Chapter One

Introduction
The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) eunuch Admiral Zheng He carried out seven expeditions in the period 1407-1433. Some of these expeditions ventured as far as the Indian Ocean and Africa. During these expeditions there were at least three naval engagements, including a Chinese naval attack on Ceylon in 1411. As a result of these expeditions the Ming dynasty established several maritime ‘vassal’ and tribute paying states. These included Hormuz, Ceylon, Malacca, Java and Champa (Ptak 1998: 24, 28-29, cited in Kondapalli 2000: 81). In 1424 a scholar-official named Hsia Yuan-Chi (Xia Yuanji) urged Emperor Jen Tsung (Ren Zong) to cancel all missions to foreign countries and stop building sea-going ships. Emperor Jen Tsung died before he could act on this suggestion, and the next emperor dispatched Zheng He on yet another voyage. But this emperor too died shortly thereafter, and his successors followed Hsia Yuan-Chi’s advice. At some point between 1465 and 1487 other scholar-officials burned the reports which Zheng He had made after his voyages (Needham et al. 1971: 524, 525, cited in Kane 2002: 28). By the end of the 15th century an inward looking continental focus emerged in China which was further reinforced by the expansion of European, Russian and Japanese empires. Although during the Qing and Nationalist eras substantial efforts were made to revive China’s naval power, these were not successful in preventing the expansion of the other empires at China’s expense. After the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949, till the late 1970s, China’s naval strategy was limited to coastal defence (jinhai fangyu) (see Kondapalli 2001: xvii-xix, 6).

In the late 1970s and through the 1980s, a new recognition of the importance of maritime affairs began to emerge in China. A key turning-point in this regard was the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) decision in 1978 to ‘open-up’ China’s economy. As Ni Lexiong (2005: 1) has remarked,

“when a nation embarks upon a process of shifting from an ‘inward leaning economy’ to an ‘outward leaning economy’, the arena of national security concerns begin to move to the oceans...in recent decades as the overseas trade sections in [China’s] national economy have grown bigger and bigger, the question of a ‘life line at sea’ has become more and more important.”
As You Ji (2008: 48) has put it, "the Chinese sense of ocean (haiyang yishi), which had been buried by the country’s continental mentality since the end of Zheng He’s voyages 600 years ago, has been greatly strengthened since the 1980s."

On February 13 1987 Admiral Liu Huaqing and Commissar Li Yaowen co-signed a doctrine entitled ‘On the Question of Establishing the Naval Strategy’ (Guanyu mingque haijun zhanlie de wenti) and formally submitted it to the Central Military Commission (CMC) for approval. This doctrine outlined a long-term development programme with ‘blue water’ (lanhai) capability and power projection in the high seas as its ultimate goal, and it continues to be influential in China’s naval development. It envisioned that by 2000 the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) would acquire ‘sea control’ capability within China’s adjacent waters (from Bohai Sea to Yellow Sea and some areas of the East China Sea), and a ‘sea denial’ capability within the ‘first island chain’ in the West Pacific between 2010-2020. By 2050 it aimed to make the PLA-N a powerful regional navy with a global reach (You Ji 2008: 47). Along with You Ji (2008), scholars of China’s navy, such as Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang (1994), Srikanth Kondapalli (2001), and Xu Qi (2006), often refer to two ‘island chains’, a strategic geopolitical construct that is also attributed to Admiral Liu Huaqing. It is important to note that there are at least two differing depictions of the ‘two island chains’ construct. According to John Downing (1996: 130, cited in Kondapalli 2001: 3), the ‘first island chain’ (diyi daolian) encompasses areas from Vladivostok in the north to the Strait of Malacca in the south, and includes Japan (Ryukus islands), the Philippines and the South China Sea, and the ‘second island chain’ (dier daolian) encompasses the Kurils in the north, and the Bonin and Mariana islands, and Papua New Guinea in the south. According to Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein (Xu Qi 2006: 57, translator’s note 11) the ‘first island chain’ is formed by Japan and its southern and northern archipelagos, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Greater Sunda Islands, and the ‘second island chain’ runs from the Japanese archipelago southward to Bonin and Mariana islands (including Guam) and finally to the Palau group of islands. In Map 1.1 (see p. 4), cited by Kondapalli, the northern terminus of the ‘first island chain’ is the Kamakchatka Peninsula, and the perforated line enclosing it is drawn to the east of
Map 1.1: China’s Island Chains (I)

Map 1.2: China’s Island Chains (II)

Sakhalin, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, so that the southern terminus falls east of Sulawesi (Celebes). It is important to point out here that even though in Kondapalli's citation of Downing referred to above, the 'second island chain' is said to encompass the Kuril Islands, the map (Map 1.1) cited by Kondapalli puts the Kuril Islands within the perforated line encompassing the 'first island chain'. Map 1.2 (see p. 5), which is of a smaller cross-section but on a larger scale, cited by Erickson and Goldstein, does not include the area north of Sakhalin, and the perforated line enclosing the 'first island chain' is drawn just east of Sakhalin, but west of the Kuril Islands, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, and its southern terminus falls east of Borneo. That is to say, in Map 1.2 the Kuril Islands are not a part of the ‘first island chain’. In Map 1.1 the northern terminus of the ‘second island chain’ is the Aleutian Islands, and the perforated line enclosing it falls east of Irian Jaya and Papua New Guinea, and its southern terminus falls east of Australia. In Map 1.2, the frame of reference does not include the area south of northern Australia, and the southern terminus of the perforated line enclosing the ‘second island chain’ falls west of Irian Jaya and Papua New Guinea. Thus, the crucial difference to note is that Map 1.1 constructs the two ‘island chains’ at a greater distance from China's coastline than does Map 1.2. Apart from the difference in scale between the two maps, it should also be pointed out that Map 1.1 is taken from a Taiwanese source published in 1995, and that Map 1.2 is based on a Chinese source published in 1989. According to Erickson and Goldstein, Chinese analysts view the 'island chains' either as benchmarks of China’s progress in maritime force projection, or as fortified barriers that China must continue to penetrate to achieve freedom of maneuver in the maritime realm. However, they also point out that that neither the PLA-N nor any other organization of the PRC government has publicly made the ‘island chains’ an integral part of official policy or defined their precise scope.

John W. Garver (2006: 1-2) has argued that the post-1978 developmental success of eastern China had much to do with its coastal position. The harbour cities along China’s east coast, with a historical experience of maritime commerce, were able to trade swiftly, economically and globally via oceanic lanes. Once harbour and transportation infrastructure had been substantially upgraded, this easy access to global markets was
helpful in attracting foreign investment in manufacturing facilities in China. Western China however is separated from the sea by thousands of kilometers of land. According to him currently a major effort is underway to develop transportation networks linking western China to the oceans through Central, Southwest and South Asia with the use of modern transportation technology. Hu Shisheng (2004: 310-11) has pointed out that in 2001 the foreign trade volume of China’s western provinces was US$ 15.29 billion, which accounted for 3.3% of China’s total foreign trade volume, and that in 2002 their share of the total foreign trade rose to 4%. He argues that since many of China’s western provinces are adjacent to South Asia, with the improvement of basic infrastructure and services, such as transportation, shipping and other tertiary trades, South Asia can provide transit trade routes to international markets for commodities produced in China’s western provinces. One such route to international markets is through Pakistan and the Arabian Sea. Another is through Myanmar (formerly Burma) and the Bay of Bengal. Yet another possible route is through Nepal, India and the Bay of Bengal. The route through Nepal and India is through extremely difficult terrain and cannot afford too much traffic. In his view for China’s western provinces these routes, particularly the ones through Pakistan-Arabian Sea and Myanmar-Bay of Bengal are more economical, efficient and safe than the South China Sea-Malacca Straits route.

Garver (2001: 275-276) has also noted that by 1993 foreign trade constituted 33% of China’s GDP, out of which 85% was seaborne. At the start of the 21st century about 9% of China’s total foreign trade passed through the Indian Ocean. This included China’s petroleum imports from the Middle East and capital goods imports from Europe. According to Hu Shisheng (2004: 313) in 2001 China’s total foreign trade volume was US$ 509.8 billion, and in 2002 it was US$ 623.8 billion. Thus China’s total foreign trade volume increased by 22% from 2001 to 2002. Many of China’s trade partners are linked with it by sea. Among China’s sea trade routes the one through the South China Sea-Malacca Straits is one of the busiest. Between January and October 2002 44.8% of China’s total foreign trade volume went through the Malacca Strait. China started to import petroleum in 1993. Since then the annual increase in oil consumption has been 7.3%, while the annual increase in domestic oil production has been 1.7%. In 2001 China
imported over 60 million tons of oil, while in 2002 it imported 71 million tons, meaning that from 2001 to 2002 its oil imports increased by about 15%. A main source of China's imported oil is the Persian/Arabian Gulf region. In 2002 50% of China's oil imports came from this region. Christopher J. Pehrson (2006: 4-7) has noted that in 2006 coal accounted for 70%, oil for 25%, natural gas for 3%, nuclear power, hydro-electric power and other sources for the remaining 2% of China's total energy requirement. Oil consumption is expected to increase at an annual rate of 5.8% for the next ten years. In 2004 China surpassed Japan to become the second largest oil importer in the world. Around 40% of all new oil demand in the world is attributable to China. He goes on to point out that in 2004 Saudi Arabia, Oman and Iran in the Middle East/West Asia supplied 14%, 13.3% and 10.8% respectively of China's total crude oil imports, and that Angola, Sudan and Congo in Africa supplied 13.2%, 4.7% and 3.9% respectively of the same (see Table 1.1). All together more than 70% of China's total crude oil imports in 2004 were from the Middle East and Africa. According to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission's Report to Congress (2008: 187), in 2006 Angola became the largest supplier of crude oil to China, with Saudi Arabia as the second largest. The Middle East and Africa supplied 44% and 32% of China's total crude oil imports respectively. Thus 76% of China's total crude oil imports in 2006 were from the Middle East and Africa (see Chart 1.2). All of this had to be transported by sea, particularly through the Malacca Straits. Pehrson goes on to note that China's energy projects in Central Asia, such as the agreements to develop oil and gas fields in Kazakstan and to construct pipelines in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, have proven expensive, logistically difficult and complicated by inadequate infrastructure in western China. The deal negotiated by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) with Russia's Yukos in 2003 had come apart when the Russian government dismantled Yukos and accepted a higher bid from Japan. Thus China's success in developing reliable oil or gas pipelines from Russia and Central Asia has so far been limited. Therefore in Pehrson's view China has become heavily dependent on Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) through the

1 First, the two phrases 'sea lines of communication' and 'sea lanes of communication' are both often abbreviated to the acronym 'SLOC'. For the latter usage see You Ji (2008: 47) and Haider (2006: 24), cited in chapter four. The term 'line' indicates the shortest possible distance between two points, while the term 'lane' indicates a transport route. Since the functional referent of both 'lane' and 'communication' in this
Table 1.1: China's Crude Oil Imports from the Top Three Suppliers in the Middle East/ West Asia and the Top Three Suppliers in Africa during 2004 as a Percentage of China's Total Crude Oil Imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Supply</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


context is transport, the term 'communication' in the phrase 'sea lanes of communication' is rendered redundant. Therefore it is possible to argue that the correct usage would be 'sea lines of communication' and 'sea lanes'. Hence the acronym 'SLOC' should denote only the abbreviation of the phrase 'sea lines of communication'. Secondly, SLOC refers to one's own 'lines of communication' at sea, that is to say a nation's, an alliance's or a coalition's 'lines of communication' at sea. Therefore while it may make sense to refer to the security of one's own SLOC, it does not make sense to refer to regional SLOC security, or international SLOC security, unless this involves a separation of one's own SLOC from those of others, and the according of recognition to each other's SLOC, in a particular region, or among two or more nations, alliances or coalitions. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that one can refer to a nation's, an alliance's or a coalition's 'sea lanes' (see for example Z. Wenmu 1988, as cited in Swaran Singh 2000: 74, and Garver 2001: 295, both referred to in chapter four). That is to say, while the phrase 'sea lines of communication' is applicable only in a limited context, the phrase 'sea lanes' is more broadly applicable. This is perhaps what makes it possible for the two phrases 'sea lines of communication' and 'sea lanes' to be used interchangeably (see for example Garver 2001: 275). Thirdly, it is important to keep in mind that a 'sea line of communication' on a map represents a 'sea lane' in the real world. See the section 'Sea Lines of Communication' in chapter two for further elaboration.
Chart 1.2: China’s Crude Oil Imports by Region and Country in 2006

Strait of Malacca and other chokepoints for importing oil from the Middle East and Africa. Not only is South Asia located in proximity to the middle segment of China's SLOC between the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca, it also offers alternatives to the Malacca Strait transit route.

You Ji (2008: 46-47) has noted that in 1999 the Communist Party of China took a crucial decision on accelerating the preparation for war. This decision was partly based on its perception of threat emanating from what has been called the ‘one point’ and ‘one lane’. The ‘one point’ refers to Taiwan’s tilt towards de jure independence, and ‘one lane’ refers to the sea route taken by Chinese oil tankers coming home from the Middle East and elsewhere. He argues that the Hormuz and Malacca Straits are seen as posing the most strategic challenge to the security of China’s oil supply and transportation, and that the Indian Ocean is the most important section of this lane, as indicated by President Hu Jintao’s concern about the ‘Malacca Strait dilemma’. According to him this issue of the ‘Malacca Strait dilemma’, and the need for measures to cope with it, was raised by President Hu Jintao at an enlarged meeting of China’s Central Military Commission in December 2003. In 2006 the PLA had held an international conference on energy security, with President Hu receiving the foreign delegates, which indicated the level of China’s worry over this dilemma. In You Ji’s view the ‘one lane’ challenge will lead to readjustment of China’s maritime strategy, in which naval modernization had been hitherto directly linked to the ‘one point’ Taiwan scenario, and the ‘one lane’ challenge will also affect the PLA-N’s force structure, weapons equipment and combat principles. He believes that the Indian Ocean is crucial to the PLA’s efforts to deal with it. Moreover, as pointed out by both Hu Shisheng (2004: 313-314) and Kondapalli (2007: 32-33) the Malacca Strait, Southeast Asian waters, and the Bay of Bengal are also notorious for incidents of piracy.

According to Pehrson (2006: 3-4, 8-9) the phrase ‘string of pearls’ was first used to describe China’s emerging maritime strategy in a report entitled ‘Energy Futures in Asia’ by defence contractor Booze-Allen-Hamilton. This report was commissioned by the Office of Net Assessment of the US Department of Defense in 2005. The ‘string of
pearls' extends from the coast of mainland China, through the littorals of the South China Sea, the Straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean, to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. The specific pearls in the string consists of: Hainan Island with recently upgraded military facilities; an upgraded airstrip on Woody Island in the Paracel archipelago; the proposed container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh; the deep water port under construction in Sittwe, Myanmar; and the naval base under construction in Gwadar, Pakistan (see Map 1.3). Port and airfield construction projects, diplomatic ties and force modernization form the essence of China’s ‘string of pearls’. It is thought that it could enable China to establish a ‘forward presence’ along the SLOC that connect it to the Middle East. However, Pehrson also points out that the ‘string of pearls’ may not be an explicit strategy of China’s central government, but rather a term applied by some in the United States to describe a specific aspect of China’s foreign policy. Therefore one could argue that the ‘string of pearls’, like the ‘two island chains’, is also a strategic geopolitical construct. Pehrson argues that while China may not have the same perception of its policy as does the United States, economic benefits of relations with China and China’s diplomatic rhetoric have been an enticement for countries to facilitate China’s strategic ambitions in the region. He also argues that in Asia the United States has been facilitating freedom of navigation on the high seas, and that the ‘string of pearls’ raises the question, will China let the United States continue fulfilling this role or will it attempt to assert its own primacy in the region? According to Avery Goldstein (2005: 12-13, cited in Pehrson 2006: 8-9) ‘peaceful development’ was a strategy adopted by China in the mid-1990s to enable it to pursue economic growth and modernization and at the same time reduce the risk of other nations perceiving China as a threat. Pehrson goes on to argue that while on the one hand the ‘string of pearls’ may support ‘peaceful development’ and may be a measured and prudent hedging strategy, on the other hand it could also be the beginning of a bid for regional dominance. However, one must point out here that in comparison with the ‘two island chains’ construct, the creation of the ‘string of pearls’ construct is not even attributable to unofficial Chinese sources, and that it has originated as a part of America’s perception of China’s maritime strategy. Gurmeet Kanwal (1999, cited in Garver 2001: 31) has argued that, while China professes a policy of peace and friendliness toward India, its deeds clearly indicate that concentrated efforts
Map 1.3: China’s String of Pearls

Source: Pehrson (2006: 3).
have been underway for the last several decades aimed at the ‘strategic encirclement’ of India through efforts to create a string of anti-Indian influence around India through military and economic assistance programmes to neighbourly countries, combined with complementary diplomacy. Garver (2001: 31) goes on to argue that while one should not necessarily accept the proposition that China is motivated by the strategic calculations attributed to it by Kanwal, one can accept this view as representing Indian perceptions. One may qualify Garver by pointing out that the notion of ‘strategic encirclement’ is a strategic geopolitical construct, like the ‘island chains’ and the ‘string of pearls’, applied by scholars such as Kanwal to China’s relations with South Asia. C. Arasakumar (2006: 61-62) points out that China’s effort to gain a strategic foothold in India’s neighbourhood in the Indian Ocean includes seeking naval and commercial facilities in Bangladesh, building naval bases and electronic intelligence gathering facilities at Great Coco Island off the coast of Myanmar, the funding of a canal across the Kra Isthmus, and the development of the strategically important port at Gwadar, Pakistan. According to him India views this as an ‘encirclement’, and it has been periodically expressing its concern to its smaller neighbouring countries regarding their military security ties with China. C. Raja Mohan (2006: 50) points out that the expansion of China’s maritime profile in the Indian Ocean is apparent from what we see in relation to what is called the ‘string of pearls’ strategy. Hence it would seem that there is an overlap between the American construct of the ‘string of pearls’ and the Indian one of ‘encirclement’. Given China’s involvement in the Hambantota port development project in the Southern Province of Sri Lanka, Mohan and Nuwan Peiris (2007) have added Hambantota as well to the ‘string of pearls’.

According to Sam Bateman, China has come to be the focus of much of the strategic rivalry in the Asia Pacific, with other regional powers moving to contain the strategic rise of China. These moves are most evident in the maritime domain. They are apparent in attempts to create a trilateral naval coalition in Northeast Asia involving Japan, South Korea and the United States, and in the US proposal for a multilateral security relationship between the US and its main Pacific allies, Australia, South Korea and Japan. They are also suggested by Japan’s proposal for anti-piracy patrols in the
South China Sea and involvement in expanded multilateral exercises COBRA Gold conducted in Southeast Asia, as well as by the annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises between the US Navy (USN) and the Southeast Asian navies. Similarly, Indian naval activities, such as naval ship visits and exercises east of Singapore suggest the ‘maritime containment’ of China. However these attempts to contain the rise of China are, as Bateman puts it, a little like King Canute trying to hold back the rising tide. There is some inevitability in the rise of China’s strategic power and influence. The US, and particularly the US in close alliance with Japan, cannot assume that East Asian countries (other than Japan itself) will support attempts to contain China. These countries are well aware of geo-strategic realities, and may at least ‘sit on the fence’ if not move into the Chinese ‘camp’. The countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)- Burma, Malaysia and Thailand in particular- have a pragmatic view of China and are unlikely to be part of a containment process. With the prospects for closer economic and trade links between ASEAN and China, there are indications of an acceptance, at least in Southeast Asia, of China as the dominant Asian power. From a Chinese perspective, efforts to contain China are threatening and justify increased military expenditure, particularly naval. Bateman goes on to argue that there can be four levels of regional maritime security cooperation: 1) alliances, 2) coalitions, 3) non-coalitional naval cooperation, and 4) maritime cooperation. The different levels of cooperation are not mutually exclusive and some types of activity might overlap different levels. The first two levels, alliances and coalitions, constitute a higher tier of maritime security cooperation involving some degree of political commitment. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the prime example of an alliance. Examples of alliances in the Asia Pacific are the bilateral alliances between the US and Japan/South Korea/Australia. Examples of formal coalitions are the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) involving Australia, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, Singapore and New Zealand, and the US commitments to the external security of Thailand and the Philippines. At times however naval operations may be conducted by a coalition of nations on an ad hoc basis, such as the UN INTERFET operation in East Timor and those conducted as part of the ‘war on terrorism’. Naval peacekeeping operations are a particular example of ad hoc coalition operations. The lower tier of maritime security
cooperation, non-coalitional naval cooperation and maritime cooperation, encompasses cooperative activities between countries which do not necessarily share any specific common political or strategic objective other than a common interest in confidence building, preventive diplomacy, and law and order at sea. Such cooperation is likely to focus on non-controversial issues, including basic interoperability requirements to facilitate cooperation on activities such as search and rescue, and humanitarian relief. The Western Pacific Naval symposium is a leading example of non-coalitional naval cooperation. Maritime cooperation encompasses any cooperative activity associated with an interest in the sea, the protection of the marine environment, or a use of the sea or its resources. The objectives of maritime cooperation are twofold: 1) to provide a 'building block' for regional stability by easing tensions and reducing the risk of conflict at sea; and 2) to help promote a 'stable maritime regime', ensuring the free movement of seaborne trade and enabling nations to pursue their maritime interests and exploit their marine resources in accordance with agreed principles of international law. Track I regional arrangements that provide possible frameworks for maritime security cooperation are the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the organization for Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation (IOMAC), the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Seaborne trade, the protection of shipping and the security of SLOC stand out as common interests of countries in Southeast and Southwest Asia, and they might provide a bridge between the two regions and lead to maritime security cooperation becoming more of a reality. International maritime commerce is the classic multilateral maritime security interest. Historically, as with convoy operations in the two World Wars, the development of NATO maritime doctrine, and arrangements for the Naval Control of Shipping (NCS), it has provided the fundamental rationale for multinational naval cooperation. The Pacific and Indian Oceans' Shipping Working Group (PACIOSWG) is an existing arrangement to promote common doctrine and procedures for the naval control of shipping in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The core membership of PACIOSWG comprises Australia, Canada, the UK and the US. Chile and South Korea joined in 1989 as observers, and France has been an occasional participant.
There may be potential for extending the membership of PACIOWG. Track II forums have utility for establishing maritime security frameworks by spreading awareness of problems and have the potential to identify solutions that may be too sensitive or embryonic for consideration at the Track I level. Notable Track II maritime security forums are the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), the biennial international SLOC conferences, and the annual workshops on the South China Sea. A particular problem with the higher tier of maritime security cooperation— alliances and coalitions— is that they risk sending the wrong message through implications of exclusiveness. China has high sensitivity towards potential security cooperation involving the US, Japan and South Korea. Therefore Bateman argues that the focus should be on inclusive multilateral maritime security frameworks rather than exclusive ones, that is to say on the lower tier of maritime security cooperation— non-coalitional naval cooperation and maritime cooperation— rather than on alliances and coalitions, with the exception of ad hoc coalitions for peacekeeping. He also argues that there is a particular need to pursue cooperative relations with China, and to make clear that strategies of containment and exclusion have no place in policies towards China.

This thesis seeks to examine China’s maritime relations with South Asia since it adopted its policy of ‘opening up to the outside world’ in 1978. The objectives are, first, to identify the place occupied by the Indian Ocean and South Asia in China’s maritime strategy, and secondly, to identify the appropriate means of dealing with the global and regional maritime security concerns regarding China’s maritime strategy as far as the Indian Ocean and South Asia are concerned. Specifically, the research questions of the thesis are as follows,

- What are the components of an appropriate framework for analyzing the maritime dimension of international relations?
- How does China view maritime strategy, what is the content of China’s maritime strategy, how does the capabilities of the PLA-N measure up to it, and how does China’s maritime strategy relate to its overall diplomatic and geostrategic relations?
What is the importance of the Indian Ocean to China, and what comprises the maritime dimension of China’s relations with India, Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh?

To what extent and in what ways has multilateral maritime cooperation developed in the Indian Ocean and South Asia?

To what extent and in what ways has China participated in global and regional multilateral maritime cooperation?

In order to explore these questions,

- chapter two, which draws upon the seminal work of Mahan (2003), Corbett (1988), Pinto (1992) and Graham (2006), will lay the outline of a general framework for analyzing the maritime dimension of international relations by elaborating on the maritime dimension of military strategy, the maritime dimension of international law, and the concept of sea lines of communication (SLOC);

- chapter three, which draws upon the seminal work of Xu Qi (2006), You Ji (2006), Kondapalli (2001) and Kane (2002), will consider Chinese views on maritime strategy, the content of China’s maritime strategy and how the capabilities of the PLA-N measure up to it, and China’s maritime strategy in the context of its overall diplomatic and geostrategic relations;

- chapter four will focus on the maritime dimension of China-South Asia relations through the importance of the Indian Ocean to China, and the maritime dimension of China’s relations with India, Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh;

- chapter five will examine maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean and South Asia through the implementation of UNCLOS in the Indian Ocean, and specific attempts at regional maritime cooperation such as the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (IOZP) initiative, the Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation (IOMAC) process, the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), and the proposal for a South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Centre for Maritime Cooperation; and,

- chapter six will examine China's participation in global maritime cooperation through its implementation of, and conformity with, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and in regional maritime cooperation through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), in regional measures for combating piracy, and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) of the United States.