CHAPTER-2

THE POSTWAR JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: PACIFISM VS MILITARIZATION DEBATE

Introduction

With the enactment of legislation in both the houses of Japanese Diets to go for a referendum on Constitution, recommendations by both the houses to amend article 9 “so as to align the constitutional provisions with the realities of present world order” and upgrading Japan’s Defense Agency to Ministry of Defense, Japan seems all set to renounce its long held pacifism by revising US imposed peace Constitution promulgated in 1947.

But what has held Japan so long to maintain this pacifist Constitution and despite debates on amending the war renouncing clauses, why a substantial number of Japanese people are not yet ready to renounce pacifism? A number of Japanologists believe that the pacifist tendencies developed in Japanese society following country’s disastrous defeat. But the fact that the pacifist ideology was considered as an ideal policy even during the prewar period can not be ignored. The pacifists had strongly condemned Japan’s expansionist policies and forewarned about its outcomes.

In this background, this chapter starts with tracing the roots of pacifism in Japan and goes down analyzing the circumstances under which the pacifist clauses were included in the US drafted Japanese Constitution and highlights the role played by members of Allied nations and Far East Commission in imposing war renouncing clauses. Further this chapter also attempts to examine the ideological dichotomies that characterize the militarization versus pacifism debates in the Japanese polity and accounts the divergent push and pull factors that led to the preeminence of pacifism as the dominant ideological trend in the post war Japan. The chapter concludes on examining the fact that why despite the strong public opposition Japanese government continued on defense build up and how the pacifist tendencies eroded in the 1980s with the advent of Prime Minister Nakasone.
Pacifism in Japan: Tracing the roots

Pacifism\(^1\) - the doctrine that Japanese establishment is trying to renounce through constitutional amendment has a deep historical root and strong ideological position as it developed during the prewar Japan. This goes back to Meiji Restoration (1868) when Japan was transforming itself from a closed country to an open country with the slogan - "a rich country and strong military" (Fukoku Kyohei).

However, it seems that Japan's desire to make the country strongly armed was initially not to dominate, but to make it independent. The fact that a section of the oligarchs did not want to dominate the world is evident from the statement of the oligarchs like Iwakura Shisetsu-dan who declined to opt for a military expedition over Korea and maintained that Japan must concentrate on developing her wealth and strength at home, 'not harshly opening hostilities against Korea' (McIntosh M 1986:7). Yet another oligarch Toshimochi Okubo resolutely opposed military action when debate arose about sending troops to Korea (Ozawa 1994: 30).

Despite this makeover from a closed country to an open country, attitude of non-participation towards the world affairs, a characteristic of pre Meiji Japan, remained inherent in this era too. Apart from the traditional warrior class- the Samurai, common people wanted that Japan should maintain its peaceful image by not participating in affairs like war. This attitude of non-participation, and non-interference world affairs later provided base to pacifism in Japan.

\(^1\) Pacifism---The doctrine of opposition to all wars, including civil wars. Its most obvious feature is personal commitment to non-participation in wars, except possibly in non-combatant role. Pacifists also advocate efforts to maintain peace and support disarmament, through strengthening of international organizations and law. They have long been associated with, Christian sects, but in the 20\(^{th}\) century they included many who opposed war from secular moral bases. Pacifism is often associated with support for non-violent political action. A more limited form is nuclear pacifism, which is opposed to nuclear but not conventional war. (As defined in New Penguin Encyclopedia 2003 (edit) David Crystal, Penguin Books, London 2003)
The emergence of pacifism as an ideology was not a sudden phenomenon rather it came to the individuals through liberalism. The emergence of educated youth with liberal ideas gave impetus to the “Liberal and Popular Rights Movement” which was initially launched with the demands to establish constitution, and greater participation of the people in the government. The Japanese oligarchs instead heeding to their demands, embarked on the overseas expansions. The liberals viewed this move by oligarchs as a ploy to deflect public attention from the domestic affairs to war efforts. Thus the opposition of war became the part of the ongoing liberal and popular rights movements.

Later Japan’s expansionist policies such as the first Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 introduced the horrors of modern warfare, and anti-war sentiment flourished in the masses. In the following three decades, pacifism became recognized as an acceptable philosophical position but could not take shape of a mass movement and remained an ideological debate launched by the individuals and community leaders.

**Pacifism: The Christian and Social Trends**

The two ideological groupings, namely, the Christian democrats and Social democrats played vital role in introducing the ideals of pacifism to the people. To understand pacifism in the prewar period and commitment of community leaders towards the issue is being briefly discussed here.

Christian democrat, Kinoshita Naoe (1869-1937) expressed strong concern for society amid the growing militarism between the Manchurian incident and at the outset of second Sino-Japanese war. Because of his Christian piety, he considered the nation an instrument to realize the ideals of human kind, and advocated of peace, premised on the mutual love of human beings. He recommended the reduction and abolition of armaments and urged the Japanese to reject the “military government”, which is permeated with “paternalistic despotism” in domestic politics and seek to realize international peaceful coexistence. (Nishita 1978: 67-90). This practical manifesto is surprisingly similar to the pacifist principles included in present Japanese constitution.
Disillusioned with government’s callous cruelty towards the Chinese, another Christian democrat Uchimura Kanzo (1861-1930)- a proponent of righteous war- was compelled to rethink his assumption about the ‘righteous war’ and advocated absolute pacifism terming the war as a “robbery”. Deploiring the Russo-Japanese war he wrote “I not only oppose war with Russia, I absolutely oppose (Zettaiteki haishi) all wars... some people preach the profit of war... the profit of war is the profit of robbery.” (Howes 1976:91-122).

Kotoko Shusui (1871-1911) actively encouraged opposition to the Russo-Japanese war and dared to question the first Sino Japanese war asking- “why shouldn’t we pacifists who are opposed to wars talk about the painful predicament of the soldiers?” He was of the view that military expansion would only do harm when it was not accompanied by democratic development within Japan. Later, he founded the Heiminsha, the first organization to advocate the propagation of peace throughout Japan. In his pacifist manifesto published in 1903 he opined that “in order to favor men with fraternity, we adhere to peace policy and we endeavor to actualize disarmament to stoop bellicose attempts without race distinctions and political divisions. It is our ideal that perfect liberty, equality and fraternity for the greater mass of man should be secured: we shall attempt in realizing this ideal to rouse the public opinion”. (Masamichi Asukai, 1978:123-142). Opposing Russo-Japanese war he questioned the whole course of modern Japanese development.

Abe Isoo-(1876-1949) universally acclaimed as the father of Japanese socialism, expounded his own socialist pacifism through the journal of the Tokyo Unitarian Association, the Rikyo Zasshi. He never deviated from a rational and consistent opposition to war through out his life. Abe’s socialism from the beginning involved opposition to war. In First Socialist Manifesto of 1901 he set the goal of total abolition of armament as a first step toward the establishment of peace among nations and argued that “armament creates a financial burden on the common people, which might be used for social welfare”. He opined that “militarism is evil because it leads to exploitation of weak by strong”. (Powles 1978: 143-168)
Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961) firmly opposed the government’s colonial policy following his visit to Manchuria in 1932 and he committed himself to pacifist activities and addressed the question in many books and articles. In one of his articles he commented “that the Manchurian incident had been trumped up by the Japanese side, as I have suspected from the beginning and since that time I determined to oppose the Manchurian policy of the government”. He foretold that if Japan continued its course of military expansion it would eventually be destroyed. In his book Minzo to Heiwa (The nation and peace) he criticized various militaristic and chauvinistic opinions expressed within the Ministry of education. (Wakao Fujita 1978:199-219)

When the second Sino-Japanese war broke out in July 1937, Yanaihara criticized the government action. Because of his criticism to war he was made to resign from Tokyo Imperial University. He then propagated his ideas from a monthly called Kashin (Good News) and relentlessly pursued to achieve the goal of a peaceful Japan in the postwar as well. He is considered among the architects of the postwar education system and a champion on the peace clause in the new constitution.

Tabata Shinobu was the only Pacifist who led anti-war movement and talked for peace in the pre war as well as postwar Japan. He was a Constitutionalist belonging to Kyoto school of thought who rejected Tokyo school of thought’s interpretation that practical interpretation of the Constitution was necessary in order to fit with the changing political scenario. Instead Tabata vouched for Kyoto School of thought which argued that spirit of the Constitution must be the same and should not be changed with subjective interpretation to suit political convenience (Katsumi Ueda, 1978:224). He vigorously pursued the ideal of “Unarmed neutrality” in world affairs and wrote protest notes to the international leaders whoever talked about armament and militarization. To advocate the ideals of Japanese Constitution and generate awareness about the unique war renouncing clause of Japanese Constitution established Institute of Japanese Constitution. He wrote many books and booklets on the relevance of Peace constitution including Politics of war and peace and Japanese Pacifist thoughts.
On the literary front many authors and poets wrote poetry against war and expressed their hatred for the war. A poem Kimi Shintamo Kotonakare (Do not offer your life) written by poetess Yosano Akiko during the Russo-Japanese war became very popular among the masses. Some excerpts of her poem need special mention here.

Do not offer your life,
The emperor himself does not go
To battle.
The emperor heart is so deep
How could he ever wish
That men shed their blood
That men die like beasts,
The men's glory be in death?

Dearest brother
Do not offer your life
In battle.
Mother whom father left behind this past autumn
Suffered when
In the midst of her grief
Her son was called away.
Even under this Imperial reign,
When it is heard that the home is safe and secure,
Mothers hair has grown whiter.
Do you forget
Your forlorn young wife
Weeping,
Hidden in the shadow of shop curtains?
Or do you think of her?
Consider a young women's heart when
After less than ten months her husband is taken away!
Alas who else than you alone
Is she to rely on in this world?
Do not offer your life! (Bamba and Howes 1978: 251-252).

This poem which became very famous among the people represents the anti-war sentiments during the prewar period. This not only urged to stop sacrifice of life for the sake of Imperial expansion but also made satire on entering into war on the name of Emperor, who "himself does not go to the battles."
Pacifism which was gaining ground during the pre-war Japan started weaning with the start of Second Sino-Japanese war (1937) and the nationalist sentiments began to prevail over the pacifists' thought. The main reason behind the decline of pacifist thought was that the war gave new boost to production in industrial units and people, especially urban people supported military expansion and continuation of war. Thus the military and business connection commonly known as *Zaibatsu* also pushed for Japan's greater militarization.

In this era, the military gained influence in politics as they were given two portfolios of military ministries to manage the Army and Navy. This meant that the military not only had a say in the appointment of two key ministers but also gained two Cabinet seats. The military gave a further blow to the democracy by suppressing the trade unions and constituting the Industrial Association for Service to Country.

In yet another blow to the democracy, the army replaced all political parties constituting the Imperial Rule Assistance Army in 1940. The newly formed Imperial Rule Assistance Army paved the way for Tojo Hideki to become Prime Minister. The pacifists and liberals also resisted the efforts of military regime when it embarked on Greater East Asia co-Prosperity sphere, a concept that represented the desire to create a self-sufficient bloc of Asian nations led by the Japanese and free of Western powers, created by Imperial Military. The military regime extensively used provisions of Peace Preservation Law (1925) against the pacifists and liberals. The military regime was so harsh against those who opposed war and military rule that during the period of 1939 to 1943, nearly 3350 people were punished for calling for an end to the imperial system and private ownership, for espousing liberal ideas and for claiming to be pacifists (McIntosh 1986: 11). The state repression towards pacifists continued till Japan's defeat in 1945. The allied occupation powers, which took control after the war, fostered opposition to war as an important part of their program.
Early Years of Occupation:
With the Emperor's surrender speech on the radio on 20 August 1945, and his pronouncement "the war had not necessarily gone in Japan's favour", the Japanese history took another turn. In the last days of World War II; the spiritually superior Japanese forces had been beaten by the material superiority of the American Forces. Subsequently, Japan came under the American occupation and remained under its tutelage till 1952. From the earlier stages of their planning for postwar administration of Japan, America had two clear goals, namely to establish a peaceful and responsible government and to democratize Japan.

The Supreme Commander Allied Power (SCAP), General MacArthur took the initiative. The main basis of SCAP's program was the Potsdam declaration of July 1945, which Japan accepted by its surrender. It demanded that:

"There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and mislead the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest... Japan will be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exactions of just reparations in kind, but not those, which would enable her to rearm for war". (Mendel 1976)

In their first ever task the occupation forces revoked the ban on political parties, including communist sympathizers. Those thought to be right wing; nationalistic or militaristic were removed from senior administrative and business positions. The Education System was thoroughly overhauled, school texts were rewritten and American liberal ethics based on Western values were propounded. The Zaibatsu (the big business) with the concentration of real power and wealth, which played an important role in establishing an aggressive and expansionist state, were broken up.

These changes introduced during the early years of Occupation rule promoted liberal ideas and gave hope to the liberals that in the changed scenario they will achieve their prewar goals for greater democratization of Japan. Fifteen years of psychological
pressure and eight years of wartime conditions had generated strong disgust among the masses for the military and the government. MacArthur drew on this strong disgust and exhorted the Japanese to adopt realism of peace. Granting females the right of franchise and revoking ban on political parties and leaders were MacArthur’s calculated moves to capitalize revulsion of the masses in American’s favour. (McIntosh 1986) These were major steps towards Japan’s democratization, for which the Japanese were struggling from the prewar period. With these changes the occupation authorities tried to garner support and good will gesture.

**Drafting the ‘Peace Constitution’: Doctrination of Pacifism**

The Second major step by the Occupation authority was to draft a new constitution for Japanese aimed at establishing a political system according to American values and ensure that Japan never again “revisits” war. To this end, Preamble of the US drafted postwar constitution explicitly mentioned that “never again shall we be visited the horrors of war through the nation of government”.

The SCAP inserted articles in the constitution to check Japan’s remilitarization. The Article 66 has a provision, which spells out “that Prime Minister and other Ministers of States must be from civilian population”. This has been done taking the fact into consideration that in prewar Japan, the military had two important portfolios and through which they grabbed the Prime Ministerial post. This time occupation ensured to check such happenings in the future.

However, much more controversial was introduction of “War renouncing” Article 9 of the US drafted Constitution. This pacifist clause not only renounces war but also bans having potential military forces. Another caveat was attached in the form of article 96, which stipulates that “a two-thirds majority is needed in the diet” and a “referendum” has to be held in order to change any provision in the constitution. This article proved another hurdle in the way of amending US imposed Constitution.
The Controversy around Author of War Renouncing Article:

Though 1947 Constitution was drafted by the SCAP during US occupation, the mystery still shrouds about the authorship of Article 9. Nothing can be said with certainty that whether Japanese or Americans were the author of controversial clause. There is no unanimity among the Japanologists over the name of the writer. The theory of origin of war renouncing clause of pacifist Constitution revolves around three broader categories:

a) It is the war weary Japanese leadership who influenced American occupation authority to insert war renouncing clause.

b) It was the American’s who wanted to ensure that Japan should never pose challenge to international security and hence inserted Article 9 to demilitarize it.

c) The “divine providence” - a less debated theory of origin of Japan’s pacifist Constitution hints that it was God’s will which worked upon Japanese leadership and they accepted the anti-war clause.

Donald C. Hellman has opined “the Contrite of utopianism of a senior Japanese statesman [Shidehara Kijuro] led to the insertion of article 9 into the new constitution (Scalapino 1997).”

While discussing on the same issue former Prime Minister Nakasone describes Takayanagi as proponent of “collaborative theory” - a claim that the Constitution was the joint work of Japan and the US. He writes that “the Commission on the Constitution headed by Prof Takayanagi pushed through the opinion in conclusion that the present Constitution was enacted under strong influence of America but Japan’s view were taken into account” (Nakasone 1995: 116).

The Japanese Security experts have drawn their opinion following MacArthur’s testimony to the Senate Military and Foreign Relations Committee a month after he was dismissed from his post as Supreme Commander during the Korean War in 1951. During the series of hearings, he testified that it was Shidehara who proposed the no war clause.
In his reminiscences also MacArthur repeated the same. On yet another occasion MacArthur expressed that “their wise old man Prime Minister Shidehara came to me and urged that to save themselves they should abolish war as an international instrument. When I agreed Shidehara turned to me and said, the world will laugh and mock on us as impractical visionaries, but a hundred years from now we will be called prophets.” (MacArthur 1965:319).

Kade, one of the Americans who was the part of drafting committee made this issue more complex while stating, “at the time every body was thinking much the same thing about renunciation of war and pacifism. It is difficult to determine whose ideas this was or where it got started.” (Shoichi 1997)

There are yet another group of people who believe that it was American alone who inserted this clause. Richard A. Poole—a former staff member of the GHQ wrote to the Research Commission on the Constitution that:

“as for Article 9, I expressed concern about Japan giving up having military forces forever , but my boss did not listen to me at all , saying that it was General MacArthur’s idea, so you could not change it” (Research Commission on the Constitution, House of Councillors, 2005, p 6).

Yet another theory on origin of Japan’s war renouncing clause of the Constitution believes that it was the “divine providence” that God’s will influenced the politicians at that time to enshrine the anti-war provision. Katsumi Ueda (1978) has quoted Tabata Shinobu one of the Christian pacifist and Constitutional expert has arguing that Shidehara

2 In his testimony Macarthur said “…the Japanese people more than any other people in the world, understand what atomic warfare means. It was not academic with them. They counted their dead and they buried them. They of their own volition, wrote into their Constitution a provision outlawing war. When their Prime Minister came to me, Mr. Shidehara, and said ‘I have long contemplated and believed that the only solution with this problem is to do away with war’. He said: ‘With great reluctance I advance the subject to you, as a military man, because I am convinced that you would not accept it; but, he said, I would like to endeavor, in the Constitution we are drawing up, to put in such a provision.’ And I could not help getting up and shaking with the old man, and telling him that I thought it was one of the greatest constructive step that could possibly be taken … I encouraged him and they wrote the provision in”. MacArthur, May 5th Testimony on the Military situation in the Far East: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, United State Senate, Eighty Second Congress, First Session, Part 1, May 3, 4, 5, 7,8,9,10,11,12 and 14, 1951,US government Printing office, Washington D.C. p.223.
Kijuro’s wife was a Christian and God’s will may have worked upon Shidehara through his wife’s Christian influence. (Nabua Bamba and John F Howes 1978:231).

Japanese Constitutional expert Koseiki Shoichi has stated that it was not Shidehara but MacArthur himself who introduced the provision of war renouncing clause in the draft constitution. He substantiates his argument based on the fact that McArthur on February 3, 1946 directed, to General Courtney Whitney a member of Japan’s new Constitution Committee that no war clause is contained in the new constitution.

The second clause of “Mac Arthur’s Three Principles” (Shoichi 1997:83) spells:

> “War as a sovereign right to the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its dispute and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals, which are now stirring for the world for its defense and its protection. No Japanese Army, Navy or Air force will ever be authorized and no right of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force.”

The Security experts believe that Japan is not the first nation where the concept of War renouncing clause first appeared. The War renouncing provision made its appearance in the law through anti war treaties following the World War I. For Example Article 1 of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 reads:

> “The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.”

Many also believe that the drafting committee also took the note of the UN Charter article 2, without explicitly mentioning it in the draft proposal.

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3 Article 2 of the UN Charter- “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of United Nations”
But Koseiki Shoichi’s argument holds ground as he opines that the idea of War renouncing clause to Mac Arthur came from his Philippine’s experience. He notes that with the aid of the Philippine’s Constitution on Nov.15, 1935, the American Colony took its first step toward complete independence as the Republic of Philippines. Mac Arthur was appointed military advisor to the Philippine national militia a few days before the transition began. Article 2 of the Philippine’s constitution of 1935 is as follows: “The Philippines renounce war as means of implementing national policy, and adopts the principles of generally established international law as one part of its law.”

Koseiki Shoichi asserts further that it seems highly likely therefore that MacArthur had this in mind when his staff began drafting a constitution for Japan in 1946. He adds:

“....we should not forget that relating to the origin of the Philippine Constitution to that of Japan in this way, we might also tend to regard Japan as a colony like the Philippines and article 9 [renouncing the war] as simply a military measures.” We should not forget that Okinawa was under direct US military rule as well we see, MacArthur proceeded to draft the new constitution on the assumption that Okinawa would be made into a fortress and that the Japanese mainland would be demilitarized.”

Based on the fact that, it was MacArthur who ordered for the war renouncing provision, to be moved from the preamble to the body of the draft constitution, Koseiki Shoichi concludes that it was him, who proposed the Article 9, not Shidehara.

Rewording Article 9: An effort to enshrine right of self-defense?

When the MacArthur draft proposal was put to the diet for discussion and amendment, the Article that aroused the greatest concern was the amendment to Article 9. Majority of the questions asked in relation to the provision regarding the right of self-defense and the problem of security.
The government sponsored draft of war renouncing clause read as follows:

"War, as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force, is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with other nations. The maintenance of land, sea and air forces, as well as war potential, will never be authorized. The right of belligerency of the state would never be recognized."

After the protracted debate on this article Ashida Hitoshi (who later became Prime Minister for a brief period) redrafted the clause (Williams 1997:121), which was agreed by the majority of the diet. The reworded draft reads as follows:

**Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order**, 4 the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation, or the threat or use of force, as a means of settling disputes with other nations.

"In order to achieve the purpose of the preceding paragraph, the land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state would never be recognized."

The explanation publicly offered by Ashida at the time was that these additions would indicate in a more emphatic way Japan’s sincere wish for peace by using independent judgment in expression of the provision. (Auer 1993:72-86).

**Reaction of Victor Nations to the Rewording of War Renouncing Clause**

The amendment "In order to achieve the purpose of the preceding paragraph", provoked greatest concern as it has implicitly paved the way for having defense force in the name of self-defense. Consequently, the pledge never to maintain war potential is not absolute but it is intended to be limited to aggressive war. Writing, "the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized" at the end of article can be interpreted various ways. Firstly, it is not to deny conflict as a means of self-defense. Second and most importantly,

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4 The Ashida amendment is italicized,
it may be interpreted as Japan can militarize itself up to the extent it is not perceived belligerent.

This amendment by the diet raised eyebrows among the members of the Far East Commission (FEC), which apart from the three allied powers, the US, the UK and the Soviet Union included, China, France, India, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippine. The members of FEC suspected Japanese motive behind the amendment with particular reference to Article 9.

In its first reaction to the amendment, the Chinese representative expressed concern, and said:

“the Chinese delegation notes that the Article has been so revised by the House of Representatives of Japan as to permit an interpretation which might in effect permit the maintenance by Japan of land, sea and Air Forces for the purpose other than those specified in the first paragraph of Article 9 of the draft Constitution.... We know that, of course it is necessary for any government to have a police force. But, generally, speaking, we don’t call a police force an armed force. That is to say there is a danger, if Japan will be allowed to maintain armed forces for other purposes than those enumerated there that means there is [a] possibility for Japan to reemploy such armed forces under the certain pretext, such as for instance, self-defense.” (Shoichi 202)

Thus the Chinese were first to express concern and what they forwarned during that time came true later as Japanese interpreted this clause as not denying right of self defence.

Russia on the other hand had proposed an amendment in article 66, and suggested to add a provision, which could bar the military officials and those, served in military to be appointed as the Prime Minister and in the cabinet. The British representative, George Sansom, argued that because of variety of interpretation is possible and argument abounded, the amendment set the worst possible precedent. He agreed that MacArthur should be asked to clarify about it.
The Canadian delegate George Patterson agreed that a query should be sent to MacArthur and strongly supported the argument for civilian provision and the necessity of clarifying the relation between the provision and article 9.

The Australian representative Major J. Plimsoll expressed his distrust about Japan, saying that in future Japan might amend article 9, so as to allow maintaining armed forces. He explained that once it occurred it would be consistent with Japanese traditional practice for officers on active duty to be appointed as to the cabinet as ministers in the army and navy. Therefore it would be more effective to insert at this juncture a provision specifying that all the cabinet members be civilians.

Taking note of apprehension observed by the FEC representatives SCAP Commander General Douglas MacArhur quickly accepted some part of the FEC’s request and inserted in Article 66, “The Prime Minister and other Minister shall be civilians”. However he did not comment regarding the meaning of Article 9. By accepting some of demands by FEC, the General satisfied the members of FEC and achieved a political victory.

The Chinese representative however expressed his concern and noted:

“the second point related to the wording of Article 9, of the draft constitution, which as it stands, contains implications which could not be acceptable to us. Japan in the past repeatedly used her armed forces for aggressions against her neighbours and denied at the same time that she was making war upon them. It should therefore clearly be understood that the commission, letting this article stand, intends in no way to overlook the possible danger of Japan again misusing her armed forces for any warlike or aggressive acts any more than for war itself ....”

The Chinese representative, however, noted with satisfaction that “the message just received from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers reports among other thing, that a provision has been pledged to be made in the draft Constitution that the Prime Minister and all Minister for State shall be civilians. This provision, when made will to
some extent serve to preclude the objectionable implications to which I have referred.” (Shoichi 1996:206)

To sum up, it may be said that the complex process that started with the Ashida amendment to Article 9, concluded with the insertion of the civilian provision (Article 66) in the case of Prime Ministers and all state Ministers. The idea that Ashida amendment could be made a constitutional interpretation for war of self-defense or for procuring war material for self-defense was not even discussed in the Occupation government or in the diet. It was only discussed in the FEC that the amendment might give rise to the self-defense interpretation. In order to close off the possibility, the FEC demanded that Japan insert in the constitution civilian provision as an additional safeguard. The Japanese side believed that the civilian provision is useless as a way of countering the Article 9 and therefore accepted it without any major debate.

**Outbreak of Korean War: Initial shift towards militarization:**
Japan could not sustain continuance as an unarmed and neutral country for a long period. The changing security scenario in the region, especially the impending Korean War, led to a change in US policy towards Japan.

With the outbreak of Korean War in 1950, the US realized its political mistake of imposing the pacifist clause in Japan’s Constitution. For Japanese, it was surprising to know that the MacArthur, who praised the significance of new Constitution in his 1950 New Year’s Day message, advised Japan to create 75,000 strong National Police Reserve, to cope with internally fomented Communist insurrection, the real reason for the creation of the National Police Reserve was to allow the United States to move the 75,000 troops to fight in Korea. Most of the National Police Reserve created by Yoshida Cabinet in response to SCAP, was deployed in Hokkaido to fill the void of the US forces hurriedly transferred to Korea.

Then US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles suggested Japan to send its force to Korea in the wake of outbreak of Korean War. But Prime Minister Yoshida politely declined the
proposal citing the reasons such as the Article 9, which explicitly prohibits rearmament and overseas dispatch to settle international dispute, and the Japanese have psychological aversion to the military due to the tragic pacific war.

However, the creation of National Police Reserve was a first step towards Japan’s rearmament. Frank Kowalski, who was chief of staff to the military advisor of the US forces, acknowledged in his book, *The rearmament of Japan*, that “it was clear without question that what we were establishing was armed forces, but we were ordered to camouflage it.” (Toshihiro Yamauchi, 2001:27-41)

**US-Japan Security Treaty: A mechanism towards militarization**

Though Yoshida has declined US suggestion to rearm Japan, the changing Security scenario and a possible threat from China and Soviet Union and a greater rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China- the two erstwhile enemies of Japan, resulted in change in Yoshida’s mind. In the changed circumstances he preferred to align with the US for defense and Security purposes.

On September 8, 1951, the same day as the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, he signed US-Japan mutual Security Treaty and on behalf of the Japanese government guaranteed the US, the right to station military force in Japan, even after the end of the Occupation period. In return he got the promise from the US to protect Japan militarily from the threat of both foreign attack and domestic insurrection. Moreover, the Japanese government according to the provision of the treaty agreed that it will not allow any third country the use of Japanese territory for the deployment of military forces without the US consent. In brief, this treaty was starting point for rearmament in Japan.

Three years after the US-Japan Security Treaty, the Japanese government completely reorganized the National Police Reserve (*Keisatsu Yobitai*) turned into National Security Agency (*Hoantai*) and finally to Japanese Self Defense Force (*Jeitai*), an air-land-sea military with an authorized strength of 146,000 men. The newly formed SDF came under the Japan Defense Agency, the director of which was headed by a civilian and enjoyed
status equal to cabinet minister. The joint chiefs and service commander were composed of uniformed personnel and were in charge of tactical planning and operation. In this way the Japanese defense establishment clearly established a military apparatus.

**US-Japan Mutual Security Agreement: A forced Militarization?**

As Japan initiated this process of rearmament and subsequently, in the 1960s launched a program of high-speed economic development, the US pressed Japan to build a military capability appropriate to an ally with whom the US could build a truly mutual security agreement. Accordingly, in January 1960, an entirely new US-Japan Mutual Security agreement was signed replacing the 1951 Security Agreement.

The 1960 treaty obliged both Japan and the US to increase their military forces for the purpose of self-defense and mutual assistance. Moreover, Japan and the US were both committed to responding an attack on the other by a third country, if the attack occurred within the Japan’s territory. The US was given right to maintain bases on Japanese territory for the purpose of maintaining security in East Asia. Thus, the new treaty had strong overtones of a US-Japan military alliance rather than just a passive defense agreement.

The Security alliance between the two countries further strengthened in November 1978, with signing of a set of Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. The Guidelines had three main futures:

1. The Guidelines established nuclear deterrence as the foundation of security cooperation. The Japanese government in this document clearly recognized the nuclear deterrent role of the American forces in Japan. The Guidelines pledged “The American forces will remain a [strategic] nuclear deterrent force and at the same time develop a [tactical] response force in a frontline position,”


3. The Guidelines called for US –Japanese military cooperation in the event of a situation in East Asia outside of Japan if it bore serious implications for Japan’s own security.
By the terms of these guidelines, the geographical limit of US Japan security cooperation spread far beyond the horizon and beyond all previous Japanese military obligations as well.

Public Opinion: Pacifism Vs Militarization:

The issue of rearmament and maintaining pacifism had vertically divided the Japanese society. Defense had been the most controversial issue in Japan’s postwar politics and it affected directly or indirectly almost every other domestic and foreign policy issues. In the following section, an effort has been made to trace the contours of the public perception with respect to militarization and pacifism.

What is the best way to secure Japan?

In a survey conducted following Japan’s Security Alliance with the US, the respondents were quizzed on the best means of ensuring Japan’s security? Out of 16630 respondents, 38% considered their own forces are capable to provide security while 33% thought that it could be done through Collective Security with the American forces (Mendel 1976: 68). (See Figure 2).
Just after the outbreak of 1951 Korean War and creation of the paramilitary Police Reserve, Asahi began a series of Surveys asking whether people approved the need for military forces, not just police reserve. 54% respondents answered in a categorical ‘No’ while 28% answered in affirmation. (Figure 3).

In 1952 Survey, Asahi found that only one fourth of those favouring rearmament wanted conscription, the rest favoured the existing enlistment system. The group opposing armament was even more hostile to a revival of the prewar conscription. Also one third, who supported rearmament in 1952 survey, objected to paying higher taxes for it and a majority opposed any member of their own family entering the service. (Mendel 1976: 69)

Should there be a revision in Japanese Constitution for rearmament?
In its 1952 survey, Asahi asked that whether revision in Article 9 for building military forces was necessary or not? 31% respondents approved the idea while 32% opposed.
When the same question was put in 1953 survey 31% replied in affirmation and 42% responded in negation. In 1955 and 1957 when this question was presented more lucidly asking, ‘Do you approve or oppose revising the Constitution in order for Japan to have a regular military Forces?’ In 1955, 37% of respondent supported the revision while 42% opposed it. In 1957, the percentage of respondent who opposed revision was surprisingly high and it touched to 52% while the percentage of those supported revision came down to 32% (Mendel 1976: 74). (See Figure 4)

![Public Rejection of Re-armament by Constitutional Amendment (In Percentage)](image)

There are various factors that contributed in the rise of opposing revision in Article 9. Most important was the continued external pressure to expedite Japan’s armament. The external pressure for armament resulted into fear of involving Japan in war. The masses thought that Japan’s armament would serve purely US purposes.
Whether Japan or the US Benefits from US-Japan Security Treaty:
The surprising degree to which the average Japanese viewed native rearmament as benefiting the US more than Japan, was confirmed in an Asahi survey conducted in June 1953. Only 10% of people thought that the rearmament benefits Japan while 40% replied that it benefits the US. Only 28% thought that it benefits both the US and Japan. (Mendel 1976: 81). (See Figure 5)

![Leasing Weapons and Creating Military Forces is for the Benefit of:](image)

Figure 5

Another factor that resulted in rising opposition of a revision in Article 9 was campaign form various peace groups like Denwakai, which tried to generate opinion against the rearmament and maintenance of peace among the masses. More and more people accepted their pacifist idea and opposed any effort to revise war renouncing clause of their Constitution.

The trend of national opinion on revision of Article 9, indicates that revisionist sentiment remained constant at about 30% throughout the five years in Asahi survey. Opposition however increased from 32 to 57% by 1957.
Pacifists Demand for a Just Interpretation of Article 9:
The question naturally arises why the Japanese people accepted the pacifist constitution? The situation that prevailed following the war resulted in a change of mind of the Japanese. The new realities of war that was forewarned by the pacifist during the prewar period came true which helped transformed the once militarist nation into a country of convinced pacifists. There was great rejoicing over the peace that had liberated the nation from the long time oppression under the wartime regime. Now pacifism became the basic tenet of the Japanese society. The situation has matured so that what had once seemed a utopia was institutionalized in the form of the war renunciation clause (Article 9) which gave legal sanctity and symbolic dignity to pacifism in Japan. The pacifists following the legal institutionalization of their ideas propagated their philosophy with much added vigour. Buoyed by the realization of their goal, they further pressurized the government for a just interpretation and amendment in Article 9.

In March 1949, Public Law Forum consisting of pacifists presented proposal for revising the constitution. Regarding Article 9, the Forum proposed to delete “as a means to settling international disputes” from the existing clause and insert a new provision that prohibits individual participation. They proposed to change the words as “in order to accomplish the aim for the preceding paragraph,” to “For whatever purpose”.

Explaining their reason for revising Article 9, the group opined:

“Paragraph one of the Article 9 is a declaration of the renunciation forever of aggressive war and threat or use of force. Paragraph two is a provision, which denies the right to maintain any armament or to wage any kind of war. Despite the fact that the spirit of the original provision was a declaration of complete pacifism renouncing all war, including war in self-defense and war for imposing sanctions, the wording of this article contains various restrictions, which can be misinterpreted and should be completely rewritten.” (Shoichi 1997: 249)
It is evident from the wording of their suggestion that the pacifists wanted to give no room of (mis)interpretation of the article 9. All the exercises of Ashida to get the right of self-defense through interpretation could have been proved futile, if pacifists’ suggestion to add “For whatever purpose” could have been acceded to. It may be noted here that the suggestion for revision came at a time when the SCAP had written to the Japanese government that they may amend the Constitution if the representatives in the Diet deem so.

Contrary to the pacifists, right wing nationalists wanted that the government scrap some of the provision of the Constitution, which they thought to be “imposed” on Japan. But the then Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru showed no interest to go for a revision. It seems that he tried to evade form entering into controversies and postponed it for a later period and gave more priority to economics over politics, which was need of the hour.

With the legalization of pacifism, Japanese pacifism entered a new phase, as the pacifists resisted every move to rearm Japan. They showed no sign to budge from their stand even during the Korean and Vietnam War. They not only defended the constitution legally but also came on the street with long rallies and chanted slogan against anti-Vietnam War, anti US-Japan Security treaty, and Return Okinawa. Thus the Pacifism, which was a mere slogan during the prewar period, became a real movement. This resulted into clashes of ideas with the nationalists and changed the course of Japanese polity and society.

**Pacifist Movements Against Militarization and Security Treaties:**
The military build up and defense treaties roused concern among the pacifists and all those who had aversion towards militarization. They adopted various means to resist it. The Heiwa Mondai Denwakai (Peace issues discussion Group) played the most influential role in propagating peace thought among the masses by issuing statements and publishing thought provoking opinions in its magazine, *Seikai*. The Group’s statements regarding the security treaty of 1950 and revision of treaty in 1960 exerted tremendous impact on the debate about peace treaty and influenced the radical political parties, peace movements and labour unions. The group took up the problems of peace and security at
the level of thought and values. Most specifically, by examining a number of fundamental questions—what view of reality to adopt in regard to the international situation, what kind of security policy to pursue in the face of the destructive power of atomic weapons? Denwakai emphasized that in order to prevent war, the members of Denwakai should maintain a close and trustful relationship with the people. (Hook 1996)

"Peaceful Coexistence" and "Unarmed Neutrality"

One of the Denwakai's leading political thinkers Murayama Masao gave the idea of "peaceful coexistence and "unarmed neutrality". The group proposed that as part of a new Japanese identity, the government should play an active role in promoting cooperation and peaceful coexistence between the two worlds.

Glenn D. Hook (1996) opines that Denwakai's statements can be viewed as a focal point of postwar peace thought on demilitarization because they were issued in opposition to practical start of militarization at the dictation of the US (Hook 1996: 38). The group did not only issue statements but also presented some proposals to maintain peace amid the rising cold war confrontation.

Following the US Japan Security Treaty and San Francisco peace treaty the Denwakai urged the government to conclude a peace treaty with all former adversaries, economic and political independence, inviolable neutralism, admission to the UN and opposition to the Japan's provision of providing bases to a third power. To this effect, the group stated:

"If we are to abide faithfully by the pacifist spirit of our Constitution, we are required to take a positive attitude in attempting to bring about harmony between the two worlds, instead of passively adopting our attitude on the peace settlement problem in line with the vicissitudes of international politics." (Hook 1996: 34)

The ideas that the Denwakai, proposed played a significant role in determining mass approach and promoting mass action on security issues in the Cold War era. Though the
government did not accept the Denwakai’s proposal for unarmed neutrality as its security policy, it became an integral part of security policy proposed by the socialist opposition and the pacifist groups. As a result of Denwakai’s endeavours, both parliamentary and extra parliamentary tactics to oppose the militarization got legitimacy in Japan. At the same time due to active propagation of peace at the individual level violent means of opposition in the masses lost popular support.

Amid the agitation against the renewal of US Japan Security Treaty of 1960 *Koe naki Koe no kai* (Voice of the Voiceless) came into existence. Through its movement the organization tried to focus on the views of ordinary citizens. It was organized by a group of intellectuals like Takabatake Tsurui and Tsurumi. Both the leaders later mooted the idea of constituting an organization *Betanumu ni heiwa O, Shimin bunka dantani rengo* (Beherein, in short). Beherein (Committee to peace in Vietnam) was contemporary to Denwakai. Unlike the Denwakai it was a citizen’s movement launched to mobilize anti war sentiment in the masses against the US imperialism in Vietnam. In this movement Beherein tried to bring people from all walks of life to its fold to raise their voice for peace.

In 1969 –72, Beherein widened its area of interest and activity and launched various protest movement to oppose the continuity of US –Japan Security treaty as well as the military bases in Japan. The Behrein on June 1969 organized a rally at Hibiya Park in Tokyo where 70,000 people gathered to protest, demanding to stop Vietnam War, End US Japan Security Treaty and return Okinawa. About a year later it organized a rally to protest the renewal of US- Japan Security treaty in which almost 80,000 people participated. (Bamba and Howes 1978: 270)

Both the organizations played a significant role in the promotion of peace thoughts and anti-militarization movement in Japan. While Denwakai influenced people through debate on basic issues related to peace, the Beherein and other smaller groups sensitized the masses through their active participation against militarization, the US imperialism and revision of security treaty.
In reaction to the Constitutional revision effort by the Japanese administration, the reformists formed the National Union of Constitutional Defense (Kenpo Yogo Kokumin Rengo) in late 1954 which was an umbrella organization of 135 together having total membership of 5 million with former Prime Minister Tetsu Katayama as chairman. The league gathered groups representing labourers and farmers, the Labour-Farmer Party, the General Council of Trade Unions, the National Federation of Industrial organizations and Japan farmers association. (Osamu Nishi 1989:196). Thus with the creation of Constitutional Peoples protection League a movement for Constitutional preservation has begun.

Amid the opposition by the masses against Constitutional revision the Constitutional Investigation Bill was introduced in lower house in March 1956. The JSP denounced government’s effort and composed versus of Song against Constitutional revision which became very famous among the people. The song goes as follows

"Hear ye Traitorous LDP
the hurrah of 80 million
rising up to smash the Constitutional revision
and rearmament.” (Kataoka 1991:152)

Along side these movements anti nuclear movement was going on in Japan. The anti nuclearisation movement took form of the mass movement following the atomic radiation at the Bikni islands nuclear tests conducted by the US in 1954. Following this incident the Gensuikyo (Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) came to existence, which holds nation wide rallies including an annual world conference against all forms of nuclear weapons. Following the Bikni incident opposition of nuclear armament became Japan’s official policy as the Japanese administration viewed that if the nuclear tests are conducted in its territory, the people will continuously suffer from nuclear radiation.

Anti nuclear movement in Japan strengthened when the opposition parties joined hands with the ongoing anti- nuclear movement in Japan. The Socialists blamed the ruling LDP
for having desire of the Kishi cabinet to arm the SDF with nuclear weapons and presented a resolution in 1959 in the Diet against possible domestic nuclear armament. Socialist’s anger increased when Prime Minister Kishi told a Diet Committee that, “small atomic arms for self defense would not violate the Constitution.” (Mendel 1976:158). Prime Minister Kishi’s statement stirred anti nuclear debate in Japan. Due to continued pressure from the anti-nuclear lobby Japan in 1967 adopted the three non-nuclear principles (hikaku sangensuku) which spelled out that Japan is not to produce, posses or introduce nuclear weapons. Amid the debate whether Japan should join the NPT or not, the Yomiuri Shimbun conducted a nation wise survey and put the question to 3,000 respondents asking, “whether they desire nuclear weapon for Japan”? Only 20% desired the weapon with some conditions while a majority of them resoundingly rejected the option. (Endicott 1972: 98). The ongoing debate to renounce the option of nuclear weapon achieved substantial breakthrough when Eisako Sato government signed NPT in 1976.

The nuclear pacifists lobby in Japan has been so strong that it influenced the government to adopt a policy of suspension of ODA loans if a recipient country conducts nuclear tests and involves in WMDs proliferation. The result of this policy was visible when following the nuclear tests by China in 1995, and India and Pakistan in 1998 ODA loan was suspended. There still exists nuclear pacifism in Japan; however, it is eroding following nuclear ambition of North Korea and its recent announcement that it may produce nuclear weapon. As a result of this Japanese are weighing nuclear option as a deterrent to the North Korean nuclear challenge.

It is fact that the pacifist movements could not continue for so long and could not achieve to alter the course of remilitarization and termination of Security treaty, but the long-term influence of pacifist movements is evident in the preservation of Article 9, maintaining sustained pressure to get back Okinawa from the US occupation, the ban on the dispatch of military forces overseas, the imposition of a 1% ceiling on defense spending and adoption of three non-nuclear principles. There may be various reasons for gradual decay of the pacifist movements. But most obvious reason was emergence of new generation
who had not witnessed the devastation of war, thus pacifist ideas did not appeal to them that much.

Another reason for the decay of pacifist movement was the government’s relentless pursuit for remilitarization, ignoring the exhortations of the pacifists. The emergence of nationalist leaders like Nakasone who vociferously talked about amendment in imposed Constitution and mutual alliance with the US was yet another blow to the pacifist’s ideal to establish a peaceful and unarmed Japan.

**Impact of Constitutional Pacifism on Japanese Policy:**
Before reaching to a decline, Pacifism in Japan has left a remarkable influence on Japanese Policy decisions the implications of which is still seen some of the policies which stem out from the Constitutional Pacifism and Article 9 can be sited as follows

**Three non-nuclear Principles:**
Japan was the only nation to face the catastrophe of nuclear weapons on two of its cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the concluding month of World War II which resulted in the killing of millions of its civilians and results of atomic radiations are still seen in the successive generations. As a result there was a strong nuclear allergic feeling among the Japanese masses that formed various anti-nuclear societies and pledged to eliminate nuclear weapon from Japan and the world. The socialist took up the issue in the Diet and presented a resolution in 1959 against possible domestic nuclear armament.

The then Prime Minister Kishi made a remark in the Diet that “small arm for self defense would not violate constitution” (Endicott 1978: 98) indicates that Japan wanted the nuclear option open since China was developing the nuclear arsenal. A new revelation following the declassified document in which Sato said to the Americans that “We expect the United State to retaliate immediately using nuclear (weapons),” (The Japan Times, December 22, 2008) also indicate towards that direction. But since the public pressure on Japanese administration was mounting the same Sato who was in favour of nuclear option adopted three non nuclear principles (hikaku sangensuku) in 1967 pledging
Japan’s commitment that it will not produce, possess or introduce nuclear weapon. Japan later affirmed this resolve by signing a NPT in 1976.

Restriction on the Export of Arms and Military Technology:
When the Cold war was raging the Free World has adopted a policy of ban on selling arms as well as sharing technologies with the Communist Countries. At home there was growing pressure from Japanese administration to adopt a policy of “un-armed neutrality” to uphold the pacifist principles of Constitution. At this time Sato administration in Japan enunciated a policy of restriction of arms export to the Communist Countries as well as to countries under UN sanctions and parties in disputes. Later ,Takeo Miki administration in 1976 extended this policy calling for a blanket ban on arm export to all nations.

One percent GNP Cap on Defense Expenditure:
When Japanese economy witnessed a sign of recovery and growth there were apprehension among the pacifist groups that Japan would go for a major defense spending and may raise defense budget. There were demands to put a limit on defense spending inside the Japanese Diet as well. Owing to the public pressure and in a bid to ally these concerns Japanese Diet adopted a policy of 1% GNP ceiling on defense expenditure in 1976. *(Defense of Japan 2008: 557). Since the adoption of this policy in during Takeo Miki’s administration, successive governments barring Nakasone regime Japan has spent less than 1% of GNP on its defense.
Yet another influence of Japan’s pacifist Clause of the Constitution on Japan’s defense policy is civilian control as specified by the Article 66 which stipulates that all the minister would be civilians. Thus owing to its Constitutional obligation Japan till January 2007, Japan maintained a defense Agency rather than a Ministry of defense which was headed by none other than Japanese Prime Minister. Though Japan has upgraded its Defense Agency to a Ministry but it claims that transformation does not mean that a civilian control over the ministry is over. The defense white paper of Japan states that:

"Learning from World War II Japan has adopted the system of uncompromising civilian Control that are entirely different from those under former (Meiji) Constitution. Civilian control ensures that the SDF is operated in accordance with the will of the people." *(Defense of Japan 2008:111)*

With this clarification in the Defense white paper it seems Japan still gives precedence of political will over the military.
Militarization during Nakasone Regime:
In 1982, Nakasone Yosuhiro the ardent nationalist and a former JDA Chief assumed the Prime Ministership of Japan. He sought to take a number of initiatives aimed at breaking out the normative constraints imposed on the military as a legitimate instrument of state policy.

The salient feature of militarization during Nakasone administration (1982-87) was to further increase Japan’s military might and integration with the US Forces in the region. There was tremendous pressure from the US administration to increase armament to play a vital role in maintaining military balance to fight the challenges of Cold war.

Prior to the advent of Nakasone successive Japanese administrations had been able to use domestic political factors, such as popular opposition, to increased expenditure and Constitution as a means to resist pressure from the US. Nakasone’s political will to create a new national identity and normalization of Japan (Hook 1996: 70) helped the US to push Nakasone for greater militarization in Japan.

Following his visit to the US and meeting with the US President Ronald Regan, he announced that- “Japan is unsinkable aircraft carrier for the West”. In this way, he accepted a greater defense burden as demanded by the US and took endeavor to boost Japan’s military might. With the greater defense cooperation Nakasone aimed to achieve his own nationalist goal of making Japan an international State (Koksai Kokka Nippon) (Hook 1996: 70). His policy resulted into cooperation in military planning, combined military exercises and technology transfer related to defense industry.

Through these initiatives Japan tried to dispel the “free rider” theory, which always criticized Japan for taking a free ride on US defense system and not spending for its own defense. But increased defense spending resulted in the erosion of 1% GNP barrier for the first time in 1987, which was imposed during the Miki cabinet in 1976. In yet another step Nakasone partially breached the ban of export on weapon related technology, by signing an Exchange of Technology Agreement between Japan and the US. Another step,
which he took, was to visit Yasukuni shrine (symbolic fountainhead of prewar militarism) in the official capacity of Prime Minister. This stirred the debate in East Asian countries and was seen as the revival of Japanese prewar militarism. Through this visit Nakasone revived the spirit of nationalism in the new generation and the critical reaction from the neighboring countries further fuelled such nationalistic views especially amidst youth.

To sum up, the resurgence of nationalism and big power consciousness in the name of internationalization clearly demonstrates that apart from external pressure, pressure to strengthen Japan’s military came from within the government and governing party, too. In this sense Nakasone skillfully exploited American pressure as a means to legitimize the military build up despite opposition at the popular level.

**Conclusion:**

It is evident from the above discussion that during the early years of occupation a host of provisions were made to make Japan a demilitarized and peaceful country. All these measures were to some extent enthusiastically accepted by the majority of masses who had bore the brunt of catastrophic war. But with the bipolarization of the world and the outbreak of Korean War, US stances towards Japan greatly changed. The US, which has imposed pacifism on Japan, pressurized it to play an active role in containing communism in the region. Japan entering into US alliance tried to secure its territory under the US Defense System on one side and utilized opportunity to strengthen its economy under US led Capitalism. With the rapid economic growth in Japan, US further pressurized it to play its role as a security ally commensurate with its economic strength. But the continued pressure from the pacifists against the Japan-US Security System, and their movements against the remilitarization and revision in pacifist clause put a check on such move over the various political will of Japanese leadership.

By the 1980s except the Communists, opposition parties had shed their anti militarist policies and adopted more accommodative stance towards defense and security policies
pursued by the ruling party, which proved a shot in the arm for the ruling establishment to undertake militarization.

Amid this change in opposition attitude, Nakasone took rein of the political affairs. Nationalism once again saw a sudden rise. Nakasone pursued active rearmament and defense build up policy and skillfully capitalized the change in opposition’s mood in realizing his goal of a global Japan. Thus as a result of external pressure and an internal churnings the normative principles impeding Japan’s Militarization were gradually eroded but Article 9 of the constitution, a major constraint in breaking pacifism, remained intact till the end of 1980s. (Hook 1996) Yet another external change like the end of Cold war and the Gulf War of Iraq pushed Japan for a greater global role in the field of security. This time Japan was compelled to reexamine its role in world affairs and particularly in the UN Peace keeping mission. For this reason Japan was thinking to amend its pacifist Constitution to integrate its security policies with the changing Security scenario in the post Cold war period. It is these external and internal developments that will be discussed in the next Chapter.
The Developments of Legal Framework for Japan's international Security Role

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