Chapter Five

Question of Relevance, Applicability of Mackinder's Geopolitical Model in Present World Order
In 1904 Mackinder, had originally drawn attention to the danger of the over-turning of the European balance of power in favour of Russia, which he described as the ‘pivot state’. The result, he maintained would be the expansion of the pivot state over the marginal lands or the rimland area, which would in turn permit the use of vast continental resources for fleet building, and a world empire would be insight. Mackinder’s thesis had originally challenged one of the basic geopolitical patterns of the nineteenth century - the confrontation between Russian landpower and western maritime power. The possession of the rimland, by Russian land power would give access to warm-water ports, and increase access to raw materials. Its possession by the maritime powers of the rimland would enhance the dominance of the imperial powers. As the soviet union, mobilized the resources of Eurasia, increased its relative military capabilities and highlighted communist ideology in the neighbours. This move was seen, as a threat to the security of its neighbours, by policy makers. Mackinder’s model was an eye-opener for western powers.

The idea of achieving, equilibrium, with respect to international order, through a global geographical hierarchy, strikes a chord, with the classical geopolitical dictum which was first formulated by Mackinder\(^2\) in 1919:

Who Rules East Europe Commands The Heartland  
Who Rules The Heartland Commands The World Island  
(Mackinder, 1919: 113)

Mackinder was attempting to illustrate, the importance of a global geographical hierarchy, if an overall balance of power, of political and military domination of a single power was to be prevented.

It was in 1943, that, sir Halford Mackinder formulated the third version of his, Heartland theory, which he had originally formulated in 1904. This represented, an attempt to update and reassess pragmatically, the geopolitical validity, of the heartland theory. The geographical environment of the Eurasian continent in 1943 was, in theory, to be the testing ground for Mackinder’s original assumptions, about the supremacy of the landpower of Eurasia, compared to the rimland empires of the maritime powers. This reassessment, resulted in the emergence of a new geographical concept of political history - that of the midland ocean. This consisted of the North Atlantic, and its dependent seas and riverbasins. The new Notion was applied, within the context

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of the original thesis. From this new pattern it was deduced, that no legitimate international order could be established, on the Eurasian continent, without the active participation of Britain and the United States, in conjunction with the continental democracies.

Together, Mackinder contended they would have to balance, the unification of Eastern Europe with the Heartland, which now corresponded to the USSR. Both Eastern Europe, and the heartland would according to Mackinder, be dominated by the Soviet Union. Latter, Mackinder maintained, represented the greatest natural fortress on the globe. Moreover for the first time, in its history, it was manned by a garrison, sufficient both in numbers and quality, to present a serious threat, to the security of the maritime powers. The midland ocean, was presented as a geographical base, of one half, of a balance of power system, which was emerging, between the United states and the Soviet Union.

It can be maintained, that this balance of power system, was different in its function, from the balance of power ‘policy’ which Britain had attempted to maintain before the war. In the balance of power system, which Mackinder envisaged, France would act, as the bridgehead on the Eurasian continent. Britain would fulfil the role, of a moated aerodrome. The United States and Canada, would act as a secure reserve of trained manpower, agricultural and
industrial production. It can be interpreted, as an acceptance of the fact, that the expansion of the Soviet Union, now identified as the Heartland power, could not in future, be held by an alliance of rimland powers, plus Britain alone as the balancer.

To Mackinder, the power of any state, and its success or failure, in the continuous power struggle of the international state system, was conditioned by two factors. First, the power of any state was relative to its location and the physical features which it encompassed; secondly, changes in the levels of transport and weapons technology. Interestingly, in his third version, of the Heartland theory Mackinder maintained, that the advances which had been made in air transport technology and weapons technology, especially nuclear weapons, would have no effect on certain immutable strategic conditions, although what these consisted of was not made clear.

It can only be said that no adequate proof, has yet been presented that air fighting will not follow the long history of all kinds of warfare by presenting alternatives of offensive and defensive tactical superiority, meanwhile effecting few permanent changes in strategical conditions.³ (Mackinder; 1943: 602).

There is some parallel, between what Mackinder, was attempting to show, in the version of the Heartland theory, and what German geopolitics had asserted, but which was subsequently ignored. If Germany, became involved in a conflict, with both the continental landpower Russia, and the maritime powers, led by the United States, Germanys’ very existence, would be endangered because of her bulwark location, on the Eurasian continent:

There are certain territories which do not belong to the English monopoly. They constitute two great domains, Eurasia controlled by Russia, and the two American continents with the United States of America as leader. This is the present political organization of the earth⁴ (KUN; 1940: 162-3).

Both the German geopoliticians and Mackinder perceived the emergence of two super powers; the soviet union and the United States. Superficially at least, German geopoliticians and Mackinder in his third version seem to have much in common. They both formulated a geographical pattern of political history and from this pattern deduced certain explanations which attempted to illuminate the future political relevance of countries, such as Germany, which were located in a rimland position.

However, Mackinder, unlike the German geopoliticians, did not maintain that only one state in the state system had a unique and separate destiny from

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other states, and that Germany was not yet complete as a state. Mackinder’s explanation rested largely on the perception of three separate facets of physical geography which: while reinforcing one another are not exactly coincident’.\(^5\) (Mackinder; 1943: 597-8). First the Heartland possessed the widest lowland plain in the Eurasian continent. Secondly, there flowed across that great plain navigable rivers which have no exit to an ocean, apart from the Arctic and the Caspian seas. Thirdly, there existed a grassland zone which until the last century and a half, presented ideal conditions for the development of high Mobility by camel and horse riding nomads. Taking into account these three features and their location provided an adequate base for certain deductions to be made with respect to their future strategic relevance. Although, Mackinder thought it would be misleading to maintain that this area had a unique and separate destiny from the rest of the Eurasian continent: ‘the heartland provides a sufficient physical basis for strategical thinking. To go further and to simplify geography artificially would be misleading’.\(^6\) (Mackinder; 1943: 598).

As in earlier versions of the Heartland theory, Mackinder maintained the importance of integrating these geographical factors, with economic and

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\(^6\) ibid., p.598.
political considerations. The actual balance of power in the postwar period, would be a product of these combined factors not just a product of one. It can be maintained, that this third version of the heartland theory was a rationalisation of a geopolitical situation, which in 1943 looked like becoming a permanent reality. It is doubtful whether Mackinder was attempting to predict the future political history of the Eurasian continent. Although this last version, as much as the previous two, was intended to act as a practical guide for political action for statesmen. None the less, he did predict with some accuracy the geopolitical configuration of the Eurasian continent in the postwar period, which had its influence on world political scenario and strategic policies of nations.

Classical geopolitical theory emphasised, the importance of certain geographical patterns of political history. From these patterns, explanations were deduced, which suggested the present and future political relevance of such geographical conceptualizations as the Heartland, Rimland and world Island.

Explanations deduced, which suggest the contemporary and future political relevance of various geographical conceptualisations, emphasize on the examination of a number of global perspectives. This raises the question, how can one define what is significant or insignificant geopolitical theory? What criteria can be applied, to help us decide? Perhaps one of the most significant
criteria will be postwar developments, which can be used as analytical tools to clarify the relationship between geopolitical theory and state power. The extent to which there is continuity in the geopolitical theory, and its connection with subsequent strategic state policies, proves its significance to that time period. An influential geopolitical theory moulds the perceptions and actions of policy markers, which affect the whole world.

Politics is a Mediu in which geopolitical patterns of political history may become relevant, in that geopolitical perceptions can account for much of strategic policy. In this process it is important to remember that spatial patterns in politics are used as a means, they are not aims in themselves. The choices of statesmen and policy makers result in geographical space and geographical configurations, being perceived to have a particular political meaning or value. The theories which statesmen adopt often reflect the intellectual and political context of a particular era.

We now proceed further to an examination of the extent, to which it is possible to provide evidence in support of the claim that geopolitical theory of 'Heartland concept'; or a theory of spatial relations and historical causation is relevant. Explanations can be sought, which suggest the contemporary and future political relevance of various geographical conceptualizations, one by
establishing a close link between a particular policy and the idea of a geopolitical theorist, whether directly in person or through his published work. Second by, observing and comparing the patterns of spatial structures that emerged after the war periods. Whether these geographical conceptualizations matched with the ones framed by, the geopolitical theory. The continuity on the length of its relevance can be judged by the above methodology.

The geographical scope of strategic policy was expanding, and geopolitics as a theory of spatial relations and historical causation, was increasingly moulding the perceptions and actions of policy makers. This is demonstrated, with respect to the Eurasian continent. Rossevelt perceived geographical configuration, to have a political relevance similar to that which Mackinder had ascribed to it. If a Eurasian power was to expand its political jurisdiction over the entire continent, including the rimland areas, then the increased access to raw materials would facilitate a huge fleet building programme which would ultimately challenge the supremacy of the western maritime powers:

If the world outside the Americas falls under domination, the shipbuilding facilities which the axis powers would then possess in all of Europe, in the British Isles and in the far East would be much greater than all the shipbuilding facilities and potentialities of all the Americas - not only great but two or three times greater. Even if the United States threw all its resources into such a situation seeking to double and even redouble the size of our
navy, the axis powers, in control of the rest of the world, would have the manpower and the physical resources to outbuild several times over.⁷ (Roosevelt, 1941: 610-611).

There is a strong evidence, to suggest, that the second world war resulted in Roosevelt’s perception of the political importance of the Eurasian Continent to the security of the United states, taking a form which had many similarities with one of the central concepts of Mackinder’s heartland theory. If Eurasian power was politically to dominate the whole continent, then the result would be a huge fleet building programme, which would ultimately challenge the supremacy of the maritime powers. He also attempted to show that advances in transport and weapon technology had changed the political importance of the geographical distance between America and Europe, the traditional means where by political isolation from Europe had been maintained.

The political choice made by Roosevelt during this period was to help Britain win the war without the entry of the United States. In many respects the geopolitical perspectives of global self defence were complementary to these political objectives. This reflected the tendency of policy makers, to attach importance to geographical environment on the basis of, how they see it rather than of its objective nature.

One of the effects of the changing perceptions of the political relevance of geography by policy makers during the second world war, was that geopolitics can be seen as fulfilling the role of an instrument of political propaganda. One of the administration wartime aims was to receive public opinion, that the expansion in the geographical scope of strategic policy, was unavoidable.

‘In a world of rival sovereignties, the art of combining geography and strategy on a world scale, is indispensable to the leaders of every nation, that seeks to win or to keep a world position’,8 (Schuman; 1942:164)

Throughout the duration of the war the volume of articles on geopolitics increased greatly. In the immediate postwar period geopolitical concepts of Heartland was still interpreted as having an important role to play in the new international order that was emerging. Heartland concept must not be brushed aside merely because it has been a hand maiden to German imperialism. Analytical tools are as important in securing, the benefits following world war II as material weapons were in winning the war. Heartland concept is one of these analytical tools.9 (Flaners; 1945:578).

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The new political circumstances gave rise to the fear that no international order on the Eurasian continent could survive, without the active participation of the United States. Only the United States balance the unification of Eastern Europe with the Eurasian heartland. The aim was to prevent Soviet Union, which was now perceived as the major land power of the Eurasian continent, acquiring through the additional material and human resources it would have at its disposal, the ability to become a sea power as well. This objective had a close parallel with the third version of the Mackinder's heartland theory and N. Spykman's, Rimland theory: He stressed on the importance of US foreign policy-makers enacting a balance of power policy, with the United States as the balancer. This position could only be maintained if the United States maintained a margin of superiority on the Eurasian rimland.¹⁰ (Spykman, America's Strategy, pp.182-3).

In the postwar period, there was a realisation by policy makers that the pre-war strategic policy was inadequate. The assumptions concerning geographical distance and a European balance of power in which Britain played the role of a balancer was now invalid. There was now a need to set out a number of new strategic objectives.

¹⁰ N.J. Spykman, America's strategy, pp.182-3.
However, a new set of political circumstances meant that policy makers adopted geopolitical perspectives that were complementary to their political objectives. Consequently a number of geopolitical terms or labels were used by policy makers, as a means through which the new relationship between the United States and the Eurasian continent could be articulated, both at public and policy making levels. One of the most important geopolitical terms used was a ‘point’. This was used to describe a particular country which was located in the Eurasian rimland. It was a location which had to be prevented from falling under communist control. The second geopolitical label was a ‘line’- a number of points which were jointed together.

The main reason for linking a number of points by a line was the assumption on the part of policy makers of this period, that as the Soviet Union held interior lines of communication on the Eurasian continent, she possessed radii of aggression, which could cover a number of points on the Eurasian rimland. It was further assumed that these individual points would be politically and geopolitically incapable of cohesive resistance, unless they were joined by a line.

This is relevant with regard to the way in which the geographical scope, of policy was expounded. All these geopolitical theorists made reference to the
importance of the Eurasian rimland, primarily because in this geographical area a number of important passageways were located which gave access to the heartland areas, and conversely to the circumferential maritime routes.

Increasingly, emphasis was placed by policy makers on the importance of countering Soviet power at a number of unspecified geographical locations on the Eurasian rimland. To quote one of them, the Soviet Union was seen as:

‘Impervious to logic of reason, it is highly sensitive to the logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point... Gauged against the Western, Soviets are by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on the degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which the Western World can muster.’

(Kennan, 1964: 707).

The Truman doctrine can be interpreted as a prescription for a huge expansion in the geographical scope of the strategic policy of the United States. It also marked the beginning of an end of a perspective where by the geographical distance between Europe and America helped to protect the national security of the United States:

‘Furthermore, the Truman doctrine was the first public acknowledgment of the political relevance that was now attached

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to the geographical configuration of the rimland area\textsuperscript{12} (Jones, 1955: 156).

The Truman doctrine, it can be suggested, helps to illustrate the nature of the relationship between geopolitics and United States strategic policy.

It was the publication of the now famous ‘X’ article in the periodical Foreign Affairs which had the greatest impact, in terms of public perception of strategic policy, on geopolitical expressions of the changed political relations, that now existed between the United States and the Eurasian continent. Kennan’s thesis can be interpreted, as being geopolitically significant for two reasons. First, it can be suggested that Spykman’s geopolitical theory moulded the perceptions of a policy maker such as Kennan. Spykman’s emphasis on the importance of the United States maintaining a margin of political and military superiority on the rimland, was similar to Kennan’s political objective of deterring Soviet expansionism. Secondly, Kennan’s thesis, like geopolitical theory in general, attempted to put forward certain explanations which suggested the contemporary and future political relevance of geographical conceptualisations of Mackinder’s theory.

\textsuperscript{12} Some of Clifford’s more blatant geopolitical points were deleted from the speech by Acheson. See J.M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955, p.156.
America’s strategic policy, which was intended to provide a means to deter political expansion has been said to have had its origins in the nineteenth century: ‘What Truman, Acheson and others took from Kennan was the stark reformulation of Lincoln’s strategy of containment. What kennan said between 1945 and 1948 was what Lincoln had said between 1848 and 1861: ‘put a wall around the Russians [the South] and that evil society will disintegrate’.¹³ (William: 186). With respect to the Soviet Union the assumption was that the inner contradiction of the Soviet Union, when contained, would cause that society to disintegrate: The application of this new doctrine would enable the Unites States to control the evolution of the postwar international order, and shape the rule of state interaction.

The containment doctrine resulted in increasing reference being made to the links between giving financial aid to various countries and the deterrence of Soviet expansionism.

It was the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty by the United States in April 1949, which formalised its commitment to cooperate politically and militarily with Western European powers, on the European part of the Eurasian rimland. In terms of the political relevance of geographical configurations it is

¹³ Williams, ‘Empire as a Way of Life’ p.186.
possible to discern, during this period, the effects of what were then recent geopolitical patterns on the perceptions of policy makers:

'It is clear that the North Atlantic pact is not an improvisation. It is the statement of the facts and lessons of history. We have learned our history from two World Wars in less than half a century. That experience has taught us, that the control of Europe by a single aggressive, unfriendly power, could constitute an intolerable threat to the national security of the United States. We participated in those two great wars to preserve the integrity and independence of the European half of the Atlantic community in order to preserve the integrity of the American Half.14' (Acheson, 1949: 38).

It was on official acknowledgment, that the geographical distance between Europe and America was no longer the best means, through which the national security of the United States could be protected. In addition this statement of Acheson's had a close similarity with mackinder's 1943 version of the heartland theory. What Mackinder had called the Midland Ocean was termed the Atlantic Community; but despite a difference of terminology both recognised the danger of a Europe which was dominated by the Soviet Union. It was recognised by both Mackinder and Acheson that an alliance of the powers located

14 Mr. D. Acheson, Department of State Bulletin, 27 March 1949 p.38.
geographically in the Midland ocean/Atlantic Community was the only way, to balance the threat posed by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Even during the 'Great Debate' which concerned the commitment of the United States to stationing ground troops permanently in Western Europe, it is possible to discern a close parallel between the geopolitical theories of Spykman and Mackinder, and the way in which the political and economic relationships between the United States and Western Europe were interpreted.

'Today the free people of the world have a great superiority over the police states in the matter of steel production, coal production, electric power and the raw materials, that are essential for the conduct of modern war. What if all Western Europe were overrun? This difference of potential would be very materially reduced, and also to the free world, would be the very sizeable and industrially able manpower of that area. Without adequate army forces on the ground backed up by tactical air forces, it would be impossible to prevent the overrunning of Europe by the tremendous land forces of the police states No matter what air and sea power we could bring against them.\textsuperscript{15} (Dulles, 1952: 151).

The Eisenhower doctrine was used to arrive at political explanations. Mackinder maintained that ‘There are certain strategical positions in the heartland and Arabia which must be treated as of world importance, for their possession may facilitate or prevent world domination’.16 (Mackinder, 1919: 233). The Eisenhower doctrine also tended to preclude, the examination of the political and economic relationships of states located in this geographical area.

In conclusion, in terms of the relationship between geopolitical theory and subsequent strategic policy from the end of the Second World War to the 1960 presidential campaign a number of points can be made. First it can be suggested, that Heartland concept as a theory of spatial relations and historical causation had throughout the period moulded the perceptions and actions of policy-makers. It is important to note that there was a marked continuity with respect to this relationship during this period.

Secondly the influence of this theory on strategic policy had but one political aim: to maintain a margin of superiority on the Eurasian rimland to deter further Soviet expansion. The third factor can be described as paradoxical in nature. While there was a close similarity between the classic geopolitical

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theories of Mackinder. Spykman and Mahan and the statements of policy makers, the latter group ignored completely one of the most important maxims of these classical theorists the importance of integrating geographical knowledge with the rest of political knowledge if a deterministic analysis is to be avoided. The result was that the strategy of containment was increasingly dictating policy objectives, instead of the other way round.

Yet it is important to bear in mind that the writings of the classical theorists focused on the respective geopolitical contexts of their historical eras, and one the most consistent objections to geopolitics has been, that it has failed to anticipate and allow for changes in the levels of transport and weapons technology. One of the effects of changes in transport technology has been, the expansion of the geographical space that is accessible to a particular power. Ironically, with respect to US foreign policy makers, one of the consequences of this rise in the level of technology, was the assumption that it was possible for the United States to prevent any changes in boundaries or the political complexion of states located along the entire length of the Erasian rimland. This assumption, was considerably strengthened by the use of such geographic terms as ‘points’, ‘lines’, ‘dominoes’ and the ‘new frontier’.

Geopolitics has moulded the perceptions and actions of policy-makers over an historical period, between 1890 and 1980.
It was Henry Kissinger, who was largely responsible for the formulation of a new policy. The objective of this policy was the establishment of a balance of power in international society. This objective, was to be realised by use in an explicit manner of geopolitics, which was interpreted as being synonymous with equilibrium. Geopolitical considerations would guide the strategy of foreign policy.

It is evident from the choices made by Nixon and Kissinger that the political importance that would in future be attached to certain geopolitical conceptions, such as a monolithic communism, located in the centre of the Eurasian heartland was going to change:

'The postwar period in international relations had ended... Then, we were confronted by a monolithic Community world. Today the nature of the world had changed the power of the individual Communist nations has grown, but international Communist unity has been shattered. Once a unified bloc, its solidarity has been broken by the powerful forces of nationalism. The Soviet Union and Communist China, once bound by an alliance of friendship, had become bitter adversaries by the mid-1960\(^\text{17}\) (Nixon, 1970: 141).

It can still be argued, that classical geopolitical theory has continued to influence the perceptions and actions of policy makers. In that geopolitics defined as being synonymous with the maintenance of equilibrium, is not without foundation in the writings of Mackinder:

If we would take the long view, must we not still reckon with the possibility that a large part of the Great. (Eurasian) continent might some day be united under a single sway, and that invisible sea power might be based upon it? Ought we not to recognise that is the great ultimate threat to the world liberty so far as strategy is concerned and to provide against it in our new political system.18 (Mackinder; 1919:92).

However, it is important to appreciate the context of the equilibrium to which both Mackinder and Kissinger referred. Mackinder maintained that the process of industrialisation was of key importance as it permitted a tremendous increase in the number of people that could be settled in a given area. His fear being that if Russia managed to gain political dominance over the majority of the Eurasian continent, she would have access to the material and human resources which would enable her to build a fleet that would challenge the maritime dominance of the western power. Mackinder failed to appreciate, the possibilities of growth in industrial capability. It was this growth in industrial capability than had permitted the Soviet Union by the beginning of the 1970s to

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become a major sea-power. This had been achieved without Russia gaining access to the human and material resources of the Eurasian rimland.

The ultimate objective of Kissinger, the creation of what could be described as discriminate globalism, was similar to one of the objectives of geopolitical theory that is to underline the point that political predominance is a question not just of having power but also of the structure of the field within which power is exercised. It can be argued that the increase in the geographical space which became accessible to the Soviet Union and its satellites during the 1970s presented Kissinger with similar problems to those which Mackinder had first attempted to draw attention:

'There has been much said recently about the role of the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf - a region in which there is a historic Russian interest. The Soviet Union has developed close relations with Irac at the head of the gulf, as well as in certain other Arab countries not bordering on this waterway.'

(American foreign relations 1972:226). In conclusion the geopolitics of equilibrium originally was formulated as a means, whereby, the restructuring of

the political and military relationship between the United States and the two communist powers on the Eurasian continent.

When Ronald Reagan became President there was a sharp change in the nature of the relationship between geopolitics and United States strategic policy. The coming to power of the Reagan administration resulted in the identification of four goals or pillars which outline the constituent elements of this new strategy of flexibility:

'The restoration of American and Western economic and military strength; the reinvigoration of alliances and other relationships with friendly states; the promotion of progress, in an environment of peaceful change, among less industrialized countries, and last but not least, the development of a relationship with the Soviet Union based on Soviet restraint and reciprocity.'


In addition, it can be suggested that Spykman’s geopolitical theory was again moulding the perceptions and the actions of policy-makers in the Regan administration. Spykman’s emphasis on the importance of the United States',

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maintaining a margin of political and military superiority on the rimland as it will be argued, been reflected in the statements of policy makers.

Secondly, there was a continuity with the Nixon Heartland concept of Mackinder in certain respects. Geopolitics was an approach which paid attention to the requirements of equilibrium, and which required that the United States be prepared to intervene at an early stage to preserve the existing equilibrium.

The third and perhaps the most significant relationship between geopolitical theory and United States strategic policy in the Reagan administration is the explicit acknowledgment by policy makers of the link between political importance of the Pacific Ocean to the security of the United States.

It can be suggested that in the early years of the Reagan administration there was an explicit revival of the doctrine of the continuity of the Eurasian rimland. The argument was that the United States had to secure a margin of superiority on the rimland if the political and military security of the United States was to be maintained:

The Soviet Union has greatly extended its geostrategy in reach by establishing military outposts in the Middle East, in Africa and elsewhere. Soviet foothods in Ethiopia, Yemen and
Afghanistan threaten the vital oilfields of the Middle East and indeed, the peace of the world. These bases and facilities were formerly neutral or accessible to us. And Soviet forces have increasingly been designed and deployed to take advantage of this far flung access they have gained.\textsuperscript{21} (Casper Weinburger, 1981:46). This stress on securing a margin of superiority on the Eurasian rimland, was emphasised by the revival of the geopolitical terminology of the late 1940s; the idea of a ‘point’ and a ‘line’ which would join a number of points together and thus deter Soviet expansion.

Overall the Reagan administration, like previous administrations, attempted to confront through geopolitics, the reality of trying to define United States strategic policy, in a dynamic worldwide security environment. During this period when geopolitics, primarily had a relationship with subsequent policy whereby it moulded the perceptions and actions of policy makers, geopolitical theory can be said to offer a theory about international order.

**Geopolitical World Orders**

However, the nature of international order, with respect to its structure, is that it changes from time to time. The Key issue in contemporary international politics, so President George Bush and his advisers kept reminding us, is the creation of a ‘New world order’. After a transition, a new world incorporating

new geopolitical assumptions is in the making, but it is not yet constructed and we cannot be certain what it will look like. After the collapse of the communist regimes in eastern Europe in 1989, it has become generally accepted that the cold war - the 'old world order' - is finished, and international politics has to be reconstructed in another form. Hence the call for a New world order from the remaining super power, seemingly the only state with the power to embark on such a project.

World orders are a given distribution of power across the world that most political elites in most countries abide by and operate accordingly. This includes hegemonic stable periods to be sure, but there is an order of sorts between the certainties of a hegemonic world. In such times international anarchy has not prevailed, rather the great powers of the day have accommodated to one another's needs in quite predictable ways. 'The hegemonic periods of both Britain and the USA are times of relative international stability which has led to a general hypothesis relating hegemony to world power.'

By geopolitical world order we mean, however powerful the state, there

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is an order that defines the basic parameters of the international politics of the
time. Such orders represent relatively stable pattern of geographical power
distributions over distinctive periods of time. During that period the geographical
codes of most, though not necessarily all states will accept the defining
parameters of the order. Cox associates, 'world orders with periods of high
hegemony such as the USA and the cold war'. ²³ (Coxs, 1981:126).

Geopolitical world orders vary in terms of the degree of conformity
required of states. We can tell from the name of the latest such order the 'cold
war' popularized by US political Commentator Walter Lippmann in 1947. The
stability was based on very strict adherence to an antagonistic alliance system.
Previous world orders have been much more flexible, although a general global
structure of power was always easily discernible. All orders may incorporate
contrary codes, however, these may reflect vestiges of past world orders or may
represent attempts to define new orders. For instance, Spain and Portugal
Vigorously pursued policies akin to pre-world war II colonialism for two
decades, after such activities had been de-legitimized by the coldwar. In contrast,
other states, such as India, refused to be forced into taking sides in the cold war.
They formed a non-aligned bloc to proclaim their independence from the

²³ R.Cox, 'Social forces, States and World Order: Beyond International
prevailing order. Notice that this policy is not one of neutrality as typically practiced by some of the smaller European states. Neutrality is a policy that is effectively a local code, a strategy against more powerful neighbours. Non-alignment is a global strategy, a policy against a world geopolitical code: by its violation of the premises of the cold war it constitutes a challenge to that world order. Refusing to chose between east and west. The non-aligned states defined themselves as south in an attempt to change the key geographical fracture of world power from ‘East/West’ to ‘North-South’. But the coldwar geographical patterns prevailed until its recent demise which was not precipitated by the south.

Distinctive historical period can be conceptualized in several ways. They may be viewed as stages in a sequence of changes, as components of cycles in which repetitions of circumstances are emphasized, or simply as different times that are not linked into any such patterning. Geopolitical world orders at first sight seem to fit into the latter category, but infact can be related to other temporal sequences that are far more patterned. The international political elites and their governments making the decisions that collectively make up the world orders do not operate in a material vacuum.
Table 1 Long cycles and geopolitical world orders
(Goldstein, 1988)

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<th>Hegemonic cycles</th>
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<td>First Kondratieff Cycle</td>
<td>British Hegemonic Cycle</td>
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<tr>
<td>1790/8</td>
<td>A phase (industrial revolution)</td>
<td>Ascending hegemony (grand alliance)</td>
<td>(Napoleonic wars as French resistance to Britain's ascending hegemony)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1815/25</td>
<td>B phase (first long industrial depression)</td>
<td>Hegemonic victory (balance of power through Concert of Europe)</td>
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<td>1844/51</td>
<td>A phase (mid-Victorian boom)</td>
<td>Hegemonic maturity (‘high’ hegemony: free trade era)</td>
<td>(Balance of power in Europe leaves Britain with a free hand to dominate rest of the world)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1870/75</td>
<td>B phase (late-Victorian depression)</td>
<td>Declining hegemony (age of imperialism, new mercantilism)</td>
<td>Disintegration World order of Rivalry and Concert Transition (1866-71) (Germany dominates Europe, Britain still greatest world power)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third Kondratieff Cycle</td>
<td>American Hegemonic Cycle</td>
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<tr>
<td>1890/96</td>
<td>A phase (the Edwardian boom)</td>
<td>Ascending hegemony (a world power beyond the Americas)</td>
<td>Disintegration World Order of the British Succession Transition (1904-7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913/20</td>
<td>B phase (the ‘great’ depression)</td>
<td>Hegemonic victory (not taken up: global power vacuum)</td>
<td>(Germany and USA overtake Britain as world powers, two world wars settle the succession)</td>
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<td>Fourth Kondratieff Cycle</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940/45</td>
<td>A phase (the ‘post war’ boom)</td>
<td>Hegemonic maturity (undisputed leader of the ‘free world’)</td>
<td>Disintegration Cold War World Order Transition (1944-6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967/73</td>
<td>B phase (the latest long ‘slump’)</td>
<td>Declining hegemony (Japanese and European rivalry)</td>
<td>(USA hegemony challenged by the ideological alternative offered by the USSR)</td>
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</table>
The world economy is notoriously cyclical in nature what Wallerstein\textsuperscript{24}, (1984 b: 559) call it ryhms and politicians have to accommodate to these systematically varying circumstances. Precisely how the world orders relate to these cycles is complex and highly contented theoretical issue. The starting point of the analysis is a discussion of cyclical changes on a global scale, concentrating on the two longest cycles that are usually identified, ‘Kondratieff cycles of approximately half a century and hegemonic cycles of about century or so in length’.\textsuperscript{25} (Goldstein, 1988). For instance the cold war is how US hegemony has been expressed as a world order. Most studies of the rise and decline of major powers have developed cyclical models of change. Goldstein has recently developed more than a dozen such analyses. Modelski provides a model which identified five cycles and four world leaders (Britian leads twice). In contrast, in world systems analysis just three hegemonic cycles are distinguished with just three hegemonic powers. These differences in numbers of cycles are symptomatic of fundamental differences in the conception of political cycles. Table (1) shows two types of cycles (Kondratieff cycles and hegemonic cycles) and their component periods are compared across the last two centuries.

\textsuperscript{24} I. Wallerstein, ‘Long Waves as Capitalist Process,’ Review, 7, 1984 b, pp.559-75.

Kondratieff cycles are usually described in strictly economic terms, but undoubtedly they have profound political impacts. The fifty year cycle is divided into two approximately equal periods, an A-phase of growth and a B-phase of stagnation. There is a large debate on the causes of these long economic fluctuations, but their existence is now generally agreed upon. In conventional timing of these cycles the twentieth century covers the third and fourth Kondratieff cycles when dated from the industrial revolution in Britain. In general terms B-phases are more competitive economically, although how this translates into politics is by no means simple. Probably the most successful interpretation of Kondratieff cycles in relation to political processes has come through their linkage to hegemonic cycles.

Hegemonic cycles focus upon one state, the hegemon, that for a short period is pre-eminently powerful economically, politically and culturally. The cycles consist of the rise and fall from this position. Following Wallerstein we can describe the cycle as follows. Relevance the hegemon gradually gains a clear economic advantage in the realm of production and extends its leadership to the commercial and financial spheres. At the same time to becomes politically dominant after leading a coalition of states against its main political rival. Hence forth it is able to order the world to its advantage using such techniques as balance of power rather than outright coercion. This is possible in part because of its cultural leadership in 'universal ideas' - the hegemon is typically the
champion is world liberalism. The period of 'high hegemony is relatively short, and these leadership attributes from production to culture are progressively lost.

Geopolitical world orders are not as neatly related to the two material long cycles as they are to each other. nevertheless world orders do generally begin and end at roughly the same time as Kondratieff phases. Infact, both cycle phases and the world orders between them constitute the nature of our modern global times. For instance, the processes making up Kondratieff cycle IV, US hegemonic practices and the cold war are impossible to disentangle in understanding the recent past and our contemporary situation.

Modelski\textsuperscript{26} provides a model which identified five cycles and four world leaders. (Britain 'leads twice). In contrast, in world systems analysis just three hegemonic cycles are distinguished with three hegemonic powers. These differences in numbers of cycles are symptomatic of fundamental differences in the conception of political cycles.

Modelski first presented his long cycles model in an article in 1979 and has made several modifications since, culminating in his book long cycles in

Table 2 A dynamic model of hegemony and rivalry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>USA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt; Ascending Hegemony</td>
<td>1790/8 Rivalry with France (Napoleonic Wars) Productive efficiency: industrial revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt; Hegemony Victory</td>
<td>1815/25 Commercial victory in Latin American and control of India: workshop of the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt; Hegemonic Maturity</td>
<td>1844/51 Era of free trade: London becomes financial centre of the world-economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt; Declining Hegemony</td>
<td>1870/85 Classical age of imperialism as European powers and USA rival Britain. 'New' industrial revolution emerging outside Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890/96</td>
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world politics in 1987. He creates a new type of cycle of just over a hundred years in length. Each cycle is associated with a world power which is defined as a state which, engages in over half the 'order keeping' function of the global political system. Four such powers have existed - Portugal, Netherlands, Britain and the United States. These have dominated their centuries. (Tab 2). In each case the rise and fall of the world power is indicated through definite steps.

A cycle starts with a weak global organizational structure of severe political competition which degenerates into global war. Such wars have a wide geographical range and have global pay off. The winner is able to order the resulting political system. This phase ends with a legitimizing treaty which formally sets up the new world order centered on the new world power. As no world power can maintain its control, a decline phase sets in. Initially the world order becomes bi-polar and then multi-polar before the system becomes weakly organized again, is ripe for the rise of a new world power, and the cycle starts again. We can be impressed by the symmetry that Modelski finds in international politics.

The world orders are separated by relatively short geopolitical transitions when the assumptions on which the global power distribution exists are overturned. These transitions are very fluid times where the old world and its
certainties are 'turned upside down' and what was 'impossible' becomes 'normal' in the new order. We identify three such transitions in 1904-7, 1945-6 and 1989-91, these transitions encompass two world orders which we will term the Geopolitical world order of the British succession and the cold war geopolitical world order. Geopolitical transitions constitute changes that surprise contemporaries, no new order can be constructed out of nothing.

A New Geopolitical World Order

And so we return to the contemporary search for a new world order. After a transition, a new world incorporating new geopolitical assumption.

‘All the world’s a stage. And all the men and women only players. They have their exists and their ‘entrances’. Thus declared William Shakespeare (1564-1616) in his play, As you Like it, published in 1598. This dictum when applied to nations, aptly describes the changing circumstances which have shaped and will continue to shape the political geography of the world. The ‘exist’ and the ‘entrances’ of nations - in war (including cold ones), in peace and the economic power arena to a large extent capture the essence of changes in the world’s political geography.

The ‘players’ in the world’s political scene have never been equals.
Whereas some nations have been actively involved in shaping the political geography of the world others have been passive actors. The spatial distribution of the active and the passive nations changes overtime, determined by the relative economic prosperity of nations. Whereas such changes in themselves may determine the potential patterns of war and peace, the actual patterns of war and peace are often set by an earlier configuration of victors and of the vanquished Germany's role in the outbreak of world war II after her defeat in the first world war, and Egypt's initiation of the Yom Kippur war of 1973 after her defeat in the six day war of 1967, are good examples.

Given these generalized past and contemporary trends, of the changing spatial patterns of power and of powerlessness, what is to be expected of the relevance of geopolitical concepts specifically the 'Heartland concept' in the world's political geographic scene? This issue in the said New world order is analysed on the basis of two time frames: Keeping in mind the relevance of the Mackinder's 'Heartland Concept'.

- Present Transitional Phase of Geopolitical World Order
- Possible Geopolitical World Orders

**Transitional Phase of Geopolitical world order**

There is no doubt that the period 1989 to 1991 represents a geopolitical
transition. A key characteristic of such a transition is surprise. As late as 1987 Edward Thompson\footnote{E.P. Thompson, 'The Rituals of Enmity,' in D.Smith and E.P.Thompson (eds) Prospects for a Habitable Planet, Penguin: Harmonds Worth, U.K., 1987, p.14.} (1987:14) felt it necessary to argue against the cold war 'an immutable fact of geography' with Europe 'divided into two blocs which are stuck in postures of "deterrence" for evermore'. We know now how much that 'immutable' geography was soon to change. The list is impressive: the fall of communist regimes in Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania at the end of 1989; the reunification of Germany in 1990;\footnote{On 9 Nov. 1989 the Berlin Wall was Breached by the New Forces; This Stands as the Symbolic Event of the end of the Cold War, Leading to the Unification of Germany the following year.} and a failed military coup in the USSR in 1991 leading to the abolition of the soviet state by the end of the year. Three momentous years and all three sets of events unforeseen by all the experts almost until they had happened. A good example of this unpredictability can be found in the political geography debate on the 'Post cold war world' held in Miami in April 1991. By the time the debate was published (Nijman\footnote{J. Nijman, (ed.) 'The Political Geography of the Post Cold War World', Professional Geographer, 1992, pp.44: 1-29.} 1992) the USSR no longer existed. Yet the soviet state figures prominently in these discussions of the future and none of these experts even hinted that the USSR would completely disappear from the world scene. Clearly our political world has been turned upside down since
1989; we have been lucky enough to experience the excitement of a geopolitical transition.

Knowing that we have just experienced a transition does not particularly help us predict what the next geopolitical order will look like. According to Wallersterin’s world system analysis, we are experiencing a Kondratieff B phase economic recession, coinciding with the decline in the hegemony of the United States (Wallerstein, 1991). With the power vacuum left by the USSR’s collapse, the antipode loses its role.

The USA as the only remaining super power has claimed to be constructing a new world order under its leadership but it is by no means certain that a post hegemonic USA will be able to sustain such a role in the coming decades. We have to be honest at this time and admit that we just do not know what the distribution of power across the world will look like in the medium future. But an attempt would be made to draw some assumptions and speculate the future world order.

The world also became different in terms of increased rapid means of

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communications, which had their impact on international politics. Supercomputers, satellites, instruments of better transmission and reception enabled signals and images to be received instantly in all parts of the world. It was modern technology and fast communications which gave a decisive edge to the United States and its allies during the gulf war, and the TV media played a crucial role in the collapse of the coup in the USSR. North America, Western Europe and Japan could become part of a single interdependent region, despite their physical separation by the two largest oceans, because of rapid communications and means of transportation. This closeness gave them a decisive say, or power, which will have a decisive affect in reshaping the world in their image in future.

In such an environment, three major processes can be identified which are changing the world today: a universal shift towards capitalism and the globalization of the economy; democratization and, sadly the rise of fundamentalism. Associated with a shift towards capitalism is the effort of all countries to become integrated with the global economy. All the developing countries are making efforts to raise their productivity to levels where it is possible for them to exchange their products with the wealth in countries of North America, western Europe and Japan. In the process they are opening up their economics and resources to global industries, and inviting foreign capital
and knowhow by making their political systems suitable and attractive for such investment. Many times it means the undermining of sovereignty and an invitation to economic colonialism. One of the most important political questions at the end of the century is the accentuation of inequalities between the centres and the peripheries. As the East-West dispute disappears, the world becomes divided into the fast and the slow through the possession or non-possession, of scientific knowledge and communication networks. We are witnessing the age of technological apartheid.

World commerce is regionalizing itself. Globalization is forcing each nation to direct its energies towards international competition for markets and gains. To avoid war and to achieve a broader scale and greater speed in the production of new technologies, the central economies create supra-national markets even through the basis for these coalitions will for a long time be the nation-state and the defence of national interest. Integrated by the space of flows and by networks, these markets are strongly exclusive.

Globalisation: There May Be Gales Ahead

One of the chief problems we face as we go into the 21st century is this: how is globalisation the inter-connectedness of capital, production, ideas cultures at an increasing pace to be handled? How do we recognise the merging of the
economic activities of 186 different nation states when their own socio economic conditions are so varied, when they are not on a level playing field.

For it is my contention that if the pace of change and intensity of challenge is too severe, the numbers of those unable to compete might, in certain parts of the world, be dangerously large and lead to a political and ideological backlash.

What will happen in the next 10 to 20 years, in both richer and poorer countries, as they struggle and perhaps fail to readjust? Will we not see mounting public discontent as political leaders grapple inadequately with the consequences of modernisation and are rejected by angry electrorates who turn to nationalist and fundamentalist alternative as in Russia, India, even in parts of the US, or to protectionist social welfare parties, such as in Italy?

Schumpeter was right, capitalism causes turbulence. Or perhaps Marx, lying in his grave and at present almost universally scorned, has a slow smile creeping across his face as he sees the convulsions ahead.31 (Paul Kennedy, 1988-1996).

The reduction of the volume and types of raw material used with the creation of new materials signifies the crisis of the principal markets of

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31 Paul Kennedy, 1996, this is an edited version of the 1996 Analysis lecture he gave in London, Broadcast on BBC Radio Last Month. (Times of India June 14, 1996, New Delhi).
traditional raw materials and of mass production. Cheap labour ceases to be a market advantage for the peripheral countries, and the disequilibrium in the global distribution of telecommunications infrastructure tends to exclude them from international transactions. As well, the elevated cost of technological warfare excludes them from the possibility of making it.

The potential for conflicts and instability is amplified with the formation of supra-national markets due to competition, to cultural confrontation and to the excess population not absorbed into the newform of production. The new public private relationship is sustained by a new multilateralism. Not only the IMF and the world bank, but also the UN, under the command of the Group of seven, become collective instruments of international administration. The multilateral agenda has a global scope and a limited number of themes and relevant actors and it defines norms which are imposed through collective actions on national societies. The third process that is noticed today is the rise of religious fundamentalism’ (TOI, 1996) in many countries.

**Iranian Cleric Puts Islamic Books on Internet**

With its domed Islamic shrines and bearded Muslim clerics, this ancient religious city now has at least one place that’s cutting edge: Ali Korani’s Computer Centre.
Beneath the gold-and-turquoise minarets of a theological seminary, Korani runs an ambitious project to place 5,000 Islamic texts on computer and make them available to scholars worldwide via the Internet.

But Korani’s work also reflects a modernising impulse in Islamic Iran that’s not often visible from beyond its borders. While some older, traditional clerics in Iran see such technology as a threat to their pre-eminent roles, a younger generation embraces the changes. (QQM, (Iran), July 10, Greg Myre TOI).

Iran Magazine Issues ‘fatwa’ Against Barbie

A new danger is sweeping Iran in the shape of Barbie, the curvy, plastic all-American toy beloved of little girls across the world, whose growing popularity here has led to her being dubbed the ‘satanic doll’ by Islamic hardliners. (May 7, TOI).

Protestant March to Finally Get Under Way in Northern Ireland

Riot police and soldiers shoved Catholic protesters off the street on Thursday, clearing the way for a disputed Protestant march that had brought havoc to Northern Ireland. (July 11, TOI).
Religious Revival in China has the Regime Worried

Eighteen years after Deng Xiaoping launched his economic reforms, a tidal wave of religious fervour is sweeping over China. ‘We haven’t any more artificial Gods like the cult of Mao, and not much to believe in beyond the money we try to earn.” explains Victor Yuan, a Christian and president of the Horizon market research company. He remembers the conviction with which he once sang the most famous line from *The East is Red*: ‘China gave birth to a Mao Zedong. He is the people’s great saviour’. ‘No more’, Yuan says. ‘Today we’re looking elsewhere.’

Be it Christianity, Buddhism, ancient sects that long threatened social order in China or cults invented weeks ago to fleece the credulous, Chinese are returning to religion with a vengeance. In a new age of economic prosperity and weak central government, the once sacrosanct Marxist-Leninist ideology has been eclipsed by a sweeping revival of spirituality. Not surprisingly, all this has deeply alarmed the authorities in Beijing and left them fumbling for means of control - so far without much success.

In the north western province of Xinjiang, where Muslim minorities comprise more than half the 16 million population, party leaders have ordered a crackdown on religious separatists. Recently, it resulted in the death of nine separatists in a gun battle with police.
Tibetans, meanwhile, have spent the past five months with their religious hierarchy in limbo. (Matt Forney, Easter Economic Review, May 13th).

The activities of fanatics committed to the theocratic control of the lines of people in some countries has assumed serious proportions. It is a paradox that with better means of transportation and communication which enable greater interaction, the differences of race and religion have accutuated. The categorization of the world into religious regions carried out by Mackinders (1904) at the beginning of the present century have not become irrelevant, and those regions may continue for a long time to come:

To east, south, and west of this heartland are marginal regions, ranged in a vast crescent, accessible to shipment. According to physical confirmation these regions are four in number, and it is not a little remarkable that in a general way they respectively coincide with the spheres of the four great religions - Buddhism, Brahmanism, Mahometanism, and christianity. The first two are the monsoon lands, turned the one towards the pacific, and the other towards the Indian ocean. The fourth is Europe, watered by the Atlantic rain from the west. (Mackinder; 1904: 241-42).

It is therefore necessary to divide the world into broad religious/racial reforms. They are:

The circular christian belt extending from the Americas through Europe, including most of the Russian federation, into Australia and Newzealand and parts of southern and central Africa; the Islamic
FIG 11
RELIGIOUS ARCS OF 1904 MACKINDER'S MODEL
religion extending from Northern and central Africa, through the middle East, reaching right up to central Asia comprising the southern parts of the former USSR and western parts of china, and another fork going into Iran, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia, Buddhist Asia in the East and South East, Hindu Asia in the Indian Subcontinent which over laps Buddhism in South-East Asia; and black sub-saharan Africa with a mix of christianity, Islam and tribal religions. Thus the Islamic region is surrounded by christianity in the north and, with some exceptions, the non-christian and non-muslim religions in the south extending from East Asia to west Africa.32 (Fig. 11).

The United Nations cannot remain unaffected by the changes in the global environment. There will be many more member countries, whose complex interrelationships and demands on the world body may bring about structural changes within the UN.33 (TOI, June 20 1996). There are already demands for the restructuring of the security council; which is playing a very important role in world affairs and these may increase further by the beginning of the twenty first century.


33 Times of India, Japan and the UN Seat; US opposes Ghali’s Candidancy; Its Ghali Versus U.S. in the U.N. Race; China Likely to Play Kingmaker; June 20, June 30, July 7, June 23, 1996, New Delhi.
US is Indifferent to United Nations

Writing in the New York Times on April 8, the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali said, 'The United Nations is on the brink of financial disaster. Americans need to know what’s going on, because their country took the lead in creating the organisation, and its delinquency in paying arrears is threatening it... Today, the United Nations created 51 years ago, is in deep trouble. This time around, there should be no surprises'.

For the last one year and a half, the Secretary General has been crying hoarse about the need on the part of member states to pay up their dues. The UN will completely run out of money by the end of 1996. The cash on hand is under $100 million. The members owe the UN a whopping sum of $2.9 billion - $1.2 billion for the regular budget and $1.7 billion for the peacekeeping expenses. Of this entire amount, a total of $1.7 billion is owed by the US, the biggest defaulter. The regular annual budget of the UN is $1.3 billion, said to be less than that of the New York city police department. The Russian Federation paid up $400 million last month, thus clearing its arrears and dues for 1996. India cleared its arrears a few days ago by paying $3,371,877. (June, 1996).
**US Interest**

Why is the US not paying its dues? Not because it cannot pay, but obviously because it does not want to pay. The US Congress does not want to strengthen the UN except on its own terms. The UN is worth supporting only if it serves US interests. US Ambassador to the UN, Ms Madeline Albright once said that "From the day we signed the UN Charter, Americans Republican and Democrat have viewed the United Nations not as an end in itself, but as one instrument, among many, for advancing US goals.

Operating Desert Storm, successfully conducted in the name of UN in 1991, was therefore hailed by US policy makers as a grand achievement of American strategy in the post Cold War era. By the time it came to Bosnia, having experienced the vicissitudes of Somalia and Rwanda, and faced with the dilemma of how to make NATO sound relevant, the US decided to sideline the UN, and implement the Dayton peace accord under NATO auspices.

The US does not like the UN which faces the prospect of being democratised, and which devotes considerable attention and financial resources to problems of development, environment, health, education, women and children. The US would like ECOSOC, UNCTAD and UNIDO to be abolished. The US is not interested in the kind of UN reforms the countries of the South
are demanding, for instance Security Council expansion. It has been demanding what it calls "administrative reforms". (New York Times April 8).

It's Ghali Versus U.S. In The U.N. Race

US Opposes Ghali's Candidacy

The 73-year old Egyptian diplomat, Boutros Boutros Ghali, citing "strong encouragement" from members states stated on Thursday that he intended to run for a second five year term as UN secretary general which has been teetering on the edge of financial bankruptcy.

But the Clinton administration, which has in weeks of behind-the scenes activity attempted to dissuade Mr. Ghali from running, gave indications that it would be prepared to oppose him. The US officials also suggested here that Washington would be prepared to use its veto as permanent member of the Security Council to stop him from winning a second term which ends in December this year. All candidates for the post must be cleared by the Security Council before being submitted to the General Assembly for a vote. (Ramesh Chandran The Times of India News Service Washington, June 20).
China likely to Play Kingmaker

Beijing may veto West's candidates for UN chief

Although the United States will probably succeed in ousting Boutros Boutros-Ghali, China may play as big a role in determining who succeeds him as secretary-general.

China will ensure that no one unacceptable to developing countries wins approval in the Security Council, which nominates a candidate, or in the 185-member General Assembly, which ratifies the choice.

As one of the five permanent members, China has a veto too, along with Russia, France and Britain. The 15-member council will probably begin the formal selection process in November. (Robert H.Reid TOI June 22).

Japan and the UN Seat

Japan is working every hard to have its candidate, Sadako Ogata, elected as UN Chief. N.Nagesh analyses the significance of the diplomatic move (TOI June 30).

Possible Geopolitical World Orders

Knowing that we are just experiencing a transition does not particularly
help us predict what the next geopolitical world-order will look like. The USA as the only remaining super-power has claimed to be constructing a new world order under its leadership but it is by no means certain that a post-hegemonic USA will be able to sustain such a role in the coming decades. We have to be honest at this time and admit that we just do not know what the distribution of power across the world will look like in the medium future.

Although the ending of the cold war was precipitated by the economic and then the political collapse of the soviet union, we should not forget that it occurred also in the period of relative US economic decline. Political recognition that the USA’s period of high hegemony was over come in 1971 when President Nixon recognized the existence of a new ‘multi-polarity’ in world affairs. Most of the recent literature focused on the USA in relation to the rise of Japan (TOI June 30,1996) certainly the most discussed scenario was derivative of our paired kondratieff model predicting a ‘Japanese century’.

The sun shines again brightly on Japan. In its pursuit for a major role at the UN, 40 years after its entry, Japan is suddenly finding several opportunities coming on its way. While its avowed bid for the UN permanent Security Council

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seat remains right on top of the agenda, its recent move to get even the two-year non-permanent seat reflects the increasing assertion by Japan in international arena. But the ongoing race for UN secretary general’s office has unexpectedly placed Japan in a dilemma.

With Boutros Boutros-Ghali announcing his decision to run for a second term though his candidature was equivocally opposed by the US, Japan’s Mother Teresa, Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, has emerged as a major contender for the top UN post.

In fact, when Japan entered the UN in 1956, it had two major goals in mind, one to join the global mainstream and the second to regain its status during the 1920s in the League of Nations, predecessor of the UN. Japan has successfully accomplished its first goal as it is a highly respected as well as a rich member of the UN family now. Its contributions to the UN system amount to 14 per cent second only to the United States’ 25 per cent.

The major turning point in Japan’s perception of the UN system came in 1991 following the Gulf War and disappearance of the Cold War. Its cheque book diplomacy during the Gulf War faced immense criticism abroad that it had to offset the adverse implications by contributing $13 billion to the UN.
peacekeeping operation in the Gulf. It had to trim up from the peace constitution’s constraints and enact the International Peace Cooperation Law in June 1992 enabling its participation in numerous peacekeeping operations of the UN. Presently, it contributes 12.5 per cent of the total expenses of the UN peacekeeping operations. Having realised that it cannot hold back any longer from international conflicts. Japan has embarked upon accomplishing second goal.

Japan has equally heightened its diplomatic parleys with the developed nations, including the five permanent members. Its soft-pedalling approach to China on several counts defying US pressure is quite evident. Unlike in the 1970s when Japanese hardly figured in the UN bodies, present numbers are quite overwhelming and many who’s who in the UN are Japanese. Moreover, its economic clout around the world has won it more staff positions than it could vie for.

The procedural ambivalence, is however, keeping it on its toes since several founding members and the Third world leaders are in the race along with Japan. Besides Germany, another developed country, India and Brazil too have expressed their desire to join the permanent members club of the Security Council.
Japan has therefore, a three prolonged strategy: Seeking entry into the Security Council as a non-permanent member, pushing Ogata as a secretary general candidate and thirdly to become a permanent member with or without veto powers.

But for Japan, Ogata’s candidature for the top UN post has come up at a wrong time. It may turn out to be a short term gain to push for Ogata’s case, especially when it is trying to redeem its long cherished dream to get permanent seat in the UN. (TOI, June 30).

_End of a Taboo: Japan Debates a Wider Military Role_

For half a century, one of the great taboos of public life there has been any discussion of a Japanese military role beyond its shores. There is less taboo in Japan in discussing security questions, and that’s good thing, ‘said Sadayuki Hayanshi, the deputy foreign minister.

For now, Mr. Hashimoto has made clear that he has no plans to move toward collective self defence, and the U.S. insists that it is not trying to push Japan in that direction. (Nicholas D Kristof, New York Times Service, May 11).
A Calculated Risk

The compulsions of Cold War kept them tied for over four decades. The post-Cold War phase has eroded the necessity for such close cooperation as conflicting economic interests virted States have realised the faux pas when they grabbed the earliest possible opportunity to recreate their security cooperation during President Bill Clinton’s recent visit to Japan, No wonder, the summit turned out to be an unusually security-centric one eclipsing several long pending trade frictions. (Nagesh TOI, May 12 1996).

Japan to Get Spy Satellite

Japan’s armed forces, already equipped with some of the world’s most advanced weapons, may get their first military spy satellite soon. The subject has long been a taboo in Japan, stemming from a 1969 parliamentary resolution which banned the use of space for military means. (Reuter May 17 1996, TOI).

As US hegemony winds down the question of a successor naturally arises and on almost all economic criteria. Japan seems to be the most likely hegemonic candidate. This is certainly the reason for the phenomenal success of
Paul Kennedy’s (1988) book just before the end of the cold war. This model postulates that all great powers overstretch themselves militarily and this becomes a particularly acute problem when economic decline sets in hence the claims of great powers from the Habsburgs to the British Empire. Is the United States the latest great power to succumb to this process? What makes Japan (TOI, 1996) look so good as successor in this sort of discussion is that its economic prowess is unencumbered by any military commitments. Here, surely is a new hegemonic state is in the making.

Akiniko Takagi, maintains that Japan, in all likelihood, will not replace the United States as the next hegemonic power. According to him, Japan, defeated in world war II, now proclaims itself to be a peaceful nation. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution states it renunciation of war and forbids the maintenance of any armaments and the right of belligerency of the state. In reality, however Japan has a self defense force (Jieitai), but Japanese people are very sensitive to an increase in the defence budget. A bill calling for the dispatch

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36 Times of India, ‘End of a Taboo’: ‘Japan debates a wider military role; ‘A calculated risk Japan to get spy satellite’: May 17, may 12, June 14), 1996, New Delhi.


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of a Japanese contingent to participate in the United Nations peace keeping force in the gulf war was submitted to the Diet, but it was not passed. This bill is still under deliberation and was carried over to a subsequent dietary session.

Neighbouring countries such as China and Korea are also extremely sensitive to any enlargement of a Japanese force. There attitude is understandably given that, it is said now, based upon the well-used former metaphor to describe US/Japanese relations, that if ‘Japan sneezes, its neighbouring countries catch a cold’.

But there is another way of reading history of hegemonic states. In the three cases so far, each new hegemonic power has been substantially larger than its predecessor. In this writing, Mackinder appreciated the importance of geographical regions forming an overall balance of power if political and military domination of a single power is to be prevented. His theory premised on one fundamental geopolitical assumption. This is what we may call an ‘ideology of bigness’. In this light the Island state of Japan does not look the part to take over from the continental scale United States. Infact, we can interpret Japan as the antithesis of the USSR, another mammoth mismatch between economic and political power but the other way around.
The possible revival of Heartland’s concept is only possible if we lay focus on one of the statements made in 1904 world model where Japan together with China could construct the yellow peril and emerge as one of the world powers. There is more talk now of Japan as a future world leader as Japan is widening its military role, planning to be a permanent or non-permanent member of U.N.’s security council and has also become more assertive towards USA.

One of the features of the post-cold war is the recognition of the complexity of contemporary geopolitics. This was reflected in the great variety of opinions expressed in the Political geography debate refered to earlier. The two polar positions in the debate were probably those presented by de Blij (1992) and Taylor (1992b). We are reminded of the continuing military capacity of the USSR and that ‘the power potential of the Eurasian heartland remains’ (de Bij 1992:16): the post cold War US monopoly of world power will be a brief interlude and a bi-polar world or something like it would be resumed. This scenario is not necessarily diminished by the demise of the USSR, a leaner Russian state retaining a large military capacity nuclear and abundant may yet attempt to reassert past political influence and power.

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40 H.J. de Blij, op.cit., p.16.
The implications of a reversion to socialism by USSR may not be so far reaching that there would be a reactivation of the cold war. This is because it may not be feasible to enforce many of the repressive principles which underlay the earlier regimes. Furthermore, it could be difficult to operate a closed system for once the democratization process has been introduced, individuals and some Republics might go to great lengths to resist any reversal.

Howsoever, a new USSR, 'A Heartland' may attempt to ensure that it re-establishes a sphere of influence made up of weaker countries sympathetic to the socialist cause. The dependence of the nations emerging out the former USSR on the more advanced and developed countries is likely to continue, with the exception of the Russian federation (Heartland 1943 still exists), which has abundant resources, a vast expanse of territory, and is strongest in terms of military and nuclear power, and the Ukraine, which has been the granary of the USSR. But a measure of uncertainty continues to persists, because of the sudden impact of the new situation, coupled with the traditional miscrutability of Russia to the western mind. Sooner or later, two general topics tend to be brought up: the inevitable comparison with the United States, present and future, and the shadowy notion of a world-dominating Heartland harking back to Mackinder.
Conclusion: A New Heartland

A superstate today has to be possessed of many attributes a great size and population a wide range of industrial resources (including energy), and an adequate foodbase coupled with a high level of internal unity, organisation and technological development. The later factors are without doubt the deciding ones.

The most fundamental of all the elements of national power is sheer location on the globe. Although this is often regarded as absolute and immutable, it is in reality relative to the other parts of the world and its significance changes and shifts and the charge therefore has to be reassessed. We can progress a little, by trying to identify those elements of the present order that may continue to recognize Mackinder’s Heartland concept that has permeated most of the geopolitical strategic thinking in the past. We must come to terms with Mackinder and geopolitics, not by ignoring it but by understanding these ideas in their historical and national content, only in this way we can go beyond this distinguished yet notorious heritage.

With the power vacuum left by the USSR a situation of competition and systemic chaos is being configured similar to the periods which characterize the end of the hegemony of one state and the emergence of a new player within various contestants. In the extrapolation, it is thought that Pax Japanica (or Pax
Nipponica) or Pax sinaica may follow Pax Americana. I state my reason below and refer to the 1904 Mackinder's statement.

The place of China in the *Heart land* scheme is a mystery at the time of writing. Its interior lands, particularly Sinkiang and Tibet, plus Mongolia were included in Mackinder's Heartland, and the last sentence of his original (1904) paper may be worth quoting here:

> Were the Chinese, he says, 'for instance, organized by the Japanese to overthrow the Russian Empire and conquer its territory, they might constitute the yellow peril to the world's freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the pivot region.' Two years after Mackinder's death, the Communist came to power in China and proclaimed their solidarity with the Soviet Union. Thus a closely knit political bloc of territory had materialized, comprising almost all the Heartland, plus, the oceanic frontage, militantly organized and involving over a third of all mankind. This seemed to be the ultimate writing on the wall for the 'marginal powers' with in the framework of the heartland theory. H.J. Mackinder, 'The Geographical Pivot of History', Geographical Journal, vol. 23. (1904).

One of the events which had given impetus to the formulation of the heartland theory in 1904 was the commencement of the Russo Japanese war. This conflict in Manchuria was interpreted by Mackinder as being a struggle

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between three imperial power, Russia, China and Britain for political dominance. (Mackinder; 1919:147). The same idea was perceived by Nixon as a 'locus of interaction. He placed China in a pivotal role.

That network of alliance takes on special meaning in the light of Asia's special significance on the world scene today. Asia and particularly Northeast Asia, is the locus of interaction among four of the five great power centres in our world, 'China is the heartland of this vast region'. Siberia and Far Eastern territories of the Soviet Union spread across the North of Asia from China to the Arctic, from Europe to the Bering Strait. The islands of Japan form a 2,000 mile crescent just off the mainland, running from the frigid waters of the North Pacific to semi-tropical Okinawa. The fourth major power of the Pacific area, is of course the United States.42 (Nixon; 1975: 426).

The ultimate objective can be said to be a change of focus. Kissinger attempted to discern distinctive geographical and historical experiences in the style of the leaders of Nixon's Heartland 'China' and Mackinder's Heartland 'Russia'.

'Mao Tse Tung and Chou En-Lai represented a society with the longest uninterrupted experience of the art of government, a nation that had always been culturally pre-eminent in its region. China had absorbed its conquerors and had

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proved its inward strength by imposing its social and intellectual style on them. Its leaders are aloof, self assured, composed. Brezhnev represented a nation that had survived not by civilizing its conquerors but by outlasting them, a people suspended between Europe and Asia and not wholly of either, with a culture that had destroyed its traditions without yet entirely replacing them. He sought to obscure his lack of assurance by boisterousness and his sense of latent inadequacy by occasional bullying. 43 (Kissinger, 1138).

The contrasts which Kissinger drew between the Russian and Chinese style of diplomacy were not only illuminating, but revealed an increasing sensitivity to the complications inherent in the integration of force and diplomacy. He appreciated the relationship between style of diplomacy, geographical location, and historical development:

Gromyko’s method of negotiation approached a stereotype... Just as Russia had expanded over the centuries by gradually inundating the territories on the flat plain, surrounding the original Grand Dutch of Moscovy so Gromyko preferred steady pressure to the bold move. He patiently accumulated marginal gains until they amounted to a major difference. 44 (Kissinger: 789).

44 ibid., p.789.
The Chinese style of diplomacy and its relationship to geographical location and historical development was juxtaposed to the Russian style in a candid manner:

Chou En-lai possessing the sense of cultural superiority of a ancient civilization softened the edges of ideological hostility by an insinuating ease of manner and seemingly effortless skill to penetrate to the heart of the matter. Gromyko, as the spokesman of a country that had never prevailed except by raw power lacked this confidence, he was obliged to test his mettle in every encounter.\(^45\) (Kissinger: 792-3).

While it must be acknowledged that there are limitations to the extent to which this interpretative role could mould predictions about the future political development of both China and Russia.

In the second term of the Reagan administration another important geopolitical rival was identified. ‘While the Soviet Union presents a global geopolitical challenge, it is most attentive to its interests in areas along its borders. Viewed from Moscow Europe remains the grand prize; the Middle East, a cockpit of conflict and potential opportunities. China a feared neighbour.'\(^46\) (Armacost; 1985: 53).

\(^{45}\) ibid., pp.792-3.

It was used in the late nineteenth century to justify the large policy of the limited states in the Pacific. Political explanations deduced from these choices asserted that the Pacific ocean was destined once more to be the main area of strategic and economic concern for the United States.

We do not consider the Pacific an 'American lake' but do acknowledge our responsibilities and legitimate national interests there. We are a Pacific nation, and have been, historically. We are proud of that fact and proud of the contributions we have made to the welfare and development of the region.47 (Sigur; 1986: 75).

It can be argued that the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries represented a watershed in the historical development of US foreign policy. In this period the United States expanded its economic interests in the Pacific Ocean, Japan and China. Powerful political lobbies believed that the United States should assume the commercial role that England had relinquished. The choices with respect to the political importance that was attached to certain geopolitical conceptions were changing. The political objective of no permanent alliances with any foreign power, which had been projected through a system of opinion largely based on geographical distance, was perceived increasingly as an obstruction to the new direction of strategic policy:

47 'The Strategic Importance of the Emerging Pacific,' Address by Mr.Sigur, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 29 September 1986: Dept of State Bulletin, December 1986, p.75.
Our interests in China are considerable... The Pacific Ocean is destined to bear on its bosom a larger commerce than the Atlantic... Here are diverse and varied sources of interest in the Far East which directly touch us.\(^{48}\) (Minister Denby to Secretary of State Sherman, 1898).

China is another contiguous region of geopolitical importance. Though China has similar diversities as in the USSR and has adopted the communist ideology, there are several differences between the two. China has already allowed selective private ownership of agricultural land and trade. There, production and distribution systems are changing universally, from ‘Commune Command’ and ‘State control’ to largely ‘household control’. Foreign investment is expanding in China (a large part, hitherto, by the overseas Chinese) because of the favourable policies of the government in providing infrastructure, services and other facilities. Production and trade linkages are developing with the outside world directly and through Hongkong which has very developed linkages with large overseas markets. China has no balance of payments problem, in 1990 its trade surplus account was nearly US $9 billion. But these factors may prove to be the undoing of the communist system in the country in the not-too distant future. Radical democratization in china may well be realized in the future, depending on how the post-Deng ‘regime’ develops by the year 2000. Hongkong will be returned to China in 1997, and China with hope to promote the opening

\(^{48}\) Minister Denby to Secretary of State Sherman, 31 January 1898, Department of State.
of its economy, centering on Hong Kong and its coastal regions. China’s dream of becoming an economic superpower, is feared by USA and that has led to major confrontations between the two nations in policy matters. Inspite of that China could not be refused the status of Most favoured Nation. (MFN) trading status by Clinton administration.  

China Policy Makes Clinton, Dole Unusual Allies

When President Bush tried to maintain ties to the Beijing government and renewed China’s most favoured nation or MFN trading status, candidate Clinton accused him of ‘coddling dictators.’

Now Clinton is hearing the same sort of criticism, particularly from conservative Republicans. ‘The Chinese government knows that when they are dealing with clinton they’re dealing with a ‘Paper Tiger’ when it comes to human rights his deeds don’t match his words.’ Even while supporting renewal of MFN for China, Dole said the president "has never articulated a coherent strategy for dealing with China." (D.M.Rothberg, TOI May 14 1996).

US administration is very keen on setting a ‘China policy’, through various summits.  

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49 D.M. Rothberg, China Policy Makes Clinton Dole Unusual Allies, May 13 1996 TOI.

50 B.Schweid, ‘Christopher Suggests U.S.- China Summits’, May 18, 1996, TOI.
**Christopher Suggests U.S.- China Summits**

Reaching out to China, U.S. Secretary of state Warren Christopher proposed a growing international role for the Asian giant and regular summit meetings between the American and Chinese presidents:

An isolated China can produce harmful, even disastrous, results for the Chinese people, the region and the world,” Mr Christopher said on Friday in a New York speech. ‘A more secure China is likely to be more open to reform and to be a better neighbour.

US discouraging China’s nuclear test plans. whereas China gives a deaf ear to all that.51

**U.S. Trying to Block Chinese Missile Efforts**

United States is trying its best to foil China’s efforts to acquire from Russia and Ukraine inter-continental ballistic missile technology for building SS-18 missiles, the most powerful in the Russian arsenal. (TV Parasuram TOI May 23 1996).

**Now It’s ‘China That Can Say No’**

A new book titled China Can Say No - a virtual diatribe against the United States is on its way to becoming a bestseller in China.

Similar in theme to the bestselling Japanese book, ‘The Japan That Can Say No’, authored by Japanese politician, Shintaro Ishihara and Akio Morita, chairman of Sony Corp, the book exhorts the powers that be in Beijing to stand up to US bullying.

Authored by five Chinese journalist Song Qiang (31), the book has sold all 50,000 copies of the first edition within weeks of its publication.

‘The US wants to destroy China’s dream of becoming an economic superpower. We wanted to issue a warning’. Song says in his book, according to U.S. media reports from Beijing.

**China Conducts ‘Penultimate’ N-Test**

China on Saturday tested a medium size nuclear weapon and declared that after one more test it would observe a nuclear test moratorium like the other four nuclear powers.

China followed up its concession at the Geneva test ban negotiations on Thursday with a nuclear explosion at its Lop Nor test site in the northwestern province of Xinjiang.
Saturday’s test came just two days after China announced that it would abandon its insistence on continuing ‘peaceful nuclear explosions’ at the negotiations in Geneva for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT).

Anticipating another around of furious criticism following this latest nuclear test, China made two further "concessions".

First, it was more transparent about this test than previous ones the last Chinese nuclear test was in August last year. Instead of keeping quite about the test and leaving announcements about it to foreign monitors, which was past practice, China on Saturday acknowledged that a test had taken place.

Additionally, it announced that another test would take place in September.

These latest tests were justified in a foreign ministry statement as being necessary for the safety of China’s nuclear weapons a curious excuse suggesting as it does that China’s nuclear weapons a curious excuse suggesting as it does that China’s nuclear armoury is currently in an unsafe or volatile state. (Harvey Stockwin, TOI, June 9, 1996).
Although it is true that the four nuclear powers the US, Russia, Britain and France have announced a halt to nuclear tests. But other countries do not have the right to criticise China, even if they have stopped nuclear testing. In particular the US, which has simply replaced live tests with computer simulation. The Tiji press new agency also reports that there are signs that China has obtained nuclear testing computer simulation technology from Russia which would aid China’s multiple war head technological development.

Another report in the newspaper\(^2\) (quote, TOI, June 11, 1996), shows shift in China’s plans to seriously favour European nations over US companies.

**Li Peng Favours Trade with Europeans Over US Companies**

Chinese Premier Li Peng says Beijing will favour European companies over their American counterparts to reward their government "more lenient" policies toward China, the Financial Times reported on Tuesday. (TOI, June 11, 1996).

It appears that China, is ready to take fights with any nation, which dares to interfere in its internal matters. Recent report\(^3\) (TOI, June 13, 1996) shows how China outrightly expressed this to Germany for backing Tibet.

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\(^2\) 'Li Peng Favours Trade With Europeans Over US Companies', June 11, 1996, TOI.

\(^3\) 'China Bans German Trust Backing Tibet', June 13, 1996, TOI.
China Bans German Trust Backing Tibet

China squared up for a fight with Germany on Thursday, closing down a Bonn funded aid organisation and summoning the German ambassador in Beijing for a dressing down over an upcoming Tibet conference in Germany.

German ambassador Konrad Seitz was called into the foreign ministry in Beijing and informed that all activity by the local office of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation was being banned, a Chinese government spokesman said. (TOI, 13 June, 1996).

The March 23 elections in Taiwan was held amid simmering hostility between the China and the capitalist Island it claims as a renegade province. On the other hand, opposite to its no-nonsense policy on the other hand, China is trying to improve its diplomatic ties with its neighbours one such move which threatens of mackinderian theories relevance again is the report\textsuperscript{54} quoted in April 25, 1996, TOI.

Russia, China Sign 14 Major Agreements

In a move reminiscent of an era when Moscow and Beijing were aligned as Communist powers, China and Russia signed an agreement on Thursday setting up a hot line between the two capitals.

\textsuperscript{54} ‘Russia, China Sign 14 Major Agreements’, 25 April 1996, TOI.
Russia and China have said they have no intention of forming an axis. However, Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s three-day visit, which began on Wednesday, marks a high point in warming ties. Both sides are expecting the visit to draw the two nations even closer.

In China’s view, relations with Russia now are the best they have been in a long time.

During the Cold War, ideological differences, personal animosity between leaders of each side and border disputes kept China and the Soviet Union apart.

In recent years, despite China’s dismay over the breakup of the Soviet Union, the two sides have been drawing together. (TOI, April 25, 1996).

As China favour’s trade relations with Europe (unified Europe after the end of cold war) and constructing fresh relationships with Japan and Russia or taking over the Mackinder’s Heartland. Also the pacific rim power bloc threatens to displace Europe from the centre of world affairs to a side show location. The only dictum which could now be applicable in the emerging new world order would be:
FIG 12
NEW HEARTLAND OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER
Who Controls Asia Pacific, Commands The World Island,
Who Controls The World Island, Commands The Euroland,
Heartland, Islands and the World.

As Funabashi\textsuperscript{55} (1991) states in his discussion of ‘geo- economics’ - a situation where international politics is prescribed by economic, technical and geographical conditions rather than only geopolitical conditions. If this is the case, given the continued economic growth of China, Japan and the Asian newly-industrialized countries, we can expect a formation of East and South East Asian Economic blocs, and formation of a Pacific Rim economic bloc.

In the Pacific region, structural impediments will be removed gradually as the Asian bloc increases, and a Pan Pacific economic bloc will be formed. On the other hand, regimes indicative of the old war remain in Asia, especially in the Far East. Two pole system might again emerge consisting of the Atlantic bloc and the Pacific Bloc with China dominating in the Pacific Bloc. This can be perceived as Infact, this is a move towards, processing the 1904 Heartland world model’s since if successful it would leave China in possession of most of Mackinder’s world-Island and emerging as a ‘\textbf{New Heartland}’ (Fig.12) of land and sea power both, ready to strike at the remaining other pan - region, and would re-engage the other nations in the ‘great game’.

\textsuperscript{55} Y. Funabashi, ‘Post the Cold War, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1991.
The geographical scope of Mackinder's model is larger. His international political system is global from its inception. This is not just a matter of geographical definition. It relates to why is a world outlook an important criterion for Mackinder? The original mechanisms for change in his system are twofold. First there is the urge to make global order once the possibilities of a global order became known an in mate will for power becomes expressed as an urge to shape world-order. Only a few people may have such a world outlook, but they respond to the inarticulated needs of the many. Second, the nature of international politics as a system means that structures run down and have to be reconstructed. All systems suffer a loss of order and survive by cyclical development. Mackinder's model describes a particular expression of this general process. It is on the basis of these mechanism that change has occurred in Mackinder's global system. We need to consider this world order to understand the stabilization in alliances that is to occur after 2000 to produce a diplomatic turn about.

The world is a stage for international rivalry, for the major patterns of political geography have been determined by competition amongst nations. It is to be expected that the future political geography of the world will be consequent on the patterns of future competition.