Chapter Three

Geopolitical Models & Their Theoretical Aspects
If politics is the art of government then the 'Geo' prefix implies the application of geographical Knowledge to this end. Geographically speaking and in international relation, geopolitics consistently assigns priority to the 'objective factor' of space and human masses over the 'subjective factor' of cultural and technical development. The main service a geographer can provide in foreign affairs is to emphasize the defence which geography offers against the ambitions of rivals and to instil as much objective geographical reality into the dealings between nation as possible.

Geopolitics is concerned with the recent past, the present, and the near or distant future. On the basis of the analysis of the recent past and the actual present, and some times even of assessment of man's historical experience the geopoliticalician can evaluate future geopolitical trends and indicate what policy or policies a particular nation or region, or the world, as a whole should pursue for its safety and welfare. There is, therefore, scope for writing the particular region or country, or of the globe as a whole, through this methodology. It discovers the geopolitical basis for the growth of a worldwide empire. It further pinpoints geopolitical reasons for the success or failure of States or empires. As geopolitics deals with basic aspects of the growth of civilisation, its analysis in the form of a complete methodology has a fourfold objective: (1) to evolve a sound
theoretical basis on which geopolitics could be developed as a systematic discipline; (2) to examine the nature of the development of contemporary regional and global geopolitics, including seabed and outer space; (3) to reconstruct the history of geopolitics of any particular country or region or of the globe; and (4) to analyse the national power of important countries.

Origins of Geopolitics

Friedrich Ratzel, is usually recognised as the founder and father of modern political geography because of his ideas on state formation and features, is also often credited with the earliest thinking about geopolitics. His thesis on the theory of the organic growth of the state, included in his 'Politische geographie'\(^1\) (1896) was based in part on evolutionary biological and environmental determinism of the late nineteenth century. While Ratzel postulated seven 'laws' of state growth, he did not coin the term 'geopolitics' or 'Geopolitik'; that credit is given to Rudolph Kjellen\(^2\) (1864-1922), a Swedish political scientist. His ideas on territorial expansion (Lebensraum or living space according to Ratzel) as a legitimate goal for a state influenced the writings of a number of German and other European geographers, historians, and political scientists. Kjellen (1916) argues that: 'vitally strong states with a limited area of

\(^1\) F. Ratzel, 'Politische Geographie', Munich: Oldenbourg, 1897.

sovereignty are dominated by the categorical imperative to enlarge their area by colonization, union with other states, or conquests of different types. It is not the raw material of conquest, but the natural and necessary trend towards expansion as a means of self preservation.\(^3\)

It was out of such thinking that geopolitics became associated with a state’s territorial expansion. The state according to Kjellen, was behaving like a biological organism, the same theory advocated by Ratzel. Large states would survive, be powerful, and influence continental and global politics. Only a few of these were likely to persist.

**Definitions of Geopolitics**

Hartshorne,\(^4\) stated in his detailed examination of ‘Political Geography’ that at the turn of the century it was difficult analytically to separate political geography from geopolitics. But for Hartshorne geopolitics had a specific meaning: ‘the application of the Knowledge and techniques of political geography to the problems of international relations’.\(^5\)

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Similarly Sprout in his discussion of ‘political geography recognises the association geopolitics had with political geography. Much of the confusion came from the adjective ‘geopolitical’ He states: ‘This word entered the English language as a loose translation of ‘geopolitik’, which came, in the interwar period (1919-1939), to denote mobilisation of a real knowledge for purposes of state-in Short, Geo-Policy. 6

Ratzel did not coin the term nor is he given credit for introducing it into political geography. That credit is given to Kjellen who used Ratzels ideas area theories of the state as a living organism to develop the ‘Science of geopolitics.’ Kjellen defined geopolitics as:

‘The theory of the state as a geographic organism or phenomenon in space, i.e., land territory, and, or most especially, as country’ (Kjellen, 1914). 7

States according to Kjellen, were regarded more an competing powers than legal units. With this view it is easy to see that the inevitable result would be a few large and powerful units devouring the smaller weaker ones. Kasperson and Minighi (1969, p.8) wrote, about Kjellen and his ideas:

‘He (Kjellen) viewed this process as a perpetual interchange among ‘country, people, and government’. This process of human occupation of a region gave it, in casual sequence, continuity, solidarity, interaction, loyalty, and nationality; that the creation of a nation with what Kjellen called a ‘geopolitical instinct’ (Kasperson and Minghi, 1969:8).  

Halford J. Mackinder, 9 who, had a major influence in the thinking about world politics early this century. He was concerned with the changes among warring Eurasian powers and the expansive colonial systems. Mackinder also did not use the term ‘geopolitics’, but in his writings, he discussed the emerging strategic importance of pivotal area in Eurasia, later called the heartland. His ideas about position, power, dominance, and influences in the rapidly changing military and political world of the early twentieth century influenced Haushofer personally and German school of geopolitics.

According to Busteed (1983, pp. 36-7) the German School of Geopolitics espoused certain views. These included (1) the primacy of the state over the individual; (2) the state as an organism (following Ratzel and Kjellen); (3) the adoption of Kjellen’s use of the term Geopolitik; and (4) the endorsement

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of Kjellen’s notion of national self-sufficiency (autarky). Considering that the School of Zeitschrift emerged in importance in defeated World War I Germany, it was little wonder that geopolitical ideas and thought came to influence policy.

Haushofer saw in the writings of Ratzel, Kjellen, and Mackinder the basis for a theory to explain state growth. To make geopolitics a science, he had to search for ‘laws’ that would explain and justify the organic growth of a state. He and his disciplines even developed a vocabulary to fit their science. An organism (viz., the state) needed living space (Lebensraum to retain power grossmachte), to define military boundaries (Wehrgrenze), to define an ethnically homogenous population (Kultur) and to become economically, self sufficient (Autarky). One of Haushofer’s students Otto maul (1936:31) provides a concise definition of German Geopolitik.

‘Geopolitik’, concerns itself with the state, not as a static concept, but as a living being. Geopolitik investigates the state primarily, in relation to its environment - its space and attempts to solve all problems resulting from spatial relationships... Geopolitik is concerned with the space requirements of a state while political geography examines only its space conditions. In putting geography at the service of space - Conscious politics, Geopolitik devoted itself to questions of the future. Are the space needs of a state met? If not, how can they be brought into accord with geographical conditions? In what direction should any change be made?. The extent to which these questions are answered determines a state’s national and economic structure.
and influences its foreign relations. Geopolitik is a discipline that weighs and evaluates a given situation and by its conclusions seeks to guide practical politics. (Otto Maull, 1936:31)

Haushofer, according to Hartshorne (1954, p.172), was instrumental in ‘supplying a pseudo-scientific rationalisation for the Nazi policy of expansion’ commenting on German geopolitics write:

The analysis of the geographical basis of national and international power became a pseudo-science; the early theories were shrewdly manipulated to further German nationalism, and to rationalise German territorial expansion.

Haushofer’s thinking and indeed that of the German School of Geopolitics is reported in Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik (Weigert, 1942, p.14):

[Geopolitics] should suggest the future course of political action, and, like the still, small voice of conscience, keep reminding politicians of what they should do in the best interests of their country. Yet geopolitics was something more than strategy because it helped to formulate the objective of policy as well as being the means by which that objective might ultimately be reached.

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Glassner and de Blij (1980, pp. 268-70) in discussing the origin of Geopolitik succinctly summarise Haushofer’s views:

Haushofer and his group blended together the organic state theory of Ratzel, its refinements and elaborations by Kjellen, and the geostrategic principles of Mahan and Mackinder, added a heavy dose of German chauvinism, willful ambiguity, and mysticism, and created a case for a German policy of expansionism. They used not only maps but slogans and pictographs to influence people.  

Definitions during the 1940s by non-German political geographers reflected the emotional and propaganda connotations associated with geopolitics. Others, such as Fifield and Pearcy (1944) and East and Moodie (1956), related geopolitics directly to foreign policy. Later theoreticians, including Hartshorne (1954) in their assessments of political geography and military geography were mindful of how geopolitics was related to power and strategic studies. Hartshorne writes that: ‘It would seem well to identify this area (national power) of joint interests with a clear and simple name, such as ‘power analysis’, rather than to obscure it with the all-embracing term, geopolitics, the

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origin of which is stepped in error, exaggeration, and intellectual position.\(^{17}\)

(Hartshorne, 1954: 126).

More recently, Sprout suggests that geopolitics is:

> The areal aspect of any political pattern and, in particular, hypothesis that purport to explain or to predict area distributions and patterns of political potential in the society of nations\(^{18}\) (Sprout, 1948: 121).

Today, much of what might be included under the rubric of geopolitics, deals with economic and military ties state security power influences, and military defence strategies.

Cohen\(^{19}\) (1973, p.29) adds a dynamic dimension in his observation that,

"The essence of geopolitical analysis is the relation of a international political power to the geographical setting. Geopolitical views vary with the chaning setting and with man’s interpretation of the nature of this change. Cohen, is a major user of the term geopolitics in interpreting contemporary international relations. He defines the components of a geopolitical study as:

\(^{17}\) op cite., p. 126.


(1) description of geographical settings as they relate to political power, and
(2) laying out of spatial frameworks that embrace interacting power units. It is much more difficult to attempt such analysis today than in the past. Because of the hierarchical spatial overlap that exists among great power blocs and the process of constant political realignment, sharply defined global, political divisions cannot be easily rationalized. Moreover, the exercise of political power may be the measure of a man's daring or a people's desperation, rather than the result of the cultural and physical setting. Cohen (1982, 1983) uses geopolitical consideration in assessing the contemporary political scene and in identifying 27 states that he believes have, or aspire to, regional power status.

Glassner and de Blij, discuss in some detail 'Geopolitics on a smaller scale' by focusing on the decay of the buffer zone in southern Africa since 1960 and the geostrategic importance of the Indian ocean. Glassner and de Blij, write that geopolitics: is concerned basically with the application of geographic information and geographic perspectives to the development of a state's foreign policies. It has been called, with some justification, 'applied political geography'. (Glassner and De Blij, 1980: 263)

\[20\] op.cit., p.265.
Moreover, geopolitics has a double function. Like political geography, it represents facts as they are, but unlike political and other departments of geography, it analyses and interprets the national situation of a country and the global scene on the basis of facts presented and formulates the internal and external policies of that country. Postwar, geopolitical writers all focus their inquiry on the relationship between geography and foreign policy in a changing international environment. All seek to play down the negative connotations associated with the term during the war years.

Three other individuals who are credited with promoting geopolitical applications are Admiral Thomas Mahan (180-1914), Nicholas Spykman (1893-1974). Mahan, an historian in the US Navy, was writing before Mackinder about the importance of seapower in a state's military strategies and international relations. Among his books are the Influence of Seapower Upon History, 16601-783 (1890). The Influence of Seapower upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1973-1812 (1892), and The Problem of Asia and its Effect upon International Politics (1900). Mahan was an advocate of a large and strong navy to contain the expansionist policies of Russia in particular. His ideas exerted substantial influence on US, British, Japanese and German foreign policies at the turn of this century.
Spykman, a political scientist, writing after Mackinder’s ideas had been publicised, revised, and criticised, is credited with stressing the geopolitical importance of Mackinder’s Inner or Marginal Crescent on the Rimland. Spykman believed that powerful states are those that forged alliances between land and sea powers, i.e., those in the Rimland. Their survival and power were derived from their strategic Rimland location, hence his dictum:

Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia;  
Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world  
(Spykman, 1944).

Spykman’s major books were America’s Strategy in World Politics (1942a) and the Geography of the Peace (1944). A timely review of the former book is by Bowman (1942), spykman, according to Hartshorne (1954) used geopolitics to show the Rimland’s importance to the US vis-a-vis the rest of the world.

De Seversky contended that air power represented a new and challenging dimension for a state’s defence and security. He was influential in alerting the government and public to the importance of developing air warfare. His books included Victory Through Air Power (1941) and Air Power: Key to Survival (1950); he also wrote in popular magazines during World War II. In addition to stressing the need for the US to develop air power superiority, he also introduced an azimuthal equidistant projection centred on the North Pole. It
showed a pilot's view of the world. Glassner and de Blij (1980, p.272) remark that his 1949 map.

Performed a most useful function by tearing us away from zero Mercator-view of the world, by developing an interim defence system, and by emphasizing defence instead of expansion as the prime goal of geostrategy.²¹

The ideas of de Seversky, while considered a revolutionary at the time, were responsible for traditional and emerging European, Asian, and North American powers rethinking their political relation vis-a-vis other states and their own military strengths, treaty agreements, and defence system.

In summary, geopolitics represents one of the major thrusts of political geography investigation during the past century whether or not the term has been specifically identified.

Continuing Controversies

Intellectual controversies have persisted among geopoliticians. One group of controversies is embedded in geopolitics itself, scholars working within the geopolitical tradition challenge other scholars working for the same theoretical framework.

²¹ op.cit., p.272.
Historically, scholars working within the geopolitical framework have debated the extent to which geopolitical factors can or cannot be altered or modified. As sprout and sprout explain:

'The political value and significance of location, distance, space, distribution and configuration - the prime geographic dimensions formerly - remain fairly static for long periods'. (Sprout and Sprout, 1971: 264)\(^\text{22}\).

However, with changes in the system (technological), these relationships have become unstable and dynamic. Infact, the definitions of geopolitics presented earlier attest to the prevalence of the view, that geopolitical factors are changeable. As cohen suggests:- 'Geopolitical views vary with the changing geographical setting and with mains interpretation of the nature of this change'.\(^\text{23}\)

A second controversy within the field of geopolitics involves the specification of the relationship between geopolitics and political


behaviour. Three contrasting views specify this relationship. The first view is that geopolitics 'determines' political behaviour. German geopolitik of the interwar and war period comes closest to this position. By suggesting that sufficient land area and natural resources were needed to support the population of a nation, they implied that these geopolitical factors determined the policy of 'Lebensraum' or living space supported by Ratzel, Kjellen and Haushofer. The above determinism became the rationale for Nazi expansion and aggression.

Geopolitical Models

In the initial stage of the growth of civilization, geopolitical thought constructions or models developed in an unsystematic and isolated way in different political areas of the globe. Indeed, it was indistinguishable from geographical ideas, foreign policies and general political notions of different states and political areas. In tracing the evolution of geopolitical models, we not only analyse the writings of different geopoliticians, but also discuss the possible geopolitical significance of that model in relation to geography, foreign policy, and general political notions which contains geopolitical values and substance in them.

Geopolitical models are designed to draw attention to the importance of certain geographical patterns in political history. These models are theories of
spatial relationships and historical causation. 'Geopolitics' is one of the grand models of political geography. Geographical factors or variables are an important part of the power equation. Geopolitical theory, is of particular relevance to states strategic policy for a number of reasons.

The two main components of ancient geopolitical thought were the ideas of geographic homogeneity and land as the main basis of geographic space. In the early nineteenth century such geographic concepts as 'manifest destiny' were coined to explain expansion of continental limits. This suggested existence of a dynamic relationship between a natural boundary and the continuous expansion of the geographical size of the state. Explanations have been deduced from these models which suggest the contemporary and future political relevance of various geographical conceptualisations. The unique nature of geopolitical models and its attempt to show the interaction between spatial relationships and historical causation has been eloquently described by sir Halford Mackinder. 'In applying geography to the lighting up of history, the physical features may, as a first approximation be treated as constant rock-like, around them the human flood surges and rests, ebbs and flows now calmly contained in its basin, now sweeping over, bursting through or wearing away the obstacles'.

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Geopolitical models were an attempt to show how geographical patterns of history formulated by geopolitical theorists were the result of historical movements which were centuries old. Therefore let us see how geopolitical thought has gradually developed out of sea, land, and at a much later stage (i.e. since the second world war), air geographies. Only a proper understanding of the evolution of geopolitical models, would enable us to determine the task of assessing the geopolitical situation of a country or an area in particular, and of the globe in general, in any given period of history, especially in the contemporary era.

The Geopolitical models can be organised into three selected categories; sea power advocates, Land power advocates and Airpower advocates. This can be supplemented with additional items of German ‘geopolitik’, maps as tools of propaganda and contemporary geopolitical models.

Sea Power Models

A. T. Mahan Sea Power Model

Mahan a graduate of United States Naval Academy and retired with a rank of Rear Admiral. It has been rightly observed that no individual has so directly and profoundly influenced the theory of sea power and naval strategy as Mahan.
Mahan's ideas about global strategy cannot be found in any single book or article. These have to be pieced together from the numerous statements scattered throughout his large number of writings. His major contribution consists of the greattrilogy of the following books: The influence of sea power upon History, 1660-1783 (1890), The influence of sea power upon the French revolution and Empire, 1793-1832 (1892); and The life of Nelson (1897). However, all his writings are linked through a common cord. This link was derived from his firm conviction that the essential condition for world power status for any state was an effective control of the seas. He was convinced, that in the struggle for supremacy among the leading states of the world, the oceanic power would have the upper hand. Mahan attempted to give rationalist perspective. He emphasized on the investigation of historical events which may then have been woven into geographical or political patterns. Mahan examined the relationship between the political control of the sea, through the action of a Navy, and the effect that the possession of a powerful Navy had on the foreign policy of the most powerful states throughout the course of history. From these two factors certain explanations were formulated which predicted the role that naval power could play in the foreign policy of the united states.

The four spatio-political aspects on the role of sea power in the world were basic to the thinking of Mahan:
a) there is a continuous and unbroken system of oceans and seas on the earth's surface leading to a united system of oceanic communication.

b) there is a vast transcontinental and almost completely landlocked state the Russian Empire - extending without a break from the ice bound Arctic in the north to the rugged desert mountain belt of inner Asia in the south, and from Eastern Europe to the extreme eastern margin of the Asian mainland.

c) Around the transcontinental Russian Empire are the maritime states of Europe and the countries of south and East Asia bordering on the Indian and the Pacific oceans.

d) There are three insular states disconnected from the Eurasian mainland - Great Britain, Japan and united states.

To Mahan, the sea was a 'great highway'; 'a wide common', over which men may pass in all direction, but on which some well known paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lives of travel rather than others'. In a trade dominated modern world, therefore, suitable oceanic location offered a distinct politico - economic advantage, and a land locked location was in that regard a relative disadvantage. Mahan wrote that, the, 'ships that -- sail to and or must have secure ports to which to return, and must, as far as possible, be followed by the protection of their country throughout the voyage.... In these
three thing - production, with the necessity of exchanging products, shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on and colonies, which facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping and tend to protect it by multiplying points of safety is to be found the key to much of the history as well as of policy of nations bordering the sea.'

Mahan held that control of the sea was a prerequisite of world power. He listed the following as the six fundamental factors affecting the development of sea power; geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, size of population, national character, and governmental character. Control of the sea could be achieved only by controlling those land bases which had the advantage of strategic location, coastal shape, and a hinterland endowed with a depth suitable for defence.

Mahan also believed that no state can be a land power and a seapower of consequence at the sametime, as the problem of defending a land boundary against a strong continental rival would preclude successful competition for supremacy on the sea. Throughout their history, for example, the continental European states have had to stand guard on their borders to prevent possible intrusion or encroachment by their neighbours. They have thus been preoccupied largely in military preparations to keep their land forces in battle readiness. Only
France possessed a geographical setting that could be used as a base for sea power.

To Mahan the Russian empire typified the strength and the weakness of land power. Obstacles imposed by physical geography placed a strong check upon the freedom of movement of the Russian state. Enormous distances and inadequate internal communications severely limited its internal coherence. At the same time because of its landlocked position, Russia was greatly disadvantaged in that it could be completely shut off by a hostile sea power. Because of these difficulties inherent in her geography, Mahan thought that the Russian Empire, if it could not be broken, could at least be ‘contained’.

Mahan, however, ruled out the possibility of a land sea power in Eurasia seizing control of the ocean. He argued that only great Britain, with its excellent insular base at home and easily defended bases abroad, could make a bid for naval supremacy in the world. Mahan also felt that the Northern Hemisphere was the key to world power, with the Panama and Suez marking the southern limit of active commerce and politics. Within Eurasia, he described Russia’s position as unassailable as the dominant Asian land power. He called the zone between thirty and forty degree parallels in Asia as the zone of conflict between Russian land-power and British sea-power.
According to Mahan, the Russian drive for world dominance could be checked by the Anglo-American alliance from key land bases surrounding Eurasia because of the inherent advantages of sea movement over land movement. In fact, he forecast an alliance between the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan for the common purpose of containing Russia and China.

In the opinion of Harold and Margaret Sprout, Mahan, in his geopolitical analysis of the contemporary world, clearly anticipated Mackinder’s concept of the Eurasian ‘Heartland’. ‘His strategy vis-a-vis the Russian Empire closely resembled in geopolitical conception the strategy for containing the Soviet Union (that was) actually pursued by the United States during the later 1940s and 1950s, nearly half a century after Mahan’s death in 1914’.25 (Sprout and Sprout, 1964, p. 325).

However, like all other strategic speculations, Mahan’s also were written in the perspective of its time: a time when the Navy of Queen Victoria (1837-1901) reigned supreme. Now that the technology of transportation and warfare have so revolutionizingly changed, and air power has in a good measure replaced

seapower much of what Mahan wrote has become obsolete. But this in no way
lessens the value of his writings which were full of great insight and had helped
a great deal to mould the strategic thinking of his countrymen. And Mahan
became again relevant with the arrival of a new oceanic age heralded by the
nuclear powered sub-surface ship.

In one way or the other his writings affected the character of naval
thought in France, Italy, Russia, Japan and lesser powers... 'By direct influence
and through the political power of his friends, Theodore Rossevelt and Henry
cabot lodge, he played a leading role in persuading the United States to pursue
a larger destiny overseas during the opening years of the twentieth century'
(Sprout, 1943: 415).26

G. H. Lea's Model of Sea Power

The geopolitical theories of General Homer Lea27, while not reaching
the political prominence of Mahan, initially had a number of important

26 T. M. Sprout, ‘Mahan : Evangelist of Sea Power’, Chapter 17 in E, M.
Earles’ (Ed) Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton, Princeton University

Attempts to Illustrate where a Japanese Attack Would Occur in both the
Phillipines and Hawai, and Eventually the East Coast of the United
States.
similarities between the latter. First lea, like Mahan, was sustained by a Darwanian mode of thought when making an analysis of the state system. Secondly emulating Mahan, and in a vein similar to the classic geopolitical theorists; Lea gave expression to a rationalist as opposed to an empiricist perspective. He also intended his theory to act as a practical guide for political action for statesmen and policy makers.

Thirdly, while Mahan had formulated principles of naval power based on geographical position, Lea formulated a number of a priori natural laws from which certain political aims and objectives could be deduced. These natural laws formed the central concepts of Lea’s theory.

1) First law maintained that the security of an insular power is not measured by warships but by an ability to control the coasts encompassing the sea in which it is situated.

2) The second law asserted that sea power in an insular empire is not measured by the number of its ships of war, but by the capacity to prevent the maritime superiority of any state placed on the external shores of the sea in which it is located.

3) The third law maintained that a continental state which has access to a sea in which a sea power is situated will eventually become a more powerful maritime power than the insular sea-power.
The main weakness of Lea’s geopolitical model was similar to that of German Geopolitics. States were interpreted as living organisms. He also paid little attention to how changes in the levels of transport and weapons technology would affect the validity of his three natural laws.

Although, within a rationalist perspective Lea used a different method of analysis to Mahan, the conclusions which he came to were similar - that a strategic advantage accrued to Russia primarily as a result of her location on the Eurasian continent. A central geographical location resulted in shorter lives of communication and transport which was advantageous for defence and offence.

Lea’s natural laws can be described as an attempt to explain the relationship between seapower, land power and geographical configuration.

Land Power Models

Mackinder’s Heartland Concept

Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) has perhaps been the best known geographer in the nongeographic circles, and his has definitely been the best known global strategic scheme in modern times. Many believe that, ‘It would be difficult to find an essay of comparable length and reputation that is more

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indefensible in terminology and ideas than Mackinder’s’ (Malin: 1959, 339)\textsuperscript{28}

A Scot by birth, Mackinder was a professor of geography at the university of London, Director of the London school of Economics, and a member of the British Parliament. Mackinder in a more organized and pointed way than Mahan, provided a fresh political perspective on the geographical distribution of land masses and bodies of water on the earth. He interpreted history as essentially a struggle between Land and sea power. The geopolitical concepts and hypotheses of Mahan and Mackinder are by no means as far apart as has often been asserted. Their theories of sea and land power have often been contrasted. But it was Mackinder rather than Mahan who methodologically ordered the concepts and hypotheses, propounded an interpretation of history in the grand style, and drew a geopolitical blue print of the future which for better or for worse still grips the imagination of men in many lands.

\textit{Fundamentals of the Heartland Thesis}

In 1904 Mackinder presented before the Royal Geographical society of London his seminal paper entitled "The geographical pivot of History". It is in

this paper that the basic ideas of his ‘Heartland’ thesis were for the first time presented in an organized manner. In the post-columbian era international politics had become a closed system of worldwide scope. Mackinder presented his paper with ‘a view to delineating his formula of ‘geographical causation’ in the history of the world which in his estimate had, throughout human history, been “most coercive of human action”29 (Sprout and Sprout, 1964, p. 320).

From his study of the physical map of the world Mackinder concluded that on the global scale the earth surface consisted of a huge continuous landmass consisting of Europe, Asia, and Africa, and some isolated Islands, e.g., North and South America, Australia, Britain, and Japan. He named the huge united land mass of Europe, Asia and Africa as the ‘world Island’: But in 1919 presentation he included the whole of Africa in his world Island.

He envisioned the landmasses of the world arranged in three tiers. (see fig) In the first tier, there is a huge area of interior and Arctic drainage in inner Eurasia surrounded by mountains on three sides and by the ice-bound Arctic on the fourth. This was his co-called ‘Pivot area’ that he later named as the ‘Heartland’. The distinguishing feature of Mackinder’s Heartland area was that

since it is surrounded by mountain barriers on three sides and an ice-bound sea on the fourth, it is not accessible to seapowers and is, therefore, strategically secure like a fortress.

The ‘pivot’ or the ‘Heartland’ was pictured by Mackinder as surrounded by an ‘inner’ or ‘marginal’ crescent consisting of an arch of coastland and characterized by drainage into navigable seas. This inner or marginal crescent consisted of the whole of Eurasia outside the Heartland. It included Europe west of the Ural mountains, southwest Asia outside the Iranian upland, India, South-East Asia, and most of China.

Outside the lands of the inner or marginal crescent lay his third tier which he named as the outer or Insular crescent. Besides the continents of North and South America, Australia, and Africa south of the Sahara, the Island regions of the great Britain and Japan were also designated as ‘outer’ because of their complete insularity from the mainland of Eurasia.

From his study of Eurasian history as well as the contemporary political map of the world Mackinder was convinced of the great strategic importance possessed by the inner Eurasian region in the affairs of the old world. He interpreted the history of European civilization was a continuing struggle against recurrent invasions from inner Asia.
Mackinder noted that mobility upon the ocean was the natural rival of the horse and camel mobility in the heart of the continent. Mackinder was, however, convinced that, 'trans continental railways are now transmuting the conditions of land power, and nowhere can they have such effect as in the closed heartland of Euro Asia, and steppe' (Mackinder, 1904).

Mackinder envisaged two possible ways in which the empire of the world would be insight. First, if Germany were to ally with Russia, and secondly, if the chinese, organized by the Japanese were to overthrow the Russian empire and conquer its territory.

Mackinder was clear in his mind that a seapower could, in the longrun, be no stronger than the land base that sustained it (i.e., its homebase).

Modification of Heartland Concept

In 1919 Mackinder published a some what laboured and extended version of his 1904 paper as a book entitled, ‘The Democratic Ideals and Reality’. In this book he renamed the ‘pivot region’ as the Heartland. He wrote this book especially with a view to warn and instruct the statesmen of the Allied countries who were engaged at that time indiscussing the terms of peace with a defeated Germany at the end of the first world war. Events of the war, made it clear to
Mackinder that the sea power was capable of controlling a much less extensive area of the world Island that he had originally thought. He was convinced that from the viewpoint of strategical thinking the Heartland was much larger than the one originally defined by him in terms of physical geography. He now defined the heartland as; the region to which, under modern conditions, sea-power can be refused access, though the western part of it lies without the region of Arctic and continental drainage. His modified strategic heartland included the Baltic sea, the navigable middle and lower Danube, the Black sea, Asia Minor, Armenia Persia, Tibet and Mongolia. (fig) He wished some ‘airy cherub’ could keep whispering in the ears of Allied statesmen at the Peace conference his strategic formula:

Who Rules East Europe Commands The Heartland
Who Rules The Heartland Commands The World Island
Who Rules World Island Commands The World."\(^{30}\)

The strategic argument is simple. The Heartland is the strongest fortress on the earth, commanding resources of a huge transcontinental area. Any power that could organize it effectively was in Mackinder’s view, bound to emerge as a great colossus in world politics, head and shoulders above any other state.

Mackinder’s Latest Model

Mackinder’s chief virtue was his flexibility of thought. During the second world war he modified his geopolitical theory considerably. In 1943, he wrote an article entitled ‘The Round world and the winning of the Peace’, to pinpoint the modifications made by him. He detached Lenaland (the Central Siberian table land) as from the heartland. He redefined the Heartland. The area consisting largely of the cleared forest and steppe portions of Eurasia. ‘He stated’.. it is sufficiently accurate to say that the territory of the USSR is equivalent to the heartland, except in one direction". And that exception, as has already been pointed out, is lenaland and or Siberia east of the Yenisei.

Besides, Mackinder changed his concept of the map of the world as a whole. He said that the North Atlantic unit (the Middle ocean) is as significant as the heartland as the transpolar counterpart of the latter. He also made Monsoonal Asia and the south Atlantic basin important units in the global sphere. He also created a fifth unit (which he described as a ‘Mantle of the vacancies’) as the barrier zone between the heartland and the Middle ocean on the one hand, and the other units on the other. Thus, his original concept of the pivot area of the world changed from that of an area of movement (i.e. as a region of mobility for land forces) to one of a ‘power citadel’, based upon people, resources, and interior lines. His changing views indicated that he was
well aware of the importance of geographic location in relation to technological developments, including air power.

It is also clear that Mackinder's geopolitical model believed now more on national power. After an analytical study of soviet national power, he concluded:

All things considered, the conclusion is unavoidable that if the Soviet Union emerges from this war as the conqueror of Germany, she must rank as the greatest land power on the globe. Moreover, she will be the power in the strategically strongest defensive position. The Heartland is the greatest natural fortress on the earth. For the first time in history it is manned by a garrison sufficient both in number and quality" (Mackinder, 1944; 501)\textsuperscript{31}.

From his observations on the Soviet Union and his refashioning of world political geography by giving some areas important positions as noted above, certain points emerge. First, the idea of the pivot area must yield place to that of the area of power citadel. Secondly, the heartland, though reduced in importance, was still a factor to reckon with. It could be identified with soviet national power and regarded as potentially the strongest land power on the earth. Lastly, science and technology played an increasingly important role in rapidly changing the geopolitical situation of the globe. Mackinder's geopolitical view thus changed with the changing global geopolitics.

Spykman and the Rimland Model

Professor Nicholas J. Spykman (1893-1943) of the university of yale, gave a very different interpretation of the relative importance of the heartland and the surrounding tier, the inner or marginal crescent 'partly continental and partly oceanic', which Spykman named as the 'Rimland' (fig).

Drawing attention to maritime mobility as the basis of a new type of geopolitical structure, the overseas empire in contrast to the former pattern of great land powers based on the control of contiguous land masses-spykman emphasized that 'It is seapower which has made it possible to conceive of the Eurasian continent as a unit and it is sea power which governs the relationships between the old and the New worlds' (Spykman, 1944). To him sea power appeared as the Keyfactor in global strategy.

Spykman criticized, Mackinder's blanket application of the theory of history as a continuing struggle between land power and sea power. He wrote: 'there has never really been a simple land power sea power opposition. The historical alignment has always been in terms of some members of the rimland with Great Britain against some members of the rimland against Russia, or Great

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Britain and Russia together against a dominating rimland power'. Mackinders dictum about global strategy, therefore appeared false to him. He said that if at all there need be a slogan for power politics of the world, it must be:

Who Controls The Rimland Rules Eurasia;
Who Rules Eurasia Controls The Destinies of The World (Spykman, 1944).

Spykman thought that it is a combination of land and seapower controlling the rimland that would in all probability control "the essential power relations of the world", inevitably because this combination would emerge as the owner off greater resources, man power, and mobility, than the heartland or any other combination.

Writing at a time when the second world war was still going on Spykman advocated that the Allied powers should base their future policy on preventing any consolidation of the Rimland by the enemy. With the defeat of Germany in the second world war and the emergence of the USSR as the sole master of the Heartland Spykman’s prescription became the basis, atleast in part, of the American policy of ‘containment’, of communist influence outside the Soviet Union.
Meinigs Model of Functional Criteria

Donald Meinigs\textsuperscript{33} of the Syracuse university published his theory in 1956. He rooted his ideas in functional and cultural aspects of the region. He identified the broad similarity of physical conditions, same cultures and interior core positions which were the nexus of historic land routes interconnecting various ancient centers of civilization on the oceanic margins of Eurasia.

Another major contribution of practical value is Meining functional re-evaluation of the Rimland. He thought that Rimland should be viewed in relation of its politics rather than its physiogeographical orientation, because the functional importance of the region lies in the political alignment of the rival blocs.

Meining divided his rimland (inner oriented) as continental rimland and an (outer oriented) as maritime rimland. He also recognised a group of nations as neutralist (fig) for e.g. Pakistan had gradually changed from a clear-cut American orientation in its foreign relations to a somewhat more neutralists, while its former eastern wing the Republic of Bangla Desh - is now apparently neutral. Therefore he stressed, since actual functional-political orientations of

\textsuperscript{33} D. W., Meinig, 'Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History', Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 9, 1956, p. 553-569.

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individual states in the Rimland have been changing with changes in the global power balance, it is wrong to assign the whole of this surrounding tier of states to a sea power orientation.

**Air Power Based Geopolitical Model**

After the second world war, the destructive potential of air bombing was clearly demonstrated, and now any scheme of global strategy that failed to take air mobility into account was to be regarded as unrealistic. Edward Warner noted that, 'the fundamental doctrine of air power supremacy is that the airplane possesses such ubiquity, and such advantages of speed and elevation, as they possess the power of destroying all surface installations and instruments, ashore or afloat, while its remaining comparatively safe from any effective reprisal from the ground' (Warner, 1943)\(^{34}\)

The most notable among those who have developed the geopolitical models based on airpower are, Alexander de Seversky,\(^{35}\) 1952, Renner\(^{36}\) and

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John Slessor. The sum and substance of their theories is the absolute superiority of air as a means of movement. They brush aside the variable significance of the landmasses and the seas and hold that any nation with superior air power can command the world, both in an offensive war and as a deterrent to aggression, regardless of that nation's territorial location.

Air Man’s View of the World

Alexander de Seversky’s Air Model

The expression ‘airman’s global view’ has come into vogue since the second world war through the writings of Alexander de Seversky. His ideas were represented in 1950 in his book, ‘Air power’: Key to survival. In this book he advocated that the United States should aim at the development of massive air power as its primary military defence objective. Seversky opines that by using Superior air power it is possible to make a war go in favour of a nation in this nuclear age. He subordinates land and naval forces to air force.

De seversky, looked at the world as on an azimuthal equidistant projection centered on the North Pole. He, therefore, viewed the chief adversaries for global supremacy in the post 1945 world as standing face to face across the Arctic Mediterranean, through whose air space pass the shortest routes

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between places in the Heartland and North America. De seversky’s world map on the azimuthal projection led him to conceive of both the United states and the Soviet union separately holding complete air dominance over vast areas within their respective orbits. The circles marking their spheres of influence overlapped over a vast area in North America and Eurasia. This zone of overlap, de seversky pointed out, is the critical area in the struggle for global military supremacy between the two rivals. He termed this zone as the ‘area of decision’. De seversky thought that for its survival in the event of a total war, it was necessary that the united states should concentrate all its energies and resources in acquiring complete air dominance in this zone since it is here that, decisive conflicts of the future would take place. As Jones noted, this notion of absolute air supremacy based on intercontinental mobility through the air, and the juxtaposition of the United states and the Soviet union as the principal cold war antagonists standing face to face across the Arctic, tended to encourage in the united states a sense of ‘air isolationism’ oriented to the western hemisphere.

De seversky’s generalization of global strategy has not stood the test of time. From the perspective of the present, his views appear oversimplistic in view of the further revolutionary changes in transportation technology with the arrival of intercontinental missiles, nuclear powered submarines, and satellites orbiting around the earth.
Air Power Model of Sir John Slessor

John Slessor holds that a strategic air force with nuclear weapons is the ‘great deterrent’ which may prevent a total war. He, however, concedes that local wars may still be possible with ground forces bearing much of the load. But Slessor has no globewide view. He believes that the Rimland is going to be the focus of local wars. He believes size, centrality, and inaccessibility are no advantage to the heartland, rather they are handicaps. He suggests that the Middle East and south-east Asia will become the arenas of limited wars in which air power, supplemented by sea supported land actions, would hold the key to success. He also thinks that even an invasion of Western Europe can be countered by a limited type of air attack and that land defence can, with adequate air support, check an invasion even without any all-out nuclear war. The only correct geopolitical forecast of Slessor in his statement that the Middle East and south-east Asia are going to be the areas of limited war. The events in Vietnam, Arab-Israeli war bear out Slessor’s prediction.

Conclusion

The geopolitical models discussed above emphasize the strategic unity of space as organized through a single arena of movement Ratzel, Haushofer, and the earlier writings of Mackinder postulated the idea of the land mass as achieved through roads and highway; Mahan and Spylkman advanced the idea of

38 op. cit., 1954.
the unity of the sea as achieved through ocean-going ships, Alexander de
seversky, and slessor presented the idea of the unity of air as achieved through
bombers and missiles. The basic approach in all these views was the
indivisibility and unity of some one arena of movement. It was held that either
the dominant land army could rule the land space, or the dominant fleet could
rule the entire open sea, or the dominant air power could rule the air.