PREFACE
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Judged at one time as the golf playing president, the opinions on Dwight D. Eisenhower underwent a drastic change from the 1970's onwards. This was the result of the declassification of numerous private and official papers, which gave rise to a revisionist historiography on Eisenhower. In the light of the new sources this study tries to reexamine the United States policy towards Egypt during the presidency of Eisenhower. This study tries to review the subject in its historical context, how the declassification of Eisenhower's papers have revised or corroborated assessment of such events of far reaching consequences as the Suez crisis and the proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Thus this thesis is a reappraisal between what was known and what is now revealed.

A distinct shift is noticed in the approach of Eisenhower towards the Arab nations of the Middle East. Thus the first issue the study looks into is the contours of the United States policy towards the Middle East, particularly Egypt after the Second World War and why it changed when Eisenhower became the President in 1953? What complications did this change bring to the Anglo-American friendship? Did the complications in turn affect the relations of the United States with the
Israelis and the Arab states particularly Egypt? And what were the consequences of Eisenhower's policy termed the 'new look' towards Egypt? These are some of the questions that are analysed.

The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter examines the immediate post Second World War foreign policy aims of the United States and the altered pattern that came into being from 1953 onwards. The Eisenhower presidency if seen as more pro-Arab than pro-Israel and pro-British.

The causes, nature and results of the Anglo-American divide from 1953-1956 is the subject of the second chapter. Withdrawal of the British troops from the Suez region, the Baghdad Pact, sale of arms to the countries of the Middle East and the Aswan Dam loan are the issues which led to this divide.

In the third chapter the Suez crisis of 1956 is analysed in detail. The differences between the United States and Britain were sharpened when the interests of the two as defined by their respective governments collided. The reasons and consequences of the cancellation of the Aswan Dam loan by the United States which was supposed to have triggered off the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Gamal Abdel Nasser are reviewed in this chapter. The responsibility for
the resultant Suez crisis is also looked into. Who is to be blamed—Britain, France, Israel or the United States?

The Eisenhower Doctrine as a post war measure of peace is reviewed in the fourth chapter. It attempts to examine in the light of new material the motivations of Eisenhower which prompted him to formulate his Middle East proposal, the debates and discussions which took place in and outside the Congress on whether to accept or reject the proposals and the consequences of the introduction of the Doctrine in the Middle East countries.

The fifth chapter is that of conclusion. Ultimately what emerges is that for the United States the most important goal of its policy in the Middle East was containment of Communism. All other objectives were subordinated to this. In turn it vitiated the entire policy and brought the United States onto a collusion course with Arab nationalism led by Nasser.

The School of International Studies of Jawaharlal Nehru University generously gave me a field-work grant that enabled me to spend a few hurried weeks in the United States. As a result I was able to collect materials for this study from the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas and consult Dulles papers at Princeton
University Library. I am grateful to the school for this help. This study is largely based on private and official papers, oral transcripts, microfilm transcripts and volumes on the United States foreign policy released after 1986. It is important to mention here that sources are still being released and the latest that I went through were the microfilm transcripts at the John Foster Dulles Oral History Collection, Princeton University, released in 1992. I also made a short stop over in London, on my own to go through the records on the Suez crisis. I was somewhat disappointed as very few primary documents of that period as yet have been declassified.

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