CHAPTER 4
ETHICS AS FIRST PHILOSOPHY
Metaphysics, Ontology and first Philosophy

Aristotle established ontology as a branch of philosophy as he understood that there are many senses of being. Aristotle called the studies of ‘being as being’ the first philosophy and his first philosophy was closely tied to theology. This happens since being is immediately approached in the form of a foundation of beings, i.e., a supreme being. Since then, the European philosophy of being became onto-theology. Heidegger, in his readings of Hegel, introduced the term onto-theology.\(^1\) Western thought, for Levinas, consists in understanding being only as the foundation of being.\(^2\)

Incorporation of Aristotelian ontology into Christian theology was the contribution of Thomas Aquinas. Thanks to his efforts, ontological issues remained the subject matter of scholastic philosophy. The term ontology first appears in its Latin form *ontologia* in Jacob Lorkard’s *Ogdoas Scholastica*. In 1631, Rudolf Goclenius in *Lexicon Philosophicum* used ontology as an abstract study of physical entities. It was Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665)\(^3\) who used ontology in the sense of universal studies of being, which was closer to Aristotelian sense.\(^3\) Christian Wolf extensively used ontology in the sense of the universal study of being.

Modernity brings in a paradigmatic shift in the disciplinary approach to ontology. Descartes denied revelation the status of legitimate source of knowledge. Thinkers after him raised questions regarding the legitimate source of knowledge and human capacities of knowledge. It is in that way that the theory of knowledge gradually superseded ontology. In other words, before we discuss the questions of being, the questions of the limit of our knowledge became the primary issue. For Levinas, it represents a break.

Kant had a significant role in establishing the primacy of epistemology in philosophy. However, Kant ultimately posits God as the totality of reality. Levinas

\(^1\) Levinas, 2000, p.121
\(^2\) ibid, p.122
\(^3\) www.newworldencyclopedia.org
views a return to onto-theology in Kant. In other words, we can say that epistemological questions of Kant do not surpass the hegemonic structures of ontology. Edmund Husserl, who was the founder of phenomenology, upheld the view that there are various senses of being. According to his new theoretical conception, our perceptual capacities are also multifaceted. Husserl had the first tip of Aristotelian ontology from his teacher Franz Brentano. Brentano's *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* can be considered as a thorough study on Aristotle's ontology.

Husserl was dissatisfied with the narrow, one-sided view of being in modern philosophy. He refused to presuppose sense perception as the primary cognitive faculty and physically sensible qualities as the primary quality of being. Husserl argued that faculties of mind are far diverse and they include feeling, sensing, imagining, reasoning, believing, loving, willing, hoping, and so on. The framework of modern philosophy did not capture these multifaceted faculties of mind. Each object equally presents its existence in multifaceted ways. Husserl developed phenomenology as a philosophical methodology to describe diverse senses of being. Husserl's attempts can be considered as sheer extension of Cartesian epistemology over ontological questions. But he eventually reduces reality to rational thought.

Revival of ontology owes much to the thought of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger combined phenomenology and hermeneutics and developed hermeneutic phenomenology as his philosophical methodology to approach the questions of being. Taking a different path from traditional ontologies, Heidegger stressed that human understanding is always interpretive. Taking the human being as the access point to the question of being, Heidegger pointed out that the human being is a kind of being whose sense of being or non-being is always at stake.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger clarifies the intricate relationships among being, time, life, death, conscience, hermeneutics, and other fundamental

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4 Levinas, 2000, p.154
5 ibid
6 ibid, p.134
questions of ontology. Maintaining the ontico-ontological difference, Heidegger declares closure of metaphysics. For Heidegger, 'the notion of a foundation of beings by Being characterizes metaphysics.'\(^7\) In Western metaphysical tradition, ontological difference is forgotten. Heidegger sought to destroy the identification of presence and being. The tyranny of the same haunts his philosophy to the core. Levinas observes that the same is still rational in Heidegger.\(^8\)

Apart from phenomenologists, existentialists were very much concerned with the question of being. Analytic philosophy showed its keen interest in the question of being through the analysis of language. But Levinas sees in Heidegger's ontological difference an opportunity that is given to rediscover a possible thinking of being. For him, 'to separate God from onto-theology is to conceive the notion of meaning in new ways.'\(^9\) Unlike Heidegger, Levinas is not for a foundation of being. For him, God is the infinite other. Levinas asserts that ethics is the first philosophy. This assertion is grounded in the separation of Being and beings. The distinction between the *saying* and the *said* is another way of upholding this separation. His new assertion implies that there is a level of existence that precedes consciousness, freedom and beings. This is irreducible to being or beyond being. Levinas articulates the primacy of the ethical. Interhuman relationship is an irreducible structure upon which all other structures depend.\(^10\) The irreducibility of interhuman relationship is explained in terms of diachronic separation of the *saying* and the *said*.

**First Philosophy and Paradigms**

First philosophy is logically distinct from ontology. First philosophy was conceived as the logically prior universal basis of knowledge that provides the framework in which systematic issues are discussed. It was Descartes who upheld a tradition of treating the subject, which includes experiences and consciousness,

\(^7\) ibid, p.126  
\(^8\) ibid, p.135  
\(^9\) ibid, p.127  
\(^10\) Levinas, 1969, p.79
as the core field of philosophy in contrast to onto-theological considerations. There is a paradigmatic shift with Descartes' treatment of first philosophy.\textsuperscript{11}

Theocentric speculation has been logically prior to consideration of human problems or aesthetic concerns since it relied on some universal basis of knowledge. However, the paradigm of ontology began with Thales. Parmenides also believed that thought and being were one. For Heraclitus, things that appear to be permanent are, in fact, always changing. This world is really a flux, with no underlying structure. Parmenides, by contrast, argued that we can reach certain conclusions by means of reason alone. He does not leave much room for senses. However, Plato's theory of forms is a synthesis of these two views. Following Heraclitus, he argues that the objects of the world have no true existence. Following Parmenides, he says that the objects are merely copies of eternally true realities. We cannot directly perceive the Platonic forms. We can apprehend them in some way or the other by means of intellect or reason.

Aristotle says that any discipline deserving the name \textit{sophia} (wisdom) must describe the \textit{aitia} (first causes) and the \textit{archai} (principles). These causes and principles are clearly the subject matter of what he calls 'first philosophy'. It concerns issues that are in some sense the most fundamental or at the highest level of generality. Aristotle distinguished between things that are 'better known to us' and things that are 'better known in themselves,' and maintained that we should begin our study of a given topic with things better known to us and arrive ultimately at an understanding of things better known in themselves. The principles studied by 'first philosophy' may seem very general and abstract, but they are better known in themselves.

Aristotle identified the pure being, the unmoved mover to thought: thought thinking itself. Aristotle eventually grounded logic in first philosophy, which was for him ontology.\textsuperscript{12} According to Aristotle, first philosophy is logically prior to all other fields as the ground of knowledge. First philosophy is an episteme, a

\textsuperscript{12} ibid, p.35
Each science studies a particular kind of being as a field of being. Mathematics studies quantities. Physics studies moving beings and biology, living beings. First philosophy is the universal basis for all fields. The Ionians, the Pythagoreans, the Eleatics, Heraclitus and his followers, Atomists, Peripatetics and Epicureans share this paradigm of first philosophy.

In the history of thought, philosophers believed in different paradigms. In each paradigm, one may find complementary and contradictory views. For instance, the atomists viewed that the world was built out of atoms. For the Pythagoreans, 'numbers regulate everything, but transcend each instance.' In the medieval period also, 'wisdom' is regarded as the highest knowledge. Philosophical questions and theological problems are addressed in a common frame work of knowledge. Aristotle himself called first philosophy 'wisdom.' Medieval schools considered theology as the queen of sciences.

However, the credit goes to Descartes's *The Meditations on First Philosophy* for inaugurating the inevitability of another paradigm. Descartes connected existence to thought, not to being. Inner consciousness grounds knowledge, not outer reality. The experience of a subject is the universal basis of philosophy. Descartes announces that subject of consciousness is logically prior to being. This paradigm includes Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Bergson, Husserl etc. Knowledge was tied to consciousness in modern framework. The reduction of subjectivity to consciousness dictates modern philosophy. For instance, Hegel's idealism seeks to overcome duality of being and thought.

In the paradigm of language, meaning was shifted from the meaning for the subject to impersonal meaning. In the paradigm of language, language

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13 ibid, p.29
14 ibid, p.43
15 ibid, p.37
16 Levinas, 1991, p.103
universally mediates reality. It upholds the independence of concepts from thought. If thought is prior to concepts, concepts are consequent, not first. Concepts are given to individuals through language. Thought, which depends upon concepts, is a derivative.¹⁷

Hegel tried to overcome the opposition between being and consciousness in terms of absolute spirit. But Kant speaks about the idea of transcendence in many places. Nietzsche developed an axiological theory of becoming. For Nietzsche, 'becoming is not a shift between beings, but creations that can be interpreted.'¹⁸ Wittgenstein observes that there is something linguistic about morals.

However, we cannot entirely depend upon the paradigms. One can trace the competing logics in each paradigm. Refuting the thesis that posits an exact correlation between an age and its thought, Hugh P. Macdonald writes:

History is often complicated and difficult to generalize. This may be one basis for the rise of philosophy as an attempt to go beyond historical contingency, multiplicity and conflict. I will argue below that philosophy is distinct from history and historical determinations and has a procedure and a subject in the sense of topics, all its own. If philosophy reflects its age, all ages would have their philosophy, including ages before philosophy was articulated in the Greek world, India and China.¹⁹

Reflecting upon the history of philosophy, Hockings says that there are four major philosophical paradigms in the entire history of philosophical development.

1. Ontology (being and becoming)
2. Axiology (the good value)
3. The subject (Consciousness-experience)
4. Language (formal-informal)

According to Hockings, philosophy includes beliefs that are about the whole, not parts. It includes beliefs about reality, knowledge and conduct. The

¹⁷ Macdonald, 2004, p.41
¹⁸ ibid, p.46
¹⁹ ibid, p.58
paradigms that Hockings articulate are normative in the sense that they set limit to
the historical discourse. For instance, Being, as conceived by Aristotle, prepared a
ground for all philosophical issues in the medieval period. It could be seen that
being disappeared as a problematic by Hume’s time. It is scarcely found in Kant.

First philosophy, in brief, is an attempt to provide a certain ground that
will avoid infinite regress. Philosophy requires an ontic ground to make logos and
reasoning finite. For Aristotle, science of being is the first philosophy. Being is
the most universal category. ‘First philosophy is a logical requirement, not logical
in content.’

Aristotle ontologized hierarchical relations too. In Plato, hierarchy was
ultimately grounded in the form of the good. According to Aristotle, God is the
only pure being. He treats good as an attribute of a substance. Aristotle bases the
ultimate basis of philosophy on a normative model. Paradigms of subject and
language pass on to an ontologized substance-subject relation as eventual model
and ground. Descartes conceives first philosophy more as negotiation than as an
episteme. In his scheme of things, the relation to the subject became decisive in
defining the object. Subject took the place of substances, to which all referred
back as attributes. Berkeley’s ‘esse est percipi’ clearly illustrate this change. In
Berkeley, there is no being other than the perceiving subject.

Moore followed Aristotle in articulating value as the predicate of a subject.
The predicates refer back to the subject of the proposition, as in the relation of
substance and attribute. All philosophical paradigms display an ontological
prejudice which does not allow them to move beyond metaphysical finally. The
ontological shadows limit them to the presence of the given.

Levinas observes that scepticism is present at the dawn of philosophy. Ontology, right from Plato’s refutation of Sophists, refuses transcendence and

20 ibid, p.63  
21 ibid  
22 ibid, p.65  
23 ibid  
24 ibid  
alterity. The refusal of transcendence is connected with refutation of scepticism in the history of philosophy. Levinas views that scepticism seems to haunt the philosophical projects that refute it.\textsuperscript{26} It could be viewed as an ambiguity or an inherent tension. In contrast to unity and comprehension, there is periodical rebirth of scepticism in most of the philosophical projects. In his writings on the closure of metaphysics, Derrida also shares such an opinion. Every closure implies a new beginning. It implies an exit beyond the traditional way of thinking.

\textbf{Ethics as First Philosophy}

Levinas has set ontology and ethics into mutual opposition. For him, philosophy never begins with ontology nor with the formal categories of thought. He is against phenomenality which is a permanent presupposition of the philosophical tradition of the west.\textsuperscript{27} This presupposition subordinates subjectivity to a sense of objectivity. Philosophy can only be the question that a consciousness asks itself. But this questioning is not the act of a consciousness.\textsuperscript{28} According to Levinas, the self questioning itself is possible only thanks to the interruption of the other.

Asserting his view that philosophy is born of different level of consciousness, Levinas argues that first philosophy is ethics. Levinas deviates from the conceptual affinities that place self as something autonomous. For him, consciousness itself is the product of a relation with another human being. Consciousness, for Levinas, is "born as the presence of a third party."\textsuperscript{29} First philosophy, in this way, is 'an attempt to define the possibilities of existence and thinking.'\textsuperscript{30} Then, first philosophy should begin by addressing the relationship with other human beings. In this respect, the first philosophy is nothing but ethics.

Levinasian first philosophy refers to a self which discovers itself as a subject only because it is answerable to an other. The questions such as what is a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{26} ibid, p.171
  \item \textsuperscript{27} ibid, p.132
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Bergo, 1999, p.39
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Levinas, 1991, p.160
  \item \textsuperscript{30} ibid, p.38
\end{itemize}
being and what is the relationship of being to beings are not the fundamental questions of philosophy. According to Levinas, the fundamental question of philosophy concerns the way of being of consciousness whose immediacy escapes thematization and philosophy itself. Levinas is not focusing on the comprehension of being.

Here, Levinas adopts Heidegger's notion of transcendence. According to Heidegger, man should exist as always outside of himself. Heidegger speaks of the transcendence of the self out of itself. For Levinas, transcendence must be understood as 'one's being pulled out of oneself by a radical exteriority.' Following Heidegger, Levinas concludes that the essence of man points only towards the manifold of his modes of being in relation to beings. Man in this sense is a plurality of being.

Levinas accords human beings this ontological characteristic. But this is only a secondary characteristic of human beings. Unlike Heidegger, Levinas believes that the modes of disposition to other beings are not tantamount to the turning of being into truth. The otherness of other person may lead one to another truth. Levinas agrees that there is a horizon against which beings appear. In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas explains pre-thematic consciousness that stands separated from *il y a*. Here, Levinas refers to a world of labour and enjoyment. Prior to reflective subjectivity, to representation, a consciousness is in relation to its domain of beings. It could be pulled out of this relation by the summons of the other. The emergence of self-consciousness takes place in an economy forged by enjoyment, labour and possession. The reflection necessary to self-consciousness is only possible through the other.

Faithful to the theme introduced in *Existence and Existents*, Levinas observes being as a horizon of a continuous, indefinable being out of which the subject emerges. With enjoyment, the self rises out of a full immersion in the world. In *Totality and Infinity*, consciousness is defined as that which responds to

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31 Levinas, 1969, p.41
32 Bergo, 1999, p.42
33 Levinas, 1969, p.82
these various experiments. This is what constitutes the situated subject.\(^\text{34}\) The subject is capable of keeping his own distance with respect to enjoyment.

According to Levinas, the other interrupts the totality of subjects and its objects. The coming of the other interrupts this totality only to open it beyond itself toward the true transcendence. In enjoyment, subject participates in the world of existence. The subject is absorbed in the object it absorbs. Nevertheless, it keeps a distance with regard to that object.\(^\text{35}\) Levinasian ethics converts Husserlian intentionality to sensibility and primordial responsibility. Levinas writes in his essay 'Is Ontology fundamental?'

Thus we are responsible beyond our intentions. It is impossible for the attention directing the act to avoid inadvertent action. We get caught up in things. That is to say our consciousness, and our mastery of reality through consciousness, do not exhaust our relationship with reality, in which we are present with all the density of our being. It is the fact that, in Heidegger's philosophy our consciousness of reality does not coincide with our dwelling in the world that has created a strong impression in the literary world.\(^\text{36}\)

Levinasian discovery of the infinite as the epiphany to which all other phenomena owe their ultimate meaning has important consequences. First of all, the epiphany of the face subordinates all experience to responsibility. The epiphany of other's face breaks the totality. Levinas points to the infinite, stressing that its way is not essence, but otherness.\(^\text{37}\) The other's existence transcends the claims of my self-centered universe. The other transcends the horizon of being itself. In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas discusses the alterity of other. In *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, he reinscribes subjectivity as substitution. His subject is not the isolated subject of modern philosophy. Subjectivity is already 'turned toward the other.'\(^\text{38}\) It is substitution. Husserl, Heidegger, Neo-Hegelians and Neo-Marxians are in conformity with the idea that ethics is secondary to ontology. Levinas reflects on some of the attempts to conceive transcendence from the finite to the infinite and to go beyond ontology. Levinas, first of all,

\(^{34}\) ibid, pp.139-40
\(^{35}\) ibid, p.147
\(^{36}\) Levinas, 2007, p.3
\(^{37}\) Peperzak, 1997, p.12
\(^{38}\) Levinas, 2000, p.235
refers to the good beyond being in Plato's Republic. Similarly, Levinas largely
draws upon Descartes's conception of infinite. According to Descartes, the
relation that links human consciousness to the infinite is anterior to consciousness.

Levinas considers the periodical return of scepticism against objectivity,
comprehension and thematization. In thematizing, we synchronize the terms
involved. Synchrony is the time of ontology and thematization. Scepticism could
be taken as a 'rebuttal to synchronize the saying in the ontological said.'\(^3\) Levinas
emphasizes the 'diachrony of proximity which accounts for true transcendence.'\(^4\)
For Levinas, the only way in which transcendence is possible is ethical
relationship.

Explaining transcendence, Levinas upholds the primacy of the ethical. He
is for revising the entire project of western ontology on the basis of his conception
of transcendence as the ethically determined relation to the other.\(^5\) Levinas has
strived to make ontology secondary by subordinating it to the metaphysics of
transcendence. The primacy of theory or ontology is the secret of Husserl's
attitude towards being. Husserl follows a historical conception of being. The
transcendental consciousness constitutes the empirical \textit{cogito} and its time. In his
scheme, subject always coincides with itself.

Upholding the primacy of ontology, Heidegger also suggests that the
relationship of comprehension is the only and primary one between existence and
being. Since the publication of \textit{On Escape}, Levinas sought a way out from
ontology. His thematic essay 'Is Ontology Fundamental?' questions the primacy
of ontology to the core for the first time.

Levinas's long meditation on the meaning of phenomenology and the roots
of philosophy has resulted in the following conclusions. Consciousness is the
primary condition of all disclosure and ontology. It is not the other way around.\(^6\)
Good is beyond being or otherwise than being. In \textit{Totality and Infinity}, the good

\(^{39}\) Levinas, 1991, p.167
\(^{40}\) ibid, p.168
\(^{41}\) Peperzak, 1997, p.34
\(^{42}\) ibid, p.52
that Levinas refers to is pure exteriority. It refuses to be totalized by rationality. Good is not merely other. It doesn’t have other. The good is discernible in the face of the other persons, and it is only there one comes into contact with it. The good cannot become present or enter into a relation of representation. It entails a relationship of responsibility. Levinas writes:

Goodness is the sole attribute that does not introduce multiplicity into one. If goodness were distinguished from the one, it would be no longer be goodness. To be responsible in goodness is to be responsible in the inside or outside of freedom. Ethics slips into me before freedom. Before the bipolarity of good and evil, the I as “me” has thrown its lot in with the Good in the passivity of bearing. The “me” has thrown its lot in with the good before having chosen it. This means that distinction between free and non-free would not be the ultimate distinction between the human and non-human, nor that between sense and non-sense.

The priority of responsibility relative to freedom signifies the goodness of good. Levinas describes responsibility as a pre-phenomenal and pre-ontological inspiration. But that never implies that human body with its sensibility contains an exclusively altruistic possibility. Human body with its sensibility is directed towards others. Similarly, it also enjoys earthly satisfaction and pleasures. One is normally immersed in the ocean of suffering, lust and pains. In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Levinas conceives subjectivity as unchosen form of subjection to and responsibility for others. Levinas is for a phenomenology of the inspired body. Sensibility is being affected in contact with other. Levinas holds the view that ‘the transcendence of subjectivity is found in the very structure of sensibility.’ Proximity has always already made the subject obsessed for the other.

Proximity is ‘history before any history.’ It is political before any politics. For Levinas, obsession is the very proximity of beings. In obsession, consciousness, in all its forms – representational and axiological – looses its

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43 Levinas, 1991, p.11
44 Levinas, 2000, p.176
45 Peperzak, 1997, p.82
47 Scott, ‘A People’s Witness Beyond Politics’, in Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion, op.cit, p.28
presence. The other does not posit itself as a theme. It precedes cognition. Proximity implies a more intense relation than intentionality. According to Levinas, "obsession is a responding without choice, a communication without phrases and words."\(^{49}\)

Within ontological tradition, all temporal transitions are variations of the present. I have already pointed out that the temporality of being is synchrony. Levinas conceives, right from *Existence and Existent* and *Time and the Other*, a time that can resist all attempts to reduce it to presence. Levinas does not deny the importance of human needs despite his idea of transcendence that surpasses it. In fact, transcendence presupposes the economy of enjoyment. Desire transcends the economy of enjoyment by desiring the other. For Levinas, good, which is otherwise than being, is surpassing the limit of being.\(^{50}\)

*Totality and Infinity* began this approach by contrasting enjoyment with intentionality and reached a point where subjectivity encounters the other. In *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, the question of affectivity is introduced. The *saying* is an affectivity which lies beyond the intentional structure of signification. With the notion of the *saying* beyond the *said*, Levinas is not pointing to an original ground, but to a discontinuity and an excess which is effaced in the *said*. By introducing an irreducible duality of the *saying* and the *said*, Levinas recognizes the ethical and ontological moments in the production of meaning. The introduction of ethical *saying* presents the final form of Levinas’s renewed project on the question of meaning of being. The *saying* corresponds to a realm of affectivity beyond *said*. Levinas describes the interruption effected in the *saying*. He is for a necessary assemblage of *saying* and *said*.

Levinas is least concerned with the study of morality. He is not concerned with the logical analysis of the moral claims. He stands for "the normative

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48 Miller, Hugh, ‘Reply to Bernhard Waldenfels: Response and Responsibility in Levinas’, in *Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion*, op. cit, p.54
49 Levinas, 1987, p.120
50 Peperzak, 1997, p.166
perspective without any metaethical constraints.\textsuperscript{51} He addresses the problem of egoism also. Egocentric views place self-interest at the forefront of everything. One is always driven by self-interest. It is nothing but the self interest that eventually motivates one to save others, stand for justice etc. By strongly arguing that human experience is constituted by exposure to the other, Levinas conceives justice as part of face-to-face. In \textit{Totality and Infinity}, Levinas says that justice is a right to speak.\textsuperscript{52} Werhane observes that justice, for Levinas, does not arise from ego. Levinas is not reducing it to a product of community life also. On the other hand, it is the normative aspect of the exposure to the other.\textsuperscript{53} Levinas uses justice as a normative term. Unlike Kant, Levinas is against any attempt to equate freedom with autonomy. Kant is a pioneer in conceiving freedom as the obedience to the moral law of reason. Rousseau also approached the problem in a very similar fashion. According to him, people of sovereignty stipulate a law for themselves.

Levinas's earlier texts question the dominant readings of phenomenology articulated by Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. Unlike thinkers of modernity, Levinas refuses to separate philosophy from religion. But he is of the view that philosophy knows its limit, and it remains something greater than knowledge. He throws light on another dimension more compelling than knowing. This dimension lies at the root of all knowing.\textsuperscript{54}

For Levinas, religion is alien to mythology and ideology. Religious knowledge is not less universal than scientific knowledge. Apart from Positivism, all twentieth century philosophies question the superiority of science. For Levinas, Husserl represents all staunch supporters of science. Heidegger belongs to the group that opposed the hegemony of science.\textsuperscript{55} Levinas distances himself both from the extreme form of scientificity as advocated by Husserl and from Heidegger's radical opposition to it. For him, both these streams do not suggest a

\textsuperscript{51} Werhane, 'Levinas’s Ethics: A Normative Perspective without Metaethical Constrains', in \textit{Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion}, op.cit, p.59
\textsuperscript{52} Levinas, 1969, p.298
\textsuperscript{53} Werhane, op.cit, p.65
\textsuperscript{54} Cohen, 2004, p.2
\textsuperscript{55} ibid, p.3
way out for the ontological and epistemological orientations of philosophy. According to Levinas, the credit goes to Socrates for questioning the epistemological tradition of the west. Socrates challenged the hegemony of knowledge of the real. The knowledge of the real is not important. Priority is accorded to the knowledge of the good.56 Plato also emphasized this aspect of enquiry. Levinas traces the return of otherwise than being in the form of scepticism.57 According to Levinas, "scepticism is refutable, but it returns."58 One can trace same philosophical insights in Plato's good beyond being. Largely depending upon Plato's idea of good and Descartes's idea of Infinite, Levinas challenges the hegemony of knowledge. To question hegemony of knowledge is to question the hegemony of ontology. Levinas sets out to question the epistemological and ontological foundation of philosophy to the core. Philosophy has traditionally been oriented by the concerns of epistemology and ontology.

Unlike the western philosophical tradition, Levinas locates the humanity of the human in ethics. For him, ethics would be more important than epistemology. Epistemology seems to reduce other to the same. Earlier, Kant and Hume had expressed their concern for the limitation of knowledge. But they do not represent a philosophical inversion. Kant had shown that two roots lay open beyond knowledge, ethics and aesthetics, i.e., will and imagination. However, Kant understands ethics in terms of an adherence to the universal law. Kant sees the rationality of the other person, not the very other person. For Kant, morality is based on freedom. Levinas challenges the Kantian dichotomy between autonomy and heteronomy.

Levinas surpasses the entire enterprise of philosophy in defending ethics ethically. This is the postmodern take in him.59 Ethical relationship, for Levinas, does not stem from the individual choice. Ethics does not first arise in the context of knowledge and freedom of an intentional consciousness. Ethics precedes ontology, not in a synchronic, but in a diachronic way. Levinas opposes Kantian opposition between inner freedom and external coercion. For Levinas, 'human is

56 ibid, p.5
57 Levinas, 1991, p.168
58 ibid
59 ibid, p.6

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neither wholly free nor wholly determined. He believes that pure freedom and pure necessity are mental constructs foregrounded in intellectual abstraction. Morality, for Levinas, is a difficult freedom. Moral command comes to self thanks to the intervention of the other. Before self consciousness, the other is in the self. Being for the other is deeper than being for oneself.

Kantian philosophy opened up two alternative paths of post-epistemological philosophy. These are the alternatives of aesthetic and ethical. The domain of aesthetic is not confined to paintings, sculpture, poetry etc. All the senses in their sensuousness come in the purview of the aesthetic. Levinas asserts that being moral is to go beyond being. Diachrony implies being and at the same time being above. Levinas calls the trace of transcendence otherwise than being.

As Derrida points out, the word ethics undergoes a semantic reversal in Levinas. Levinasian ethics, writes Critchley, is not just an aspect of philosophical enquiry. Ethics is not secondary to some other primary concern of philosophy. Its meaning is found only in the singular relation with the other.

Face-to-face

Levinas casts light on the hidden level of meaning that is primary for human living. According to De Boer, Levinas integrates phenomenological ontology into dialogical thought. Face-to-face plays a key role in this integration.

Kant argues that categories of understanding and the intuition of space and time are necessary condition for the knowledge of the world and for the sensory experience. According to Kant, self experiences the world in various ways. Kant emphasizes on ‘I’s experience and its conscious activity. Levinas reduces the manifold of interaction between the world and the self in face-to-face relation.

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60 ibid, p.7
61 Critchley, 1992, p.17
62 ibid, p.16
63 Morgan, op.cit, p.50
Levinas asserts face-to-face as originary, primordial and anarchic. The face of the other person and the responsibility of the self are hidden horizons of meaning.\textsuperscript{64}

Levinas is initially provoked by both moral scepticism and nihilism. The moral sceptic asks whether the life is morally meaningful or not. Heidegger's indifference towards ethics is a major influence in this direction. Conceiving language as founded on a relation exterior to comprehension, Levinas says that the face is the way other person presents herself to me. Language is produced in the face-to-face.\textsuperscript{65} In the same fashion, he argues that 'language would surpass the limit of what is thought.'\textsuperscript{66} By the term face, he does not simply mean the other person. Face is not the object of everyday intentional consciousness; but it is a breach in that intentionality. In his essay, 'Transcendence and Height', Levinas writes: "The epiphany of the absolute other is a face by which the other challenges and commands me through his nakedness, through his destitution."\textsuperscript{67} Keeping Plato's notion of good in mind, Levinas raises certain fundamental problems in his essay 'Freedom and Command.' (1953)

Levinas says that there is an indispensable condition for the institution of law. There is a discourse before discourse and a relationship between the particulars prior to the institution of rational law. According to Levinas, engagement with a face is particular, prior to moral and political law. This is what he meant while asserting proximity before history and politics. For him, face of the other resists totalization.\textsuperscript{68} Otherness of the other person is a negation for Levinas. Levinas presents face-to-face as a primordial ethical event. The face, for Levinas, "resists possession, resists my powers. In its epiphany, in expression, the sensible, still graspable, turns into total resistance to the grasp."\textsuperscript{69}

Levinas connects language and the face-to-face. The other person who is present in an expression appeals to the self. In expression, there is already a sociality. The other challenges self's power to appropriate worldly things for its

\textsuperscript{64} ibid, p.56
\textsuperscript{65} Levinas, 1969, op.cit, p.295
\textsuperscript{66} Levinas, 1991, op.cit, p.169
\textsuperscript{67} Levinas, 1996, p.17
\textsuperscript{68} Levinas, 1987, p.19
\textsuperscript{69} Levinas, 1969, p.197
enjoyment. There is a moral summons to help, to be generous. Levinas equates this moral summons to religious election to serve the poor, the stranger, the widow etc.

Philosophy seeks transcendental arguments for the conditions that make communication possible. Kant expresses this through the rational categories of human understanding. On the other hand, Levinas feels that speech and discourse presuppose the face-to-face. Levinas is of the opinion that discourses of speech are transcendentally grounded in the face-to-face. He asserts that discourse is possible only on the basis of the face-to-face. Discourse implies a radical transcendence. It implies a radical separation between interlocutors. The relation between the interlocutors is the relation of face-to-face. Face-to-face relation reveals other's need, pleas and command.

Language, for Levinas, “doesn’t exteriorize a representation pre-existing in me: it puts in common a world hitherto mine.” In this respect, Levinas feels that there is no private language. Language requires at least two elements. Both elements are grounded in a face-to-face relation. He strongly argues that the commonality and universality of language coming from ordinary dimensions of life. But this ordinary dimension is hidden.

Levinas further explains that the encounter with the other is not an act of seeing. It is an act of sensing and responding. Sensing and responding happens first. For Levinas, ‘the saying of a said is in the dominion of sensible.’ Levinasian ethics entails a philosophical shift from intentionality to sensibility. In other words, ethics comes first since epiphany of the face has an ethical content. Ethics is the ground of language and community.

In his later works, Levinas points out some other aspects of the face-to-face relation. For him, face is not only pleas and commands. It unsettles or

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70 Morgan, 2007, p.73
71 Levinas, 1969, pp.245-46
72 ibid, p.174
73 Morgan, 2007, p.75
74 Levinas, 1991, p.62
disorients. Face as suffering/persecution strips the ego of its imperialism. The meaning of substitution and being a hostage is really the persecution of the self in its engagement with the other.\textsuperscript{75} Levinas articulates that the face of the other person is ethically prior to language and thought.

Modern notion of rationality seeks to transcend the limitations of everyday life. However, it can be said that post-modernism invokes the mundanness and everyday life. Post-modernism re-asserts a belief in variety of beliefs and practices. On the other hand, everyday world of modernity is the world of totality. For modernity, totality is the domain of reason. But Levinas says that the Infinite is outside totality and breaches it. The Infinite, for him, is ‘like a traditional God who exists as a transcendent being yet discloses itself in speech and act.’\textsuperscript{76} In the western philosophical tradition, from Parmenides to Heidegger, exteriority is assimilated into a comprehensive whole. But, for Levinas, there were and are hints about an exteriority that is absolutely outside. Here comes the notion of infinity and its relevance in Levinas’s philosophy.

In order to explain this absolute exteriority, Levinas depends upon two impulses of western philosophy – heteronomy and autonomy. Heteronomy refers to a move from everyday life to a beyond. This is a pointer towards metaphysics and philosophical theology. Autonomy aims at reduction of the other to the same. Western tradition, from Socrates to Hegel, is more inclined to the imperialism of autonomy.\textsuperscript{77}

Proving the veracity of distinct ideas, Descartes gives some hints about the possibility of a beyond. Descartes’s arguments are based on the existence of an infinite and perfect God. In \textit{Meditations}, Descartes says that we do not create the idea of God. This idea comes to mind from sources outside of us. These sources will be completely independent of us. Levinas wants to put emphasis on this. The thought of the infinite comes to us from a source independent of us. This is an

\textsuperscript{75} ibid, p.82
\textsuperscript{76} ibid, p.88
\textsuperscript{77} Levinas, 1987, pp.47-48
instance of heteronymous impulse. Levinas calls the infinite the epiphany of face. The relation with the other is not simply cognitive relation. It is desire. Desire, in Levinas, is 'a passive striving.' Contrasting his understanding of face with dominant impulses of western philosophy, Levinas in *Otherwise than Being* or *Beyond Essence* conceives responsibility not as a characteristic of self. Rather, his point is that responsibility is what is constitutive of self before it is anything else. The responsibility is thus an election. It is not a choice.

In brief, Levinas relates face-to-face and the idea of infinite. The face has meaning prior to all meaning constituting activity. The face and the ethical, as infinity, lie outside totality. In his essay, 'Meaning and Sense', Levinas contrasts meaning and sense. For him, meaning is plural. But sense is single. Sense is orienting whereas meanings are culturally or historically constructed. Sense is orienting for the construction of cultural meaning. The single orienting sense is the epiphany of the face of the other person. The other, says Levinas, "is neither a cultural signification nor a simple given. He is sense primordially, for he gives sense to expression itself, it is only by him that phenomenon as a meaning is, of itself, introduced into being."  

**Heteronomy and Autonomy**

Levinas's philosophy seeks to establish the priority of an ethical subjectivity that is constituted in responsibility for the other. Such subjectivity is not self-constituting, but is constituted in subjection to the other who is exterior to the subject. Levinas upholds subjectivity founded on heteronomy against a philosophical tradition that advocates the autonomy of the subjects. Ethics, for Levinas,

signifies the bursting of the unity, originally synthetic, of experience, and therefore a beyond of that very experience. Ethics requires a subject bearing everything, subjected to everything, obedient with an obedience that precedes all understanding and all

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78 ibid, p.53  
79 Morgan, 2007, p.92  
80 ibid, p.99  
81 Levinas, 1996, pp.52-57
listening to the command. Therein lies a reversal of autonomy into heteronomy.\textsuperscript{82}

Levinas takes efforts to show that Descartes' idea of infinite suggests the possibility of heteronomy of subjectivity.\textsuperscript{83} He explains his position very clearly in his article 'Philosophy and the idea of Infinite'. Philosophy, according to Levinas, addresses the question of truth in two ways. First, it focuses on subject's relation to a reality which lies beyond it. Here, truth becomes a matter of experience. The reality may be laws of physical world or metaphysical world. Truth could also be considered as the experience of the ideal. For Levinas, it is heteronomy that construes truth in experience in relation to the other or the transcendent.\textsuperscript{84}

Secondly, philosophy emphasizes that truth lies not in a relation to the other but in an act of free judgment. Judgments that are made freely are considered to be true. It is expected that these judgments are not made under conditions of interference. Such conditions primarily include interference from other people. It also includes factors such as passion, self-interest etc. Levinas calls this philosophical tendency autonomy. It stresses subject's uniqueness from the influence of the other.

Levinas views both heteronomy and autonomy as modes of epistemological subjectivity. They address the questions of how a subject can be said to have knowledge and how that knowledge can be considered true. For Levinas, the quest for truth is more fundamental than theory.\textsuperscript{85} Truth that is based on autonomy demands independence and self-sufficiency. Levinas feels that truth might be based on heteronomy.\textsuperscript{86} Truth might be the experience of the ideal and transcendent that exist exterior to the subject and with which the subject may enter into a relation.

\textsuperscript{82} Levinas, 2000, p.200
\textsuperscript{84} ibid
\textsuperscript{85} Levinas, 1969, p.60
\textsuperscript{86} MacAvoy, 'Truth and Evidence in Descartes and Levinas,' op.cit, p.22
According to Kant, ethical subjectivity is fulfilled in autonomy. In autonomy, the subject acts in conformity with the moral law as given by reason. Mapping out a position that is directly against Kant, Levinas points out as to how metaphysical and epistemological accounts of the subject are bound up with ethical accounts of the subject. He problematizes the discourse on autonomy to the core.

Levinas pinpoints the moments of heteronomy in the works of Descartes, Plato and Husserl. He strives to trace ambiguity in their works. Ambiguity implies the development of alternate philosophical possibility. Levinas views Descartes primarily as a thinker of autonomy. But the idea of infinite carries in itself some potential to undermine the notion of autonomy. Subject thinks more than what it can when the subject thinks the infinite. The finite subject’s idea of infinite can never be adequate to the infinite itself. Self cannot comprehend the infinite. Self is not a sovereign self. It cannot produce all ideas. Descartes’s idea of infinite challenges autonomy of the subject and suggests its heteronomy.

For Descartes, the truth of judgment and the truth of understanding are bound up with the autonomous activity of the rational subject. This provides a justification for the denial or affirmation of truth of some state of affairs. Clear and distinct perceptions can be construed as an experience of truth in the subject. Consequently, the possibility emerges of thinking this idea in accordance with the tendency towards heteronomy. Husserl also tends to move in such a direction when he construes clear and distinct perceptions in terms of the notion of self-evidence. To speak truth as evidence is to prioritize the experimental aspects of that truth. Evidence consists in experiences in which one thing is present in itself. For something to provide evidence, it must confirm an intention which one already had. Objects intended in acts of signification are attested to by objects given in intuition. Then, ‘truth is experienced in the adequation that results.’

87 ibid, p.23
88 Levinas, 1969, pp.49-50
89 MacAvoy, ‘Truth and Evidence in Descartes and Levinas,’ op.cit, p.24
90 ibid
91 ibid
Levinas rejects Husserl's account of experience of truth. He feels that Husserl is wrong in asserting experience's dependency on subject's intentional orientation. Evidence undergoes substantial change in Levinas's account of truth. The question of truth cannot be confined to subjectivity only. It cannot be limited to the relation between truth and knowledge. Levinas invokes the connection between ethics and truth. He asserts that truth requires a separation. It requires a separation between interiority and exteriority. But there is no truth without the possibility of error. The pursuit of knowledge consists in 'a movement beyond oneself towards the other.'92 Truth is a partial modality of the relation between same and the other. It is a relation between interiority and exteriority.93

Against a tendency that characterizes truth as subject's comprehension of the object, Levinas places truth in a relation to interiority of the subject and the exteriority of what lies beyond the subject. Subject desires to know this exteriority. A relation of heteronomy between interiority and exteriority is required for truth, provided truth is the experience of the relation with exteriority. For Levinas, it is language that establishes the contact between exteriority and interiority.

According to Levinas, a proposition doesn't represent the world.94 It is a saying in reference to the object. A proposition doesn't signify only what it thematizes. World is borne by propositions. World is offered in the language of the other. Objectivity of what is expressed in a proposition doesn't consist in its reference to an objective external world. By bringing the notion of responsibility, Levinas seeks to establish that subjectivity is grounded in heteronomy. Autonomy is possible only on the basis of this prior constitution.95 Responsibility for the other is precisely related to an unthematizable infinite. It is a relation beyond self. Being in relation with the good is being in relation with the other. It is heteronomy.

92 Levinas, 1969, p.64
93 MacAvoy, 'Truth and Evidence in Descartes and Levinas,' op.cit, p.25
94 Levinas, 1969, p.92
95 MacAvoy, 'Truth and Evidence in Descartes and Levinas,' op.cit, p.33
In *Third Metaphysical Meditations*, Descartes makes no distinction between the idea of God and the notion of infinite. According to Descartes, the sole idea of God couldn’t have come from the self. This idea is the idea of an infinite, eternal, immutable and all knowing substance by which all things are created. Descartes is of the opinion that the idea had been placed in the self by some substance that is truly infinite.\(^{96}\)

According to Levinas, the idea of infinite constitutes the formal design of the Cartesian idea of God. It is an intention and a thought whose *noema* doesn’t fulfill the *noesis* of which it is the correlate. Here, the ideatum surpasses the idea. The infinite shows its exteriority.\(^{97}\)

Levinas’s discovery of the Infinite, as the epiphany to which all other phenomena owe their ultimate meaning, has important consequences. The epiphany of the other subordinates the world of phenomena and experiences to responsibility. In this way, Levinas doesn’t conceive an ethics. But he insists that ethical perspective must be starting point of every philosophy. For Levinas, other’s face and speech ruptures the homogeneity of my universe. The mere fact of other’s existence dethrones me. Such a subject is rather a servant than a sovereign.\(^{98}\) The asymmetry of interpersonal relationship breaks the force of economy and egology of ontological tradition.

The idea of infinite cannot be reduced to or developed from the idea of totality. Human existence is not primarily thrown into the world. It is rather a way of being in the world.\(^{99}\) According to Peperzak,

A human dwelling is not a tool or utensil, but my private domain, the concrete form of my intimacy presupposed by all possibilities of using and discovering things in the worldly network of utilitarian relationships. Being at home in the world has neither the structure of a subjective activity or passivity in the face of objects, nor the meaningful coherence of a hammer, nails, a wall, and a

\(^{96}\) Peperzak, 1993, p.57  
\(^{97}\) ibid, p.59  
\(^{98}\) Peperzak, 1997, p.12  
\(^{99}\) Levinas, 1969, pp.152-53
painting as described by Heidegger. The home precedes the world of useful.\textsuperscript{100}

Levinas claims that Heidegger's thought is haunted by the traditional tendency to totalize. Heidegger considers being as first and ultimate. He excludes the possibility for infinitude and inevitably commits totalization. But Hegel's system, for Levinas, is most adequate instance of philosophical totalitarianism. Levinas finds the completion of philosophical history in Hegel's system.

**Phenomenology of Eros and Transcendence**

Levinas defines transcendence as passing over into being's other. He writes in *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*:

Transcendence is passing over into being's other, otherwise than being. Not to be otherwise, but otherwise than being. And not to not-be; passing over here is not equivalent to dying. Being and not being illuminate one another, and unfold a speculative dialectic which is a determination of being. Or else the negativity which attempts to repel being is immediately submerged by being.\textsuperscript{101}

For Levinas, there is no model of transcendence outside of ethics.\textsuperscript{102} Plato characterized human relation to the good as transcendence. Levinas links eschatology with transcendence. Eschatology implies a new structure of time.\textsuperscript{103} It is not oriented according to the *telos* of a given totality. On the other hand, eschatology "is a relationship with a surplus that always exterior to totality."\textsuperscript{104} From the stand point of eschatology, transcendence implies that beings are not simply manifestations of a totality. Beings, for Levinas, "have an identity before eternity, before the accomplishment of history, before the fullness of time, while there is still time."\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{100} Peperzak, 1997, p.9
\textsuperscript{101} Levinas, 1991, pp.3-4
\textsuperscript{102} Levinas, 2000, p.194
\textsuperscript{103} Caygill, 2002, p.105
\textsuperscript{104} Levinas, 1969, p.22
\textsuperscript{105} ibid, p.23
In the first part of *Totality and Infinity*, transcendence is identified as a desire. It is a movement towards other.\(^{106}\) The being at home in the world is constituted by needs and natural choices. Levinas emphasizes the utilitarian aspect of the 'economy.' The economy maintains and limits the human actions.

Levinas grounds the economy of needs in a more elementary form of phenomenology. This is based on impulsive assimilation and enjoyment.\(^{107}\) The wider form of phenomenology, as he conceives it, allows him to place all human activity — art, science, philosophy, religion and science — in that economy of dwelling. He conceives good as surpassing the limits of being in *Totality and Infinity* itself. *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence* deepens the earlier analysis and shows that being has a pre-economical nature.

According to Levinas, 'desire transcends economy and good transcends ontology.'\(^ {108}\) Desire transcends economy by desiring the other. Only in desire, one understands that he is not enclosed in himself. He is already for the other. He is a hostage or a substitute. Transcendence already presupposes economy of dwelling and enjoyment, but surpasses it. Transcendence precedes time and constitutes ultimate passivity.\(^ {109}\)

According to Levinas, a subject is being possessed and obsessed by transcendence. Human subject is an enthused body. It is inspired by the obsession for the other.\(^ {110}\) To live for the other is to suffer. It is passion that propels one to suffer for nothing. The passion is generated from an immemorial past. Sensibility and affection account for a breath that comes from an immemorial past. Human beings desire for something ultimate and absolute. The desire for the infinite is good. It is a metaphysical desire that cannot be satisfied.\(^ {111}\) Desire orient human ego to the other. The good orient human ego to dedicate itself to be good endlessly. Responsibility for the other is 'an expiation that goes beyond being.'\(^ {112}\)

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106 ibid, p.33  
107 Peperzak, 1997, p.166  
108 ibid, p.167  
109 ibid, p.168  
110 ibid  
111 Levinas, 1969, p.34  
112 Levinas, 1991, op.cit., p.15
According to Levinas, no true transcendence occurs at the level of *il y a*. The transcendence towards the human other is similar in its form to the transcendence towards participation in the world of enjoyment. But it qualitatively differs. Commenting on the true transcendence in Levinas, Bergo writes:

The contingency of the *il y a* intersects being and our experience of being. We cannot say that it is temporally prior to or posterior to consciousness as the identification of self and its objects. Intersection here means the irruption and intercalation of what is other than reflective consciousness in its world. Structurally then, the irruption of *il y a* as a pure difference, or neutral being in which no objects comes to light, is analogous to the self-loss that is provoked by the approach of the other. The other, likewise, interrupts pursuits and enjoyment of being of a consciousness. However, the human other breaks the totality of subject and objects in an entirely different way. For Levinas, this coming of the other interrupts this totality only to open it beyond itself toward the true transcendence which is the other person.113

Enjoyment characterizes the stage of ipseity for Levinas. But in *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, he defines passivity as a continuous form of sensuous exposure to the world. It is a defenseless openness to the other. According to Levinas, writes Elisabeth L. Thomas, “enjoyment is that way of being in the world which doesn’t negate the singular moment in which ‘I’ contracts existence and finds itself bearing the weight of being. It does effect a distance and thus appears beyond being understood as *il y a*.”114

Levinas refuses to acknowledge this ‘distancing from’ as transcendence. He struggles to distinguish relations analogous to transcendence and those relations of transcendence.115 He refuses to identify representational relations that constitute the immanent identity of the ‘I’ with the movement of transcendence.

He also says that erotic love cannot be a true transcendence. *Totality and Infinity* posits two grounds for the time of responsibility. The first one is the face-to-face encounter and the other approach is dialectic of eros and fecundity.116

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113 Bergo, 1999, p.63
114 Thomas, 2004, p.55
115 Levinas, 1969, p.109
116 Bergo, 1999, p.117
telos of eros is fecundity. The encounter in erotic relationship is based on desire. This relationship is both ontic and ethical. In erotic relation, there exists reciprocity between same and the other. But in face-to-face relation, which entails a true transcendence, Levinas speaks of the limited reciprocity and asymmetry. 117

Levinas speaks of the birth of a child as the transubstantiation of the same. Transubstantiation opens a new perspective on infinity. Fecundity inaugurates a new ethical time for father. The infinity of transubstantiation conjoins the time of the world and ethical time. 118 The infinity of the other was ethical infinity, and it implies a time that is different from the time of the world.

Paternity, filiality and fraternity are key figures in Totality and Infinity. Fecundity establishes a relationship with absolute future. 119 Levinas's dialectic of eros explores the origin of face-to-face in connection with the biological relations. He goes on to explain face-to-face and human reconciliation in social life. Love entails transcendence. But love deploys a structure that is the inverse of the face-to-face. 120 Dialectic of eros reverses the order of welcome. It introduces reciprocity into responsibility too. Futurity of eros only becomes fecundity. But the dialectic of eros and fecundity cannot account for infinite time and infinite responsibility. Levinas explains that 'the goodness and transcendence peculiar to erotic desire are quasi temporal.' 121

Eros and face-to-face originate in an irrecoverable past. Both point behind and beyond themselves. Eros entails both symmetry and reciprocity. Moreover, it inverts the relationship of same to the other. Eros is habilitated as a mode of intersubjectivity as it produces a son who is outside my time. In fecundity, 'I' transcends the world. 122 The fecundity of 'I' is its very transcendence. 123

117 ibid, p.106
118 ibid
119 Levinas, 1969, p.268
120 Bergo, 1999, p.115
121 ibid, p.116
122 Levinas, 1969, p.268
123 ibid, p.277
Limiting his phenomenology to pure immanence of the subject, Levinas in *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, abandons the dialectic of eros. Ethical relationship is founded on language and dialogue. Levinas explores the meaning of dialogue in *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*. In *Totality and Infinity*, the ethical relation was straightforwardly one of dialogue. However, the equivocity of eros makes it ethical and sub-ethical concurrently.¹²⁴ Language in eros is not dialogue. It is capable of opening a dialogue which can degenerate into a provocation also. A relationship without speech is in the process of becoming ethical.¹²⁵

Levinas further explains that transubstantiation is a total transcendence. It is a transcendence that does not have the temporal form in which the 'I' leaves and then returns to immanence.¹²⁶ Levinas, in order to elaborate the experience of transcendence within immanence, introduces the heteronomous moments of *saying* and *said* in *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*.

According to Levinas, true transcendence is found in the ambiguity that arises in both the *saying* and the *said*.¹²⁷ The pre-original *saying* "weaves an intrigue of responsibility."¹²⁸ The ambiguity of *saying* lies in the trace that it leaves within spoken language. The ambiguity of *said* is the ambiguity of meaning inherent in thematization. This ambiguity is characteristic of all languages. The ambiguity altogether accounts for the passage of ethics to politics in *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*. This is a passage from singular to general. This is the universalization of responsibility.

**The Third Party and the Question of Justice**

The notion of third party is indispensable to account for the question of justice and the universalization of responsibility. The third party effects the

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¹²⁴ Bergo, 1999, p.118
¹²⁵ ibid
¹²⁶ ibid, p.122
¹²⁷ ibid, p.169
¹²⁸ Levinas, 1991, p.6
transition from transcendence in immanence to phenomenality. My relationship with the other as neighbour gives meaning to my relationship with others.\textsuperscript{129}

Levinas is always confronted by the question whether morality is possible without God or not. He answers it by a counter argument: is divinity possible without a human other? Levinas feels that the direct relationship with God is a Christian concept. It has nothing to do with Judaism. In Judaism, the third, apart from I and you, makes an emphatic presence. The God reveals himself only as a third.\textsuperscript{130}

According to Levinas, the responsibility for the other person “does not originate in a vow to respect the universality of a principle, or in a moral imperative. It is the exceptional relation in which the same can be concerned with the other, without the other’s being assimilated to the same, the relation in which one can recognize the inspiration, in the strict sense of the term, to bestow spirit up on man.”\textsuperscript{131} Levinas speaks about the relation between ideology and morality. According to Levinas, contemporary thought “is the thought of a human society that is undergoing global industrial development.”\textsuperscript{132}

Ideology, in contemporary time, gives the most severe blow to morality.\textsuperscript{133} The western world understood morality as an actualization of rational understanding. Immanuel Kant represents the culmination of such a conception. Critics view Kantian ethics as an extension of Christian ethics in philosophical garb. According to Levinas,

“morality understood as an ensemble of rules of conduct based upon the universality of a set of maxims, or upon the hierarchical system of values, contains its own rational justification within itself.”\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{129} ibid, p.159
\textsuperscript{130} Levinas, 1989, p.247
\textsuperscript{131} ibid, p.244
\textsuperscript{132} ibid, p.236
\textsuperscript{133} ibid, p.237
\textsuperscript{134} ibid
Earlier, theological paradigms retained the legitimacy on the universality of maxims. In modernity, rationality emerged as a powerful paradigm that sustained the universally valid ethical imperatives.

The term ideology appears continually in the Marxist critique of liberal society. But one can trace back its origin in Hegel's philosophy. The concept of ideology, as it is used by the Marxists, gave a partial blow to the traditional way of understanding ethics. Marxism, and specifically its conception of ideology, heralded the relativity of morality in relation to history.\(^{135}\) By giving more emphasis on the historical situations that really mould the moral logos, Marxists problematized the essentialist nodal points of traditional ethics. But the credits for subverting the nodal points of traditional ethics go to Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud.\(^{136}\) Levinas does not end his ethics yielding to the conceptions of Nietzsche or Freud. Similarly, he is not for universally valid moral imperatives of tradition. Instead, he formulates his points to address morality in a very different sense. He draws inspiration from Plato who set forth a beyond of institutional justice. Plato has a very strange idea of a dead judging the dead. The idea is that justice of the living could not pass beyond the clothing of men. The privileges, the clothes, obstruct the judges. Plato, here, is advocating the idea of disinterestedness, which is very close to Levinasian conception of substitution.

Levinas advocates the transcendence of being through disinterestedness.\(^{137}\) The face reveals to the subject the reality of other in his/her pure humanity. Transcendence is brought by the face of the other. In contrast to intentionality, Levinas rehabilitates the notion of sensation in the face-to-face.\(^{138}\) The face of the other doesn’t appear to one’s intentional consciousness. It doesn’t appear within the time of history. Levinas argues that

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\text{the other remains infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign; his face in which his epiphany is produced and which appeals to me breaks with the world that can be common to us, whose virilities are inscribed in our nature and developed by our existence.}\(^{139}\)
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Levinas is of the opinion that "ethics is not a moment of being; it is otherwise and better than being, the very possibility of the beyond." In his essay ‘The Third Man’, Levinas discusses friendship. He is against equating love or agape to the categories of ethics. In his essay ‘The Ego and the Totality’, Levinas prepares a critique of the love of the neighbour. He rejects Eros and love as inadequate account of the ethical. He feels that love of neighbour is conceived in terms of traditional religion. It is foregrounded on a private relation to God. Levinas sees love in a different way. According to him, “love is the ego satisfied by you, apprehending in the other justification of its being.”

For Levinas, Buber conceives his I-Thou in opposition to the public realm. He doesn’t account for many other things. He doesn’t explain the representational relation with other things. I-Thou doesn’t account for the economy of enjoyment and dwelling. Levinas argues that closed society fails to recognize the economy and justice. Levinasian attack of the couple is part of his general criticism against Bergson’s notion of love. Bergson views love as the élan vital that transforms the world of evolution. But Levinas feels that love ignores the third. It establishes a non-public solitude.

Levinas speaks about a kind of morality that ushers in love. But this morality cannot carry the potential possibility to found a society in which not only the neighbour but also stranger can live. Tina Chanter points out that his critique of eros is motivated by his concern for the ethical. Levinasian search for the ethical is essentially tied around the question of third party and justice.

Levinas distinguishes between the alterity encountered in the erotic relation and the alterity encountered in the face-to-face relationship. Commenting on this distinction, Elisabeth L. Thomas writes:

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140 Levinas, 1989, p.179
141 Thomas, 2004, p.92
142 Levinas, 1987, p.31
143 Thomas, 2004, p.92
144 Levinas, 1969, p.265
145 Thomas, 2004, p.93
146 ibid, p.94
While the alterity encountered in the erotic relation contain the same demand expressed by the face, *eros* is nevertheless essential to the possibility of ethics and justice. Unlike the love of the neighbour, which remains a duo-solitude, *eros* is both before and beyond the face. It is the essential ambiguity which allows Levinas to explain the paradoxical subjectivity who is not annihilated in the relation with transcendence but affirms itself there as an other while retaining in itself.\(^{147}\)

In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas describes this ambiguity of *eros*. For him, *eros* is both beyond and before the face. It is beyond the face in so far as it becomes enjoyment. Beyond the face, *eros* is voluptuosity. Voluptuosity excludes the third party. Voluptuosity remains completely non-public despite its I-Thou structure.\(^{148}\) The relation to the other in voluptuosity withdraws from the dialectical structure of the social whole.\(^{149}\) However, there is a relation to something beyond the other encountered in voluptuosity.\(^{150}\)

According to Levinas, there is a production of the infinite in *eros*. It anticipates 'I' beyond the ontological possibility of death. Fecundity establishes a relation with future.\(^{151}\) It opens transcendence in being. Levinas is of the opinion that voluptuosity is essential to the production of the future as infinite. The subject-child relationship is a mode of being. Child is engendered in the relationship with beloved. For Levinas, 'engendering child in relation to the beloved produces being as a multiplicity.'\(^{152}\) Thus erotic relation introduces another dimension of sociality in terms of paternity and fecundity. Erotic relation in its multiplicity introduces human into being.

In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas doesn’t see *eros* as an ethical relation par excellence. But he does not undermine its important role in the possibility of social whole.\(^{153}\) According to Levinas, subject in the intersubjective relation maintains a distance with regard to the totality and a distance with respect to the

\(^{147}\) ibid
\(^{148}\) Levinas, 1969, p.265
\(^{149}\) ibid, pp.264-65
\(^{150}\) Thomas, 2004, p.95
\(^{151}\) Levinas, 1969, p.268
\(^{152}\) ibid, p.269
\(^{153}\) Thomas, 2004, p.98
other. He is conceiving a subject that participates in the social totality, without being reduced to it.

Addressing the question of ethics, Levinas refuses to accept the opposition between private ethos and public justice. Private ethos is governed by love. Justice is governed by law and impersonal reason. There is a way in which the singular breaks through the totalizing movement of economy. Here, Levinas brings in face as the site of the emergence of the other. The relationship with other is an asymmetrical relation. But it is not devoid of conditions of economic injustice.¹⁵⁴

According to Levinas, other invokes a relation of justice. The subject of dwelling participates in an economy of enjoyment. At the same time, the subject of dwelling withdraws from the economy. The arrival of the other awakens the subject to this separation. Thirdness is discovered only in the face of the other.¹⁵⁵ The face of the other calls into question the subject in relation to being and possession. The other awakens the subject to the demand of justice. The face summons one to go beyond the linearity of justice. Here, Levinas tries to distinguish between economic justice and ethical justice.¹⁵⁶

According to Levinas, justice requires a response. This response doesn’t remain between the two. He is speaking about the generalization of the ethical relation. It is a shift from face-to-face to social whole via political justice. It is a universalization of responsibility. In that sense, Levinasian ethics is not a moralism. In other words, Levinas distinguishes between linear justice and justice. By introducing the concept of the third, Levinas tries to show that he is concerned with a critique of morality in terms of justice. The straight line of justice is linked to the right attached to law. Justice is associated with the infinite relation with the other.¹⁵⁷ For Levinas, ethical relation is the necessary condition for the possibility of justice within society. In other words, ethical justice is necessary condition for the possibility of political justice. It can be said that Levinas rethinks justice of social totalities in terms of the ethical relation. Critchley notes that there are two

¹⁵⁴ Levinas, 1987, p.42
¹⁵⁵ Thomas, 2004, p.104
¹⁵⁶ ibid
¹⁵⁷ ibid, p.115
notions of justice in Levinas—ethical and political. In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas deals with the first notion only.

Levinas is primarily concerned with providing an account of ethical justice. His point is that justice arises out of a singular relation to another. Levinasian ethics does not assume a pre-existing universal. Levinas further explains his position in *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence* by bringing in the notion of time. Responsibility presupposes an infinite time—a time that is not measured in or by history. The other confronts the subject from an immemorial past. Levinas is not speaking about the time of representation. He is invoking the idea of the unrepresentable time. According to Levinas,

> a face is a trace of itself, given over to my responsibility, but to which I am wanting and faulty. It is as though I were responsible for his morality, and guilty for surviving. A face is anachronous immediacy more tense that of an image offered on the straightforwardness of intuitive intention. In proximity, the absolute other, the stranger whom I have "neither conceived nor given birth to", I already have my arms, already bear, according to the biblical formula, 'in my breast as the nurse bears the nurseling.'

Interestingly, Levinas explores a fundamental connection between face, trace and the infinite. He sees the trace of God in the face of the other. He is of the opinion that God is revealed through his trace. The ethical subject is always responsible to the other. This responsiveness is at the same time a desire for the infinite of God. Levinas draws the difference between desire and need. A need can be satisfied. Need identifies its end. But, in case of desire, the journey is endless. It is beyond satisfaction. For Levinas, "the endless desire for what is beyond is disinterestedness, transcendence—desire for the good."

According to Levinas, the relationship with other is a relationship prior to freedom. One is responsible for the other prior to any choice. The responsibility for the other is proximity. It is troubled and becomes a problem when the third

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158 ibid, p.117
159 Levinas, 1991, p.91
160 Levinas, 1989, p.177
Levinas locates the birth of consciousness with the entry of the third party. Levinas writes:

Consciousness is born as the presence of third party. It is in the measure that it proceeds from it that it is still disinterestedness. It is the entry of the third party, a permanent entry, into the intimacy of the face-to-face. The concern for justice, for the thematizing, the kerygmatic discourse bearing on the said, from the bottom of the saying without said, the saying as contact is the spirit in society.  

Levinas explains the relationship between ethics and politics by exploring the possibility opened up by the entry of the third party. He also addresses a contradiction brought about by the entry of the third party. It introduces a contradiction in the saying whose signification before the other went in one direction. Levinas argues that it is the limit of responsibility and the birth of this question: What do I have to do with justice? A question of consciousness. Justice is necessary, that is, comparison and coexistence assembling, order, contemporaneity, thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus the intellect and the intellect, the intelligibility of a system, and thence also a copresence on an equal footing as before a court of justice.

There is no distinction between the proximate third party and the distant third party. It is the explanation of true fraternity. This is at the heart of Levinasian justice which is not a lesser form of obsession.

God and Philosophy

Unlike Immanuel Kant and other modern philosophers who reflect upon ethics, ethics lies at the heart of Levinas's philosophy. Western philosophy has reduced metaphysics to ontology. Ontology reduces other to the same. Ontology does not distinguish between myself and what is otherwise than myself. Metaphysics based on ontology ends in totality. Levinas distances himself from the ontological and epistemological conceptions of God.

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161 Levinas, 1991, p.157
162 ibid, p.160
163 ibid, p.157
For Levinas, the otherness of the other points towards absolute otherness. The encounter with the absolute other takes us beyond all possibility of encompassing the totality of things in a single system. It is here that the question of God comes in Levinas’s philosophy. Traditional metaphysics and even Kant has made God an object of knowledge. For Levinas, here is the birth of theology. Theology treats God as a kind of object of knowledge. Even modern philosophy prioritizes its epistemological approach towards God. According to Levinas, all these approaches deny God’s intrinsic otherness.165 There can be no knowledge about God separated from the relationship with men.

The traditional metaphysics views God as essentially cognitive. The approach of empiricism or positivism does not alter the nodal points of traditional metaphysics. Positivists categorize all human individuals as simple instances of humanity.166 All are part of the same totality. Levinas says that ‘the great myth of philosophy is the myth of legislative consciousness of things, where difference and identity are reconciled.’167 All philosophical endeavors show some sort of idealism. The idealism varies from metaphysics and epistemology to politics and ethics. The distinction between idealism and rationalism is not addressing the real problem. These debates eventually complement the broader idealistic nature of philosophical thinking. The theoretical character of philosophy, for Levinas, “makes the question of being inevitable. Being is the correlative of knowledge. Knowledge is occasioned by being as its manifestation.”168

Modernity conceives philosophy as a rational thought. The rational self comprehends everything. According to Hegel, real is rational and rational is real.169 History of thought shows a scission between knowledge and being. In Hegel, we see advancement towards spirit. Levinas locates “a return to onto-theology in Kantian thought.”170 In Kant, God is posited as the totality of reality. Kant calls the set of all possible predicates of reality a transcendental ideal. Levinas accuses that even Husserl and Heidegger could not overcome this riddle.

165 ibid, p.162
166 ibid, p.163
167 Levinas, 1996, p.14
168 Levinas, 2000, p.161
169 Morgan, 2007, p.96
170 Levinas, 2000, p.155
In Heidegger, 'the manifestation of being happens by way of forgetting.'\textsuperscript{171} The phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger continue the triumph of same in the philosophical traditions.

Heidegger criticizes onto-theology. Onto-theology consists in thinking God as a being on the basis of a supreme being. Heidegger suggests that we must ultimately think being without beings.\textsuperscript{172} Levinas says that his inquiry also starts from a critique of onto-theology. But he seeks to think God without making being or beings intervene in the relation with God. Levinas seeks to think God as a beyond being.\textsuperscript{173}

Levinas finds in Descartes a hint on infinity. Obviously, he is the founder of the modern epistemological turn. But Levinas finds inspiration for his radical turn from Rosenzweig. Rosenzweig also feels that modern western philosophy fails to respect the irreducible difference among world, God and man.\textsuperscript{174} He argues that revelation is the ground of meaning for human existence. Something outside the realm of traditional philosophy can account for the meaning of human existence.\textsuperscript{175} Levinas opens the possibility of realism beyond the broader framework of idealism that is totalizing. He conceives other as that the self cannot assimilate. Levinasian other calls the self into question.

Philosophy in the twentieth century moved away from religion and the theological. However, there are certain religious impulses in the philosophy of Karl Barth, Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig and Walter Benjamin. They found in God a ground for the meaning of human life.\textsuperscript{176}

Logical positivism sidelined theology from the domain of philosophical debates. But, with the influence of later Wittgenstein and ordinary language philosophy, various religious phenomena get philosophical legitimacy. Earlier, Kant had banned God from philosophy, science and theory. Later on, he is

\textsuperscript{171} ibid, p.161
\textsuperscript{172} ibid, p.160
\textsuperscript{173} ibid
\textsuperscript{174} Morgan, 2007, p.95
\textsuperscript{175} ibid
\textsuperscript{176} ibid, p.176
convinced of the necessity of a belief in God for moral agency. In this respect, Levinas’s conception of God has certain structural affinity with Kant.

According to Martin Buber, God is the eternal Thou. He is the divine presence. We cannot speak of God. But we can speak to him. In his essay ‘The Ego and Totality’, Levinas says that “god could not be god without first having been this interlocutor.”177 God is not the Thou of an ‘I’. He is neither a dialogue nor in a dialogue. But he is not separable from my responsibility for the neighbour. God is thus a third person or *illeity*.178 Levinas is of the opinion that god has something to do with face-to-face encounter. In *Totality and Infinity*, he says that encounter with a face is a relation with God. According to him, “there can be no ‘knowledge’ of God separated from the relationship with men.”179 The other, writes Levinas,

is indispensable for my relation with God. He does not play the role of a mediator. The Other is not the incarnation of the God, but precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in which God is revealed.180

Face reveals the height that is the locus of the divine revelation. The height in Levinas refers to the asymmetry of face-to-face. The height, in Levinasian vocabulary, also means the moral force encountered in other’s face. In brief, the God of *Totality and Infinity* is ‘the moral force in virtue of which the other commands the self’.181

Morgan feels that Levinas appropriates religious and theological language to establish the primacy of the ethical. For Levinas, for instance, revelation implies the primacy of responsibility to other.182 Similarly, creation implies the idea that each human beings are worthy of care and generosity.

In *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, and in ‘God and Philosophy’, Levinas further clarifies his understanding of the face-to-face in terms of some

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177 Levinas, 1987, p.33
178 Levinas, 2000, p.203
179 Levinas, 1969, p.78
180 ibid, pp.78-79
181 Morgan, 2007, p.181
182 ibid, p.182
theological notions. Instead of 'height', Levinas uses new terminology such as hostage, obsession, persecution, substitution in his later writings. Trace and glory are the two terms that have theological underpinnings. Levinas takes them to a different meaning altogether. Trace is the trace of the transcendence, and glory is the glory of the infinite. In *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, Levinas says that the infinite passes in *saying*. God's revelation, for him, is an expression to show desire to respond to other person with kindness. The infinite has glory only through my substitution for the other.\textsuperscript{183}

Above all, Levinas puts his views against a tradition that sees social interaction as the beginning of reflections on God. Levinas thinks that Nietzsche also orients himself in this tradition when he declares the death of God.\textsuperscript{184} Through this declaration, Nietzsche indirectly affirms the life of God in social interaction and history. God is dead when God is the object of subjective necessity.\textsuperscript{185}

Levinas uses the term *illeity* in connection with the notion of God. *Illeity* is the otherness of the other person that is present in the other person as a trace. *Illeity*, as trace, disrupts the world of totality.\textsuperscript{186} *Illeity* is there in the face of the other person as a trace. The divine is not present in itself. It is present in the face-to-face. God, as *illeity*, is present on the face. But God is not related to the other as a third party.\textsuperscript{187} God, as *illeity*, is other. God is the ethical force. But third party is the locus of justice, institutions and principles.

Traditional theology and philosophy speaks about a God who is omnipotent and overwhelming. Tradition conceives a hidden God, who confers upon the human the freedom to respond to the command. On the other hand, Levinas believes that there are moments in human existence when the divine

\textsuperscript{183} Levinas, 2000, p.200  
\textsuperscript{184} Morgan, 2007, p.184  
\textsuperscript{185} Scott, op.cit, p.28  
\textsuperscript{186} Levinas, 1996, pp.60-64  
\textsuperscript{187} Morgan, 2007, p. 192
enters the human, yet departs. While departing, the divine leaves its trace. The trace resides in the face of the other person.

While reflecting upon the traditional conceptions, Levinas discusses the problem of theodicy. Traditional philosophers and theologians consider the problem of evil as a problem of theodicy. They address the problem of evil with the shield of God who is omniscient and omnipotent. Levinas asserts that we are living in a time after the end of theodicy. By the term theodicy, Levinas doesn’t mean a narrow sense of theodicy as introduced by Leibniz. For Levinas, theodicy means the tradition as old as the Biblical one.

Theodicy presupposes that we can have some knowledge about God’s attributes. Kant approaches theodicy as a theoretical problem. He is of the opinion that morality doesn’t need religion at all. Kant sees God as a practical necessity. Extending the debate on the problem of evil to the modern era, Levinas takes Stalinism and Hitlerian fascism to mark a crisis in European culture. Stalinism was the outcome of Marxism and socialism. Levinas discredits humanism grounded in socialist notions. Problematizing the Kantian dilemma, he writes:

If there is an explicitly Jewish moment in my thought, it is my reference to Auschwitz, where God let the Nazis do whatever they wanted. Consequently, what remains? Either this means that there is no reason for morality and hence it can be concluded that every one should act like Nazis, or the moral law maintains its authority... It still cannot be concluded that after Auschwitz there is no longer a moral law as if a moral or ethical law were impossible, without promise. Before the twentieth century, all religion begins with the promise. It begins with the ‘Happy End.’

Levinas is not in a position to affirm God, Israel’s election and ethics after holocaust. For Levinas, holocaust marks the end of theodicy. Theodicy, in a narrow sense, allows the believer to maintain faith in God in the face of the world’s evil. Theodicy, in a broader sense, is a way of giving meaning to evil that

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188 ibid, p.193
191 Morgan, 2007, p.355
help us face despair. It is an attempt to justify evil on account of an aim. In other words, it provides some directions to prevent future ones. Levinas writes in his essay 'Transcendence and Evil':

That in the evil that pursues me the evil suffered by the other man afflicts me, that it touches me, as though from the first other was calling to me, putting in to question my resting on myself and my conatus essendi, as though before lamenting of the good in the intention of who I am in my woe so exclusively aimed at? Is it not theophany, and revelation? The horror of the evil that aims at me becomes horror over the evil in the other man.

According to Levinas, evil as excess, as unintegratable otherness, is beyond theodicy. After the holocaust, the balance between western theodicy and suffering is devastated. Now there is disproportion between suffering and theodicy. The horrific events of twentieth century come in the way of all intellectual explanations of theodicy. Levinas, closely following Nemo, takes evil and suffering to breach totality. He, thereby, resists the hegemony of theodicy. Suffering is fundamentally meaningless. It is beyond the dimension of theodicy. For Levinas, my suffering can take on meaning by bearing the suffering for the other. The only way to make my suffering meaningful is to be compassionate. The end of theodicy, for Levinas, means that I should not hide my responsibility for the other.

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192 ibid
193 Levinas, 1987, p.185
194 Levinas, 2007, p.127
195 Bernstein, op. cit, p.261