese Intervention on Humanitarian Grounds**

While giving due consideration to the motivations which caused Vietnam's intervention, two factors must be recognised. Vietnam could have been impelled by humanitarian interests since the deplorable acts of inhumanity perpetrated by the Pol Pot regime led to the loss of life and large scale deprivation. Moreover, the presence of a hostile government in Cambodia backed by the Chinese further threatened Vietnam's existence. These two factors cannot be
looked at in isolation but must be combined in order to understand Vietnam's action in Cambodia.

Humanitarian intervention as a doctrine has been formulated over a period of time but owes its recognition to the work of Antiore Rougier.\textsuperscript{35} In the post-Second World War period, the United Nations Charter gave emphasis to two articles which recognised territorial sovereignty. These were articles 2(4) and 51.\textsuperscript{36}


\textsuperscript{36} Article 2(4) states that "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." According to Article 51, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the security council has taken Measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the security council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." See,\textit{The Handbook of the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice} (UN Department of Public Information, UNO, New York), pp.1 and 10.
These two articles provided a certain guarantee to the inviolability of territorial sovereignty. While they did not condemn military action per se, they recognised the need to distinguish between an aggressive military policy and a defensive one. In this context, the right of self-defence was recognised only as a response to an attack and it had to be exercised in order to repel the aggressor. Anticipatory self-defence was not to be exercised and the action was not expected to be retaliatory in nature.37

Another clause of the UN charter that can be linked to the doctrine of humanitarian interventions is article 2(7), which precludes UN action because it cannot intervene in matters which essentially fall within the domestic jurisdiction of a member state.38 So in actual fact the United Nations was unable to take effective steps when a state violated certain fundamental and basic rights of its own citizens.


38. Article 2(7) states that, "Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under chapter VII." See the Handbook of the Charter, n.36, p.2.
These three clauses taken in toto could offer the justification of humanitarian intervention in the Vietnamese situation. The United Nations ineffectiveness in checking the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge, coupled with the provocation which the Democratic Kampuchea regime gave to Vietnam, had led to a situation in which Vietnam probably had no option but to intervene.

In order to accept the validity of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, several prerequisites had been emulated as the basic standards for its justification. First, large scale atrocities, leading to denial of human rights, genocide and deprivation were to exist. Second, an element of consent is further assurance of internal difficulties. Third, there should be a preference for joint action. Fourth, failure on the part of the UN to prevent human rights atrocities should be verified. Fifth, all attempts at negotiations and peaceful settlement should be exercised before military action. Sixth, the size of the intervening force and extent of stay are also important factors. 39

39. For a detailed discussion of the above see, Gary Klintworth, *Vietnam's Intervention in Cambodia in International Law* (Canberra, 1989), pp.59-77. See also, Bazyler, Michael, J., "Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in the Light of Atrocities in
While the Vietnamese intervention met several of the prerequisites, it did not meet others. As such these cannot be viewed in isolation, because of which the Vietnamese intervention has been compared to two others which bear resemblance. These are India's intervention in East Pakistan and the subsequent emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation; and the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda which ended the despotic rule of Idi Amin. 40

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40. These two case studies form interesting comparisons in understanding the issues relating to the doctrine. In the first case, the independence of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, resulted in the emergence of two nations-India and Pakistan, Pakistan was divided into two regions-East and West, separated by one thousand miles of Indian territory. By 1970, East Pakistani's claimed that they were being discriminated against and clamoured for an independent state. India asserted that basic standards of human rights were being violated and with the influx of large numbers of refugees, India was forced to rely upon military action. While the motivating factor was humanitarian, it was also an opportunity for India to weaken its fiercest political and military rival-Pakistan. Its course of action constitutes one of the clearest examples of individual humanitarian interventions in this century.

The second case stands out even more clearly. The rule of Idi Amin has been regarded as one of the most brutal regimes, during which time, the sanctity of human life was violated to an unthinkable extent. In early 1979, Tanzanian forces joined by the Ugandon exiles marched into Uganda and overthrew Idi Amin's regime. In view of the situation Tanzania's objective seems to be based on an ethical policy of humanitarian
Though India and Tanzania do not strictly follow the standards set for humanitarian intervention, it is still relevant. As such, a general scheme for interventions cannot be of practical value since, in the mosaic of international life, interventions can be justified without UN consent. While all three interventions have had humanitarian motives, there have also been secondary concerns which may not stand the test of legal debates. Thus while they are not legally binding, politically and morally, there seems to be some justification.

In Vietnam's case the atrocities of the Pol Pot clique left little choice. Moreover, the provocation which the Kampuchean government had repeatedly given to the Vietnamese cannot be overlooked or underestimated. At a time when Vietnam had been trying to consolidate itself in the aftermath of the US war and reunification, the taunts from the Khmer Rouge left it with very little choice but to take

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concern as evidenced by the fact that immediately after Idi Amin fled from the country, the Tanzanians withdrew to their borders. The brutality of the Amin era, the impotence of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to act against the violations and the limited nature of the intervention tilt the balance in favour of Tanzania and justify its intervention on humanitarian grounds. For details see, ibid.
military action.

Its efforts were furthered by the formation of the KNUFNS (Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation) and the PRC (People's Revolutionary Council). Both the KNUFNS and the PRC constituted the front structures of the Vietnamese, which seemed to have been put together rapidly to give the impression that such a front existed. The KNUFNS issued a 'programme calling for the overthrow of the Pol Pot gang and the establishment of a regime tending towards genuine socialism'.\textsuperscript{41} Once established it was accepted that in the name of the KNUFNS, the struggle would begin.\textsuperscript{42} It was evident, however, that despite the obvious Cambodian 'genes' within the KNUFNS, the surrogate father was the Hanoi Politburo.

The initial responses to the intervention were one of relief, since it ended the Pol Pot rule. In fact the Vietnamese forces had been described as 'saviours' who had crushed the Khmer Rouge. This would have been possible only with the population supporting the Vietnamese despite their traditional fear of them.\textsuperscript{43} The Vietnamese intervention, in

\textsuperscript{41} Evans and Rowley, n.9, p.123.
\textsuperscript{42} Chanda, n.32, p.255.
\textsuperscript{43} Klintworth, n.39, p.65.
that sense, was probably a 'true liberation'. The Vietnamese introduced a great deal of change which broke down the existing system. Inspite of the apparent reconstruction of the social and political order, the Heng Samrin government suffered from the stigma of being a foreign backed one. Administration under the PRK was institutionalised on the Vietnamese pattern and included several pro-Vietnamese leaders which led to feelings of subjugation and foreign domination. Thus, the Vietnamese intervention triggered off the conflict in the global sphere. What followed was the divergence of interests of those external powers which formed the superstructure in this region.

CHINA's Role in the Cambodian Conflict

Perhaps, the single most dominant role in keeping the crisis at status quo had been played by China. An analysis of the Chinese dimensions to the Cambodian question must take into account an understanding of China's interests in


the region. Chinese relations have been influenced by its security interests vis-à-vis Vietnam. Hence its concerns have been dependent on the question of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, which had been a long standing one. This is so because political issues translate into opportunities for the involvement of outside powers or the expansion of "Vietnamese influence which conflicts with China's interests." Historically, China had occupied Vietnam for over one thousand years. According to Hall, the name Vietnam came from the term Nam-Viet. The Chinese Emperor Chao To' had expanded his kingdom southwards into the southern regions of the Red River delta and called his kingdom Nan-yuē ' or Nam-Viet, which meant the kingdom of the Southern people. The term Vietnam also derives from the Chinese 'Annam' which means a 'pacified south'. For their part, the Vietnamese believed that the long term threat to their independence emanated from China which viewed Vietnam and

46. Copper, John, F., "China and Southeast Asia", in Donald E. Weatherbee (ed.), Southeast Asia Divided : The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis (Boulder, 1985), p.47.


Indochina as its 'soft underbelly'.

The liberation struggle of Indochina received support from China. Even during the war against the American presence in Vietnam China continued to give support. By the sixties, China had identified the Soviet Union as its main enemy and in subsequent years, it developed ties with the US. It seems evident that the precondition for strengthening Sino-American relations was the deterioration in the Soviet-American detente. In the aftermath of its split with the Soviet Union, China's relations with Vietnam also deteriorated.

The unification and emergence of an independent Vietnam furthered this antagonism since China felt its security threatened by a powerful neighbour. This was probably one of the factors which led China to establish close ties with the Democratic Kampuchea regime. As relations improved, 'Chinese advisers and weapons poured into Kampuchea'. Even with regard to the issue over the border the Chinese press seems

49. ibid.


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to have assumed Vietnam to be the aggressor.\textsuperscript{52} The Chinese People's Daily on 12 July, 1978 wrote that as a 'socialist country', it had a bounden duty to support and assist all just struggles' and that it was only 'natural that her sympathies and support should go out for Kampuchea which had become the victim of Vietnamese aggression'.\textsuperscript{53} These factors led to a further deterioration in the Sino-Vietnamese relations.

It is important to bear in mind that China's preoccupation in Vietnam was not with the United States but the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{54} As such the Sino-Vietnamese tensions were a fallout of the Sino-Soviet split. With regard to China's support to the Khmer Rouge, it is important to note that China's historical relationship with Vietnam would not welcome the consolidation of the Vietnamese position since this would challenge the Chinese hegemony over the area.\textsuperscript{55}

Moreover, Vietnam's close alliance with the USSR, its entry into the COMECON in the summer of 1978 and the signing of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{52} ibid., pp.25-26.
  \item \textsuperscript{53} \textit{Kampuchea Dossier}, vol.II, (Vietnam Courier, Hanoi, 1979), P.113.
  \item \textsuperscript{54} Das, n.50, p.101.
  \item \textsuperscript{55} ibid., p. 103.
\end{itemize}
the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in November 1978, widened the existing schism considerably.\textsuperscript{56}

During this period another problem emerged which concerned the Chinese minorities in Vietnam. According to Hanoi, Peking spread rumours to the effect that with the ongoing tensions between Kampuchea and Vietnam, and China supporting Kampuchea, the Chinese or Hoa minorities would be subjected to suppression.\textsuperscript{57} Vietnam for its part probably felt that the Chinese minorities would identify with China and could, therefore, not be trusted, thus leading to their expulsion. After claiming that 'ostracism, persecution and expulsion' were being carried out by the Vietnamese against the Hoas, China 'cut off its aid, withdrew its specialists and closed the Vietnamese Consulate-General in China'.\textsuperscript{58}

Following the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia and the overthrow of the Pol Pot group, Sino-Vietnamese relations reached its nadir. With the removal of Pol Pot, China lost

\textsuperscript{56.} Evans and Rowley, n.9, p.123.

\textsuperscript{57.} The Vietnamese - Kampuchea Conflict, n. 51, p.26. See also, Kampuchea Dossier vol.II, n.53, pp.78-102.

\textsuperscript{58.} ibid.
probably the only Socialist supporter in the region.\textsuperscript{59}

In response to the Vietnamese military action and occupation, China first gained guarantees of non-interference from the United States and went to war against Vietnam. Attempting to 'teach Vietnam a lesson' and also to prevent the Heng Samrin regime from consolidating its power, China sent a massive force of 320,000 against Vietnam.\textsuperscript{60} The attack seems to have been more of a pressure tactic than any real attempt to progress deeper into Vietnam. Apparently, the objective was to tie down Vietnamese manpower and thus indirectly assist the exit of the Khmer Rouge.\textsuperscript{61} The punitive nature of the attack also seems to have been an attempt on China's part to prove the myth of Vietnam's military strength.\textsuperscript{62} Another possibility was that the Chinese used the Pol Pot clique in the war of December 1978, and later directly launched an offensive against Vietnam in


\textsuperscript{60} Copper, n.46, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{61} For a detailed account of China's war with Vietnam see Jencks, Herlon, W., "China's Punitive War with Vietnam: A Military Assessment", \textit{Asian Survey} (Berkeley), vol. 29, no.8, (August, 1979), pp. 801-815.

\textsuperscript{62} Pao-Min, Chang, \textit{Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam} (Singapore, 1985), pp. 87-88.
February 1979, with the aim to weaken, subdue and eventually conquer Vietnam, thus wrecking the unity of the Indochinese countries. Moreover, it was to establish Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia in the changing balance of power and was a message for the USSR.

The attack led to the polarization of the conflict and increased tensions along the regional power balance. But the Chinese began to offer another form of opposition to the newly installed Heng Samrin regime. They supported the Khmer Rouge through military and financial aid. With the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea in 1982, the support continued. In fact, the Khmer Rouge force got the lion's share of their military assistance from China.

One of the significant aspects of China's role has been its successful lobbying at the United Nations. China persistently lobbied for the de-recognition of the Heng Samrin government and was backed by a number of other countries.


Thus, it supported the right of representation by the Pol Pot faction, called for withdrawal of foreign troops and emphasized the need for an international conference to implement the resolution. Throughout the years of the conflict, China was one of the foremost diplomatic forces which managed the continued retention of the Khmer Rouge representation in the U.N. At the 34th, 35th, 36th and 37th sessions of the UN General Assembly, Beijing, along with the US and ASEAN, influenced many countries to maintain the illegal Pol Pot seat. This has really affected the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia since Vietnam's objective has been 'to compel its opponents to accept the Cambodian issue as a fait accompli and thus give de facto recognition to the Heng Samrin government'.

65. These were a few of the points that were emphasised by this resolution. For details see, 'General Assembly Resolution 34/22 on the Situation in Kampuchea' in Documents on the Kampuchean Problem 1979-1985 (Deptment of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, September, 1985), pp. 126-127.


While analyzing China's role in the settlement of the Cambodian issue, it is imperative to bear in mind that any possibility of easing of tensions between Vietnam and China was in itself dependent on a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. China identified Vietnam's presence in Cambodia as one of the major obstacles to Sino-Soviet relations. It was believed that if the Soviets could pressurize Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia then a modus vivendi for accommodation between China and Vietnam could be worked out.68

Another obstacle, according to China was the fact that Vietnam was being used by the USSR to encircle China. China tried to 'assert her claims to Vietnamese aggression' by posing this threat of 'Soviet designs in places like South Yemen, Afghanistan and Vietnam' as an attempt at global expansion and encirclement of China.69 Thus, if Sino-Soviet


relations changed, China's overriding foreign policy concerns vis-a-vis Vietnam were also likely to change.  

China's attempts to militarily handle the Vietnamese presence was also a message to the Soviet Union. The first attempt was in February 1979. The second attempt came in December 1985, when Chinese troops fired several rounds of artillery and mortar into Vietnam's northern provinces, while a Chinese battalion mounted land grabbing attacks in an area deep inside Vietnamese territory. Hence the Chinese invasion not only targeted Kampuchea and Vietnam but served a larger purpose of containing Soviet expansion and expressed Chinese ability to confront the Soviet threat. In fact even during the first attack, Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping stated that the Chinese were prepared for the possibility of a war with the Soviet Union. Thus for China, the Kampuchean issue was not an 'isolated' or 'localised' event. Other than revealing Hanoi's ambitions in  

70. Ahn, n.68, p.78.  


73. The Straits Times (Singapore), February 28, 1979.
Indochina, it also was an expression of Soviet attempts at world hegemony.\(^74\)

As far as the Cambodian issue is concerned it is crucial to remember that China had a disadvantage as compared to Vietnam. Primarily, China gave recognition to the Khmer Rouge and was associated with the genocidal clique. In this regard China asserted that its recognition of the Democratic Kampuchea government was a 'matter of principle' and did not necessarily mean an 'approval of its policies'.\(^75\) Second, it had to use its pressure only through its support to the resistance, which indirectly provided an opportunity to weaken Vietnam. The ability of Vietnam to withstand such efforts and somehow proceed with its plan of reconstruction in Cambodia, caused China to take an intransigent stance on the entire issue. Thus, the continuation of the prolonged stalemate had both sustained and reinforced the adamant positions of China and Vietnam.\(^76\)

\(^{74}\) Pao-Min, n.62, p. 114.

\(^{75}\) ibid.

Any perceptive change in China's attitude was evident only in the post-1985 period. The emergence of Gorbachev on the Soviet political scene seems to have been the catalyst in the settlement process. It is also significant that Sino-Soviet relations started to improve. Another aspect of importance was the slight shift in Sino-US relations following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. Moreover, by July 1990, the U.S. revoked its recognition of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), especially the Khmer Rouge, which formed a part of it. They also welcomed Vietnam's cooperation in keeping the Khmer Rouge out of power in Cambodia.

With these changes occurring, China in August 1990 changed its stance to a certain extent. Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng stated at Jakarta that the Chinese were willing to make concessions and would not seek a dominant role for the Khmer Rouge in the Supreme National Council. These changes continued to influence the situation and culminated in the Paris Peace Conference of October 1991 of

77. Discussions with Sridhar Krishnaswamy, Southeast Asia Correspondent, The Hindu, on 7 August 1994, at Singapore.


79. ibid., 29 August 1990.
which China was one of the signatories. The various details of the peace settlements and the implications which followed, have been discussed as part of the United Nations' role in Cambodia in Chapter IV.

**ASEAN's Role in the Cambodian Conflict**

Ever since Vietnam intervened and occupied Cambodia in 1978, one of the major participants in the quest for a suitable solution has been the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It had been the attempt of ASEAN to combine political, economic and diplomatic efforts to pressurize Vietnam into withdrawing from Cambodia. Despite such efforts, however, there had been a deadlock in the situation for over a decade.

The precursors to ASEAN could probably be traced to the ASA (Association of Southeast Asia) and the Maphilindo.  

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80. The ASA was started in July 1961 and included Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand as its members. The main objective was to promote economic and cultural cooperation. All three members were linked to the western powers in security alliances. Malaysia was part of the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement and Thailand and Philippines were a part of SEATO. The ASA gave way to the formation of the Maphilindo which was to be an amalgam of Malay populated countries of Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia. This plan was aborted in the initial stages itself due to disputes arising over the Sabah issue. For details see, Norman D. Palmer and
Both these plans were aborted over issues of security interests. There continued to be a quest for normalisation of relations among the Southeast Asian nations and further diplomatic initiatives led to the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on August 8, 1967. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore were the five original members of the ASEAN. In 1984, Brunei was included as the sixth member of ASEAN. In July 1995 Vietnam also entered the ASEAN as a full fledged member.

ASEAN's genesis took place at a time when the United States was involved with the war in Indochina. As a result of this, concern over communist insurgency was reflected in each states individual foreign policy as well as in the collective policy of the organization. Its declared objective was to promote economic and cultural cooperation in the hope that political solidarity would follow. But almost from the beginning, ASEAN represented a political solidarity which arose from the formation of a group of non-communist states in a region threatened by communist

...Continued...

pressures. It was probably perceived that ASEAN would grow to act as some form of 'collective political defense' which would eventually replace the US alliances.\textsuperscript{81}

The interests of the various states differed with regard to their needs. The primary concern was at the regional level and minimizing the chances of external power domination. This proved true for Malaysia and Singapore. For both Thailand and the Philippines, which were closely associated with the West, it offered an Asian identity and could counter-balance their Western influences.

The primary motive seems to have been socio-economic progress which would eliminate the threat of communist revolution. However 'security issues were inherent from the beginning which led to the proposal for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971.'\textsuperscript{82} This concept was threatened right from its inception since the dominant view among the members of ASEAN was to keep the West in that region—especially so for Singapore, Thailand and the

\textsuperscript{81} Interview with Prof. Tim Huxley (University of Hull), National University of Singapore, August 5, 1994, at Singapore.

\textsuperscript{82} Discussions with M. Rajaratnam, Director, Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 10 August, 1994 at Singapore.
Philippines.\textsuperscript{83} Indonesian foreign policy believed in ASEAN's importance as a result of which ZOPFAN was dispensable.\textsuperscript{84} After the 1975 victories in Indochina, ZOPFAN 'faced the additional hurdle of an incipient trend towards the solidification of two opposing ideological blocs in Southeast Asia.'\textsuperscript{85}

The tensions in ASEAN-Indochina relations were evident soon after the communist sweep in Indochina in 1975. The question of contending with the Indochinese states posed deeper security implications for the ASEAN. Despite this, the Malaysian Premier stated that the triumph of communist regimes posed no threat to ASEAN and even suggested the possibility of their entry into ASEAN.\textsuperscript{86} However, Vietnam exhibited hostility towards ASEAN. Hanoi looked upon ASEAN as an American backed anti-communist alliance which had emerged from SEATO. Quite apart from this, the main trend within ASEAN opposed any such moves. Recognising the need

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{83} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Interview with Prof. Tim Huxley, NUS, Singapore, n.81.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Huxley, Tim, "ASEAN's Prospective Security Role: Moving Beyond the Indochina Fixation," \textit{Contemporary Southeast Asia}, vol.9, no.3, (ISEAS, Singapore, December 1987), p.196.
\item \textsuperscript{86} \textit{Philippines Express News}, (Manila), July 8, 1975.
\end{itemize}
for some cordiality with Indochina, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was initiated, which stressed the inviolability of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and the peaceful settlement of disputes. This treaty remained open to accession by other states which allowed it to act as a political link between ASEAN and Indochina. 87

Despite these expressions of goodwill, there remained differences over the individual members perceptions on Vietnam. Security issues, geographical proximity and historical relationships contributed to this diversity of views. Vietnam's efforts to moot the idea of the 'Treaties of Peace and Friendship' with its emphasis on peace, independence and neutrality was probably closest to ASEAN's concept of the ZOPFAN, but this was also rejected. 88

The Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia provided ASEAN its raison d'etre. It was the catalyst which brought the countries together to respond collectively to articulate an ASEAN viewpoint. Immediately after the Vietnamese intervention the ASEAN standing committee issued a


88. Discussions with Professor Lau Tek Soon, Head of Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 10 August, 1994 at Singapore.
statement which deplored the escalation and enlargement of the conflict in Indochina and called for conformity to the principles of the UN charter and the Bandung Declaration. It also urged the UN Security Council to discuss the issue and take appropriate measures.89

The core of ASEAN's policy hinged upon its perception of Vietnam's intervention as illegal and unjust. Despite the war-like situation which had existed between Vietnam and Kampuchea prior to Vietnam's military action and the nature of Pol Pot's rule, ASEAN stuck to its claim of the illegality of Vietnam's presence.90

The most successful implementation of ASEAN's policy was its use of the UN institutions. Conforming to its view of Vietnam's illegal presence in Cambodia, it called for the


90. Interestingly enough, ASEAN had recognised the government which replaced Idi Amin and even accepted the case as a humanitarian intervention by Tanzania. This could be understood by recognising that diplomatic initiatives ultimately give way to political realities. It probably goes to prove that humanitarian interests are strong where a nation or group of nations' security and strategic concerns are not involved. Discussions with Prof. Lau Tek Soon, Head of Department of Political Science, NUS, Singapore, 10 August 1994 at Singapore.
acceptance of the representation of Democratic Kampuchea. Emphasis was placed on the need for the total and immediate withdrawal of troops and convening an international conference which would achieve a political settlement, inclusive of UN sponsored elections. In 1981, the Heng Samrin regime held elections to consolidate its position. This was rejected by ASEAN which questioned the validity of an election that compelled the Cambodians to accept a foreign backed government. It denounced the elections and called for implementation of the General Assembly Resolution which sought comprehensive and durable political settlement and also for UN supervised elections.

In 1981, ASEAN was a principal participant at the International Conference on Kampuchea which was sponsored by the UN held at New York. The conference adopted a declaration which called for a ceasefire by all parties to the conflict in Cambodia, withdrawal of foreign forces, arrangement of measures to ensure that armed factions do not

91. Chintamani Mahapatra, American Role in the Origin and Growth of ASEAN (New Delhi, 1989), pp. 94-95.


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disrupt elections under UN supervision and maintenance of law and order.\textsuperscript{93}

During this period ASEAN and China supported the moves of the resistance. Their efforts culminated in the emergence of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), which brought together the three factions of the Khmer Rouge under Khieu Samphan, the FUNCINPEC under Norodom Sihanouk and the KPNLF under the republican leader Son Sann. The objective behind forming the CGDK was to bring the resistance factions together under a collective umbrella and give it some semblance of solidarity and unity.\textsuperscript{94} Moreover, it 'greatly legitimized the position of the Khmer Rouge which till then had been viewed dubiously.'\textsuperscript{95} The association with the Royalist party and the republicans considerably improved the image of the Khmer Rouge and allowed for its future role in the political process. In reality, the CGDK

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95. Interview with Mr. Saroj Chavanaviraj, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, October 4, 1994, at Bangkok.
\end{flushleft}
was more 'acceptable to the international community.'\textsuperscript{96} There is another view that 'the prospect of the Khmer Rouges international isolation' worried China, the United States and the ASEAN. In order to 'salvage the Pol Pot regime' the CGDK as alliance was 'presented to the international community.'\textsuperscript{97} The coalition was supposedly formed to 'reinforce the potential of the resistance' and 'facilitate Pol Pot supporters access to Western aid'.\textsuperscript{98}

Two important initiatives that were taken were nominally successful and could probably be considered the first breaks in the diplomatic process. In February 1983, the Prime Ministers of Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos suggested a proposal for restoration of peace. According to this proposal all Vietnamese 'volunteers' would be withdrawn after ensuring that the threat from Peking and the factions along the Thai border ceased to exist.\textsuperscript{99} The 'volunteers' were to be withdrawn annually and the Heng Samrin government

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{96} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{97} Undeclared War Against the People's Republic of Kampuchea, (Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRK, Phnom Penh, 1985), p.28.
\item \textsuperscript{98} ibid., p.29.
\end{itemize}
had the right to seek the advice of Vietnam at any given point. Further, elections were to be held and could be observed by foreigners in which former Khmer Rouge members could also participate.\textsuperscript{100}

The second development took place at an unofficial, bilateral level between Vietnam and Malaysia whose representatives met at the Non-Aligned Summit held at New Delhi in March 1983. Here the Malaysian Foreign Minister, Tan Sri Haji Muhammad Ghazali bin Shafie, proposed the five-plus-two formula which included discussions between the ASEAN states, Vietnam and Laos. Kampuchea was excluded from this since the ASEAN countries did not recognise the Heng Samrin Government. Despite this, Vietnam accepted the proposal which it considered a significant break through.\textsuperscript{101} The proposal fell through due to opposition from Thailand and the Philippines who refused to negotiate with Vietnam until it withdrew its troops from Kampuchea. Since this did not conform to the ASEAN policy of consensus, the five-plus-two formula proposed by ASEAN met with little

\textsuperscript{100} ibid.

\textsuperscript{101} ibid., p.32671.
success.102

The efforts which went on between the Indochinese states and the ASEAN continued to result in some deadlock. This was because both sides took an intransigent position and were unwilling to compromise on any of the issues which would have allowed for negotiations to take place. ASEAN supported any settlement which would be preceded by Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea. There were a few attempts at troop withdrawal both in July 1982 and again in May 1983. In July 1982, there was doubt about the sincerity of Vietnam's offer to a partial withdrawal and the Thai officials claimed that it was merely 'another routine rotation of disengaged troops.'103 In fact it had been stated that reports from guerilla sources claimed that Vietnamese forces had been reinforced by new arrivals.104 The second withdrawal was witnessed by foreign journalists. However, Thai sources again claimed it as a false statement.


104. ibid.
and that in actual fact the forces were reinforced. 105

In January 1985, the Indochinese Foreign Ministers conference took place and in the Communique, Indochina reiterated its willingness to have negotiations with the parties concerned. The proposals included the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops and the isolation of the Pol Pot clique; the right of self-determination, freedom from the threat of genocide and holding of free elections in the presence of foreign observers, promoting concepts of peace and stability leading to peaceful co-existence in Southeast Asia; respect by external powers of the national rights of Southeast Asian countries and finally the establishment of guarantees and supervision of the implementation of proposals. 106

One of the significant diplomatic initiatives that aimed at bringing the warring factions together was taken in April 1985 at the meeting which commemorated the 30th Anniversary of the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference. Here Indonesia and Malaysia, with the full concurrence of their

105. n.99, p.32671.

ASEAN partners proposed what came to be known as the 'proximity talks'. These talks were to take place between the CGDK and Vietnam for the purpose of discussing the basic elements of a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Kampuchean problem. The talks were to be attended by the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). The talks proposed withdrawal of foreign troops, a United Nations control and supervisory commission, national reconciliation and UN supervised elections, and self-determination. The ASEAN was to act as the mediator in these talks.

However, several objections were raised which led to structural changes in the pattern of the proximity talks'. The CGDK was to meet with the Vietnamese representatives and the latter would articulate the PRK's views. This clause was included because the United States refused to extend support to the idea of proximity talks inclusive of the PRK, as it legitimized the Heng Samrin government. ASEAN's policy was to convince Washington that it would not move in a direction which implied recognition of the PRK regime in Phnom Penh.

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This move of ASEAN was not appreciated by Vietnam which took exception to the exclusion of PRK as a main participant. Moreover, Vietnam was also not willing to negotiate with the CGDK because it did not want to enter into a dialogue with the Khmer Rouge.110 The talks were rejected by Vietnam. At the Indochinese Foreign Ministers Conference held at Phnom Penh in August 1985, a Communique was issued which emphasized the willingness of the PRK to negotiate with the opposition forces. The inclusion of the PRK was, therefore, imperative to any measures taken towards a comprehensive political settlement. Indochina, at this meeting, reiterated the five-point position put forward during the January 1985 meeting.111

An important development of this meeting was the setting up of a timetable for the planned withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops which was to be completed by 1990. ASEAN could not view this with much enthusiasm because it seemed


that Vietnam having rejected the 'proximity talks' offered little consolation by way of suggesting a phased withdrawal of its troops.\textsuperscript{112}

From 1986 onwards, the peace process entered a new phase and probably marked the beginning of the end. In March 1986 the CGDK led by Norodom Sihanouk announced an eight-point proposal which included, (i) phased withdrawal of Vietnamese troops; (ii) the establishment of a four party coalition government; (iii) the reconstruction of an independent neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea; (iv) free elections under international supervision.\textsuperscript{113} This was rejected by the Vietnamese who were unwilling to accept any proposal that included the Khmer Rouge. Moreover, Hanoi claimed that the proposal's plan was to cover up the CGDK military losses.\textsuperscript{114}

By July 1987, the ASEAN increased the pressure for negotiations. Following the visit of the Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumatmaja to Vietnam, a new proposal was put forth. This round of talks suggested by the ASEAN was to

\textsuperscript{112} Kuroyanegi, n.102, p.72.

\textsuperscript{113} ibid., p.73.

be informal in nature and was referred to as 'cocktail-party' diplomacy. The talks were to be held in two stages. The first was between the PRK and the CGDK, followed by the second round in which the Vietnamese could participate. ASEAN viewed the proposal as "one meeting initially among the Cambodian factions, followed immediately by the participation of Vietnam." Hanoi and Phnom Penh interpreted them as two separate meetings.

The CGDK under Sihanouk reacted favourably to the idea of an all-Cambodian Conference. It was believed that this carried the implication that the Cambodian question was essentially for Cambodians to settle. Further, this would reduce the diplomatic criticism levelled against Vietnam which was considered to be an aggressor in Cambodia.

According to Van der Kroef, the proposal fell through due to opposition from several quarters. First, within ASEAN, both Thailand and Singapore opposed the idea of involving Vietnam only during the second stage of the dialogue. They believed that this would reduce it to a civil

war rather than a war of aggression by Vietnam. Second, Cambodia and Vietnam rejected it over the revision made by ASEAN. Third, both Democratic Kampuchea and its principal backer, China, were against the proposal. Finally, it was dropped in favour of the eight-point proposal mooted by the CGDK in March 1986.\textsuperscript{118}

In September 1987, Hun Sen stated for the first time that the Khmer Rouge may have a role to play in the solution of the conflict and expressed a willingness to hold talks with Khieu Samphan, the Foreign Minister of the CGDK.\textsuperscript{119} The next month, the PRK put forward a five-point peace proposal. According to this, the PRK agreed to (i) meet Sihanouk and other leaders of the CGDK, with the exception of Pol Pot and his immediate associates. Sihanouk was to be offered a prominent position in the governmental set up; (ii) PRK was willing to allow Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia which was to occur simultaneously with the cessation of support to the resistance; (iii) after the Vietnamese withdrawal, elections were to be held under foreign supervision; (iv) it expressed its desire to start negotiations with Thailand

\textsuperscript{118} Van der Kroef, n.115, p.307.

regarding the transformation of the Thai-Cambodian border into one of peace and friendship, which would allow for the orderly repatriation of refugees and (v) it sought to convene an international conference consisting of the conflicting parties, the Indochinese Nations, ASEAN, China, USSR, USA, India, France, the United Kingdom and others. 120

One of the most significant diplomatic breakthroughs in the conflict was the meeting between Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Previous attempts to arrange such a meeting had met with little success since Sihanouk had declined twice to meet with Hun Sen, in 1984 and 1986. Another meeting had been scheduled for October 1987, which had also not taken place. Despite those unsuccessful attempts, there was optimism about the outcome of the Hun Sen-Sihanouk meeting because no preconditions had been laid down and all matters pertaining to elections and the future government were to be discussed at the negotiating table. 121

The first round of talks between Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk, in December 1987, took place in France and resulted in the signing of a Joint Communique which stated,

120. ibid.
121. Van der Kroef, n.115, p.313.
(i) the Cambodian conflict had to be settled politically through talks among the concerned parties, in order to end the war and carry out national reconstruction; and (ii) that an international conference would be called if an agreement could be reached between the two which would act as a guarantor for both the accord and the future independence of Cambodia. Both parties agreed to meet for a second round of talks in January 1988. 122

The second meeting took place at Saint Germain-en-Laye in France on 20-21 January 1988. Five principal issues were discussed - (i) the timetable for Vietnamese withdrawal; (ii) the establishment of the coalition government; (iii) the future political system in Cambodia; (iv) the principles upon which an independent, neutral and non-aligned Cambodia was to be based, and (v) international guarantees to ensure its security and independence. With regard to the Vietnamese withdrawal and the coalition government, opinions were divergent. Consensus was reached on the other three issues. Though Sihanouk initially asked for an immediate and complete withdrawal, he later accepted

Hun Sen's plan for a twenty-four-month phased withdrawal.\textsuperscript{123} However, Prince Sihanouk wanted the formation of a coalition government to precede the election, whereas Hun Sen felt it should be after the elections.\textsuperscript{124}

The Hun Sen-Sihanouk meetings acted as a prelude to the Jakarta Informal Meetings. The diplomatic initiatives taken by ASEAN, particularly, Indonesia, was instrumental in evolving the JIM meetings. China and the Soviet Union did not attend. The ASEAN members attended the talks in their individual capacities and not as a regional organisation.

The first JIM meeting was held at the city of Bagor from 25-28, July 1988. The meeting took place in two stages. During the first stage, the four Cambodian factions participated. At the next stage they were joined by Vietnam, Laos and the ASEAN members. It recognised two important factors which were linked to an overall settlement. These were the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops which was within the framework of a political solution and preventing

\textsuperscript{123} ibid.

\textsuperscript{124} ibid.,
the 'recurrence of genocidal policies.' Other than this, the meetings aimed at ending the suffering of the Cambodian people, establishing an 'independent, sovereign, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea on the basis of self-determination and national reconciliation.' These were to be achieved under the effective supervision of international observers.

The first meeting established a working group of senior officials comprising all participants who were to examine the specific aspects of the political solution. The group was expected to complete its work and recommend the next meeting by December 1988. The JIM II took place in February 1989. The parties involved reiterated their common standing on various issues-resolution of the conflict through peaceful means for the establishment of peace and stability in the region; on maintaining the sovereignty, independence, neutrality and non-aligned status of Cambodia with self-determination and national reconciliation; a country free from foreign interference and the isolation of the Pol


126. ibid.
The Jakarta Informal Meetings I and II, were probably the most significant of the peace initiatives that were taken by the ASEAN. This can largely be attributed to the changed international atmosphere which had emerged after 1985 resulting in the gradual erosion of the cold war politics. Another factor was the willingness on the part of Sihanouk and Hun Sen to negotiate for an agreement which would lead to the settlement of the conflict. Furthermore, the weariness of fighting a protracted war had taken its toll and the need for putting a stop to hostilities was a primary factor.

The achievements of the JIM I and II, culminated in the Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) in July/August 1989. The conference achieved in identifying a 'variety of elements which were necessary for reaching a comprehensive settlement.' But it lacked consensus and so a

settlement could not be achieved.\textsuperscript{128}

Wide ranging discussions continued through 1990. Australia promoted an idea of Sihanouk and the US Congress man, Stephen Solarz, and evolved a new peace plan which became the blueprint for the Peace Treaty of October 1991. According to this plan, the United Nations was to administer Cambodia during the interim period prior to the holding of UN supervised elections, 'which not only presented the UN with an extraordinary and unprecedented role but was also of significance since it would maintain Cambodia's sovereign status which, by no means, could be infringed upon.'\textsuperscript{129} The Australians fashioned this idea into the 'Red Book' which gave a detailed account of the role of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, complete with cost and personnel estimates of the election process.\textsuperscript{130}


\textsuperscript{129} Paper presented by Shri L.L. Mehrotra, Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi at SIS, JNU, New Delhi, 19 November, 1991.

In June 1990, Japan convened the Tokyo conference on Cambodia which was its first major effort to become involved in the Cambodian peace process. Tokyo's initiative failed when the Khmer Rouge representative invited to attend as an observer began to demand equal status. 131

The most significant change came in July 1990, with the shift in the United States policy. This paved the way for the Permanent Five from the Security Council to draw up a plan based on the proposal of Gareth Evans. The plan provided for,

i) achievement of a comprehensive political settlement to the conflict;

ii) establishment of the Supreme National Council as the unique embodiment of Cambodia's Unity and Sovereignty,

iii) the UN was to monitor and supervise the administration of Cambodia in the interim period leading to free and fair elections,

iv) demobilization of the armed forces of the four contending factions and,

v) the conduct of free and fair elections by the United Nations.¹³²

The UN peace plan was fully supported by ASEAN which welcomed the enhanced role for the United Nations in Cambodia. It sought for the continuation of efforts to bring peace to Cambodia, either by a United Nations interim administration or through the setting up of the Supreme National Council which could be a 'representative of all shades of political opinion' and could act as an administrative organ by using the already existing ones in conjuncture with the United Nations.¹³³

Two other meetings which were held at Jakarta in February 1990 and September 1990 were significant. The first meeting centered on the plan proposed by Gareth Evans and it


formulated several elements which would be a part of the UN Proposal. However there was disagreement over the inclusion of a statement which referred to the 'non-return of the genocidal policies of the Khmer Rouge.'\textsuperscript{134} Though a statement was not agreed upon, the meeting did endorse the acceptance of an enhanced United Nations role in the Cambodian settlement.

The waring factions came together at another meeting in September 1990 with the purpose of discussing the UN plan and the setting up of the SNC. The Cambodian factions accepted the P-5 framework in its entirety as the basis of the peace settlement.\textsuperscript{135} This meeting was significant from the point of view of settling two major issues. First, under the UN plan the administration of the country during the interim period was to be handled by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Second, the formation of the SNC was significant since the CGDK was not allowed the right to retain its seat in the UN. Only until

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Keesing's Record of World Events}, vol. 36, no. 2, (Longman Cambridge, February 1990), p. 37249.

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Keesing's Record of World Events}, vol. 36, no. 9, (Longman Cambridge, September 1990), p. 37712.
the formation of the SNC was it to retain its seat. The SNC was to comprise of twelve members and was considered to be an embodiment of "independence, sovereignty and unity." Differences of opinion arose over the composition of the SNC. Of the twelve members-six were to be from the State of Cambodia (SOC) and the rest from the National Government of Cambodia (NGC). Sihanouk wanted to act as the thirteenth member and chairman of the SNC, but this was opposed by the SOC. The SOC did not want this as it would increase the NGC elements to a total of seven in the SNC. For their part the NGC were unwilling to accept Hun Sen as the SNC Vice-Chairman and head of the Cambodian delegation to the UN. It was later resolved at Pattaya in June 1991, that Sihanouk would convene and chair the SNC as the twelfth but neutral member and Hun Sen withdrew his proposal for the post of Vice-Chairman.

The culmination of these efforts at negotiations resulted in the convening of the Paris Peace Conference and the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty on 23 October 1991. The signatories included all twelve members of the SNC, the

138. Address by Shri L.L. Mehrotra, n.129.
five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the three Indochinese countries, the six members of ASEAN, India, Australia, Japan, Canada and Yugoslavia in its capacity as chairman of the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) and was also attended by the UN Secretary-General.\textsuperscript{139} The conclusion of the Paris Peace Accord was the most decisive step towards a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia.

It is imperative to mention that the regional actors played the most significant role in the Cambodian conflict. In the entire period of the issue the interests of Vietnam, China and ASEAN and their responses to the issue are vital. While both Vietnam and China were motivated by individual interests, ASEAN had to act collectively. ASEAN, however, was 'rarely and genuinely of one mind on the Cambodian issue'.\textsuperscript{140} Despite this it was able to orchestrate a single position during the years of the conflict. The regional actors were supported indirectly at the extra-regional level which has been discussed in the following chapter.

\textsuperscript{139} Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, Paris, October 23, 1991 (Department of Public Information, UN, January 1992), p.2.

\textsuperscript{140} Bernard Gordon, "The United States and Indochina After Vietnam leaves Cambodia", in Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia: Regional Issues and Realignments, Monograph Canberra Papers, (ANU, Canberra, October, 1989), p.23.