CHAPTER IV

DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION AND BUREAUCRACY IN THE ARAB GULF
There are a variety of definitions of administration. Generally, it is defined as the maximum utilization of available resources in order to achieve specific aims. This definition evidently regards efficiency or competency as the essence of the administration process. In the 1950s, the concept of development administration emerged as an aspect of public administration. This kind of administration is the basis for the implementation of policies, programmes and projects where the aim is to improve economic and social conditions.¹

Development administration is often referred to as activities performed in order to implement development programmes or projects.² A detailed definition is that development administration comprises all phases of the formulation of policies conducive to the achievement of specific aims, and the mobilisation, organization and maximum utilization of all available resources with the purpose of realising these aims and policies.³ Because in addition to traditional activities, developing countries are introducing

1. G. Grant, Development Administration (Madison, 1979), p.3.
new ones directly related to the objectives of economic development, development administration is usually viewed as governmental administration of those new activities which aim at changing the economy.

A distinction is made between public administration and development administration. Public administration assumes traditional tasks which correspond with the state’s traditional, social and economic roles, whereas development administration lies outside the traditional area and is suited to new tasks. Therefore, public administration tasks are static and highly bureaucratic, whereas those of development administration are constantly increasing and varying. Further, a distinction is made between development administration and administrative development. The former refers to all activities concerned with formulation, implementation and evaluation of policies and programmes whose aim is to produce economic and social changes. The latter means development of organizations, techniques and methods and the increase of administrative capability.


Development administrations in the developing countries differ from those in the developed ones. Although both developed and developing countries are characterised by the steadily expanding role of government institutions and agencies, expansion in the roles of the former relies on a broad base of potentials and active participation from the private sector, whereas the latter not only lacks such a base and participation, but also occurs within conditions where it would be too late to wait for potentials to grow or for the public sector to be mobilized.

Change administration is another name for development administration, for administration plays an essential part in bringing about and controlling change. In other words, it is an influential factor in effecting development. Administration, and particularly public administration in the developing countries, is assigned the responsibility of achieving development objectives.

Though the development administration is considered a part of public administration, actually it represents a dynamic administration. Principally, it includes the agency responsible for economic planning and also for identifying the resources essential to raise the national income. It also involves all various organizations related to the process of comprehensive change, such as those which contribute
to the acceleration of industrial and natural resources development and to the improvement of the infrastructure. Furthermore, it involves all other institutions which take part in raising economic or social standards.  

Some people in positions of responsibility in the public and private sectors in the oil producing Arab Gulf states view development administration as the maximum utilization of available resources. They rank institutions of planning, industry and education as directly relevant and as playing essential roles in development. This possibly explains why planning, industrialization and education are considered indispensable for development even though far more than these are required.

Development administration may refer to the agencies and institutions responsible for the implementation of development plans and programmes, or to one type of administration with distinctive properties, orientations and requirements. Ideally, the most important properties of development administration are:


1. the ability to set objectives and formulate policies,
2. the ability to act, innovate and take initiatives,
3. the ability to deal with changing situations,
4. the ability to effect changes,
5. the ability to make proper decisions,
6. the ability to implement policies competently and efficiently,
7. the ability to evaluate.

The requirements of development administration are represented by the following:
1. building self-sufficient economic potentials,
2. achieving multidimensional advancement,
3. providing welfare for future generations.

The requirements of administrative development are:
1. the will to develop,
2. definite objectives and policies,
3. conscientious political leadership,
4. competent administrative leadership,
5. trained, qualified manpower,
6. active political reinforcement,
7. genuine societal interaction,
8. a productive economic base.

A more realistic definition of development administration is the administration capable of translating the aspirations of society into plans and programmes which are
competently and efficiently implemented. Such an administration possess the will for development; it also possesses insight and shows determination and perseverance in the face of challenges; it interacts with society and has the skill to mobilise it; it develops material and human capital and utilizes it to the maximum, thus creating a self-developing base in political, social, economic, educational and other dimensions in order to realise prosperity for present and future generations. 9

Development of Development Administration

In recent times, the role played by government administration in social and economic fields has grown regardless of the nature of the system. In the oil producing Arab Gulf states, too, the role of government administration is dominant for a variety of reasons, especially the nature of the economic structure and the absence of an active private sector. However, these states have not yet utilized the oil wealth in a way that can most efficiently serve the purposes of development. It is administration there that constitutes the decisive factor in the development process.

Studies on development reveal that it is not financial resources that determine the ability to achieve development, but administrative potentials which enable a country to

utilize its own resources most efficiently. The experiences of several countries indicate that a chief obstacle to development is not insufficient finance, as it is widely believed, but lack of administrative potentials capable of successful running and coordination of projects as well as realising the desired objective.\textsuperscript{10} In his reference to the significance of development administration, Al-Qaissouni, an expert on Arab economic affairs, states:

\begin{quote}
I have seen with my own eyes developing countries spend a lot of money on establishment of projects and import of up-to-date machinery and equipment, but they fail to run them because of lack of sound, capable and enlightened administration. I have also seen other countries spend less on new projects, but they succeed in their implementation and the achievement of their objectives because of sound administration.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}

The oil-producing Gulf states spend incredible amounts of money on many projects, the import of the latest machinery and equipment and the personnel to run them, even though the required administration is lacking. That is why, according to some views, no comprehensive, real development exists in these states.\textsuperscript{12} These states could not, in a short period of

\begin{itemize}
\item[12.] The Second Annual Meeting of the Development OPCAP (Oil-producing Countries of the Arabian Peninsula) Forum (Bahrain, December 1980).
\end{itemize}
time, even with good intentions, set up the required competent administration capable of utilizing oil resources most efficiently.

Oil has made it easy for the Arab Gulf states to finance many projects and programmes, and to expand services. Thus, oil poses for development administration a major challenge governed by various internal and external factors with economic, political and social implications. Oil significantly and decisively influences the economic, social and political aspects in the Arab Gulf states, both directly and indirectly.

Development administration — even a competent one — does not operate in a vacuum. The lack of clearly defined objectives in agencies and institutions, and the absence of a definite role, make it impossible for development administration to function. However, without the ability to function effectively, the presence of clearly-defined objectives and a definite role will not, even with good intentions, lead to any growth of abilities.

The problem before the Arab Gulf states is that their governments have found themselves obliged to act in several fields and expand their own activities and tasks. In addition, they have dominated the economy by establishing public institutions and firms. These agencies often fail to
perform even their traditional tasks satisfactorily, and to be under an obligation to perform new development tasks, in addition to the traditional, means lowering the standard of performance even further. Thus, efficiency in performance in developing societies is even lower than in primitive societies.  

Within conditions of abundant wealth, small population and small territory, the Gulf states have been spending large amounts on services, particularly education, health; schools and hospitals have been provided and sometimes housing on easy terms. However, the way in which services are provided is characteristically consuming rather than productive, for they are designed as a form of charity, an end in themselves rather than as a means to self-development of the recipients. The likely outcome is the creation of a consuming rather than a productive society.

In the Arab Gulf states, development administration is associated with government administration. In a context where the economic structure is almost completely dependent on only one source of wealth whose revenues are controlled by the government, and where government administration

constitutes development administration, the role of government administration becomes more dominant and exercises more influence on development. How can government agencies be fit for development administration while they are slaves to bureaucracy, routine, complicated rules and the suppression of competence, productivity and morale? These agencies, in their expansion, accommodate only bureaucrats — the opportunists in particular — and allow no room for genuine performance or achievement. Therefore, being dominated by government agencies, development administration inevitably becomes bureaucratic.

The Arab Gulf states have tried to overcome the negative nature of their bureaucracies through a variety of means. Several public corporations and companies were established to be responsible for some so-called developmental tasks. They were usually dominated by the negative elements inherent in the existing government agencies, they were frustrated by censorship and restrictions, and they lost their expected positive outcome of autonomy. In other words, development administration in these states, be it government agencies or public companies and corporations, is often inefficient.

Development administration has made some achievements exemplified by building and construction projects and by

15. Osama, n.8, p.55.
services which are usually below standard quality. However, as far as the modes and relations of production are concerned, it has evidently failed to effect any fundamental changes. Neither has there been success with respect to development of manpower and establishment of an industrial base dependent on indigenous skills and expertise. What has been achieved is mainly due to the oil wealth which made the finance of many projects easy. It is difficult to measure the performance of development administration against such economic indicators as the increase in national or per capita income, for in most of the Arab Gulf states the increase is mostly the result of oil investments and oil price rises.

Measurement of the satisfaction of basic needs represents one of the newly introduced criteria against which performance of development administration can be evaluated. Judged against these criteria, the social, health and education services in the Arab Gulf states are not sufficient, and their quality is below standard. Though educational, social and health services have been created within a short period of time, they do not satisfy demand, nor does their quality, which counts in the measurements of real achievements of development, satisfy desirable requirements.17

17. Ibid, p.57.
Many projects and programmes to which the Arab Gulf states have allocated a large portion of their huge resources and potentials have not been matched with proper output. They have faced with many difficulties, of which the following are outstanding: (i) inappropriate choice and inadequate preparation; (ii) delayed implementation; (iii) high costs; (iv) defective implementation. Underlying the symptoms of failure is a variety of causes, such as inadequate investigation of possible alternatives, poor decision making and insufficient information. In addition, administrative corruption is responsible for channelling project contracts in the personal interests of administrative and non-administrative leadership. Sometimes, decisions regarding certain projects are made politically rather than administratively. Other reasons are poor choice of responsible personnel, lack of necessary abilities and potential, obstructive bureaucratic procedures and inadequate evaluation. 18

Many of the projects and programmes represent either symptomatic development or some necessary requirements needed for achievement of the basic objectives of development. In this sense, the difference between the objectives and what is actually reached is not due entirely to failure on the part of development administration but also to unrealistic objectives.

Growth of Bureaucracy

Bureaucratisation has swept the Arab world; including the Gulf states since the 1950s. "Bureaucratisation" means two things (a) bureaucratic growth, i.e. expansion in public bodies of the sort that can be measured by increases in the numbers of administrative units and personnel as well as the rise in public expenditure, including in particular, wages and salaries; and (b) an orientation whereby the administrative and technical dominate over the social. Generally it is a tendency that goes very much in the direction of centralisation, hierarchy and control. Both aspects of bureaucratisation have grown substantially in the Arab World in the last four decades. 19

It is remarkable how extensively and rapidly the bureaucracy has expanded in the Arab Gulf states, even though the relative weight of the various causes of this expansion has differed from one type of country to another. Four criteria are used to measure bureaucratic growth: increase in the number of administrative units, increase in the number of public employees, increase in current government expenditure and, within that, increase in the wages and salaries of the employees. In considering the extent of bureaucratic growth,

these four criteria should be taken together in the sense that a relatively limited slow increase in one category at any particular stage should not distract us from observing the phenomenon of bureaucratic growth in its totality; i.e. as represented by a combination of all four factors together.

Practically, the bureaucracies of the Gulf have been created from scratch. Their main expansion has been an outcome of oil wealth, which moved the states towards large-scale social welfare programmes and ambitious economic development plans.

Saudi Arabia

The Saudi nation-building process underwent several major stages of evolution. First came the consolidation of the fragmented Sheikhdomes into a cohesive national entity. Then came the creation of a number of institutions and systems to implement the objectives and programs of the new nation. Unlike most governments of the Third World and particularly in this region, the Saudi bureaucracy evolved in absence of a colonial legacy. It grew largely from local resources and in response to local needs.

Early Saudi bureaucracy stress the development of institutions of law and order. Only later were organizations beyond the realms of law and order institutionalised. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established in 1930 followed by the Ministry of Finance in 1931. 20 It appeared understandable at that time that the new bureaucratic order of the post-consolidation period placed less emphasis on rational schemes of planning, programming and organization. 21

The establishment of additional government agencies continued into the next decade. The Ministry of Defence was established in 1944. 22 A Ministry of State for Development Projects was created in 1947, but did not survive long enough to initiate any work.

The early 1950s were distinctively different from previous years where the proliferation of government agencies reached a record level. In 1951 three ministries were inaugurated. These were the Ministries of Health, Interior and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). In 1952, the Bureau of Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Finance was made a ministry, but it as well, did not last more than two years. 23 In the ensuing years, directorates, originally operating within the Ministry of Finance, became autonomous.

22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
ministries. These were the Ministries of Communications (1952), Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, Education (1953), and Petroleum (1954). The Comptroller General of State Accounts followed suit in 1953. Since 1950s, the number of ministries has grown from four to twenty, and over forty public authorities and corporations have been established.

Civil service employees, who numbered no more than a few hundred in 1950, increased to about 37,000 in 1962-63, to 85,000 in 1970-71 and to over 245,000 in 1979-80. The ratio of public employees to the total population in the early 1980s was approximately 3.5 to 4 per cent, which is admittedly not excessive, but government civil servants represented 10 per cent of the total labour force and 13 per cent if one counts non-career personnel.

Due to oil boom reserves jumped from $ 2.7 billion in 1972 to $ 22.6 billion in 1974. This was immediately followed by large increases in expenditure. Between 1973 and 1982, salaries and benefits, as well as current expenditure, grew thirteen fold. Without doubt, the expansion in public expenditure in Saudi Arabia has been most impressive.

Kuwait

The handful of administrations and directorates that existed in the early 1950s developed into ten departments in 1959. These were turned into ministries in 1962, when three more were added, making a total of 13 ministries. By 1976, the number of operating ministries had reached 16 in addition to two ministers of state. Furthermore, a number of higher councils have been created and over 25 public authorities and corporations.

The numbers of government employees grew rapidly from 22,073 in 1966, to 113,274 in 1976, to 145,451 in 1980. According to official figures, government employees represented 12.5 per cent of the population and about 34 per cent of the total labour force of Kuwait in 1975. In 1979 the Amir of Kuwait expressed the view that some 65,000 civil servants in Kuwait were unnecessary and a World Bank report on Kuwait public administration suggested a total freeze on all new appointments.

Government expenditure also soared. Between 1973 and 1979, domestic expenditure increased by 388 per cent and salaries and wages by 242 per cent. It is estimated that

nearly 39 per cent of government expenditure can be classified as organizational: this includes the substantial income provided to the head of state and the Amiri Diwan as well as more standard expenses such as the Employees Bureau and supplementary allocations.

United Arab Emirates

The first federal government in UAE was formed immediately after the Union was declared in 1971, with Abu Dhabi as the main sponsor. In 1968 Abu Dhabi had some 20 government directorates, which increased to 25 by 1970. The first council of ministers of Abu Dhabi, which was formed in 1971, included 15 ministers, but this was abolished in 1973, and replaced by a federal cabinet with 28 ministers. Abu Dhabi also established an executive council to run its own affairs.

In 1968 the Abu Dhabi administration employed 2,000 officials. By 1970, their number had doubled and by 1974 it reached 5,352, of which 37 per cent were UAE citizens, 42 per cent were other Arabs and 21 per cent were foreign nationals. Eight years later, the number of public employees in Abu Dhabi had jumped to 24,078.

The rise in public employment on the federal level has been four times between 1972 and 1982, from 10,500 to over 40,000. The UAE is representative, but in an extreme way, of what happened in other Gulf States where the local human base could not support the required expansion, leading therefore to heavy reliance upon expatriate labour. In the Abu Dhabi bureaucracy, which is the largest and most established within the UAE, a ludicrous 83.6 per cent of all officials are foreign nationals.

Indicators show that the state bureaucracy may have been stretched beyond its capabilities. In 1983, this country, which ranks among the highest in the world in terms of per capita income, ran up a budgetary deficit which forced it to defer payment of salaries to public employees for a number of months. As the budgetary deficit was expected to increase in 1984, the Ministry of Finance and Industry forbade the creation of new public posts for non-citizens in the following financial year.

Since the oil boom, there has been a vast expansion in public finances in the UAE. The federal budget quadrupled between 1971 and 1974. The budget was mainly financed by

34. Ayubi, n.19, p.133.
Abu Dhabi. Payment for national and federal ministries accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the total. In the Abu Dhabi budget for 1976, expenditure on both Emirate and the federation continued to grow; expenditure in 1977 was 74.8 per cent of the total rising to 84.3 in 1982.

Bureaucracy vs. Bedoucracy

Bureaucracy, in the Weberian sense, is an ideal model devoid of subjective elements (such as whims and inclinations, etc.) and concerned with objectivity and productivity. In reality this model is not in practice. Bureaucracy in the Arab Gulf states and other developing countries is not just a tool for the achievement of development objectives. It also tends to influence development process since it plays the major role in policy formulation, interpretation and implementation. Bureaucracies have their own interests, which are likely to affect development plans and programmes.

Public administration is embedded in its social environment and an integral part of it; the two are inseparable. Administration is a cultural and social product which reflects the values of society as a whole. Thus, administrative behaviour is an end product of social values,


traditions and other cultural constituents. This throws light on the reasons for the weak performance of government agencies in spite of their adoption of models of administration copied from those in advanced countries. As societies in the Arab Gulf are held back by tribal values and traditions, so are their administrations.

Bureaucracy in the Arab Gulf states, although simple until recently, is being steadily inflated due to an unclear vision of future objectives and the abundance of financial resources. It is suffering from structural and behavioural defects of both external and internal origin terms like 'Bedoucracy' and 'Sheikhocracy' are used to designate the model of tribal bureaucracy. According to Al-Rumeihi, the 'Bedouinocracy' model includes, besides traits of bureaucracy, the resolution of modern problems by traditional concepts within traditional contexts. According to Ayubi through the creation of a bureaucracy, the rulers of oil states are paying the citizen - by way of lucrative government employment in return for a cessation of the old tribal wars, for tacit acceptance of the political supremacy of one tribe or fraction of a tribe (the royal or princely family) over the others.

What the central administration does for the modern urban sector, the system of local subsidies achieves for the rural and nomadic areas. This can be likened to a system of indirect administration that recognizes the traditional authority networks of the bedouin and incorporates them in the state structure.'

Added to the tribal element of public administration is the taxation function. Here it is reversed: instead of the usual situation, where the state taxes the citizen in return for services, here the citizen taxes the state — by acquiring a government payment — in return for staying quiet, for not invoking tribal rivalries and for not challenging the ruling family's position. 40

The relationship that has been established between the official and the state is quite complex. On the one hand he knows that the state or the ruling family needs his acquiescence on the other he knows that he needs a public post not only for the financial benefits it offers him but also for the contacts it provides. In the short run, the official is tempted to feel that he is in the stronger position, that the state needs him more than he needs the state and that he can bargain with the state over the price of acquiescence. 41

40. Ibid, p.144.
41. Ibid, p.145.
Under such circumstances, the official is bound to think that he receives a meagre price for his service to the state. An empirical study conducted on 614 Saudi officials indicates that 79 per cent of the respondents were dissatisfied or neutral as far as their pay was concerned; the petrodollar flood has obviously created very high pay expectations. 42

Hierarchy in organization has two aspects. The first is as a channel for occupational mobility, with related status and economic rewards; the second is as an instrument of control. 43 When an Arab takes a government job because it has prospects, he cannot escape, at least in part, the control that it will have on him. Available empirical evidence tends to support this: the Arab is learning to obey. In Saudi Arabia, for example:

While government workers are not highly motivated, they do seem to be responsive to demands from superiors. Hierarchical information flows are quite effective, but decisions are made at the top of the hierarchies regardless of competence. 44


43. Ibid, p.94.

44. Ibid, p.321.
It indicates that the control functions of bureaucracy work successfully. But to respect hierarchy is not the same as becoming an 'organisation man'. The bedoucracy, with its emphasis on family and kin relationships, has survived into the petrocracy with its superficially large, complex and 'modern' (i.e. formal-rational) arrangements, and this has given rise to a new variety of state organization that can be termed petro-bureaucracy.

Al-Awaji⁴⁵ explains the resulting conflicts within the bureaucrat most eloquently:

... because he wants to maintain his position both with his kin, friends and neighbours, and with his superior or superiors, he either evades the issue to avoid possible conflict, or exploits it to his advantage. While his loyalty to his particular group is largely an emotional one, his loyalty to his superior and his organizational mandate is for expediency. Where there is no conflict between personal goals and those of his organization or superior, his opportunism remains unrevealed. This may occur when a bureaucrat is able to satisfy the demands of one interest without violently offending the other. In such a case, he is an exploitationalist. He can be boldly corrupt when the formal rules are flexible, or legalistic when this best serve his interests.

Nevertheless, in most cases, he is escapist. When the conflict is so sharp that it endangers his position at the office and/or at home or before his friends, he is most likely

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to evade it. The typical situation is when the interests involved are vital to both his particular group and to his supervisor or the formal regulations of his agency.

However, the existence of conflict should not be taken to mean that bureaucratic organizations will not develop: bureaucracy may co-exist with Kinship, and bureaucratic organizations can be held together through patronage. Concerning the Gulf region, Amir al-Kubaisi has coined the term Sheikhocracy to describe the behavioural outcome of the juxtaposition of the attitudes of the Sheikhs who acts as bureaucrats' role, and the bureaucrats who act the Sheikhs' role. 46

Obviously, public administration in the Third World is characterized by negative traits of bureaucracy, such as an insistence on sticking to strict formal procedure as well as slow process of decision-making. 47 In addition, the long list of negative traits of bureaucracy includes: waste of resources, shunning responsibility, weakness of professional ethics, limited competence, unnecessary centralization, numerous unnecessary committees, inadequate communication, absence of

46. A. Al-Kubaisi, Public Administration and Development in the UAE (Dar al-Khalij, 1982), pp.152-54.

47. H. Laski, Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Bureaucracy, vol.III.
demarcation lines for authority and responsibility, absence of clearly defined tasks for each job, prevalence of task dualism and repetition and absence of co-ordination among agencies of administration and even within agencies. The Arab Gulf states, too, has acquired many of the above traits. According to one of the studies on the negative traits of bureaucracy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a large percentage of personnel under investigation acknowledge the existence of those traits, whereas the largest percentage does but "to a certain extent". The personnels' conception of bureaucratic traits focuses on multiplicity of procedures, centralisation of authority and strict interpretation of rules and decision. 48

The Arab Gulf states, until recently, did not have even the simplest type of administrative, economic and social organization or institution. However, some agencies existed for limited purposes. Later, waves of government agencies and institutions were established which were structurally identical to those in the advanced countries but lacked the latter's potential, competence and the efficiency needed to achieve objectives. It has become customary for these states, like other developing countries, to aspire to

copying models of advanced countries regarding organization, concepts or techniques, but there was no significant effect on actual performance.

The traditional model of administration known in most of the Arab Gulf states till the middle of the twentieth century was represented by the tribal style, the clan convention and the Sheikhdom system. Only in the early 1960s, after oil resources poured in enormously, did most of them witness changes in their administrative systems. Clearly, the sudden wealth has contributed to the rapid expansion of government agencies and to the growth of the labour force in the public and the private sectors. Expansion and inflation evidently coincided with the steadily increasing financial resources, which led to the unconsidered expansion of government structure and the direction of expenditure in a way that is not necessarily conducive to the most efficient use of financial resources. Thus, the governmental structure is not built on sound strategy directed by actual needs, but rather on guesswork supported by financial abundance which provides the cost of building as well a greatly increasing labour force.

The oil wealth has contributed enormously in the creation and development of a great number of schools, institutes, educational centres, universities and other
institutions. But the problem is that non-material side of culture has been barely touched by change. There is a great difference between the material and the non-material sides of life. For example, the increased number of educational institutions does not necessarily mean an improved performance level, nor better product quality, nor satisfaction of development demands, nor acquisition of the ability to face challenges created by change. There is a rapid and steady increase in the number of graduates from these educational institutions, and consequently the pool of qualifications increases, but with very little significance to the required quality of manpower. Public institutions in general might, but their modern machinery and equipment, look advanced, yet as far as administrative objectives, ways and techniques are concerned, they are backward.

The inconsistency between the non-material i.e., values and social behaviour and the material side of culture is clearly reflected in government agencies in the form of the contrast between structures and equipment on one side and administrative attitudes, values and behaviour on the other. Such inconsistency is increased by the nature of material change, which occurs at a quicker pace and more easily than non-material change. It is this cultural gap or inconsistency which is mainly responsible for administrative problems. 49

49. Osama, n.8, pp.61-62.
Why the Expansion?

As we have seen earlier, there has been a tremendous development of bureaucracy in the oil rich Arab Gulf states. Reasons for bureaucratic expansion are multiple. Some is due purely to demographic growth and to the need to supply services for increasing populations. But as the percentage of public officials within the population in general and the labour force in particular tends to be higher than in many other societies, one has to examine other causes. The following seem to be of particular importance: traditional prestige of public office; strong belief in the developmental role of the bureaucracy; the relationship of public office to creating the contacts vital for private business; and possibly the impact of the Egyptian model, both as an example and through the role of the large number of Egyptian officials working in many other Arab countries. 50

Some of the reasons for bureaucratic growth are entrenched in the social and political conditions of the society. Most important is the expansion in formal higher education that is in no way related to the economic needs and manpower requirements of the society. Under pressure from people aspiring to higher social prestige, and the belief that qualifications lead to economic development, the

Middle-East has witnessed a strong case of what one expert has called 'diploma disease'.

Unfortunately, too much attention has been given to formal higher education in comparison with technical education and vocational training in all Arab countries. In most countries of the world, educational expansion has in fact followed, not preceded, industrial development. Muhammad Ali's experiment in nineteenth century Egypt to expand higher education without a similar expansion in on-the-job training resulted in virtually no real industrial development and the country had to start almost from scratch in the inter-war period. All Middle Eastern countries are currently making the same mistake, with high ratios of university graduates and relatively low levels of industrial development. One important outcome is to inflate public bureaucracy, with too many controllers, inspectors and supervisors but few functioning personnel to control, inspect or supervise. 51

Another major reason behind the expansion in the size and role of the government bureaucracy in the oil rich Arab Gulf states is the rentier nature of the state in these countries, mainly as a consequence of the oil boom. In these states, a dominant proportion of the national income is derived from rents rather than from the productive sectors of

the economy; these revenues mostly go to the state, which takes charge of their allocation and distribution. Palmer, Alghofaily and Alnimir maintains that: 52

Rentierism is not only an economic phenomenon. Rentier criteria... also possess concomitant cultural-behavioural characteristics that make it difficult for the rentier state to increase its productive capacity and to maximise the economic and political advantages at its disposal.

The economy of the oil rich Gulf states is that of rentier nature. The percentage of oil exports to total exports in those countries ranges between 90 and 99 per cent; the percentage of oil revenues to total government revenues ranges between 85 and 99 per cent; oil's contribution to GDP in turn is to a large extent related to government expenditure which is almost totally dependent on oil revenues. If one excludes the direct and indirect impact of oil, it is clear how weak the economic base of the society is. 53

In the Arab Gulf states oil revenues accrue to the state before they are distributed and it has made the economic role of the state extremely powerful. Saudi development plans may extol the virtues of free enterprise and the advisers to


the Saudis may assure that the rapidly growing role of
the Saudi government in the Saudi economy is viewed as
only a 'temporary evil', but the fact cannot be concealed
that the government sector was responsible for over 62 per
cent, or nearly two-thirds, of GDP (as expenditure) during
the third plan.\textsuperscript{54} In 1976 the share of government in total
consumption was 59.8 per cent, the share of government
purchases in GDP was 33.3 per cent and the share of government
in Gross Fixed Capital Formation was 69.6 per cent.\textsuperscript{55} As
Osama Abd al-Rahman\textsuperscript{56} observes, "The governments' hegemony
over the economy is large - possibly exceeding government
hegemony in most developing countries, and not differing
very much from the hegemony of government in countries
following a socialist path". Long has tried to reconcile
the two contradictory aspects by concluding that the govern-
ment has in effect "become the senior partner in a system
of Islamic State Capitalism."

In the oil rich Arab Gulf states, the bureaucracy
serves as a respectable and modern-looking method of distribu-
ting part of the oil revenues. Unlike traditional straight

\textsuperscript{54} KSA, Third Development Plan, p.29.

\textsuperscript{55} R.El-Mallakh, Saudi Arabia: Rush to Development (London,

\textsuperscript{56} Abd al-Rahman, n.53, p.40.

\textsuperscript{57} D.E.Long, "Saudi Arabia", The Washington Papers, no.39,
(California, 1976), p.56.
forward handouts, bureaucracy provides a more dignified way of disbursing largesse, camouflaged in the language of meritocracy and national objectives. And sure enough, the Gulf bureaucracy is, in spite of all its paternalism, a redistributive instrument that provides people of lesser status and income with opportunities for social promotion through state education and bureaucratic careers.  

The creation of jobs has become almost an objective in its own right, irrespective of what the recruits should or can do. This explains, among other things, the high numbers of illiterate and other poorly educated nationals who tend to be employed by the bureaucracies of the oil-rich states. It may also partly explain why many officials are not in their offices for much of the time. According to studies made by the Saudi Institute of Public Administration, 75 per cent of officials arrive at work late, 69 per cent often leave the office for private business, and 51 per cent are frequently absent without leave; when the employee is actually at his desk, only 48 per cent of his time is spent on his official job.  

The resultant inefficiency is at least partly intentional. Even before the oil bonanza, one analyst observed:

58. Ayubi, n.19, p.137.
Some of the inefficiency is deliberate, because civil service appointments are viewed as a vehicle for distributing oil wealth among the citizenry and as a means of giving idle Kuwaitis a job. Consequently, most offices are grossly overstaffed; five people are commonly employed to do work that one could perform.

Employment in bureaucracy is also perceived to be a political safety valve. The government in Saudi Arabia cannot fail to see, for example, that most members of the militant Islamic groups are either university students in their final years or newly graduated. Public employment may be regarded as one way of reducing their anger, and if not of co-opting them, at least controlling them through attendance requirements and official tasks. Probably this is the reason why the most extreme among these militant groups (such as Ikhwan in Saudi Arabia) dissuade their followers from working for the government. 61

Even the sizeable number of foreigners in the bureaucracy of the oil states, which is often regarded as a potential political risk, is not without its rewards. It gives locals the opportunity to command and supervise a respectable number of subordinates. This is bound to represent an element of satisfaction for the native officials. Nomadic


societies have traditionally assigned technical jobs to slaves, minorities and outcasts, keeping for the insiders - in addition to the pastoral activities - the honour of carrying arms.  

Control Functions

One of the reasons why central, monocratic types of administration are favoured in the Arab World is the useful control functions that this type of bureaucracy can serve. This is why other types of organization are not tried, and why, when they are adopted within programmes of administrative reform, they are used only as techniques void of power-sharing devices.

Weberian style bureaucracy is regarded as an ideal model. 'Machine bureaucracy' is the term used by Henry Mintzberg to connote the type of bureaucracy first described by Max Weber. The operating work of such a bureaucracy is routine, often simple and repetitive and hence easily standar-dised. Rulers become impatient with the Weberian-style 'machine bureaucracy' because its narrow minded, routine-bound instrumentalism seems incapable of confronting developments needed for innovations and mobilisation.  


elaborate hierarchy and strict chain of command is also an invaluable instrument of control. They feel bound to criticise the dysfunctions of the monocratic-type bureaucracy that they inherited from the colonial period, but they know that its control qualities should never be eroded. Most leaders in Arab countries including the Arab Gulf not want development; but many want power too, and in most cases power is the more immediate and pressing of the two objectives. According to Chackerian and Fathaly:

Part of the superficial attractiveness of machine bureaucracies is that they cope quite well with hostile political environments. Power is centralized in the administrative apex and this arrangement provides clear responsibility for administrative action and quick response to political threats.

Arab rulers appear to prefer a system of administrative authority in which all power emanates from a single political leader and where the influence of others is derivative in rough proportion to their perceived access to him or their share in his largesse. They often subject their bureaucracies to frequent and unpredictable transfers of administrators. Shifting people around is a continuous reminder of how those in superior positions can intervene


on whim and at will. Ministers fight for funds with other units of government, not as a means to pursue particular programmes but as an on-going test of their standing in the bureaucratic pecking order. The often criticised overlapping of jurisdictions may also be politically functional from the ruler's point of view. To ensure competition among a leader's subordinates, they are endowed with roughly equal power and given overlapping areas of authority. Absence of defined responsibility fits the system's informal modes and enhances the leader's flexibility to choose among personnel and policies. An element of tolerated corruption goes a reasonable way towards ensuring the official's loyalty. Not only does he benefit but he is always under the threat that the authorities may decide to put a stop to that tolerance and apply the law.

In the Arab Gulf states, the top and middle administrators themselves - given their cultural and social background - are likely to be just as power conscious. A study of 52 executives from six Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) showed that out of a range of seven decisions, 22 per cent are likely to be the executive's decisions.

66. Ayubi, n.61, p.142.

67. Marvin G. Weinbaum, Bureaucratic Norms, Structures and Strategies in Agricultural Policies in the Middle East, paper submitted at the Middle East Studies Association Annual Conference, Salt Lake City, Utah, 1979, pp.3-7.
own decision, 55 per cent a consultative decision (discussion with a small selected group followed by his own decision), 13 per cent a joint decision and only 10 per cent a decision based on delegation. There is even less power-sharing, more autocratic behaviour in organizational decision-making.68 It is difficult to imagine that anything but a monocratic, hierarchical bureaucracy could suit the inclinations of such a power-conscious executive.

Even when rulers and executives are prepared, under popular pressure or expert advice, to consider some measure of reform that involves delegation and decentralization, they will tend to apply it in such a way that it is robbed of its participatory ethos. It is no wonder administrative reform based on power-sharing, participation and delegation tends to die a speedy death almost as soon as it is tried in the Arab Gulf.

Job Structure

In the Arab Gulf states, the general quality of personnel in public institutions is low. These states have failed to prepare indigenous manpower because of their backward cultural state (educationally, scientifically, 68. Farid A.Muna, The Arab Executive (London, 1980), pp.47-60.)
technically and practically), because of the prevalent disdainful attitude to many necessary jobs of a practical nature, and because of the easy life they are leading due to financial abundance. Excessive public expenditure and social assistance have led to the underdevelopment of human energies in a society where illiteracy is prevalent and incentives for hard work and earning do not exist. Until recently, a large percentage of government personnel were either illiterate or holders of only primary school certificates.

In the Arab Gulf states, governments have adopted a policy of social security through the creation of jobs in government agencies, thus guaranteeing a minimum income for a large section of society. The result is job inflation which increases as long as such policies continue. In the space of a few years, there has been a rapid growth in the number of government jobs - some of them have doubled in number - in these states. In spite of heavy dependence on imported labour in many such jobs, there is still a large number of vacancies to be filled. The real problem of manpower in these states is not the issue of quantity, but

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70. Osama, n.8, p.63.
the basically insufficient use of the existing labour force.\textsuperscript{71}

There may be a significant relationship between the increase in financial resources and the increase in the number of jobs,\textsuperscript{72} as the former can lead to many projects and programmes and the expansion of tasks and posts without reference to specific manpower plans.

A large percentage of personnel in government agencies are labourers and servants. This category sometimes reaches 50 per cent of the total of government personnel. It is obvious that such a large percentage reflects the social security role of job provision in the public sectors. In the case of Kuwait, in spite of its precedence in education, the illiterate and those with only reading and writing skills still represent a large percentage of the total government personnel.\textsuperscript{73} The illiterates in Qatar constitute more than half the total government personnel, and a substantial percentage of the mixed sector.\textsuperscript{74} The situation in other states is no different. This shows the weakness of the hierarchy on which development administration depends.

\textsuperscript{71} Othman Al-Ahmad, "Identification of the Manpower Needs of the Public Sector Organizations", a paper presented at the Seminar on the Importance of Administration for Development in Saudi Arabia (Riyadh, 1978), p.120.


\textsuperscript{73} Ministry of Planning (Central Department of Statistics), Annual Statistics (Kuwait, 1979).

\textsuperscript{74} Central Agency of Statistics, Annual Statistics (Qatar, July 1981).
The imported labour will constitute an important ingredient of workforce, because the major percentage of the nationals are either unqualified or holders of primary school certificates and only a very small percentage, particularly in the professional field, are holders of higher degrees. In the civil service, imported labour has led to a reduction in the percentage of indigenous personnel. This is true in all the states, even Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. In Kuwait, in spite of its comparative precedence in education and development, the percentage of non-Kuwaitis in the governmental sector in 1978 reached 63.8 per cent of its total personnel, whereas Kuwaitis were 36.2 per cent. The situation in Qatar and the UAE is worse. 75

Because of social security policies on jobs in the public sector, because of exaggerated estimates of needed government jobs, and because of increasing dependence on imported labour, the number of jobs has increased tremendously in these states. For example, the number of jobs in Saudi Arabia increased by 110 per cent between 1970 and 1975 76 and in Qatar by about 100 per cent between 1975 and 1979. 77

75. Osama, n.8, p.65.
76. The Board of the Civil Service, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, The Statistical Report, 1379 H.
77. Personnel Administration, Qatar, The Annual Statistical Report, 1399 H.
rest of the states have witnessed similar increases in the number of government personnel. However, in spite of such large increases, these states still suffer from lack of competent personnel, particularly at high level of administration.

The accumulation of vacancies, the failure of the local labour force to fill them, and restrictions imposed by these states on the import of labour all lead to a deficient job structure characterised by a large number of unfilled jobs. In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the increase in the number of jobs from 19,870 in the fiscal year 1970-71 to 244,556 in the fiscal year 1979-80 (i.e., by 306 per cent) created 136,859 job vacancies (56 per cent).78 In Qatar, the total of vacant jobs, excluding those in the ministry of defense and ministry of the interior, reached 5,417 in 1980, which represented a large percentage of the total number of jobs. The total number needed to be created reached 6,149 jobs.79 This is a symptom of inflationary growth and deficiency of job structures. The large increase in demand, which is always exaggerated, coupled with the shortage of supply gives local labour a chance to exercise administrative blackmail.


79. Personnel Administration, Qatar, The Annual Report, 1400 H
Attitude Towards Bureaucracy

A number of studies have been conducted to assess people's attitude towards bureaucracy in the Arab Gulf states. A few of them will be discussed in the following pages for though the studies have been made in connection with particular states, they are relevant for the region as a whole.

Al-Mizjaji\(^\text{80}\) has examined the Saudi people's attitude toward bureaucracy through the following variables:
1. The Saudi people's receptivity to change.
2. The Saudi people's trust in bureaucrats.
3. The Saudi people's civic responsibility toward bureaucracy.
4. The Saudi people's satisfaction or dissatisfaction (attitude) with the five vital public services: hospitals, postal, telephone, price control and utilities.

These dependent variables were studied with other independent variables such as age, education, income, location information exposure (media), job (public and private) and tribal status (affiliation and distinctions) to find significant relationships.

The data indicate that the majority of the Saudi people (81.5 per cent) are receptive to change with certain reservations, but that 71.5 per cent of them lack sufficient trust in bureaucrats. Also, most of the Saudi citizens (47.8 per cent) have little tendency to cooperate with civil servants, and are not satisfied with public services: hospitals (49.6 per cent dissatisfied), postal (60.3 per cent dissatisfied), telephone (52.4 per cent dissatisfied), price control (78.3 per cent dissatisfied), and utilities (73.9 per cent dissatisfied).

The analysis of relationships in the data failed to show any statistically strong association between people's attitudes and other independent variables such as age, education, income, location, information exposure (media), job and tribal status. In other words, the Saudi people in general are less than satisfied with public hospitals, postal, telephone, price control and utilities services regardless of their demographic characteristics.

Public apathy, bureaucrats lack of sufficient concern for their clients, dependence upon foreign labour, and lack of technical and organizational resources are the most frequently cited reasons for public services deficiency. However, special comment is required on the Saudi manpower shortage and the high percentage of the respondents (89.6 per cent) calling for Saudi women to work. Even though Saudi
women represent almost half of the Saudi population and it is believed that they are not given enough chance to participate in the development programmes, most respondents have made it very clear that they do not approve of women and men working together (89.6 per cent and 88.3 per cent).

Another important study was conducted by Al-Ramadan⁸¹ to assess people's attitude towards bureaucracy and bureaucrats in Kuwait. Questionnaires administered and interviews conducted for this study included clusters of random samples of 700 citizens, 252 college students and 216 public officials.

On the whole, the study indicated that there was a higher degree of satisfaction with bureaucracy and official's performance among the rural citizen samples than among the urban citizen samples. Also the data revealed that rural citizens seemed to indicate a greater sense of efficacy with regard to personal contacts with influential people and to some degree public officials. However, the data indicated that urban citizens had more administrative contacts with officials and bureaucracy. Also, it was clear in the study that urban lower-status groups were supportive of the bureaucracy and officials whereas urban higher-status groups seemed too critical. The same holds true for the

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⁸¹ Soud A.A.Al-Ramadan, Attitudes Toward Bureaucracy and Bureaucrats in the State of Kuwait, Ph.D thesis (The Florida State University, 1973), pp.11–v.
college student respondents. But, because the college student is relatively more educated and aware of the public official's performance than an average citizen, it was found that the majority of college students tended to be critical of the official's performance.

Citizen public and college students revealed mixed feelings of support for and hostility toward public officials and performance. Citizen public and college students demonstrated their hostility toward police officials, health officials, Kuwait Transport Company employees and to some extent postal officials. Despite these hostile attitudes, the majority of the respondents were supportive of the public officials.

Some public officials in the survey seemed to be authoritarian in their attitudes toward their jobs, but less bureaucratic. Some were bureaucratic in the way they viewed their positions. Nevertheless, readiness and willingness of public officials to adopt and accept democratic perspectives toward their jobs were clearly indicated in their responses.

In another study by Al-Hussniyah regarding Saudi students perceptions of selected administrative practices.

in Saudi Arabia, a general dissatisfaction was noticed. The purpose of the study was to examine the views of Saudis studying public administration, who had worked in some capacity in the United States.

The Saudi students abroad expressed an amazing lack of confidence in their present superiors despite the advances in government theory, application and practice, and the expansion of business and industry; the students felt that much needed to be done to increase the pace and the quality of the advances - these students plan to receive training which will enable them to step into needed areas upon their return home. Certain underlying problems causing this lack of confidence in the Saudi leadership surfaced during this questionnaire: (a) the need for a general plan for the economy of Saudi Arabia once the oil resources are depleted; (b) the matching of qualified executives with jobs within their ability; (c) lack of planning on important major projects, and (d) the need for an overall improvement in governmental efficiency.

Administrative Reform

In most of the oil producing Arab Gulf states, the administrative systems were too weak to be effective, however, modern they might appear. As a result, there was a large discrepancy between bureaucracy's state of deficiency and its expected role.
Some attempts at administrative reform have been made, but they have not received genuine political support. Almost all these states have been characterized by the absence of administrative reform and by the spread of administrative corruption in government and non-government agencies alike.

Although, of the oil-producing states, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has made attempts at administrative reform, it still suffers from many administrative difficulties such as extreme centralisation, overlap of responsibilities, obsolete procedures, rising costs in the public services sector and the low standard of technology utilization.

Attempts at reorganization have occurred at various stages in the Arab Gulf states. For example, the Saudi government concluded an agreement with the Ford Foundation in 1963 to reorganize all government agencies and institutions. A higher committee for administrative reform was formed to control, delineate, implement and supervise the process of administrative reform. However, several administrative obstacles arose in the course of implementation of the second development plan. Among these obstacles were the following:

1. Overlap and duplication of administrative responsibilities which have increased the demand for manpower and the costs in the public service sector.

63: The Third Development Plan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
2. Underutilization of qualified personnel because of absolute procedures and excessive centralization of decision-making.


4. Increase in the number of vacant jobs.

The third development plan aimed at achieving the following:

1. A comprehensive organizational study of the public administrative system in order to identify problems and methods of resolving them,

2. The analysis of the tasks to be performed by each governmental agency, and the formulation of a modified organizational framework in addition to the description of required jobs,

3. The identification of sources of overlap in job responsibilities and appropriate administrative methods of their resolution,

4. The investigation of work regulations in related organizations and recommendations for the regulation of administrative reform,

5. The provision of the needed manpower for each governmental organization in order to avoid the problems related to low productivity resulting from the employment of an unnecessarily large number of personnel; the reassessment of

84. Ibid.
the distribution of manpower among governmental agencies and institutions,

6. the evaluation of government regulations in view of new administrative changes and the establishment of a system of evaluating personnel's performance.

When changes in the administrative structure occurred in the United Arab Emirates, low performance was consequently identified and the need for reorganization arose. Some recommendations called for the investigation of the government organizational structure, for integration among the various organizational divisions, for the simplification of regulations and for the establishment of units for organization and methods in government agencies. 85

In Qatar, as a result of the lack of sound organization some administrative problems emerged. Consequently there were calls for the establishment of a central agency for administrative reform to prepare a general programme of reform, to follow up implementation and to make administrative reform a continuing process. It was also recommended that a central agency for organization and methods to be established whose principal task is to study, develop and modify organizations and methods in light of the contextual conditions

and the increase in new tasks assigned to government agencies. 86

Some of oil-rich Arab Gulf states already possess all the structures of the agencies and units required for preparing programmes of administrative reform and simplifying regulations, but the end result is limited. Foreign expertise has been invited to conduct a large number of studies in varied governmental fields of planning, organization, civil service administration, financial administration, training and simplification of regulation. The outcomes of these studies were unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons, most important of which are the following: 87

(1) The gap between foreign expertise and local conditions.

A trend in administrative thought is that concepts and methods adopted by agencies and institutions in the advanced countries can equally well be applied in the developing countries. However, the success of administrative concepts and methods is primarily determined by the appropriate contextual conditions as well as the administrative ability to use them. Since conditions and administrative ability

in the advanced countries differ from those in the developing countries, chances of successful application in the latter countries remain very limited under the concepts and methods are adapted to suit the new context.

(2) Imitation of advanced country model

There is a trend in developing countries to model their institutions along the lines of advanced countries. The danger lies in uncritical imitation which leads to superficialities characteristic of developing countries, whose agencies and institutions are copies of those in the advanced countries, and whose regulations manifest administrative concepts and principles which are adopted from the advanced countries. In response to such a situation, the First Scientific Conference on Administrative Development in the Arab World has recommended the search for methods appropriate for the local conditions and the adoption of successful experience in other countries to suit the nature of the new conditions, provided that uncritical transfer or copying is avoided.

(3) Inability of the agencies and units responsible for administrative reform.

The experiences of those states which started administrative reform comparatively earlier showed that the agency responsible for administrative reform could not perform its task regularly or continually, and was cut off from the governmental agencies. The units for organization and methods within government agencies were not given due attention either. Since all their activities were of an advisory type, those studies were hardly ever made use of. For instance, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 271 organizational studies were conducted by the Central Department for Organization and Methods and 315 studies by the Institute of Public Administration in the period from 1970 to 1976. The purpose of these studies was to prepare organizational structures and to reorganize certain agencies in order to delineate responsibilities, to eliminate duplication of tasks and to modernize systems. Yet the studies were never used.

(4) The bureaucratic resistance to administrative reform.

Administrative reform in these states as well as other developing countries encounters several obstacles created by

the bureaucracy in order to obstruct reform attempts. By nature, bureaucracy tends to resist change and to cling firmly to traditions and familiar patterns.

(5) Lack of political support for programmes of administrative reform.

The lack of political support for administrative reform is reflected by the less than serious treatment of many reform programmes, most of which represent responses to immediate pressure arising from administrative difficulties. The lack of political support for programmes of administrative reform coincides with the resistance exerted by bureaucracy. Seldom has the political leadership adopted an integrated programme for administrative reform, or coordinated administrative reform with the main issue of development; seldom has it firmly committed itself to the cause of development or shown its belief in its importance by giving total support to those agencies responsible for administrative reform, and by providing the necessary potentials and authority needed for active follow-up of the implementation of administrative reform programmes and for making reform a continual process.

(6) Weak sense of loyalty to institutions.

In the Arab Gulf states, there is traditionally a stronger loyalty to the family or the tribe than to the institution or the profession. This loyalty influences
administrative behaviour and the attitude of personnel towards jobs in the public sector, so that a job may be seen as a means to the service of one's own interest, ignoring the public interest. The likely outcome is the spread of administrative corruption, favouritism and bargaining for personal interests. The resulting separation between the personnel and the institution reflects a separation between the citizen and the state.

Al-Awaji have attempted to identify different forms and effects of the interactions between parochial elements in Saudi Arabia society (e.g. regionalism and localism), and the public bureaucracy. The interaction between the two is quite apparent. First, because the essential concern of the state-building process was mainly the creation of one political entity in Saudi Arabia, little attention was given to the requirements of socio-political and administrative integration. Hence, the first thirty years of the Kingdom's history was characterized by institutional fragmentation. Consequently, parochial attitudes have remained intact. Second, when the central bureaucracy has become a powerful institution solely in control of vast amounts of jobs, goods and services, the respective

regions and localities have begun to compete for favourable positions in and treatments by, the bureaucracy. This competition, in turn, has served as an instrument in the revival of parochialism especially among bureaucrats.

Corollary of the foregoing phenomenon is the dominance of the regions of Al-Hijaz and Najd over the key bureaucratic positions. The analysis has revealed the inproportionate distribution of higher administrative posts among the four regions in favour of these two regions and also in favour of urban vs. rural areas as well. Consequently, such an unequal representation is reflected in the allotments of various benefits accruing to regions and localities from the bureaucratic activities.

The effect of the gap between the citizen and the state is reflected in the relationships between government agencies and institutions and the public, whereas in the advanced countries the public is largely responsive to the state and its agencies, stimulated perhaps by a sense of the public service provided by the state.91

(7) The Social and Educational Context.

Al-Awaji92 is of the view that the impact of the social value system is principally responsible for most of the


92. Al Awaji, n.90, p.249.
environmental obstruction of the bureaucratic achievement. Saudi Arabian society is composed of collective groups rather of individuals and therefore, the basic loyalty and concern of its individual is not to the nation as a whole but to their particular collective social units which mainly centres around the family.

Education within the family - though this has changed a little in the context of educational expansion - does not inculcate in children a love of work, competence or moral responsibility, and the educational system itself can be regarded as a continuation of family upbringing. Education fosters rote learning, not critical thinking, and restricts analytical reasoning. People brought up in such a way cannot be expected to think critically or make sound decisions.