Chapter II

Coleridge and I.A. Richards: Continuities and reformulations

Richards' career as a literary critic — from The Foundation of Aesthetics to So Much Nearer 1 — reflects his keen and sustained effort to understand Coleridge’s thoughts on poetry, language, and imagination and to reinterpret Coleridge in modern terminology. 2 How he "reinterpreted" the literary theories of Coleridge and "translated" them into his theory of value, theory of 'inclusion', and theory of metaphor — and how far he is successful in his efforts — will be analysed in this chapter.

Large areas of critical theory have developed from several formulations of T.S. Eliot and I.A. Richards, who

1 I.A. Richards with C.K. Ogden and James Wood, The Foundation of Aesthetics (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1922) is the first book Richards published and So Much Nearer: Essays Towards a World English (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1968) his last so far as his critical formulations are concerned.

have virtually reoriented literary criticism towards new forms and structures, methodological and epistemological. What had been subjectivist in terms of standards has given place to what is objectivist, thereby making it possible for criticism to become object-centered, as it were, to concern itself (in regard to poetry) with the poem rather than the poet. Its most important implication has been the new emphasis that has come to be laid on close reading and on regarding the poem as an organic thing.

Although, as Murray Krieger has argued, "ultimately in twentieth century, the Hulme-Eliot side of the tradition succeeded in modifying Richards side toward objective criticism", it is Richards' 'Myriad-minded genius' that has done most "in the twentieth century to renew and extend Coleridgean study of literature and language."  

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Looking at his contribution to the modern tradition one notices that besides being "a theorist in Coleridgean line"\(^6\) Richards was concerned with the questions of mental equilibrium and internal organization of experience as well as with those concerned with linguistic and mythopoeic activity. It is apparently on account of such many-sided interests and pre-occupations that Richards has not been fully understood by various contemporary schools of criticism who have tried to interpret him in their own terms. He has been either praised for bringing about "a fruitful interaction between psychology and literary study"\(^7\) in order to "refine a literary theory in terms of psychology"\(^8\) or denounced for the "psychological orientation"\(^9\) of his writings which brought "hocus-pocus of impulses, stimuli and response\(^{10}\)" with "little benefit

\(^6\) Angus Fletcher, "I.A. Richards and the Art of Critical Balance" in *I.A. Richards: Essays in his Honor* p. 85


\(^8\) Angus Fletcher, "I.A. Richards and the Art of Critical Balance" in *I.A. Richards: Essays in his Honor* p. 88


and a great deal of confusion\textsuperscript{11}. Similarly, there are critics who, neglecting the psychological orientation of his writings, acknowledge his greatness for being "quite clear about what semantics is\textsuperscript{12}" and for carrying over "the study of signs into the field of linguistics where it assumes a fundamental importance\textsuperscript{13}". The main focus of these critics is on \textit{The Meaning of Meaning} and, accordingly, they value Richards for his "vigorous attack on taboos and word magic", for a clear denial of the view that there is "a natural connection between words and things\textsuperscript{14}" and they consider his 'basic triangle' —


\textsuperscript{13} B. Malinowski, "The problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages" Supplement I to \textit{The Meaning of Meaning} by I.A. Richards and C.K. Ogden p. 298.

given in The Meaning of Meaning — to be "the best known modern attempt at the analytical approach to the problem of meaning".

Richards' adoration in the United States has been summed up by Schiller who, through a detailed analysis of Coleridge on Imagination, attempts to correlate the earlier theory of Richards with the later one. In the process Schiller arrives at a tentative conclusion that the crux of Richards' critical stance is that "to comprehend non-poetic language ... the reader must arrive to a single interpretation, while to comprehend poetic language he must accept multiple interpretations." Schiller does not pay any attention either to Richards' sources and influences, which is the main concern of critics like Heyman, Wimsatt and Brooks, Rene Wellek, and Russo, or to the often debated issue of Richards' 'conversion'.


from affective to cognitive critical theory. Nevertheless his book and the writings of other critics, including Hotopf who is particularly concerned with assessing Richards' wholesale "application of psychological explanations within the different disciplines", remain valuable for any scholar writing on Richards because they touch upon the numerous aspects of his critical writings. At the same time, they are pointers to the fact that Richards' thoughts are complex and that a failure to grapple with the complexity of his works can lead to a conclusion such as: "Richards is a rhetorician with one foot in the camp of the speculative or dialectical grammarians and one foot in the camp of the psychologists." 

The complexities arise mainly because of Richards' viewing art as a subject-object unity, calling for the


'aesthetic ontology', is not sustained if this aesthetic unity is projected as a mere 'epistemological' attitude having no significance beyond itself. Moreover Richards' theory of value, one of "the two pillars upon which a theory of criticism must rest", in so far as it is helpful to the relating of psychology to aesthetics needs to be framed in terms offered by his view of the role of language in the realization of order and coherence with regard to experience. Questions concerning "the systematization of impulses" ought to be considered in the background of the view of art as proposed by Richards or Coleridge — a view suggestive of a unity stemming from the identification of art with the superior reality, as well as from what may be termed as 'fetish of mediacy' posited by utilitarian value theories. Before attempting such a task it is necessary to point out that the relation between Coleridge and Richards has been summarized, in their own limited way, by various critics among whom Basil Willey, Kathleen Coburn, and F.R. Leavis

22. Ibid p. 52.
merit special attention. Basil Willey very rightly points out that "Richards is not only a pre-eminent Coleridgean but is himself in many important senses, the Coleridge of our time."23 He compares these two seminal minds in the following words

Like Coleridge, he taught us that there can be no criticism without reconsidering fundamental conceptions ... like Coleridge, he sees poetry as bringing the whole soul of man into activity, at the same time imposing upon it a more than usual order; ... unlike Coleridge, he does not subordinate his critical and psychological insights to an over-riding metaphysical and religious programme. 24

Similarly, Kathleen Coburn has observed that like Coleridge Richards sees that "What we say, and how we say it are inseparable in utterances that are entire." Both Richards and Coleridge stress the necessity of "the reconciliation and cooperation of heart and head."25 Leavis, on the


24 Ibid p. 227

other hand, complains of Richards' "uncritical satisfaction with words" and his failure to fulfil in practical terms his excited promise of a great new critical "science" based on Coleridge. Obviously this way of relating the two critics needs further scrutiny and it is a pointer to some deep and subtle connections worth pondering.

In this kind of comparison the main point that is being overlooked, however, is that Richards never professed to catalogue or reproduce Coleridge's thoughts as a whole but attempted "to extract ... from the confusing network of his speculations and observations, those hypotheses which seem most likely to be useful in other hands," in the belief that "a further development of Coleridge's method would fundamentally change the current conceptions of the relation of Poetry to Life and with this the contemporary tone of criticism." What Richards exactly meant by the

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27 *Coleridge on Imagination* p. XII.

28 Ibid pp. XII-XIII.
phrases like "current conceptions of the relation of Poetry to Life" and "the contemporary tone of criticism" is of primal importance and, therefore, worth explicating because they are crucial to his reinterpretation of Coleridgean imagination.

By 'the contemporary tone' Richards seems to point to the controversy between the 'literary radicals' like Van Wyck Brooks and H.L. Mencken, and the New Humanists like Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More. Whereas the literary radicals asserted that literature to be authentic must be an expression of the society and times that produce it, the New Humanists, who had "acquired knowledge of the best classical and European thought in literature", laid emphasis on the basic moral values of all times which had a universal timeless appeal. 29 Besides these two schools there developed a new way of thinking also which was much less influential in the early decades of the twentieth century but which ultimately proved influential

for its contribution to the American New Criticism. This was the "aesthetic expressionism" propounded by J.E. Spingarn who pointed out that the primary function of literature is neither the expression of its society and times nor the vehicle of basic moral values of all the time, but it is an act of creative imagination. Consequently, he offered a design for rebuilding criticism on the foundations of Benedetto Croce's aesthetics according to which a critic must direct his attention to the work of art itself, and not to its relationship to its author or reader, concerned with questions such as "What has the poet tried to express and how has he expressed it." But lacking an explanation of the Crocean sense of "expression" Spingarn did not attempt a systematic exposition of Croce's aesthetic nor could he do justice to its key concept "Art is expression". Knowing what "expression" had meant to certain Romantics, particularly Coleridge, Spingarn's audience was almost sure to ask, "what does art express?" and other questions related to it. To have this main question answered in the words of Spingarn by the assertion that art has performed its function when it has expressed itself and literature is the "exquisite expression of delicate and fluctuating sensations or
impressions of life,"\(^30\) was to somewhat complicate the issue — this is (as we shall see in chapter IV) what the American New Critics have done — related to experience and expression.

It is to be noted here that Croce's identification of 'intuition' with 'expression' holding them to be indistinguishable in the cognitive process is helpful to the apprehension of the system of reality with which poets and critics alike are concerned. Croce's philosophical premises with their perspectivization of the "lyrical intuition" being "couched in all pervasive spirit" have found a psychological version in the works of R.G.Collingwood who views aesthetic experience as "an intuitive, empirical response to sincere lyricism."\(^31\) It is interesting to note that Croce's position has been dubbed as "essentialist" by the semantic-linguistic school which is in some measures responsible for the emergence of such critics as I.A. Richards with his differentiation between 'emotive' language and 'referential' language.


Without invoking Crocean categorization of the four elements or degrees — aesthetic, logical, economic, ethical — in which the spirit has come to be conceived it is possible to examine the intricate system of relations implied by the use of the term 'expression' as Richards has done. As observed by him, it is the analysis of the "intricate collection of relations commonly compressed ... with the term expression" that is "the most urgent task of speculative criticism."32 Richards' inclination towards the Crocean critical formulations can be understood by noting that while "Coleridge developed his account of imagination mainly in terms of the characteristics of the poet 'described in the ideal perfection', Richards uses this account primarily to elucidate the poem as it is grasped by the critic or reader."33

In order to understand the main reason for the shift of emphasis from a purely subjective to objective, or what Russo calls in term of Coleridgean epistemology "from


33 Schiller, I.A. Richards's Theory of Literature p. 43.
Creation to Criticism" to "from Criticism to Creation" it is necessary to keep in mind the context in which there emerged a need to re-define the nature and value of poetry. This would help to explain the underlying implication of Richards' belief that "a further development of Coleridge's method would fundamentally change current conceptions of the relation of Poetry to Life."  

Richards, a Cambridge scholar, was conscious of a new school of thought current at Cambridge itself uniting the empiricism of Hulme, the positivism of Comte and Mach, the logical analysis of the type initiated by Moore, Russell, and Whitehead, and which finally culminated in the logical positivism of Wittgenstein. These philosophers, in one way or the other, believed that the primary task of philosophy is to analyse the language through which thinking is done, and this analysis should be based on the principle of precision demanded by science. In their


35 Richards, Coleridge on Imagination pp. xii-xiii

own analysis of language, these logical positivists indicated that language is the symbolic representation of experienced facts. It can be analysed into significant assertions called 'propositions' and all prepositions can be shown, by further analysis, to consist of some more elementary propositions. Every elementary proposition is a picture of some atomic facts experienced. The world is composed of such facts, and can be completely analysed in those terms. An atomic statement is true if it corresponds to an atomic fact; a hypothesis is true if the atomic propositions it denies are false. This kind of analysis led to the thinking that language is to be reduced to rigorous logical symbols and the validity of these could be verified (verifiable statements being acceptable and non-verifiable ones not). Accordingly, they rejected metaphysical propositions because, by their very nature, they rest upon some other propositions which purport to assert the existence of non-verifiable entities. Similarly, they indicated that the statements made by poetry are not verifiable and, therefore, not worthy of any attention: in otherwords, they are nonsensical.

This was the situation when Richards endeavoured to assert the claims of poetry against the assumptions of science and reinforced Coleridge's dictum that
Poetry, even that of the loftiest and, seemingly, that of the wildest odes, has a logic of its own as severe as that of science; and more difficult, because more subtle, more complex, and dependent upon more, and more fugitive causes. 37

Like the Cambridge philosophers, referred to above, Richards accepted the fact that "truth" and "Verifiability" are decisive notions "not only for the scientific value of poetry, but for its aesthetic value as well."38 But, at the same time, Richards, like Coleridge, pointed out that truth in scientific theory and truth in art warrant different modes of verification, one against empirical evidence, the other against individual experience.39

Chapter XXV of the Principles ("Poetry and Beliefs"), Chapter VII of Practical Criticism ("Doctrine in Poetry"), and the whole of Science and poetry and The Meaning of Meaning, in different ways, make the same point that the poetic statement is not true or false in the way any

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scientific statement is. In his earliest essay "Art and Science" Richards clearly states:

Science is the systematic connection of propositions. It is, therefore, predominantly interested in those propositions whose connection with other propositions can be traced. The vehicles of science for the reason are composed of signs, words for the most part, arbitrarily assigned as names to define ideas. Art, on the other hand, is interested in propositions for their own sake, not as interconnected. 40

The above statement does not mean that the propositions in art have no inter-connection at all. On the other hand, the work of art is the more successful the more difficult it is to trace fully its connections in order to test its truth value. By this principle, as we shall establish through analysis later, obscurity and ambiguity in themselves become criteria of important works of art with a complex organicity. Richards was moving right from the beginning towards a recognition of this position.

It may be pointed out here that Richards' belief that art is interested in propositions for their own sake,

40 Complementarities p. 4.
not as 'interconnected', is itself a Coleridgean formulation; and in this connection a consideration of the viewpoint of Bertrand Russell may be worthwhile.

Russell maintained, like some eighteenth century philosophers, that the world in reality is nothing more than what is given in "sense data": 'certain patches of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, etc., with certain spatio-temporal relations'. Accordingly scientific knowledge is, in all strictness, knowledge of sense-data, and must consist in the statement of general rules relating to the succession of sense elements. Russell says that "we now realize that we know nothing of the intrinsic quality of physical phenomena except when they happen to the sensations." And speaking of the possibility of the thing being anything more than sense-data he maintains that "it can be no part of legitimate science to assert or deny the persistent entity; if it does either, it goes beyond the warrant of experience."\(^{43}\)


\(^{43}\) Ibid p. 126.
Richards, while accepting that strictly scientific statement has reference only to objects viewed as systems of actual sense data, distinguishes it from the poetic-statements or "pseudo-statements" whose validity is to be tested against the whole dynamic of mind and feeling. In *Science and Poetry* he states

A pseudo-statement is "true" if it suits and serves some attitudes or links together attitudes which on other grounds are desirable. This kind of truth is so opposed to scientific "truth" that it is a pity to use a similar word.

Again, he defines "pseudo-statements" as a form of words which is "justified entirely by its effect in releasing or organizing our impulses." While answering to Middleton Murray's objection that the term "pseudo-statement" is an inadequate and misleading coinage, Richards explains that it stands for "a form of words which look like a statement but should not be taken as one" because "the most important point about statements, their truth or falsity ... becomes irrelevant to the state of

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44 It may be remembered that Wittgenstein maintained that all problems of philosophy could either be translated into symbolic logic or considered "pseudo-problems".


46 Ibid p. 60.
mind which ensues on contemplating them." From these statements it is clear that in order to answer the challenges of the scientifically oriented philosophers Richards utilized another branch of science, the behaviourist psychology, which bases its interpretation on the model of stimulus-response experiment. Like Pavlov's training of dogs, in which a dog gradually learns to align his responses with a signal given by the experimenter, it is supposed that the poem serves as a stimulus to the various impulses which are to be the organized. Richards' greatness as a critic, therefore, consists in defending the most unscientific thing i.e. poetry, and that too in an age which was almost dogmatically science oriented. As David Dachies points out, "just as Shelley used Platonism to remove Plato's objections to poets, so Richards wished to use science to remove the scientist's objections."  

Richards takes great pains in indicating the possibility and the practical implication of the verifiability of pseudo-statements. This forms the basis
of his most influential book **Practical Criticism** in which Richards' method of analysis — in terms of Sense, Tone, Feeling, Intention, Linguistic Functions, Attitude, Irony, — is developed to show how the obscurity, ambiguity and allusiveness of poetic statements can be encountered. The book, with its critical strategies for "close reading", its discussion of authorial tone, feeling, doctrine or belief in poetry, and sincerity, had a potent effect on the subsequent generation of critics in England and America. How Richards' method is somewhat different from that of the American New Critics is a point worth pondering and will be considered in chapters III and IV.

Richards' consciousness of the contemporary situation and his attempt to "locate his theory in its social and cultural context" is attested to by his disapproval of the various theories of poetry which have endeavoured "to explain the high place of poetry in human affairs, with, on the whole, few satisfactory results." He agrees that "all the great watchwords of criticism from Aristotle's 'poetry is an imitation' down to the doctrine that 'poetry is expression', are ambiguous.

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50 Poetries and Sciences p. 21.
pointers that different people follow to very different destinations";\textsuperscript{51} at the same time he asserts that "neither together, nor singly, nor in any combination, do they give what is required.\textsuperscript{52}

According to Richards, the main reason for the ineffectiveness of various theories was the "biological crisis" caused by the rise of pure scientific knowledge which brought about the "Neutralization of Nature", and the death of the "Magical View"\textsuperscript{53}. This 'Magical view', he suggested, was of great value to us because it provided us with occasions for complex emotional play, valuable for the development of our feelings. Loss of these feelings and emotions threatens us with emotional starvation. It is dangerous because the circle of human nature is not complete without the arch of the emotions — a human being feels as well as thinks. He is not intellect alone as science broadly indicates but is receptive to the sublime and beautiful as well as true. Indeed, Richards believed that even the intellectual action of a complete man is consciously or unconsciously sustained by an


\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Principles of Literary Criticism} p. 7.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Poetries and Sciences} p. 58.
undercurrent of emotions. Accordingly it is vain to separate the moral and emotional from the intellectual. But as science did separate them by a transference from the 'magical view' of the world to a world of "neutralized" Nature we are in need of something to take the place of the old order in which "the magical view of Nature was held with sincerity." 54

It is to be noted here that Richards defines the magical view as "the belief in a world of spirits and powers which control events ... the beliefs in inspiration and the beliefs underlying rituals." 55 Since the emergence of science has shattered our beliefs in these objects Richards pleads for an objectless belief, "a morality which will change its value as circumstances alter." 56 This he found in naturalistic ethic according to which a good thing is that which 'satisfies' and good experience is that "in which the impulses which make it are fulfilled and successful" and their "satisfaction shall not interfere in any way with more important impulses." 57 The problem of

54 Poetries and Sciences p. 51.
55 Ibid p. 51
56 Principles of Literary Criticism p. 58.
57 Ibid p. 58.
morality then, to Richards, becomes a problem of organization and he asserts that during the act of organization some "impulses have to be renounced, gratification of others has to be postponed, judgements have to be made about their relative priorities";\(^{58}\) and the result would be "the systematization of impulses or mental equilibrium."\(^{59}\) Once this notion is granted it is very easy to understand what Richards meant by saying that "we need no beliefs and must have none when we read King Lear".\(^{60}\)

Richards maintained that apart from the natural tendency of the human mind for organization, the impact of the arts is always helpful in that it harmonizes "complex human impulses" and in the harmonization of these impulses "the capacity for future satisfaction is increased."\(^{61}\) His awareness of the fact that poetry can exercise as a mediator in changing chaos into order, disbelief into belief, and loss of faith into faith is

59 *Principles of literary criticism* pp. 44-53.
60 *Poetries and Science* p. 62.
61 Hotopf *Language Thought and Comprehension* p. 40.
anticipated by the autotelic form implicit in Arnoldian definition of poetry as "a criticism of life". It reflects the Arnoldian faith expressed by the declaration that poetry as criticism "obeys an instinct prompting it to try to know the best that is known and thought in the world." But, more than that it refers to the famous Coleridgean assertion that the "poet brings the whole soul of man into activity." It can be attested to by looking at those chapters of the Principles where Richards analyses the relevance of his theory of value.

He rejects the view of thinkers like Whistler and Pater that "the values of art are unique or capable of being considered in isolation from all others." In his celebrated essay on "Poetry for Poetry's sake," he makes a minute analysis of this view — a view which

64 Principles of Literary Criticism p. 72.
65 Ibid pp. 71-80.
according to him culminates in Bradley\textsuperscript{66} — and refutes the idea that the nature of poetry "is to be not a part, not yet a copy of the real world (as we commonly understand the phrase) but to be a world by itself, independent, complete, autonomous."\textsuperscript{67} Setting forth his own point of view he says:

The world of poetry has in no sense any different reality from the rest of the world and it has no special laws and no other worldly peculiarities. It is made up of experiences of exactly the same kind as those that come to us in other ways. \textsuperscript{68}

Talking of the differentiation of the 'poetic' from 'ordinary' experience he says that the poem "is more highly and more delicately organised than ordinary experiences of the street or of the hillside."\textsuperscript{69} Needless to say that Richards' befitting reply to Bradley and his demonstration that the world of poetry is not different

\textsuperscript{66} cf. \textit{Principles of Literary Criticism} pp. 74-80.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid p. 74.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid p. 78.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid p. 78.
from the real world are essentially a reformulation of Coleridge's ideas concerned with the distinction between primary and secondary imagination. Coleridge's primary imagination, the "repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation", and the secondary "as an echo of the former"\(^{70}\) indicate that there is a common source for poetry and other values of the civilized world and hence a relation between them. (The idea of autonomy of poetic imagination is thus not tenable.) Similarly Richards states

> The separation of poetic experience from its place in life and its ulterior worths, involves a definite lop-sidedness, narrowness, and incompleteness in those who preach it sincerely ... It is impossible to divide a reader into many men — an aesthetic man, a moral man, a practical man, a political man, an intellectual man, and so on. It cannot be done. In any genuine experience all these elements inevitably enter. \(^{71}\)

This vital point is to be borne in the mind while discussing the relationship between Coleridge and Richards on the one


\(^{71}\) *Principles of Literary Criticism* p. 79.
hand, and Coleridge and the American New Critics on the other. The American New Critics, unlike Richards, neglecting other things in Coleridge, were concerned only with Coleridge's theory of imagination as 'reconciliation of opposites'. Once the vital core of Coleridge's philosophy of imagination was lost sight of, the result was not only a distorted picture of Coleridge but also of Richards.

Unlike the New Critics, Richards was all through his literary career a true Coleridgean and in true sense attempted to modify Coleridge's theory of imagination in order to make it suitable for a world dominated by process of "Neutralization of Nature". He underplays Coleridge's transcendental mysticism and asserts that "there is nothing peculiarly mysterious about imagination"; quite appropriately he thought it desirable "to avoid part of the fate which befell Coleridge" and to explicate his theory "devoid of theological implications." Consequently in Coleridge on Imagination — which may perhaps be

72 Principles of Literary Criticism p. 191.

73 Ibid p. 191.

74 Ibid p. 191.
termed as Richards on Imagination — he discusses Coleridge as "a semasiologist — aware, as few have been, that to ask about the meaning of words is to ask about everything." What he praises in Coleridge, it is important to note, is his "endeavour to destroy the old antithesis of Words and Things: elevating, as it were Words into Things and living things too" and "to concentrate free mind to the affinities of the feelings with words and ideas under the title of 'Concerning Poetry, and the nature of the pleasures derived from it'" with the faith that "this work would supersede all the books of metaphysics, and all the books of morals too."  

Looking at Richards one observes that he too devoted much critical energy to inquire into the field concerning the relationship between Words and Things in order to resolve the Religion-Art-Science triad and to develop his theory of metaphor. In The Meaning of Meaning.

75 Coleridge on Imagination p. XI
76 From Letters of Coleridge quoted in Coleridge on Imagination p. 12.
one notices this concern particularly when the authors (Richards and Ogden) criticize a belief in "word magic" which, they define as "the superstition that words are in some way parts of things or always imply things corresponding to them."\(^{78}\) This superstition, which according to them duped the philosophers like Moore, Russell, and Wittgenstein, may prevent one from noticing that words are 'instruments' and their relations with things are indirect, depending for their full understanding upon a knowledge of their user's purpose, emotions and feelings. Through a detailed analysis of the triangle which Ullmann considers "the best known modern attempt at the analytical approach to the problem of meaning"\(^{79}\) and its implications the authors maintain that the relationship between Word (symbol) and Thing (referent) is indirect because between the two comes the "slippery mind" (reference). Under emotive function the authors include "both the expression of emotions, attitudes, moods, intentions, etc. in the speaker, and their communication,\(^{78}\)

\(^{78}\) The Meaning of Meaning p. 17.

\(^{79}\) Richard Ullmann, Language and Style p. 17.
i.e., their evocation in the listener." Likewise in the Principles Richards states

A statement may be used for the sake of the references, true or false, which it causes. This is the scientific use of language. But it may also be used for the sake of the effects in emotion and attitude produced by the reference it occasions. This is the emotive use of language. 81

In The Meaning of Meaning three kinds of 'emotive' functions are distinguished. These are the expressing of the writer's attitude to his audience, the expressing of his attitude to what he is writing about, and the expressing of his intentions, which in Practical Criticism are referred to respectively as Tone, Feeling, and Intention. 82 Contrary to this 'referential' language is only concerned with 'Sense' or the direct and inherent relationship between Words and Things. On the basis of this distinction, it is argued that most use of language is either emotive in function or has a mixed function, the

80 The Meaning of Meaning p. 258.
81 Principles of Literary Criticism p. 267.
82 Practical Criticism pp. 131-88.
exception being "scientific statement, that recent new development of linguistic activity."\(^3\) This analysis, it may be pointed out here, has caused some confusion among the American New Critics who claim themselves to be the true followers of Richards.

Richards' distinction between the two functions of language is based on the assertion that all language is based on relationships and the process is that of a transference from the sensory experience to ideation. The language of poetry is only a heightened form of ordinary language in the sense that here the range, delicacy, and freedom of the connections is wider and more complex. One recollects here Coleridge's remark that the "logic of poetry is more complex"\(^4\) and that language is framed to convey "not the object alone, but likewise the character, mood and intentions of the person who is representing it."\(^5\) More than that, it may be argued that Richards' distinction between the two functions of language is based on the following passage of Coleridge's:

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\(^4\) Biographia Literaria vol. I p. 4.

\(^5\) Ibid vol. II pp. 115-16.
... the difference is great and evident between words used as the arbitrary marks of thought, our smooth market-coin of intercourse, with the image and superscription worn out by currency; and those which convey pictures either borrowed from one outward object to enliven and particularize some other; or used allegorically to body forth the inward state of the person speaking; or such as are at least the exponents of his peculiar turn and unusual extent of faculty. 86

Similarly, like Coleridge's assumption that his proposed work on the relation of Words and Things "would supersede all the books of metaphysics, and all the books of morals too" Richards very confidently points out that through a proper understanding of the 'emotive' and 'referential' functions of language the controversy "between Vitalism and Mechanism, Materialism and Idealism, Religion and Science, etc. would lapse, and further the conditions would be restored under which a general revival of poetry would be possible." 87 While Coleridge's discussion of the relationship between Words and Things led him to an analysis of the imagination through which they get fused

86 Biographia Literaria vol. II p. 98
87 The Meaning of Meaning p. VIII.
together, Richards arrived at his concept of metaphor which is nothing more than the modified version of Coleridgean imagination. This assertion is validated by The Meaning of Meaning itself (see particularly page 213) where, after a short discussion of metaphor, Richards, through a footnote sends the reader to chapter XXXII of Principles of Literary Criticism. In this chapter entitled 'The Imagination', after discussing six distinct senses of the word imagination "still current in critical discussion" 88, he finally considers the 'most important one':

That synthetic and magical power, to which we have exclusively appropriated the name of imagination ... reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities. 89

Richards considers this "original formulation" as Coleridge's "greatest contribution to critical theory" and acknowledges that "except in the way of interpretation, it is hard to add anything to what he has said, though ..."

88 Principles of Literary Criticism p. 239.

89 Ibid., p. 242.
something might be taken away from it with advantage." 90
What he takes away from it is its transcendental mysticism
after which it becomes easy for him to say in Coleridge
on Imagination:

I write then as a Materialist trying
to interpret before you the utterances
of an extreme Idealist and you,
whatever you be by birth or training,
Aristotelian or Platonist, Benthamite
or Coleridgean Materialist or Idealist,
have to reinterpret my remarks again
in your turn. 91

Significantly, Richards in the same chapter "The Imagination"
brings in Aristotle's definition of tragedy and equates it
with Coleridge's theory of imagination:

What clearer instance of the "balance
or reconciliation of opposite or
discordant qualities" can be found than
Tragedy. Pity, the impulse to approach,
and Terror, the impulse to retreat, are
brought in Tragedy to a reconciliation
which they find nowhere else, and with
them who knows what other allied groups
of equally discordant impulses. Their
union in an ordered single response is
the catharsis. 92

90 Principles of Literary Criticism p. 242.
91 Coleridge on Imagination p. 19.
92 Principles of Literary Criticism p. 245.
He describes tragedy as 'perhaps the most general, all accepting, all ordering experience known', and its special character as a "balanced poise, stable through its power of inclusion, not through the force of exclusions."\(^{93}\) Richards, however, points out that this balanced poise is not peculiar to tragedy, and it thus becomes for him the norm for "all the most valuable experiences of the arts."\(^{94}\) That Richards' theory of inclusion goes back to Coleridge's theory of imagination as "the reconciliation of opposites" and was greatly influenced by it hardly needs any elaboration. According to him, impulses fall under two groups: those which run parallel to each other and those which run counter. The poetry of exclusion embodies the impulses of the first group and the poetry of inclusion those of the second group:

A poem of the first group is built out of sets of impulses which run parallel, which have the same direction. In a poem of the second group the most obvious feature is the extraordinarily heterogeneity of the distinguishable impulses. But they are more than heterogeneous, they are opposed. They are such that in ordinary, non-poetic, non-imaginative experience, one or other set would be suppressed to give as it might appear freer development to the others. \(^{95}\)

\(^{93}\) *Principles of Literary Criticism* p. 248.

\(^{94}\) Ibid p. 248

\(^{95}\) Ibid p. 250
From the above statement it is obvious that Richards' poetry of the first group corresponds precisely with Coleridge's fancy "the faculty of bringing together images dissimilar in the main by some one point or more of likeness distinguished"⁹⁶ where as the poetry of inclusion is a reformulation of Coleridge's (secondary, mainly) imagination which "reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities."⁹⁷ Further, the unification of disparate elements of experience which characterizes Richards' poetry of inclusion is the ground plan of poetry singled out for praise by the American New Critics particularly when their focus is on the structure of poetry.

Richards' Coleridge on Imagination has been interpreted as a revolutionary change in his critical stance.⁹⁸ This is an exaggeration because in spite of some changes in epistemological terms in his attitude towards Coleridgean imagination, Richards continued to

⁹⁶Biographia Literaria vol. II p. 12.

reject metaphysical doctrines on the basis of his materialistic standpoint. The main value of the book, however, lies in its attempt to resolve the Religion - Art - Science triad and in explicating Coleridgean theory of "reconciliation of opposites" in such a way as to make it a solid foundation for metaphor.

Richards explores the possibilities of assimilating science to myth and attempts to interpret the world of experience in terms of mythopoeic-linguistic activities. To him mythology spells a unification of man's power, an ordering of possibilities and a realization of an order of the mind responsive to the universe. He arrives at the conclusion that

The saner and greater mythologies are not fancies; they are the utterances of the whole soul of man and, as such, inexhaustible to meditation. They are no amusement or diversion to be sought as a relaxation and an escape from the hard realities of life. They are these hard realities in projection, their symbolic recognition, co-ordination and acceptance. Through such mythologies our will is collected, our powers unified, our growth controlled. 99

What is implied in the above statement is that if myths were to be regarded as utterances, poetry would become a

99 Coleridge on Imagination (1955) p. 171
possible means for or a "necessary channel" for reconstitution of order — an idea which Richards in a different way had long before developed in the Principles while discussing the theory of value. Significantly Richards adopts here Coleridge's Aeolion Harp as the most expressive image for reflecting the fusion of projective and realist epistemologies. In the two chapters "The Wind Harp" and "The Boundaries of Mythical" he rigorously analyses the means through which Imagination constructs myths or 'Nature'. He gives the two main doctrines of imagination "which Coleridge (and Wordsworth) at times drew from it as to a life in or behind Nature." Stating these two doctrines Richards says

In the first doctrine man, through Nature, is linked with something other than himself which he perceives through her. In the second, he makes of her, as with a mirror, a transformed image of his own. 101

That both these "realistic and the projective doctrines are true" is indicated by Richards through an analysis of the various senses of "Nature". After noting the four

100 Coleridge on Imagination p. 141.

101 Ibid p. 145.

102 Ibid p. 146.
senses of the word "Nature" — i.e. the world of Science or Physics ("Nature" in Sense IV)\textsuperscript{103}; the world of daily routine or "the world of our practical everyday experience" ("Nature" in sense III)\textsuperscript{104}; the conception of Nature in which our feelings are projected ("Nature" in sense II)\textsuperscript{105}; and the influence "to which the mind is subject from whatever is without" ("Nature" in sense I)\textsuperscript{106} — he concludes that all our "Natures" are mythologies and all are true in the sense that they are relevant to a certain particular purpose and remain "radically a production of our perceptions."\textsuperscript{107} After this analysis it becomes easy for him to say, with Coleridge, that "our concern is with the fact of mind itself, the immediate self-consciousness in the imaginative moment which is the source of the doctrines."\textsuperscript{108} Accordingly science, history and religion

\begin{footnotes}
\item[103] Coleridge on Imagination p. 158
\item[104] Ibid p. 158.
\item[105] Ibid p. 157.
\item[106] Ibid p. 157.
\item[107] Ibid p. 161.
\item[108] Ibid p. 162.
\end{footnotes}
are myths in the Coleridgean sense of interpretation as poetry is because all are projections of our experience. Richards goes to the extent of saying that neither the "inanimate cold world" (Nature III) nor the world which science can order and control, will suffice for our needs:

Wisdom requires a different co-ordination of our perceptions, yielding another Nature for us to live in — a Nature in which our hopes and fears and desires, by projection, can come to terms with one another. It is this Nature that "comes from the heart that alone goes to the heart". It is such a Nature that the religions in the past have attempted to provide for man. 109

This "Nature" that "comes from the heart" is Coleridge's "self-realizing intuition" — know thyself — which to him is the source of all knowledge, and is defined by Richards as the source of all mythologies. A belief in these mythologies is very necessary because "without his mythologies man is only a cruel animal without a soul — for a soul is a central part of his governing mythology — he is a congeries of possibilities without order and without aim." 110 Once it is granted that "all is myth"

109 Coleridge on Imagination pp 169-70

110 Coleridge on Imagination p 172,
poetry "becomes necessary channel for the reconstitution of order."\textsuperscript{111} As "the completest mode of utterance",\textsuperscript{112} as "the myth-making activity" which brings "the whole soul of man into activity"\textsuperscript{113} it represents "man's chief co-ordinating instrument"\textsuperscript{114} and the study of the way in which poetry expresses meaning becomes the most important subject for critical analysis.

In order to analyse the ways in which poetry deals with meaning Richards explores "with thoroughness, the intricacies of the modes of language as working modes of the mind"\textsuperscript{115}, in other words, he attempts to examine "the processes (of which imagination and fancy are modes) by which the words they use acquire their meanings."\textsuperscript{116} The basic stance, like Coleridge's, is that language enables man to proceed from an intuitive capacity of the mind through its discursive operation to develop a reflective capacity and it is language only that "introduces man to the world."\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{111}Coleridge on Imagination p. 228
\textsuperscript{112}Ibid p. 163
\textsuperscript{113}Biographia Literaria vol.II p. 12 also quoted in Coleridge on Imagination p. 228.
\textsuperscript{114}Coleridge on Imagination p. 230
\textsuperscript{115}Ibid 230.
\textsuperscript{116}Ibid p. 231
\textsuperscript{117}Brendan E.O'Mahony, "The Rediscovery of Language" Studies, LIII: 209 (Spring, 1964) pp. 72-84.
Starting with Coleridge's famous definition that "a poem contains the same elements as a prose composition, the difference therefore must consist in a different combination of them, in consequence of a different object being proposed," \(^{118}\), Richards goes on to analyse 'the elements of composition' and the way they combine in a poem. The argument, while remaining the same as that of 'emotive' language and 'pseudo-statements' developed in the early writings, \(^{119}\) pivots round Coleridge's famous saying that it is the fundamental Mistake of Grammarians and writers on the philosophy of Grammar and Language [to assume] that words and their syntax is the immediate representatives of Things, or that they correspond to Things. Words correspond to Thoughts, and the Legitimate order Connection of words to the Laws of Thinking and to the acts and affections of the Thinker's mind. \(^{120}\)

In order to indicate the true relationship between Words, Thoughts and Things Richards applies Coleridge's idea of

\(^{118}\) Biographia Literaria vol.II, p.8 also quoted in Coleridge on Imagination p. 100.

\(^{119}\) cf. The Meaning of Meaning pp. 147-159; Principles of Literary Criticism pp. 240-253; Poetries and Sciences pp.57-55.

\(^{120}\) Collected Letters of S.T. Coleridge, op.cit, vol.VI, 1558,
fusion to 'the units of the poem' the fusion of perception and feeling, a word's sound with its meaning, and that of the reader's whole personality with the experience he is having. In each case the main argument centres round the Coleridgean distinction between Fancy and Imagination. As Terence Hawkes has rightly pointed out:

Coleridge is careful to distinguish two aspects of the imaginative process: that of the so-called Primary Imagination, which perceives and operates within the 'ordinary world', and that of the so-called Secondary Imagination which re_works this world, and impresses its own shape upon it. Words are the means to this end. And the process, whereby words construct a 'reality' from within themselves, and impose this on the world in which we live, is a process of metaphor.

It is, therefore, metaphor through which words are elevated into living things. Taking the cue from Coleridge's distinction between fancy and imagination, Richards talks of "words as bare signs and words into which some part or the whole of their meaning is projected"; he then

121 Coleridge on Imagination pp. 100-121.
123 Coleridge on Imagination p. 109.
describes "the projection of its meaning into a word[as]
and instance of imagination" comparing it directly
with the projection of feelings into perception. He
interprets the distinction between Fancy and Imagination
in these terms:

In Imagination the parts of the meaning —
both as regards the ways in which they are
apprehended and the modes of combination of
their effects in the mind — mutually modify
one another. In Fancy, the parts of the
meaning are apprehended as though independent
of their fellow-members. 125

This formal contrast is presented as a hypothesis intended
to account for Coleridge's discussion of the difference
between fanciful and imaginative passages from Shakespeare's
Venus and Adonis. The similarity between the approaches of
Coleridge and Richards becomes clear by looking, among other
examples, at the following two lines of Shakespeare.

Look! how a bright star shooteth from the sky
So glides he in the night from Venus' eye.

124
Coleridge on Imagination p. 110

125
Ibid p. 86.
To Coleridge this is a perfect example of how through the faculty of imagination "many images and feelings are here brought together without effort and without discord — the beauty of Adonis — the rapidity of his flight —
the yearning yet helplessness of the enamoured gazer — and a shadowy ideal character thrown over the whole."126 Richards, on the other hand, considers it an ideal example of the process of metaphor as can be indicated from his discussion of these two lines. He points out that here more relevant connections are discovered:

The separable meanings of each word, Look (our surprise at the meteor, her's at the flight), Star (a light-giver, an influence, a remote and uncontrollable thing) shooteth (the sudden, irremediable, portentous, fall or death of what had been a guide, a destiny), the Sky (the source of light and now of ruin), glides (not rapidity only, but fatal ease too), in the night (the darkness of the scene and of Venus' world now) — all these separable meanings are here brought into one. 127


127 Coleridge on Imagination p. 83
It is clear from this discussion that Richards' main concern with Coleridge's concept of "Coadunative Imagination" or "esemplastic" power is to understand how words function in the poem through complex 'interactions' and 'cross-connexions'. This concern is at the basis of The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Interpretation in Teaching, How to Read a Page and the rest of his writings where the concept of metaphor is further explicated through the 'context theory of meaning' and the concept of the 'form' is built. The argument remains the same that "a word by itself apart from an utterance has no meaning — or rather it has too many possible meanings."

Apparently Richards was trying to dislodge the sense of a word's definition as standing among a group of strict dictionary definitions. Even in essays like "Emotive Language Still" and "Semantics" he insists that words were not "rigid crystals", but they were workers, had functions, performed within a given context. The point was

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to begin by examining the particular context in which the word was found, lending and receiving its own nuanced meaning in a fluid transaction. Richards wrote the three books mentioned above to indicate how multiple and contrasting were current definitions of key words, and left for Empson the task to develop a theory of equations and ambiguities out of this theory. How this conception is related to Coleridge is an important issue and will be looked into in the next chapter.

The underlying assumption behind the critical formulations just mentioned above, it is worth mentioning here, is that a word is "a component of an act of the mind" that always works "in and through its interinanimation with other words." Explaining the meaning of the term 'interinanimation' Richards states that it is "a short way of saying the thing which Poetics is in most danger always of overlooking. Words only work together. We understand

130 This is the subject matter of How to Read a Page (New York: W.W. Norton, 1942).

no word except in and through its interanimation with other words. "132 Meaning, therefore, is not a stable quality but one which words or images or group of words acquire because just as human beings impose concepts of things on to the world of chaos, so do they impose meanings. Accordingly meaning is to be thought "as though it were a plant that has grown — not a can that can be filled or a lump of clay that has been moulded."133 The mere fact that all our words in ordinary "fluid discourse"134 are constantly shifting their sense, that is, mean different things at different times and sometimes mean different things at the same time reaffirm this observation.

By the 'context theory' Richards does not only mean the "words before and after a given word which determine how it is to be interpreted" but also "the circumstances under which anything was written or said."135


133 The Philosophy of Rhetoric p. 12.

134 Ibid p. 92 see also p. 72, 125, 119, 128.

135 The Philosophy of Rhetoric p. 32.
Accordingly metaphor, which because of its being based on relationships (hence "the omnipresent principle of language"),\textsuperscript{136} is "a borrowing and intercourse of thoughts", a transaction between contexts.\textsuperscript{137} Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the "metaphors of language derive therefrom."\textsuperscript{138} In his \textit{Interpretation in Teaching}, Richards equates the contextual theory of meaning and metaphor by pointing out that "thought is radically metaphoric."\textsuperscript{139} The same argument has also been presented, though in a different context, in \textit{Science and Poetry}

It is not the quality of words a writer has at his disposal but the way in which he disposes them that gives him his rank as a poet. His sense of how they modify one another, how their separate effects in the mind combine, how they fit into the whole response is what matters.\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{The Philosophy of Rhetoric} p. 92.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid p. 94

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid p. 94.

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Interpretation in Teaching} (London: Routledge, 1949) p. 48.

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Poetries and Sciences} p. 43.
In order to explicate this theory of metaphor Richards refers to Hamlet's question: "what should such fellows as I do Crawling between earth and heaven?". Is crawling to be taken literally or metaphorically? Metaphorically, Richards answers. A baby literally crawls, and, on occasion, a man may literally crawl, but here "there is an unmistakable reference to other things that crawl", such things as cockroaches, foul insects or snakes. If we substitute for crawling, walking, or more decisively still moving, we shut out the context of crawling creatures and the use becomes literal. If looked at literally, metaphor "a transaction between contexts", vanishes and so does the 'beauty' and form of the whole passage. One recollects here Coleridge's striking observation that, right from school days he was trained to think as follows:

In the truly great poets ... there is a reason assignable, not only for every word, but for the position of every word; and I well remember that, availing himself of the synonimes to the Homer of Didymus, he [his teacher Rev. James Bowyer] made an attempt to show, with regard to each, why it would not have answered the same purpose; and wherein consisted the peculiar fitness of the word in the original text.  

141 The Philosophy of Rhetoric p. 119.
142 Ibid p. 120.
143 Biographia Literaria vol. I, pp. 4-5.
Richards also maintains, like Coleridge, that "the language of the greatest poetry is frequently abstract in extremes," and attacks Lord Kames's "brick and mortar model", whether of our perception of the outside world as being built out of the basic units of sensational complexes or of our understanding of complex meaning as being determined by the meanings of individual words, assumed to be fixed and definite. As a true Coleridgean, he opposes Kames's emphasis on the use of concrete, individual images in writing, and firmly asserts that his "theories about trains of ideas and images are typically 18th century Associationism — the Associationism of which David Hartley is the great prophet." In other words, just as Coleridge refuted Hartley's associationist philosophy by projecting a counter theory of imagination, Richards invalidates Kames's "brick and mortar" (associationistic) theories by his own context theory of meaning and concept of metaphor.

144 The Philosophy of Rhetoric p. 129.

145 Ibid pp. 98-108

146 In this aspect Richards is against Hulme, who emphasizes the quality of concreteness of imagery to the neglect of total unity of structure. For details see Phyllis Rackin, "Hulme, Richards, and the Development of Contextualist Poetic Theory", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism XXV:4, (Summer, 1967) pp. 413-25.

147 The Philosophy of Rhetoric p. 17.
Richards' discussion of metaphor leads him to the idea that a poem is an extended metaphor as it is composed of different and often contradictory images which appear meaningless if taken in isolation. One main reason of this apparent contradiction is that the images or words are the meeting points at which regions of experience, which can never combine in sensation, come together. In order to grasp the meaning of the images, it is essential to understand their full implication, which in Richards' terminology would imply Sense, Feeling, Tone and Intention. The process would include all the functions that language can have, the functions described in *The Meaning of Meaning*. In *The Meaning of Meaning* Richards enumerates five functions that language could have in a given context: (1) symbolizing a reference, (2) expressing an attitude towards a listener or reader, (3) expressing an attitude towards the object spoken of or written about, (4) promoting certain intended effects through the statement, (5) managing or supporting the whole statement effectively. There are additions to these functions and we notice that whereas in "Emotive Language Still" they become six, in "semantics" a schema of seven functions is presented which are: (1) selecting, or pointing to, indicating; (2) characterizing, or saying something about; (3) presenting, or "realizing", vividly or plainly, excitingly or quieteningly; (4) valuing, or
giving worth to, making it more or less on a given value scale; (5) adjusting, getting someone (may be the speaker) to take an attitude toward; (6) managing, or keeping the preceding five functions working effectively for, to some end; (7) purposing, the overall intention or endeavour of the statement. Richards thus suggests that no single word, out of the context, may be said to have or to be serving any one of these functions.

The above analysis is a pointer as to how Richards' relation between 'tenor' and 'vehicle' is to be understood. They do not simply refer to an 'image' and the 'imaged', as the American New Critics assume, but to the diverse elements that are brought together in the poem. Richards himself in 1974 pointed out that 'tenor' and 'vehicle' were chiefly "a means of describing the extreme and necessary complexity of what happens in metaphor. They were not (couldn't be) at all any solution of any problem. They were, at best, a means for keeping oneself alerted to what may happen." In this context we also remember the following words:

148 Complementarities pp. 88-108 For a similar view see Poetries: Their Media and Ends pp. 1-16.
149 The Philosophy of Rhetoric pp. 132-36.
... a metaphor involves a comparison. What is a comparison? It may be several different things: it may be just a putting together or two things to let them work together; it may be a study of them both to see how they are like and how unlike one another; or it may be a process of calling attention to their likeness or a method of drawing attention to certain aspects of one through the co-presence of the other. 151

For Richards there is no distinction between a content and a form, a technique and a message; there is no What as distinct from a how in the complete utterance of poetry. There is only the entire, living utterance to be accepted or rejected for its success or failure in focusing needs. This is precisely what Coleridge had tried to establish, in saying that "language is framed to convey not the object alone, but likewise the character mood and intentions of the person who is representing it", 152 and by asserting that imagination "dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify." 153 Following Coleridge's view of poetics, based on tensions and balances of "discordant images" it becomes easy for Richards to distinguish a

151 The Philosophy of Rhetoric p. 120.
152 Biographia Literaria vol. II pp. 115-16.
successful poem from an unsuccessful one. A successful poem, according to him, may be known by the quantity and complication of impulses — it is able to unify by relating the various parts of the images of the poem together so as to give a unified effect. In other words, a good poem in Richards' formulation is "one in which what comes first prepares best for what follows, and what follows confirms and completes what has gone before."\textsuperscript{154}

That this argument is a reformulation of Coleridge's concept of organicism is indicated by the following comparable passage from Coleridge:

> But if the definition sought for be that of a legitimate poem, I answer, it must be one, the parts of which mutually support and explain each other; and in their proportion harmonizing with, and supporting the purpose and known influence of metrical arrangement. \textsuperscript{155}

We thus note that Coleridge's ideas of imagination and 'organicist' form have a bearing not only on Richards' conception of linguistic and mythopoetic activity but also on his theory of value, the context theory of meaning, and his conception of metaphor (a conception

\textsuperscript{154} Poetries: Their Media and Ends p. 219.

\textsuperscript{155} Biographia Literaria vol.II, p. 10.
that takes in its sweep several aspects of the epistemological problematic concerned with it). In Richards' formulation what Coleridge's imagination can possibly accomplish is a 'totalization of experience' where true artistic creation is possible. It is a totalization achieved through a kind of 'aesthetic-subjectivity' which can possibly appropriate the artist's entirety, as it were, through a medium or power identifiable with Coleridge's imagination.

These concerns of Richards, besides those of T.S. Eliot's centring on the re-unification of 'dissociated sensibility' have led to the renewed interest in 'organization', 'balance' and 'order'. Indeed the problematic of organization, balance and order has come to be explored in terms of experience against the entrapment of critical theory in an ideological dualism which finds significance in separateness of things rather than in their relatedness. Eliot's preoccupation with such questions as 'tradition' and 'the fusion of sensorial' and Richards' own attempt at imparting to modern critical theory a psychological and philosophical orientation, which had almost been lost since Coleridge, have set up the parameters that have come to govern, more than anything else, the works of the American New Critics and the Genre Critics.