CHAPTER II

MILITARIZATION OF POLITICS: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

1. Traditional Role of Military

The military is the main armed wing of a state. It is a part of society's political structure and an instrument of the policy pursued by the ruling classes in regard to internal and external affairs. The organised setting up of the military started when the state emerged.

Although it is impossible to determine precisely when and how the state system emerged, it is undeniable that force was a positive factor in bringing it about. The military came into being, among other things, to maintain internal peace and order and protecting the state from external dangers. This coercive power, the power to enforce decision, was employed by the state in the performance of its functions. Thus, naturally, these police functions of the state necessitated the maintenance of a machinery capable of achieving this end. It is in this context that the army began to play its role in politics in traditional society.
In an antagonistic society, the army as a whole was an instrument in the hands of the exploiting classes and confronted the people as an alien and hostile force. Instances of this can be cited from history. The armies of slaves led by Spartacus in ancient Rome, and peasants fighting in peasant wars, uprisings in France and England in the 14th century, Germany in the 16th century, the armed workers' detachments and militia bodies set up during the Paris Commune in 1871 and the first Russian Revolution of 1905-1907, etc. The armies of the exploiting classes, on the other hand, have always been formed for the single purpose of suppressing the enslaved classes and conquering other countries and nations.

The armies of big countries in the world have always been in the forefront of promoting colonialism and neocolonialism. In the course of four centuries, Britain, the oldest colonial master, unleashed more than two hundred wars to seize foreign lands and enslave other peoples. The history of U.S imperialism also abounds in wars and punitive expeditions to conquer foreign lands or to suppress indigenous peoples. In the U.S.S.R, the Stalinist regime used its military to widen the horizons of its power and influence in the neighbouring countries. The military was
also used to forcibly implement their ideology and power in the Eastern European countries. In Asia, the military was not part of the ruling elite or the privileged class at the time of colonial rule. As loyal soldiers the military accepted their confinement to the barracks and to obey their masters. Over the years, the role of the military has entirely changed everywhere. Today, the armed forces of imperialsit states preserve and extend their domination even in the area of national independence struggles.

Role of Military and Civil-Military Relations in Developing Countries

The ascendency of military over political power in many of the developing countries is a pervasive phenomenon. The military had played covert and overt role in the past but the expansion of its role in the political arena, especially in the developing countries, has been overwhelming during the past three to four decades. A large number of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America succumbed to military intervention or coup d'etat and counter-coups. In these countries, the military either assumed power or it emerged as a formidable actor in political processes.

The role of the military in developing countries has uncovered a number of features that considerably expand
traditional perspectives on the military institution. In the past, a 'military regime' was understood military controlled, administered and legislated government at every level. Too often, the label also suggested that "politics" was separate from the military. But it is seen that in the developing countries, a coalition of military and civilian elites as well as total military regimes ruling. Equally important, politics is as intense in military as in civilian controlled systems. Defining the role of military regimes, Sam C. Sarkesian stated:

We need to note that several developing countries have "services" other than the army. Although the ground forces play crucial roles in military intervention and subsequent rule, it does not always follow that the other services do not play important roles.1

Analysing the role of paramilitary and national police forces in their relationship to the military in developing countries, Sarkesian points out:

Such forces are generally deeply involved in internal politics, provide an alternative to the military, and are usually stationed in sensitive areas of the country. There is a need to

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examine the politics of such forces and the impact they have on military systems and politics. 2

In the Third World phenomena of military interventions, it is too often seen as intervention by a cohesive and monolithic military institution. In developing countries, military institutions have internal disagreements, disparate loyalties, and differing perceptions of their role. Sometimes a handful of military officers and soldiers are sufficient to overthrow existing regimes in a number of developing countries. One of the essential aspects of a successful military intervention is for the coup perpetrators to insure the backing, neutrality, or at least indifference of the rest of the military. Another important aspect of military role is "return to the barracks" phenomenon. 3 For example, under what circumstances do military men relinquish formal control of a country and return to their "traditional" role, leaving politics to politicians? This phenomenon raises questions about the veto role of military who are in the barracks, about civil-military relationships and about the degree of civilian control.

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p.4.
The military’s role in developing nations does not always synchronise with its implementation of a coup or with the number of seats it occupies in the official structure of a government. But the power of the military exists basically in its continuing strength and ability or vision to influence the political process or system of a country. The label "military government" or "military regimes" was traditionally used when a military official came to power as the head of a state or when a military junta became executive. But in reality, the military is also capable of exerting power from the barracks.

The interaction between military and civilian elites is another important aspect of the rule of the military. Its influence and impact on the political system is determined in no small way by coalitions between military/civilian elites. The more realistic focus, therefore, is to examine coalition building and factional politics within the military and civilian elite groups and between military and civilian factions. The relationship between military and civilian groups have an important bearing on performance. The smooth performance and running of civilian regimes also

4 Ibid., p.5.
is not solely determined by the civilians who occupy the official seats of power. Military behaviour and attitude of any civilian regime has an important impact on the final performance of any type of regime. Therefore, to arbitrarily categorise governments as military or civilian is to miss the fundamental mix of military and civilian elites in developing states. As suggested by Sarkesian, by applying the military civilian coalition one can easily transcend national boundaries and focus on common political factors that cut across regimes. 5

In the case of a new nation, it is more easy for the military to seize power and more difficult to govern the country. While examining rulers and techniques of ruling, Howard Wriggins states:

A regime can survive for a time when the civilian bureaucracy opposes it... But no regime can survive if the military does not at least acquiesce in its rule... Most civilian leaders in new states, therefore, are ambivalent in their feelings toward their armies. They need them for many functions; they fear they may be overthrown by them. Winning their backing is a central concern of any leader. 6

5 Ibid.

It is also relevant to discuss the questions raised by Morris Janowitz, a Chicago based sociologist, namely, the effectiveness of the political leadership of the military for a new nation, especially if the nation is striving for rapid economic development and social modernisation. Answering these questions Janowitz continued: "Once political power has been achieved, the military must develop mass political organisation of a civilian type or it must work out viable relations with civilian political groups." In several countries the military found it easy to seize power. But, when it came closer to the reality, it was much more difficult for the military to govern the country and look after the well-being of the people. The role of the military in the process of modernization has important implications in traditional societies. Janowitz observes that there is a widespread notion of the military being 'technocratic in orientation' and concerned with modernisation. Such a view ignores the fact that 'the military is also concerned with legitimate authority and with historical and national traditions.'

In this connection, as V.R.Berghahn has pointed out, it was, of course, one thing to state that the military in developing countries did not fulfil a modernising role, but quite another to put forward plausible explanations of this. On the analysis of Samuel P. Huntington's modernization theory military intervention in politics are not military. But political and reflect not the social and organisational characteristics of the military establishment, but the political and institutional structure of society. He starts from the basic assumption that "the general politicization of social forces and institutions' is the most important feature of all developing societies.

When we compare the role and function of military in different countries, a variety of patterns on military roles around the world can be seen. In his empirical study, the impact of military rule upon Economic and Social change in

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the Non-Western States, Eric Nordlinger focusses on policy consequences of military rule in developing areas and concludes that military rules are fundamentally unconcerned about social change and are opposed to groups who strive for reform. Moreover, he claims that military officers as a whole are more concerned about their corporate interests and about the preservation of political stability. Thus, military officers are generally attached to their middle-class interests and value systems.

While analysing the military involvement in domestic politics and its consequences for foreign and defence policies, T.W. Park and F. Abolfathi observed that 'countries with a strong political rating of the military tend to spend a higher proportion of their governmental revenues for defence'. They also found that 'health and education expenditures tend to decrease as military influence increases'.


the performance of military regimes in terms of their political, social and economic impact, categorised regimes into Military Regimes (MR), civilian regimes that have experienced military rule (CRM), Civilian regimes that have not experienced military rule and have a mean per capita G N P of less than US $900 (CR) and civilian regimes with a per capita G N P greater than $900. They concluded that while the majority of military regimes do not have the normal components of civilian regimes, a sizeable minority do not have the normal components of civilian regimes, a sizeable minority do adopt the main formal political institutions characteristic of a civilian regime.12

It is clear that the role of the military in Asia, Africa and Latin America differs considerably from Western perceptions of the role of the military in domestic politics. In the 1960's, leading American political scientists regarded the military as the only institution which could modernise their societies.13


governments, however, have frequently been viewed by the citizenry as illegitimate, and a widespread civilian protest rather than a stable political framework for development has been the result. As rulers, the military in most cases do more or less than the civilian authorities. Military regimes vary in their degree of freedom they allow for civilian participation in politics. "There is increasing evidence to suggest that military rulers do not differ appreciably from comparable civilian elites and party government". 14 The military as rulers do not generally rule alone. Invariably, they are involved with civilian political groups and civil servants. Usually, there is an ongoing interaction between groups within the military and their civil allies.

The features and characteristics of military elites are not always the same within different nations. They differ from country to country and region to region. However, there are commonalities such as acting as a conservative force, as a nationalistic or revolutionary force or as a combination of civil-military allies or as an instrument in the hands of an authoritarian ruler. In developing

14 Sam C. Sarkesian, op. cit., p.11.
societies, even when the military stays inside the barracks, it can exercise significant power over the day to day affairs of a civilian government. In many cases, the military constructs civilian front organisations or staffs of cabinets with political technocrats. As a result of this, the military remains a force behind the scene to strengthen the civilian rulers, and at a minimum a powerful pressure group whose interests and views must be taken into account. Normally, authoritarian rulers in the developing countries use the military to protect their interests. Casually a civilian-military mix will develop and it goes out of control before very long.

3. Failure of Political Parties and Military Intervention

The military generally takes over a country on the pretext of cleaning up the mess created by the politicians. The argument advanced is that the democratic institutions have been rendered ineffective due to the corruption of politicians and, therefore, the administration needs to be straightened out. It is to some extent a fact that most societies in the Third World failed to evolve a strong and viable political system. Clement John, a Pakistani lawyer and human rights advocate has stated that in Asia, however, this is not due to the shortcomings of the people or
politicians. "It is because most Asian societies are faced with complex problems relating to race, culture, religion, nationalism, ethnic parochialism and, last but not the least, their class base. In such circumstances it is difficult to obtain a political consensus on such complex issues". The military, on the other hand, resolves these intricate issues by imposing its arbitrary decisions with brute force without taking into consideration the desires or will of the people. In reality the issues are not really solved they only submerge for a while. Meanwhile the resentful feelings of the people keep building up beneath the surface and polarisation becomes deep between different sections of the society.

At the same time, the army never realise the fact that political issues cannot be resolved by suppression of the people. In order to make it more clear, Clement John has pin-pointed two examples: In Turkey, where army rule under General Gursel only accelerated the polarisation between the various political factions the result was that, when civilian rule was restored, there were wanton killings and

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15 Clement John, "Human Rights and Militarization in Asia: Focus on Pakistan", in Profit at Gun Point, (Singapore: CCA Youth, 1983), p.87.
the army again stepped in to clear the mess. Baluchistan in Pakistan is another case where, despite two army actions against Baluchis in 1967 and 1973, the question of provincial autonomy remained unresolved. Political scientists like S. E. Finer believe that socio-cultural environment is the key factor for military interventions. He argues that a low-level of political culture is likely to result in military intervention and military intervention itself seems to indicate a low level of political culture. 16

Experiences in the past, show that at the time of a political crisis in a country, military interventions establish military regimes or a group of officers appoint a civilian government and act as arbiters of policy and politics. The military officers justify military rule on the ground that the army represents the national interest, or that only military rule can secure and maintain a stable political order for economic development. Whatever the nature of a military rule, there is a general tendency for the soldiers to establish a veneer of civil legitimacy, either through presidential plebiscites, the incorporation of sympathetic individuals or civilian parties, or through

16 Quoted in Paul Commek and David Rooj, op. cit., p. 115.
establishing new political organisations.

4. Militarization and Civilian Regimes

Militarization is identified as a multifaceted phenomenon. The ruling group enforces it as a system to control the economic, political and social spheres of life. Its diversity lies in the different yet interrelated interpretations that can be attached to it. "Defined operationally, militarization can refer to the defensive reaction of a threatened economic and political order, the posture of which often tends to military abuses and the curtailment of civil liberties. It can also mean the process whereby the military is engaged in an active pursuit of political domination". Existing governments justify militarization through political manoeuvres and on the need for the protection of national security against internal and external aggression. Interpretations of militarization vary, simply because conditions warranting its rise and the extent of its influence vary. The process of militarization in any society is determined by the presence of a powerful

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17 Fernando V. Cao, "Militarization and the Third World", *Philippine Colleague*, (Manila), No. 29, 13 November 1986.
military institution capable of exerting its influence over governmental decisions.

The rise of militarism in general and of a military elite in particular is now a common phenomenon in most Asian countries. Those days are gone when Generals believed in and adhered to a high degree of professionalism, one significant aspect of which was to keep the army confined to the barracks. Today it is the reverse. Several of the civilian rulers who use the military continuously for their own sake, claim a role for the military in the country’s politics as a matter of right. Keeping the soldiers away from civil life was considered necessary in order to prevent them from succumbing to its temptations. Military, then, had a specific and restrictive role to play in the power structures. The right to rule was considered the domain of the colonial masters, who used the services of the bureaucrats and the politicians for the purpose. The military was trained and conditioned and groomed to serve the needs of the colonial system, which ranged from being used as cannon fodder to being used to suppress and control the people.

Over the years, civilian rulers in Third World countries sharpened the role of the military and became
authoritarian with the support of the military. Military is being used to advance the cause of the vested interests and the ruling civilian elites. With increase in military power, the ruling elite become more and more repressive in suppressing political dissent. And the military officers, who enjoy a lot of privileges under the patronage of civilian rulers, are not answerable to any one. This obviously leads to abuse of power and authority. The military succeeds in keeping the lid on the situation by increasing the process of militarization in society.

Australian political scientist Richard Tanter describes some characteristics of a militarised society. First, the presence of the military in government, either as a military government or immediately beneath the executive power. Second, the military's presence in that society's economic life. The level at which this intervention takes place may vary from village level coercion to something close to a corporatist national security role for the military in economic development. Third, is the militarization of social institutions where the traditional values and norms are bent, or are in the process of being bent, toward military values and norms. Fourth, is the administrative

18 Quoted in Fernando V. Cao, op. cit.
violation of human rights. Fifth, counter-insurgency operations which are nothing but a more overt military expression of a general repressive stance. Sixth, international aggression against perceivable smaller and weaker states. And lastly, an expanded military arms transfer and domestic arms production which can partly explain a huge military budget.

All these features deviate from the traditional concept and role of the military. According to the conventional 20th century political models, the military's tasks are simply to defend and protect the existence or integrity of the state against any perceived external or internal threat or attack. In this connection Fernando V.Cao states:

Since the military owes its loyalty only to the state and not just to any of its branches, the military should not engage itself in the policy making processes in the government, except perhaps for matters directly concerning it. Thus, the military establishment is construed to be strictly apolitical and non-partisan, an obedient enforcer of laws and policies arrived at by other state organs.\(^\text{19}\)

Unfortunately the evils of authoritarian or direct military juntas result in the military's notion of its

\(^{19}\) Ibid.
responsibility as covering all state processes; that it no longer is a component of the state but the latter's synonym. Here, we must understand from our Asian experiences, especially of the civilian democratic regimes, the fact that militarisation is not just military leadership. In fact, it is merely one of its more blatant features. This phenomenon has often developed under civilian leadership or where the military is kept on a fairly tight leash by civilian politicians. In developing nations where a civilian government is in power, militarization has become the most important cause of increased political instability. F.V.Cao reveals the fact that the emergence of authoritarian strongmen were generally preceded by dramatic political and social unrest or tragic events which dramatize the apparent impotence of civilian rulers operating under the conventional democratic processes. Usually, the situation appears to be so chaotic that to let things deteriorate means the collapse of that society.20

In order to exaggerate the gravity of the internal situations, normally civilian authoritarian rulers

20 Ibid.
propagate an idea that the country is in danger and that revolutionary groups are out to seize power. Amid all this propaganda would emerge authoritarian figures as the real "patriots" in the country, or military officers who claim that their intervention indispensable to meet the "grave situation". A classic example of this was that of President Marcos of the Philippines who, till he was deposed used to justify his dictatorship saying that it was necessary "to save the nation and reform society".

The Philippines is a typical example of how a civilian democratic regime turned into an authoritarian dictatorship under the support given by the military. Before Martial law was imposed in 1972, the country was passing through a grave situation. People were disgruntled. The economy of the country had deteriorated, while the rulers proved to be prodigals. The so called communist insurgency was not at all a threat then, but a small guerilla group; but, there was political unrest rocking even the presidency. Even though, there was no decisive political opposition which was strong enough to capture state power - only the Marcos government and its military backup were supreme.

This kind of a civilian government shows a tendency to seize all governmental powers and consolidate its authority.
These regimes, then, develop dependence in the West by enmeshing themselves in the International economic and political order. They encourage foreign investments in their economies and resort to counter-insurgency operations at home. They receive huge military aid from the West to strengthen their military so as to be able to suppress their people’s collective initiatives.

Somehow, there have been spread two notions, that the practice of democracy hinders development in Third World countries and that development can come only from the West. Behind this is the belief that underdeveloped nations are underdeveloped because of their political immaturity, which is traceable to civilian politicians and their politickings.

5. Global Militarization: Its Causes and Consequences

Since 1700 A.D. there have been 471 wars, (conflicts involving the death of 1,000 or more per year), resulting in 101,555,000 fatalities.21 To convey a true sense of the reality behind those numbers - the human tragedies and futile waste of life -- is beyond the limited literary

skills of a statistical analyst. But the number themselves and the historical records do carry some messages which may help towards an understanding of this extreme manifestation of the military imperative.

Historically, as many civilians as professional soldiers have been killed in wars. In the 18th, 19th and the 20th centuries, civilians represented about 50 per cent of war-related deaths. Recently, the proportion of the civilian death toll has been going up. In the 1960's, civilians accounted for 52 per cent of the deaths; in the 1970's for 73 percent; and so far in the 1980's for 85 percent.22

Europe was the principal site of wars and war related deaths over the past three century span. But the geography of warfare has changed radically. Since the Second World War, only one conflict, (U.S.S.R intervention in the Hungarian civil war in 1956), has taken place in Europe.23 All other wars have been fought in the Third World. They

22 Ibid.

have not, however, been without the involvement of the major powers, and recently this involvement, both overt and covert in nature, appears to have increased. Weapons used in all these wars were produced mostly in the so-called First and Second Worlds. In some areas, the super powers were involved directly. It is significant to note that the arms production and troop build-up and training in many of these countries today are done with the intent to use them, not in their own territories, but in Third World countries.

Today the situation has changed. The most outstanding features of current global militarization are the nuclear and conventional arms race, an increasing tendency to resort to force and interventionism, and the trend towards using military considerations to dominate inter-state relations, etc.

(a). Arms Race: a Catalyst of Militarization

The increase in world military expenditure has become the sign of an arms race. This arms race has gone out of control and acts as a catalyst of militarization. World outlays for global military spending have been estimated as $800 billion in 1986 and $930 billion in 1987.24 Although

some cut-off in military spending has been effected in conflict areas, the apparently undiminished military extravagance of the two super-powers keep overall expenditures rising. In her study, *World Military and Social Expenditures*, R.L. Sivard used two statistical indicators to gauge military trends, the numbers in the armed forces and the flow of arms in international trade. In neither case, however, is the overall picture unambiguous. The world's armed forces (regulars) declined from a peak of 26,982,000 in 1984 to 25,752,000 in 1986, but that big drop was in China alone. In the Middle East and in South Asia the numbers were rising, and this process, by 1987, had brought the total up to 26,620,000. Arms transfers, according to the official U.S count, fell sharply in 1985 in constant U.S dollars, after levelling off between 1981 and 1984. It has been reported that secret trade through an extensive international network of arms dealers and also a massive undercover flow of weapons is quite common.

The militarization of the Third World has increased by the import of military technology and of modern arms. The

25 Ibid.
U.S. and U.S.S.R in the post war period took on a new role as weapons suppliers to Third World countries. The resources devoted to military purposes in the Third World in the form of Research and Development (R & D) and military expenditures are much higher always. The percentage distribution for Arms production expenditure shows that the U.S.A, U.S.S.R and other NATO, WTO countries account for 78.1 percent while the share of the approximately 100 Third World countries is but 12.3 percent.\textsuperscript{26}

Since the advanced industrialised countries produce weapons on a large scale, they want to export all their productions to other countries. Normally their customers are the poor underdeveloped countries. It remains true that the major powers in the world - the U.S and U.S.S.R - are the leading powers in the field of arms development, followed by West European producers such as U.K. and France and also a group of countries with expanding arms industries, such as Italy, Federal Republic of Germany,

Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium as well as Israel in the Third World. Thus, these countries play an important role in the process of intensification of militarization of the Third World. The arms producing countries in the world are transferring their production to the Third World in several ways such as commercial sales, military assistance or on credit basis and so on. The United States accounts for approximately half of world arms exports and the Soviet Union for another 25 percent. A U.S state department policy release notes that

U.S arms are transferred in several ways, including grant aid under the Military Assistance Programme (MAP), now a small part of total transfer; commercial sales - about 10% of the total; and government-to-government. Foreign Military sales (FMS) on a cash or credit basis, which account for most transfers ... The LDC’s are buying foreign arms at a rate faster than any other group of nations, and about two-thirds of global exports go to them.27

Besides arms for the military, weapons for police forces are also exported to Third World countries. Michael T.Klare, who did research on the transfer of police weapons and technology by the U.S to the Third World, listed police

27 Quoted in Miles D. Wolpin, "Arms Transfer and Dependency", in Problems of Contemporary Militarism, op.cit., p.259.
weapons such as "pistols and revolvers, rifles and anti-riot equipment such as chemical munitions, shotguns, clubs, and water cannon; surveillance and intelligence systems; torture devices such as thumbscrews, electronic shock devices and trauma-producing drugs. Under the U.S Freedom of Information Act, researchers at the Institute for Policy Studies have found evidence that U.S supplied Third World police forces some 615,000 tear gas granades, 51,000 rifles and submachine guns, 126,000 pistols and revolvers and 55 million rounds of ammunition through the commercial sales programme. As examples of such weapons sales to Asia Michael T. Klare listed sales to the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, etc.

Transfer of arms manufacturing technology is widely spread during the past several years. For example, in 1945, India was the only country in Asia capable of producing weapons other than small arms and ammunition. Today, North Korea produces aircraft, warships and small arms, etc., under licence of the Soviet Union; South Korea likewise produces aircraft, warships and small arms all

under license of the U.S; Pakistan produces aircraft under a 1972 French licence and missiles under a cancelled West German licence; the Philippine produces aircraft under a 1975 West German and U.S licence, and small arms under a U.S licence; Singapore produces warships under a West German licence; Taiwan produces missiles under a 1976 U.S licence; and Thailand produces aircraft under a 1973 U.S licence. 29

The technology for arms production is spreading through agreements with established arms producers, and the covert trade and the devious secret arrangements facilitate it. The link between International Military and Economic Order is a key factor in the promotion of militarization. Arms transfers, for example, are not unimportant affairs; arms require spare parts, maintenance, and transfers. So arms transfers result in continuing sales. Arms sales, in fact, are often justified by arms exporting countries as decreasing the cost to them of research and development. 30

During the period 1975 - 1983, over two thirds of all arms


30 Jose W. Diokno, Militarization of Asian Politics (Unpublished Monograph)
were exported to repressive governments. The largest supplier, according to U.S official estimates, was the Soviet Union (especially to Syria, Iraq and Libya); the next in rank were the U.S and France, which supplied arms to a large number of repressive governments but generally in small quantities.31

The spread of sophisticated arms throughout the developing world has been one of the most striking and disquieting features of the modern arms race and arms manufacture technology. As a result of this phenomenon, the process of militarization also is spreading widely, especially in the Third World countries.

(b). Super-Power Interventions

Both the U.S and the U.S.S.R abet militarization because militarization ties developing nations to them, as ASEAN countries for example, are tied to the U.S and Vietnam to the U.S.S.R, and fuels the ambitions of the super powers to rule the world. Militarism provides the super powers with testing grounds for new weapons, and areas in

which to fight proxy wars, using the armies of their satellites to test each other's strength of will without committing their own territories or risking the safety of their own people.

In 1987 there are six times as many Americans under arms as there were before World War II and military expenditures in real terms are twenty-five times as large. Several factors account for this radical change in the military profile of the country. In two major respects U.S post-war governments assumed military commitments which expanded their country's global role. One related to the containment of Soviet and Chinese expansionism in Europe and Asia; the other to achieve anti-communist objectives in the Third World. A third influence, affecting both policy and size of the budget, was the increased political power of the military-industry complex.

After the formation of NATO in 1949, a large body of U.S forces remained in Europe, and the U.S has, from the earliest years, carried the major share of the overall financial burden of NATO defence. U.S role in Asia and the

Pacific also were a financial burden to the country. U.S occupation forces remained in Japan after Japan's defeat in 1945 and in South Korea after the end of the Korean war. Throughout the Pacific area, the U.S created a vast network of anti-communist military alliances to contain China and North Korea, as well as the U.S.S.R. R.L. Sivard comments: "An interventionist role is not new for the U.S., but in scope, variety, and in cost, the actions taken in recent decades are unprecedented." Unlike in the earlier part of this century, U.S interventions have been geographically more wide ranging. Indirect forms of intervention (interventions not involving U.S forces directly) have also become more common. Although not always successful, such covert operations did succeed in overthrowing some popularly-elected but leftist governments which were taken over by the armed forces.

After the Vietnam war, the U.S adopted a "never again" stance on the use of U.S combat troops in internal conflicts in the Third World - this being the so called "Vietnam Syndrome". Under the Nixon Doctrine, Americas counterinsurgency function was delegated to "surrogate

33 Ibid.
gendarmes" such as Iran and Brazil. With the fall of the Shah, however, U.S leaders lost confidence in the Nixon Doctrine, and began moving towards the reinstatement of America's traditional interventionary posture. Michael T. Klare states that "to a large degree, the current military posture of the U.S.A represents a reaffirmation of the Truman and Eisenhower doctrines, and other cold war policies which were used to justify U.S intervention against pro-Soviet forces in the Third World".

While analysing the new elements in U.S interventionist policies and ideologies, Michael T. Klare points out a new element which he calls 'Brown Doctrine', named after former Secretary of Defence, Harold Brown. This Doctrine basically states that 'Third World instability by itself - whatever the ideological orientation of the antagonists involved - is a threat to the existing world order and thus to U.S economic security. The Brown Doctrine further assumes that "the U.S.A and its industrial allies are becoming increasingly dependent on the raw materials (especially oil) and markets of the Third World, and that these "Vital

34 Michael T. Klare, op.cit., p.26 (no.28)
35 Ibid.
"interests" are increasingly threatened by Third World 'turbulence'—meaning social, economic, political and religious strife".35 This idea was first elaborated by counterinsurgency theorist Guy Pauker. Pauker stated: "There is a non-negligible chance that mankind is entering a period of increased social instability and faces the possibility of a breakdown of global order as a result of sharpening confrontation between the Third World and the industrial democracies." And because Third World governments can no longer be relied upon to control such disorders using indigenous repressive capabilities alone, the U.S.A, "as a super-power cast by history in the role of world leadership", would have to be prepared to "use its military" force to prevent the total collapse of the world order.36

The same approach was stated even more crudely by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, architect of the U.S intervention in Vietnam: "As the leading affluent 'have' power we may expect to have to fight for our national valuables against envious "have-nots". This approach became national policy in 1980.

when secretary Brown told Congress that "international economic disorder could almost equal in severity the military threat from the Soviet Union", and that, "in a world of disputes and violence, we cannot afford to go abroad unarmed.\textsuperscript{37} Out of this logic came the Rapid Deployment Force and the present revival of the counterinsurgency establishment of the Vietnam era. And while the Reagan Administration has repudiated many of the policies of the Carter Administration, it has fully endorsed the Brown Doctrine and pledged to defend U.S overseas economic interests against any further outbreak of Third World lawlessness.\textsuperscript{38}

Quite often the U.S acts in the role of a self appointed custodian or guardian and arbiter over other sovereign nations. The problem is that the U.S is completely obsessed with its security interest and geopolitical role. Another aspect of the U.S role in intensification of militarization is the anti-communist attitude. It is in this context that the U.S policies and relationships with other countries are determined and


\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid}.
formulated. The combination of several of these aspects makes the U.S an interventionist power. Be it in the label of interest of arm industry or "communist phobia", the U.S makes it its business and strategy to keep the flames of conflict and tension smouldering to further its own interests.

The case of the U.S.S.R is different. Because of the geographic characteristics of U.S.S.R, its security is defined more as a problem of the security of its boundaries. The Warsaw Pact is the defence resort that would impede a conventional aggression of the Soviet Union from Europe. In addition to this, since the 1960's there is the protection to certain allied countries like Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambic. The invasion of Afghanistan is part of the defence-boundary logic and the seclusion and confinement psychosis, after the U.S.A-China approximation. The main danger is found in the effects that the American policy can have in the Soviet military establishment and in the destabilization process of the countries of the Warsaw Pact.\(^{39}\) All this could lead the U.S.S.R to take parallel actions to those of the U.S.A.

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There are also political reasons for the involvement of developed countries in the militarization of the developing nations. The superpowers employ weapons transfers as a means of establishing a political presence in a particular area. This is especially true for the Soviet Union, which has less to offer new friends in the areas of trade and investment than does the U.S. Moscow’s sale of weapons to Peru on a long-term low-interest basis is an example of this. One of the other reasons frequently cited by the superpowers for arming certain Third World countries is to maintain regional power balances. Both East and West have justified massive arms sales to the volatile regions as a means of preserving the power balances and peace. This rationale has been normally used to support arms transfers to Chile and Pakistan while Soviet sales have gone to Peru and India.

Another important political reason for the superpower involvement in militarization of the Third World is to maintain spheres of influence which are sympathetic to their particular economic, political and ideological positions.

For the U.S., this means advancing a pro-Western free market system. Although American State Department officials stress on the promotion of democratic political systems, U.S. involvement in South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines under Marcos, etc., show that U.S. gives higher priority to backing Pro-American governments than to promoting environments in which the people participate freely in political life. In the same way, the Soviets supply arms to the nations which have opted for communism, or at least an alternative to a Western economic and political model. Thus they have supplied weapons to various national liberation movements - governments like that of Allende's Chile and present day Nicaragua, as well as to North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Ethiopia and other communist countries.  

Nevertheless, arms sales will probably continue to remain a prime instrument for both the Soviet Union and the United States in their rivalry for the allegiance of the various countries.

Over the past 25 years, the Soviet Union has become more deeply involved in the Third World affairs, and is

evidently prepared to help defend its allies and clients against Western-sponsored interventions. So it is definite that an intervention by one superpower in a Third World country will result in a confrontation with the forces of the other superpower. Superpower tensions often overlay and intermingle with internal and regional unrest. For example, both the U.S and the U.S.S.R base naval and airforce units in Asia to protect what they see as their legitimate interests in the Pacific. The U.S has bilateral security treaties with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. The Soviet Union has Treaties of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with Afghanistan, India, Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, etc. This kind of various linkages with Third World countries establish mother state–client state relationships and that tensions between the superpowers often flow down and increase tensions between respective client states. Inversely, increased tensions between respective client states often result in heightened friction between the superpower patrons.

The U.S and the U.S.S.R also deploy both seaborne and airborne strategic nuclear weapons in several parts of the world, especially throughout Asia, as part of their global nuclear strategy. Superpower basing centres in Asia
including Yokosuka and Okinawa in Japan, Subic and Clark in the Philippines, Da Nang and Cam Ranh in Vietnam, Thailand, Guam, etc., would be primary targets. The rivalry between the superpowers tends to poison relations between other countries and leads to big power involvement in local rivalries.

6. Militarization in the Third World

If the global militarization's most outstanding features are the nuclear and conventional arms race, an increasing tendency to resort to force and interventionism, and the trend towards using military considerations to dominate inter-state relations, equally perturbing trends can be noticed at the national level. Taking it in the global context, militarization can assume the character of superpower nations stockpiling and producing nuclear-armed weapons in the seemingly unending race for military supremacy. But militarization is not just merely military leadership or nuclear and conventional arms proliferation. In fact, these are merely its more blatant features. "Militarization is one phenomenon that has developed under civilian leadership or where the military is kept on a fairly tight leash by civilian politicians". 42

42 Fernando V. Cao, op.cit.
A number of external and internal factors promote militarization, whether it is at the global level or at national level. However, common factors can be seen in both cases, such as: 1. Militarization was the product of fear; fear of the people in one case, and fear of the ousted elite and colonial power in the other; 2. Militarization required the collaboration of technocrats with the military: without the former's know-how, the latter's coercive power was not enough to govern the country; 3. Militarization would not have succeeded or lasted for as long as it has were it not abetted and aided by the superpowers.43

When we analyse the causes of Third World militarization, we can find several internal factors such as unjust social system, racial structures, national security syndrome, authoritarianism, internal violence, insurgency, growth of popular movements, etc. And there are also external factors such as superpower interventions, arms race, etc.

In the Third World countries, normally a small segment of the total population enjoys privileges and owns a major part of the wealth of the country. The privileged class has

43 Jose W. Diokno, op.cit., p.4.
access to the government or ruling elites. At the same time, their close association with the ruling class is likely to rely on the use of military force to deter or overcome any threats to the existing order which is beneficial to them. This tendency results in what has been termed a system of "economic apartheid", wherein the privileged few live in "sanctuaries of wealth" surrounded by and protected from the impoverished masses. Same is the case of any society where there is unjust racial discrimination. In such society, the dominant racial grouping tends to rely on force to discourage and overcome rebellion on the part of the oppressed. In order to protect the interests of the privileged classes, once the military is used to suppress the oppressed masses or a society has created a powerful military apparatus in response to some real or imagined threat, this institution will often seek to expand and enhance its prerogatives at the expense of civilian institutions. Michael T. Klare observes: In the advanced countries, this drive is often linked to and fed by the self-perpetuating mechanisms of the military industries; in

44 Peter Lock and Herbert Wulf, "The Dialectics of Rearmament and Dependence", Paper presented at the WCC Consultation on Militarism

the poorer countries, it is sometimes produced by the desire of the officer class (which is often composed of middle and even lower-class persons) to enhance their status vis-a-vis the traditional ruling elite.46

Authoritarianism is on the increase in many of the Third World countries, where military leaders are assuming control of the governing institutions of the respective countries. In some countries this process leads to the overthrow of civilian governments, while in others it is characterised by the destabilisation of civilian institutions to the advantage of military agencies. Under the pretext of an exaggerated 'developmental policy' the military tends to impose centralised, hierarchic forms of decision-making on all government institutions, and to place all other civilian institutions under centralised control - such as press, educational institutions, trade unions, farmers organisations, etc. Any groups or individuals who oppose such control are considered a threat to 'national security' and are forcibly dissolved or have their wings clipped by the authorities. In order to promote the rulers' self-image as powerful, and to suppress popular

46 Ibid.
movements, the military use or divert more resources to the acquisition of weapons. This phenomenon is quite common in most of the Third World countries.

The popular movements or cause-oriented groups which oppose the authoritarian tendencies are usually branded as subversive organisations or communist insurgents. There is a growing divergence of interests between the military authorities and the people, who live in a suffocating atmosphere. In many countries people have attained power through their collective efforts to oppose the authoritarian rulers. The ruling elites often unleash a reign of terror and brutality on them to deter popular discontent. This process is most advanced in several of the Third World countries, where the military leadership tried to wipe out an entire generation of political activists. This process is common in other societies also where martial law has become a permanent set-up created by the authoritarian rulers.

7. Militarization and 'National Security' Doctrine

The doctrine of national security was developed in the U.S.A after the Second World War and it spread to the Third World along with U.S hegemony. The theoreticians of the
concept were originally French military officials who developed the doctrine in the years following the Indochinese war. But the Americans developed this theory in response to their specific needs and it was first experimented in the Philippines, afterwards in Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia and then in Latin America, after the Cuban Revolution. The development of the theory influenced by the U.S not only its external policy, but also the political system. In the U.S, the National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defence Department, and institutionalised the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces. The National Security legislation implemented in the U.S was considered as an action of the rulers that contradicted the democratic values highlighted in the American constitution. However, the U.S authorities tried to justify their actions in this regard.

The tendency to emphasize the military aspect of security is omnipresent in the militaristic regions of the Third World. Both the authoritarian and democratic regimes recognize the complexity of the problem. Within authoritarian thought, there is a tendency to reduce security factors only to a problem of military strategy; in
contrast, democratic thought insists on the complexity of the phenomenon. According to the Latin American theoreticians of national security doctrine, internal subversion is considered to be the most important threat to national security. Subversion through ideas as well as through actions is considered most dangerous. So, the government must be alert to declare war against the enemy whether it is internal or external.

While interstate regional tensions are important motivations for increased military establishments, an equally important factor is the determination of ruling elites in Asian countries to use state force to assure their continued hold on power and to implement unpopular domestic political, economic and social programmes. In such societies, 'national security' has been defined as the creation of conditions necessary for implementation of such programmes. When called upon to uphold the concept of national security, the military acquires equipment designed for the suppression of domestic resistance and unrest. In the role of guard and saviour of 'national security', the military acts as the enforcer and gains a large degree of

political power in the Third World countries. Paramilitary and police forces are also structured and armed so as to coordinate their role with the military for this purpose. Often, arms races sparked by external threat perceptions can also bolster the influence of the military under the plea of protecting national security.

The U.S attitude in relation to the national security concept in Asia is mainly based on the concept of maintenance of a balance of power in the region, the enhancement of the political and economic stability of the non-communist countries, ensuring American access to the resources and markets in the area, and keeping open the major sea passages between the Pacific and Indian ocean.

U.S considered the primary security problem in the region for its allies to be domestic communist insurgencies. So the U.S has been always giving help directly and indirectly through military as economic assistance, especially for the five pro-U.S countries in the ASEAN -- Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines -- to fight against local insurgency problems. National security legislations introduced by those countries reflect an authoritarian conception of state security.
Another notable feature is that national security in these regimes are directly related to American security.

However, it should not be assumed that one uniform national security doctrine exists all over the Third World countries, especially everywhere in the South East Asian countries. Different manifestations may occur depending on the historical background, national traditions, social structures, political systems, economic stability, etc., of each country. The most prominent element of national security common to several of the countries is acceleration of militarization.

In several of the countries, a new institutional structure has emerged, with an authoritarian government controlled by the armed forces which concentrate the principal powers of the state in their own hands. Even in countries which have a democratic constitution, institutions of democracy are weakened and restrictive legislative enactments erode the democratic framework. Under the guise of national security doctrine, a state of emergency will be declared since a state of emergency is a justifiable constitutional provision for any country to ensure its survival. In Asian countries, there is a consistent pattern of misuse of constitutional provisions for the declaration
of emergency. These provisions have been invoked often to protect a particular regime or rulers facing challenges or threats from internal opposition. The regular recourse to emergency and martial law has resulted in militarization in most of the Asian countries.

8. Militarization: its Consequences

Militarization puts a back-breaking burden on poorer countries in the world, among which it is more prevalent. In 1960, 26 percent of the developing states that were then independent were under military control in some form. In 1987, the proportion rose to 52 percent; that is, in 59 of the 113 countries the armed forces, domestic or foreign, exercised significant executive and/or judicial-legislative power. 48

Taken as a group, military-dominated governments in the Third World have distinguishing characteristics and policies. The countries in which they rule are more highly militarised than are most of those under civilian authority. Relative to population, they have two and one-half times as many men under arms. Their military expenditures per capita

48 R.L. Sivard, op.cit., p.28.
also average twice as high as in other developing countries.48 A militarized government, once established, is not easily dislodged from the centres of political power. R.L. Sivard has observed that the countries now under military rule have experienced an average of 19 years of controlled government out of a span of 28 years. The consequences of militarization, summed-up, are as follows;

(a). Repressions and Human Right Violations

In terms of basic human and political rights, militarization has had far-reaching and disastrous effects. Among the 59 governments identified as military controlled, in 57 countries the most extreme forms of repression, including torture, brutality, disappearances, and political killings, were used by the authorities against the very people who were presumably under their protection. In half of these cases, terror tactics were so frequent as to appear to be institutionalised. Among other Third World countries also, the human rights record is not uniformly good. In political rights - defined in this case as the citizen's right to vote peacefully against the government in power - the contrast between the military controlled governments and

48 Ibid.
other Third World governments was also striking. Only 5 percent of those under military control had no apparent restrictions on voting, while among other Third World countries, 6 times as many had no voting restrictions. 50

Sivard comments that over the last six years' study has revealed that human rights violations in the context of military- or civilian-controlled governments give little cause for optimism. The spread of militarism and the growth of political and economic power by the armed forces, have increased the danger of violence from within. 51 So it is clearly evident that militarization carries within it a deadly virus that kills human rights. A militarized government, whether it is purely military controlled or civilian in appearance with military backing, survives on repression. Fear-inducing tactics are used to subdue the opposition, bottle up change, and to ensure the control of resources that nourish power. The authoritarian rulers see that it is easier to break the heads of the people rather than to change their minds. So, the very logic of militarization requires prolonged detention without trial-

50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
often without charges, torture, "disappearances", control of mass media, suppression of popular movements and trade unions, denial of right to peaceful assembly, destruction of judicial independence, legislation by decree, enacting black laws to curtail the freedom of people, etc. These violations of human rights are sadly prevalent in most of the Third World countries.

Militarized political power is directly associated with the violation of human rights. In a militarized society voting is restricted, the press is censored, organising activity is crushed, and there is quick resort to arbitrary arrest, torture, disappearances, murder, etc., whereby people are prevented from freely exercising their political rights. There is no assurance that the benefits of development will be evenly distributed. As Marek Thee has put it: "... freedom, autonomy and liberty of active participation in political life are pre-conditions to the effective struggle for implementing social, economic and cultural rights". As people rise up opposing the authoritarian repressive measures, the rulers resort to repression to maintain social control. As the military apparatus is engaged to break up

people's uprisings, to arrest, torture and kill dissidents and to wage counter-insurgency operations, more arms are required. This costs more economic hardship, and the very arms which are supposed to provide security, in fact foster insecurity.

Where political power is militarized, there is a high level of authoritarian rather than participatory decision making. The International Peace Research Association explains why it happens:

A participatory democratic system will lead to decentralization, and a preference for an appropriate and labor-intensive technology that gives priority to basic needs; the military represents an entirely different organisational structure, with a high degree of centralization and hierarchy. The emphasis is on command and subordination, defining alternative thinking and approaches as "subversive". These attitudes, closely associated with the organisation of the armed forces, are deeply anti-democratic in nature. 53

Militarization of the state apparatus is also associated with a high reliance on coercion to enforce decisions, as well as the systematic violation of human rights.

(b). Loss of Resources

Militarization misuses a lot of resources which might otherwise be used for development of the world. Military expenditure in developing countries have increased fourfold since 1960 and Third World military spending now accounts for 20 percent of the world's total military budget. As a result, serious damage has been caused to economies of the respective countries.

For developing countries, military imports represent a serious drain on precious foreign exchange reserves, not only at the time of transfer but far into the future. The recruitment of highly skilled workers into the armed forces and defence industries seriously restricts the quality of the labour force available to civilian employers. Especially for the developing countries, the result is a kind of internal "brain drain". At present one-fourth of all money spent globally on research and development (R & D) is military related and twenty percent of the world's scientists and engineers are engaged in military research and development.54 An estimated 5-8% of total world

54 Quoted in "Theft on a Global Scale", Ploughshares Monitor, (Waterloo), Vol.VIII, No2, June 1987, p.3.
consumption of petroleum is presently for military purposes. This is nearly half of what all developing countries, excluding China, consume, and more than that used in France alone. Additionally, military consumption accounts for more than 11% of world consumption of copper, more than 8% of lead, about 6% of aluminium, nickel, silver and zinc, and nearly 6% of platinum. The major producer of military accessories are increasingly dependent on the Third World for cheap supplies of strategic minerals.

The amount of land used by the military on a global scale amounts to between .3 and .5 percent of the total land available. Overall, this is rather insignificant, but in a place like Singapore, the military occupies 10 percent of a 226 square mile island. Land used for civilian purposes must now be reclaimed from the sea. In several other countries, the long-term damage to land, air and water by the storage and testing of weapons (particularly nuclear) can have a profound impact on civilian activity far beyond the immediate area used.

55 Ibid.

High levels of military spending as one of the key elements of the process of militarization, contribute to inflation in several ways. First of all, military spending generates additional income, and thus purchasing power, without producing any equivalent consumable output or without expanding production capacity to meet increased demand for them. Secondly, the high profits and wages in the industry stimulate demands for higher profits and wages in other industries. Thirdly, where goods and services required by the military sector are scarce, prices rise quickly. This latter kind of inflation can be particularly intense in underdeveloped and war damaged countries.

Most developing countries in the world import their military needs by drawing on their foreign exchange reserves and thus contribute to a country's foreign debt. In 1987 the developing world owed the developed world approximately $850 billion.\(^{57}\) Arms imports account for 25% of the debt burden. Moreover, a United Nations report noted that in at least 4 of the 20 countries with the largest foreign debt in

\(^{57}\) "Theft on a Global Scale", op.cit., p.4.
1983, the value of arms imports amounted to 39-40% of the debt increase between 1976 and 1980.\textsuperscript{58}

In order to generate foreign exchange to pay their debts, developing countries increase production for export, usually to the neglect of local needs. They export primarily raw materials like oil and minerals, and cash crops like peanuts, pineapples, bananas, sugar, tobacco, cotton, coffee, etc. Unfortunately, as a result of world recession, demand for raw materials is down, and commodity prices are at their lowest level in forty years.\textsuperscript{59} A terrible irony results. Where some 35% of people in the developing countries are underfed, more and more land is being used for the production of export crops. At present, 1/4 of land under cultivation in the Third World is given over to non-food crops, and this area is growing. At the same time, these countries are having to import cereals to feed their increasingly hungry people. Cereal imports by the developing world have increased by 75% in the last 10 years.\textsuperscript{60}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{59} Theft on a Global scale, \textit{op.cit.}, p.4.
\item \textsuperscript{60} \textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
All these cases reveal the fact that, even if there is no war, arms spending can destabilize the Third World. Militarization strains economies already weakened by the world recession and it diverts the resources of a country from badly needed social development programmes.

Most developing countries increasingly depend for their military needs on the foreign exchange reserves and in the process contribute to a country's foreign debt. Arms purchases have thus contributed significantly towards international debt burdens carried by many Third World countries. A quarter of the accumulated Third World debt is caused because of arms imports. Often the Third World countries borrow from international lending agencies like I.M.F and World Bank and use this money for arms purchase. The granting of I.M.F loans is dependent on the recipient's compliance with a set of harsh austerity measures. Governments must agree to limit public borrowing and reduce the availability of domestic credit by removing price controls and subsidies on basic consumer goods, cutting back on spending for health, education, and social welfare, and holding back wages.\(^{61}\) And they are asked used to encourage

\(^{61}\) *Ploughshares Monitor, op.cit., p.4.*
more production for export by devaluing currencies and removing export controls.

(c). Militarization causes Underdevelopment

It is evident that militarization contributes to underdevelopment in many ways. There are several schools of thought on the interrelationship between militarization and underdevelopment. Emily Benoit, exponent of the "Economic Growth" theory of development, argues that military spending may have a favourable effect on economic growth and, therefore, may contribute to development.62 There are differences of opinion on Benoit's study. Some critics argue that his methodology is faulty while some, in fact, reach the opposite conclusion - namely that military spending inhibits growth.63

A U.N. Group of experts regard the interrelationship of militarization and under development as a negative one; that is, militarization, as represented by high levels of military spending and the build up of arms, hinders


development because it utilizes resources that could be used in pursuit of social and economic development. The third school of thought, while analysing the militarization and under development problem, emphasizes the structural relationship between the two. According to this school, militarization is an integral part of a global order which ensures continued economic and political dominance for the developed countries and continued subordination for the under developed. Thus militarization fosters underdevelopment not primarily through the misuse of resources but through the manner in which it enables the developed North to keep the South underdeveloped.

In order to highlight the significance of militarization and its impact on development, some development - military comparisons will be helpful.

In 1987, global military expenditures reached a new high point of $946 billion dollars, or $1.8 million per

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64 Ploughshares Working Paper, op.cit., p.5, (No.40)


minute. Third World military spending accounted for almost twenty percent of this spending. The great powers have 1.8 million soldiers stationed on foreign territory and in 70 developing countries. Arms import is responsible for 25% of the debt burden of developing countries, and that burden is rising. Parallel to these astronomical expenditures runs a long list of unmet human needs. 1.5 billion people have no effective medical care, 500 million are severely malnourished and 600 million are illiterate. The developed countries on average devote 5-4% of their GNP to military purposes and only .3% to development assistance.67 Money that is used for the production or purchase of armaments is money that is not available to vaccinate children against disease, to provide people with drinking water. It was reported that a WHO project to eradicate malaria, a scourge to many developing countries, was not moving ahead because of lack of funds. The estimated $450 million needed to complete the project is only half of what is spent each day for military purposes, and only one third the cost of a Trident nuclear submarine.68

67 Sivard: WMSE, 1985, p.5.
68 UN Group Consultant Experts, "Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race", in Pradip K. Gosh, op.cit., p.90.
Yet the opportunity costs of militarization cannot be calculated simply by estimating how many more hospitals, schools and roads could be built if financial resources could be diverted to them from military use. The effects are cumulative. In this connection Tames Szentes says:

Better social services improve workers' economic performance; the resulting increase in social productivity facilitates further development in education, public health, culture and services. Human skill, knowledge and creativity, if used for social development purposes, can multiply the growth rate of the very sources that satisfy human needs; at the same time higher satisfaction of such needs increases human creativity.68

All these facts and evidences trumpet the truth that militarization, which is widespread in different forms, seriously impedes development.

(d). Increases Dependency

Militarization deepens the dependency of the developing countries. This is because it is the military or dependance on the military, of that every militarised regime requires more and newer weapons for its armed forces, even

though these weapons may never be used. And because its country is a developing country, the regime cannot develop or produce the weapons its armed forces want. So it becomes more and more dependent on external supply. Another route to dependence is through military training programmes. Military training programmes do much more than teach military personnel how to use new weapons or how to instil discipline in the rank and file. "A Central objective", according to Miles D. Wolpin, is political indoctrination. Participants in military training, whether it is given by U.S or U.S.S.R, are inculcated with a particular ideology which, it is hoped, they will succeed in transplanting to the Third World.

Military assistance programmes and aid to the developing countries from the developed countries are always a trap to keep the developing countries under their foot. A clear example of this is evident from the Philippine experience. In exchange for U.S $500 million in military aid, the militarized regime of the Philippines assured the

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U.S government of "unhampered military operations involving its forces within the Philippines". It allowed the U.S military the right to "participate in security activities" and "contribute security forces" outside the base areas. The consequences of this kind of a dependence in the Philippine experience has been described by Jose W. Diokno as follows:

"These concessions give the United States blanket authority both to involve people in a nuclear war and to intervene in our internal affairs. Today, we Filipinos, live with a loaded gun pointed at our temple--and the finger on the trigger is not a Filipino finger."

Dependence characterizes the relations between the developing countries and the industrialized countries, especially the major world powers. Unequal degree of reliance on markets and sources of supply, and unequal ability of the members of a pair of states to influence each other, etc. create a climate of permanent dependence. Once political hegemony is established and used to structure

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73 Jose W. Diokno, op. cit.
a subordinate economic relationship, other societal areas become similarly dependent. 74

As a result of these different factors trends in the Third World, an aggravation of internal polarisation is a common scene in several countries. Increasing poverty and unemployment of the majority, growing affluence of a minority, growing foreign dependence, etc. are the processes whereby the minority gets structurally interlocked into transnational capitalism. The political tensions arising out of these phenomena may well be among the most important explanations for the growing number of repressive and authoritarian regimes that nowadays characterise the Third World.

CHAPTER III

MILITARIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia, stretching from Burma in the North west to the Philippines in the East, consists of ten countries - Burma, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia. Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. This spacious corner of the Asian continent extends more than 3,000 miles east to west and over 2,000 miles north to south. Its total land area is somewhat less than half that of the United States. Geographically speaking, Southeast Asia is situated in the monsoon belt and except for a small portion of Burma located between the tropics. However, nature has divided the land here as nowhere else in any of the Asian segments, effectively fractionalizing it into diverse social and political units, making the validity of a common approach to the entire region questionable.¹ Its people are fragmented ethnically, culturally, religiously, and linguistically; they are also divided politically.