Chapter III

Major Islamic Organisations
and Resistance Movements:

Their Programmes and activities
Islamic society has witnessed numerous Islamic organisations in both intellectual and practical forms with the emergence of radical Islamic resurgence. Such organisations oppose the existing political regimes in Islamic countries and call for a return to the original principles of Islamic state. Their origin lies in of the social, economic, political and cultural conditions in the Islamic states. These conditions are manifested in the interrelated and multi-faced crises of development, inequality and identity that have intensified over the century and produced war, oppression and dependency in their wake. An explanation of the rise of militant political activism lies in the failure of existing political systems to deal with these problems and to safeguard the community against foreign domination and exploitation in its various forms. This process reached its zenith with the intrusion of modern European imperialism. Their doctrines, formulated at a time when European pressure on the Islamic world had reached new heights with the Russo-Turkish war (1877), the French occupation of Tunis (1881), and the British occupation of Egypt (1882), were to have a lasting effect on social and political thought in the Islamic world, and it can be seen even today. The Islamic political activism has
roots in the socio-cultural and socio-political traditions of Islam as manifested in the rich heritage of Islamic thought. The Islamic activists pressed for the enforcement of Islamic values and system in their societies. The demand assumed an international dimension with the success of Islamic revolution in Iran and the fall of the Shah's regime in 1979. However, the Islamic political movements had their roots in Egypt, Jordan and Syria. In recent decades they extended its influence to the Lebanon, the Israeli-occupied Palestinian lands and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf.

The Ikhwan al Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt

"The society of Muslim Brothers (Jamaiyyat al Ikhwan al - Muslimeen) popularly known as the Ikhwan al Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood) movement in Egypt is a radical Islamic organisation. The society was founded by Hassan al - Banna in 1928 in the Suez canal zone city of Ismailiya along with the six members of the British camp labour who came to him carrying resentment at their inferior cultural, social and economic position as compared to the British personnel.¹

Hassan al - Banna came from a pious family in the Nile delta town of Muhammadiya. His father, Al Banna, a graduate

of Al Azhar university and author of books on the Hadith and Islamic jurisprudence, was a religious teacher who had led a very active life, fully absorbed in Islamic activities. In his youth Hassan set out to organise preaching societies and in the early 1928 the Ikhwan al Muslimeen began in Ismailiya where he was appointed as a government school teacher. Banna started an Islamic movement among the poor and depressed masses. As a result the new Islamic spirit radiated far and wide into the lower strata of society almost unnoticed by the ruling and privileged classes.\(^2\)

The motive behind the establishment of Ikhwan was to create an Islamic order based upon the following three principles: (a) Islam is a comprehensive, self-evolving system and it is the ultimate path of life in all spheres; (b) Islam emanates from, and is based on, two fundamental sources, the Qur'an, and the Prophet's Tradition, and (c) Islam is applicable to all times and places. In short, Islam was a total ideology, offering an all-powerful system to regulate every detail of the political, economic, social and cultural life of the believers. In Hassan al - Banna's view the ills which had befallen Egypt and indeed the entire

Muslim world were result of centuries of corrupt practices, innovations and deviations combined with political, cultural, religious, legal and economic imperialism which had grown external and internal form. More precisely he found the illness of Egyptian society in the disunity resulting from the political dispute between the wafd and the liberal party, the drift away from Islam to apostacy and nihilism, opposition to tradition and orthodoxy, the current of secular thought in the newly organised Egyptian university and libertarian societies and the widespread circulation of books, newspapers and magazines which were overtly anti-religious or irreligious. To escape this un-Islamic state of affairs, Banna advocated the return to the original and simple doctrine of Islam as grounded in the Qur'an and the tradition. 3

Thus having realised the necessity of acquisition of political power to attain the goal of creation of Islamic order, the Muslim Brotherhood, under the leadership of Banna, initiated a series of programmes for the reform and development of the political system, a new Islamic Constitution, new electoral procedure, and overhauling of the machinery of government and so on. 4 The Brothers

3. Ibid.

stressed that it is unnecessary for Muslim to borrow ideas and institutions from other systems and societies. Thus the main aim and programmes of the Brothers was to create a new generation capable of understanding the true meaning of Islam as interpreted by the Ikhwan's leaders and restore to Islam its prestige and power. In order to challenge the corrupt practices of politicians the Brotherhood entered into political activities and some of the leaders declared that the organisation is active not only on religious and social but also political levels. The Brothers openly spoke about an eventual control of political authority and demanded replacement of secular regime by the Islamic institutions. In their programmes, the Brothers repeatedly warned that the internal conditions in Egypt were progressively deteriorating and the Western powers had dominated the whole society while the Government has failed to achieve progress. The leaders of the Ikhwan declared that only Islamic rules can solve the existing problems. They insisted that religion must be the basis of polity and its details would be worked out in accordance with social conditions. According to political Islam authority is

derived from divine source and its holders must be guided by an ultimate religious objective. In their programmes, the Brothers also declared that Islam is inseparable from politics and stressed that the basic principles of an Islamic government were the principles of representation, unity of the nation and the national will. At the same time, the Brothers also stressed that any government that seeks to be legitimate must satisfy these basic requirements. Sovereignty ultimately belongs to God, but its exercise is entrusted to the nation. An Islamic government must, therefore, be responsible to the will of the nation. Such responsibility implies that the holders of authority are not the masters of the people but their servants. All believers are brothers and must enjoy equal rights. All the citizens must be respected equally according to the principles of Islamic brotherhood. The citizens should not be denied the right to share authority with rulers. Muslims are responsible for their public and private affairs. The believers must constitute one umma (Muslim Community). If they are divided into various countries, the people still remain as united umma because of the spiritual bond of brotherhood.6

6. Ibid.
Besides, in their programme the Ikhwan also stressed that the Muslims must be united especially in their struggle against foreign influence and divert their efforts from public to personal affairs. The Ikhwan demanded the dissolution of the party system because they claimed that under the guise of parties the politicians were competing with each other to serve their personal interests at the expense of the masses. They also said that the will of the people must be exercised by a representative government in accordance with the principles of the Constitution (al-shura) which would be guided by ulama (religious leaders) who represent the people on all matters of religion and law. 7

In the economic field, the Ikhwan were unsatisfied with the widespread disparity between the rich and poor. They stressed on the economic system based on the Islamic principles. Usury should be prohibited, they demanded and the masses protected from exploitation by monopolies. Productivity, income and employment should be increased, natural resources exploited and foreign projects

nationalised, civil service salaries should be adjusted so as to increase pay of junior civil servants.  

The Ikhwan's participation in socio-religious movement as well as political affairs was widespread. During the period of the Second World War the Ikhwan movement reached the height of its influence not only among the people interested in socio-religious reforms but also among the politicians as well at all levels. However, their participation in the Palestine struggle brought the organisation to the forefront. The Ikhwan spread very rapidly all over Egypt. In a short period, its followers and sympathizers increased and it drew its support from students, civil servants, artisans, petty traders and peasants. The recruitment of military officers into its ranks further strengthened the Ikhwan al Muslimeen. The Ikhwan following reached new heights during 1946-48, with some estimates putting the figure at 300 - 600,000 members, organised into some two thousand branches. Formal or informal Muslim Brotherhood branches existed outside Egypt in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Sudan, Eritrea, Morocco, Tunisia and other Islamic countries inside

and outside the Middle East.\textsuperscript{9} It had by then coined a highly attractive slogan: "The Qur'an is our Constitution, the Prophet is our guide, Death for the glory of Allah is our greatest ambition."\textsuperscript{10}

The Ikhwan active involvement in the Islamic movement shook many a government and they emerged as a serious threat to the existing regimes in the region. After the death of Banna till today the Brotherhood took an active part in leading the Islamic movement and confrontation with the government. The Brothers resorted to violence and face to face fighting led to the closing down of the headquarters of the organisation. Nasser was the object of two assassination attempts by Ikhwan members (in 1954 and 1965). According to one of the critics of the Nasser regime, the number of people who were arrested was 20,000 of whom 11,000 were held for lengthy prison terms. It was further pointed out that the prisoners were subjected to "torture and degradation beyond imagination." Qmar al-Tilmisani, the present leader of the movement, describes the Nasser regime as the "inquisition era" and often links the phenomenon of violence by youthful elements to the ruthless repression mounted by the security apparatus of the Nasser

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid, p.60.

\textsuperscript{10} Hiro, n.2, p.63.
regime. He draws an analogy between the Nasserite era and Sadat's repressive measures in the late 1970s and their violent reactions. His favorite remark to the press is: "violence invites violent counter-reactions."^{11}

The emergence of the Ikhwan al Muslimeen as the principal opposition in Egypt gave a fillip to the clandestine Islamic radical groups throughout the Arab world. Prominent among them were Mukfiritiya (Denouncers of the Infidel), Jund Allah (Soldiers of God) Munazzamat al Jihad, the Jihad Organisation and Al-Takfir wa Al-Hijra (Denunciation and Migration). All of these were violently opposed to the regime. When the organisation was first banned in Egypt in 1948 hundreds of its activists went into exile in other Arab states and became active spreading their programme and ideologies. The same thing happened in 1954. Consequently, the Ikhwan exists in all Arab countries either openly or underground, sometimes under its proper name and other times not. In Algeria it is known as Ahl al Da'awa (People of the Call), and in Tunisia as Hizb al Islami (the Islamic Party). In Jordan, where political parties are outlawed, it is registered as a charitable organisation. In other Persian

Gulf states, which also disallow political parties, the Ikhwan exists through its affiliate, Jamiiyya al-Islah al-Ijtimai (The Society of Social Reform).12

Harakt-e-Mogawemat al-Islami (Hamas)

Hamas - the Islamic Resistance Movement was born out of the Intifada which marked the beginning of the true political revival of the Islamic forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the face of Israeli occupation on the one hand and the national secular forces led by the PLO on the other.13 The leaders of Hamas (the Arabic for zeal, ardor, strength, bravery, flame) came from both the Ikhwan al Muslimineen (Muslim Brothers) and the Islamic Jihad. One of the principal leaders was Shmed Yassin who became a spokesman for the organisation. Another was Sheikh Khalil Qawqa who was deported half a year after the Intifada began. He made his way to Kuwait where he became a major spokesman abroad for Hamas.

In fact, Hamas was the projection of the Ikhwan al Muslimineen in Palestine in 1988. The contents of its Charter do not differ from the position taken by the Muslim

Brotherhood on the issue of liberation of Palestine which believes in use of Islam as a weapon in the resolution of Palestine problem. However, the Charter pays little attention to the Brotherhood's core goal of transforming society and places far greater emphasis on the Palestine problem and Jihad.

Hamas's aims and programmes are spelled out in the Charter issued on 18 August 1988. It contains the philosophy of the movement, its rationale, and its positions not only on such central issues as the Palestine problem but also on social welfare, the role of women, other Islamic movements, nationalist movements and the PLO, the Arab countries and so on.

Concerning Palestine, the Charter states that "the land of Palestine is an Islamic trust (Waqf) upon all Muslim generations until the Day of Resurrection. It is not right to give it up nor any part of it" (Article 11). In the opinion of Hamas, the solution of the Palestinian problem

14. The Article emphasizes that since the conflict is with an enemy that has utilised the weapon of a religious faith in its wars with the Palestinians the only effective response is to use Islam as a weapon in that conflict.

rests on uprooting the state of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in its place. The Charter also mentions three spheres of the Palestinian cause. These are the Palestinian, the Arab, and the Islamic, each of which has its role in the struggle against Israel (Article 14).

Regarding peace negotiations and initiatives, the Charter states: "What are called peaceful solutions and international conference to solve the Palestine question all conflict with the doctrine of the Islamic Resistance Movement, for giving up any part of the homeland is like giving up part of the religious faith itself" (Article 13). According to the Charter there is no solution to the Palestine problem except Jihad "When an enemy occupies some of the Muslim lands Jihad becomes obligatory on every Muslim" (Article 15). Thus, all peace initiatives are a "waste of time and acts of absurdity" (Article 13). In keeping with this Article the Hamas protested against the peace conference that was held in Madrid in October 1991 and it continues to oppose Palestinian participation in the current Arab-Israeli negotiations, calling for immediate withdrawal from these negotiations.16

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16. Ibid.
At the same time, the Hamas calls on the society to "cleanse" itself of traces of ideological invasion going back to the Crusades. Education must be recognised by using a "healthy" curriculum that will include a comprehensive study of the enemy so that Muslims will understand his strength and weaknesses. "Women must play an active role in guiding and educating new generations". The enemy has recognised woman's importance and has attempted to subvert her "through Zionist organisations of various names and shapes, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, espionage groups and others, all nothing more than allies of subversion and saboteurs".

As for Hamas's relations with the nationalist movement, the Charter refers to the PLO as a "father, brother, relative or friend" of the Islamic movement and stresses the fact that the two movements have a common plight and common destiny and face the same enemy (Article 27). At the same time, the Hamas sharply criticizes the PLO's secular course and its leadership as well as its political programme calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state that would coexist with the State of Israel. The Hamas condemned
the PLO's recognition of the State of Israel and its acceptance of UN Security Resolutions 242 and 338.\textsuperscript{17}

Although the Hamas does not openly question the PLO's status as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in fact, it objects to the organisation's widespread acceptance as the people's frame of reference and definer of their identity and national goals. The Hamas makes no explicit claims to being an alternative to the PLO but its makes repeated references to Islam as the alternative to the failed ideologies. The Hamas's rejection of the PLO's political programmes, its call for the establishment of an Islamic society in Palestine, and for the establishment of an Islamic leadership to spearhead the popular struggle are all manifestations of its rivalry with the PLO. The Hamas participated in the Intifada on an equal footing with the PLO groups. From the beginning, the Hamas leadership has been plagued by repeated losses in its ranks through deportations and imprisonment, necessitating periodic reorganisations both at the central and committee or branch levels and obliging it to graduate successive leadership echelons. After Shaykh Yasin was arrested in May 1989 and sentenced to fifteen years in prison, Dr Abd al-

\textsuperscript{17. Ibid.}
Aziz al - Rantisi took command of the Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, the better known leaders included Husayn Abdu Kuwik, a prominent unionist, Fadhil Salih, an Imam, and Hasan Yusuf, a school teacher and Imam. All of them were deported by Israel in December 1992. The Hamas connection of the renowned advocate, Shaykh Bassam Jarrar, also deported by Israel, is not confirmed. Among the well-known cadres of the Hamas outside Palestine are Musa Abu Marzuo, head of the movement's political bureau, Muhammad Nazzal, representative in Jordan, and Imad al - Alami, representative in Tehran. The identity of a number of Hamas leaders both inside and outside the occupied territories remains unknown.18

The mass deportation of the Hamas and Ikhwan al Muslimeen members in December 1992 removed not only most of the front-line leaders but also a large number of second and third tier leaders and other activists. The act left the occupied territories seemingly bereft of major leaders. At present the Hamas is larger than any single Palestinian faction except the Fath. Like the Fath, it has a strong presence throughout the occupied territories. There is no doubt that Hamas actions, including the use of arms against

18. Ibid.
Israeli military targets, have been a major factor in the continuation of the uprising because of the movement's wide following and mobility. Moreover, its non-participation in political processes led it to concentrate its efforts on Intifada activity. The Hamas has become the party most engaged in armed actions against Israeli targets and is estimated to have more members under detention than any other group except the Fagh. It should be noted that the Hamas's military activities are intended not only to strike at the occupation but also to embarrass the negotiating factions and to bolster its own position as a major Palestinian force that cannot be ignored and without which no agreement can be reached.

The Hamas, along with the Islamic movements, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in general has made great strides, becoming a major political force in Palestinian society. It continues to face important challenges. The Hamas has benefited immensely from being in the "opposition". The PLO's abandonment of revolutionary slogans and shift to political pragmatism enabled the Hamas to fill the ideological and doctrinal vacuum at a time of increasing disillusionment in the nationalist programme. The Hamas

19. Ibid.
soon became a credible and convenient name for a rehabilitated Muslim Brotherhood society, enabling the 'new' organisation to attract followers and supporters who had not been members of the Brotherhood. It has been able to build on the mother organisation's extensive infrastructure in expanding its public base of operations. It is thus that nursery schools, kindergartens, social and sports clubs, libraries and other such associations function under its auspices and the Islamic universities in the West Bank and Gaza continue under its control. These various institutions - to say nothing of the network of mosques-are useful vehicles for spreading the Hamas's ideas and influence and enlisting supporters. At the same time Hamas is slowly gaining ground.

**Al-Jihad Al-Islami (Islamic Jihad):**

The Islamic Jihad is another important Islamic group in the West Bank and Gaza which broke away from the Ikhwan al-Muslemeen in the mid-1990s. Since then and particularly after 1979 this group emerged as one of the most strong and independent organizations in the occupied territories. The

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20. Ibid.

leaders of *al-Jihad*, unlike other groups, believe in action and armed struggle against the enemies of Muslims and Islam (US and Israel). This organization is the strongest military group in the region and has close links with other Islamic organizations i.e., *al-Jihad* of Egypt and the revolutionary organizations in Iran. Since 1993 members of this group launched several armed operations against the Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza.

Since its establishment its leaders favoured close relations with the PLO despite their political and ideological differences. To attain their goal and objective—liberation of Islamic land—they mobilized the masses especially in the Islamic University in Gaza against the Israeli occupiers. After the killing of its four members by the Israeli forces in 1987 they successfully mobilized the masses in the form of strikes and demonstration against the Israeli forces. As a result of *al-Jihad's* increased activities and mass support, other Islamic groups like *Ikhwan* considered it as a challenge to their future plan.

In November 1987 the Israeli forces arrested Abd al-Aziz Odeh—a lecturer in the Gaza university and the leader of this group. After his deportation in the same month the *Jihad* activists attempted to mobilize and gain the support of
masses particularly the students of the Islamic University of Gaza. In late November 1987, the student of that university held a day of solidarity with Odeh and his organization.22

Al-Jihad al-Islami's reaction to the Islamic groups especially the Ikhwan was very harsh and apart from denouncing them, it labelled them as unrevolutionary and misguided reformists. For achieving the liberation of the holy land of Islam the organization stressed on dialogue with nationalist as well as with various Palestinian groups. The Islamic Jihad intensified its bid for the leadership of the Islamic revolution in the occupied territories. Its activities radicalized the Islamic activists in the West Bank and Gaza.

The activities and programmes of al-Jihad al-Islami in the West Bank and Gaza are as clear as its stand on the liberation of Palestine. It started its activities in the Islamic University as well as other higher secondary educational institutions in Gaza. It focussed particularly on recruiting the youth and teachers. It called the Muslim masses of the Arab States of the region to revolt against their un-Islamic regimes and for achieving its objective it

established close links with different Islamic militant groups in these countries especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The al-Jihad believes that only by armed struggle and open confrontation it could solve the problems of Muslims as well as resolve the Palestinian issue. In order to achieve its objective namely liberation of Bait al Muqaddas (Jerusalem) the Jihad not only supported the people's armed struggle in Gaza and the West Bank but it also strengthened its ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In its objective and programme, the Islamic Jihad is pronouncedly anti-imperialist, anti-Israeli and anti-un-Islamic regimes in the Arab World. For ending the presence of foreign powers, particularly the U.S., it called upon the revolutionary Muslims to take arms and fight against them. This organization pledged itself to continue its armed Jihad until the liberation of the Islamic lands from the yoke of imperialism and Judaism.23

In the West Bank and Gaza there are several other Islamic organizations which include the Sufis, Salafiyun, al-Takfir wal-Hijra, Jama'at al Tabligh, and Hizb al-Tahreer al-Islamiyya. The leaders of the Hizb broke away from the Ikhwan due to their differences over their area of

23. Abdel Aziz Odeh - Interview, Bagie (Tehran), Vol. 50.
activities as well as approaches. The leaders of this organization decided to confine its activities to the West Bank and Gaza. This organization's programmes are mostly revolutionary in nature. It has carried out several armed attacks against the Israeli forces in the occupied territories. Its programme and plans are mainly directed against the Israeli forces and for achieving its objectives it resorted to recruit new members from the students in the University of Gaza. It also established close links with the *Jihad al Islami* group.

**Ikhwan al Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood) in Palestine**

The first *Ikhwan al Muslimeen* group formed in Palestine was established in Jerusalem in 1946 and it was endorsed by the Palestinian nationalist leader, Musa al - Husseini. Later in that year other groups were established in Jaffa, Lydda, Haifa, Nablus and Tulkarem. The movement was welcomed by the nationalists as an ally in the liberation struggle against the Zionist and British Mandate forces. The *Ikhwan al Muslimeen* participated in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war despite some initial opposition from Arab governments. The *Ikhwan* volunteers found themselves

fighting alongside the regular forces of the Arab armies. These forces were further strengthened by local Palestinian volunteers. The Ikhwan in Jordan and Syria also despatched small groups of volunteers to fight in Palestine.

The performance of the Ikhwan volunteers in the 1948 war drew many Palestinian Muslims into their ranks in the aftermath of al-nakbah (the catastrophe). Palestinians who joined the Ikhwan and lived in or sought refuge in the territories of Palestine administered by Jordan and Egypt experienced quite different condition under the two administering authorities. This was to have quite significant impact on the development of Arab national political organisations and the Ikhwan in the two territories.

The Ikhwan al Muslimeen movement in the West Bank and in Gaza did not participate in the nationalist movement of armed resistance against Israeli occupation. During the first ten years the Ikhwan maintained a low profile. They prudently chose not to challenge the nationalist movement which enjoyed massive popular support. It was only after 1976 that the Ikhwan began to re-emerge as was evident in

its recruitment activity and increased membership. This development was substantially encouraged by the success of Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. Islamic radicalism - response to 'imposed rule' and political repression - extended to both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 27

The Ikhwan's power base was strengthened further by its close relations with traditional Islamic institutions in which it has been able to maintain position of influence over the Islamic sharia (law) courts and through imams (preachers) of important mosques and members on Zakat (tithes) committees. The recruitment method used by the Ikhwan is simple. It tries to interest individuals in its group prayers and in its group study sessions which are usually held in mosques. The Ikhwan also expresses concern for the individual's well being and is willing to discuss a range of problems that fall within the personal sphere. The groups that seem to be special targets for recruitment include the youth in the villages and refugee camps, high school and college students, school teachers and office employees. Very little attention is paid to recruitment among workers. Therefore, it is not surprising that the

27. Ibid.
majority of the Ikhwan members are young, mostly from the lower income groups, and with a rural background.

The activities and programmes of the Ikhwan-al Muslimeen in the West Bank and Gaza are clear as far as its stand on solution of the Palestinian question is concerned. The Ikhwan considers all of Palestine (the areas occupied by Israel in 1948 and in 1967) as Islamic land. The creation of a Jewish state in the areas occupied in 1948 with 3.5 million Jewish residents does not alter this view. It stresses that no one has any right to negotiate away a single inch of Palestine.

The idea of negotiating the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip or on parts of these areas is described as a betrayal of the cause. Equally, the suggestion that the Palestinians should seek a compromise solution on the lines set out by the 1982 Arab summit conference in the form of the Fez peace plan is considered to be defeatism. While the Palestinian National Movement argues that time and objective conditions militate against the rejection of a peace plan, the Ikhwan stresses that such justifications are largely irrelevant given the Muslims' success in liberating Palestine after ninety-two years of occupation by the Crusaders in the twelfth century.
It proposes an Islamic solution as an alternative. This proposal is premised on the following assumptions:

1. Since various mundane efforts to resolve the Palestine issue have failed the only viable alternative is to return to true Islam or pure Islamic system where only the Sharia would be applied, and the Sunna of the Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) would be the supreme example which is the only effective tool in the war with Israel.

2. The conflict is with an enemy who has utilised the weapon of a religious faith in its wars with the Palestinians; Therefore the only effective response is to use Islam as a weapon in that conflict.

3. Islam proved to be a successful weapon during the early period of Islam and later by the Ottomans in their conquests of parts of Europe and, therefore, there is nothing to be feared if Islam is resorted to as a weapon.

4. If the Palestinians resort to Islam there is sufficient evidence in the Hadith (Prophet Muhammad's sayings) of the promise of victory. The practical steps that should be taken to achieve the Islamic solution include:
(a) The formation of a truly faithful and committed Muslim group within the Palestinian people. This group should have an understanding and awareness of the Palestine issue and of all the conspiracies against the Palestinian cause.

(b) This faithful group will expose the traitors, agents and proponents of nationalism and will bring about Palestinian awareness of the nature of its battle with Zionism.

(c) The third step would be to carry out an educational programme where the Palestinian masses will have full faith in God and learn the full extent of the nature of this religious conflict with the Jews.28

The *Ikhwan* emphasises that once the process of Islamic religious transformation in Palestine occurs and is accompanied by Islamic revivalism in the entire region, the battle for the liberation of Palestine would begin and the Palestinians alone will be the spearhead in the battle.29 The *Ikhwan* activists in the West Bank and Gaza perceive themselves as this select group of the faithful that will implement this programme. They also justify the use of physical violence against their opponents whether the enemy are

28. Ibid., p.669.
29. Ibid., p.673.
fellow Palestinians. Their success in controlling or gaining significant support in existing institution is evident. Student Islamic blocs led by the Ikhwan have been established in almost all the post-high school educational institutions. Their ability to attract substantial support has been remarkable. Their support far exceeds the number of their committed members, for example, a survey conducted in May 1984 of the student body at An-Najah university revealed that 12 percent of students were ideologically committed to the movement. However, their bloc in the student elections of that year and the several years that followed received 35 - 40 percent of the total student vote. Currently, they control the student councils in two out of the six universities in the West Bank and Gaza (Hebron and Gaza). 30

The Ikhwan activists in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip are independent of each other and have separate organisational structure. Although they share a similar ideological commitment to the movement as a whole there has been no fusion of the two branches at any point during their histories. Before 1967, the Ikhwan in Gaza was organised on lines somewhat parallel to those of the Ikhwan in Egypt and both groups operated underground. The basic organisational

30. Ibid., p.681.
unit was called usra (family) and a group of this unit formed shuba (branch) which was a gathering or meeting place. The highest structure of the movement, the General Administrative Centre, is composed of a committee whose head is referred to as head of the Centre and is usually elected or chosen by Shura (consultation).31

The strongest features of the Ikhwan are that it is well-organised, has disciplined and committed members, moves in the religious environment of the community, and dispenses well-financed programmes.32 The movement in Gaza appears to wield more power than the one in the West Bank because of the more traditional nature of the Gazan society and through the Ikhwan’s ability to control some of Gaza’s key institutions. With the rise of Islamic radical groups in the occupied territories during the last ten years, the Ikhwan has emerged not only as the dominant force among the Islamic groups but also a power to be reckoned with on the national level.

31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
**Ikhwan al Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood) in Syria**

The *Ikhwan al Muslimoon* (Muslim Brotherhood) in Syria came into being in the mid-1930s when Syrian students of the Sharia returning from Egypt began formed branches in different cities under the title *Shabab Muhammad* (Young Men of Mohammad). The most important of those, established in 1935 in the northern city of Aleppo in 1935, became the organization's headquarters. The *Ikhwan* stood for an end to the French mandate (imposed in 1920) and for social and political reform along Islamic lines. In 1944 the headquarters was moved to Damascus, and Mustafa al-Sibai was elected the General Supervisor. Born in a religious family which provided preachers for the grand mosque in Homs, Sibai was a graduate of Al-Azhar and a friend of Hassan al Banna. He ran the Syrian *Ikhwan* along the lines followed by Banna. Once the French departed in 1946, the organisation concentrated on socio-economic issues always stressing its opposition to secularism and Marxism. It drew the bulk of its support from petty traders and craftsmen. They and their families comprised about one-sixth of the Syrian population. Unlike its Egyptian counterpart it lacked rural middle class backing. The creation of Israel

and the defeat of the Arab forces in 1948 gave a boost to the Ikhwan.

Its base improved further when, in the wake of ban on the Egyptian Ikhwan in 1954, many Egyptian activists took refuge in Syria. For the first time the Syrian organisation's programme clearly called for 'the establishment of a virtuous polity which would carry out the rules and teaching of Islam'. However, when Syria joined Egypt in early 1958 to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) and the ban on political parties in Egypt was extended to Syria, Sibai formally dissolved the Ikhwan. However, it functioned underground. Growing disaffection with Nasser's presidency of the UAR helped the Ikhwan to expand its base. The result of the election held in December 1961, a few months after Syria's secession from the UAR, proved this. The Ikhwan won ten seats, nearly half as many as the older, more established National Bloc. Following the clamp-down on the Ikhwan's activities in Egypt in the mid-fifties the Syrian Ikhwan al Muslimeen branch became the main centre in the Arab World for the activities of al-Ikhwan.34

Like their Egyptian counterpart, the Syrian Ikhwan al Muslimeen (Muslim Brothers) were also active in the socio-

34. Ibid.
religious as well as political affairs of the country. Their influence among the youngmen and potential abilities in handling public matters created fear among the Syrian rulers. In their programmes they repeatedly warned that internal conditions in Syria were deteriorating as the Western powers had dominated the whole society and the government had failed. The confrontation between the Ikhwan al Muslimeen and the Ba'athist state tended to revolve around defining the religious character of the state with the Ikhwan insisting that the Constitution should openly declare Islam as the state religion. Clashes occurred in 1973, thereafter, the state conceded that Islam should be the religion of the head of state but not of the state itself. In the meantime, in order to prepare the ground for reviving the Islamic ethos, the movement concentrated internally on educational affairs and on organisational matters.

In their plan, the Syrian Ikhwan stressed that an Islamic order, based on the sovereignty of God, rule of the Sharia, and possessing a specific 'comprehensive Islamic economic system' was suitable for humanity. In broad terms, their ideology portrayed the Ikhwan as the guardians of the native popular culture against the distortions of foreign and secularist ideologies. Their ideologue, Sa'id Hawwa,
called for absolute sovereignty and rulership (hakimiyya) of God. He believed that all Muslim countries are not currently Islamic in the true sense but are deeply immersed in 'apostacy' (ridda) and called for the establishment of the Kingdom of God (Dawlat Allah) in all countries. According to him this is the only way to guarantee the enforcement of God's commandments in their totality and the fulfillment of the Jihad duty. 35

The Ikhwan escalated their offensive against the Ba'athist state organisation. Their activities took a new turn after Syria's secession from the UAR and their significant electoral success in 1962. But with the Ba'ath resuming power in 1963 suppression of the movement escalated. The Ikhwan resisted fiercely in 1964 and 1965, then again in 1973 and 1976. Their resistance reached new heights in 1979, 1980 and particularly in 1981 when the Hamah massacres took place. The main aim and programme of the Syrian Ikhwan militant activists was to create a new generation capable of understanding the true meaning of Islam. At the same time, the Ikhwan has proved to be the most persistent and violent clandestine opposition to the government in recent Middle Eastern history. 36

Al-Jihad (Holy Struggle)

A more militant organisation which posed the gravest threat to the regime's survival in Egypt is Al-Jihad. The group derives inspiration from its leader, Mohammad Abdel Salam Faraq's work, *al Faridha al-Ghaeba* (The Hidden Commandment). The hidden commandment is the *Jihad* and hence the name given by the authorities to the group which assassinated President Sadat in 1981. Faraq derived his ideas from Abn Taymiyya (A.D. 1263-1328), a noted Islamic thinker of more than six centuries ago. Both pronounced the society of their respective times as an interlude in between the abode of peace (*dar al-Islam*) and the abode of war (*dar al-harb*). This in-between status means that the majority of people are basically good Muslims but they are living under 'non-Islamic laws and 'non-Muslim' or nominal Muslim rulers. The implication of this characterisation is that it is the duty (commandment) of good Muslim to fight their ungodly rulers and liquidate their laws. In Faraq's words: "The State is ruled by heathen laws despite the fact that the majority of its people are Muslims. These laws were formulated by infidels who compelled Muslims to abide

by them. Since they deserted the *jihad*, Muslims of today live in subjugation, humiliation, division and fragmentation. The Qur'an has aptly scolded them in the verse- "Though believers when it told to rise up for the sake of God, you hedge closer to the ground? Are you more content with earthly life than with the hereafter? The pleasures of the earthly life are little compared to that of the hereafter. If you do not rise up God will torture you most painful..." Thus, the aim of our group is to rise up to establish the Islamic state and restore Islam to the nation.... The means to this end is to fight against heretical rulers and to eradicate the despots who are no more than human beings who have not found those who can suppress them with the order of God almighty."38

This combatant spirit, combined with religions passion, has made Islamic militants quite deadly in their confrontation. The leaders have no illusions about a quick victory over the heathen state and its rulers. Nevertheless, they are willing to rise up in anger for the sake of God' *(Ghadhabah lillah)*. Their death in battle, or subsequent execution after trial, is akin to martyrdom that takes one right to heavenly paradise *(Al-Janna)*.39

38. Quoted in Ibid., p.652.
39. Ibid.
The programme of *al-Jihad* was set by Muhammad al-Faraq in *al-Faridha al-Ghaeba*. Faraq stressed the establishment of the Islamic state and the restoration of *Khilafah* as the duty of every Muslim. He argued that a true Muslim's duty is to struggle for the establishment of the Islamic state. *Jihad* is an imperative for every Muslim. Propagation of the Islamic state is not sufficient. The Muslim must prepare himself to struggle for the sake of God. The Islamic state, once established, will be indestructible because it is God's will. In addition, Islamic laws are neither deficient nor feeble and subjugate every corrupt person on the earth who goes against God's will. Furthermore, God's laws are all just and will be welcomed by everyone, including those who do not know Islam. The objective of *al-Jihad* was thus the establishment of an Islamic society i.e. one based on the adoption of and adherence to the *Sharia* (Law) as the basis of political and social life. All those who opposed the ordering of human existence on that basis were considered by *Al-Jihad* to be unbelievers to be struggled against. The list of these enemies thus included those of other religions (including *Ahl al-Kitab*, the Jewish and Christian people of the book), atheists, secularists, and Muslims who were integrated in contemporary Egyptian society (including the religious establishment).40

40. Ismael, n.8, p.119.

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In case of militant activities, al-Jihad group was by far the bloodiest and most deadly in its confrontation with the state. Despite the preventive arrest of hundreds of its members by the state in September 1981 it still had sufficient organisational capability to plan and successfully carry out the assassination plot on the life of President Sadat in October 1981.41 Despite a second round-up of its members in the aftermath of the assassination, the Jihad was still able to storm the main police headquarters in the governorate of Assyut and kill or wound tens of state security men. Some members have already been tried for direct involvement in the assassination of President Sadat receiving death sentences or varying terms of imprisonment.42 A second trial, involving 302 Jihad members, charged for the Assyut events and membership in an unlawful organisation, ended on 30 September 1984 with 110 convicted, receiving sentences ranging from two to forty years. In 1986, several attacks and bombing incidents were directed against night clubs, video shops, alcohol stores and taverns. In 1987, assassination attempts were made on the lives of two former Ministers of the Interior, Hasan Abu-Pasha and El-Nabawy Ismael, and a leading journalist,

41. Ibrahim, n.37, p.652.
42. Ismael, n.8, p.119.
Makram M. Ahmed. The first two were targeted by Islamic militants for their alleged role in ordering the torture of fellow Muslims' while in jail between 1981 and 1984. The third was singled out for his relentless smearing of Muslims groups in his editorials in the weekly magazine, al-Miswar. It took a few months before the Egyptian authorities were able to arrest some, but not all suspects, in August 1987 and charge them in November 1987. In the process, several skirmishes and shoot-outs took place, with a score of dead and wounded on both sides.

**Da'wa, (the Call)**

It is an Islamic group based in Iraq. In its religious sense, *Da'wa* is an invitation to human beings to believe in the true religion, Islam. In its political sense, it is an invitation to adopt the cause of Islam. In the late 1950s Iraqi *ulama* began to issue *da'wa* in both senses. Plans for the party were made by the *ulama* in Sayyid Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr's home in 1957. Shaikh Murtada al-'Askari assumed responsibility for organizing the educated young laymen willing to call their brothers to Islam. These men who

43. Ibrahim, n.37, p.651.
44. Ibid.
became the organisation's "hands" were invited to meet with the ulama in early 1958. Official religious sanction was given later that year. According to a special edition of Al-Jihad (the weekly newspaper of the Islamic movement of Iraq), Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiya was organised in the month of Rabia' al-Awwal A.H. 1377 corresponding to October 1957. A thirty-nine-page pamphlet containing several articles written by Sayyid Baqir al-Sadr for Sawt al-Da'wa, one of the main publications of the Da'wa party, was issued. In one of those articles Sayyid al-Sadr explained his choice of name for the organisation, saying 'da'wa' accurately expresses the group's mission of "calling the people to Islam" and "instructing the largest number of people possible in Islam". Baqir al-Sadr described the study circles as part of the first stage of the call to Islam, the second goal at this stage being "preparing the faithful and mobilizing (ta'bi'a) the ummah spiritually and intellectually. The instrumental acts by which the Da'wa party was to prepare and mobilize the ummah were publishing pamphlets, obligating each member and supervisor to attend

46. Ibid., p.32.
47. Ibid.
cell meetings, preaching, organizing celebrations, building libraries and schools, and attending scientific discussions and lessons in jurisprudence. Sayyid Baqir al-Sadr believed that the practice of Islam had deviated in the past, making it necessary "to separate religion from the customs and apprise the people of the true nature of religion and its role in life". The Mujtahids could correct deviations in traditional interpretation and practice through *ijtihad* (authoritative interpretation of Islamic law) thereby helping educated young Muslims to reconcile their faith on a rational basis. Sayyid al-Sadr stressed the need to exercise *ijtihad* properly, incorporating modern social and political possibilities and harmonizing the world of faith.48

Sayyid Baqir al-Sadr and the other reformist ulama sought a means by which they could reach out to modern educated laymen in order to enlist this important group in the cause of Islam. Reaching out required adopting more assertive methods and a language meaningful to educated young Muslims. The reformist clerics organised study circles, first among the ulama and then among the laity. Sayyid al-Sadr revolutionised thinking in Najaf by the respect he showed for the ability of educated lay people to understand religious law and by his acceptance of non-

48. Ibid.
seminarists in his classes. Young people embraced his idea that they could be religious scholars even though they were not turbaned clerics.

Leaders of Hizb al-Da'wa contacted leaders of the Iraqi Ikhwan al Muslimeen and the two groups agreed that an Islamic state should be set up in Iraq by means of Shi'i-Sunni cooperation and the creation of an Islamic awareness among the people. After a period of lobbying by proponents of the Islamic parties, the Court of Cassation overruled the government's refusal to license a religious party. The Islamic Da'wa party, now an amalgam of the two parties that had previously applied, was granted a licence in 1960. Ayatollah al-Hakim was the party's sponsor or guarantor and Nu'man Abdal Razzaq al-Samarrai, a Sunni layman, was its acting leader. The party's professed objective was to oppose "atheism and materialism."49

The clerics and lay members of Hizb al-Da'wa stepped up their programmes and activities to bring religious awareness among the people in 1963 and 1964. The activist clerical establishment engaged in a camouflaged series of conferences and lectures for the purpose of recruiting young people in the movement. Most of the meetings took place in Najaf, but

49. Ibid., p.36.
the Husainiya Al-Yasin in Kazymiya and Husainiya Al-Mubaraka in East Karada (Baghdad) were also sites for meetings. Potential recruits were known personally to the one who would "call" them to Islam. That meant that recruitment was along lines of established interaction. Callers recruited family members, classmates, and fellow soldiers. Only practising Muslims were considered for recruitment. Along with religious literature, callers offered potential recruits respect, making them realize that they and their families, as practising Muslims, were highly esteemed. The need for Muslims to meet the intellectual challenges of managing social change in congruence with Islamic beliefs was stressed, as was religious obligation.50

The organisational efforts to expand Hizb al-Da'wa beyond Najaf were delegated to specific disciples. Abd al-Sahib Dakhil (Abu'Isam) (d.1977) carried the responsibility for organising Da'wa in the universities. Shaikh Arif al-Basri (d.1977) became clerical guide to Da'wa members in Baghdad. Females were included in the new ministry by means of Sayyid Baqir al-Sadr's sister, Bint al-Huda, a recognised and respected 'alima (female religious scholar) who organised study circles for pious young women. Besides,

50. Al-Khatib, "Taghyir Ijtima'i" and Sawtal-Iraq al Thair", July 1988, pp.1-10.
Bint al-Huda authored eight books, the first of which, *Kalima wa Da'wa* (An Announcement and Summons), appeared in the early 1960s. She organised demonstrations against the arrest of her brother in 1979 and was hanged with him on April 8, 1980.51

The members of Da'wa were also active in the socio-religious affairs. In 1958 Ayatollah al-Hakim authorized the formation of *Jama'at al-'Ulama'* (Society of Religious Scholars) "to establish bridges between Islam and various segments of the umma, especially the educated strata and students". Shaikh Murtada al-Yasin, maternal uncle of Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, became the first leader of the *Jama'at*. Mujtahids accepted assignments to write reinterpretation on explanation of religious law on given subjects. *Jama'at al-'ulama'* established a variety of health, welfare and educational institutions in the manner of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.52

An early undertaking of the reformist ulama was the publication of Islamic periodicals and books aimed at both converting other ulama to activism and filling the void created in religious education by the demise of traditional

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52. Wiley. n.45, pp.33-34.
Islamic schools. Among the periodicals one was Al-Anwar' al-Islamiya (Islamic lights) published by the steering committee of Jama'at al-Ulama. A regular feature of Al-Anwar' was "Risalatona" (Our Message) written by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. Sayyid al-Sadr also wrote a series of books criticising non-Islamic ideologies and setting forth what is required for Muslims. In his books, he sought to expose the shortcomings of democratic capitalism, communism and socialism and to offer reasoned arguments for the superiority of Islamic ideology over all other ideologies.

With the adoption of militant activities, the Da'wa members divided into civilian and military wings. The civilian branches continued to concentrate on raising Islamic consciousness; the military wings added Mujahidin (fighters) to their tanks and undertook militant activities. The Mujahidin are combatant members of the various Islamic groups willing to sacrifice their lives rather than submit to unjust authority. They patterned themselves after Imam Hussein who "fought against the heretics, sacrificing himself for the principles of the Prophet". Leaders of the Islamic movement concluded that it would have to abandon mass demonstrations in favour of nonpeaceful means of protest. Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr wrote for Sawt al-Da'wa:

53. Ibid, p.54.
In the present situation, Islam needs not reform but revolution. The reformative calls that built religious schools and published books are now peripheral, although they served a good purpose. The main battle that Islam is fighting now is against its enemies. The schools and their curriculum, the newspapers and the magazines with their aims, and the radio stations, are all tools in the hands of the authorities. The only way to change the propaganda is to change the rulers. So our da'wa is a revolutionary one, an uprising to save the umma from its present corrupt situation.54

The militant activities of the Da'wa in Iraq took a new turn with the success of Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. In August 1979, a mujahid member of Da'wa, Dr. Ghazi al-Hariri, attempted to assassinate Saddam Hussein at Karama Hospital in Baghdad by holding explosives under his clothes. The attempt was foiled by Saddam's securitymen who found the explosives.

By the end of 1979, Da'wa's military wing, subsequently called the Shahid al-Sadr (Martyr al-Sadr) Force, was formed. During Ashura, November 1979, a Shi'i named Talib Alwan al-Alili, also known as Jabbar, opened fire on government security forces monitoring a Shi'i religious ceremony in Karbala. Four security agents were killed before the mujahid was captured by other government agents.

54. Ibid., p.55.
Afterwards, an expansion of government security forces was announced and arrests of Islamic activists escalated.\footnote{Ibid.}

The government continued its repressive policies against the Islamists in general and the Da'wa in particular. Finding it difficult to operate in Iraq these elements left the country and began their activities from outside, mainly Iran and the Lebanon. The migrant Muslim militants set up presses in Tehran and Beruit and organised underground transmission networks, in the government semi-government and military circles in Iraq with the collaboration of those whose cells had not been penetrated and had remained in the country.

In the wake of the execution of Ayatollah Syed Baqir al-Sadar and the following reign of terror in 1980, the Jama'at al-ulama al-Mujahid (Society of Militant clergymen) was formed outside Iraq under the leadership of Hojjatolislam Sayyid Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim. Following fresh executions and purges after another attack on President Saddam Hussein in July 1982, the Da'wa emigres announced in Tehran on 17 November 1982 the formation of Al-Majlis al-Aali lil-Thawra al-Islamiya fil-Iraq (Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq - SAIRI).

\footnote{Ibid.}
The establishment of the SAIRI was a major step towards preparing for a transitional government that could take eventual responsibility in Iraq. The Majlis co-ordinated the activities of different dissident Islamic groups of Iraq. Hojjitolislam Sayyid Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim, the chairman of the Majlis, called the Iraqi masses to overthrow the Bathist regime in Iraq.

In April 1987, the Da'wa cell, Shahid al-Sadr, staged an armed attack on Saddam's motorcade in Mosul. Saddam escaped but is said to have shed tears to learn that he was hated even in Mosul, in the Sunni Arab heartland near Tikrit. During the Iran-Iraq war, activists had hoped for a military coup in Iraq. The Da'wa spokesmen told in August 1986 that they had reason to believe "that an Islamic government could come about as a result of election allowed by a transitional military government in Baghdad."

The Da'wa was capable of engaging in militant activities in Iraq. The members of the organisation defend its cause for the glory of God. Those who issue the call to Islam have understood their religious obligation ahead (in time) of their Muslim brothers. More important point is that the Da'wa sought to bring Islamic practices in congruence with change and to bring Islamic clerics into the management of change in Iraq. In pursuit of Islamic
government, the reformist Shi'i ulama led Shi'is to abandon their traditional political quietism and involve themselves in politics and cooperation with virtuous Sunnis. The Da'wa is one of the prominent Islamic organisations in Iraq and 10 percent of its members are Sunnis.56

Ikhwan in Saudi Arabia

The Ikhwan movement of Saudi Arabia should not be confused with the Ikhwan al Muslimeen of Egypt. This movement emerged in the second decade of this century among the deprived tribes of the Najd region of Arabia. These were Wahhabi-inspired nomadic groups who organised themselves around the turn of the century in hujra (singular: hijra, from literary Arabic hijra), or agricultural and military colonies. They cooperated with the Saudis in unifying much of Arabia before the Saudis turned against them and suppressed their forces, especially in the major confrontation that occurred in 1929-1930. Since that date, the defeated tribes continued to harbour antagonistic feelings towards the Saudi royal family.57

56. Ibid.
In Saudi Arabia there is a trend of thought in religious circles which opposes the subservient role of the clerics to the lay establishment and is also critical of the regime's un-Islamic policies as well as its close relations with the Western countries particularly the United States of America. The Saudi government's measures to neutralize or eliminate the anti-government ulama and organisations did not succeed and the dissent came to the surface.

Early in the 1970s the Salafi movement became much active mainly after the establishment of the Islamic University in Medina. When Shaikh Aziz bin Baz become the Vice-Chancellor of this university with the help and support of the Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Mohammad Ibn Ebrahim al-Shaikh, he attempted to revive the Salafi movement. His organisation was named Jama'at al-Da'wa al-Mohtasebah. Through its well-organised cells known as Boyut al-Ikhwan, the Jama'at started its religio-political activities against the state ulama and un-Islamic policies of the regime all over the peninsula. The organisation also began publishing a journal named Al-Towhid from Dammam, the base of the Ikhwan. The Jama'at embraced students from the Islamic educational institutions, Law schools, universities, and other traditional institutes in Mecca, Riyadh and Tait. It found support among the National Guards and tribesmen especially
of Otaiba, Qahtan, and Yam tribes, which constituted the source of man power of the Guards. Significantly, the organisation also attracted a great number of Islamic sciences students from other Muslim countries like Kuwait. The UAE, Yemen, Egypt, Morocco and Pakistan.  

Popular protest and opposition to the existing Saudi regime grew much stranger after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Moral laxity and neglect of religion, inequitable distribution of wealth, rivalry between the new generation and the ruling elite, demands for participation in political and administrative decision making and freedom of speech as well as functioning of political parties were the main bones of contention. The November 1979 Mecca revolt by the students of Islamic institutions under the leadership of Juhaiman Otaiba and Mohammad al-Qahtani should be perceived and analysed in this background. The objective of the shrine takeover and revolt was to bring the Saudi monarchy to an end.

Prior to this revolt, a secret religious group was formed which included segments of the army. It distributed leaflets in the country calling on the royal family and the

state-paid ulama to follow Islam in its right form according to the teachings of Salafiyun.\(^59\)

Juhaïman's revolt was the extension of al-Ikhwan's movement. It started its activities in an organized manner around 1960s when the Saudi government set up the Islamic university in Madina in 1961. Juhaïman Otaiba and Mohammad al-Qahtani, leaders of the organisation went to the extreme when, along with other supporters, they revolted against the Saudi royal family and the regime-subservient ulama. Juhaïman declared in his statement that the Saudi rulers called upon the men of religion and knowledge that they must either agree with the government or remain silent, else they would be killed. He concluded that such suppressive policies of the government and the silence of the state-paid ulama on such a cause made him stand against both.\(^60\) Juhaïman exhorted the people to return to the fold of true Islam of Salaf and he accused the Saudi authorities and their mission ulama of violating the Islamic sharia's

Juhaïman's judgement about the subservient ulama was that "these people are not Imam because their Imamat is


\(^{60}\) Al-Haram Revolt, n.58, p.35.
false and an abomination to be repudiated. Further that they do not care for, or follow, religious instructions and common Muslims do not support them. 61 According to him they used religion as a means to perpetuate their legitimacy and to promote their self-interest. The broad objectives of Juhaiman's movement were to bring an end to the hereditary royal rule, to establish an Islamic value system based on Salafiya, to exterminate the state-paid subservient ulama, to stop oil export to the US, and to drive out all the foreigners from Saudi Arabia. 62

It is noteworthy that during the Juhaiman revolt, several ulama such as Shaikh Salih Mohammad Ibn Lahidan also encouraged the revolting group as part of their displeasure with the authorities. These disgruntled ulama also periodically vented their disapproval of particular government actions especially the increasing suppressive role of the Ministry of Justice. In their public sermons, they criticized the regime and encouraged militant activities for forcing a return to the "right path". 63

61. Ibid, pp.35-36.
62. Ibid, p.56.
The Mecca takeover of 1979 clustered around a revived Ikhwan nucleus which believed in a type of neo-Wahhabism and wanted to strike back at the Saudi society and the Saudi State. Several leaders of the faction were from Najdi nomadic tribes who were traditionally opposed to Al-Sauds and who continued to live in less-privileged regions where the benefits of the oil bonanza were scarce and where there was relatively little penetration of the Saudi state. The leader of the movement was Juhaiman al-Otaiba (born 1936) who was brought up according to bedouin traditions by a father who was deeply learned in tribal customs. His grandfather had been killed in the Sabla battle with the Saudis in 1929. He grew up when the memory of that battle was fresh among the Arabian tribes. In his late teens he joined the National Guards and rose to become a corporal. However, military discipline seemed to frustrate his fierce piety and his vocal opposition to the presence of non-Muslim Westerners in the kingdom's institutions (including the National Guard) and elsewhere. In 1972 he left the force after fifteen years' service. He enrolled at the University of Medina, an institution set up in 1961 by leading Egyptian Ikhwan al Muslimeen after they had convinced the Saudi king

64. *Al-Haram Revolt*, no. 58, p. 40.
that President Nasser was misusing Al Azhar and that an alternative centre of Islamic learning was sorely needed. At this university Juhaiman became a student of Abdul Aziz Ibn Baz, the rector since 1969, who was later to become the head of the Council of the Ulama. Shaikh Ibn Baz advocated a return to the letter of the Qur'an and the Hadiths, and decried innovation of any kind. Juhaiman imbibed Ibn Baz's teachings and applied them to the actions of the Saudi dynasty only to conclude that the Saudi rulers had deviated from the true path of Islam. Juhaiman's uncompromising stance towards the House of Saud created friction between him and Ibn Baz and led to his expulsion in 1974. 65

Accompanied by his followers Juhaiman returned to his native Qasim and began to preach along the lines of Shaikh Abdul Wahhab of the mid-eighteenth century. Juhaiman was a charismatic figure, courageous and a natural leader. He was also a popular poet and writer on Islam. He set up cells in numerous bedouin settlements in Qasim. His followers were inspired by militant piety, a recurring theme in Islam through the centuries. In 1976 he and his close followers moved to Riyadh. There he published a pamphlet, Rules of Allegiance and Obedience: The Misconduct of Rulers. In it, he attacked the Saudi rulers for their deviation from the

Sharia, their greed and corruption, misuse of the laws for their own benefits, and for mixing with atheists and unbelievers. Several of his followers were students of the Islamic university. Indeed, according to some sources, students represented about 80 percent of the nucleus of the neo-Ikhwan organisation.66

The ideological position of Juhaiman represented a neo-Wahhabi orientation. It believed that the puritanism of the original Wahhabism was now being tainted by the corruption of the House of Al-Saud and the self-indulgence of Saudi society under the oil bonanza. The xenophobia of the neo-Wahhabis was directed against the Christian ambassadors, experts and educators who attempted to 'routinise' Wahhabism through government organisations such as Al-Amr bil-Maruf, Al-Ifta, Al-Da'wa, and others, and sought cooperation from the official clerics whom Juhaiman called "Shaikhs with degrees, ranks and social pursuits."67

Juhaiman and Muhammad al Qahtani went ahead with their programme. After their followers had closed all forty-eight gates of the Ka'aba, Juhaiman delivered a speech in which he set out his programme. It was mandatory for true Muslims

66. Ibid.
to follow Prophet Muhammad's example of revelation, propagation and military struggle, he began. In the present circumstances, he continued, genuine Muslims must overthrow their present Saudi rulers who are deficient in Islamic attributes and had been forced upon the populace. In any case in Islam there is no place for kings or dynasties. A legitimate Muslim ruler must govern according to the Sharia. He must be a devout Muslim, originate from the Quraish tribe, and must be chosen by the Islamic ummah. None of these attributes applied to the Saudi monarchs. Islam must be grounded in the Qur'an and the Hadiths, and not on taqlid, blind emulation of the interpretations offered by the ulama, as was the practice in contemporary Saudi Arabia.

Believers must detach themselves from the present system by rejecting all official positions, he urged. The Mahdi will come from the House of the Prophet, through the lineage of Imam Hussein Ibn Ali, to counter impiety and taqlid, and to bring peace and justice to the believers. It is the duty of all true Muslims to establish an ummah which protects Islam from the unbelievers and refrains from courting non-Muslim aliens. In short, Juhaiman issued a call for the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and severance of ties with the unbelieving West. Qahtani and Juhaiman who claimed themselves as the soldiers of Imam Mahdi referred to the
tradition: "The Mahdi and his men will seek shelter and protection in the Holy Mosque because they are persecuted everywhere until they have no recourse but the Holy Mosque". 68

Undoubtedly, the Mecca event of 1979 was the severest shock that the Saudi dynasty had received in the half century since the 1929 Ikhwan militancy. It was significant that the revived Ikhwan led by Juhaiman and Qahtan challenged the deviation of King Khalid from true Islam and his alliance with the Americans just as the original Ikhwan had fought King Abdul Aziz for straying from the true faith and allying himself with the British. Participants in the Ka'aba take-over can be described as young and educated. The events had a wider significance. 69

Another Islamic organisation, the Islamic Revolution organisation of the Peninsula, established in 1975, carried out its activities against the government throughout the peninsula. This organisation which was led by the ulama opposed to the Saudi regime was an underground movement till 1979. But after the revolution in Iran it came to the surface. through its organs, Al-Thowra al-Islamiya in Arabic and Mecca Calling in English, the organisation an-

69. Ibid.
nounced its objectives. Its manifesto and declarations considered Muslims as a single ummah and called upon the Muslims to follow Imam Khomeini for achieving their goals. The objectives were to bring about total revolution, overthrow the regime, and establish an Islamic republic. In general, the leaders of this organisation accepted and adopted the Islamic Republic of Iran's belief and call that the Islamic nation and the oppressed people of the world must follow the model of Iran. The Islamic Revolution Organisation believed that there should be a single state in the Arabian Peninsula and it should include Saudi Arabia Yemen and Oman. It insisted that there should be freedom of faith expression, press and political organisation and activities, as well as the establishment of an independent judicial system. It also demanded a modern Constitution in which the power of the ruler should be limited and the rights and duties of the people must be clearly recognized.

It is noteworthy to add that the rank and file of opposition in Saudi Arabia grew with additional supporters.


from non-clerical segments. Most prominent among them was Mohammad al-Khilewi, First Secretary in the Saudi mission to the UN, who left his job in a huff and sought political asylum in the United States.  Another notable dissident was Shaikh Zaki Yamani, the former Minister of Oil. He articulated his criticism of the regime. His house in Jeddah reportedly became the haven for those religious leaders, businessmen and Saudi elite who were opponents of the regime and genuine concerned about the future of their country. Arab sources indicated that Yamani had gathered around him prominent Saudi ulama who are critics of subservient ulama and the royal family. These ulama unequivocally criticized the Saudi administration particularly the un-Islamic behaviour of the regime which, according to them, was totally contrary to the Salafism. They also pointed at the increasing financial crisis caused by the second Persian Gulf war in 1991. They further claimed that in Saudi Arabia political action and religious action are one and the same, and that their political movement against the regime was steeped in Islamic teachings and values.

72. Ibid.

73. The Times of India (New Delhi), 2 December 1994.
The Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) which is a Wahhabi organization and led by Saad Al-Faquh and Dr. Mohammad al-Massari, claim that Saudi Arabia is now in a "pre-revolutionary situation". The leaders of this organization who fled Saudi Arabia in April 1994 represent the moderate middle-class wing of the Islamic movement. The CDLR is a group of well connected and influential Wahhabis who are attempting to change the system in Saudi Arabia. Their activities are making an impact. In addition to giving interview, issuing press releases and publishing a weekly chronicle of the misdeeds of Saudi royal family, they run a virtual electronic guerrilla warfare centre. They penetrate the kingdom by sending 300 faxes a day all of whom are reprinted in their thousands and distributed throughout the Saudi Kingdom. The activities of the Saudi dissidents gained momentum with the emergence of armed struggle against the regime. In response to these developments Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz, Saudi Arabia's top state religious leader as well as other ulama, gave a religious decree that it was incumbent on the Saudis to destroy the faxes of CDLR and described the distribution of these faxes as a sin.

74. The Pioneer (New Delhi), 18 October 1994.
The CDLR argues that the royal Saudi family should implement Islamic system based on the Salaf. It claims that the kingdom's 4,000 princes were corrupt and had been abusing their powers. It demanded that there should be an independent parliament, political parties, trade unions, and free speech and expression. Prince Naif bin Abdul Aziz, Interior Minister, admitted that some criticisms were legitimate and the changes had been made accordingly. He, however criticised the distribution of open protest letters in public.75 The Prince added that these radical Islamic preachers and fundamentalists who were demanding for a stricter application of shari'a were harming the kingdom.76 The CDLR leader, Dr. Massari, insisted that the regime must be "swept away like dinosaus".

The close nexus between the opponent ulama and the moderate as well as the young Saudi generation particularly the Islamic activists has worried the regime and the West. Tapes of speeches of ulama such as Salman bin Fahd Al-Odeh and Shaikh Abdul-Rahman Al-Hawalli who were arrested by the regime's force were distributed throughout the peninsula.


In these tapes the incarcerated leaders exhorted the masses to mobilize against the un-Islamic royal family. The CDLR reported that in response to these developments the government arrested several dissident ulama, which in turn, led to increasing unrest in the peninsula. Safar al-Hewalli was very harsh in his criticism of the pro-Western Saudi policies, particularly on the stationing of the Western troops in Saudi Arabia during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War. He vehemently criticised and rejected the Fatwa (decree) of those ulama who tried to justify the invitation to the Western troops. He emphasised that the Western countries aimed at systematically subjugating the Muslims and reversing the Islamic awakening which the West considered as the most serious challenge to its interests. Even though he identified himself with Salafism his approach touched the states beyond Saudi Arabia's borders. Hewalli attacked the Saudi ruling family for its "Westernization and worldly greeds", and he further emphasised that this approach of the government totally contradicted the "concept of the state of faith" on which the foundation of the Saudi's lay. He said

77. Ibid.
that due to increasing corruption nothing of the Shari'a was left with us. 78

There are several other Islamic groups and associations in Saudi Arabia which are either dominated by ulama or well educated youths and business elites. These organizations, for instance the Jama'at al-Ulama al-Hijaz and the Saudi Islamic association in Europe etc, have the same view as that of radical ulama. They called upon the Saudi people to revolt against the regime and establish an Islamic government based on Shoura system (consultative system).

The Persian Gulf war in 1990-91 and the stationing of foreign troops in the holy land of Mecca and Madina angered residents of the region. Leaders of the Islamic groups and the masses expressed their anger and criticised the Saudi regime for allowing the non-Muslim troops to enter the holy land of Islam. They called for the immediate withdrawal of all Western and the US forces from the region. Their opposition to the subservient ulama and the un-Islamic behaviour of the regime germinated the seed of Islamic militancy in Saudi Arabia. The people, hearing official propaganda, mainly comprising lavish praise of the kings and princes,

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are fed up with the rosy side of the picture. They hated
the West particularly the Americans for their selfish ends,
double standards, hypocrisy and their policy against Muslims
and Islam. 79

The recent activities of the Islamists in Saudi Arabia,
particu larly the bombing of the communications headquarters
of the Saudi National Guard and the bomb attack on the U.S.
military base in Riyadh, indicated the increase in
activities of the Islamic organizations and radical ulama.
The Movement for Armed Jihad (Harakat at Jihad al-Musallah)
and Jama'at al-Ulama al-Hijaz which receive the support of
prominent ulama demanded the withdrawal of all Western
troops, particularly the 9000 US personnel from the holy
land, as well as return to the right path. 80

The 14 November 1995 bomb attack was a telling indica-
tion of the growing political tension, Islamic militancy and
increasing role of radical ulama in the kingdom. The tradi-
tional Wahhabi ulama confined their propaganda against the
regime to the issues such as increasing corruption, unem-
ployment, un-Islamic behaviour of the ruling family as well
as the economic crisis and the American presence in the
country.

79. Rizvi, n.75, pp. 18-21.
Opposition also emerged among the majority of the Sunni Muslims, and most perilous of all, among the Wahhabi, the Puritan, Sunni sub-set to which many rich merchants, army officers, civil servants and the royal family itself belong.\textsuperscript{81} Like the Shah of Iran, the Saudi rulers, instead of attempting amelioration of the political, economic, social, cultural and religious problems of the people, turned to silence the opponents by strong arm methods. The approach seemingly proved counterproductive.

The billeting of American military forces and advisers on the Saudi soil intensified disquiet among the ulama. The policy of buying off discontent is no more effective mainly due to increasing influence of the ulama who openly opposed the regime. There is a growing chorus of militant Islamic disaffection against the ruling family which has been occasionally voiced in mosques.\textsuperscript{82}

\textbf{Hizbullah}

The formation of \textit{Hizbullah} in Lebanon was clearly related to the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and to Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon. In fact until the

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{82} \textit{The Statesman} (New Delhi), 15 November, 1995.
arrival of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards who numbered around 1,000 in June 1982 ostensibly to fight Israel and made their headquarters in the city of Ba'albek, Hizbullah had previously existed simply as an idea in the writings of Muhammad Husain Fadhlallah. In the closing paragraphs of his major political work, *Al-Islam wa Mantiq-al-Quwwa* (Islam and the Logic of Force), finished in May 1976, Fadhlallah had expressed the hope that his work would establish the basis for the formation of an organisation like Hizbullah.\(^83\) Although some leaders of Hizbullah deny that it is 'a party in the ordinary sense of the word' it is a group of mobilized people working within the parameters of the directive issued by the leader (*al-Qa'id*) i.e. the Jurist.\(^84\) It is well organised on both the national and local levels. There are seven specialised committees each dealing with a specific subject matter such as ideology, finance, politics, information, military affairs, social affairs, and judicial affairs. The consultative council and the specialised committees are replicated in the three

\(^{83}\) Ayubi, n.35, p.100.

\(^{84}\) Marius Deeb, "Shia Movements in Lebanon: Their Formation; Ideology; Social Basis and Links with Iran and Syria", *Third World Quarterly* (London), Vol.10, no.1, January 1988, p.692.
regions in which *Hizbullah* operates, namely, Beirut and its southern suburb, al-Biq'a, and the south (*al-Janub*)

The leader of *Hizbullah* in Lebanon is Sheikh Muhammad Husain Fadhlallah. He is a descendant of a family of clergymen from Ainata, a village near Bint Jubail in Southern Lebanon. Fadhlallah studied under Ayatollah Abul Qasim al-Khui in Najaf and returned to Lebanon to live in the Naba slums from where he was evicted along with the rest of the slum's Shi'i community by the Christian militia of the Lebanese Front in July 1976. By 1983 Fadhlallah had become the leading political and religious figure among the Shi'i militants. He utilised underground organisations such as the Islamic Jihad (*al-Jihad al-Islami*) which was the code name for *Hizbullah* when it was engaged in secret militant activities. By 1984 he was regarded as one of the three most prominent Shi'i clergymen in Lebanon. The other leaders of *Hizbullah* are Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, the vice-President of the Higher Shi'ite Islamic Council, and the Shi'i Mufti, Abd al-Amir Qabalan. By 1985 Fadhlallah had become an Ayatollah, addressed by his followers as *my Lord* or *Master* (*Mawlana*). There is no doubt that Fadhlallah is the foremost ideologue as well as the organiser of *Hizbullah*.  

85. Ibid.

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the sole leader or ideologue for there are others such as Ibrahim al-Amin, Subhi al-Tufaili and Abbas al-Musawi who disseminate the ideology of Hizbullah and who also run the day-to-day activities of the organisation. It is interesting to note that all these leaders are clergymen and that they all originated from the Ba'albek and Zahla regions of the Bekaa. Ibrahim al-Amin is from Nabi Ayla, a village in the Zahla region. He studied theology in Najaf, and before founding Hizbullah he represented Amal in Tehran, at present he is the official spokesman of Hizbullah. Subhi al-Tufail hails from Brital in the Ba'albek region. He studied theology at Najaf and Qom and was a student of the late Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. Abbas al-Musawi comes from Nabishit in the Ba'albek region. He studied at Najaf where he was also a student of Baqir al-Sadr. The only leader of Hizbullah who is not a clergymen is Husain al-Musawi who heads Islamic Amal which he regards as part and parcel of the generic Ummat Hizbullah. Husain al-Musawi was a former school teacher and the former official spokesman of Amal until June 1982. After that he parted and formed his Islamic Amal in the Ba'albek region. His power is confined to the Ba'albek and Zahla regions.

The Hizbullah's programme and outlook approximate most closely with those of Ayatollah Khomeini's vision. The
first programme of Hizbullah, following 'the Imam Khomeini line (Khat al- Imam Khomeini) is the imperative struggle against imperialism in all its forms followed by the stand of "No-East and No-West, only Islam'. Hizbullah follows Ayatollah Khomeini's thought in believing that all disasters that have befallen Muslim countries can be traced to foreign imperialists and in particular to the USA. Quoting Ayatollah Khomeini, the Hizbullah maintains the view that the original objective of the imperialist countries is to destroy the Holy Qur'an and obliterate it and Islam and the Muslim Ulama (leadership), and their plan is to keep the Islamic countries backward and, in the name of encouraging education, they have suppressed religious schools. Not unrelated to the first programme, the complete political, economic and legislative unity of all Muslims has been a central goal in Ayatollah Khomeini's thought and this is only possible when an Islamic state is established.

One of the most crucial programmes of Hizbullah, following the Imam's line, is the position of the Muslim ulama in the political transformation envisaged by Ayatollah Khomeini. Since the Shi'i ulama have kept their independence vis-a-vis the political authorities of Iran and else-

86. Ibid.
where they can not be held responsible for the actions of rulers and tyrants. They have been closer to the masses of the downtrodden who, in turn, have supported the ulama.\textsuperscript{87}

The vision of the Twelver Shi'is has made their ulama more committed to fight against oppression, exploitation and imperialism. Ayatolla Khomeini denounced in particular what he called the "Sultan Jurists" (Fuqaha al-Salatin) who take orders from rulers and tyrants and render religion subservient to mundane power. According to him the pious and fully conscious man of religion (alim) is the most important instrument of social change. Collectively, the ulama constitute the vanguard of the Islamic ummah (Community). Imam khomeini's conception of the Shi'i ulama is not unlike the role of the communist party in Lenin's thought as the vanguard of the working class that would lead the masses to make the revolution. On the basis of teachings of Imam Hussain the Shi'i ulama play the same role in leading the masses to triumph and the eventual establishment of the Islamic government.

Another significant tenet in the ideology of Hizbullah similar to the ideas of Imam Khomeini is that of the Governance of the Just Jurist (Hukumat al-Faqih al-Adil).

\textsuperscript{87} Al-Ahd, 57, 25 July 1985. Al-Ahd is the most prominent publication of Hizbullah (Lebanon).
The Rule of the Jurist (Vilayat al-Faqih) has not been discussed in Sunni jurisprudence as it confines itself either to ba'ya (process of selection) or al-Shura (consultation). Only Shi'i jurisprudence has dealt with the Rule of the Jurist. The only disagreements among the Shi'i jurists, according to Hizbullah, have been with respect to how wide are the powers granted to the Jurist in his rule.

Like other militant Islamic organisations, Hizbullah has a broad social base. Its organization shows a sophisticated and close-knit structure that has made it capable of engaging in militant activities with tremendous success. In June 1985, the escalating attacks on Israeli forces in Southern Lebanon by the members of Hizbullah and others led to the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon. In fact, the stronghold of Hizbullah in Lebanon lies in the region that includes Ba'albek, Budayy, Brital, Nabishit, Shamistar, Tamnin, Niha and Ah al-Nahri. The region is adjacent to the Syrian border and since June 1982 the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards have been stationed there. The other regions where Hizbullah has support are the southern suburbs of Beirut and certain important villages and towns in the regions of Aqdiyat, Sidon, Tyre and Nabatiya, a kind of a triangle that extends from Ghaziya

88. Ibid.
south of Sidon to Bazuriya, east of Tyre and to Jibshit West of Nabatiya.\(^{89}\)

The emergence of Islamic organisations received special attention not only in the Islamic movement as such but also in the Islamic world because of its potential impact on the whole world. The actions and programmes of the Islamic organisations exposed the vulnerability of the regimes in the region and challenged the interests of several major external powers. They presented coherent and explicit analysis of the ills of contemporary social, economic and political life and offered equally viable reforms through which the problems could be contained and overcome. A major breakthrough was achieved in the Islamic movement with the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979.

It must be kept in mind that the Islamic movement is on the defensive. Its actions and programmes are aimed at not only converting the beliefs but to defend the Muslim communities in multi-ethnic states where they are perceived to be under threat. The Islamic movement is reformist. Its aim is to change society by changing government. It is the governments which have undermined Islam and introduced un-Islamic ways. The militant Islamic organisations in almost

\(^{89}\) Abu - Amar, n.15, p.5.
every Islamic country are fighting their own governments. They believe that Islam lost its pre-eminence because it absorbed too many foreign elements which corrupted it. If these corrupting elements can be removed and Islam restored to its pristine state then the perfect society can be created based on the Qur'an, the Hadiths and the Sharia.

The activities of Islamic organisations cannot be branded as terrorist or extremist. They are the vanguard of Islam as well as Muslim countries. They aim at eliminating ignorance and dynastic rule, vulgarisation by Western culture, Western puppet regimes as well as exploitation of indigenous resources and natural treasurers by foreign companies. This path was not conceived as simply being a narrow, spiritual one. Rather, Islam was seen as representing an all-encompassing system of guidance in social, economic and political conduct.