Latin American countries supply between 70 to 80 percent of refined cocaine, 50 to 60 per cent of marijuana and one third of heroin reaching the US market. But the countries of Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia, which are also known respectively as the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent, in the eighties continued to supply nearly 60 per cent of heroin and some quantity of marijuana (mainly from Thailand).\(^1\) Heroin was also of very serious concern for the Reagan Administration. It is known to have a capacity to addict consumers and thereby generate multibillion dollars sale. Cocaine was rivaled only by heroin.

A kilogram of heroin had a wholesale value of about $90,000 to $200,000 in the United States. Diluted for street sale, it valued around $2.5 million.\(^2\) Due to high level of profits earned from heroin traffic, British journalists in 1973 coined the term the Golden Triangle and the Golden

\(^1\) Bruce M. Bagley, "Colombia and the War on Drugs", *Foreign Affairs* (New York), vol.67 (Fall 1988), p.70.

Over the last two decades, Southeast Asia's "Golden triangle" produced approximately one third of the heroin consumed by addicts in the United States. But later on the dominance of the "Golden triangle" in opium production was eclipsed in the last two decades by the "Golden Crescent", encompassing lands running from Pakistan through Afghanistan and Iran. As social upheaval and civil strife in Iran and Afghanistan in the 1980's disrupted production and shipping, Pakistan became the world's largest source of heroin. By 1984, European police concluded that 70 per cent of the world's supply of high grade heroin came from that country.

Since the Reagan Administration mainly focussed its drug control policy on supply side, an attempt would be made here to analyze the factors responsible for the achievements and failure of the United States narcotics control policy in Thailand, Burma and Pakistan. The policies towards these countries became much more important for the Reagan Administration because it had no political equations with

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other major opium producing countries like Laos, Iran and Afghanistan.

As pointed out earlier in this study, the United States international narcotics control programme, supported foreign governments', endeavours to control the cultivation, production and refinement of illicit drugs by providing financial and technical assistance for crop control and other law enforcement activities and, by providing development assistance to some countries. An effort would be made here to examine how effective the US programmes were in Thailand, Burma and Pakistan in controlling the production and export of narcotics.

The Reagan Administration assigned the responsibility of international narcotics control programmes to three agencies in Thailand and Pakistan: the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM), the DEA, and the AID. The main US agency entrusted with above responsibility in Burma was the INM. In all these countries, the INM had the lead role and was responsible for developing, coordinating and implementing the overall US international narcotics control strategy. It accomplished its mission through diplomatic efforts, assisting the host governments in crop control and interdiction, training
foreign personnel, participating in international organizations, and providing technical assistance to reduce demand. Both the US mission in Pakistan and Thailand had narcotics affairs counsellors, each supported by a deputy, and foreign service staff. The mission in Burma had a narcotics affairs counsellor supported by an aviation advisor and foreign service staff.\(^5\) During the Financial Year 1987, out of the INM budget of $118 million nearly $21 million was provided to Burma, Thailand and Pakistan\(^6\), which was nearly 18 per cent of the total allocation.

The US supported crop control, enforcement and interdiction efforts in Burma, Thailand and Pakistan did not produce major reduction in opium productions. Law enforcement organizations in these countries had basic problems of narcotics related corruption and weak narcotics laws, which inhibited effective enforcement and interdiction. The crop control programmes were also not effectively managed. Development efforts did not fully support narcotics reduction goals. Though the US programme failed to take off in these countries, their governments


\(^{6}\) Ibid.
extended cooperation to the programme during the Reagan Administration. The failure was not due to a lack of government's cooperation. In contrast were the cases of Laos, Afghanistan and Iran which did not have political relations with the United States. The United States, General Accounting Office (GAO) report in 1988 stated:

It has been reported that much of the opium is produced in the countries, where, for various reasons, it is not possible to undertake US assisted narcotics control activities. For example Iran, Afghanistan and Laos, countries which are hostile to the United States, produce more than 49 per cent of the world supply. Thus reductions achieved in other countries would not significantly offset the supply available to the United States, since annual heroin consumptions in the United States is the equivalent of 60 to 70 tons of opium and these countries produce an estimated 1,190 tons, 17 to 20 times US demand.

This was then the crux of the problem and the administration could hardly do much in the matter. The total control of opium production seemed to be beyond the reach of the United States. Even if control was achieved in countries assisted by the United States, other countries outside American political influence became major producers. Though the United States persuaded Burma and Thailand in the Golden Triangle to control drug production. The Reagan

Administration achieved a major success in Thailand, but Laos filled up the vacuum by producing more opium than used by the United States.

The Golden Triangle

The United States believed that for achieving narcotics reduction targets in Southeast Asia, multifaceted approach was essential. Dominick L. Dicarlo, Assistant Secretary for the INM, stated:

Our narcotics control strategy for the Southeast Asian region is to stimulate governments to take effective action against illicit drug production and major trafficking that will achieve the objective of reducing the availability of Southeast Asian narcotics in the United States.

Diplomatically, we impress upon governments in this region and all other regions - their national responsibilities under treaties to control illicit narcotic cultivation, production and trafficking. We recognize that some governments need assistance in fulfilling these obligations, and we provide bilateral assistance for crop control and interdiction programs in a country on a specific and regional basis, as well as support through multilateral UN programs. This assistance not only encourages governments in the region to undertake programs but is critically important to the success of those initiatives.

The United States recognize that crop control can impact on local economies in producing countries, which are generally underdeveloped and resource poor, and we,
therefore, provide or stimulate income re-placement projects where appropriate.

The Reagan Administration adopted multilateral approach; crop control and eradication, law enforcement, interdiction and development assistance through the AID and through United Nations agencies i.e., United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (particularly in Burma).

Laos:

Though the Reagan Administration had no political or diplomatic relations with Laos but President Reagan certified that Laos would cooperate with the narcotics control policy of the United States despite the reports of its involvement in drug trade. In a report in March 1988 on "International Narcotics Strategy", the State Department said that report indicated that local and military officials in Laos were involved in drug trade. But the Department recommended against decertifying Laos, saying the search for prisoners of war and missing servicemen was a vital national

8 For the statement of Dominick L. Dicarlo, Assistant Secretary (for the INM) before the Sub-Committee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee on December 14, 1982, see US Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.,), vol.83(February 1983), pp.47-48.
As mentioned earlier, under the anti drug abuse Act of 1986 it is up to the President to certify that countries with major drug trafficking are "fully cooperating in anti-drug efforts." The countries which do not qualify lose American military and economic aid, trade preferences, loans and other economic advantages. The US was not providing to Laos either military or economic aid. Nor was there any direct trade links with Laos. The US had made Laos' cooperation in finding MIAs necessary condition for resumption of normal relations. Therefore, decertification would not have served any purpose other than adding another controversy.

US intelligence informations indicated the increasing opium production and trafficking in Laos possibly resulted from increased enforcement and eradication efforts in Thailand and Burma (1985-86). Laos produced an estimated 100 to 290 metric tons of illicit opium in 1986, compared to 30 tons in 1984. The Department of State believed that Laotian opium was supplied to refineries in Thailand and Burma. Laotian government claimed that it had banned production and trafficking of opium for private gains but permitted

production only to sell to the Communist bloc for legal processing. The US had made preliminary overtures to the Laotian government to determine the possibility of assisting it in a programme to curb opium production. Though Laos did not respond directly to the US wishes but it accepted in February 1988, the first narcotics control project to be funded by the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). An UNFDAC project formulation team met in Vientiane at the end of April to discuss technical aspects of the project’s implementation.

Since the United States had no diplomatic relations with Laos its worldwide programmes of checking drug trafficking had no impact on Laos. It had limited information about Laotian narcotics activities since the formation of the communist government there. In its report to the Congress the Department of State in 1988 reported non-cooperation of Laos and an increased cultivation of illicit opium and cannabis there. It was being found deficient in narcotics cooperation in 1987 and 1988. Even then it received a national interest certification from the

11 Department of State, Report to the Congress I, (Section 2013, PL.99-570, May 1, 1988), p.I.
President because it promised cooperation in search of MIA/POWs. The most important cooperation on joint excavation of crash sites had satisfied the conditions set down with the 1988 national interest certification. But the fact was that the US received reports that the government of Laos facilitated and encouraged narcotics cultivation, refining, and trafficking. The report ruefully concluded that there was little prospect for a reversal of those trends in the near future.\textsuperscript{12} The US Attorney for the Eastern District Andrew J. Maloney told the press that in a year long investigation evidence of Laotian involvement in the drug trade surfaced. This led to the arrests of two major traffickers in Hongkong, who tried to ship 70 pounds of heroin to New York. In a taped conversation with an American undercover agent, the two men, Chang Ah-Kai from Hongkong and Wichai Chaiwisan from Bangkok confided that their production laboratories were in Laos and operated with the permission of its government. They said that the government charged $200 for each 700 grams produced and posted inspectors at the laboratories "to make sure the government was not cheated".\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p.4.

These facts were confirmed by Ann B. Wrobleski, Assistant Secretary of State (INM) in her statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1988.

Laos was granted a national interest certification in 1987 on grounds of promised cooperation on MIA/POW issues despite a failure to address narcotics production and trafficking and, indicates that local officials and number of military officers were engaged in narcotics trafficking. Lao opium and marijuana production are increasing significantly, and there are reports from multiple sources implicating Communist party, Lao Army, and other officials in managing as well as facilitating the trade, which is increasingly important to the economy of this cash-poor country. Laos has not accepted offers of US narcotics assistance, nor undertaken any control initiatives. There is little prospect for a reversal of these trends. There is, however, progress on the POW/MIA issue, with remains and aircraft parts having been received by US officials and pledges of cooperation in early 1988 on joint excavations of crash sites.14

The US thus came to the conclusion that the provision of US assistance, both prospective narcotics control assistance or US support for any Laotian request for assistance from Multilateral Development Bank (MDB), must improve the prospects of cooperation with Laos in halting the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. The Lao government neither accepted nor rejected a 1987 offer of

International Narcotics Matters assistance. However, it indicated that multilateral assistance sponsored by the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) would be acceptable to it. In February 1988 it agreed in principal to accept its first narcotics control project to be funded by the UNFDAC. An UNFDAC project formulations team met in Vientine at the end of April to discuss technical aspects of the implementation of the projects. On the other hand, the US wanted to be in a position to support a multilateral project by UNFDAC if such funding would improve prospects for narcotics control. Moreover it wanted to retain the option of voting or not voting for Laos People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR) loans for MDB.¹⁵

There were several reasons why the US failed to receive the necessary cooperation from Laos. Although in eighties Laos was eager to normalize relations with the US but it was still a Communist country making the United States somewhat suspicious. And beneath the surface, Laos being a Communist country had anti-American feelings that made cooperation at the ground level more difficult. Moreover, poor economy of Laos became dependent on drug trafficking and a source of major income for people as well as the government.

¹⁵ Department of State, Report to the Congress, n.10, p.1.
In Burma, the second country of the triangle, the INM was the only main agency which pursued the US narcotics control policy in Burma. It was responsible for development, coordinating and implementing the overall US international narcotics control strategy. The DEA had no law enforcement programmes in Burma as the Burmese government did not want the presence of foreign law enforcement agency. At the same time, Agency for Internation Development (AID) had no narcotics related development projects in Burma because Burma wanted to remain nonaligned. It rather preferred to receive aid and assistance from international agencies like the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (which was receiving maximum funds from the United States). By receiving funds from a UN agency rather than directly from the United States, Burma could claim to maintain its independence. The principal US goal in Burma like in other countries was to support the Burmese government in suppressing opium production, processing and export to the US the INM support to Burma had four major components i.e., aerial eradication, aviation support for narcotics interdiction operations, communications and support for five People’s Police Force Task forces. Aviation support
11 represented 91 per cent of overall programme funding.\footnote{GAO, \textit{U.S. Supported Drug Control Efforts}, n.5, pp.10-11.} Ms. Wrobleski told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs while replying to Congressman James H. Bilbray's (Nevada) question on Burma's objection to the US military aid:

that the Burmese government, certainly under the stewardship of Ne Win, has aggressively pursued a nonaligned status and, in fact, our only aid in Burma is narcotics assistance. And I am not an expert on that part of the world. But I would have to guess - and this is an educated guess - that they would resist or would not accept any aid from any other government except on the narcotics issue. And this is the one - it is interesting, Burma is one of those countries - I mean there are lots of countries where narcotics is a problem in the relationship. And there are a lot of places where narcotics ease the relationship in a negative sense. And, in Burma, again in my view narcotics is a relationship in a very positive sense. Narcotics and our cooperation on narcotics is the basis for the bilateral relationship.

So we from a foreign policy perspective and I think the Burmese view our mutual bilateral narcotics program as the real foundation of the bilateral relationship.\footnote{Hearings, \textit{Narcotics Review in South East/South West Asia, The Middle East and Africa}, n.13, p.25.}

Since the beginning of the Reagan Administration, the Burmese government extended cooperation to the US policy of eradication. It estimated that it eradicated more than 10,000 acres of opium poppies in 1981-82 season that could have produced as much as 40,000 to 45,000 kilograms of
opium. While this represented only about 8 per cent of the total acreage under cultivation in Burma, it almost doubled the previous year's destruction. 18

Since the Financial Year 1984, the United States had given Burma about $21.7 million in support of its narcotics control programme. A substantial part of this amount, nearly $9.7 million was provided in the Financial Year 1987 to support the aerial spraying and interdiction efforts of Burmese army. This would indicate progressively increasing support for the programme. 19 A report prepared by the INCSR noted the following positive development in 1984:

The Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma's (SRUB) decision to test aerial eradication of opium poppy with US assistance (the test was conducted in December 1984).

The attendance at US maintenance training courses by Burma Air Force personnel responsible for maintenance of the INM - supplied aircraft.

The very successful executive observation visit to the US of the Deputy Minister of Home and Religious Affairs, Colonel Khin Maung Win, and the Director General of the People's Police Force, U Thein Aung. This visit included not only a productive exchange of views in Washington on control strategy, but also visits to several other US cities to observe US drug


education and prevention activities and drug law enforcement efforts.

The development by the SRUB of plans to enhance narcotics law enforcement capabilities.

The United States did not put forward a timeframe for the progressive elimination of production of opium in Burma. It believed that the full-scale aerial programme would have a significant and continuing impact on illicit narcotics production. Therefore, since its introduction in 1985, the US supported the annually expanding Burmese programme of aerial eradication. The US provided funds for aircraft, equipment and training. This spray programme allowed the Burmese government to reach inaccessible cultivation areas controlled by anti-government insurgencies. Probably, the Burmese government accepted it with such alacrity because it also served as an anti-insurgency operation. It destroyed the poppy crop and deprived the insurgents of valuable income. Funds included in the Financial Year 1988 budget to procure replacement fixed wing and rotary-wing transport aircraft which would enable the Burmese government to intensify its operations against production and trafficking


21 Ibid., p.28.
of narcotics. It also provided support for continuing the programme to maintain and repair rotary-wing and fixed wing aircraft previously supplied to the Burma Air Force by the INM.\textsuperscript{22}

In 1986, Burma undertook one of the largest eradication programmes in the history of narcotics control.\textsuperscript{23} Ms. Wroblewski told the Sub-Committee on Foreign Operations, Committee on Appropriations on April 18, 1986 that:

\begin{quote}
More than $33,000$ hectares of opium poppy have been reported destroyed by the Burmese government this year. Funds are included to procure additional fixed and rotary wing transport aircraft which will enable the Burmese government to carry out operations aimed at narcotics trafficking groups, primarily the Burmese Communist Party and warlord organizations operating in the border with Thailand. Support will also be provided to improve the capability of Burmese Police to interdict narcotics trafficking.
\end{quote}

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One year later in 1987 the US Government reported that the Burmese government destroyed 16,279 hectares of opium poppy, despite having to curtail spraying to counter major offensive by the Burmese Communist Party (BCP), which controlled a substantial portion of the prime opium growing area. The 1988 target was 20,234 hectares, much of it to be destroyed by aerial spraying. The Burmese government continued their very active programmes of destroying heroin laboratories, intercepting opiate caravans, and seizing precursor chemicals and other contraband, till the suspension of US assistance in September 1988.

In August and September 1988, the Burmese military crushed demonstrations for democracy, killing thousands of unarmed demonstrators. In response to anti-democratic attitude of Burmese government, the United States suspended all aid and loans, including programme costing $6 to $8 million a year for opium eradication.

From the beginning, Burma’s narcotics problem was inextricably mixed with the insurgency problem. Since independence in 1948, the Rangoon government was plagued by rebellious groups seeking national power and Ethnic

25 INCSR (1985), n.20, p.34.
26 International Herald Tribune, April 2, 1990, p.3.
minorities autonomy for their region. Some of the important ethnic groups/minorities were Shan, Kachin and Lahu and they rose in rebellion. In fact separatist movements thrived ever since a number of key tribes rejected or later disavowed the unified political structure proposed in 1947. These groups were aided by several powerful armed bands of narcotics traffickers, usually ethnic Chinese. Atleast for leadership these groups were heavily dependent upon the opium trade for their income, arms purchases and other activities. Besides, even the Burmese government allowed some traffickers to operate freely in exchange for help in the battle against different ethnic insurgents.27

There were reports in March 1988 that some insurgent groups were against opium trafficking. According to Brang Seng, Chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization, informed that his forces recently seized more than two tons of opium from an outpost of 47th Burmese Regiment at Manyot near Bhamo in North Central Burma. "This is perhaps the first time a so called Burmese rebel movement has interdicted opium traffic by a so called legitimate government", he said.28

Ethnic resistance leaders further claimed that they had promulgated a "very rigorous" anti-narcotics policy and were aware of the public opinion abroad on this issue, especially in countries from which they could hope to win democratic support. "The derivative of opium has such a terrible impact on the youth of the world, so should we not reconsider, what we are doing", said Saw Maw Reh, a Karenni leader and Chairman of the National Democratic Front, representing the Arakan, Kachin, Lahu, Mon, Pa-o, Paluang Shan, Wah, Karenini and Kayan resistance organizations. The front can field about 350,000 troops.29

Although narcotics experts believed the Burmese Communists (BCP) to be heavily involved in drug trafficking, many of the ethnic groups were not, certainly not the Kachins or the Karens. Some of the groups were not in prime opium growing areas and others were not tempted by the opium trade because they enough money to sustain guerrilla wars by taxing smuggled goods, like teak, gems, or cattle bound for Thailand.

The BCP remained involved in drug trade. It was founded in the 1930s with the support of China. At one time it was

29 Ibid.
the best armed and disciplined force in rural Burma. Although the BCP was one of the Burma's oldest insurgent groups underground since 1948, it did not become a significant factor in the Shan State insurgencies until 1967, when the Chinese backed insurgents opened a second front in the northern Shan State in the area of east of the Salween River. The BCP's military force, estimated at 8,000 to 15,000 drew heavily Ahka, Lisu, Lahu, and Wa minorities for recruitment. It also appealed to more organized insurgents forces to form alliances and some Kachin and Shan insurgents periodically allied with BCP. 30

The BCP controlled area producing the bulk of the opium crop and received a substantial sum in the form of taxes forcibly levied on farmers. It had also set up refineries to convert opium into heroin, and was directly engaged in the sale of refined opium products to middlemen. The competition among these groups for the control of a lucrative trade often results in bloody clashes, Rangoon being unable to establish its authority over the areas controlled by the insurgents.

The BCP moved more deeply into the opium economy as an alternative means to support its insurgent activities. Its forces operated in areas that accounted for nearly half of Burma's opium production. While local BCP leaders had probably been involved in brokering opium sales to some of the warlord organizations, the BCP Central Committee had publicly opposed opium cultivation and narcotics trafficking. Since 1979 there had been increasing signs that the BCP leadership sanctioned opium sales and that the BCP had developed its own narcotics production and sales capability.31

After the tension of the Cultural Revolution, there had been gradual improvements in relations between Rangoon and Beijing. This apparently resulted in a substantial reduction of Chinese material support to the BCP and by 1980s there were signs that aid levels had dropped sharply.32 Western officials, without mentioning names, reported that the US asked China for help in curbing opium and heroin production in Burma where Communists were believed to be the major suppliers of narcotics. Barbara

31 Times of India, July 5, 1990.
32 Wiant, n.30, p.134.
Crossette reported in *New York Times* in December 1988, the Burmese battling with the Rangoon government over control of a stretch of the Burmese-Chinese border in an area noted for its abundant opium fields, and produced bulk of opium and heroin reaching the American market.\(^{33}\) It was further reported that Burmese Communists had imported chemicals needed to refine opium and urged the Chinese for use of their territory as a refuge from government attack. But later on in 1986 China expressed an interest in cooperating in reducing narcotics production and have helped in drug seizures in the US involving Chinese and Hongkong connections\(^{34}\). The US pursued two policy objectives in Burma: the control of drug production and isolation and elimination of Communist Party as a political force. Despite various measures against anti-opium production, the Burmese opium continued to enter American markets. Therefore despite the success of anti-drug programme, Burma remained an obstacle in America's war against drug.

The US anti drug policy in Burma had long reflected clear line of reasoning. Drug trafficking originated with


\(^{34}\) Ibid.
certain tribal groups. There was no non-communist alternative to working with the government and the Burmese government expressed willingness to collaborate in the suppression of drug trafficking. Therefore, until the 1988 uprising in Rangoon, the United States provided Rangoon with helicopters, herbicides, and funds to use against the tribal groups and assiduously avoided contact with them. American antagonism toward tribal groups was guided by the perception that they were political leftists that they grow and sell drugs. The US also believed them to be insignificant in the national political balance. It felt that contact with the tribal groups would only be opposed by the government in Rangoon and "American influence with it would be destroyed. The Reagan Administration’s anti-drug policy in Burma thus allied the US with one of the most autocratic and anti-democratic regimes. As a result administration’s policy was strongly assailed. Furthermore, the Burmese government’s economic policies forced segments of the population into the drug trade and eliminated any alternatives to the drug economy for some tribal groups. It was alleged that the Burmese government did not employ the helicopters and

herbicides provided by the US only against the drug trade. It used them primarily as weapons in an extensive civil war against tribal groups that favoured democracy and freer trade rather than the Burmese way to socialism. The helicopters were used for troop transport and the herbicide 2, 4-D were sprayed on food crops to punish the rural populations.36

While the United States believed that it was backing the Burmese government in a war against drugs and the Burmese leftists, the critics of the policy, pointed out that the Burmese regime was itself modelled on communist pattern. Even more serious was the contention that the military regime itself was heavily involved in the drug trade, and was in collaboration with the Burmese Communist Party as the core of its strategy of suppressing minority dissidents. It was also allied with drug lord Khun Sa against shared political opponents in the Shan States. The Ne Win government used the drug trade to nurture Khun Sa's force as a pro-government militia in the mid 1960s, then later periodically turned against or realigned with him.37

36 Ibid., pp.177-178.
37 Ibid., p.178.
The DEA believed that Khun Sa controlled 80 per cent of the heroin that was produced in 1987 from Golden Triangle opium. He also had some 15,000 well equipped highly disciplined men under arms. Both the Burmese and the Thai military forces made periodic attempts to dislodge Khun Sa from his nearly inaccessible redoubt. But all failed. 38 Bangkok had announced reward of $200,000 for his capture. But despite that the latter's power and his personal wealth had continued to grow. He was helped by inaccessible terrain, lax border surveillance and a large and well organized network of corruption that had become inseparable part of the heroin trade in Thailand. 39

For years, the United States was willing to overlook the official narcotics corruption in Southeast Asia because of its strategic interests. Khun Sa's drug dealing was tolerated because he allowed his private army to act as a buffer against communist rebels in northern Burma. 40


40 Times of India (New Delhi), July 5, 1990.
While making feeble gestures against the drug trade, the United States had inadvertently supported a system that made continuation of the drug trade only inevitable. One could understand the compulsions of following such a policy had there been no alternative to working through Rangoon or the only political alternative to the regime was the Burmese Communist Party. But after the suppression of the 1988 students' democratic movement, which led to the suspension of all US aid to Burma, a democratic alternative was available. The United States was not willing to go all-out in opposition to the army ruled regime. And therefore the drug trade in Burma continued and the US policy failed. The BCP had broken up.

The Reagan administration was convinced that from 1974 until 1988, combating narcotics trade was an important priority of Burma. The Burmese government retaliated to the suspension of aid in 1988 by suspending its US supported eradication campaign in the 1988-89 growing season despite possessing the resources and ability to continue

unilateral effort. The government of Burma made it clear that eradication programmes would not be resumed until the indigenous population had the means to make a living by other means than growing poppies. The wisdom dawned only after the suspension of the US aid. So long as the aid was forthcoming, it had no compunction in eradicating the poppy crop.

Burma produced more illicit opium than any other country in the world. In 1988 it reportedly produced over 1,280 tons of opium, more than 20 times the estimated 60 tons needed to manufacture the heroin consumed annually in the United States. Burma's estimated opium production increased nearly 270 per cent between 1985 and 1988 despite the US supported efforts to eradicate opium producing poppies and to interdict raw and refined opium.

Despite being the largest producer of opium poppies, Burma cooperated with the US efforts to control the drug menace by adopting a eradication measure. Melvyn Levitsky, 44


43 Ibid.

44 GAO, Drug Control: Enforcement Efforts in Burma, n.41, p.8.
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, testified before a Congressional Select Committee:

Until 1988, a year in which the Burmese eradication campaign reportedly reduced the crop by 12,500 hectares by the end of the growing season, the host government took steps to control opium cultivation, refining and trafficking, and the US supported the world’s largest aerial opium eradication program in INM’s portfolio. The Burmese also carried out operations using Burma army troops to interdict opium caravans. Under cooperative agreements, five thrush spray planes and over thirty helicopters were donated to Burma between 1974 and 1988. The program amounted to over $80 million total funding for aviation support, training, demand reduction support and law enforcement commodities.\(^{45}\)

The United States resumed economic assistance to Burma in 1974 after a gap of around one decade. The aid was cancelled by Burma at the instance of China over the controversy of the construction of an improved trunk road running from Rangoon to Mandalay in mid sixties.\(^{46}\)


Until 1974, Rangoon was reluctant to cooperate with the United States in drug control, fearing that under the cover of such a programme, the US might try to become involved in the Kuomintang (KMT) or seek to use Burma as a base in the struggle against North Vietnam and the secret war in Laos. Once the US forces were withdrawn from Indo-China in 1975, the Burmese quietly began cooperating with the United States efforts to restrict the illegal flow of opium from the "Golden Triangle". With no publicity, Rangoon purchased six helicopters valued at $5 million in 1975 and twelve more, valued at $13.35 million in 1976. The price included the training of pilots. In addition, Burma sent military and civil chiefs of intelligence to the United States in the spring of 1975 for a month's training in drug control. The helicopters were to be used to suppress the opium traffic.47 However, these aid programmes were widely criticized. Some of the aid and helicopters provided had been used to fight ethnic insurgents like the Karen and Mon, who were seeking autonomy. Democrat Senator Daniel P. Moynihan criticized the US aid programmes for Burma. He stated that the Military government in Burma was corrupt and had no intention of

eliminating opium production. He said before House Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee, that the US had spent $80 million since 1974 on opium eradication aid in Burma "to absolutely no avail". "Economic development in opium growing and political settlement of Burma's ethnic insurgencies are essential if the US is to have any chance of curbing opium production", he said and further added, "economic development and an end to the civil war require the restoration of a democratic government in Burma. 48 Reagan administration could not control the production in Burma, which increased year by year. From 1984 to 1988, a Burmese diplomat said, the Burmese opium crop increased 40 per cent a year. According to Melvyn Levitsky, the crop during the 1988-89 growing season exceeded 2,600 metric tons of opium

48 Bangkok Post (Bangkok), September 17, 1989. Press clippings in the Library of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

As long as the Burmese way of Socialism remains intact, the Burmese drug trade will flourish. The system ensures that there will never be usable roads to allow farmers to market their crops in Burmese cities or to provide the Burmese Army access to heavy drug areas. The money to fund such endeavours simply will not exist. The Burmese way to Socialism thus discourages the collaboration between people in the lowlands and tribal groups in the highlands that could eliminate the drug trade. Indeed, the subsistence economy creates a state of war between them. Further, the political premise of the Rangoon regime has always been to maintain the absolute superiority of lowland Burmans over the hill people. Overholt, n.34, p.178.
compared with about 1,600 tons in 1987-88.\textsuperscript{49} Commenting on increasing opium production in 1988, Western diplomats, without being named, were quoted as warning that "with the best opium growing conditions in years occurring while the Burmese Army is preoccupied with political dissent, the flow of Southeast Asian opium and heroin to the rest of the world may increase by as much as 20 per cent over last year".\textsuperscript{50}

While recognizing that shortcomings and problems that remained, the United States officials were generally pleased with the Burmese enforcement efforts and before civil unrest halted the programme sought to increase enforcement assistance. They believed that the Burmese efforts were resulting in the destruction and interdiction of significant amounts of opium, that the aerial eradication programme could be expanded to insurgent-controlled areas without heavy aircraft attrition, and that enforcement efforts would significantly reduce Burma's opium production. The US officials described the 31,000 acres of opium poppy eradicated during the 1988 growing season as a "fantastic effort". They acknowledged that the aerial eradication

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\textsuperscript{49} International Herald Tribune, April 2, 1990.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., December 13, 1988.
\end{flushright}
programmes needed some improvements, including spraying in areas controlled by insurgents but expected such improvements to take place as the Burmese became more experienced in aerial eradication. Responding to reports that the US assistance was being used for counter insurgency operations, American officials stated that the Burmese generally used the helicopters and transport aircraft against opium trafficking and refining.51

According to its 1988 international Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the Department of State expected Burma to substantially reduce illicit drug production through expanded aerial eradication and increased enforcement activities. The US officials told the GAO team that proper spray techniques, such as flying fast and low, and the immediate abandonment of spray missions if ground fire was encountered, would limit aircraft losses against the insurgents' current air defences. They noted that aerial eradication involved some risk even in secure areas. They claimed that the pilots they trained were willing to undertake risk if permitted by their superiors. To encourage more aggressive spraying, they promised to replace aircrafts

51 GAO, Drug Control: Enforcement Efforts in Burma, n.41, p.21.
that were shot down or crashed during operations. The United States also gave helicopters specifically to rescue downed pilots. 52

It was assumed that the narcotics assistance programme had increased contacts between the US and the Burmese officials had helped in improving bilateral relations. American officials suggested that the programme served an important symbolic purpose and that it was important for the United States to demonstrate its resolve to fight opium at the source. By clearly indicating that the United States disapproved of opium production, enforcement programmes might have dissuaded some farmers from planting poppy or expanding their fields. Some might have demonstrative effect and officials also stated that the programme in Burma encouraged other countries, such as Pakistan, to accept anti narcotics assistance.

In their zeal to argue in favour of the programme the American officials went to the extent of suggesting that the suspension of assistance, which was positively a set back for the programme, might have improved the image of the

52 Ibid., pp.21-22.
United States in Burma's minority area. The General Accounting Office's visiting team was told by the US Official Working in Burma that the Burmese minorities viewed the US assistance to Burma as a collaboration with the government's brutal counter-insurgency campaign. As a result, the assistance programme reportedly generated anti-American sentiment among the various ethnic groups. The officials of National Democratic Front, representing many of these minority groups, told that they were grateful that the United States had suspended assistance to the military regime.\(^5\) The tribal groups might have heaved a sigh of relief that the counter insurgency operation would no longer receive US assistance and they might indeed have conveyed this feeling to the US officials, but there was no denying the fact that the U.S. programme had received a big blow. The spurt in the cultivation of poppy following suspension demonstrated that.

**Thailand**

Thailand was the only country in the Golden Triangle, where an overall comprehensive US narcotics control policy

\(^5\) Ibid., p.22.
was pursued. All the major drug control agencies i.e., the INM, the DEA and the AID played important role in Thailand to control drug production, processing and trafficking. They were equally reciprocated by their counterparts. Thailand was not a major source of opium production during the administration of President Reagan but a great source of refinement and shipment. According to the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumer Committee (NNICC), at least 20 per cent of the heroin that entered the United States transited through Thailand. The INM, the DEA and the AID’s narcotics programmes in Thailand were budgetted at about $12 million for the Financial Year 1987.54 As noted earlier, Laos and Burma were the main sources of opium production and they supplied opium to Thai laboratories for refinement. So Thailand was besieged by the Communist Party of Burma and Laotian Communist government and together they thwarted the US designs of narcotics control in Thailand. There were also reports about the growing of marijuana in Thailand. Ms. Wroblewski testified before the House Committee that the country was:

...a major supplier of heroin and cannabis for the United States. It is primarily of concern to the US as the transit route for Southeast Asian heroin destined for the United States. Much of the domestic opium production and opium imports are used to satisfy domestic demand. US agencies receive very good cooperation in their investigations, and in turn assist Thai Units in their multifaceted program to destroy crops and heroin labs and suppress trafficking on the border with Burma. Thailand is more of a transit point than a true money laundering center, and Thai officials don’t consider money laundering a major problem...

The United States agreed that Thailand was a minor opium producing country but was a major conduit for opiate products leaving the area because of its superior communications and transport infrastructure. It was the most developed country in the region. All the opium that was produced in Laos and Burma moved through Thailand. With the end of eradication and enforcement programmes after September 1988 in Burma, heroin production and refining in Thailand increased. This increase in illicit production was not matched by corresponding success in interdiction by Thai authorities. Corruption and lack of a conspiracy law hindered effective enforcement. 56

The United States narcotics assistance programme in Thailand was carried out under the provisions of the 1950

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55 Hearings, Narcotics Review in Southeast/Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, n.13, p.13.

Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement which was updated in 1977. Cooperation in narcotics control was the subject of a Memorandum of Understanding signed by the US and Thailand in 1971. These two agreements, together with the annual programme agreements, satisfied the Chiles Amendment requirements of Section 481(h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.57

The primary US goal in Thailand in the 1980s was the same as in other countries, to assist the Thai government in reducing as rapidly as possible the amount of opium and marijuana cultivation. The secondary goal was to limit drug trafficking through Thailand. The US objectives included sustaining and enhancing the Thai government’s commitment to drug control, disrupting heroin trafficking routes and border refining complexes, denying Thai territory to paramilitary trafficking organizations and eliminating opium poppy cultivation and trafficking. To accomplish these goals and objectives, the Reagan Administration funded Thai narcotics crop eradication efforts and provided limited short term aid to farmers in opium growing villages, if they agreed to stop growing opium poppy. In addition, the US

57 INCSR (1991), n.42, p.272.
provided Thai law enforcement agencies with training, equipment, and operational and technical support and supported the Thai army operations against insurgent trafficking groups on the Thai-Burmese border. A study mission under the Chairmanship of Chares B. Rangu (D., NY.), which visited the Thailand from January 18-20, 1988 gave a report about the cooperation and success in Thailand and recommended:

Thailand is to be strongly commended on its successful drug eradication efforts. Illicit production estimates range between 20 and 50 tons. This compares to levels of 150-200 tons 10 years ago. With the cultivation of opium in Burma and Laos estimated to have increased by 40%, the delegation sees a need to further intensify the existing excellent interdiction work conducted by the Thai police as well as joint investigations with DEA.

The RTG (Royal Thai Government) should further consider the use of herbicides in the eradication of its remaining opium cultivation, as well as for the increasing marijuana cultivation. An aerial survey of the marijuana growing areas would be helpful in assessing the scope of that problem.

The delegation urges the RTG to pursue its dialogue with the Burmese government to enhance and speed up information sharing, as well as developing joint operations against the traffickers and the opium refineries.

The delegation strongly recommends that the RTG and the legislature enact law enforcement tools which would enhance the Thai law enforcement effort against drug
trafficking organization and lead to the prosecution of drug kingpins.

About strong law enforcement measures the delegation urged the following proposals:

Ratification of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) by the Thai Parliament. This treaty, signed in 1986 by the Thai and the US governments and approved by the US senate, would bring even closer cooperation between Thai and the US narcotics investigators and permit the sharing of narcotics assets seized in the US when Thai law enforcement is involved in the investigation.

Enactments of conspiracy, money laundering, and asset forfeiture statutes by the Thai Parliament. Passage of these laws will enable Thai law enforcement officials to trace and seize the assets of large scale trafficking organizations and cripple their operations.

During President Reagan’s tenure, Thailand continued to maintain a crop eradication narcotics law enforcement programme. Cooperation with the United States counterparts remained fairly satisfactory, and joint refinery interdiction operations and criminal investigations produced


59 Ibid., pp.7-8.
significant results. About the Thai government's performance, David L. Westrate, Assistant Administrator for operations, DEA testifying before a select Committee said:

1988 was a good year for law enforcement efforts. According to Thai government officials, drug arrests exceeded 46,000, up from 42,550 the previous year. The amount of heroin seized almost doubled that confiscated in 1987 - up from 1.3 tons in 1987 to 2.4 tons in 1988. Refinery interdiction operations were undertaken regularly during 1988, with a total of 10 heroin refineries being immobilized by year's end. Several refineries have been neutralized so far this year.

Wrobleski, defining the goals for the programme in Thailand said:

The major emphasis in Thailand will be on elimination of the opium crop and on delivering development assistance to the hilltribe population, reduction of the marijuana crop, and improvement of Thailand enforcement operations. INM's 1988 budget provided funds to help the Royal Thai Government further reduce opium poppy cultivation by providing bridge assistance to farmers who agree not to cultivate poppy or whose poppy crop has been destroyed. Our goal continues to be elimination of opium poppy in Thailand by 1990.

61 Hearings, Narcotics Review in Southeast/Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, n.13, p.6.
The United States continued to provide funds to support Thai paramilitary forces who interdicted trafficking and refining along the Thai/Burma border and to enhance the narcotics investigation capabilities of police units.62

Approximately, 1,700-1,800 hectares (about 30-45 percent of the total planted) of opium were eradicated in each of the last three growing seasons (1986-1987 to 1988). The Thai government launched a vigorous marijuana eradication campaign in the past few years. Eradication in 1987 and 1988 fell below 1986 levels because substantial marijuana production shifted from Thailand to neighbouring countries as a result of Thai efforts. In 1988 over 62 metric tons of cannabis were seized.63 Thus, in the last three years of his administration, President Reagan had very good cooperation from Thailand. The United States therefore increased its narcotics budget to Thailand. Between Financial Year 1974 and Financial Year 1987, the US provided a total of $32.8 million to support Thai government's narcotics control efforts. For the Financial Year 1988 alone, nearly $4.5


63 Ibid., p.98.
million were allocated to support the Narcotics crop control and Narcotics Law Enforcement Projects. The priorities of these two projects were to eliminate the cultivation of narcotics crops and to disrupt the trafficking of illegal drugs through Thailand. The first project supported Thai development and eradication programmes designed to convince hilltribe and other farmers not to grow opium and marijuana. The latter project, on the other hand, supported efforts to interdict narcotics before they entered the international market. To achieve this purpose the United States provided basic commodity and training assistance to the specialized Thai anti-narcotics law enforcement agencies.

Thailand was one country in which the US programme received fullest possible cooperation from the government. This mutual trust and cooperation was the offshoot of close and friendly bilateral relations between the two countries. The success achieved in reducing the production and interdicting the drug traffic was noteworthy. However, there were problems which needed to be overcome if achievements had to be greater. The US constantly reviewed its policy and came up with recommendations.

64 Hearings, Study Mission to Korea, Thailand, Burma, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Hawaii, n.58, p.8.
Responding to American suggestion, the Thai government sent the draft of conspiracy and asset seizure bill to its parliament. The bill was not approved. In 1988 the narcotics control was redrafting the bill on the basis of previous studies and legislative experience. In the United States, the MLAT had been signed but had not been ratified by the Senate. It was expected to go before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the summer of 1988. Wroblewski affirmed this. She also pointed out that the two governments were continuing a dialogue for improving the legal tools available to the Thai government for enforcing the agreed upon measures for narcotics control. The officials of the Thai government agreed that the concept of sharing of seized assets was beneficial to Thailand. 65

To make the law enforcement more effective the DEA encouraged the Thais to pass an effective Narcotics Conspiracy law and Asset Seizure Law. It was also felt that a more effective means of opium and marijuana eradication could be used, such as for opium the slash and burn method and for both opium and marijuana use of herbicides to destroy the crops. It was also believed that the Thais could

65 Hearings, Narcotics Review in Southeast/Southwest, the Middle East and Africa, n.13, p.89.
make a much stronger effort to seal the Northwestern border between Thailand and Burma. From this area, opium and heroin were brought into Thailand and consumer goods were daily delivered to the narcotic insurgent groups working in the area. 66

It was felt by the United States that the Thai Government had enforcement and interdiction problems that include endemic corruption, a lack of asset seizure and conspiracy laws and need for more effective enforcement agency efforts. If the United States wanted to achieve success in enforcement and interdiction then it should continue to place its officials in Thailand and provide economic and technical assistance. Corruption in Thailand was endemic. It was a major barrier to effective enforcement. Corruption in police which was responsible for enforcement was widespread and was accepted as a means of supplementing salaries, which were considered low even by Thai standards. 67

66 Hearings, Study Mission to Korea, Thailand, Burma, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Hawaii, n.58, p.10.
Therefore, a major objective of the US should have been to influence the Thai government leadership to acknowledge the endemic corruption that existed among officials charged with narcotics control responsibilities. It was suggested that to achieve this goal, carefully selected incidents of corruption should be brought to the attention of Thai government officials at the highest level to encourage prosecution and punishment of corrupt officials, rather than mere transfer to less visible posts as was done in the past. A certain climate was also needed that made narcotics corruption unacceptable. The General Accounting Office reported:

In the opinion of some, Thailand's police and government agencies are capable of dealing more effectively with the problems of narcotics production and trafficking. The problem is often not a lack of resources as much as the relative priorities set by Thai government officials. Effective US political and diplomatic pressure, coupled with continued economic and technical assistance may result in better Thai performance in this area.  

Though the US was not fully happy with the Thai government's performance, but at the same, certain US officials who visited Thailand realized the problem of eradication of opium poppies in Thailand. US Attorney

68 Ibid., p.31.
General William French Smith who visited Bangkok in October 1982 felt "heartened" by Thailand's attacks in the region of opium production and heroin traffic but also with a keener sense of obstacles to controlling narcotics at their source. The problem, noted Smith, in an interview, included rugged opium growing terrain, rich traffickers backed by their own armies and the fact that hill tribes had depended on opium crops for generations. The Thai authorities "have some very difficult problems, some of which are political", Smith said, but he added that the Thai government was "dedicated" to overcome them.\textsuperscript{69} After talks with Thai officials and a plane ride over the opium fields, he further said that "it's just not really feasible to do some of things that might from a distance, seem to be the obvious thing to do, like march through the hills and pull up the poppy plants."\textsuperscript{70} The Thais successfully conveyed the impression that they were doing their best under political constraints.

But there were US officials since the beginning of the Reagan administration who were not happy with Thai government's narcotics control programmes and assailed it


\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., February 20, 1983, A16.
for its failure to destroy the opium in the fields. Dominick L. Dicarlo, Assistant Secretary of State for the INM, spent two days in Chiang Mai, in the opium growing areas around northern Thai city, late in August 1981, and later told the newsmen that he was amazed that the Thais had not moved against much "easy targets". He contended that every acre of opium in the hills led to heroin deaths, not only on the streets of the US cities, but among Thailand's addicts as well. The New York Times reported that DiCarlo had told Thai officials that the US could probably provide far more money for Thailand's war on narcotics if destruction of poppy in the field took place. The US contributed $7 million to Thailand's anti narcotics efforts in the year 1981 and maintained the Drug Enforcement Administration's office there which had 39 persons. 71 Subsequently, on December 14, 1982, Dicarlo expressed a less patient view. He told the House Judiciary Sub-Committee in 1983 that Thai efforts at crop substitution had been of "limited success in reducing the number of acres planted with opium poppies since the Thai government has yet to take effective action in enforcement of the opium growing ban". 72

72 Ibid., February 20, 1983, A16.
Reacting sharply to Dicarlo's criticism, Major General Chavalit Yodmani, Secretary General of Thailand's Narcotics Control Board, said that "The Thai Government has the intention not to allow the production of these drugs. But we have to do it our own way." He further added, "we can't be dictated to by Mr. Dicarlo...., if we keep hitting people who don't have enough to eat, we will have huge problems, if we have them arrested, where will we put them."

But in its last years the Reagan Administration was impressed with the cooperation extended by the Thai Government. David L. Westrate, Assistant Administrator for Operations, the DEA testified before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives:

Thailand continues to be a consistent ally in drug control objectives. The Thai government has sponsored continuing opium and cannabis eradication programs. One area of concern in Thailand is the effectiveness of the opium eradication programs. Recent reports indicate that this program may not have been as successful as previously believed. Thailand carried out its second major cannabis eradication effort last year when it seized approximately 2,000 tons of fresh marijuana.

The Thai Army, Border Patrol Police (BPP), and the office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) continue to apply pressure on major trafficking groups. As a result, arrests and seizures remain at commendably high

73 Ibid.

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levels. For years, DEA has enjoyed an extremely productive relationship with its Thai counterparts. The acceptance and implementation of laws targeting traffickers for financial investigation and asset removal will greatly enhance our joint efforts in Thailand.

There were a number of significant seizures in Thailand during 1986. One involved 136 kilograms of heroin which were concealed inside a shipment of sports shirts that were awaiting shipment to the United States....

Department of State while giving the answers to the question states,

Thailand has USG-provided aircraft which are now dedicated to logistical support of narcotics control. These aircraft were often unflyable due to poor maintenance, and the Thai government repeatedly requested that the US provide them with new equipment. Instead, it was determined that with the assistance of an aviation maintenance advisor to help the Thai effectively manage and maintain their existing fleet, additional aircraft would not be needed. The maintenance advisor helped build an effective logistics/maintenance organization which has kept the existing helicopter fleet in operational order. His continued liaison with the Thai maintenance operation will allow for a continuation of the existing program.75

Thailand was a consistent ally in drug control objectives. The Thai government sponsored opium and cannabis


75 Ibid., p.83.
eradication programmes. One area of concern in Thailand was the effectiveness of the opium eradication programme. After being in operation for quite some time, it was realized that the programme might not have been as successful as it was previously believed, though Thailand production had consistently fallen at the end of the 1980s, it had been unreceptive to using aerial spray to achieve further eradication as it could be hazardous to human being and ecology. Therefore it laid stress on manual destruction of opium crops.

Thailand carried out its third major cannabis eradication effort in 1987 and destroyed approximately 1,000 metric tons fresh marijuana. The quantum was half of that destroyed in 1986. The Thai government attributed this to the effectiveness of the eradication programme which forced cannabis growers to plant smaller plots in more remote areas, making detection and eradication more difficult and time consuming. Thai traffickers had also been working with Lao farmers to produce more marijuana in Laos where there was no eradication or enforcement pressure.

The Thai army, National Police, and the office of Narcotics Control Board continued to apply pressure on
major trafficking groups. As a result, record seizures were made in 1987 and during the first two months of 1988. In October 1987, the Thai National Police seized 680 kilograms of heroin base from a Thai fishing trawler in the gulf of Thailand. This record seizure was surpassed by another seizure by the Royal Thai Customs on February 10, 1988 of approximately 1,280 kilograms of No.4 heroin that was concealed within 62 bales of rubber which was to be shipped to a company in New York via Singapore.76

AID’s Development Assistance in Thailand

AID had been engaged in a variety of narcotics control programmes in many Asian countries. Priority attention, was however given to Thailand and Pakistan due to continuing problems of illicit opium production, refining, trafficking, and domestic drug use. Its anti-narcotics programmes in Asia fall into two general categories: Opium crop replacement and area development and drug awareness. These activities were carried out with extensive involvement of the host country and coordinated closely with other US mission

narcotics agencies and programmes. In Thailand the AID also pursued these programmes. Thomas H. Reese, III, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Asia and the Near East, AID stated:

Over the last two decades, Thailand has made significant progress in reducing cultivation and production of opium and in providing alternative income sources for opium producers. Thailand's achievements are partly offset by the continuation and expansion of opium/heroin trafficking from neighbouring Burma and Laos, and widespread drug use in both urban and rural areas of Thailand itself. With the recent completion of the Mae Chaem Watershed Development Project. Thailand will primarily receive technical assistance and programme support for narcotics education and awareness efforts under the centrally funded and administered Regional Narcotics Education Project.

The AID narcotics control development assistance projects in Thailand and Pakistan played an important role in the US government's narcotics control efforts for several reasons. The projects helped demonstrate US commitment to eliminating illicit narcotics supplies at the source, introduced a government presence in remote narcotics producing areas and relaxed the financial hardships imposed by enforcement measures.

AID's Mae Chaem Watershed Development Project in Thailand was initiated in Financial Year 1980 and scheduled

77 Hearings Asian Heroin Production and Trafficking, n.60, p.79

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to run until 1987. An extension to 1989 had been approved. 78

In contrast to Pakistan, the AID's contribution to narcotics control efforts in Thailand had not been as focussed. Its narcotics related project was only marginally related to narcotics reduction objectives, contained a weak poppy clause, and the AID staff had not monitored narcotics production in the project area as actively as in Pakistan. The AID's plans for future narcotics-related work in Thailand were confined to drug awareness and detoxification efforts, and its country strategy for Thailand did not include opium control as an explicit AID objective.

In Thailand, only the AID Mae Chaem Watershed Project had a poppy clause. In contrast to the poppy clauses used in Pakistan area development projects, which provided for the termination of assistance if opium poppy was discovered growing in project areas, the Mae Chaem poppy clause, according to AID's legal adviser, called for the termination of assistance only if project inputs, such as AID-supplied fertilizer, were being used directly for opium cultivation. Thus the provision for Thailand was much more lenient. The Mae Chaem project also addressed opium production through a  

78 GAO, U.S. Supported Drug Control Efforts, n.5, p.35.

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land use certificate programme. It provided farmers with land use certificates stipulating that if recipients produced narcotics, they would lose their rights to the land.

The Mae Chaem Watershed Project poppy clause was of questionable utility. The AID programme officials in Thailand told GAO's team that under the Clause, direct use of AID-supplied project inputs to grow opium would be needed to invoke it. AID's legal adviser in Thailand stated that since most project benefits were indivisible public goods, such as roads, opium growers in project areas would derive incidental project benefits as opposed to direct benefits. In his view, the poppy clause would be virtually unenforceable under such circumstances.\(^79\)

The AID monitoring of opium cultivation in project areas in Thailand was less frequent and too informal to produce reliable evidence of violations. Project staff had not determined the amount of opium acreage under cultivation. A 1986 AID Inspector General report recommended increased monitoring. However, project staff continued monitoring on an infrequent basis. Moreover, the staff's

\(^79\) Ibid., p.39.
observations were not verified against available aerial survey data provided by the Thai government to the NAU.

The AID officials in Thailand were dependent on the Royal Thai government to monitor poppy production in the Mae Chaem project area. They believed that more AID monitoring was warranted because poppy had been found growing in district. In 1986, AID project staff discovered opium poppy cultivation in the project area and informally asked the Thai government to eradicate it. The Royal Thai Army conducted the eradication in December 1986. 80

The AID staff also did not systematically monitor land distributed under the land use certificate programme to ensure that opium was not being grown. Thailand was responsible for enforcing the prohibition against opium cultivation on project land, but AID did not monitor the government’s enforcement activities.

For the Thai government's crop control programme and for improving performance continued US support was needed. Issues that needed to be addressed were identified as follows:

80 Ibid.
The Thai government should be encouraged to reduce reported corruption and to enact conspiracy and asset seizure laws.

Consideration should be given to changing the focus of US strategy, placing more resources in enforcement and interdiction efforts.

Consideration should be given to whether AID can or should play a greater role in contributing to the narcotics control program in Thailand; this is not now an AID priority and limited AID resources are devoted to this objective.

Thai eradication claims need to be more systematically verified; it is generally believed that eradication results reported by the Thai government are considerably overstated.

As the Reagan Administration neared its end, a worldwide review of the programmes for controlling drugs was taken. The conclusion was that there was urgent need to change the strategy. Recommendations relating to Thailand had wider application.

THE GOLDEN CRESCENT

Pakistan

Of the three countries in the Golden Crescent, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, the US Narcotics Control efforts were carried on only in Pakistan. It was the only

country where the US received cooperation from the government. Despite that the programmes met with little success. The fact of diplomatic access in Pakistan was highlighted by Ms. Wrobleski in her testimony before the House Foreign Relations Committee in 1988 when she said, "The only country in the Golden Crescent that we have diplomatic access to is Pakistan, and the only country where we have a program..." Why then the US could not get complete success in Pakistan? It was because of weak narcotics laws, corruption and Communism. As pointed out by one scholar, in Asian heroin producing countries, many of which shared borders with Communist countries and were partners in the struggle against Communist expansion during the Reagan Administration, always attached more importance to other foreign policy goals than the war against drugs. It was hard to anticipate the United States ever imposing sanctions on Pakistan, even though that country was the world's top heroin producer, or on the Afghan mujahiddins, about whom there were reports of their deep involvement in opium cultivation and trafficking. It was stated that when Reagan met with a number of Afghan Guerrilla leaders at the White House in November 1987, he did not even raise the

topic of drugs.\textsuperscript{83}

For several years the United States received, but declined to investigate reports of heroin trafficking by some Afghan Guerrillas and Pakistan military officers. But it did not investigate these reports because of its desire not to offend Pakistan's military establishment which happened to be its strategic ally. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Reagan Administration's narcotics policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan was subordinated to the war against Soviet influence there. Its soft attitude and sanction of $3.2 billion aid met with some resentment and opposition in the congress. Charles B. Rangel, (D., NY.), reacted angrily. He favoured cutting all foreign assistance except food and medical support to those countries that produced and exported opium. "I just find it astounding that this administration would consider a $3 billion military and economic aid package to a country that's one of the largest suppliers of heroin to the United States. I am incredulous." "I can understand the reasons for the package, the administration's concern about the Soviets

and Communism". But given the administration's stated concern with drug abuse, the fact that they had done nothing to cover narcotics control at all bordered on criminal neglect. The US had done this successfully with Turkey and Mexico. Then why not Pakistan. 84

To some extent, the resentment shown by Congress members was genuine but it was only one side of the coin. Since the beginning of President Reagan's tenure, Pakistan confronted one of the worst problem in the world. There were nearly three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. It was also one of the factors that forced the US not to lay too much stress on the narcotics problem. In October 1982, US Attorney General William Smith toured an Afghan refugees camp in Peshawar and offered to the largest refugee population in the world, greetings from the President Reagan. Smith flew to Peshawar after meeting government officials in Islamabad for talks on stemming the flow of opium from Pakistan and coping with 2.7 million refugees from the fighting in Afghanistan. 85 In Islamabad, Pakistan's Attorney General Sharifuddin Pirzada told Smith that

Pakistan would cooperate in efforts to reduce narcotics trafficking. 86

Though the United States faced these problems, even then the three agencies i.e., the INM, the AID, the DEA, which funded Pakistan's narcotics programmes, had considerable success in coordinating their respective activities through the country team mechanism, but at the same time the need for more coordination was felt. 87 It was realized in the United States that Pakistan had been working with the United States and other governments in conducting a "Foreign Enforcement Agencies Cooperation Program". The government of Pakistan permitted the stationing of foreign drug enforcement personnel in Pakistan who initiated and conducted investigation of international drug smuggling. In June 1987, the Dangerous Drug Act of 1930 was amended to include a provision for Pakistan asset seizure. 88

The US and Pakistan also agreed at a special meeting of the bilateral narcotics working group in June 1986 that the ban on opium cultivation would be effectively enforced in

86 Ibid.
87 GAO, US Supported Drug Control Efforts, n.5, p.51.
Gadoon, where the AID had a major development project, and in the Dir, where the special development and enforcement project managed by the United Nations was being developed. Pakistan also agreed to enforce the ban in those portions of the Bajaur and Mohmand Tribal areas where development had been scheduled.\textsuperscript{89} The joint United States - Pakistan crop control efforts were encouraging since the beginning of the Reagan Administration. Prior to the banning of opium production by President Zia-ul-Haq, over 80,000 acres of opium were cultivated in the country, which was reduced to approximately 15,000 acres, the target of the US crop control and development strategy.\textsuperscript{90}

Though areas of opium cultivation were curtailed, there were reports of the increase of opium production in Pakistan. Raymond McKinnon, Deputy Assistant Administrator from the office of International Programs of the DEA, noted the fact,

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90 GAO, \textit{U.S. Supported Drug Control Efforts}, n.5, p.51.
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...the Pakistanis themselves are admitting probably a tripling of production within Pakistan in the area of opium. Their figures, which coincide very closely with the U.S. figures, are going from 40 tons up to about 140 to 150 tons, which, surprisingly enough, match almost identically with what our estimates are.\(^1\)

While the opium production increased between 1985 and 1987, the narcotics control programme had begun in 1981. This was attested by James A. Norris, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia and Near East, Agency for International Development, who stated,

We began our narcotics control efforts immediately following the U.S. pledge in 1981 to resume bilateral economic assistance to Pakistan for the new six year program. Our strategy was two fold. First to deny the benefits of A.I.D. projects to poppy-growing farmers and villagers who refused to stop illegal opium production. Second to assist farmers and communities who agreed to comply with the government ban on opium poppy cultivation.\(^2\)

In effect, it was a classic carrot and stick policy; denial of aid benefits to those who grew poppies and help to those who complied with the government's policy.

The United States drug control strategy in Pakistan like other countries as discussed earlier was to eliminate

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\(^2\) Ibid., p.51.
cultivation, production, trafficking and use of illicit drugs.93

Though drug crop eradication and development programmes were started in 1982-83, but herbicide aerial eradication took place in 1986. Many bilateral drug control agreements were signed between the United States and Pakistan during the Reagan Administration. According to Stephen J. Solarz, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Asia Pacific Affairs, of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, opium crop production in Pakistan reduced from about 700 to 800 tons in 1979 to somewhere between 75 and 125 tons in 1981,94 which was the good starting point for the President Reagan.

As the United States had no political and diplomatic relations with Iran and Afghanistan during 1980s it consolidated its drug control policy only in Pakistan. Dominick L. Dicarlo, Assistant Secretary of INM while testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 9, 1983 stressed the point. He said:


Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan are the principal source of opium from which over half of the heroin entering the United States is processed. For reasons not related to narcotics, we have not executed agreements with Iran and Afghanistan. Our regional strategy, therefore, centers on Pakistan as an opium producer, a heroin refiner and a transshipment point for other Southwest Asian opium, and on Turkey as a principal conduit of opiates moving from Southwest Asia to Western Europe and the United States.95

The US international narcotics control programmes supported foreign governments' efforts to control the cultivation, production and refinement of illicit drugs by providing financial and technical assistance for crop control and other law enforcement activities and in some countries by providing development assistance. It was done in Pakistan by three US agencies: the INM, the DEA and the AID. According to GAO report:

The principal U.S. goal in Pakistan is to eliminate cultivation, production and trafficking of opium and its derivatives. The United States assists the government of Pakistan in enforcing a ban on opium cultivation, production, refining and trafficking. U.S. objectives are to: (1) institutionalize crop production, law enforcement in areas where opium poppy cultivation is to be prohibited and in former opium poppy growing areas to prevent recurring cultivation, (2) enhance Pakistani law enforcement capabilities against heroin refining in tribal areas, and (3) implement an aerial spraying program to destroy opium poppy crops.


96 GAO, U.S. Supported Drug Control Efforts, n.5, p.11.
The United States supported Pakistani crop control efforts by providing agricultural and technical assistance and small infrastructure projects to assist the government of Pakistan in enforcing its ban on opium poppy cultivation in the Northwest Frontier Province. It provided training to law enforcement agencies, equipment, and operational and technical support including vehicles and communications and office equipment to support 15 joint narcotics task forces units and equipment for the Pakistani customs. This was done mostly by INM.

Role of the INM

The INM's primary objective was to control the cultivation and production of illicit narcotics in those regions that exported primarily to the United States. It stressed firstly on the priority of crop control in source countries through eradication and national ban on narcotics production. Secondly, it emphasized on interdiction of drugs transported to the United States. It also funded development assistance activities in opium growing areas.

During the Financial Year 1982 the Narcotics Assistance

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97 Ibid., p.15.
Unit, the elite unit of INM, in Pakistan began an area development project in the Malakand region, aimed at reducing opium production. In 1981, production in the region was estimated at 8,150 kilograms of opium on 1,100 acres, which was reduced by 200 to 300 acres in 1986/87 growing season, the project provided area residents with an enhanced quality of life. This project was a job oriented and area development scheme.

Although, it was originally intended to be a 3 year project with allocation of approximately $4.5 million but was extended to 5 years and the funding was increased to $6.1 million to be spent on roads, irrigation, electrification, reforestation, and other subprojects. The project's agricultural, water supply and irrigation schemes created about 100 jobs, not a big figure. This indicated show the relationship between the policing and development job creation. In addition, provincial officials created about 200 police force jobs and requested an additional 200 to 400 similar jobs from the Pakistani government.  

McKinnon remarked about programmes in Pakistan:

....INM, in conjunction with DEA, are doing a lot of training both in country and inviting individuals to

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98 Ibid., p.20.
come to this country. I think, may be conceitedly, there is quite a bit of professional transfer from having our officers over their dealing with them on a day-to-day basis on a close relationship. 99

The NAU in Pakistan also began an agricultural outreach project in Financial Year 1982. Since that time, it had been providing agricultural assistance in the Malakand Agency, Dir District, Bajaur Agency, Mohmand agency and the black mountain area of Mansehra. The project provided farmers fertilizers, improved traditional crops, and introduced new crops. Other types of development assistance included improvements to existing roads, wells and land levelling. The funds provided by the INM totalled $2.4 million since Financial Year 1985 to 1987/88. 100

Again in Financial Year 1988, INM planned to support the extension of Pakistan's ban on opium poppy cultivation by introducing improved agricultural crops and making minor improvements on irrigation systems as part of INM's continuing agricultural outreach programme in the Malakand and Dir areas. It also planned to pursue other outreach activities to prevent the spread of opium poppy cultivation and to help poppy growers substitute other new crops in

99 Hearings, Review of United States Narcotics Control Efforts in the Middle-East and South Asia, n.91, p.65.
100 GAO, US Supported Drug Control Efforts, n.5, p.20.
areas where major development assistance projects were not being carried out. Ms. Wrobleski said, "INM will also continue to support eradication and enforcement and hopes to see improvement in destroying heroin laboratories, seizing contraband, arresting major traffickers and breaking up narcotics distribution systems." 102

With the assistance of the United States, the Pakistan began aerial herbicide eradication (though simple eradication started in 1982/83) during the 1986-87 growing season using helicopters which were reconditioned and prepared for spraying. The Pakistan government planned to expand use of these helicopters in 1988. It also decided in May 1987 to expand its aerial eradication capacity by adding a fixed wing spray capability, using an aircraft on loan from the INM. In place by late January 1988, this aircraft enabled the Pakistan to extend eradication into areas where topography and lack of government control had previously limited access. The United States also assisted Pakistan's aerial spraying operation with procurement of commodities


102 Hearings Narcotics Review in Southeast/Southwest Asia, the Middle-East and Africa, n.13, p.6.
supplies and technical services.\textsuperscript{103}

Despite the vigorous effort, narcotics control in Pakistan was not very effective. There were several reasons for this including ineffective eradication, changing production patterns and limited aerial spraying. For example, in Pakistan opium production had increased because of increased and shifting areas of production and ineffective eradication. According to a US official, the setback was in parts due to the shift from a military to a civilian government in 1985 which stopped enforcing the ban on growing opium poppy when farmers in Gadoon area violently protested the eradication campaign in 1986. The Malakand project director felt that the farmers perceived the civil government to have a weaker commitment to eradication. They tested that commitment by cultivating poppies. In addition, the Pakistan government limited poppy eradication to areas that received some form of development assistance or that had not been traditional areas. It was reported that opium production in areas not receiving assistance increased from 30 per cent to about 50 per

Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo did not agree that the increase in poppy cultivation was because of change over from military to civilian rule. On his visit to the United States in July 1986, he expressed his government's determination to control narcotics problems during his meetings with President Reagan. Whitehead reported that narcotics control was a central theme of many of the meetings with Prime Minister had with officials. President Reagan applauded Pakistan's determination and Junejo's leadership in enforcing Pakistan's determination to wipe out opium growing, heroin production, and drug trafficking.

The Reagan administration also increased its assistance to Pakistan to enhance its interdiction capabilities. Begun in 1980, with the US assistance, Pakistan's extensive narcotics interdiction programme continued to expand. In 1987, a new organization the Maritime Security Agency was given responsibility for narcotics interdiction in its

104 GAO, US Supported Drug Control Efforts, n.5, p.16.
105 Hearings International Narcotics Control Programs and Policies, n.89, p.27.
territorial waters. A training course in maritime interdiction for this new unit was funded by the INM and taught by the US Coast Guard.107

Law Enforcement Activities:

The DEA's international narcotics control efforts were implemented through its Foreign Cooperative Investigative Programme. It provided expertise, technical assistance and training to Pakistani law enforcement officials; participated in collecting and sharing narcotics intelligence; and, when authorized, assisted in investigations. It helped the host government develop programmes to reduce the supply of drugs at or near their agricultural source, immobilized refineries, identified export staging areas, and interdicted illicit drug shipments. During the eight years while Reagan was in office, the DEA had approximately 17 agents in Pakistan who were supported by 16 additional staff.108

107 INCSR (1988), n.103, p.194.

The US understood that like other developing countries, Pakistan had a narcotics corruption problem. There were several factors for the lack of effective action against major traffickers. One important factor was the inability or unwillingness of law enforcement agencies, except in a few cases, to arrest major narcotics traffickers, financiers, or organizers, because of protection monies paid by the traffickers to enforcement officials and to other officials at airports, seaports, and other checkpoints to facilitate smuggling. Its law enforcement personnel were poorly paid. Second reason was that while Pakistani specialized narcotics investigation units had interdiction responsibilities and knew interdiction techniques, they were unfamiliar with the specialized investigative techniques required to develop cases against major traffickers.

The Drug Enforcement Agency faced bureaucratic problems in its dealing with the Pakistani drug enforcement apparatus. For example, in order to successfully control delivery to the United States, the Agency was required to make application to the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB) listing the amount, date and flight numbers of the aeroplane, which would be used. Later on the government decided that the same procedure should be followed and duplicate notification provided with Pakistani customs. It
It resulted in delay, which often frustrated the efforts of DEA in important cases.\textsuperscript{109}

The US took a few measures to overcome these problems of weak narcotics laws. It provided US assistance in improving Pakistani enforcement capabilities by supporting Joint Narcotics Task Force (JNTF) units made up of local law enforcement agencies, and setting up new special customs drug enforcement cells in eight principle cities around the country. The DEA advisors were assigned to Pakistan in 1985 to work exclusively with JNTF, the first arrangement of its kind in any country.\textsuperscript{110} The United States also reviewed bilateral cooperation on drug control regularly with the Pakistan's government through the bilateral Narcotics working Group, established in 1983 under the U.S.-Pakistan Joint Commission.\textsuperscript{111} Ms. Wrobeski stated before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee on April 22, 1987:

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
Aerial herbicidal eradication has begun in the Gadoon area for the balance of the 1986-87 harvest, and outreach programs will increase to other growing areas which United States wants to see scheduled for the development and eradication - linked strategy begun in 1983. We will continue to support expansion of the joint narcotics task forces and hope to see improvement by these task forces and Pakistani customs and other police units in destroying heroin laboratories, seizing contraband, arresting major traffickers and breaking up distribution rings.\textsuperscript{112}

The DEA's primary liaison was with the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board and Pakistan Customs. Their enforcement efforts, considering their limited resources, had been commendable. One DEA Special Agent in Pakistan was a training advisor and was developing concepts to improve the efficiency of these two Pakistani agencies.\textsuperscript{113} Ms. Wrobleski stated,

DEA's relationship with the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB) and Pakistani Customs has always been good. The level of cooperation between DEA and its counterparts in Pakistan has improved significantly over the past year. In fact, Pakistan customs recently created a position within the agency which will be responsible for enforcement matters as they apply to controlled deliveries, and have designated an officer to assume the position. This effort will most certainly reduce the time required for approving controlled deliveries.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{112} US Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol.87, June 1987, p.75.

\textsuperscript{113} Hearings Review of United States Narcotics Control Efforts in the Middle East and South Asia, n.91, p.34.

\textsuperscript{114} Hearings Narcotics Review in Southeast/Southwest, the Middle East, and Africa, n.13, p.78.
A major restraint in DEA's narcotics control effort was Pakistan's limited control over tribal and semi-tribal poppy growing and opium refining area in the Northwest Frontier Province. Directly related to this was the government's inability to stem the flow of opium and heroin from Afghanistan into Pakistan.

Despite certain weaknesses, the DEA was of the view that there existed a serious, cooperative relationship on narcotics matters with Pakistani government during the Reagan Administration.

Development Assistance Programme

Besides the DEA, the AID was another government agency that played a significant role in the US international Narcotics control programmes. The AID financed area development projects in Pakistan and Thailand, which helped to improve standard of life of residents of narcotics-producing regions and to provide agricultural research, alternative or substitute crops, roads, and irrigation assistance. It AID imposed poppy clauses or other conditions in project agreements, which included the termination of assistance of opium poppy found cultivated in project areas. It also ran drug awareness projects in Pakistan and Thailand.
which were aimed to inform source country opinion leaders, parents, community action groups, and users of the harmful effects of narcotics production, trafficking, and abuse on their societies.

In Pakistan, the AID made the eradication of illicit opium a priority throughout its project portfolio. It addressed narcotics control through: (1) a project specifically designed to eliminate opium cultivation, (2) support for an UNFDAC narcotics control programme, and (3) poppy clauses included in other AID projects. 115 James A. Norris, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia and Near East, Agency for International Development, describing the AID programme said,

...we designed our entire economic development program in Pakistan so as to ensure that each of our projects in energy, rural development, irrigation and agriculture contains a so-called "poppy clause". Under this arrangement we stop project disbursements if we find any poppy under cultivation in a project area. We do not resume project activity until the poppy is eradicated. Over the past five years we have had to invoke the "poppy clause" only once. The poppy in question was quickly destroyed, well before it reached maturity and could be harvested. The government of Pakistan is aware of the "poppy clause" in our project agreements and realizes that a failure to enforce it would invoke the cut-off provisions once again.

115 GAO, U.S. Supported Drug Control Efforts, n.5, p.34.
...we and the government of Pakistan have designed a special five-year project (with life of project funding of $30 million) which is focused on areas which produce opium. Through project, the Northwest Frontier Area Development project, we help the government of Pakistan, assist farmers and communities who have agreed to stop producing opium. We are unable to replace all of the income the farmers receive from illegal opium production, and we do not promise to do so.116

The clause thus committed a government to keeping specific development areas free of narcotics, especially areas which had not grown narcotics before. In the one instance when new opium poppy was discovered which was under such an agreement, the government destroyed the crop.117

Actually poppy clause was invoked first in April 1984 and then again on March 25, 1987. Joseph E. Kelley, Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs Division, US General Accounting Office stated:

Twelve of AID's projects in Pakistan contain clauses that would terminate assistance if poppies were found growing in the project areas. One project aimed specifically at narcotics control, has an enforcement schedule. AID actively monitors narcotics production in project areas and coordinates eradication efforts closely with the government. In March 1987, AID held up payment for its Tribal Area Development Project after poppies were discovered in the service area of a water

116 Hearings, Review of United States Narcotics Control Efforts in the Middle East and South Asia, n.91, p.51-52.

project. AID was preparing to use the clause again in April after discovering opium poppies being grown in an area serviced by a project irrigation system. The Tribal Area Development Project recently expanded into the Bajaur and Mohmand Tribal Areas, which are both major poppy growing areas. 118

The Northwest Frontier Area Development Project was the only project in AID's portfolio specially designed to eliminate poppy cultivation started in 1983. It was funded at $30 million. It was described as a comprehensive attempt to promote integrated rural development intended to eliminate opium poppy cultivation and change the project area - the Gadoon Amazai - from an opium based economy to a diversified agricultural and non-agricultural economy. It also funded activities designed to increase traditional food crop yields, promote new substitute cash crops, improve livestock and range management practices and build physical infrastructure. 119

The AID and the NAU disagreed over the issue whether AID should take a bilateral or multilateral approach to development assistance in narcotics growing areas. The AID moved in the direction of funding multilateral UNFDAC

119 GAO, U.S. Support Drug Control Efforts, n.5, p.34.
development projects rather than bilateral AID projects. The AID's first step in that direction was contributing $10 million to UNFDAC's implementation of the Pakistani Special Development and Enforcement Plan as a component of the Northwest Frontier project. The NAU disagreed with the strategy and favoured more US bilateral assistance. 120

The UNFDAC's lack of progress led the AID to reevaluate its position towards multilateral projects and to consider additional bilateral projects in Pakistan. When the Reagan Administration was nearing its end, the AID was engaged in examining the possibility of beginning a new $400 million project for the Northwest Frontier Province, a major narcotic producing area. 121 It began funding a drug awareness programme and development a drug abuse information and resource center and planned a major area development project which would continue project activities in Gadoon and expand them into the adjacent Black Mountain area. 122

In Pakistan, the poppy clause the AID inserted was stricter than in Thailand. It actively monitored narcotics

120 Ibid., p.40.
121 Ibid.
production in project areas and coordinated eradication efforts closely with the government. It was assumed that the AID should consider long term development project in areas where the INM had funded small scale development and agricultural outreach projects.

Benazir Government's Cooperative Endeavours in Narcotics Control Areas

Both President Zia-ul-Haq, who imposed ban on opium poppies production in 1979 and Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo insisted that enforcement of the ban on opium production should be pursued with vigour during the fall and winter months of 1986, when the next crop would be cultivated. This cooperation was continued by the government of Ms. Benazir Bhutto who signed new agreements and created a new ministry to deal with narcotics.

In September 1988, the US government and government of Pakistan signed the Tribal Areas Agreement, which provided for the gradual introduction of a ban in country’s opium production area. This five year programme was designed to eliminate all poppy cultivation in the Mohmand and Bajaur Agencies of the NWFP. In addition the Bhutto government indicated strong support for aerial eradication. Detailed plans developed to use the Thursh aircraft during the
spraying season to extend eradication into areas where topography and lack of government control had limited access. The Bhutto government made reduction of opium cultivation and heroin trafficking a national priority. Malvyn Levitsky, Assistant Secretary of State, INM, while giving testimony before Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control on August 1, 1989, not only praised Ms. Bhutto for making narcotics eradication as "one of its principal policy initiative". He claimed improved performance in most anti-narcotics activities" as a result.

During Ms Bhutto's June 1988 visit to Washington, the US and the Pakistan signed a protocol which proposed the creation of a new elite narcotics enforcement unit and provided $1.5 million US assistance for it. The US also promised assistance for the reorganization of the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board. In PNCB senior management was revamped. New Directors of enforcement and planning took up their positions in Islamabad and new regional directors were installed in Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar.

124 Hearings, Asian Heroin Production and Trafficking, n.60, p.55.
125 Ibid.
The Pakistan government increased its seizures of heroin by 30 per cent from 800 kilograms in 1987 to 1,100 kilograms in 1988. In 1988, Tariq Butt, a major heroin dealer, was arrested in Lahore. Another major drug figure, Malik Saleem, was arrested by Pakistani authorities in late 1988 under a request for his extradition from the United States. He was waiting trial in 1988 in Miami. 126 Though the US and Pakistan had entered into extradition treaty during the Reagan Presidency, it was never invoked in the case of drug traffickers.

Despite its serious domestic problems, the attitude of Pakistani government remained cooperative during the Reagan Presidency as noted by Secretary of State George P. Shultz, in an interview to Ms. Anirudhya Mitera, Correspondent of the Times of India News service. Shultz is reported to have stated that the US government was working very hard with Pakistan on this problem. He added, "President Zia, before his death, and I am sure his successors, will carry on in the effort to eradicate crops and get at the laboratories, where these drugs are processed and the movement of drug to India for transshipment purposes". He further pointed that

126 Ibid., p.70.
the shipments "is aimed at the US and once again that brings into play our own interdiction along our own borders where we are working increasingly hard and effectively, but also doing something about the big market here." Even as Shultz claimed that his government was working "cooperatively" with Pakistan on the narcotics problem, most of the enforcement agencies in his government expressed dissatisfaction over the approach of the Pakistani officials in implementing the existing laws or following suggestions made by the US government as part of their joint anti-narcotics programmes.127

In conclusion it can be said that though both the United States and Pakistan were determined to control the production, processing and trafficking of narcotics but endemic corruption and weak narcotics laws in Pakistan and communism in general and Soviet Union in particular was a major threat to the overall US administration's international objectives and goals. Because of Pakistan's strategic location and proximity to the Soviet Union, Reagan administration had no other option except to tolerate the reported involvement of certain high Pakistani civil and military officials in the narcotics business.

127 The Times of India, October 27, 1988.