Chapter 5
Comparative Analysis and Theoretical Arguments

Introduction
This chapter will look at the two case studies from a comparative perspective and try to understand them in light of the insights put forward by realist theory of international politics. The first section of the chapter will compare the following aspects of the two case studies: reasons for each states’ isolation, extent to which both the countries were isolated, various strategies used by the two states in responding to their besieged status, process of political normalisation of the two countries, and the subsequent normalisation of their defence industries. Section two of the chapter looks at the case studies from a realist theoretical perspective. In theorising the behaviour of Israel and South Africa, the latter section attempts to answer questions such as: What does the realist theory of international politics say about the two cases that have been examined here? What does the theory predict about the behaviour of two isolated and besieged states that managed to change their status? Can the theory at all make satisfactory predictions about the behaviour of the two countries which, as the two case studies have amply established, have a lot in common? Differently put, have the two countries behaved as per the theoretical expectations of realism?

Section I

Reasons for Isolation
South Africa was isolated by the international community due to the state policy of apartheid that it had enforced in the country. The isolation of South Africa was confined to a clearly identifiable timeframe. Its isolation began after the implementation of various apartheid policies such as ‘The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act’ (1949), the Immorality Act (1950), the Population Registration Act (1950) - which provided for the classification of every South African according to race, and the Group Areas Act (1950) -
demarcating separate residential areas for exclusive occupation by particular racial
groups.

It was in 1959 that South African Prime Minister HF Verwoerd introduced what became
known as the 'grand apartheid' (or separate development, in the official phraseology),
which was aimed at the racial division of the black people of South Africa from the white
community.

Under apartheid, South Africa was an unabashedly racist country that implemented the
above-mentioned laws in order to effectively implement racism, and used brute force to
enforce the country' racist policies. The South African state intended to establish and
enforce white supremacy in the country. While the White majority did fear for their
security, what dominated their minds was a sense of supremacy which was not born out
of a sense of self-preservation or a sense of security deficit. Indeed, apartheid was
ideological in nature, as far as the white supremacists were concerned.

On the contrary, an analysis of the reasons behind Israel's isolation in the international
community reveals that even though the UN declared Zionism to be a form of racism
(though it rescinded later), Zionism per se was neither a supremacist movement nor
particularly against any one community or the other. Encyclopedia Britannica describes
Zionism as a "Jewish nationalist movement that has had as its goal the creation and
support of a Jewish national state in Palestine, the ancient homeland of the Jews". Dan
Cohn-Sherbok writes that Zionism “grew out of the conviction that Jews would always
be victims of anti-Semitism and that the creation of a Jewish homeland was the only

These definitions show that this was an organized Jewish political movement in order to
gain strength of community against what they considered to be the forces of anti-
Semitism as well as to establish a homeland for themselves.
Israel has historically been an isolated nation even prior to its existence as a state. The Jewish state, ever since its inception in 1948, suffered almost the same kind of isolation and image that the Jewish community had suffered repeatedly throughout history, and most recently during the 1930 and 1940s. The low-point of Israeli isolation came when the Nazis under Adolf Hitler tried to exterminate them. Thus it may be said that unlike in the case of South Africa the Zionist movement was not a Jewish supremacist movement but was one that was born out of the need for self-preservation.

However, the Arab opposition to the modern state of Israel was essentially due to their loss of land to the Israelis. The Arab states and peoples, such as the Palestinians, have always felt that the Israelis have done injustice to them and have forcefully taken their land from them (and much of this sentiment is justified). The international community also thinks along the same lines. Israelis are also accused of forcefully acquiring more and more land from the Arab nations even after an Israeli state was given Palestine by the United Nations. Many accuse Israel of having wronged the Palestinian people.\(^\text{23}\)

Thus while the international community found South African racism unpardonable, inhuman, reprehensible and not befitting the standards of modern civilization, the Israeli wrongs were not considered in this way; the international community has been less quick to rebuke for the use of violence against Palestinians, annexing Arab and Palestinian territories, and not keeping with the various treaty obligations it made, or abiding by UN resolutions. Israeli policies were evaluated by the international community more in terms of the need to shun violence and maintain regional peace.

**Extent of Isolation**

This section compares the extent of isolation both the countries faced. The analysis shows that South Africa faced much more isolation by the international community than Israel.

\(^{23}\) For accounts of the Palestinian struggles in the face of the Jewish occupation of Israel see, Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal (2003), The Palestinian People: A History. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press
South Africa

The international community and the UN looked very unfavourably on the apartheid policies of South Africa. As pointed out in chapter two, the newly independent countries, who by then had become members of the world body, lent a great deal of activism to the global struggle against apartheid. The new superpower, the United States, was also clearly unhappy about South Africa’s racist policies. A UN convention declared apartheid a punishable crime against humanity (General Assembly Resolution 3068 (XXVIII), 30 November 1973). Prior to adopting the convention, the UNGA had used less hard measures, as well such as cautiously worded “requests”, “urgings” and “invitations” to South Africa to heed and respond to international opinion. Since persuasion was proving to be ineffective, the General Assembly resorted to coercion in 1961, requesting states to consider taking “separate and collective action” against South Africa. In November 1962 the UNGA passed its first economic sanctions against the state. Then the following year, the Security Council joined the move for punitive measures against South Africa by calling for an arms embargo” (Geldenhuys 1984: 206).

While it took time to reach, the UN convention may be seen as merely one of many forms of international pressure exerted on South Africa, apart from the forms of hard and soft diplomacy, such as “repeated verbal denunciations and exhortations, punitive measures such as mandatory arms embargo, and international support for organizations bent on effecting a political transformation in the republic through violent means” (Geldenhuys 1984: 205).

The UNSC also passed resolutions against apartheid. On 4 February 1972, the Security Council adopted resolution 311, condemning apartheid. The resolution recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa, called upon South Africa to release all those imprisoned as a result of apartheid, called upon all States to observe the arms embargo strictly (Mandatory Arms Embargo) against South Africa, and urged governments and individuals to contribute to UN funds to assist victims of apartheid, among other things.
The South African economy had generally been the target of the many restrictions that the international community had imposed on it. Direct economic repercussions of apartheid policies were experienced by South Africa again in 1976 after the Soweto Uprising. There were also high capital outflow from South Africa during the apartheid years.

Other than capital outflows, the UN and various countries had also restricted trade missions to South Africa during the apartheid years. Apart from the UNGA, the commonwealth countries have also proscribed government funding for trade missions to South Africa or for participation in exhibitions and trade fares in South Africa. Such measures have had a great deal of impact on South Africa’s economic growth as many countries desisted from trading with the apartheid South Africa.

Many international organizations, such as the ILO, ECOSOC, ITU, UPU, WMO, FAO, WHO, and UNCTAD suspended South Africa from their membership, which led to international isolation of the country. There were scarce official visits undertaken by other countries to South Africa.

South Africa had other reasons to be uneasy as well. Factors such as the imposition of the UN arms embargoes, South Africa’s military involvement in a number of regional conflicts, ever increasing political opposition at home, armed attacks by black guerrilla groups, and the Soviet threat were all problems for the apartheid government.

Israel

Israel’s isolation has been rooted, as pointed out earlier, in history. As Irving Louis Horowitz observed, when Israel was created a pariah people was transformed into a pariah nation (Horowitz 1976)24. The irony of Israel’s existence as a state is that despite

being a full-fledged member of the UN, many of its fellow members of the world body did not accept its statehood, or took a long time to do so.

The recognition of the PLO as legitimate and representative organization of the Palestinians by the international community, including the various international organizations like the UN, also contributed to the further isolation of the Israeli state.

It was not easy for Israel to gain UN membership in 1949 due to stiff opposition, principally from the Arab states. And even after Israel’s admission into the UN, this opposition against the Jewish state continued.

Perhaps the biggest blow to Israel came in the year 1975 when it branded Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination in Resolution 3379. In other words, the founding ideology of Israel came to be considered as indecent by the most important international body. Many other international bodies followed suit. In 1976, the Non-Aligned Conference in Colombo endorsed UN resolution 3379. By the late 1960s and early 1970s Zionism was widely considered to be a form of racism and its practitioners were considered international outcasts by the wider international community. The UN in 1973 also condemned the unholy alliance between South African racism and Israeli Zionism and the relationship between the two countries.

Many international bodies had excluded Israel from their membership. The Economic Commission for West Asia, an arm of the UN’s Economic and Social Council, did not have Israel as a member. Israel also was not a member of about nine caucusing groups, which included the Afro-Asian and Arab groups in the UNGA (Geldenhuys 1991: 178). Moreover, Juliana Geran Pilon writes that “from 1967 to 1972, about two dozen resolutions on the Middle East, nearly all rabidly anti-Israel, were adopted in the General Assembly” (Pilon 1983).
Even as Israel managed to sign a number of treaties with a variety of countries, we see a drop in Israeli treaty-making immediately following the various wars it fought against its Arab neighbours.

The isolation of Israel has to be seen in historical context and in recognition of the fact that Israel was born in the face of stiff opposition from the Arab world. Even though the surrounding Arab countries tried to invade the nascent Israeli state in 1948, Israel won the war. This led the Arabs to look for other means to isolate Israel and to make it an illegitimate state in the eyes of the international community. Thus they refused to recognize Israel and refused to have any economic or political dealings with it. In 1973 the Arab states managed to persuade the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to call for a diplomatic boycott of Israel with a majority of black states obliging. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) also decided to stop all economic cooperation with any country that has relations with Israel.

Indeed, even before the Israeli state came into existence, the Arab nations had begun boycotting them. After Israel's formation in 1948, the Arab League expanded the boycott in an effort to undermine Israel's economic survivability. In 1946, the Arab League Council formed a Permanent Boycott Committee and a Central Boycott Office in order to strengthen and coordinate their sanctions against Israel. Each participating state was also expected to open a national boycott office (Geldenhuys 1991: 301).

A cursory look at the diplomatic engagement of Israel with other countries, i.e., maintaining diplomatic missions, would show us that it had not managed to have missions in all countries it wanted to have presence in. Indeed, it took strenuous and long bargaining for the country to establish those engagements and the 1967 and 1973 wars had negative impact on its diplomatic presence abroad (Geldenhuys 1991: 136).

In 1957 Israel had only seven full-fledged embassies abroad, mostly in Europe and North America, though it had many more missions. In 1955 it was excluded from the Bandung Conference of non-aligned countries but it had diplomatic relations with about 32 African

Even though the Israeli state was not as isolated as South Africa, it appeared to feel more insecure than South Africa. Abba Eban once admitted: “For many years Israel was so starved for friendship that it had to look for it wherever it could be found” (Eban 1992: 544).

The above analysis makes one thing clear: South Africa faced much more isolation by the international community than Israel. Even though Israel was isolated by many international organizations and many actors of the international community, its isolation was not complete in any sense of the word. The western countries were sympathetic towards Israel due to their own guilt for not preventing the Holocaust. Anti-Semitism was no longer a welcome ideology in the West. Western sympathy towards Israel meant it decreased pressure on Israel and consequently, the Arab states found it extremely difficult to isolate Israel. Indeed, it was difficult for much of the international community to isolate Israel after its creation was approved by the UN. Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the Zionist leaders were also successful, to some extent, in selling the argument that the idea of Israel was the desire of a historically suffering and persecuted people for a homeland. It should also be noted again that Israel’s isolation increased during its wars against its Arab neighbours or when its military killed Palestinian civilians, and a lessening of its isolation was apparent in times of peace.

On the other hand, the above account shows that South Africa faced much more isolation than Israel ever did. No one seemed to have any sympathy for the white supremacist attitudes of South Africa and the cruel strategies it adopted for maintaining the apartheid order in the country. There were no takers for its ideology and unlike Israel, South Africa was not able to sell the rationale explaining its ideology to the rest of the world.
However, one could argue that the difference in the degree of isolation that the two countries faced did not correlate to their feelings of insecurity in exact measure. Israel was less isolated by the international community but was more insecure. Israel felt more insecure than South Africa because it was surrounded by countries that made no secret of the fact that they would remove Israel if they could and were evidently working towards that. In the case of South Africa, on the contrary, such an apparent and physical threat was not present: even as they feared physical security it was ideological opposition that South Africa felt threatened it the most from the international community. While Israel felt that its physical existence was threatened, South Africa felt that it was lonely and friendless in the international system and that it had to fend for itself.

Its besieged status made Israel a security state. The entire society, or most of it, had been told about threats to the Israeli state and nation, and told that if they were to survive, they would have to put their state before themselves. The moral exceptionalism argument was widely used to garner popular support for the state’s policies; Israelis believed they had extraordinary problems to confront and in order to do so had to take extraordinary steps.

The Israeli argument was a moral one which was accepted and abided by most of its citizenry. The Israeli leaders have been successful in forging an alliance between moral exceptionalism and national security exceptionalism. This is best seen in the words of Ben-Gurion:

We were always a small people, political as well as spiritual, always surrounded by big nations with who we engaged in a struggle, political as well as spiritual; that we created things that they did not accept; that we were exceptional...our survival-secret during these thousands of years...has one source: our supreme quality, our intellectual and moral advantage, which singles us out even today, as it did throughout the generations (from a speech on 10 November 1960, cited in Merom 1999: 411).

As a result, due to its focus on security matters and the legitimacy that the state drew from the people for its security related actions and decisions, Israel has been described as a garrison state, “in which military matters receive priority in both theory and
practice...Israeli army is the Israeli society and the Israeli society is the Israeli army” (Al-Qazzaz 1973: 144). The successful conversion of the moral argument into a security argument helped Israel in engaging in successful internal mobilization within the country.

South Africa, on the other hand, was not able to create such comprehensive societal awareness about the threats it faced for many reasons. It was primarily because of the inability of the ruling elite to make a successful moral argument about its apartheid policies. Of course, a large number of white South Africans were willing to support their government but that was not out of their unflinching belief in the supremacist ideology that the state presented before them, but due to the fact that the government of the day benefited them. A country that cannot make a successful moral argument in countering an enemy cannot counter such an enemy forcefully. Not only could the South African government not entirely convince its domestic population, it also could not manage to get any significant support for its policies from the international community and, as pointed out earlier, the external physical threats it faced were not extremely serious in nature. More importantly, while Israel had enemies outside the country, South Africa had ‘enemies’ within the country. Its policy of apartheid was of course, not accepted by its black population, who were in fact in majority. This lack of legitimacy and support was precarious and did eventually contribute to the apartheid government’s demise.

**Responding to besieged status**

Both Israel and South Africa adopted various methods to deal with their countries’ isolation and besieged status. One of the important decisions that South Africa took to deal with its besieged status was to internally balance: it chose the path of confrontation and started developing its defence industry aggressively.

Every time there was a major international sanction to isolate South Africa and make it more insecure, South Africa responded with more and more determination to strengthen its defence industry. Consider the following:
In 1967, the UN Security Council passed a resolution asking all states to stop supplying South Africa with arms. This was responded to by the South African government by sending its Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, to visit “armaments factories in Portugal and France as part of an in-depth investigation into various “models” for domestic arms production that South Africa might adopt. The French military-industrial system, with its high degree of integration between the public and private sectors, was then used as the model for South Africa’s domestic defence industry.” Then in the year 1968, a new state corporation, the Armaments Development and Production Corporation, or Armscor, was established in order to boost arms production in the country (Dunne 2006: 40).

Later, taking cognizance of the fact that the voluntary arms embargo against South Africa had not succeeded in curbing and strengthening the country’s arms industry, the UN imposed a mandatory arms embargo against it in 1977 (Resolution 418). To this, South Africa responded by merging the Armaments Board and the Armaments Development and Production Corporation to form the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (still Armscor) which was tasked with the responsibility for both procurement and production of armaments for the SADF (Dunne 2006: 40). As a result arms production increased.

While arms development was the most important strategy of securing itself that the South African government undertook, this aggressive development of its defence industry was also conceived of as part of a larger grand strategic approach adopted for the effective defense of the country. This larger official policystrategy was termed as the ‘total strategy’, which was conceived to mobilize all available resources of the countryeconomic, social, political, psychological, and military – in order to effectively fight what the South African regime perceived as a ‘total onslaught’ from internal, regional and international forces and to defend the apartheid system, and reassert white domination in South Africa (Biswas 2007: 20).
Dan Henk points out:

After 1975 the country’s leaders increasingly were convinced of their abandonment by the West in the face of a “total onslaught” by the communist world, spearheaded by proxies in newly independent African states. This conclusion was reinforced in 1976, when the country’s disenfranchised black majority rose up in a protracted period of violent unrest. The South African government responded with a “Total National Strategy” that relied heavily on coercive state agencies to maintain security at home and intimidate enemies abroad. Local scholars described the new strategy as “[operating] at economic and ideological levels, [affecting] every area of society, and [impinging] on the lives of all South Africans (2006: 4-5).

It was around the concept of total strategy that the South African arms industry evolved in the 1970s and 1980s. The defence industry proved to be increasingly adept at rapid research, production and the fielding of new technology, which came from a variety of sources. In the early apartheid years, some arms had been produced under license from European industries and later modified to suit unique local requirements. They also did not hesitate to “reverse-engineer” Soviet weaponry encountered in Angola; still more was covertly transferred from foreign sources in violation of the UN embargoes (Henk 2006: 5).

The apartheid-era development of the South African defence industry has been widely understood as a no-holds-barred affair. A Human Rights Watch report points out that many covert channels and transnational networks were used by the apartheid regime to smuggle in military technology for its infant defence industry. These channels were also used for South African weapons trade once domestic arms production started to exceed national requirements (HRW 2000).

Israel also adopted many measures in responding to its besieged status. The country greatly expanded the IDF and increased its stocks of military equipment in order to prepare itself for any eventuality.
‘Arms diplomacy’ was another of Israel’s external balancing strategies. For a country that was considered ‘untouchable’ by the international community and so isolated, Israel had to proactively seek allies in the international system. One of the friends-seeking strategies of Israel was to engage in what is called ‘arms diplomacy’ which has helped Israel gain ‘political and commercial’ access to at least some countries (Geldenhuys 1991: 493).

Israel also had an alliance with another isolated state, South Africa, as pointed out earlier. Indeed, it must be noted that it was South Africa that took the initiative in forging a relationship with Israel as the latter was uneasy about the implications of such a relationship. It is certain that both Israel and South Africa kept their relations secret in the 1950s and 1960s because South Africa was trying to formally develop ties with emerging African nations, South America and the Arab states (Hunter 1986: 54).

However, Israel’s search for security prompted by the acute security deficit it faced most prominently manifested in its quest for building up a strong domestic defence industry: a perfect act of internal balancing by a state that did not have many options to balance externally. As Lockwood asserts, “[t]he rapid expansion of Israel’s arms industry since 1967 offers one of the most striking refutations of the notion of a “defenseless Israel” (1972: 73). This exponential growth of the industry saw defence exports soaring to 10% of Israel’s gross exports in 1970” (Lockwood 1972: 73).

Fear of annihilation and being isolation in a hostile world were the key reasons for the aggressive development of the defence industry of Israel. As Inbar says the key motivation for the quick growth of the defence industry was the fear among Israeli decision makers that weapons needed for Israel’s security may not be available in the world market (Inbar 1996: 44).

Even during the 1973 war, Israel faced a situation of arms scarcity and thus felt the need to have a steady supply of arms, which led to increased production after the war. Gamson and Herzog write that “the sense of vulnerability and dependence was dramatically
reinforced by the 1973 Yom Kippur war, when the IDF came perilously close to running out of ammunition and needed to be urgently resupplied by the US" (1999: 259).

It was taking all these factors into consideration that caused the Israeli leadership to invest in making as much weapons as possible domestically. Indeed this was recognized even by the country’s first PM David Ben Gurion who “felt that the allies cannot be totally relied upon” and so there has to be an emphasis on self-reliance (Inbar 1996: 42).

In a sense even the nuclear option that Israel pursued was some kind of an insurance policy for a country which put most its premium on sheer survival: “The nuclear option was perceived as an insurance policy in case Israel lost its continental capacity or if Arab countries acquired nuclear weapons” (Inbar 1996: 44).

A comparison of the two countries responses to their besieged status shows that they behaved in similar ways. From deciding to develop nuclear weapons, to focusing on the aggressive development of their respective defence industries, to engaging in arms diplomacy to finding friendship in each other, they adopted similar strategies to respond to the isolation-induced insecurity imposed upon them by the international community.

Political Normalisation of South Africa and Israel
The next step of the analysis laid out in this thesis is the political normalisation phase of the two countries. This section looks at the process from a comparative perspective.

South Africa
The 1980s saw the beginning of political reforms in South Africa. There were overwhelming internal and external pressures to undertake these reforms, and when combined with economic pressures, the country effectively had no choice. International sanctions were intensified, and the UNGA adopted a resolution for comprehensive mandatory sanctions (UNGA Resolution dated 20 November 1987). This was followed by strong economic and trade restrictions on the country.
Under increasing isolation and punitive measures, South Africa decided to reassess its options. South Africa chose to ease out of a situation wherein it felt besieged by the rest of the world. To begin the reform process in the country, Botha was replaced by Frederik de Klerk in 1989 as prime minister. In fact, the Nationalist party contested elections in September 1989 with a proposal for a reform programme. They envisaged a new constitutional order with a bill of rights and a role for the African majority in the government. When this agenda was given mandate by the people, “President de Clerk declared his aim for a totally new and just constitutional disposition in which every inhabitant should enjoy equal rights, treatment and opportunity in every sphere of endeavour – constitutional, social and economic” (Biswas 2007: 27).

This was followed by the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and soon thereafter most of the rebel organizations were made legal. Moreover, restrictions on internal political organizations, imposed under the Public Safety Act of February 1988, were also removed (Biswas 2007: 27).

The besieged status of the country finally ended when Nelson Mandela was elected president in 1994 and the country has since taken up a radical transformation of its defence, foreign and security policy, which has had defining impact on its defence industry. South Africa’s normalisation process was smooth, quick and complete, leading to its absolute transformation consequent and readmission into the international community. Almost immediately, the country’s besieged status vanished, along with its insecurity. In short, in the case of South Africa, political normalisation led to the loss of its besieged status; it became a state that was no longer insecure.

Israel

While the South African example has been a story of smooth transformation from being insecure to being secure, the story of Israel’s political normalisation is more complicated.
The beginning of Israel’s political normalisation process started in the late 1970s when the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979 was signed at the behest of the United States.\textsuperscript{25}

In many ways the year 1979 was of great significance to the Israelis. The signing of the Camp David Accords was both dramatic and unprecedented. The peace process “dramatically lowered the chances for large-scale war with the neighbouring countries” (Inbar 2002: 31) and the Israelis started seeing light at the end of the tunnel of their isolation.

With the end of the Cold War, the stage was set for the re-induction of Israel into the international community.\textsuperscript{26} This process gathered further momentum in the early 1990s with the lack of Soviet involvement in the Middle East\textsuperscript{27}, the Madrid peace process and increased US involvement in the region due to the first Gulf War. Greater US involvement in the region and their desire to resolve its outstanding conflicts saw Washington bring the Syria, the Palestinians and Jordan to conference negotiations in the Spanish capital without any preconditions.

In November 1988, at its 19\textsuperscript{th} session, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) decided to accept UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) as the basis for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Resolution 242 guarantees the right of all states in the Middle East to live in peace within safe and recognized borders, and 338 calls on Arabs and Israelis to enact 242). “This decision was widely interpreted as an abandonment of the PLO’s goal of destroying Israel, and instead implied recognition of Israelis’ right of existence” (Geldenhuys 1991: 133).

Again in 1988, the PNC rejected terrorism in ‘all its forms’, even as it supported the intifada. This was praised by the international community and the UN. (Geldenhuys

\textsuperscript{25} For an excellent overview of the Arab-Israeli peace process since Camp David see, William B. Quandt, (ed.), (1986),\textit{The Middle East Ten Years After Camp David}, Brookings Institution Press, Washington

\textsuperscript{26} For more on this especially the increasing Israeli-European relations post-Cold War, see Efraim Karsh, Gregory S. Mahler (eds.) (1994), \textit{Israel at the crossroads: the challenge of peace}, British Academic Press


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There was also a relaxation in the general boycott against Israel by 1987 (Geldenhuys 1991: 305).

Soon after the 1991 Madrid Conference, countries such as Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Oman and Qatar established diplomatic relations with Israel (Inbar 2002: 27). It also led to a further decline of the Arab boycott and enabled Israel to have economic relations with some of the Arab countries.

Later the Oslo Accords, which were concluded 1993 in the presence of PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and U.S. President Bill Clinton, Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, created a Palestinian Authority that would have responsibility for the administration of the territory under its control. The Accords also called for the withdrawal of the IDF from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

The increasing normalisation of the Israeli state was being recognized by Israeli leaders as well. Rabin, in an address to the Knesset on 13 July 1992 said, “Israel is no longer a people that dwells alone” (Inbar 2008: 89). On 12 August 1993 in a speech to graduates of the National Security College, he argued that “the world is no longer against us... regard us today as a worthy and respectable address. On another occasion, “we live today in a period in which the threat to the very existence of Israel has been reduced” (cited in Mirsky 1992: 2).

In the 1990s Shimon Peres said that traditional Israeli approach of self-reliance is recalcitrant and that Israel should become proactive towards the various collaborative security arrangements in the Middle East. “He articulated a comprehensive security vision for Israel by proposing a Mideast security and development ‘superstructure’ covering issues such as arms control, nonaggression, economic cooperation, and human rights. His concept, which was initially aired in Washington in May 1994, is modeled
after the 1975 Helsinki accord and the conference on security ad cooperation in Europe (CSCE)” (Inbar 1996: 60).

Rabin, in response to Israel’s external strategic environment in 1992 said, “[w]e live today in a period in which the threat to the very existence of Israel has been reduced” (Inbar 1996: 46). In the opinion of Ezer Weizman, Israel’s then president, “Israel has never been as secure as it is in the 1990s” (Inbar 1996: 46).

Also significant was the impact and implication of UNGA Resolution 46/86 passed on December 16, 1991, revoking Resolution 3379 that had condemned Zionism as a form of racism.

However, it must be noted that the political normalisation process of Israel was never a fully accomplished project as the country never felt completely secure and safe from external threats. The normalisation that took place in Israel was partial because the country continued to face threats to its existence. The most significant event that underscored this sense of insecurity was the first Intifada, which took place even while the Israeli state thought it was heading towards normalcy. The Palestinian uprising against Israeli rule in the Palestinian Territories from 1987 to 1993, known as the first Intifada, involved tactics ranging from civil disobedience to violent resistance, to general strikes, to boycotts on Israeli products, to refusal to pay taxes, graffiti, and to barricades, and Palestinian demonstrations that included the (now famous) stone-throwing by youths against the IDF.

The Intifada was a mass uprising and therefore not controlled by the Palestinian leadership. It was unexpected by the Israelis and lowered the country’s prestige in the eyes of the international community. Palestinian opposition to Israel became a popular struggle that Israel found difficult to deal with (there was little Israel could do that was not perceived as a gross violation of the use of force when confronted by children throwing stones) and that greatly increased its insecurity.
Again in 1996 conflict visited Israel. Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement), Palestinian Islamic socio-political group, carried out a series of devastating suicide bombings in Israel; the country responded with a three-week bombardment of Lebanon. Israel now had to face a new threat – Hamas, which as a non-state militant entity would not hesitate to use terrorist acts on Israel.

In 2000, the second Intifada (also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada) began in reaction to Ariel Sharon’s visit to the al-Aqsa Mosque/Temple Mount in Jerusalem on 28 September. This was seen as a highly provocative action.

In 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected on a platform of a tougher policy towards attacks against Israel. It looked as if the Israeli electorate had become disillusioned about the land-for-peace formulas of the 1990s. Sharon started assassinating Palestinian militants, and authorized air strikes and incursions into Palestinian self-rule areas. Palestinian militants responded with increased suicide bomb attacks in Israeli cities.

Israel-Palestinian relations became worse in the year 2002. Palestinian militants carried out a number of attacks within Israel killing many Israelis. In retaliation, Israel kept Yasser Arafat in his Ramallah compound under house arrest for five weeks and reoccupied most of the West Bank. International criticism followed, with Amnesty International claiming that the Israeli army had committed war crimes in Jenin and Nablus, both in the West Bank.

The years that followed did not see a radical reduction in violence in the region nor in the Israel-Palestinian animosity. However, one of the key differences in the Israeli security situation between the 1960s and 1970s, 1990s and after 2000 was that with the peace process getting underway in the 1980s and the decades that followed, threats to Israel from Arab states drastically reduced.

In other words, what needs to be understood in the context of Israel’s political normalisation is the following: while the political normalisation process started in the
case of Israel from the 1980s or so, it was never fully achieved. The isolation of the Israeli state by the international community was reduced to a great extent though never comprehensively so. Many international bodies and members of the international community including Arab countries were willing to consider including Israel, but Israel still felt physically threatened by state and non-state actors in the region. This incomplete political normalisation, unlike as noted in the case of South Africa, also had its clear impact on the normalisation process within the Israeli defence industry.

Normalisation Process in the Defence Industry
As is expected by the study, political normalisation of the two countries (although partial in the case of Israel) also led to a normalisation process in the defence industry. Indeed, while the defence industry was affected in particular, the impact of de-securitisation was felt in the society and polity as a whole. The political and security rhetoric started changing and there was an urge to emphasize the need to de-securitize the policies of the state.

South Africa
Political normalisation led to an increased sense of security in Pretoria. As a result the country ordered its troops back home from Namibia and Angola in 1989, gave up its policy of military aggression and regional destabilization (e.g., covert support for UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique), started reaching out to other African states (Dunne 2006: 41), and began downsizing and diversifying its defence industry.

South Africa started radically redefining its notions of security, peace and stability and embarked on an ambitious programme to implement its new strategic direction. The political change was reflected clearly in the outlook and reactions of the security forces. Unlike previously when 'total security' was the guiding doctrine of South African security, the new emphasis of the government was on Non-Offensive Defense (NOD), which was to be more in keeping with the strategic environment of détente and cooperation within the region.
As Batchelor and Willet point out, the changes in South Africa's security environment, at both the material and ideational levels since the ending of apartheid, were accompanied by a series of political and institutional changes in the defence establishment. These included the restructuring of the department of defence, the establishment of a civilian defence secretariat and the formation of a parliamentary defence committee with constitutionally defined powers and functions (1998: 141).

Following the election of Nelson Mandela, the United Nations lifted the mandatory arms embargo in May 1994, thereby officially allowing South Africa to purchase armaments from foreign suppliers. The South African defence industry suddenly became a normal defence industry and was thereafter subjected to the commercial and financial pressures of a normal defence industry. There was sharp decline in domestic armament procurement expenditure that led to considerable downsizing within both the public and the private defence industrial sector.

The state's defence budget was reduced by over 40 per cent between 1989 and 1994, and defence procurement by about 60 per cent. Defence budget cuts severely affected employment in the sector which fell from 150,000 in 1989 to just over 70,000 in 1993, while the share of defence R&D as a proportion of the country's total R&D fell from 48 per cent to 18 per cent (Henk 2004: 14; Cilliers 2003: 138). Batchelor and Dunne write that research and development related to defense declined by nearly 70 per cent between 1989 and 1996 (an average of nearly 14 per cent per annum), while the share of R&D spending within the defence budget declined from nearly nine to five per cent (Batchelor and Dunne 1998). The procurement expenditure by the SADF also was reduced by over 60 per cent in real terms between 1989 and 1993 (Batchelor and Willet 1998: 736).

Since April 1994 the defence budget has been reduced further due to budgetary constraints and other spending priorities. Under a 'hands-off' policy by the government, the arms industry was forced to continue its market-driven strategy of down-sizing and restructuring in order to survive the impact of the decline in the domestic defence market. More importantly, the lifting of the UN arms embargo in 1994 and South Africa's
‘formal’ entry into the international community subjected the country’s arms industry to unprecedented levels of competition. This prompted the industry to pursue arms exports and international collaboration vigorously, with the result that South Africa’s defence industrial base has become increasingly internationalized (Batchelor and Willet 1998: 141).

Ultimately, the South African defence industry started behaving like any other defence industry. While the state stopped pumping large sums of money into it, President Mandela publicly defended South Africa’s arms industry and promoted its products on overseas trips because, of course, the industry had to seek export opportunities in order to survive. Batchelor and Willett note that the value of arms exports grew by an impressive 160 per cent (in real terms) between 1989 and 1993, rising in that period from a mere 0.3 per cent of total exports to 1.1 per cent (Henk 2004: 15). As was to be expected, the new regime under President Mandela became convinced of the economic benefits of the arms trade and then actively promoted it subject to broad policy guidelines (Batchelor and Willet 1998: 128).

Significantly, a large number of major weapons projects were cancelled or postponed, and obsolete and surplus military equipment was sold or destroyed, and the country’s nuclear weapons programme was terminated (Batchelor and Dunne 1998).

The government also issued orders to close down many of the arms industry’s facilities, like the Dorbyl shipyards in Durban, and those that remained in operation went through cycles of downsizing and rationalization (Botha 2003: 1). Not only were armed forces personnel laid off by the defence cuts and defence industry workers were affected as well. According to one estimate, almost 10000 personnel were laid off by Armscor and Denel between 1989 and 1993 (Batchelor and Willet 1998: 70-1).

At the same time, the private sector arms producers went through a series of rationalizations, downsizing and failures due to the sudden budget cuts in the defence sector.
In March 1993, de Klerk admitted to the parliament that South Africa had constructed six complete nuclear devices, and one incomplete device, between 1980 and 1989 and added that the nuclear weapons programme was abandoned in view of the normalisation of South Africa's international relations and a changed global political situation in which "a nuclear deterrent had become not only superfluous, but in fact an obstacle to the development of South Africa's international relations" (Batchelor and Willet 1998: 71).

The winding down of its nuclear programme was also due to the same reason that had prompted the country to make its defence industry less aggressive and inward looking: the reduction of its besieged status.

Israel

In response to the normalisation process that Israel went through, the defence-industrial sector too underwent transformation. The defence-industrial workforce in the country declined drastically "from 90,000 in the early 1980s to 40,000 in 1991, 24,000 in 1994 and down to 18,000-19,000 in mid-1996" (Shichor 1998: 75). Israel also started spending less and less on the defence industry. Its allocations to weapons R&D has come down. According to a report by Israel's state comptroller, R&D allocations were reduced by 43 per cent from 1986 to 1994 (Inbar 102: 2008).

Like a normal defence industry, in today's Israel defence firms can no longer count solely on domestic sales to the IDF due to budget constraints. This has given way to competition in the industry and the defence ministry encourages competition in order to obtain the lowest prices for defence articles from the industry (Vekstein 1999: 617). There is also competition today among defence firms to get external sources of funding and state-of-the-art technology (Vekstein 1999: 617).

Israel also, in the 1990s, started buying US military equipment, rather than buying it from its own defence firms, thereby undercutting domestic arms production. The Israeli defence industry has been warning that this will seriously compromise the local defence industry (Neuman 2006: 411-12).
Such instances have forced the industry to look for markets overseas and as a result export sales exceed domestic sales (with exports accounting for 80 per cent of their revenue), and the IDF has become a secondary customer for almost all IDIs (Neuman 2006: 431).

There are talks of more and more consolidation and privatization in the Israeli defence industry sector. There has been a trend among Israeli defence firms to consolidate or exit. They have particularly been adopting strategies such as downsizing, concentration and diversification in the order to survive in the newly competitive environment (Dvir et al. 1997: 434). As in the case of South Africa the defence industry started looking for ways and means to adjust to the new-found situation. Profits and competition became the new mantras of the Israeli defence industry.

However, unlike in the case of South African defence industry, the normalisation process of the Israeli defence industry has not been comprehensive. First of all, the Israeli nuclear programme was never laid to rest, whereas the South African state had given up its nuclear weapons programme in the early 1990s after its besieged status was done away with by the international community.

As pointed out earlier though, the Israeli state has failed to release its security-obsessed mindset. It still thinks that the external environment is unfavourable. Given the less than reassuring external environment, Israelis do not want to make a mistake vis-a-vis their defence/security calculations or be complacent about potential threats to its security. As Shalgi puts it Israel thinks that a strong defence industry is necessary because “keeping a strong security infrastructure provides indispensable deterrence capability, in a state that cannot afford even one single failure” (Shalgi 2003)

Thus, Israel’s defence budget and spending have not been drastically decreasing. Israel’s 2007 defence budget stood at NIS 33.15 billion (USD 7.7 billion) though it was NIS 33.54 (USD 7.8 billion) in 2006. However in 2008 it increased to NIS 51.3 billion which
represents about seven per cent of gross domestic product. However Israel's defence spending has reduced by 1.2 per cent since 2000, whereas Iran increased its defence spending by 25 per cent, Egypt by 28.8 per cent, and Syria by 37.7 per cent (Greenberg 2007).

At the same time, Israel's arms exports are increasing every year. It is today one of the top five arms exporters in the world with transfers totalling some US$4.5bn in the year 2006 (Israel Defense and Security Report Q1 2008).

What this demonstrates is that Israel's defence industry normalisation has been partial in comparison to the South African case. This can be attributed to the fact that while South Africa went through a complete political normalisation process and was thereafter readmitted into the international community which enabled it to shed its besieged status and security deficits, Israel did not go through a process of complete and total political normalisation. In other words, it is clear that Israel still feels somewhat besieged and insecure.

Section II

Theorising the Behaviour of Israel and South Africa

What does the realist theory of international politics say about the two cases that have been examined here? What does the theory predict about the behaviour of the two isolated and besieged states who later on went on to change their status (though one incompletely)? Can the theory at all make satisfactory predictions about the behaviour of the two countries which, as the two case studies have amply established, have a lot in common? Differently put, have the two countries behaved as per the theoretical expectation of realism? This section of the chapter will try to answer these questions.

Realism (more significantly neorealism) emphasizes the importance of the international system. The constraints of the international system induce states to behave in a particular
manner. In other words, state behaviour can, to a large extent, be understood as a response to the dynamics of the international system. Walt has suggested balance of threat behaviour – that is, states tend to balance threats that they face from the international system – rather than balance of power behaviour. The behaviour of South Africa and Israel make it abundantly clear that it was the ‘nature’ of the international system (vis-à-vis them) that prompted a certain kind of reaction: a strong desire to respond appropriately to the pressures imposed by the international system. The higher the levels of insecurity or threat that a country faces from the international system with no scope of external balancing to alleviate its insecurity, the more aggressive, proactive and focused is their response. Balance of threat theory would expect besieged, helpless and friendless states to use whatever means at their disposal to secure themselves: that is precisely what Israel and South Africa did. More so, their security focus underwent a transformation when the threats they faced from the international system also changed.

Realists (or once again specifically neorealists), also consider the concept of anarchy to be of great significance. While anarchy rules out the presence of an overarching power in the international system, neorealists argue that states do differ in terms of the power they possess although they do not differ in terms of their functions. An anarchical international system forces states to make decisions on the basis of a rational and objective understanding of the balance of power. Anarchy forces states to engage in strategies of ‘self-help’ in order to survive. The effect of anarchy would be even more grievous in the case of besieged states. Realism would therefore expect besieged states to fortify their defences and build up a strong defence sector in order to secure themselves if they would have the wherewithal to do so. Israel and South Africa operated in a scenario where they were both friendless and isolated but had the wherewithal to build up national defence industries. They clearly seemed to understand that self-help is the only way to survive in an anarchic international system; this is in keeping with the expectations of realism. They were also aware of the fact that in the balance of power configuration in their respective regions, they were faced with powerful enemies and therefore had to make themselves powerful enough to deter any attacks. This ‘realist’ understanding prompted them to
build up their defence industry in order to face the threats emanating from an anarchic world.

One of the most important claims that realists make is that states are in a perennial struggle for security and power. Classical realists argue that states aspire for power for the sake of power, whereas (defensive) neorealists argue that states seek power in order to be secure in an unfriendly and friendless international system. Thus neorealists would expect particularly insecure states such as Israel and South Africa to leave no stone unturned while seeking security in an unfavourable international system. However, when dealing with besieged states, there would be no difference in expectation between classical and neorealists because both would predict that besieged states would seek power. While ‘normal’ states would indulge in external balancing and coalition building, isolated states would not be in a position to do that. They would have to look for other ways to secure themselves. In the case of Israel and South Africa one could say that since both the countries were faced with a security deficit, their ultimate aim was to secure themselves in the unfriendly environment they found themselves in. Developing a strong defence industry was thought to be what the two states could do on their own to secure themselves.

A contrary argument would be that they were seeking more power to continue with their ‘atrocities’, against the black population and its neighbouring countries in the case of South Africa, and the Palestinians and Arab population in the case of the Israelis. Admitting that this is a very strong argument, I would argue that whatever may be the ‘root causes’ of the insecurity that Israel and South Africa faced, many of the aggressive policies of the two countries were products of the hostility they found themselves in the middle of. This hostility may or may not have been due to their own deeds, but both the countries suffered from extreme insecurity and this led them to take steps to alleviate their insecurity.

Neoclassical realism, a comparatively new realist variant, highlights the state’s leadership’s perception in analyzing the behaviour of a state. Zakaria (1992) and
Schweller (2003 and 2006) have pointed out that the perception of a country’s policy elite is very crucial in understanding how a state responds to the pressures imposed on it by the international system. It is clear that the perception of the policy elite and a coherence/consensus within the state elite on foreign policy issues will have a great deal of impact on the perception of such issues by the population of that state. The elite’s perception seems to have had a great deal of impact on South Africa and Israel’s citizens. The white population of South Africa was clearly swayed by the ‘total strategy’ tactics of South Africa’s white rulers and the society gradually developed a siege mentality. This was more so in the case of Israel. The political leaders and members of the ‘security network’ were successful in turning the Israeli state into a security state/garrison state. Israelis have always been told by their leaders that they were an isolated people and that they had to fend for themselves. The siege mentality that the Israeli society and people exhibited was visible to any observer. In sum, the Israeli elite’s perception became the perception of the people as a whole and such a perception contained feelings of insecurity, isolation and injustice. This prompted the country to respond to its ‘state of existence’ in a particular manner.

The security dilemma is considered to be an important concept in contemporary realist debates. Simply put, it means that any attempts made by a state in order to increase its security will cause the enemy state to act likewise, thereby decreasing its own security. In short, action taken by a state to increase its security leads it to even more insecurity. Every time the Israelis increased their capability, till about the 1980s or so, there was a jump in defence expenditure and arms accumulation by the Arab countries rendering Israel even more insecure. The more secure Israel tried to become by way of illegal arms acquisition, arms sales, nuclear weapon development, the more the international community and the Arab countries became antagonistic towards it and imposed stricter sanctions on it. This is true of the South African state as well.

Classical realism makes a distinction between satisfied powers and dissatisfied powers in international relations, a distinction later picked up on by some neoclassical realists. While E. H. Carr talked about “status quo” and “revisionist states”, Morgenthau wrote
about "imperialist" versus "status quo policies". Status quo policies favour preservation of the distribution of power as it exists at a particular moment in history, and imperialist policies aim to overthrow that status quo (Morgenthau 1948: 54). However, neorealists do not talk about revisionist states at all, which Schweller refers to as the status-quo bias of neorealism. Defensive neorealism cannot adequately account for the existence of revisionist states in the system.

In this context, classical realists and neoclassical realists would expect besieged states to be revisionist and non-status-quo states because such states are considered to be outcasts in the international system. They therefore are dissatisfied with and have no stakes in the prevailing international order. Since they are 'tormented' by the prevailing international order they attempt to overturn it, thereby becoming what theorists would call revisionist states. Having said this, it needs to be asked whether besieged and isolated states can be considered to be revisionist states. Perhaps they are in fact not trying to aggressively expand for exploits of war, but only trying to be secure in an unfriendly and antagonistic system: are they not underdogs trying to survive more than revisionist states trying to make profits from war and glory? However, it should be pointed out that if a revisionist state is understood to be one that is not a defender of the prevailing order, then besieged states trying to secure themselves against the norms of the existing order could be considered revisionist states.

Both Israel and South Africa can be considered 'dissatisfied' or revisionist powers. They worked against the norms of the international system as the prevailing international system did not suit them. The only way for them to get 'justice', in their understanding, was by working against the system or overcoming the constraints and pressures imposed by the system. They therefore tried to behave contrary to the norms and rules of the international system. In short, in (classical and neoclassical) realist understanding Israel and South Africa could be considered as revisionist states.

28 E H Carr talks about "have" powers and "have not" powers in the international system. According to him, international relations is a struggle between the powerful "have" states and the disadvantaged "have not" states (Carr 2001revised edition: 77).

Another important argument that realism puts forward in analyzing international politics is the tendency of states to balance. According to realism this is an intrinsic behaviour of all states in the system. Realism predicts that when a state competes for the relative power necessary for its security, there will be balance of power. Waltz maintains that when the following two requirements are met there will be balance of power: an anarchic international system and states wishing to survive therein (Waltz 1979: 121). Waltz argues that in international politics states balance in order to deter others from accumulating overwhelming power and thereby threaten others. In the Waltzian realist understanding, there are two ways states balance: external balancing and internal balancing. Internal balancing includes increasing one's economic capability, military size, developing the defence industry, and developing better military strategies. Waltz writes that "internal balancing is more reliable and precise than external balancing" (Waltz 1979: 168). Barry Posen, as well as neoclassical realists such as Schweller and Zakaria, have also talked about internal balancing.

In short, balancing is a normal behaviour of states in a realist framework; all states balance in an anarchic international environment. If all states are programmed to balance in the international system for their security, what would realists expect particularly insecure states to do? What would realists expect besieged states, which have few avenues to initiate or sustain alliances (external balances), to do in such an eventuality? Realists would expect states that have no avenues to engage in external balancing to engage in internal balancing even more vigorously than other states. The case studies of Israel and South Africa have amply displayed this fact: both the besieged states could not find 'reliable' external allies and so they decided to engage in internal balancing. Indeed, both the countries focused on the quick development of their defence industries in order to alleviate the insecurity they faced from external sources. Self reliance in arms was the catchphrase for both countries along with attempts (success in the case of one) at the development of nuclear weapons. However, both the countries became normal (one fully

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and the other to a lesser extent) states after the international community accepted them into their fold. Consequently, their focus on internal balancing radically shifted. Their defence industries became typical and they started behaving like any other usual state. It would be possible to extrapolate, within the general realist framework, that if besieged states with no scope for external balancing engage in internal balancing, the very same states would cease their exclusive focus on internal balancing, and start engaging in external balancing, should such states become normalised. Such changes in state behaviour are expected within the realist framework.

One could also use Walt’s balance of threat theory within the realist school to explain the behaviour of Israel and South Africa. These countries were not merely responding to the power that the opposing countries had, but the threats that they faced from their opponents power: South Africa and Israel were not merely responding to an international situation where there were powerful but neutral states in the system; they were balancing (internally) against the threat that they faced from such states.

Neoclassical realism predicts that states, when abandoned by their big power patrons, engage in internal balancing. In the case of Israel, the Israelis clearly felt that they were occasionally abandoned by their big power patrons from such as France, the UK and even the US. Such abandonment prompted Israel to choose the path of internal balancing.

Yet another significant realist concept in understanding the behaviour of South Africa and Israel is the internal mobilization capability, or the resource extraction capability of the state. Both the classical realists as well as the neoclassical realists have focused on the state’s ability (or inability) to extract and mobilize domestic resources for the successful conduct of a state’s foreign policy. In this context Carr wrote: “Power over opinion is therefore not less essential for political purposes than military and economic power, and has always been closely associated with them. The art of persuasion has always been a necessary part of the equipment of a political leader” (1945: 132). The assumption is that states vary in their capacity to extract and mobilize domestic resources, which reflects upon their ability to achieve the foreign policy ends that they wish to. Neoclassical
realism also throws light on the resource extraction capability of the state. What does this mean for the behaviour of the two states under study?

Both the besieged states under study have shown a considerable amount of domestic extraction capability. Israel, for example, was always successful in making sure that the state's policies, decisions and opinions were well received by the people as a whole. More importantly, as a state so particular about security and defence, Israel was able to, without any domestic opposition, mobilize human, material and ideological resources in support of whatever foreign and defence policy goals it was pursuing. Interestingly, the extraction capability of the Israeli state grew when it was more insecure and became less with the reduction in the besieged status of the country. South Africa performed similarly, though not to the same extent as Israel, due to the fact that South Africa had strong domestic opposition from the black community. Moreover, as pointed out earlier, South Africa was not able to make a convincing moral argument about the policies it was following. Even though the majority of the white population in South Africa stood behind the apartheid government, it was not possible for the government to garner complete moral, material and political support for its policies. Therefore its policies were seriously hampered.

In sum, what this analysis argues is that particularly besieged states with no reliable external allies would engage in internal balancing and this is well established in the realist literature. Theoretically, perhaps, the question that should be asked is whether Israel and South Africa acted out of a desire to dominate, to balance and to maintain the status quo, out of fear, or simply due to the domestic forces in operation. The answer seems to be that it is fear and insecurity, not belligerence or a desire to dominate, that prompted the behaviour of these two countries.