The world political events of 1989-91, what I call a geopolitical transition, provided a severe test to all existing political analyses, and Geopolitical models of Land and Sea power are no exception. Geopolitics is one of the 'Grand theories' of international relation's. Geopolitical model has a close affinity with the Realist approach to International relations, which maintains that all thinking about international relations must begin with a recognition of the factor of power. Geographical factors or variables are an important part of the power equation. Geopolitical models are constructed, to draw attention to the importance of certain geographical patterns in political history. It is a theory of spatial relationships and historical causation. From it explanations have been deduced which suggest the contemporary and future political relevance of various geographical conceptulaisations.

'In nearly all international transactions involving some element of opposition, resistance, struggle or conflict, the factors of location, space and distance between the interacting parties have been significant variables. This significance is embodied in the maxim, 'Power is Local'. That is to say, political
demands are projected through space from one location to another upon the earth's surface.¹ (SPROUT, 1960; 145).

Changes that have occurred in transport and weapon technology do not affect this basic point. This is to say that the geographical environment determines the objectives or strategies of the foreign or internal policies of a particular state. States do not find themselves within a geographical straitjacket, instead, geography or geographical configurations present opportunities for policy makers and politicians. This was recognised by the geographical theorist, Sir Halford Mackinder wayback, in 1890:

The course of politics is the product of two sets of forces, impelling and guiding. The impetus is from the past, in the history imbedded in a people's character and tradition. The present guides the movement by economic wants and geographical opportunities. Statesmen and diplomatists succeed and fail pretty much as they recognise the irresistible power of these forces² (Mackinder, 1890:84).

It is from choices made by policy makers that political importance or relevance is attached to geographical configurations or particular geographical


locations. This reflects the nature of politics as a decision-making process. In this process the geographical factors which influence politics are a product of policy makers selecting particular objectives and attempting to realise them by the conscious formulation of strategies.

The present work examines the nature of geographical conceptualizations, in this exciting transitional phase of world order and the impact and relevance of geopolitical theory along with technological advances on balance of power. From it explanations have been deduced, which suggest the contemporary and future political relevance of various geographical conceptualisations.

Chapter I spells out the aims and objectives of this study, and particular attention paid to elucidating, the literature survey, methodology and the structure of the study.

The geographic relationship of politics have been a subject of continuing interest, among scholars at least from the time of the early greeks. With the arrival of the columbian ear, sea-faring nations had begun to establish distant colonial footholds, transport and communication were becoming faster, and the world was rapidly shrinking into a single family of diverse nations. The geographer's perspectives were changing accordingly, and by the time of Ritter
and Humboldt, geographer’s study. This changed, geographical perspective had begun to be reflected in the writings of strategists by the end of the nineteenth century.

The main aim of this study has been to argue that while the geographical environment, does not define the choices of geopolitical strategist, it move the less provides an important conditioning influence in form of policies. Geographical conceptualisations are like the board of chess game. The theory examined had an influence, that transcended long time period. As mentioned above, certain geopolitical perceptions have mailed the perceptions of policy makers, and have been the framework within which strategic choices have been made.

Geography is no doubt the basis of political geography and geopolitics. The excitement of geography’s academic revival the quantitative revolution in the late 1950’s and 1960’s modified the subject and its influence was felt on all the subdisciplines of geography. Theories and models were developed to have an indepth knowledge. Chapter II of this study focuses on model building in different subdisciplins and their theoretical aspect. This resulted in a new generation of geographers with a collective approach. The chapter appears to belittle mish mash of models of various subdisciplines of geography therefore
incoherent in its final product. Chapter II the weakest chapter is undoubtedly the one on geographical models. The same old traditional models were treated out reflecting no dearth of original geographical research in the area for many decades.

However to integrate the wide range of geographical models I decided upon the chapter III and IV by combining the subject matter of geopolitics with the theoretical perspective.

This simple insight, places geopolitical models back at the centre of the study. From the historical point of view geopolitical models have three main branches land sea and air. Among them land based geopolitical study is the oldest and goes back to the dawn of civilization. Geopolitician of the last part of the nineteenth century tried to integrate land and sea geopolitics into one. The most nature expression of this school of thought is to be found in the writings of Halford J. Mackinder, Spykman and Mahan. But in attempting to integrate land and sea geopolitics into one system some writer laid more emphasis on sea and others on land. Admiral Mahan and Spykman belonged to the first category and German geopoliticians like Haushofer to the Second.
More than anyone else, Mahan is responsible for establishing modern versions of the thesis that seapower is the primary determinant of national and global power. Mahan was the first to distinguish between sea powers and landpowers and to analyze their different roles in world history. He argued that the worlds greatpowers, had been typical sea powers. Especially advantageous according to Mahan, was an insular location a favourable location vis-a-vis other powers, defensible coastlines and hinterlands and control over key outlying Land bases. Land was not unimportant for Mahan, but in the symbiosis between landpower and seapower, the latter dominated. The maintenance of seapower, however required a series of land bases around the world from which, seapower could be extended beyond the immediate seas, bordering a global power.

Mahan proposed, an American and British alliance that could rule the seas and oceans of the world. It would provide a counterweight, against the landpowers that controlled most of Eurasia. The result would be a stable balance of power. Mahan’s influence on American foreign policy was the strongest at the time of the william McKinley (1897- 1901) and Theodore Roosevelt (1901-9) administrations. Writing at the high tide of imperialism, Mahan also influenced the policies of Germany, England and Japan. Mahan’s popularity, had a lot to do with timing. In the just place, his concern was traditionally geopolitical, emphasizing the geographical aspects of political and military expansion.
Mahan's geopolitics fused all the expansionist impulses of the later nineteenth century.

There are many possible criticisms of Mahan's theses. In the first place air power and then atomic diplomacy clearly circumscribed the importance of seapower, restricting its superiority at best to regional and conventional disputes. The shift from sea-based geopolitics was an evolution in geopolitical theories from Mahan to MacKinder, from seabased to land based conceptions of national power.

Though air power developed rapidly after the first World War and its growing influence was felt at a tremendous rate in the second world war, yet no system of geopolitical thought on air was developed till the second world war. It was Deseversky who wrote about the critical role of air power in global strategy. No doubt, during the war, Mackinder did point out the growing influence of airpower in geopolitics, but it was after the second world war and with the mention of nuclear air power that it became important enough.

Focus is also laid on the impact of science and technology on the pattern of global geopolitical growth. This most geopolitical hypothesis need to be updated by the march of events. Perhaps the most serious defect in geopolitical
theorising has been the most universal failure of the theorists to anticipate and allow for the rate of technological and other changes.

Central to this work is the ‘Heart land - Concept’ of the realist tradition of International relations, focused in the IV chapter. Mackinder’s original presentation of his model, is a very broad conception of world history. Basically he identifies central Asia as the pivot - area of history from which horsemen have dominated Asian and European history, because of their superior mobility, Mackinder considered in the ‘Post-Columbian’ era new transport technology, particularly the railways, would redress the balance back in favour of land based power and the pivot area would reassert itself. The pivot area was defined in terms of a zone not accessible to sea power and was surrounded by an inner crescent in mainland Europe and Asia and an outer crescent in the Islands and continents beyond Eurasia.

What had this to do with current (1904) power politics? Well, at its simplest this model can be interpreted as a historical geographical rationalization for the traditional British Policy of maintaining a balance of power in Europe so

3 ‘..... but it was as Remarkable a Feat for Russia to Place an Army of more than a Quarter of a Million men Against the Japanese in Manchuria in 1904 at a Distance of 4,000 miles by rail’. H.J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, London: Constable, 1919, p.147.
that no one continental power could threaten Britain. In this case the policy implications are to prevent Germany allying with Russia to control the pivot area and so to command the resources to overthrow the British empire. Mackinder’s message in 1904⁴ was that Britain is more vulnerable than before to the rise of a continental power. British foreign policy needs revision to accord with the new post columbian situation to supplement a revised trade policy.

In his 1919⁵ revision of this world model he redefines central Asia as the ‘heartland’ which is longer than the original pivot area. This is based on a reassessment of the penetrative capabilities of sea powers. Nevertheless the same basic structure remains and the fear of German control of the Heartland is still central. In fact the is much more explicit in his advice as given in his famous dictum:

Who rules East Europe Commands the Heartland
Who rules the Heartland Commands the World Island
Who rules the World Island Commands the World.⁶

(The world-Island in Eurasia plus Africa consisting of two-thirds of the world’s lands). This message was specifically composed for world statesmen at

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⁴ op.cit., 1904.
⁵ op.cit., 1919.
⁶ op.cit., 1943.
versailles who were redrawing the map of Europe. The emphasis on east Europe as the strategic route to the Heartland was interpreted as requiring a strip of buffer states to separate Germany and Russia. These were created by the peace negotiations but proved to be ineffective bulwarks in 1939.

Mackinder’s 1943 revision is more comprehensive. It reflected the contemporary short-term alliance of Russia, Britain and America and posited them together as Heartland and ‘Midland Ocean’ (North Atlantic) to control and suppress the German danger between them. This is a longway from the grand history and basic materialist strategic thinking behind his original world model.

Mackinder’s ideas on global strategy have been so much a part of modern strategic thinking that a number of writers have presented modified variants of his thesis. Nicholas J. Spykman (1893-1943) of the University of Yale’s geopolitical ideas were identical with Mahan’s but his basic inspiration came from Mackinder.

Although he was influenced, by the Heartland theory of Mackinder, he questioned its validity. He was sceptical of the Heartland, becoming the centre of the world’s power potential at least in the immediate future. The reason for this skepticism, was the geographical limitations of Heartland, its adverse
climatic conditions, low agrarian productivity etc. He believed that the position of Soviet Central Asia would suffer incalculably in the event of the industrial development of India and China.

He considered the Rimland of Eurasia more important than Heartland. He suggested that the Eurasian coastlands region comprising maritime Europe, the middle East, India, South East Asia, and China (i.e. Mackinder’s marginal crescent) held the key to world domination, because of its large population, rich resources, and the use of interior sea lives. From this he drew a conclusion which was just the opposite of Mackinder’s:

Who Controls the Rimland Rules Eurasia
Who Rules Eurasia Controls the Destinies of the World.7

In his analysis of Eurasia, Spykman recognised great Britain and Japan as political and military centres of power outside the Rimland, off the shores of western Europe and Eastern Asia respectively. Africa and Australia were offshore continents, former was related to the southern shores of Eurasia by the European Mediterranean sea, and the latter was linked to the South-eastern shores of Eurasia by the Asiatic Mediterranean sea. The power potential of these two continents was limited.

7 N.J. Spykman (1944), The Geography of the Peace New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co.
Spykman described the United States as an entity surrounded by the land masses of Eurasia, Africa and Australia. But it is separated from the power centres of Europe and Asia by the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. All these continents together, were about equal, to the new world in their output. But they had an area two-and-a-half-times as large, and a population ten times as great as those of the New World. Spykman, therefore, held that the main political objective of the United States, in war as well as in peace, should be to prevent the unification of the power centres in the old world against the United States.

Spykman felt that France was not strong enough to contain Germany, but that the Soviet Union could be the mightiest land power in Europe. He, however, feared that a unified Rimlands would be a menace, both to the Soviet Union and to the United States. Therefore, to forestall such an eventuality, he proposed an alignment of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom to preserve world peace. The main object of his theory was to promote world on the basis of twofold policy: maintenance of a balance of power in Eurasia and the Co-operation of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain in an effective security system.
Mackinder has been variously criticized for simplifying history and not identifying the problem related to the heartland its, extremes of climatic condition. He overlooked the rising levels of transport and weapon technology. The effects of conventional cartography, such as the mercators projection. This projection exaggerates distance and distorts direction at an increasing rate, moving north to south from the equator. The problem which the decision makers face is to decide where the distortion is least dysfunctional and where accuracy is absolutely essential. Yet there was a horde of new Mackinderines and this geopolitical model was used throughout the nineteenth century.

The last Chapter V relates to the relevance of the Heartland concept and its utility in the present world order. New order, it has been argued here that geopolitical theory of Mackinder has been of continuing relevance to international relations. It has been perceived that the political significance of the geographical configuration of continents and ocean is still relevant. Inspite of the possibility to project terrific fire power over great distances, and changes that have occurred in transport and weapons technology. What this geopolitical theory attempts to underline is that political predominance is a question not just of having power in the sense of resources but also of the structure of the field within which that power is exercised.
However, probably the most famous of all statements of locational significance on a global scale, ‘Mackinders Heartland theory’ has appeared to possess, perhaps with some justification an area of permanence. Its influence on Hitler’s wartime strategy of key concept ‘lebensarum’ (which interpreted Germany’s problem as being due to unfair and confirming boundaries. The solution was expansion) was admitted and crucial, and Mackinder’s ghost could even be encountered in the corridors of the Pentagon. This idea was ‘Caught-on’ with a wide public and since the region spot lighted as USSR is situated entirely inside Mackinders Heartland, his basic strategic thinking behind his original world model became far more relevant for the other powerful nations and geopoliticians.

The date of this oracular utterance is significant. The year 1904 saw the high watermark of the Russian Empire after several centuries of continuous extension of control over the ‘Pivot-Area’. The ‘Empires’ control had spread almost to the gates of Peking as well as to the northern approaches to India and the eastern approaches to maritime Europe. Russia had become the sinister ‘bogyman’ to the British and, indeed, seemed to present a growing threat to their sea empire.'
Other changes in the world power balance were brought to a head by world war I, notably the relative decline of British power and the rapid rise of the United States. Techniques of support transport and warfare were transformed with some implications for the validity of Mackinder’s area. For instance, more than half the heartland was originally included because it drained to the frozen ocean. However, since the pioneering of the Northern Sea route in 1932, and the subsequent development of atomic-powered ice-breakers, the Arctic coast has assumed a rather less negative face, in fact, a considerable summer traffic plies to and fro between the Urenisey and the Atlantic margins. Air power had become crucial by world war II, but Mackinder claimed that this in no way invalidated his thesis, since air power depends absolutely on the strength of its home base. This is certainly a point, but it might be said, that air power is able to achieve mass penetration into the Heartland, which sea power, equally dependent on its own land base, is hardly able to do. This change has been underlined strongly with the arrival of nuclear bombs and intercontinental missiles.

All the same, it would be wrong to imagine that the missile age has in some way, neutralized the strategic advantages or disadvantages of particular areas or nations. Clearly, countries with a large area, a dispersed population, and also an interior ‘Fastness’ unusually faraway from hostile bases, are even
today relatively less vulnerable than those, with out these assets. But the disparity has certainly ceased to be absolute, if, indeed it ever was. Since world war II, Mackinder’s Heartland theory has been a keystone tenet of the concept of the nuclear deterrent, developed in order to counter, the assumed soviet geopolitical advantage.

The geographical scope of Mackinder’s model is more as far as international political system is concerned. It is global from the beginning. This is not just a matter of geopolitical definition. The relates to how the role of Britain is interpreted. For Mackinder by taking over the communist ideology in the neighbouring East Europe Russia became the centre of a global system and hence a world power. For Mackinder Russia operated only on the fringes of his system and developed a ‘Worldo Outlook’. His world system was originally a European world economy and became global, in scope, only about 1900.

The original thesis, had warned of the strategic superiority of land power in the twentieth century, Mackinder’s final (1943) work had been much less pessimistic from a sea - power viewpoint. By the end of the war it was clear that in effect the Heartland could be equated with the USSR. Germany’s failure to defeat Russia had enhanced Mackinder’s reputation. From this point onwards there existed a general world model which was called the heartland model
involving landpower (the USSR) separated by a contact zone (the Rimland).

There were minor variations in terms of definitions and emphasis but this three tier structure originally derived from Mackinder's 1904 paper persisted into the post-1945 era. It survived a barrage of criticism- Mackinder's initial emphasis on railways seemed partly antiquated in the age of intercontinental ballistic missiles - but in a sense it does not matter whether the mode is an accurate representation of reality. What does matter is that enough people believed it to be true. Therefore the Heartland-Rimland thesis could become an ideological tool of US foreign policy makers.

The application of Mackinder's ideas so many years after they were first propounded is not due to his being some sort of prophetic genius. It relates, instead, to the fact that the period 1890 to post world-war illustrates well, how politics is a medium through which geographical configuration and geographical patterns of political history may become relevant, for the geographical scope of strategic policy rapidly expanded. Political models can be interpreted as fulfilling the role of a policy science. Policy makers wished to achieve a particular objective. For those objectives to be fulfilled, then certain geopolitical theories, had to be taken into consideration as they were part of the most effective available means of realising the objective under the existing political circumstances.
The world was reduced to two superpowers with the onset of the cold wars and the Heartland thesis produced an easy way of conceptualizing the new situation. The original hydrology basis of pivot areas and Mackinder's concern for German expansion were conveniently forgotten and we were left with a model in which the enemy the USSR, had control of the 'Fortress' - the Heartland policy was formulated accordingly 'Containing the fortress' i.e. if the former USSR is a fortress then the way to deal with a fortress is to surround it and seal it in. In policy jargon this is known as contentment, with the ring of post war anti-Soviet alliances in the Rimland as the seal - Nato in Europe CENTO in West- Asia and SEATO in East Asia. Where the seal come mistruck, intervention was necessary and the Rimland contains the majority of major and minor conflicts in the post - 1945 era - Berlin, Korea, the middle east and Vietnam being the major conflicts. All this activity is premised on preventing, Soviet domination of the world-Island. Walter (1974) makes a very cogent argument that the policy of nuclear deterrence would never have developed but for the Heartland theory. Quite simply, once it was accepted that the USSR had the superior geopolitical position then nuclear weapons became the necessary salvation of the west. A nuclear arsenal will act as a counter balance to Russia's basic strategic advantage, perhaps, the most momentous foreign policy decision.

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of all time - to generate what was to become the nuclear arms race - is based upon a geopolitical theory which nearly all geographers and political scientists reject. It appears that the importance of mackinder's ideas have not diminished with time, 'Cold War', was, another stage in the great game, but with a new team leaders, the USA. It is hardly surprising therefore, that the geographer who codified the nineteenth century, great game as world strategic model, should have a second 'Life' as a major geopolitical theorist in the cold war. mackinder’s Heartland thesis concerning the importance of the world Island and the inevitability of an era of Seppower USA versus landpower (USSR) conflict, derived a new resonance with the coming of the new world order. The British imperialist Sir Halford Mackinder’s two world’ finally came into being, as the cold war geopolitical world order.

It is in the first phase of the cold war that the geopolitical codes of mackinder become clear and relevant. For the USSR, Eastern Europe is paramount\(^9\) (Mccauley, 1993). Since it had been invaded twice through this region in the First twenty five years of its existence. The soviet state insisted on political control of a ring of buffer states from the Black sea to the baltic. The other two powers had agreed to a soviet special interest in this region, although not necessarily in the form it finally took. The cold war began with the division

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of Europe into two blocs. The Truman Doctrine promising military help to defeat communism was followed later, in 1947 by the Marshall plan, through which US capital was made available, to reconstruct Europe, since the USSR refused to allow states, it controlled to accept such funds, the operation of the plan in 1948 effectively divided Europe into two economic regions.

The influence of East Europe on Heartland and vice-versa can again be confirmed by the revolution in Eastern Europe in 1989. The USSR indicated that it would no longer employ force to keep its sphere of influence, and the communist regimes collapsed one after another, starting in Poland and ending in Romania - the only collapse accompanied by major violence on 9 Nov. 1989 the Berlin Wall was breached by the new forces: this stands as these symbolic event of the end of the cold war, leading to the unification of Germany, *Which again revives the English Nightmare of Mackinder's Heartland*. Although the velocity of economic and political integration will be less, where there will be difficulty in defining a common geopolitical strategy, but all the same USA’s demand of including Germany in the UN security council again rings the cherub of Mackinder (1904). And finally, as an after shock of what the media had termed, a *Geopolitical Earthquake* of the Heartland (USSR) in 1991. This scenario is not necessarily to be believed. The nature of international politics as a system means that structures run down and have to be reconstructed. All
systems suffer a loss of order and survive by cyclical developments. Mackinder’s model describes particular expression of this general process. It is on the basis of these... mechanisms that changes have occurred in Mckinder’s global system. A leaner Russian state retaining a large military capacity may yet attempt to reassert past political influence and power. Charles Levinson¹⁰ (1980) provides a wealth of evidence to expose what he terms ‘the ideological facade’ of USSR’s geopolitics. The following information, that he compiled gives ample indications of this anti capitalist country. He shows that the largest forty multinational corporation all had cooperative agreements with one or more of the eight east European states with communist regimes - thirty four of them with the Soviet Union itself. 151 corporation from fifteen different countries which had offices in Moscow. Levinson found 170 acknowledged multinational joint ventures by the USSR in nineteen western countries. It is not surprising therefore that by 1977 one-third of USSR exports were with eastern countries. Levinson’s conclusion is that although it was international politics which makes the news, it was these crucial economic transactions which steered international politics. Hence detente followed trade, and not vice versa. The implication of this is that mechanism of power are not economic or political but both Mackinder’s model does nothing to clarify the inter-relations between political processes and the massive economic changes occurring at the very same time. Clearly, we have

uncovered the facade created by the heartland region by the Pepsi Cola
Corporation’s deal to sell cola drink in Russia and to market Vodka in the
west—hence the title of Levinson’s book, ‘Vodka Cola’. And if this goes on there
are all possibilities of bringing heartland back into our geopolitics; because
world outlook was an important criterion for Mackinder as once powerful, the
urge to make global order comes, immediately in national thinking.

Response to such criticism has been to find whether the heartland concept
of mackinder is still relevant in the present world order. But the new ‘order’ is
not predetermined, it is a political process whose trajectory will depend on
economic, political and social practices. And so we return to the contemporary
search for a new world order. After a transition, a new world incorporating new
geopolitical assumptions is in the making, but it is not yet constructed and we
cannot be certain what it will look like.

Galtung\(^1\) (1979) presents a model portraying the world as ten
‘Super-States’. The model is arranged in approximate geographical order so that
it can express both east-west and north-south political conflicts. The complete
list of super states now read United States plus Canada, European community
plus the rest of western European, soviet Union plus eastern Europe; Japan

Africa, Middle -East, China, India plus the rest of South-Asia; South-East Asia with oceania; and finally Latin America.

The key point that Galtung is making here is that there has been an important tendency in Geopolitics for the growth of larger and larger actors on the world scene.

John O' Loughlin\textsuperscript{12} (1992) provides alternative world power scenarios which he ranks in terms of likely occurrence. Number one is 'Unilateralism' by the United States. The second scenario terms 'A Bipolar world in new guise'. A new world where a greater Europe faces a combination of Pacific Rim powers.

In contrast Taylor\textsuperscript{13} (1992b) resurrects Galtung world classes model and gives it a new basis. This alternative third worldist position emphasizes the rise of Islam as a world political force. According to him Islam has the potential to replace the now defunct marxist-leninism.


Wallerstein\textsuperscript{14} (1988) states, since the demise of Soviet bloc in 1989 the emergence of a Pan-European Political and economic grouping has become much greater. A meeting of eastern and western Europe could form the basis of a new greater Europe bloc incorporating Africa, the Middle east and even India. From the point of view of coldwar geopolitical assumptions, Wallerstein’s scenario was ideologically absurd. According to Chandra Pal Singh\textsuperscript{15} (1991) it should be remembered that although the countries are interdependent and cooperate with each other, they are also competitors for wealth and power. With the rise of a number of new world order will be multi-polar and even more interdependent in the next century. Funa Bashi (1991) states in this discussion, a Pan pacific economic bloc will be formed. Thereafter, a multilateral system in which the US, United Europe and japan are three poles will shift towards a two-pole system, consisting of the Atlantic bloc and the Pacific bloc dominated by China.

In his writings (1904) Mackinder appreciated the importance of a geographical region which was both land and seapower. In international society


there is a need for a bi-polar world to balance the power system. Any system of balance of power must be able to accommodate political change. This change can take a number of forms. Following the pace set by the Pacific bloc (China, Japan and India etc.), the external environment is expected to be favourable for trade and power. But the stakes in this region are high as, USA is also taking keen interest "the who gets right in here will clear up". So the saying this time is:

Who controls Asia Pacific, Commands the World Island
Who controls the World Island Commands
The Euroland, Heartland, Islands and the World.