CHAPTER III

THE OCCUPATION ADMINISTRATION: STRUCTURE, GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
After the surrender of Japan in 1945, the Allied Occupation Administration under U.S. leadership tried to deal with two major trends in Japanese politics. First, the Occupation Administration took into account the long historical trend of anti-democratic and autocratic tradition, political practices, and social customs, nurtured under the cover of a hollow sense of Japanese superiority vis-a-vis the Western people. And second, the Occupation Administration had to confront the trend ever since the Meiji Restoration, consisting of the efforts on the part of the ruling clique to terrorize and indoctrinate the Japanese people into submission and ready support for militaristic actions and adventures beyond the national boundaries. It is in this context that the Occupation Administration, its goals and objectives can be understood.

What made this U.S. endeavour of 'planned and externally-directed change' in Japan (a defeated nation) distinctive was the retention of the Japanese government by the Occupation Administration even after its surrender with a view to make it the formal agency for introducing the socio-political reforms. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) did not replace the government of Japan, nor did he usurp the sovereign power of the state. Instead, it made use of the Japanese government in the implementation of the reforms. The institution of the emperor was also spared and allowed to exist. In addition, it was stated in the beginning of the Occupation that no government would be imposed.
Japanese people unacceptable to them. It was made clear that soon after the establishment of a peacefully inclined and responsible government in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people of Japan, the Occupation would come to an end.

In terms of 'linkage politics', thus, the U.S. Occupation of Japan corresponds to the category of 'penetrative linkage process' as propounded and elaborated by Rosenau. What happened in the occupied Japan could neither be explained in the context of international politics only nor within the framework of comparative politics. It represented a case of linkages where domestic and international politics converged. It was a situation in which a foreign power participated in national decision-making.

**AMERICAN THINKING ON THE POST-WAR WORLD ORDER**

Before the end of the World War II, hectic activities for sketching the contours of future world order started taking place in policy decision-making circles of the United States of America. The isolationist policy, then followed so closely by America, started crumbling down under the weight of new thinking which stemmed from the rapid developments which encircled the Europe. The ideal of peaceful world, free from the dictates of the brutal use of force became the focal point. Peace in totality,

1 See "Radio Address by the President, September 3, 1939", in World Peace Foundation, Documents on American
was considered to be necessary as a guarantee for peaceful world order. To ensure peace, it became mandatory to find ways and means for tackling the problems arising from the interactions of nations. To establish a system of peaceful co-existence among nations, certain universal measures, to be employed in situations of conflict among nations, were to be specified. Moreover, it was necessary for every nation to institutionalize such a political process which was conducive to the establishment and maintenance of peace and order in the world.

Law and morality had become a substitute to force in the relations among nations. It envisaged suitable institutional procedures for the resolution of conflicts and peaceful settlement of disputes. Moral norms were exalted to replace power politics.

The rule of law presumably left little room for resort to force, except in collective action against possible aggressors, and moral condemnation by the community of nations was regarded as a potent deterrent against violations of the peace.

If a threat was posed to a nation's security by another nation, whose domestic order was not compatible with the universal norms for relations among nations, then such a threat was equivalent to the threat to the very existence

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2 Ibid.


5 Ibid, p. 12.
of world order. Hence, it required to be tackled collectively. The collective action should not be confused with the coming together of some nations for the domination of world. Rather it was a combined guard against threats to a peaceful and just world order. The stable world order based on law and morality was feasible only when free economic interaction, unhindered by geographical boundaries among the nations, existed. Since nations were dependent on one another so extreme nationalism had to be opposed to clear the way of free commerce among the States. It implied a stable world economy free from trade barriers and equal access to resources, to information, transportation, markets, and investment all over the world.

All nations that respect the legitimate existence of others should be treated equal in terms of sovereignty and their territorial integrity. Political independence of all these states should be assured. No change in the territorial jurisdiction of the nations be made without the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned. There should be no foreign interference in the formation of government and people should have full opportunity of democratic self-governance. A just world order assures full liberty to people within their own countries as well as in the entire world with no barriers to travel and

6 See Hull declaration and Atlantic Charter in Ibid, pp. 6-7 and 12.

interaction with the people of other countries. This predominant mode of thinking and philosophy was prevalent before and during the World War II in the United States of America concerning the post-war World Order. It was termed as an idealist approach to the theory and practice of international relations and "ran counter to the strong sentiment of the isolationism then held by large sections of the American people." Thus, democratic rule within the domestic set-up of the nations, adoption of peaceful means for resolving conflicts, and the institution of free economy at the international level became the signpost for the future world order. U.S. Occupation policy toward Japan was formulated within these parameters.

THE U.S. OCCUPATION POLICY

EFFORTS AT THE NATION LEVEL

The defeat of Japan was taken for guaranteed by the U.S. State Department. Before Japan had been conquered in the World War II, serious efforts were made by the State Department to formulate a post-war policy toward it.10 "As early as 1942 a research division of the State Department commenced basic studies looking forward to the

9 Dunn, n. 3, p. 9.
preparation of policy papers on the Occupation of Japan." Within the State Department a committee known as Inter-divisional Area Committee on the Far East was formed to deal specifically with the issues which were of prime importance to the U.S. interests in Far East in general and Japan in particular. Its membership consisted of "representatives from the division of Far Eastern Affairs and other divisions with interest in that area, and of persons from the new research division under the direction of Dr. Leo Pasvolsky." Apart from the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, two more committees ('Policy Committee' and 'Post War Programs Committee') were constituted within the State Department in the early 1944 to accelerate the job of preparing policy matter for the post-war world. The Occupation of Japan had become the primary issue in the State Department only in February 1944, when the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department and the Occupied Area Section of the Navy Department made a request to it to draft policy statements on more than twenty crucial questions relating to the prospective Occupation of Japan and Korea.


12 Borton, n. 10, p. 204.

13 Dunn, n. 3, pp. 31-2.

These questions were about the meaning of unconditional surrender of Japan, duration of Occupation and its nature, position of the Emperor, political objectives of the military government in occupied Japan, post-war objectives of the United States in relation to Japan. The Inter-divisional Area Committee on the Far East was assigned the task to prepare detailed reports on these issues to be reviewed by the post-war Programs Committee. Although the preliminary studies were already being conducted by the State Department on many of the questions raised by War and Navy departments, the inquiries sought by these departments directed the State Department to prepare in advance incisively on those important issues which could emerge at the time of Japanese surrender to the U.S. and its Allies in the Pacific.

The analysis and study of these question required not only political but also military perspective which involved the participation of War as well as Navy departments in the planning process. For the smooth functioning of the State, War and Navy departments in a team spirit, a combined committee (State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee) was formed in December 1944. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), further,

15 Ibid; and Borton, n. 10, p. 203.
16 Dunn, n. 3, p. 32.
17 Borton, n. 14, p. 250.
formed a Sub-committee for the Far East (SFE) on January 5, 1945 with representation from each of the three departments, to formulate policies on the various post-hostility problems in the Far East and when necessary, to reconcile divergent views within the government. This sub-committee was the main body which prepared the U.S. Occupation policy in Japan. "Its decisions were reviewed by the SWNCC as a whole" usually after receiving the "comments of the Joint-Chiefs of Staff from a military point of view" or even of "the President before they became United States policy."

EFFORTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

During the World War II serious endeavours were made by the Allied Powers to arrive at a consensus concerning the war objectives and the nature of the future world order free from threats to peace. Such efforts were made at the Casablanca conference in January 1943, the Cairo Conference in December 1943, the Yalta Conference in February 1945, and the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. In none of these international historic meetings of the Allied powers, the issue of Occupation - its structure, nature, and duration - was given any consideration. In January 1943 at the Casablanca conference a vague

20 Dunn, n. 3, p. 33.
21 Martin, n. 11, p. 6.
22 Dunn, n. 3, p. 33.
reference was made to "the unconditional surrender of the Axis states."23 Similarly in the first Cairo Declaration issued on December 1, 1943, the three Allied Powers - U.K., U.S.A and China - resolved to "continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."24 Although the declaration clearly stated that the territorial status of Japan would be reduced to the pre-World War I area of Japan, there was no clause to elaborate the intended unconditional surrender of Japan. There was also no reference to the Occupation of Japan. The main concern of the Allies fighting the war was 'to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan'. It did not include any resolution or statement relating to the policies of Allied powers toward the domestic set-up of Japan after her defeat. The only inkling to the Occupation of Japan discussed at the combined meetings of the Allied powers was the Potsdam declaration of July 26, 1945. However, it is interesting to note that the Potsdam declaration, defining terms for Japanese surrender, was not the outcome of joint efforts of the signatory powers. In fact, this document was prepared by the U.S. government to be accepted by the other Allied powers at Potsdam and to be issued jointly in the name of Allies.25

23 Borton, n. 10, p. 203.

24 Ibid.

Thus, the main issue in the various international conferences which took place during the war, was to consolidate the efforts of the Allied powers against the Axis states and to reach at a consensus regarding the nature and form of the post-war world order, not to draft policy matters for the prospective Occupation of Japan. Hence the policy to guide the Occupation of Japan was not the Allied Occupation policy. It was in fact the U.S. Occupation policy as it had been prepared by SWNCC with the approval of the president where no representation was provided to the Allied powers. However, on the contrary, Roger Buckley in his *Occupation Diplomacy* reiterates that the U.K. policy perspective toward the post-war Japan was well represented by Sir George Sansom, a British authority on Asia. Sansom’s expert views were noted down by the State Department from 1943 onwards but that was in an informal context. U.K. was never provided any representation in the Occupation policy making organization of the United States of America.

The U.S. Occupation policy toward Japan was guided by the principles of democratic rule and international trade free from economic barriers. Japan before the end of World War II was a closed, undemocratic state where militarists were on the ride. In the second half of the nineteenth century America tried to forcibly open Japan from its self imposed isolation from the world. The Tokugawa's seclusion policy was dismantled by the signing of Kanagawa treaty in 1854 and the treaty of Commerce and Navigation in July 1858. This was a prelude to other nations' entry into trade transaction with Japan. However, the fundamental motive behind the forcible attempts to open Japan was to initiate free trade relations with Japan. There were no such designs as far as introducing democratic values and institutions in the Japanese society were concerned. It was only during the world war II that the U.S. policy toward Japan started taking seriously the issue of undemocratic domestic political set-up of Japanese society and its links with the aggressive foreign policy of Japan. Japan was termed as a deviant case in the peaceful relations among nations. And, unless and until it was transformed into a democratic and peace loving state, the threat to


U.S. interests in Far East in particular and world security in general would remain continued.

The nature of Japanese polity, society and economy was taken as an index to determine the U.S. policy toward Japan. Two divergent viewpoints emerged in the policy making circles of the U.S. government regarding the interpretation of Japan's aggressive posture in world politics. The first viewpoint, based on the long experiences of some of the American experts on Japan Joseph Grew and Eugene Dooman, "was based on the assumptions that militarism constituted an aberration in the normal pattern of Japan's promising domestic development and peaceful international relations of the 1920s."²⁹ It attributed war to the emergence of militarism in Japan. It also found the emerging flow of democratic values in the Japanese society especially during the Taisho era, and a sense of developing cordial relations with other states. In order to reintegrate Japan as a peaceful actor in community of nations, this perspective prescribed the abolition of nascent militarism from the Japanese domestic set-up and made provisions for the institution of constitutional safeguards against such recurrence.³⁰ In other words, it did not favour overall intervention in the Japanese society by the occupying forces. Such viewpoint was dominant in the Occupation planning in the State


Department during 1942-45. In the early draft of the Potsdam proclamation, the protagonists of this viewpoint were against the abolition of the Imperial Institution and made provision for "a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if it be shown to complete satisfaction of the world that such a government shall never again aspire to aggression."³¹

Another viewpoint which became dominant in the second half of 1945 took extreme view of the Japanese political system, economy and society. It stressed that militarism was not a recent development rather it had been well rooted in the society and economy of Japan which glaringly reflected in its polity. In order to establish a democratic rule and a peaceful order in Japan, the deep-rooted militant values³² in the Japanese society, and the economy had to be wiped out.³³ The Under Secretary of State Designate Dean Acheson, said before a senate committee in September 1945 that "(t)he present economic and social system which makes for a will to war will be changed so that will to war will not continue."³⁴ To cleanse the Japanese society from the filth of militarism and to remould it on democratic

³¹ Iriye, n. 25, p. 254.


³³ Moore, n. 29, p. 731.

lines, effective intervention in its every aspect was essential. This perspective which got articulated in the second half of 1945, finally reflected in the Initial Post Surrender Policy document of the U.S. Government.13

Thus, the Potsdam proclamation of July 1945 and the U.S. Initial Post-surrender policy for Japan of August 1945 were considered as the two primary documents underlying the philosophy of the U.S. Occupation policy toward Japan. The Potsdam declaration was an ultimatum to Japan to surrender to the Allied powers or face total annihilation. The main motive behind the declaration, however, was not to squeeze the vanquishing state to the last drop, out of vengeance for its dreadful act of destruction of the mankind in the world war II. In fact, it aimed at dislodging of militarism and the establishment of democratic order in Japan which would help her, eventually, to join the family of nations. Keeping this in view, the declaration carried a positive note for the people of Japan that "the Japanese people shall not be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation." It promised the people of Japan, says Baron E.J. Lewe Van Aduard, a participant in the Occupation forces, "a peaceful existence as a democratic nation."17

Before Japan surrendered to the Allied powers and the Occupation began officially on 2 September 1945, a

35 Moore, n. 29, p. 732.


basic directive on Occupation policy was radioed to Douglas MacArthur on 29 August 1945 to guide the complex operation of reorienting Japan. The document, entitled "United States Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan" was a result of intensive efforts made by the State Department during the early war years and then of combined study of State, War and Navy departments since early 1944. Although it was the outcome of painstaking effort of many years and took a minute account of various forthcoming issues in the Occupation of Japan but still it was not considered as a final word on the Occupation policy. The purpose of the document was to provide a general statement about the initial U.S. policy of Occupation towards Japan after surrender. It is stated in the document that "(i)t does not deal with all matters relating to the Occupation of Japan requiring policy determination." The same has been set forth clearly in the 'Basic Initial-Post Surrender Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) for the Occupation and control of Japan, November 3, 1945.'

Paragraph 3 (c) Part I of the directive reads:

This directive does not purport finally to formulate long term policies concerning the treatment of Japan in the Post-war World, nor does it seek to prescribe in detail the measures which you are to take throughout the period of your occupation of Japan in the effort to give effect to the surrender and the Potsdam Declaration. Those policies and the appropriate measures for their fulfillment will in large measure be determined by developing circumstances in Japan. It is, therefore, essential that surveys dealing with economic, industrial, financial, social and political conditions in Japan be constantly


39 Ibid, p. 73.
maintained by you and made available to your government. These surveys should be developed in such a manner as to form the basis for effecting modifications in the initial measures of control set forth herein as well as for the progressive formulation of policies to promote the ultimate objectives of the United Nations. Supplemental directives will be issued to you through the Joint Chiefs of Staff as may be required. 40

Although the question of the definition of the specific, and instrumental-goals of the Occupation was to an important degree left open at the outset so that it could evolve in consonance with developments in Japan and elsewhere, but the basic thrust of the U.S. policy toward Japan to help her to transform into a democratic and peace loving nation remained unchanged throughout the entire period of occupation. 41

What makes the Occupation of Japan a distinct endeavour was the retention of the administrative structure of the government of Imperial Japan. It was stated in the basic U.S. documents on the Occupation policy toward Japan (Potsdam proclamation, and U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy) that the administrative structure of Japan would not be disposed of rather it be used to implement the policies of the Occupation. It is clearly indicated in the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" in Part-II (Para 2) that "The Policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan, not to support it." 42


41 William, n. 34, pp. 208-30.

42 Occupation, n. 38, p. 75.
Allied Occupation of Japan was in fact an American operation of "externally planned and controlled political change on a national scale." Baron E.J.Lewe Van Eduard even went further to say that Allied Occupation was a "MacArthur show." Unlike the Occupation of Germany, Japan was not divided in occupied zones and there was no equal partners in the operation as such. The entire responsibility was put-on the U.S. military forces and civil officials. As far as other Allied powers were concerned only the British Commonwealth forces, comprising Australia, New Zealand, British and a few Indian units, took part in the Occupation operations. They were not free to operate independently of the SCAP orders and general U.S. policy decisions. In fact, they were organized as a part of the U.S. Eighth Army. Except in the purely military affairs the Commonwealth forces played no important role in the political reorientation of Japan "and their number remained small throughout." The other Allied powers especially U.S.S.R, U.K. and Australia were interested to play an equally important role alongwith U.S.A. in the administration of the Occupation. However, the United States of America was


44 Aduard, n. 37, p. 10.

45 Ward, n. 43, p. 483.

46 Aduard, n. 37, p. 9.
not ready to share equal participation with the other Allied Powers. This was mainly because of the bitter experiences of the Occupation of Germany and of its dominant role in the Pacific war. Although in the Moscow Conference of December 1945, the participant powers in the Pacific war managed to establish the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan, the two international bodies representing the countries at war with Japan to look into the matters of the Occupation—but here again U.S. survived its predominant position.47 "Thus, the Occupation was almost entirely an American show and was regarded as such by the Japanese."48

It is to be noted that there was no clear indication of the exact duration of the Occupation in the various documents on Occupation policy. However, the Potsdam Declaration vaguely stated that the occupying forces would be withdrawn as soon as in Japan a peacefully inclined and responsible government was established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese People.49

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49 Occupation, n. 38, p. 55.
THE OCCUPATION ADMINISTRATION: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PROFILE

The organizational structure of the Occupation Administration, to translate policy decisions of reorienting Japan into practice, assumed significant importance in the 'social engineering' operation of the Japanese society by a foreign power. The nature of the Occupation and the goals it intended to achieve posed the United States a serious challenge where its action to achieve those goals should not appear as forcibly imposed upon the Japanese by it. The objective was to involve the Japanese in this tough endeavour. This policy was first stated in the United States Initial Post-surrender policy for Japan. Under part II, para (2) it was stated:

In view of the present character of Japanese society and the desire of the United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment to its forces and resources, the Supreme commander will exercise his authority through the Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily further United States objectives .... The policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan, not to support it.50

The same was further highlighted in a Far Eastern Policy decision of June 19, 1947.51 In essence,

"Techniques of control must be of a nature which does no gross violence to the traditions upon which our democratic system is predicated or its principles upon which the occupation is based."52

50 Occupation, n. 38, p. 73.


The organization of the Occupation was a complex and intricate both in its structure and functions. It was structured on different levels with varied specified purposes. To term it simply as a military operation in a final military campaign would amount to turn eyes from the historic experiment made by a foreign power to transform an alien society from above with the active participation of indigenous governmental machinery.

For a matter of convenience, the organizational structure of the Occupation could be studied at three distinct levels. First, there was an international structure consisting of two bodies with specific functions to perform: Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan; the second was the specific agencies of the U.S. government acting on behalf of the president, and third the most important was the U.S. occupational control and executing machinery in Japan.

**FAR EASTERN COMMISSION**

The Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and the United States, held on December 27, 1945, announced with the concurrence of China the creation of two international bodies: Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan for the execution of Occupation operation. Far Eastern Commission was composed of representatives of the eleven nation: U.S.A., U.S.S.R., U.K., China, France, Canada, Australia, India, Netherlands, New Zealand, and
Philippines. U.S.A., U.S.S.R., U.K. and China each enjoyed veto power. Its headquarters was established in Washington. Pakistan and Burma also joined the commission on November 17, 1949. Decisions in the commission on substantive as opposed to procedural matters could be taken by less than unanimous vote provided that action shall have the concurrence of at least a majority of all representatives including the representatives of the four following powers: United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Republics and China.53

Its main function was to formulate the policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the terms of surrender may be accomplished.54

However, the establishment of this international body had not effected the predominant status of the U.S. government in the Occupation of Japan. United States government was empowered to issue interim directives to the SCAP on matters not covered by policies already formulated by the commission save "fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure or in the regime of control of dealing with a change in the Japanese government as a whole" on which prior agreement in the commission was essential.55 Even in these reserved matters U.S. government enjoyed the equal powers due to its right to exercise veto power along with other powers. No policy decision in the commission could be taken if U.S. withdrew her consent and it could effectively block

53 FEC, n. 51, p. 38.
54 Ibid, p. 37.
55 Ibid, p. 38.
any attempt to annul her interim directive and to censure General MacArthur or make him reverse actions already taken. FEC had no direct access to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers stationed in Japan for the actual execution of the Occupation programme. All the policy decision of the FEC were to be transmitted to SCAP through the appropriate United States governmental agency in the form of directives. The role of FEC in guiding the Occupation was remained confined only to its major policy decisions adopted on June 19, 1947, entitled "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan." However even this policy decision of FEC closely paralleled the earlier U.S. directive of August 29, 1945 with some minor new additions. Thus, says Edwin O. Reischauer, "in reality the Far Eastern Commission could do little more than discuss and then approve, but not disapprove previous American policy Decisions." However, it had powers which made it difficult for the United States on its own initiative to modify fundamentally the nature of the occupation or to terminate it, but the commission never had the capacity itself to control the occupation or formulate basic policies for it.

57 Ibid.
ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

Along with FEC, Moscow agreement also "established terms of reference for an Allied Council for Japan." It was housed in Tokyo and composed of representatives of four nations (the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and the British Commonwealth representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India). Its function were to consult with and advice the supreme commander in regard to the implementation of the terms of surrender, the Occupation and control of Japan and directives supplementary thereto. However it was not binding on the supreme commander either to consult with the council or to accept its advice. If the Allied Council had any power to exercise in regard to the operation of the Occupation it was in relation to its implementation of the policy decisions of the FEC on the 'reserved subjects'. But it had never utilized this power. Except its nominal existence in Tokyo as an international body, it was hardly consulted on referred to for advice by SCAP for the purpose of which it was established.

60 FEC, n. 51, p. 4.


any attempt to annul her interim directive and to censure General MacArthur or make him reverse actions already taken. FEC had no direct access to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers stationed in Japan for the actual execution of the Occupation programme. All the policy decision of the FEC were to be transmitted to SCAP through the appropriate United States governmental agency in the form of directives. The role of FEC in guiding the Occupation was remained confined only to its major policy decisions adopted on June 19, 1947, entitled "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan." However even this policy decision of FEC closely paralleled the earlier U.S. directive of August 29, 1945 with some minor new additions. Thus, says Edwin O. Reischauer, "in reality the Far Eastern Commission could do little more than discuss and then approve, but not disapprove previous American policy Decisions." However, it had powers which made it difficult for the United States on its own initiative to modify fundamentally the nature of the occupation or to terminate it, but the commission never had the capacity itself to control the occupation or formulate basic policies for it.


57 Ibid.


purpose was established accordingly. The President of the United States of America appointed General Douglas MacArthur as the supreme commander for the Allied Powers on August 14, 1945. He was also Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army Forces Pacific later changed to Far East Command (FEC). As a Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers Douglas MacArthur was "responsible for both the military and the civilian aspects of the Occupation" and his authority was confined to four islands of Japan. But, being a Commander-In-Chief of the United States Army Forces Pacific General MacArthur’s authority was extended to the western areas of the pacific ocean to look after the military affairs of the United States.

In the beginning of the Occupation, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, MacArthur was assisted in the discharge of his duties by the higher senior staff of General Headquarters, United States Army Forces Pacific (GHQ, AFPAC). GHQ, AFPAC was a military organization with a military government section based on pre-surrender planning for military government of Japan. But the organization based on the strict command of military set up was not the need of the then situations, precisely because the real goal of the Occupation was to transform the Japanese society to gear...
it towards peace and democracy. How come an organization which was itself based on undemocratic norms like that of military set-up could reform a nation to introduce it to the democracy? In fact, what led to discard the proposal of establishing a purely military type administrative structure in Japan, as proposed by General Crist's planning group, was the prompt and willing surrender of the Japanese government on the one hand and the U.S. policy to use the Japanese governmental machinery on the other. 69

Thus, accordingly, on 20 October 1945, General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (GHQ, SCAP) was established in Tokyo to take care of the political and economic matters of the Occupation programme in a relatively non-military administrative set-up. A number of special staff sections were created as part of the GHQ, SCAP to deal with other than purely military tasks of the Occupation, at the national level in Japan. These special staff sections 70 were composed of specialists predominantly civilians, and were functionally organized to deal with their equivalent sections in the various ministries of the Imperial Japanese Government. 71 Their functions were to provide

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70 For details see Alden, n. 61, p. 305.

SCAP with expertise assessment of their respective fields which, if approved, transmitted into SCAP directives and sent to the Japanese government. Another responsibility of these staffs were to direct and supervise the Japanese government in the implementation of SCAP's orders and directives. The General Staff Officers (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4) - purely military personnel - were assigned limited functions in administration of the Occupation operation and were prevented from interfering in the policy advisory function of the special staff sections.

At the local level, the responsibility for the operation of Occupation was delegated to the Eighth Army, headquartered in Yokohama. The structural pattern adopted by the Eighth Army paralleled almost to that of the Japanese government which descended from national government directly to the forty-six prefectural governments without having any administrative units in between. To supervise the conduct of Occupation in each prefecture, a local military team known as prefectural military government team was established. These prefectural teams came under the control of the Eighth Army. However, contrary to the hierarchy of the administrative structure of the Japanese government, two more administrative units (I Corps and IX Corps and Eighth military government regional Headquarters) were created between the Eighth Army Headquarters and the prefectural governmental team. These administrative units from SCAP headquarters down to the prefectural military

72 Alden, n. 61, p. 305; Fainsod, n. 69, p. 293.
government teams constituted the organizational set up of the U.S. Occupation in Japan, which revealed according to Braibanti, "a standard pattern of line command." A central Liaison office was set up in Tokyo and followed by similar offices in each prefectural capital, to maintain administrative contacts between the special staff sections and the local military government teams on the one hand and their parallel agencies in the Japanese government on the other. GHQ, SCAP sent its instruction to the Japanese government through the central liaison office in the form a series of directives commonly referred to as "SCAPINS" or as "SCAP Directives." Copies of the directives were transmitted to the Eighth Army, which sent them further to the Corps in the form of "Operational Directives." The operational directives were usually more specific in terms than the SCAPINS and instructed the local military government teams to exercise "Surveillance and report instances of non-compliance to this headquarters." The Corps in turn sent the operational directives without any change to the next lower level (military government regional headquarters) in the form of "Operational Memorandum." Then Regional Headquarters directed them as it is to the local military government teams. Thus for any instruction, concerning the conduct of implementation of policies and programmes formulated in the special staff

73 Braibanti, n. 71, p. 261.
sections of SCAP to reach the local military government teams had to pass through a long and devious chain of command.

Thus the organizational set up of the Occupation of Japan was structured on military pattern. But in essence, it was not essentially a military based operation. Although the special staff sections were headed by military officers but the policy proceedings in them were largely influenced by highly trained civilian. Sufficient measures were adopted to save these special staff sections from the encroachment of General Staff Officers (Military Personnel) who were simultaneously serving in both GHQ, AFPAC and GHQ, SCAP. Even the composition of the prefectural military government teams was not totally based on military personnels, many of the positions were filled by civilian employees.\textsuperscript{75} In fact what makes organization of the Occupation of Japan based on military set-up different from that of traditional military control was the use of Japanese national government to implement the policy decisions dictated by the SCAP. The function of the special staff sections and local military government teams were only to supervise the operation and report non compliance behaviour back to SCAP GHQ.

\textsuperscript{75} Braibanti, n. 71, p. 256.
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The objectives of 'the Occupation' were set forth in the 'Potsdam Declaration' and further elaborated in detail in the 'U.S. Initial Post-Surrender policy for Japan.' The primary objectives of the Occupation were (1) to ensure that Japan will not become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world again, (2) to effect the establishment of a peaceful and responsible government conforming to the principles of democratic self-government which will respect the rights of other states and support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the charter of the United Nations. However, it was clearly stated in the document, in part-I entitled Ultimate Objectives that the Allied Powers will not impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people. It implies that the Occupation forces aimed at creating such a situation in Japan which would abolish the militant proclivity and undemocratic character of the Japanese domestic set-up and allow the emergence of democratic values, norms and institutions. Such a dramatic change had to be effected indigenously, though under the guidance of Occupation forces.

Robert E. Ward summarized these objectives of the Occupation into two general categories: demilitarization

76 Occupation, n. 38, p. 74.
and democratization. To quote him:

it is frequently claimed that from a domestic political stand point these goals may be subsumed under two general rubrics: demilitarization and democratization. Such a dichotomy is clearly implicit in the directive,\(^{77}\) and of the two, for obvious practical reasons, the goal of demilitarization clearly enjoyed an overriding priority during both the planning stage and the opening months of the occupation.\(^{78}\)

The first major task of the Occupation was to remove the manifest monster of military set-up, rooted deep in the Japanese society, by doing away with the authority and influence of militarists. This was just preparing a ground for the implantation of a more complex and complicated process of introducing democracy to Japan. Democracy in the domestic system of Japan had itself linked with the establishment of a future peaceful world order.\(^{79}\) This exposition stemmed from the belief of the American people "that over the years democracies of the world would survive, and democracy will be restored or established in those nations which today know it not. In that faith lies the future peace of mankind."\(^{80}\) Thus the demilitarization and democratization were one of the main measures to be followed by the Occupation forces for the realization of the "Basic objectives of military Occupation of Japan" (peaceful world order free from

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77 For details see, Political Reorientation, n. 40, pp. 429-39.

78 Ward, n. 43, p. 480.

79 Occupation, n. 38, p. 74.

economic barriers through domestic democratic set-up) as mentioned in the basic documents. These documents were: Potsdam declaration, U.S. Initial Post-surrender Policy for Japan, Basic Initial Post-surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan and Basic Post-surrender Policy for Japan (FEC 014/9). Other measures, or, as Jane M. Alden put it in his Occupation as subordinate objectives, were: the punishment of war criminals, elimination of those who led Japan to war from positions of influence, payments of reparations, the limitation of Japanese territory to the four main islands and to minor adjacent islands, as provided in the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, restitution of looted property, repatriation of Japanese armed forces and their demobilization, removal of all obstacles to the emergence of democratic tendencies and guarantees for basic human rights, carrying reforms in industry, labour, agriculture, and polity, and permission for the maintenance of peaceful industries to sustain economy and to participate eventually in world trade.

In fact, the goals of Occupation and the means set forth for their realization were so that the gap between them seemed to be blurred. Japan was occupied with the primary purpose to bring her into comity of nation as a peaceful and democratic nation which would correspond to the established norms of behaviour among the sovereign

81 Alden, n. 61, pp. 298-311.
states for the conduct of varied international transactions in the orbit of international anarchy.

Japan was, till the end of World War II, an authoritarian and undemocratic state which contained the seeds of aggressive foreign policy and repression of liberal forces within its borders. It became indispensable to get her out of its anti-international postures and incorporate in its society polity and economy, those values which were considered as fundamental to the humanity, world peace and security.

"The basic documents make clear the United States's desire to democratize its erstwhile enemy—primarily for reasons of long term peace and security in the western pacific and secondarily because of a sincere and evangelical belief in the superiority of democratic institutions."\(^2\)

Hence, the demilitarization and democratization of Japan was seen to be necessary to achieve and maintain world peace and security. It is in this context that demilitarization and democratization seem to be both ends as well as means. They were objectives in themselves on the domestic front. This was because of the Occupation policy which aimed at transforming Japan into a peaceful and democratic state. Whereas in the international arena they were employed as means to realize the goal of world peace, security and free international trade. Goals-means dichotomy apart, there was unswerving persistence in the thought of Occupation designers right

\(^2\) Ward. n. 43, P. 481.
from the planning stage of the Occupation to its termination that Japanese belligerent foreign policy had roots in its militant and anti-liberal domestic system. Threats to world peace lie in its domestic system which required an overall transformation into a democratic set-up. Democracy was considered as a paragon of domestic popular rule and world peace.

During the six years and eight months of Occupation, U.S. policy went through major transformations as claimed by established authorities in the yet to be fully explored field of American experiment in social engineering in Japan. Such changes seem to be logically true if they are to be judged against the demilitarization and democratization as goals of Occupation.

But if, as mentioned above, the demilitarization and democratization were not the goals of Occupation per se, instead they were the prime means to permit Japan to join the community of nations as a peaceful and democratic nation then the meaning of the shifts in the U.S. endeavour to transform Japan would have a different connotation. With the onset of the cold war between the spring of 1947 and spring of 1948, "American policy toward Japan was well launched upon a 180-degree shift."83 But as far as the democratization of Japanese domestic system was concerned no such shift occurred at

all. The change in the U.S. policy from demilitarizing to rearm Japan was the outcome of the changed scenario of the then international environment which witnessed the division of world into two opposite camps. One representing closed door system of political process led by the U.S.S.R and the other by the U.S. which reposed faith in the free democratic political process. In such a polarized world of ideologically different and rival camps, Japan occupied a very crucial and strategically important place. Defeat of Japan in the Pacific war led to the predominance of the U.S.S.R in the Far East. China which could act as a check to the proliferation of Soviet influence in the Far East was also won over by communism. Now, Japan was the only alternative left out to be propped up against the spread of communism in the region and stop U.S.S.R. from furthering its strength vis-a-vis the U.S.\textsuperscript{84} Even at that time the major goal of the U.S. policy towards the occupied Japan was to foster conditions which would bring her into the family of nations as a responsible and peaceful member remained the same. Another point which deserves special attention is that there is difference between the militarization of Japan before the war and to rearm it after the outset of cold war.

Before the World War II militarization was rooted in those primordial values and institution (divinity of the emperor, myth of unique Japanese race and nation, shintoism, bushido) which precluded Japan to tread on the
path of democracy and prompted the ultranationalists to mislead the docile people to the war. The attempts to rearm Japan during the Occupation had nothing to do with such philosophical frameworks based on mythical values of militarist Japan. The Emperor was divested of his divinity. He had been reduced only to mere "symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power." State Shinto was abolished. The same fate befell on the national polity (Kokutai). It was in this context that the rearmament of Japan was, not to allow her, once again to adopt a belligerent foreign policy. Rather, it was to guard the Japan against its encirclement by another undemocratic system of communism. (A further elaboration of this point is made in Chapter 4.) Edwin O. Reischauer observes.

The democratic experiment in Japan is obviously not being conducted in a vacuum isolated from the rest of the World, as we at first believed, but is a crucial battle in the war between democracy and communism, it may actually prove to be the crucial battle as far as Asia is concerned.

In other words, the changes in the Occupation policy which took shape under the changing circumstance both inside and outside Japan, did not alter its basic objectives; to democratize Japan to permit her to become a peaceful and responsible members of community of nations.

To achieve these objectives, as mentioned above, the Occupation forces, under MacArthur, adopted various instrumental goals as indicated in the U.S.

85 Reischauer, n. 59, p. 43.
post-surrender directive concerning the Occupation Policy. These instrumental goals found their concrete expressions in the various socio-economic and political reforms undertaken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

The operation of Occupation started officially after the instrument of surrender was signed by Japan and accepted by the Allied Powers on board the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay, on September 2, 1945. The first and foremost task of SCAP was to insure that Japan was demilitarized. This was just a prelude to a more complex task of introducing socio-economic and political reforms to incorporate democracy in the domestic set up of Japan the lack of which, in terms of US perception, had led Japan to wage the deadly war.

Demilitarization in the real sense of the term, as employed in the Occupation policy decisions, included disarmament, demobilization and reparation. This herculean task was completed with great success under the calibre, courage and vision of General MacArthur. In the spring of 1946 Supreme Commander declared that, "Japan is unable to stage a military comeback for the first hundred years."86

86 Aduard, n. 37, p. 29.
DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION

On September 2, 1945, the day of surrender, the SCAP issued a General order No. 1 calling upon all "the Japanese armed forces and Japanese controlled forces under their command to cease hostilities at once, to lay down their arms, to remain in their present location and to surrender unconditionally" to the Allied theatre commanders in the various theatres of operation. 87 It was also provided in the General order No. 1 that all forces of Japan or under Japanese control wherever they may be situated would deliver the weapons and other war equipment at their disposal to the Allied theatre commander in an intact safe and good conditions. 88 The concerned Japanese authorities were instructed to take care of and hold in good condition, all ready material for use in war and the war production and research and testing centres. 89 Orders were issued to stop immediately the manufacture and distribution of all arms, ammunition and implements of war. 90 The movements of all types of vessels and aircrafts were stopped and orders were issued to render them harmless. 91 The SCAP Directive No. 3 prohibited production of all those items which could be

87 Japanese Government, Foreign Office, Division of Special Records, Documents concerning the the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, vol. I. [Hereafter referred to as Documents vol. I].
90 Ibid, p. 41.
incorporated into arms and ammunitions. The production of all types of aircraft and combat vessels was stopped.\textsuperscript{92} All types of weapons and equipments of war which could not be converted for the use of the non-military purpose or peaceful building of society had been dismantled or otherwise destroyed. However surface naval vessels of destroyer size or less were exempted and were agreed in Oct., 1946 by the four principal Allies to be shared among them equally.\textsuperscript{93} Some vessels were kept by the SCAP for their use in the implementation of surrender and their division was deferred to unspecified date.\textsuperscript{94} The complete demobilization of Japanese armed forces was undertaken with the help of Army and Navy Ministries in December 1945. "By the following June even these last vestiges of the central organs of the Japanese army and Navy were abolished."\textsuperscript{95}

The difficult task of demobilizing the Japanese armed forces was completed by the beginning of 1948. However, the complete demobilization could not have been achieved due to the non co-operation of the Soviet Union in sending back the Japanese prisoners of war stranded in its controlled territories.\textsuperscript{96} As far as the issue of maintaining law and order in the war affected Japan was

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid, p. 81.


\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{95} Reischauer, n. 59, p. 244.

\textsuperscript{96} Fearey, n. 93, p. 13.
concerned, the Japanese police force in the main islands of Japan was exempted from the demobilization orders."

REPATRIATION

In the Potsdam Declaration, it was clearly stated that, "The Japanese military forces after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives." It applies only to the Japanese military forces. Nowhere in the above mentioned declaration nor in other post-surrender policy directives a reference was made to the repatriation of Japanese civilians residing abroad. However, an initiative was taken by the SCAP in collaboration with other Allied Powers to bring back home all the Japanese expatriates "from the areas separated from the Japanese Empire and from the countries in the Far East over run by the Japanese military." It was provided in the SCAP directives that all those Japanese who were residing in other parts of the World including the United States of America and were considered to be objectionable would also be repatriated. In addition, provisions were also made to send back foreign nationals from Japan to their home countries. But it was not a

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97 Documents vol. I, n. 87, p. 37.

98 Martin, n. 11, p. 18.

99 Ibid.
compulsory ruling to be implemented on each and every foreigners.\textsuperscript{100}

By the beginning of 1948 the operation of repatriation was successfully completed with the bringing in home some 6,500,000 Japanese civilians and servicemen from abroad.\textsuperscript{101} The entire operation of "tremendous transfer of people probably unmatched in the whole history of maritime transportation,"\textsuperscript{102} was meticulously conducted by the Japanese themselves under the general orders and guidance of the supreme commander for the Allied Powers. But the programme could not be called a complete success precisely because it failed to get back the trapped expatriates in the U.S.S.R and its controlled areas.\textsuperscript{103}

Infact, the repatriation programme was in consonance with the overall Occupation policy of reorienting Japan on democratic lines and to permit her to become member of community of nations. It was also adopted, in words of Edwin O. Reischauer, "to root out all Japanese influence in neighboring countries, so that Japan could not easily reestablish political or even economic control over parts of her former empire or lands she had conquered during the war."\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid, pp. 18-19.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid, p. 18; and Fearey, n. 93, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{102} Fearey, n. 93, p. 241.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid, pp. 14-17.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid, p. 241.
THE PURGE

The purge of undesirable personnel from public office in Japan and the abolition of certain political parties, associations, societies and other organizations were another means or instrumental goal to demilitarize Japan for the purpose of making it a democratic and peace loving state. The scope and nature of this programme was such that it is difficult to confine it exclusively to either of the two main instrumental goals of the Occupation: Demilitarization and Democratization of Japan. It aimed at both stripping Japan of its militant elements for all times and introducing her to a democratic set up. "The basic philosophy of the purge programme was that it should be a means of creating a new democratic leadership responsive to the will of the people". 105

To achieve this goal, it was essential, as stated in the US directives on Occupation, to remove for all times the influence of the old, militaristic and ultranationalistic leaders from the society who by virtue of their strong hold on the polity, economy and society of Japan before and during the war had managed to establish a dominant position among the masses. If new political forces and leaders were to emerge and if the elections were to represent 'the free will of the Japanese people' these ultranationalists must be removed from the political scene. Otherwise, the same leaders who

105 Political Reorientation, n. 40, p. 45.
deceived and misled the Japanese would undoubtedly had been reelected to the responsible position in the ensuring election and halted the emergence of democratic forces.\textsuperscript{106}

No such efforts were made within the first four months of the Occupation. The first priority was given to the more urgent and essential programme of disarming and demobilizing the armed forces of Japan. It was in early December 1945, a proposed purge directive was circulated to the Japanese envisaging that "the initial demobilization and disarmament of Japan having been largely completed, the necessary political disarmament and the fulfillment of the above directives may bow be undertaken."\textsuperscript{107} After one month, the initial purge plan with minor modifications was issued on January 4, 1946 as purge directive (SCAPIN 550) entitled Removal and exclusion of undesirable personnel from public office\textsuperscript{108} along with a companion directive (SCAPIN 548) entitled Abolition of certain political parties, Associations, Societies and other organizations.\textsuperscript{109}

SCAPIN 548 ordered the abolition and new formation of any political party, association, society or other organization and any activity on the part of any of them


\textsuperscript{107} Political Reorientation, n. 40, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{108} For text see Ibid, pp. 482-8.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid, pp. 479-81.
or of any individual or group who obstructed the implementation of occupations tasks, justified Japanese militarism in the country or abroad instrumental in establishing Japan's hegemony over Asia and hindered trade, commerce, free cultural or intellectual relations between Japan and foreign countries. It ordered the dissolutions and seizure of property of twenty seven most prominent terroristic and ultranationalistic or secret societies.\footnote{110} By February 23, 1946, when this directive was incorporated in an Imperial ordinance 101 and assumed the form of law the number of such organizations had increased to one hundred and forty seven.\footnote{111}

SCAPIN 550 provided a wider scope for the realization of "all the subsequent purges in Japan."\footnote{112} It ordered the Imperial Japanese Government to remove from public office and exclude from government service all persons \footnote{113} who had been: (a) active exponents of militaristic nationalism and aggression, (b) influential members of any Japanese Ultranationalistic terroristic, or secret patriotic society, its agencies or affiliates; or (c) influential in the activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Associations, the Imperial Rule Assistance Associations, the Imperial Rule

\footnote{110} Ibid, pp. 480-1.

\footnote{111} For Imperial Ordinance No. 101, see Ibid, pp. 491-3.

\footnote{112} RIA, n. 106, p. 333.

\footnote{113} The terms : Public Office, Government Service, Removal and Exclusion were clearly defined to facilitate the swift implementation of the Purge programme.
Assistance Political society or the political Association of Great Japan. 114

Paragraph 14 of the above said clearly stated that in the forthcoming elections full opportunity would be provided to the democratic elements to enter into the mainstream of the political process. All those persons who detected the flow of democratic forces in Japan and contributed to the cause of Japanese militarism would be debarred from taking part in the election process. 115

The basic philosophy behind the purge programme was not only to remove and exclude the officials from public office and government service but also "to appoint new officials who will foster the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people and who will respect fundamental human rights and freedom of speech, religion and thought." 116 Consequently, within the purview of these provisions of the directives, some 1300 organizations were dissolved and almost 2,00,000 persons barred from public office. 117

After the political phase of the purge programme was successfully implemented at the national level, the task of weeding out undesirable elements and anti-democratic personnel from the office of the responsibility at the local level had become the immediate target of the SCAP. This second phase of the Occupation was extended to the

114 Political Reorientation, n. 40, p. 482.
116 Ibid, p. 482.
117 Reischauer, n. 59, pp. 245-6.
local government officials, leaders of most of the important industrial and financial companies and to those who occupied positions of power and influence in the public information media.

The guiding factor behind the extension of the purge was the consensus in the government section of the GHQ, SCAP that if the democratic forces were to emerge in Japan the local settings of polity, economy, and information public centre should be freed from the warlords who perpetrated thought controls process before and during World War II.

Indeed (says General Whitney, the head of the governmental section) it can not be controverted that in many aspects the expansion of the purge to the lower level of government is more essential to the establishment of a thoroughly democratic society than its application to the higher levels, as it was on the lowest level that direct pressure in the shaping of the thoughts and actions and daily lives of the people was to be found in the gearing of the country for war.\textsuperscript{118}

It was at this crucial level that the role of Occupation forces "to strike the shackles from the efforts of the Japanese people to rise toward freedom and democracy" became paramount.\textsuperscript{119} To put into practice the ideas of the purge extension programme the Japanese government on January 4, 1947 promulgated Imperial Ordinances Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 and cabinet and Home Ministry ordinance No. 1. Under the ordinance No. 2 three tier committee system for the purpose of screening the public officials to be purged was established.\textsuperscript{120} By March 20, 1948 various screening committees had enquired the candidature of

\textsuperscript{118} Political Reorientation, n. 40, p. 32.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid, p. 489.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid, p. 75.
about 6,23,456 officials out of which 3,960 persons were barred or removed to cleanse the administration.\textsuperscript{121}

It was well discussed in the planning stage of the Occupation that industrial base of Japan which provided economic background to the militarism had also to be reoriented towards the democratic order.\textsuperscript{122} Accordingly the original purge directive of January 4, 1946, was extended to encompass the key executives of the government controlled industries and several influential businessmen to put under the orders. The economic purge programme picked up momentum after November 21, 1946.\textsuperscript{123}

On January 4, 1947, the Japanese Government on the guidelines of the SCAP promulgated ordinances containing the provisions for implementing the economic purge.\textsuperscript{124} These ordinances made the provisions for the removal of top executives and directors of companies\textsuperscript{125}, which were earmarked for economic purge. To prevent the continuity of influence of the purgee through the family loyalty, provision was made that a relative within the the third degree by blood, marriage, or adoption would be debarred from succeeding to an appointive position from which a member of his family was removed. It was also made

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid, p. 429.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid, pp. 47-9.
\textsuperscript{125} The total number of such companies were 300 which had massive concentration of economic power.
illegal for a purgee to give advice to any company official or for the latter to accept it.

Finally, the purge was extended to the field of public information and propaganda. To disseminate the ideals of peace and democracy to get the people realized about the sinister designs of their leaders who had reduced them to such a passivity where they did not question the aggressive and expansion policies of Japan, the task of overhauling the public information media had become the utmost importance in the social engineering of occupied Japan. All those officials who had propagated the war, advocated the policies of dictators and actively participated in furthering the interest of the militarist and ultranationalist were subject to the purge. A special committee was instituted to examine the writings and publications of such persons which had appeared in the four and a half years before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. By March 1948 the whole programme had been completed.¹²

Besides the above sectors, purge was also extended to the educational institutions. The purge programme created a fertile ground for the emergence of new values norms and institutions of democratic nature in the body politic of Japan. It was in this perspective that the contribution of the purge programme to the process of democratization of Japan¹² assumed importance.

¹²6 RIA, n. 106, p. 359.

REPARATION

Another step in the direction of demilitarizing Japan was to eliminate its industrial potential which provided economic base to its military power. This course of action was termed as reparation programme. The thrust of the programme was on the nature of pre-World War II and wartime industries which were predominantly war oriented.

Although the defeat of Japan had effected the capacity of its heavy industrial set up but still it enjoyed great potential for the revival of war economy. It was precisely so that before and during the second world war the trend in industrial production was disproportionately in favour of war concerned industrial goods at the cost of consumer commodities.128 On the other hand,

(it) it was realized that the tremendous costs of modern war and the desperate economic plight of a bomb-battered and Japan made it entirely unrealistic to hope for enough reparations from Japan to meet any appreciable portion of Allied war cost or even to compensate for any significant part of the direct war damages suffered by Allied nations.129

The major policy matter before the Occupation policy formulaters was how to exact reparation from Japan which would on the one hand eliminate its capacity to once again stage a threat to world peace and ensure her a


129 Reischauer, n. 59, p. 248.
peaceful, democratic and self-sufficient existence in the community of nations on the other. This policy led to a lot of difficulties in the way of formulating reparation programme.

A reparation mission under the chairmanship of Edwin W. Pauley was deputed to Japan to look into the matter. The mission presented its report to the President in April, 1946. The enquiry was based on the two assumption: reparations were to be taken from Japan to reduce her war potential and that the determining criteria of reparation were to be based on "what is to be available" and not on the cost of war damage to the Allies. The policy behind this programme was not to crush the already defeated Japan but was to gear her industry from a war path to a peace. The report recommended the removal of all equipment from war industries which included Army and Navy arsenals, the aircraft industry, and magnesium, aluminum and all synthetic oil plants. The output in iron and steel industries, machines tools and shipping concerns and strategic plants was recommended to be reduced drastically.¹³⁰

These proposals met with little success.¹³¹ When Pauley submitted his report for the consideration of Far Eastern commission, another problem regarding the suitable method to determine the availability of goods for removal keeping in view the peacetime needs of Japan cropped up. The commission had decided that the standard

¹³⁰ Pauley, n. 128, pp. 1-52.
¹³¹ Reischauer, n. 59, p. 248.
of industrial production prevailing in Japan during 1930-1934 was to be considered as a base for determining peacetime needs of Japan. All the industrial equipment which exceeded the production of level of 1930-34 would be made available for removal to the Allied countries.

However, FEC found it difficult to come out with a decision covering the total amount of equipments to be removed on this basis of 1930-1934 "level of industry" formula. An other related issue was what percentage of the total reparation each country should get. No consensus could had been reached over this issue among the Allied Countries. To overcome this impasse United States government prevailed upon the FEC to sought out some short-cut methods to make available for the claimant Allied States the industrial equipment which were in excess of 1930-1934 level of industry. Accordingly in 1946 the Far Eastern commission issued policy papers on interim reparation removal. Under this interim removal programme some 1100 plants were earmarked for reparations and the United States unilaterally authorized the removal of up to 30 percent of the facilities set aside for this purpose, half to go to China and the remainder to the Philippines and the British and Dutch possessions in the Far East. On May 12,1949 the United States declared to

132 FEC, n. 51, p. 85.
133 RIA, n. 106, p.401.
134 Ibid.
136 Reischauer, n. 59, p. 249.
make no such further reparations and consequently the whole program of reparation came to an end at that time.\textsuperscript{137}

\textbf{POLITICAL REFORMS}

As stated above various measures were adopted to demilitarize Japan. It was, in fact, a physical demilitarization which stripped off only the outer layer of militarism in Japan. The major task before the Occupation operation was to create such conditions in Japan which would cut out the support structure of militarism and foster democratic values and attitudes in its society. Demilitarization was also a step in that direction. But it was just preparing the ground for the initiation of a much complex programme of democratization which included social economic, and political transformation of the authoritarian Japan.

The first task for the Occupation authorities was to revise the formal Japanese political and legal structure modifying or eliminating every law and institution that stood in the way of democratic development and making new rules which would foster democratic habits.\textsuperscript{138}

Even in the demilitarization programme, apart from destroying the Army, Navy and Air Force, attempts were made to eliminate all those "powerful institutions which not only had stood in the way of the development of democratic attitudes but had also played a role in pre-war Japan in undermining parliamentary power and

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid, p. 253.
nullifying earlier democratic gains". But all those reforms were of negative posture. Those positive punitive measures to transform autocratic Japan into a peaceful democratic nation were followed by various positive acts of social, economic and political reforms "to substitute more democratic political institutions for the old." The reform of the constitution was the centre of attraction of all such constructive measures.

If democratic institutions and norms were to prevail over Japan, if the isolated and belligerent nation were to join the family of nation and if its people were to be assured of hitherto denied liberties, rights and freedom enjoyed by the people in democratic political systems, the revision of the old Meiji constitution was the most essential positive reform measure in the political reorientation of Japan. However, this work had to be done by the Japanese themselves though under the general guidance and supervision of the supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. This fully bears out the nature of the Japanese political system during the Occupation period. In Rosenau's terminology, it was a clear case of a 'penetrated political system'.

On various occasions between September and December 1945, General MacArthur made it clear to the Japanese about the Allied, in fact U.S., concern to drastically change the Meiji constitution which not only hindered the growth of democratic forces in the society but also

139 Ibid.
140 Ibid, p. 254.
provided legal support to the authoritarian acts of militarist rulers of pre-war Japan. Thereupon Prince Konoye, then minister without portfolio in the so-called surrender-cabinet of Higashikumi met General MacArthur to sought his advice on the necessary changes in the old constitution. It was followed by an informal meeting between General Atcheson, political Advisor to the Supreme Commander, and Prince Konoye where the issue of the revision of the constitution was discussed in some detail.

Atcheson outlined certain basic point to be included in the new draft.\textsuperscript{141} Most important among them were the extension of the authority of the House of Representatives, the establishment of the principle of parliamentary responsibility, the abolition of the veto power of the Emperor and a restriction on his right to issue ordinances, provision for a effective bill of rights, an independent judiciary, the democratization of the House of Peers, and the obliteration of the influence of military in the government.\textsuperscript{142} Consequently, in a confused manner, Prince Konoye considered himself as a chief architect of the constitution on the basis of his meeting with MacArthur and Atcheson and formed a special constitutional investigation commission for the revision of the constitution, under the direct protection of the Emperor.\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{141} Political Reorientation, n. 40, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{143} RIA, n. 106, pp. 327-8.
The investigation commission was not the representative body of the people of Japan and its outcome, thus, would not have been in line with the 'freely expressed will of the Japanese people'. Moreover, there was no official endorsement for such activities of Prince Konoye but he still continued his efforts to introduce changes in the constitution. He was opposed to any drastic change in the old constitution.

Although Prince Konoye kept informing the Emperor concerning his constitutional modification efforts "but no comprehensive or formal report was made public." The chapter of his activities was closed on December 15, 1945 when he committed suicide after knowing his arrest as a suspected war criminal.

After the resignation of the prime minister Higashikumi and his cabinet on October 5, 1945, as a protest against the General MacArthur's directive of October 4, 1945, which among many other drastic reforms, forbidden the police interference in individual liberties, Baron Shidehara accepted the Emperor's invitation to become prime minister on October 9, 1945. General MacArthur also informed the new Prime Minister orally that the reforms which Japan must undertake "will unquestionably involve a revision of the


146 Quigley and Turner, n. 144, p. 33.
Accordingly, in October 1945, the cabinet formed a constitutional problem investigation committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Joji Matsumoto, a noted professor of law and minister without portfolio in Baron Shidehara cabinet to prepare a draft of the new constitution. 148

Meanwhile, the idea of revision of the constitution had acquired some publicity which led to the formation of divergent viewpoints of various political parties concerning the subject. On the other hand, the government section of the General Headquarters SCAP had also undertaken a study of governmental reforms including studies of the problem of constitutional revision. 149

Before Dr. Matsumoto submitted his draft, a number of unofficial proposals for revision of the constitution by different political parties were made public. Barring the communist all the political parties only proposed structural changes without any basic organic transformation in the old constitution. None of them - Progressive party, Liberal Party and Social Democratic Party - favoured the abrogation of the imperial institution and stressed the need to preserve the 'National Polity' (Kokutai).

On the contrary, the opinion of the private groups were more radical. 150 Not unlike Prince Konnoye, the

147 Political Reorientation, n. 40, p. 91.
148 Ibid, pp. 91-8.
149 Ibid, p. 91.
150 Ibid, pp. 94-8.
revision draft of the constitution prepared under Dr. Matsumoto - who publicly talked about the weakness of a "government by the people" - also failed to come up to the aspirations of the Occupation authorities as enshrined in Potsdam Declaration and the United States initial post surrender policy for Japan. The position of the Emperor and other undemocratic institutions remained intact as it was in the old Meiji Constitution. "The proposals for the revision do not go beyond the most moderate of modifications in the language of the Meiji constitution. The basic nature of the Japanese state is left untouched."

The only change Dr. Matsumoto had made was that the adjective 'Sacred' was replaced by "Supreme". Now, it reads "The Emperor is supreme and inviolable." The term "the House of Peers" was changed into "the House of senators". The report did not include the much desired "Bill of Rights", the cornerstone of a democratic political system. Moreover, it reduced the rights and enhanced the duties of the people.

Infact, "the constitutional problem investigation committee" was not a body representing the will of the people. It was a mouth piece of the civilian and military magnates who had reduced the imperial institution to veil their dictatorial and anti-people moves. They wanted to maintain their pre-war and war-time dominance in the body.

151 Ibid, p. 98.
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\footnote{151}{Ibid, p. 98.}
\footnote{152}{Ibid, p. 617.}
\footnote{153}{Ibid, p. 99.}
incorporated in the draft of the new constitution. Accordingly, Brigadier General Whitney, constituted a steering committee and a number of special committees. There was an indication about a Japanese participation in these committees. The draft of the new constitution was prepared within a few days after the formation of the committees and was presented to the Japanese government to use it as a guide to prepare a new draft. Since the General people had already shown their interest in the reform measures of MacArthur, Whitney told the Japanese government that if it failed to follow the government section's draft, "MacArthur was prepared to lay the issue before the people himself." The Government section's draft generated a sense of helplessness and sock among the most conservative sections in the cabinet who argued that Matsumoto's draft was most suited to the then political situation in Japan. And the radical draft presented by Whitney, if accepted would cause an antagonistic attitude among the moderate elements in Japan towards the much sought after democracy.

At such a critical juncture, Emperor Hirohito reposed faith in the SCAP's sponsored draft.

156 Ibid, p. 102.
157 Quigley and Turner, n. 144, p. 119.
158 Political Reorientation, n. 40, p. 105.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid, p. 106.
161 Ibid.
Consequently, dialogue was resumed between the SCAP and the stubborn cabinet on an acceptable draft of the new constitution, containing almost all the principles required by the SCAP, on the morning of March 4, 1946. After two days the text of the new draft was made public with endorsement both by MacArthur and the Emperor. After successfully passing through the stage of approval by the first democratically elected new Diet and crossing the acrimonious phase of polemical discussions between the SCAP and the FEC on various issues - such as General MacArthur's authorities as well as suitable time for drafting a constitution and holding election - the constitution was formerly promulgated on November 3, 1946, to become effective on May 3, 1947.

The new constitution of Japan was a major step in the political reorientation of Japan on democratic basis. It was designed to reform the political, economic, social and judicial system of Japan along liberal democratic lines. "Ideologically, it was anti-totalitarian endeavouring to avoid a drift to right-wing or left-wing authoritarianism." 162

For the first time in the long history of Japan rights were guaranteed to the people, and legal limitations were placed on government. 163 The people of Japan, who until its surrender were subjected to untold repressions and thought control and were never allowed to


163 Political Reorientation, n. 40, p. 113.
exercise their will in the elite monopolized political domain of the military state, became the real repository of sovereignty. Emperor was deprived of his exalted and mythical image. He became the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people. He derived his position from the will of the people not from his being direct descendent of the Sun goddess as provided in the Meiji constitution.

The new constitution was based on the concept of popular sovereignty. The preamble of the constitution began with "we the Japanese people ... do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this constitution ..." whereas, the old Meiji constitution affirmed itself as "an immutable fundamental law" guaranteed to the people by virtue of "the supreme prerogative inherited from our imperial ancestors." The Japanese people now have the absolute right to institute government, to reform, to alter, and to change it totally. "The Emperor is no more than the crowning pinnacle of the structure, bearing no functional relations to frame itself." He exercised no power and was certainly not indestructible. Under the new constitution the Diet (bicameral legislature) became the highest organ of the state. Diet was made the sole depository of law making functions and powers. "Law can


166 Political Reorientation, n. 40, p. 114.
be enacted only by the Diet, can be administered only by the cabinet and interpreted only by the judiciary."

Furthermore, in the bicameral legislature, the Lower House (House of Representatives) was given superior powers over the Upper House (House of Councillors) in several respects. Cabinets' powers were specially enumerated in the new constitution. It was made collectively responsible for its executive acts to the Diet. It ensured the cabinet's responsibility to the people. It was emphasized in the constitution that at least half of the cabinet members must be drawn from the diet and hence would be directly responsible to the electorates. Provisions were made for the establishment of the independent and impartial judiciary.

Another important change which the new constitution brought was the incorporation of detailed "Bill of Right" in its structure. This brought improvement in the socio-economic and political life of the hitherto docile and submissive Japanese people and significantly contributed to the construction of democratic political set-up. People were guaranteed the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to the extent that it should not interfere with the public welfare.

Under Article-14, Chapter-III, equality to social position was guaranteed. All people were to be treated as equal and there should be no discrimination in political,

167 Ibid, p. 113.
economic or social relation because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin. Many more specific rights as "the right to own or to hold property," "inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them," "freedom of thought and conscience," "freedom of religion," "freedom of assembly," "academic freedom," and the rights of women to organize and to bargain and act collectively were enshrined in the new constitution.

Another major achievement of the new constitution to make Japan a peaceful and democratic state was the incorporation of Article-9 under Chapter-11. It reads

war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force, is forever renounced as a means of settling dispute with other nations. The maintenance of land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be authorized. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Although it would be naive to say that war could be exorcised simply by constitutional provisions but the inclusion of Article-9 at least put a legal check on pre-surrender Japan's unbridled approach to conflict resolution through force.

EDUCATION REFORMS

Education reforms were one of the most vital reform measures undertaken by the Occupation Administration to democratize Japan. During the World War-II as in the pre-war era the state of education affairs in Japan was

170 Ibid.
dominated by one-sided stereo-typed development of mind which kept oblivious of rational, independent thinking, and basic human rights. "(f)rom primary school right on up to the University, truth was hidden and perverted, the individuality of children and adolescents was negated and human nature itself was abused.

Education" was nothing but a "domestication" of the Japanese people designed to render them instruments of the state and fit them into the desired mold of an exalted imperial community."171 In the classrooms emphasis was put on the obedience to the emperor and national patriotism, filial piety and superiority of Yamato race and state.172

During the Tokugawa period, the aims of education were confined only to churn out dogmatically loyal and submissive citizens to follow and obey the fiat of military dictators without asking for popular participation.173 With the promulgation of Imperial Rescript on Education on October 30, 1890 the grip of the state on education was further tightened to serve the whims of ultranationalists. No place was accorded to the individual self expression. Education and scholarship were separated.174 "This separation was a necessary part


172 Fearey, n. 93, pp.33; and Nishi, n. 165, pp. 11-2.


of the program by means of which the Kokutai ideology was injected into the national life through the tightly controlled system of national education."

Education had become a medium to indoctrinate the society for the sake of militarist state. Pursuit of wisdom and knowledge were no more the objectives of learning. "... what is to be done is not for the sake of the pupils, but for the sake of the country." The special courses of moral instructions (shushin) geography, and mythical Japanese history were introduced in the curricula of elementary and secondary education to instill national spirit and divine mission of the Japanese Empire in the mind of students. Small shrines were constructed in all schools to house the pictures of the emperor and empress to inculcate in the mind of youths the divine image of the Emperor. School children were also taken to Shinto shrine as a special school visit.

During the late 20s, military training was introduced in the schools and with the entry of militarists in the state power, "the deliberate indoctrination was intensified, and became even more specifically directed towards the goals of the militarists and the ultranationalists." In nutshell

175 Ibid, 78.

176 Mori Arinori, the first minister of education (1885-1889), quoted in, Passin, n. 173, p. 150.

177 Ibid, pp. 150 & 154.

178 Ibid, pp. 155 & 252-3; and Fearey, n. 93, p. 33.
the education institution instead of centres for learning had become training camps of thought control to prepare youth always ready to act on the tunes of militarists' designs of world conquest.

To democratize Japan, the removal of such war-oriented and one-sided educational system had become the immediate concern of the SCAP. In its place a new system of education which would correspond with the democratic way of life was to be established. Paragraph tenth of the Potsdam declaration stated that obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese peoples were to be removed. And to achieve this, educational system and philosophy diametrically opposed to that which existed before the surrender would have to be evolved. 179

The first step in this direction under the Occupation was a memorandum issued on October 22, 1945 to the Imperial Japanese Government by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 180 It called upon the Japanese government to critically examine the content of all instruction with the purpose of weeding out the militaristic and ultranationalistic ideology from the learning centres of the society. All those teachers and educational officials who had been active exponents of militarism and ultranationalism as well as antagonistic

to the policies of the Occupation were to be removed. And those educational personnel who had fallen victim to the pre-war and war-time dictatorial policies of the military ruler were to be reinstated—owing to their pro-liberal and anti-autocratic opinions and activities. The existing curriculum and literature which advocated conservative and warlike values were to be eliminated and substituted by new curricula, text books, and teaching manuals intended to produce self-conscious, peaceful, and responsible citizens.

The memorandum stated clearly that revised education system were to instill those values which would be in harmony with representative government, international peace, and the dignity of individual and such fundamental human rights as the freedom of assembly, speech, and religion.

On December 31, 1945, the SCAP issued another directive entitled "Suspension of courses in Morals (Shushin), Japanese History and Geography." The main thrust of this directive was to remove all those courses which were specially designed to indoctrinate students for absolute blind obedience to the Emperor; submissiveness, and such other values which provided nursing ground for the inculcation of militaristic and ultranationalistic ideology. These courses were substituted by social studies. The pictures of the Emperor and Empress were removed from the schools.

181 For text see ibid, pp. 219-21.
To streamline the programme of educational reform, on the request of Douglas MacArthur the United States sent a mission of education in March 1946. The Mission finished the assigned work within a period of three weeks and made a series of recommendations touching various aspects of the education system in Japan.\textsuperscript{182} On the basis of the mission's report, FEC issued a policy statement on the Japanese education on March 27, 1947.\textsuperscript{183} At the outset it stated that:

Education should be looked upon as the pursuit of truth, as a preparation for life in a democratic nation, and as a training for the social and political responsibilities which freedom entails. Emphasis should be placed on the dignity and worth of the individual, on independent thought and initiative, and on developing a spirit of inquiry ...

Consequently, the ninety second Diet passed two pieces of legislation (School Education Law, March 29, 1947\textsuperscript{184} and Fundamental Law of Education, March 31, 1947\textsuperscript{185}) that codified the educational reforms.

In the Fundamental Law of Education, the objectives and general policy of the reformed education system was stated clearly. It stressed the development of a creative, rational and innovative individual, sound in mind and body, and imbued with independent spirit to help building a new peaceful and democratic state and society. The law provided equal opportunities to all to achieve education irrespective of all primordial and ascriptive

\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{182}] Passin, n. 173, pp. 278-84.
\item[\textsuperscript{183}] For text see FEC, n. 51, pp. 94-7.
\item[\textsuperscript{184}] Passin, n. 173, pp. 292-300.
\item[\textsuperscript{185}] Ibid, pp. 301-4.
\end{enumerate}
notions. Provisions were made for a free, compulsory and co-education upto nine years.

"The School Education Law" laid the ground for the establishment of a uniform system of education of six years of elementary school, three years of lower secondary school, three years of higher secondary school, and four years of university. The central control of the Education Ministry was replaced by decentralization of education through the institution of local, elective boards responsible to local community. Thus, the main contribution of the education reforms in Japan was to lay the foundation of democratic and humanist philosophy to help Japan to become a peaceful democratic state.

LAND REFORMS

Before the end of World War II, the social division of Japanese society, on the basis of profession, was precariously tied to the polity in a highly disproportionate manner. The whole society was divided into four major categories based on the nature of profession. The samurai (warrior class) "constituted the top crust of the class structure." The only function of this class was to defend the state against threats from within and without. It constituted less than five percent of the entire population but enjoyed all possible


privileges. Politics and administration had become the sole domain of this class. In the descending order comes the peasant, artisans and merchants who were considered as common people (heimin) confined to the respective functions and absolutely deprived of any participation in the state apparatus. Their job was to cater the needs of the rulers without asking for the genuine democratic rights. They were reduced to a potential raw material for the maintenance of autocratic, undemocratic and military rule of the pre-World War II Japan.

Among the non-samurai classes, peasantry constituted eighty percent of the population. It were they who tilled the land, "provided the food needed by the country and furnished an overwhelmingly large part of the revenues of the Government." They had no rights but only duties, they were subjected to such a ruthless form of exploitation and oppression that "they were neither encouraged to live nor permitted to die." Their status was no higher than that of 'agricultural slaves'. "If he attempted to leave the land he could be brought back by force, for he as much belonged to the fief as the land he cultivated." They were not allowed to take participation in the political process of the state. They could not even complaint about their immediate problems.

188 Ibid, p. 25.
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid.
stemming from their work on the tenanted land. "... Any attempt to seek redress over the head of the Daimyo was an unpardonable breach of feudal discipline carrying dire punishment." 192

The most affected victim of such a state of agricultural affairs was the seventy percent tenants and part-time tenants population of the total Japanese farm families. Even after the Meiji tax reforms there was no change in the position of tenants who continued to be reeled on under the burden of heavy rents to the landlords. 193

On the political side, such a state of affair in the agricultural sector had led to serious implications. The sinistrous moves of the militarist and ultranationalist, who were ruling Japan, both within Japan and abroad remained unbridled due to the non-participatory role of the vast majority of peasantry along with other common people who were absolutely debarred from taking any part in the political process of the state.

Hence, for the democratization of Japanese society, it became indispensable to raise the political consciousness of the vast majority of the population of Japan which was engaged in agricultural sector. It is on this that the pillars of the democratic political system was to be established. The first and foremost step in that direction was to free the tenants from the clutches of landlords and feudal over-lords who at the local

193 Dore, n. 191, p. 16.
level functioned as bastion of militarists and ultranationalists. Accordingly drastic agrarian reforms* were made under the Occupation policy "to relieve the distress of the farmer, particularly the tenants, to give those who tilled the soil an opportunity to own it, and to redistribute ownership on a more equitable basis."**

The main purpose of agrarian reforms was not only to improve the pitiable economical conditions of the peasantry but also to increase their interest in politics and influence over the government.*** The economic well being "would free them from complete subservience to the landowners and moneylenders and create in them a desire to defend through intelligence, participation in democratic procedures the rights they had won."****

Although the land reforms program assumed significant place among the various Occupation policy matters, but the basic post surrender policy documents despatched to the SCAP did not contain any specific guidelines in that direction.***** The only scant reference made in this regard was that alongwith labour and industry, agricultural should be "organized on a democratic basis."****** When the Agricultural Minister of

195 RIA, n. 106, p. 393.
196 Reischauer, n. 59, p. 280.
197 Ibid.
198 Dore, n. 191, pp. 130-1.
the Shidehara government contacted MacArthur for more explicit elaboration on organization of agriculture on a democratic basis the SCAP could not able to respond. Moreover, a despatch from the Washington in the Tokyo Shimbun reported on October 11, 1945 that "as for as the United States government was concerned a policy for agriculture had not yet been worked out." Interestingly in anticipation of occupational policy Prime Minister Prince Higashikumi made a reference in his speech just a fortnight after the surrender that "consideration must also be given to a redistribution of large areas of cultivated land." What stimulated the Japanese government's concern for land reform further was "a leading article in the Manchester Guardian on 26 September 1945" which "was given wide publicity in the Japanese press."

It demanded 'Judicious American pressure' for a land reform as first step in the democratization of Japan ... and of removing the basis of aggressive policies in the rural reservoirs of cheap labour and cheap solidiery. Accordingly, Japanese Ministry of Agriculture formulated a draft embodying the main principles for such a reform.

On the other hand, in the United States of America, Robert A. Fearey (an official of the State Department) along with Wolf I. Ladezinsky (a Far Eastern expert of the

200 Dore, n. 191, p. 130.
201 Ibid.
202 Quoted in Ibid, p. 129.
203 Ibid, p. 130.
204 Ibid.
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\textsuperscript{200} Dore, n. 191, p. 130.

\textsuperscript{201} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{202} Quoted in Ibid, p. 129.

\textsuperscript{203} Ibid, p. 130.

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid.
department of Agriculture) took into account the state of agrarian affairs. It was before the surrender of Japan and its subsequent Occupation, Fearey had prepared a memorandum which would guide operation of land reforms.\textsuperscript{205} When he was transferred from Washington to the staff of George Atcheson Jr. functioning for General MacArthur's headquarters he managed to reach that memorandum to the General. George Atcheson confirmed Fearey's viewpoints and recommendations for the land reforms in Japan. In his covering letter on the memorandum to MacArthur, Atcheson highlighted the urgency of the immediate reforms in the agricultural sector.\textsuperscript{206} On December 9, 1945, the SCAP issued a directive instructing the Japanese government "to remove obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies" at the grassroots level and "establish respect for the dignity of man and destroy the economic bondage which has enslaved the Japanese farmers for centuries of feudal oppression."\textsuperscript{207} It directed the Japanese government to take measures for the extermination of "those pernicious ills which have for so long blighted the agrarian structure ... ."\textsuperscript{208} The memorandum also ordered the government to submit to the SCAP within three months, a plan containing provisions for the transfer of land to those who tilled it. In the meantime a draft for a reform

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid, p. 131.
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{208} RIA, n. 106, p. 393.
Bill prepared by the ministry of Agriculture was tabled in the cabinet. But "cabinet as a whole showed little enthusiasm."\textsuperscript{209} Representatives of landlords were opposed to such reforms which would turn the power equation in villages where landlord system was well-entrenched in maintaining the autocratic structure of the Japanese state. However, due to the fear generated by the SCAP directive that if something was not done concerning land reforms the worse might be imposed on it, the bill was passed into law on December 28, 1945.\textsuperscript{210} But this land reform law failed to bring out desired changes as indicated in the December the SCAP directive. It had many defects and also been "widely criticized in the Japanese press and academic journals as a half hearted attempt to forestall a real reform."\textsuperscript{211}

This shows that the political system under the Occupation Administration was "penetrated" so that the SCAP could force the Japanese administration take such decisions as were needed for implementing these reforms, despite the opposition of local elites including the landlords.

As per the directive issued on 9th December, a detailed plan on land reforms was submitted through the SCAP to the Allied Council for Japan in April 1946. The council made various valuable recommendations and raised serious objections to the government's proposals embodied

\textsuperscript{209} Dore, n. 191, p. 135.
\textsuperscript{210} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{211}
in the plan. The recommendations made by the Allied Council were accepted by the SCAP. The private memorandum containing these recommendations and the suggestions of the SCAP was presented to the government to the end of July. Under the pressure of the SCAP instructions the newly elected Diet eventually passed two bills; Owner-Farmer Establishment Special Measures Law and a revision of Land Adjustment Law of 1938. These two laws were a major break through in the land reforms programme of Japan. "The underlying principles of the legislation was private rather than state, and individual rather than collective ownership of the land." The first law - Owner Farmer Establishment Special Measures - defined the land available for transfer to the tenant turned new owner and the methods through which it had to be done. The law ordered the absentee land lords to sell off all their land to the government on sale price fixed at the rate of forty times the rental value for paddy fields and forty eight times for upland fields. However, it allowed the resident non-cultivators and cultivators to retain 2.5 acres, and 7.5 acres of their land respectively in Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku. Whereas in Hokkaido the land ceiling limit was raised to four times of the retained land in other islands. The government had to sell the land to those persons who

212 Ball, n. 62, pp. 114-9; and RIIA, n. 106, p. 393.


214 RIA, n. 106, p. 394.
could be expected to devote their energy to farming as owner farmers. Tenant cultivators were given first priority to purchase the land on the same price as paid to the landlords. Payments would be made in lump sum or in thirty installments at 3.2 percent interest. To administer the programme, the law required the formations of land committees at three levels - town/village, prefectural level, and central level - elected by tenants, landlords and owner-farmers. 215

The second law, a revision of the land Adjustment law of 1938 made provisions that the rents should be paid in cash and should not exceed twenty five percent of the value of rice crop and fifteen percent of the value of the other crops. 216 It was also required that all future leases were "to be put in writing and could not be terminated, nor could their renewal be refused except with the approval of the local committees." 217 In nutshell, the Occupation programme of land reforms has swept away the pernicious ills of the pre-war unequal relationship between repressive landlords and submissive tenants at a single stroke. Tenancy system was abolished to a large extent and rent in kind was replaced by rent paid in cash.

215 Dore, n. 191, p. 140.
216 Ladezinsky, n. 213, p. 59.
217 Dore, n. 191, p. 141.
LABOUR REFORMS

Although in the pre world war era, a small number of non-agricultural workers were able to organize into trade unions for both political and economic objectives, but the then overall internal environment, given the military regime, was not conducive to the development of a healthy labour movement. It was only after the allied powers (precisely U.S.) took over the herculean task of guiding the political reorientation of hitherto undemocratic Japan, a favourable climate for the growth of labour organizations was created.

The development of independent labour unions was one of the principal operational goals of the Occupation based on the belief that the industrial labour force would provide a fertile ground for planting the seeds of democracy in the body politic of Japan. On October 4, 1945 General Douglas MacArthur, keeping in view the objective of inculcating in the working class "the desire and ability to support democratic institution", issued a directive on the Japanese "Bill of Rights." It called for the dissolution of government-sponsored labour front organization and cancellation of restrictions on the activities of labour unions.

218 Miriam S. Farley, "Labour Relations", in Borton, ed., n. 61, pp. 94-102.
220 Ibid, p. 103; and Martin, n. 11, pp. 81-2.
221 Farley, n. 218, p. 103.
222 For text see, Occupation, n. 38, pp. 94-8.
In addition, the Japanese government was urged to encourage the unionization of labour. Accordingly, the Diet passed a series of laws relating to labour issues. On 21 December 1945, a trade union law was passed. It guaranteed workers the right to organize to bargain and to strike. However, it defined the conditions under which the right to strike was to be exercised. It assured the workers against any discrimination by employer on the ground of their membership in unions. The law established labour relations committees on both a national and prefectural basis. In September, 1946 the Diet passed Labour Relations Adjustment Law for the peaceful settlement of dispute through mediation, conciliation, or arbitration by impartial committees. However, it prohibited the public utility workers to go on strike for thirty days after appealing for mediation. The Labour Standard Law of 1947, set up minimum legal standards for wages and working conditions, and abolished servitude of all kinds.

These legal measures and the SCAP encouragement to give free hand to the development of conditions where work force would feel motivated to voice for their rights and take active participation into the process concerning their field led to a mushroom growth in the formation of trade unions. Thousands of post-war unions sprang up at

223 RIA, n. 106, p. 396.
224 Farley, n. 218, p. 103.
225 Martin, n. 11, p. 85.
226 Fearey, n. 93, p. 76.
the local level along with several pre-war labour unions. These local unions were clubbed together to form national unions of workers and then to form federations. The largest among them were the All Japan Federation of Labour (JFL) a right wing organization. It was a revival of pre-war organization of that name.\textsuperscript{227} Its rival, the new left wing, National Congress of Industrial Unions (CIU) was established at approximately the same time with a membership of 1,600,000.\textsuperscript{228} The third, although a much smaller but not insignificant group of independent unions organized in October, 1946.\textsuperscript{229} The combined strength of the two major federations (JFL and CIU) in 1948 was thirty one percent of the total organized labour force; 59 percent belonged to the various national unions independent of the national federations; and 10 percent to the independent local unions.\textsuperscript{230}

The unionization of labour was not left confined only to the economics of employees - employer relationship. Since economic conditions were determined by the political policy of the government in most countries. Politicization of labour union in Japan also started taking place in the very beginning of their coming into existence.\textsuperscript{231} The two main national federation of labour union - JFL and CIU - had come under

\textsuperscript{227} Farley, n. 218, p. 105.
\textsuperscript{228} RIA, n. 106, p. 397.
\textsuperscript{229} Farley, n. 218, p. 105; and Martin, n. 11, p. 85.
\textsuperscript{230} Farley, n. 218, p. 105.
\textsuperscript{231} Ball, n. 62, pp. 157-8.
the control of social democrats and communists respectively. The polarization of trade unions on different political platforms led to the failure of the emergence of United Labour Front in Japan.²³²

Political parties started taking keen interest in the trade unions not for economic interest of workers but also for political advantages. "The millions of workers who swarmed into the Unions, some with enthusiasm and some from the habits of conformity had little knowledge of trade union methods or of elementary democratic procedures."²³³ Thus, they were prone to fall victims to the power politics tactics of the political parties instead of learning democratic principles of participatory political processes as desired by the Occupation policy. There were enough factors which could be used to intensify the struggle on the labour front simply to cash on it for political gains. The most important one in the hands of trade unions was the use of strike as a political weapon. Trade unions affiliated with communists were more prone to employ strike as a political weapon.

To whip up the activities of the trade union a joint struggle committee was formed. It composed of representatives from thirty trade unions including both the JFL and CIU affiliates. The main agenda for the committee was a strike of government workers to pressurize the government to concede to a higher minimum

²³² RIA, n. 106, p. 396.
²³³ Farley, n. 218, p. 106.
wage for government workers, a mitigation of income tax for persons with low income, and the lifting of the yen 500 monthly limit of cash payments for wages.234 This stand adopted by the trade union could be attributed to internal as well as external factors. Low productions of items of daily use, inflation, prolonged economic crises and the Yoshida's government failure to solve these problems were all internal causes.235

What stimulated the trade union externally to exert direct pressure on the government by employing strike as a political weapon, was the release of FEC policy decision on December 6, 1946 which stated clearly in paragraph (6) that, "Trade unions should be allowed to take part in political activities and to support political parties."236 However, in the preceding paragraph (5) it was added that "strikes and other work stoppages should be prohibited only when the Occupation authorities consider that such stoppages would directly prejudice the objectives or needs of the Occupation."237 This FEC policy decision on the one hand stimulated the labour unions to take direct action by sanctioning the right to political activities and to support political parties, on the other authorized the SCAP to crush any


235 Ball, n. 62, p. 159.


237 Ibid.
such activity in the name of obstacle to the implementation of Occupation programme. Political activism among the industrial workers reached a height when in January 1947 they gave a call for national level anti-government strike by government workers was made. This attempt, motivated by communists was foiled by the direct intervention of the SCAP.\textsuperscript{238}

Consequently, on the basis of the SCAP's public letter to the Prime Minister Ashida, the Diet amended the 'National Public Service Law in December 1948. It denied to the regular public service employees the right to strike, and collective bargaining. As far as the employees of public corporations were concerned they were deprived of only the right to strike but the right to collective bargaining remained with them.\textsuperscript{239} The Trade Union Law of 1945 and the Labour Relations Adjustment Law of September 1946 were also revised in 1949.

The main purpose of these amendments was to direct the functioning of the trade unions on democratic lines and to save them from receding back into an arbitrary power house of a few leaders for their vested interest. Special vigil was kept on the role of communists in the trade union activities. In 1950 following the outbreak of war in Korea, anti-communist policy measures were intensified and pro-communists employees were weeded out of government and private industries to clean the way for

\textsuperscript{238} Martin, n. 11, p. 86.

\textsuperscript{239} Fearey, n. 93, pp. 78-9.
the democratization of trade union with an eye of building up democratic electoral procedures in Japan.

**DISSOLUTION OF ZAIBATSU**

In the modern Japan the *Zaibatsu* (family combines) took the position of the *samurai* of pre-modern Japan. The financial, industrial, and commercial sectors of Japanese economy came under its control. Ninety percent industries of Japan was controlled by just ten main family combines.footnote 240 These family combines not only had encircled the economy of Japan but also penetrated their strings deep into the body politic of Japan. It had become an active partner of the adventurous Imperial army in its historic mission to create 'a new order' in the world. The constrained domestic market - due to lower wage level and more emphasis on concentration of profit - prompted the *Zaibatsu* to look for foreign consumers which brought her closer to the militarist who were aiming at "spreading the just cause throughout the world."footnote 241 Edwin W. Pauley in his Reparation report to the president of United States described *Zaibatsu* as "the greatest war potential in Japan. It was they who made possible all of Japan conquests and aggressions."footnote 242 It had provided economic roots to the ultranationalist and

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242 Pauley, n. 128, p. 39.
militarist who brought untold disaster to its own people as well to the rest of the world.

The dissolution of these family combines (Zaibatsu) and the deconcentration of economic power from few hands, had become an integral part of the Occupation policy for the demilitarization and democratization of Japan. The United States post-surrender policy documents for the guidance of the SCAP's Occupation activities called for the encouragement of democratic organizations in industry and development of economic ways and institutions of a type that would contribute to the growth of peaceful and democratic Japan.243 This policy further directed the Supreme Commander:

(a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends; and (b) to favour a programme for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry.244

The SCAP, acting on the above guidelines directed the Japanese government on September 19, 1945 to prepare a report on all industrial, manufacturing, and mining companies whose business exceeded one million Yen in 1944.245 Before the Japanese government could submit a report to four big business houses (the Mitsui, Honsha, Yasuda Hozensa, Sumitomo Honsha, and Kabushiki Kaisha Mitsubishi Honsha) referred to as the 'holding companies,' presented their own plans in consultation

243 Occupation, n. 38, pp. 73-81.
244 Ibid.
245 RIA, n. 106, p. 405.
with the Finance Minister, for voluntary dissolution in accordance with the Allied Powers.246

On November 6, 1945 the SCAP approved the dissolution plan and directed the imperial Japanese government to immediately proceed to effectuate it.247 It also instructed the imperial Japanese government to make a plan to "eliminate and prevent private monopoly and restraint of trade, undesirable interlocking directorates and intercorporate security ownership ... and provide equal opportunity to firms and individual to compete in industry, commerce, finance, and agriculture on a democratic basis."

Meanwhile, on the behalf of War, and State Department, Edward's "Zaibatsu" mission248 was sent to Japan to gather adequate information for arriving at a policy decision on the recommendations of the Japanese government's proposed plan and "to assist the SCAP in working with Japanese government officials on the necessary legislation."249 The recommendations of Edward's "Zaibatsu" mission had become the basis of all subsequent policies. On July 23, 1946 Supreme Commander for the Allied powers issued a directive250 to the


249 Martin, n. 11, p. 75.

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\textsuperscript{247} Ibid, pp. 164-5.

\textsuperscript{248} Ibid, pp. 179-80.

\textsuperscript{249} Martin, n. 11, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{250} Ibid, pp. 194-6.
Japanese government to prohibit families or family members of Zaibatsu or their appointees from exercising influence in any company, and to prohibit intercorporate security holdings, multiple directorates and contractual service or patent arrangements among restricted companies which restrict competition or restrain trade and commerce.

Another step in the direction of Zaibatsu dissolution was the establishment of the Holding Company Liquidation Commission, as recommended in the four major family combine's report. It was to act as a holding company to take over the securities held by the Zaibatsu holding companies. These securities were to be sold on equitable prices to the public. The main motive behind this programme was to create circumstances conducive to the large ownership in the industry and wide distribution of income to break the pre-war and war-time monopoly and restraint of trade which lend a supporting hand to the diabolical designs of the militarists. In addition, for the democratization of the economy of Japan, the SCAP established Economic Stabilization Board to abolish the war-time autocratic system of price control and allocation of scarce materials. The war-time central associations were replaced by a series of public corporations, established by the ninety second Diet. The next important step in the "deconcentration" programme of the Zaibatsu was the extension of the purge on January 4, 1947 to remove Zaibatsu family members and

251 RIA, n. 106, p. 405.
their principal designers from the responsible positions in the financial, industrial, and business world.\textsuperscript{252}

Under the guidance of the SCAP, the Diet passed on April 12, 1947 a law ("Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade") to stop the reemergence of war oriented industry in Japan and to assure the peaceful industrialization in future. The law provided for the establishment of a Fair Trade commission to enforce the new legislation and to establish industry wide codes.\textsuperscript{253}

However, with the changed scenario in the international environment, due to the onset of cold war, the Occupation policy of strong deconcentration programme came under severe criticism in congressional and business circles in the United States. As a result, the United States had to withdraw its support to the draft directive 'FEC 230' which embodied strong measures for drastic economic reforms.\textsuperscript{254}

In comparison to other socio-political and economic reforms, the programme of democratization of industry in Japan could not generate sufficient local support and was one of the first reform programmes of its kind to be abandoned. The Japanese officials to whom the task of implementing the deconcentration programme was assigned did not conceal their apathy towards its objectives and give one and other excuse to circumvent it. Fearey

\textsuperscript{252} Political Reorientation, n. 40, pp. 50-54.

\textsuperscript{253} Martin, n. 11, p. 79.

\textsuperscript{254} Fearey, n. 93, pp. 65-66.
attributed the failure of the complete realization of deconcentration programme to the lack of competitive tendencies among the Japanese, absence of individualism, high prices of commodities, glaring inflation and unique employee-employer relationships.

However, whatever the hindrances came in the way of these reforms, it had contributed, if not significantly, to break the back of economic bastion of the military base of Japan.255

RELIGIOUS REFORMS

The deadly virus of militarism and ultranationalism, in the pre-surrender era of Japan, was rooted not only in its intricate economic structure and polity but also entered in the social set-up of Japan and permeated the entire life of the people through their indigenous religion called Shinto. "After much study the American concluded that the master Key to the Japanese mind was Shinto. A fanatical devotion to the emperor and unshakable faith in the indestructibility of the 'Land of the gods' enabled the Japanese to fight heroically to the bitter end even under the most desperate conditions."256 In fact, it was not Shinto per se but the State Shinto, or to use William P. Woodard's term 'Kokutai Kult' which

255 Ibid, p. 66.
256 Saeki Shoichi, "Our Shinto Heritage : A Reassessment", Japan Echo (Tokyo), vol. 16, No. 3, Autumn 1989, p. 82.
turned the indigenous animistic polytheism of Shinto into a virile militaristic philosophy.

State Shinto was established during the Meiji era by the militarists and ultranationalists to engender and foster patriotic and military spirit among the people to justify their militant national policy abroad as well as within the domestic politics of Japan. Under the Kokutai Cult, the Emperor was deified into a God and as a head of the sacred mission of Japan to rule over the world for a 'just order'. "Another basic principle underlying the Kokutai Cult was the unity of Shinto rites and political administration, the well known Saisei itchi." 

Thus the Emperor-state centered cult based on militant appeal and ideology in the name of the religion (which otherwise had nothing to do with foreign aggression), posed a serious challenge to the Occupation authorities in their endeavors to demilitarize Japan and to make it into a democratic system.

To liberate Shinto from the hold of militarists who had made it an instrument for legitimizing their autocratic deeds among the masses, and to grant it a status whereby it could not be employed again for antidemocratic activities, General Macarthur issued a

257 Tada Yanaihara, Religion and Democracy in Modern Japan (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of Pacific Studies, 1948), pp. 4-17.

258 Woodard, n. 74, p. 12.

259 Ibid, p. 11.
directive to the Japanese imperial government on October 4, 1945. It directed the Japanese government to

abrogate and immediately suspend the operation of all provisions of all laws, decrees, rules, ordinances, and regulations which establish or maintain restrictions on freedom ... of religion ... [and] by their terms or their application operate unequally in favour of or against any person by reason of ... creed ...

In the directive special reference was made to the notorious Peace Preservation Law under which so many persons had been persecuted and to the Religious Body Law of 1939 which "had been used so effectively in regimenting and mobilizing religion for the war effort." In order to abolish the union between state and religion, to prevent a recurrence of the perversion of Shinto theory and belief into militaristic and ultranationalistic overtones and to help Japanese people to reorient their national life into the cause of building a peaceful and democratic nation, MacArthur issued another directive on December 15, 1945. It "had a revolutionary effect on the traditional policy of the Japanese Government for controlling national thought." Its purpose was "to separate religion from the state, and to put all religions, faiths, and creeds upon exactly the same basis, entitled to precisely the same opportunities and protections." Discrimination against any person on the basis of his belief in any religion was prohibited. The dissemination of Shinto doctrines in any form by any

260 Documents vol. II, n. 180, pp. 82-6.
261 Woodard, n. 74, p. 51.
263 Yanaihara, n. 257, p. 19.
means in any educational institutions supported wholly or in part by public funds was abrogated.

The circulation by the government of official volumes, commentaries, interpretations or instructions on Shinto was forbidden. In the school, lessons on Shinto teaching were removed. All financial support from public funds and all official affiliations with Shinto and Shinto shrines were forbidden. However, purely religious functions of the shrines were not hindered. The thrust of the directive was not to stamp out Shinto religion from the soil of Japan. The corollary of this directive and other the SCAP measures was to free the Shinto from the Emperor-state centred Cult (Kukotai Shinto) and to cut out its state sponsored mythical support to the militaristic and ultranationalistic ideology of the pre-war and war-time Japan. The directive also condemned the divinity of the emperor and his superiority over the heads of other state, and the superiority of the people and islands of Japan over non Japanese and other territories respectively as militaristic and farce. It was followed by the proclamation of a rescript by the emperor on January 1, 1946 branding as "false", the "conception that the emperor is divine and the Japanese people are superior to other races and destined to rule the world." Consequently, imperial portrait were removed from the schools and the ceremonial reading of the Imperial Rescript On Education of 1890 in the public schools was banned.
The school ceremonies of bowing in the direction of the Imperial Palace, of shouting Long live the son of Heaven "Tenno Heika Banzai", and of making other expression of reverence for the emperor were all prohibited. Decision were taken to remove the imperial chrysanthemum crest from future issues of postage stamps and currency and court buildings.²⁶⁴

It is thus clear that the Occupation Administration was aimed at widespread socio-political reforms in Japanese Society. This however could not be undertaken in full seriousness and to its logical conclusion, because the strategic situations in the world had started undergoing a change, that is, the strains of cold war were now felt.

²⁶⁴ SCAP, Civil Information and Education Section, Religious and Cultural Resources Division, Religion in Japan (Tokyo, March 1948), p. 133.