CHAPTER - IV

STALIN AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE BUREAUCRACY
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The decade from 1918 to 1928 was, as we have seen, characterised by audacity in formulating the theory of the organic labour state. The decade from 1928 onward was on the contrary, characterised by theoretical inertia coupled with conditions for the practical operation of the organic labour state.

In the decade upto 1938 the great immensity of Soviet society was more radically transformed than any society in history in such a short time. It was a cataclysm such as no other modern society had endured. The class structure of Soviet society had been abruptly transformed. The goal of the integral labour state of transforming all into the salaried employees of a single economic mechanism, had been ruthlessly achieved.

Most important, the two five year plans had built up a powerful heavy industrial base and total production had quadruped within a decade. ¹ Here, for the first time in history, was an industrial workforce made to the specification of the masters of the state machine. It was a

workforce that owed its existence, its expectations, its knowledge to that same state that controlled all its avenues of movement. The cement of the system was, and continues to be, the state's almost boundless power of patronage.

The state now decided who should work at what. It set norms for all productive work, payment was strictly according to performance. Strictly defined gradations were established within the working class and between it and the managerial technical elite. ²

Within the state administration and the army, pay differentials, perks now became more exaggarated than they had been even under Tzar. The egalitarian inspiration of the revolution had now been denigrated. According to Molotov, "Bolshivik policy demands a resolute struggle against egalitarians as accomplices of the class enemeny, as elements hostile to socialism."³ The most typical aspect of this state-promoted labour competition was the Stakhanov movement which started in 1935, which sought to popularize the slogan - from each according to his ability to each according to work.⁴

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Preobrazhensky had, in 1924, believed that the political victory of the working class entailed a considerable economic impediment, in that the rate of accumulation could not be as large because "the working class... cannot treat its own labour power.... in the same way as the capitalist did..."\textsuperscript{5} However, Soviet economists like Strumlin grasped the fact that since the state disposed of an effective monopoly as an employer of labour it could impress its sumptuary norms, its hours and conditions of work upon the whole people. This way it could obviously control the rate of accumulation and the whole people. This way it could obviously control the rate of accumulation and the size of the social surplus most effectively.\textsuperscript{6} it is the central political bureaucracy that has at its exclusive command the basic means of production. It determines the size of social surplus and decides upon its allocation.

But rapid industrialisation clearly required the maximum accumulation of capital reserves in the hands of the state. This is turn presupposed that wages and the norms of consumption should be depressed to the minimum compatible with reproduction of labour power. High prices and low wages

\textsuperscript{5} E.A. Preobrazhsky, "New Economics" Vol.1, part 1, p.100, (Moscow, 1926)

\textsuperscript{6} Bukharin in his Economics of the Transformation Period, had earlier observed that the enforcement of reduced sumptuary norms through state rationing had been central to accumulation under monopoly capitalism. Bukharin Economics (New York, 1971), p.35.
were essential. It followed that the powerful organisations of labour would have to be broken and reformed to promote the goal of "socialist accumulation". They have to be the transmission belts through which the central apparatus set in motion the several parts of the single economic mechanism.

The most basic defence mechanism of the workers had been effectively destroyed: the trade unions were converted into what Carr refers as "production unions". It was under Stalin during the First two five-year plans that soviet workers were reduced to an atomised mass and their trade unions became agencies of the state. A vast impoverished work force was kept tied to its workplace partly by creating an aristocracy of labour and partly by draconian legislation.

No where except in the Soviet Union was there such a large industrial workforce so devoid of the characteristics of the proletariat. These declassed workers deprived of organisation and articulation were precisely the characteristics discussed by Lenin and Bukharin in their accounts of the workers in a typical imperialist state formation. It was Stalin who implemented the devices of

8. Ibid.
capital accumulation under monopoly capitalism in the Soviet Union, and represented the triumph of the state over society, over workers' organisations in particular.  

It was not until Stalin's Second Revolution that the dictatorial severity anticipated in the theory of the early 1920s became a reality. Simultaneously, as Lenin and Trotsky predicted, the organs of state politics literally ceased to function. The Supreme Soviet met only once in between 1929 to 1935; trade unions congresses were put off. In an atmosphere of purge and terror and a rigid bureaucratic command, meaningful political debate was impossible; the party itself became a cipher and power passed to the party state bureaucracy. Here indeed the state was purged of its political attributes, reduced to a monolithic uniformity. The party now became a poorly executive agency of the big bureaucratic machine charged with mobilising the mass for the fulfilment of the plan. Party lost its deliberative and inspirational force and had become as Gramsci had predicted "a police organisation and its name political party is pure mythological metaphor."  

Thus the revolution ended in the most consummate concentration of domination in the hands of an omnipotent bureaucracy.


It is easy to detect in Pre-Stalinist Russia, factors, making for both bureaucratic tyranny and a mono-organisational society. Russia entered the 20th century as an autocratic monarchy and the attendant attitudes were deeply embedded in both the "elite" and "mass" political culture: "Truth is God's, but freedom is Tsar's". Liberal and anti-authoritarian tendencies were growing, particularly after 1905, but they had little chance to take root before being swept away. The traditions of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia were predominantly anti-liberal and had no patience for procedural democracy. As they invested the revolutionary organisation with an unqualified claim to rule which flowed from its "correct" doctrine; and in the inevitable struggles to establish what was correct doctrine; dominant personalities and social stratum was bound to emerge, a fact recognised by Lenin's fellow Marxists Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg.\(^{11}\)

Even during Lenin's life-time what emerged was an oligarchy of party leaders resting on state machine from which they had exterminated all opposition in the form of its ban on "faction", and intra-party opposition groups.

There was the great preponderence of the state

over society marking Tsarist Russia as an oriental despotism. Because social forces were too constrained to allow much scope for spontaneous evolution, change mainly took the form of "social engineering". Related to this was the notion of society as consisting of estates, obligations of which were enforced by a centralised bureaucracy. Although capital market relations made considerable headway before the revolution, the salient features which seem to prefigure partly to those of the mono-organisational society. Tsarist Russia stood out in sharp contrast to England, pre-and post 1789 France and even less to Germany. And once the Bolsheviks were in the saddle, chances of such an outcome became bright. From their Marxism they received the concept of a society totally remade from the basic economic structure up their confidence in the state. And from Russian revolutionary traditions, they perfected the centralised military pattern of administration.

The measures collectively known as War Communism went a long way towards transforming Soviet Russia into a centrally managed bureaucratic society during the very first years of the regime. The market in goods and services for both production and consumption was almost entirely replaced by centralised allocation. Moreover the party was already

asserting a major coordinating role in keeping the specialised bureaucracies entrusted with various aspects of national life running in harness.

Thus the ground was now well prepared for both the consistent elements of Stalinist bureaucracy. However, there were a number of restraining factors. After 1921 most small-scale industries were in the private hands and agriculture was nearly total private. So there was substantial scopes for independent thought during the 1920s. Also that, largely under the influence of German social Democracy, Marxism as a political movement came to Russia heavily imbued with democratic values. It was during the Civil War that the Bolshevik leaders went for centralist stands in rallying the 10th Congress to support the suppression of intra-party opposition and factions, can be regarded as a reconfirmation and entrenchment of the established centralism - bureaucratism dominant patterns. Divisions within the top leadership activated the machinery of intra-party democracy and stimulated public debates, they simultaneously provoked fatal counter-measures.

The Soviet Union in the 1920s revealed a strong potential to develop into a mono organisational society. With great determination, the bureaucracy, led by Stalin used this objective situation into their favour. The way to
a mono-organisational bureaucratic society lay through capturing the power-bases of the Bolshevik leaders, liquidating the sub-system autonomy and concentrating decision making in a single corner. 13

It is generally agreed that the crucial resource enabling Stalin-led bureaucracy to establish their sway was control over the party organisation through his being from 1921, the only politburo member with a seat in the Orgburu and from 1922 general secretary of the party. The successive dominant factions in the politburo needed "abuses of powers" to be done in order to defeat their opponents in the leadership. Stalin was doing it for them. He did this thing with skill in coalition-building, flexibility in falling in with the policies of the temporary majority, and an acute sense of timing in changing allies and policies. The centralist side of "democratic centralism" was emphatically reasserted with the suppression of opposition groupings of 1920-21 and prohibition of factionalism.

Stalin was most adept at exploiting his organisational strength and neutralising his organisational weaknesses. Perhaps the best example is his promotion of the

"full" central committee vis-a-vis the politburo, a gambit that had the virtue of appearing in line with intra-party democracy, but it also had the advantage since well before that Stalin and his adherents had a majority in the central committee.

A rather similar maneuvour was employed with the Council of People's Commissars. Now, we know that the Government. was responsible to Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets and especially its Presidium. These bodies through party control over the election of their members were more vulnerable to Stalin, who had control over the party secretariat, than was to the Council of People's commissers. When Stalin was in a position to stack the politburo and government the Central Committee and CEC were both allowed to atrophy.¹⁴

It Stalin's organisational power was instrumental in capturing the citadels of Politburo "outs" on behalf of Politburo "ins" it was also extended by each capture. Thus when Trotsky lost Army and Navy Commissiat in Jan.1925, it was taken over by Stalin's ally Frunze. Shortly afterwards, when Kamnev and Zinoviev went into opposition, the power bases in Moscow and Leningrad partly respectivley were

restaffed with loyal Stalinists. Finally, in 1930, with the defeat of the Right-opposition and the removal of Rykov from the council of people's commissars, Tomsky from council of Trade Unions, and Bukharin from the Comintern, they were replaced by Stalin proteges Molotov, Shvernik and Manuilsky, respectively. The effect of this developments were to liquidate the semi-autonomies of several organisations, and binding them into an broader and tighter organisational network.

Thus by 1930 the transition to the mono-organisational beureaucratic society was well advanced. Meanwhile the biggest remaining gaps in this patterns were removed with the replacement of NEP by a Command Economy based on centralised directive planning and administration of industry and distribution and collectivisation of agriculture.15

Civil War-led situation and the ideological terms in which the leadership analyzed the situation were crucial in shaping the Stalinist bureaucracy. By the end of the Civil War, the country was devastated, the small higher-middle class destroyed, its working class declassed and the peasantry seething with unrest. At this moment there were no social force which could generate an internal dynamic in

the socialist direction - except the pure political will of the leadership. They had always known that they might be in power some day - but they had not expected this to occur in social isolation. One of the important factors behind such an outcome was that the Bolsheviks never constituted a real political mass movement. As an organisation of professional revolutionaries they did succeed in gaining power, but that was simultaneously a factor in isolation.

The elements of solution were suggested by circumstances rather than by theoretical anticipation. First, the Civil War brought with it a fully fledged practice and ideology of "statism". Direct and wide-ranging state intervention, mass coercion, a centralised administrative machine, were all recommended by different party authorities not on grounds of emergency but as a socialist principle par excellence. Thus it was not the proletariat but the state itself was replacing the class. The Party could not rely upon the working class, rather the state apparatus was gradually taking over the function of the principal lever for the achievement of the desired aims.

In such a way, Bolshevism acquired a social basis it did not want: the bureaucracy. Naturally the state system which presided over the building of the bases could influence deeply the very character of this bases and thus
the whole system.

New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced on the basis of the negation of what was at the very heart of the previous stage and it produced a set of compromises between plan and market, political monopoly and social diversity, state and society, ideology and expedient. LENINS'S NEW STRATEGY PROCLAIMED DELAYING AMBITIOUS AIMS, SLOWING DOWN THE RESTRUCTURING, BUT GAINING IN SOCIAL SUPPORT AND AVOIDING OVERALL STATISM.

The alternation in historical development of two models - War Communism and NEP - suggested two main alternatives. Bukharin expressed that NEP was based on a revision of a set of assumptions inherent in the isolationist syndrome. The Peasantry ceased to be seen as an automatic begetter of capitalism, and the party therefore could be seen as socially less vulnerable. The factors operating in Lenin's time which are sometimes presented as seeds of further Stalinist bureaucratic stage, could also be interpreted as seeds of Lenin's regime where his strategy was to maintain a strong state but no statist bureaucratism. It was a strategy that kept the powder dry but looked seriously for a maximum of social support.

During the NEP, there was a constant narrowing of the apex where the decisions were taken, making the party dependent on the vagaries of kitchen political manoeuvring and hence vulnerable to a significant element of chance in the outcome of political struggles. It happened due, first, to the disruption of whatever political play there was in the party's upper layers, as a result of which the ruling group lost - its unity. Secondly, the appearance and development of the party apparatus. This way - one group eliminates the other and imposes its blueprint - got ingrained.

In the social context, already inherited from NEP, the tendency to telescope stages of development and condense them, was both the result of the sense of power of the rulers at the apex of the unchallenged machinery, with the state rushing ahead and presiding social and economic development.

Engels in a letter to C. Schmidt, in Oct. 1890, note that the state enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from socio-economic factors and it might do one of three things; favour development, block it, or engage indecisively in either.¹⁷

expected to lift the "basis" to the level of "superstructure", after which the former would impose its influence on the latter. In fact the reverse occurred; instead of "serving" its "basis", the state, using the powerful means at its disposal - bureaucracy -, was able to press the social body into service under its own diktat.

Two phenomena, both resulting from the push of industrialisation drive favoured such an outcome. One was the general state of flux into which Russia was propelled into by the "big drive"; the other was a peculiar social mobility which collectivisation and industrialisation created. In a matter of few years only, the whole population changed their social roles, switched into a new class, a new job. The state machinery tried to master the chaos by strengthening the administrative and controlled machinaries. This imposing of large-scale forms on an unprepared nation of small-scale producers without allowing for the very concept of maturing, brought about a state of social warfare against almost the whole nation which contributed to the renewal among leaders of the old sense of isolation from the social base and the tendency and the need to lean ever more strongly on the bureaucracy.

It was already mentioned that the Civil War vastly weakended the urban middle classes, which constituted a setback from the point of view of social development. This can be seen from the acute sense of dependence on those bearers of the previous bourgeois culture - the managerial and professional classes - who were enlisted in the service of the new system. But now in the anti-NEP in development in the big drive and the wholesale statisation process, the development drive had to be organised by the only social force available for the task - the party and the state administration. The lower ladders of the now swelling administrations were swamped by newcomers from the popular classes badly prepared for their new positions. It is possible to suggest that the mass of culturally low-key officialdom was certainly a social basis for the flourishing of all irrational trends in those years.

No less important and momentous a factor were the upper layers of the different "appraty" now being constituted into a powerful class of bosses endowed with power privileges and status. In situation of flux in the 1930s such a stratum was essential for the system's stabilisation. The network of bosses allowed to be authoritarian toward their subordinates and masses in order to discipline them.
The relation of the peasantry and the state played a key role in the shaping of the Stalinist bureaucratic phase of the Soviet system. The NEP and its policies gave the peasantry a sense of social promotion which strengthened for a time the specific traits of the rural world as a system on its own, with deeply in-built mechanisms for self-perpetuation and a high degree of conservatism. Traditionally, in fact, the rural world dissented from official versions of orthodoxy. The peasantry were not at all "clerical", there religion was a homestead cult, says Pierre Pascal. Their communal life tended to reject any hierarchy - hence any bureaucracy. Traditionally the popular masses in Russia were excluded from participation in the government. Here, it is worth pondering over Pascal's statement, "One shouldn't forget that the revolution in 1917 was for those soldiers and peasants who made it, a movement of Christian indignation against the state". But power didn't come to the hand of the peasantry, rather the victorious revolutionaries themselves got engaged in state-building with plenty of officialdom. The NEP interlude contained a promise of compromise, but with Stalin's drive from above this state-building took a particularly dynamic


20. Ibid., p.48.
turn. The Bolsheviks were an urban party. Had they understood the peasants better, they might have discovered that peasants were not automatically bearers of capitalism.

The Kolkhozy (collective farms), a supposedly higher form of production and social organisation was brought to the peasants; a wholesale bureaucratisation, they dreaded most. At the same time, the distrust of the state towards the new form was such that the main production means were taken away from the Kolkhozy which made the peasantry into the lowest group on the social ladder. The peasants resistance invited even more control and pressure by the state bureaucracy. The statisation without a guaranteed income to the peasants was the result of the imposition of theoretically advanced forms on people who were not ready for them. The function of the state bureaucracy to squeeze without being able to encourage growth lead to the creation of an array of repressive administrative machinery. 21 No wonder, for the time being, the so called collectivisation bred a huge bureaucracy but broadened the gulf between the officials and the peasantry.

This was a return to the modernising models of earlier Tsardom. There was a deeper affinity and sincerity

21. The writings of numerous novelists interested in the Russian Peasantry, such as Ovechkin Iashin, Abramov, Stadniuk, Dororsh, and others, paint a picture of dissolution and bureaucratic oppression.
implied in the change-over of historical anticidents from Stepan Razin and Pugatchev, to Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. The traits of "Dual Russia" have been cogently shown in an article by R.C. Tucker: its traditional "state-society" dichotomy and the see-saw of "revolutions from above" were reproduced in Stalin's times with enhanced sharpness. Stalin was engaged in industrializing forcefully and speedily building a fully bureaucratic rule. The state was here engaged in making and unmaking ruling groups, making then into an appendage to itself, imposing forms of social and economic activity, influencing class relations. As the country was moving ahead in economic terms, it was surging backwards compared to the Tsar and NEP period, in terms of political and social freedom. It was a retreat into a tighter-than-ever harnessing of society to the state bureaucracy, which became the main vehicle of state's policies and ethos.

Three factors seem to be crucial in favouring the phenomenon of Stalinist bureaucratisms: (1) the unhinging of the social structures and the flux created by the industrialisation drive; (2) the characteristics of the growing and increasingly self-conscious bureaucracy; (3) the historical cultural tradition of the country. All three

factors led to a reliance on the might of the state apparatus.

The rapid the break with the old and change, the more of the old was recreated. Institutions and methods which seemed to be entirely new, after deeper insight show the often astonishing reemergence of many old traits and forms. In the process of remoulding and combatting the "petty-bourgeois mentality and spirit" and the religious mind of the masses a "principle of contamination" began to operate. In the course of supposedly Marxist crusade against "opiate of the people" the whole spiritual climate of the system showed signs of succumbing to some of the age-old currents of the Russian Orthodox civilisation. The traditional devotion to worship of icons, relics of saints and processions were apparently being replaced by a shallow lay imitation of icon-like imagery, official mass liturgy, effigies and processions. In any case, from the idea of emancipating the masses from the traditional mental structures, the bureaucratic system moved into a stage of recreating replicas. The cultural trends were not necessarily responses to what the masses wanted to get, but rather an expression of the psyche and mental tensions and values of the officials and leaders of a state machinery that was rapidly growing within and in conflict with the
Where the legal tradition is weak and wherever it is shattered, propitious conditions are created for a personal or apparatus-led authoritarianism. In the Soviet Union the continuous change in the social composition in the party is contextual here. After 1917, the newcomers who entered the party had no experience of fighting Tsarism, and, therefore, did not share the values and culture of the old guards. Now, facing the new party layers, this old guard, were unable to unite and create for themselves conditions indispensable for a stable ruling elite. So by knocking out the counter-vailing devices, the Stalin-led apparatus was set for a takeover Stalin-led by taking the levers of power, by reworking the whole ideological and political framework and launching a bureaucratic state building in a framework of statism.

Stalin clearly disliked the past of his party and its ethos - and destroyed it. But he also refused to accept the contours of the pattern emerging under his own rule whereby the new social groups especially the state and the bureaucratic startups, began to consolidate their position. Perceiving such tendencies as encroachments on his power. He therefore depended with fury his own power and his own

Stalin and the apparatus were presiding over the creation of two political models simultaneously - an uneasy symbiosis of "legality" and "arbitrariness". The extra-legal measures taken in the process of collectivisation, industrialisation shattered the social fabric. However, there was a deep craving among the officials that to regularize, to consolidate, to ensure a ruly and predictable working of the responsible institutions, some kind of constitutionality was required. The interests of the ruling apparatus as well as of the system, in terms of regaining popular support and providing predictable working conditions for the functioning of the state machinery were in the deepest interest of the system. 25

But at the same time, from early 1930s, the opposite tendency was gaining upperhand: police rule and camp system. These two inter-related factors are the very negation of the carved-for rule of law. Thus two coexisting

24. Adam Ulam said that some other ruler might eventually have yielded to the new order, made the best use of it, and accepted an honourary presidency or even a quite effective leadership. This is Ulam's interpretation of the efforts in 1934 to get rid of Stalin by making him even more of a god by pushing him up and out of interference with politics. See his Stalin: The Man and His Era (N.York, 1973), pp.372-73.

modes, one merging in the shadow of the other evolved. This process ultimately evolved into a system of orderly bureaucracy. With one institutional oligarchy at its apex, precided over by a top political management.

So with the coming of Stalin the social structure evolved under the influence of an already existing and all-embracing state organisation, became subject to a powerful controlling mechanism of the party-state apparatus. In the industralisation process, with the superstructure rushing ahead of the emerging social basis all the important social groups found themselves bureaucratised and fully dependent on state administration. On the other hand it evolved forms and structures of an autocratic power pattern reminiscent of the traits of the imperial past. As the state developed and the intitial tensions began to subside, the statized structure began to evolve into a stable pattern. It was a preclude to a more orderly, bureaucratic system which emerged later on which could have been percieved in the 1930s, but could not shake off the harness as long as the initial stages of the states' warfare against the nation of small producers went on.

The pyramidal construction of the administration, the tight system of command and one-way control from top to bottom, reinforced by overt and covert control mechanisms at
every level, gave rise to a dispersion of forces and a division of means and brought about a loss of initiative. The chief bureaucrats possessed very wide networks of clientele which were formed out of the conflict between individual careers. The links and relation formed on the fringes of professional activity remained hierarchic and personalized. State's rigid framework imposed an extreme functional concentration of initiative and means at the summit of apparatus.

Stalin respected this reality and used it as a powerful lever. The Party was the bureaucracy's instrument for social recruitment. The bureaucracy renewed itself by integrating into its ranks social layers whose origin was forgotten to it. Stalin used it to speed up the passage from one generation to another. This rapid substitution was one of the major political conditions for the success of the enterprise.

The double effect of the complete disruption of forces, divisions of means, concentration of initiative and capacity for intervention at the summit completely determined the objective data of the struggle for power within the bureaucratic summit. We know that the bureaucracy is of heterogeneous social composition. Though the position of the ruling stratum in power remains solid, at
the same time it encounters grave difficulties from the growth of productive forces, that its internal heterogeneity can be accentuated and clashes of interest within its ranks can be aggravated to such an extent that a deep crisis opens up at the level of the State. The violence which accumulates through this process find its outlet in the changing nature of the society. The nature of highly bureaucratized society creates an alternative technique: the "palace coup" or "palace revolution". Stalin's palace coup took on the scope of a coup d'etat. The charges made in the show trials bear authenticity to this analysis.

The functional consolidation of the regime - nationally and internationally - demanded the creation of a mystificatory ideology. Its foundations - the theory of socialism in one country - had to be completed with a new theory of the state. The theory of the strengthening of the state had to be substituted for that of its withering away. It was this new thesis which in effect dominated the elaboration of the law.

The justification was undertaken on two distinct levels. In the most general sense it had to affirm the social continuity of the October Revolution. So, Stalin enshrined the identification of the bureaucracy with the proletariat. He announced the disappearance of classes and
their replacement by socio-professional categories. Stalin proclaimed Soviet Union's entry into the higher stage predicted by Marx, so that "Communism" was substituted for the transitional socialist stage. More specifically, he identified the personalization of the exercise of power with the Leninist model in the revolutionary epoch. The bureaucracy as a whole was in solidarity with this general mystification process because of its fundamental interests.

It is a very essential question whether the original Bolshevik movement that predominated politically for a decade after 1917, and the subsequent events and bureaucratic socio-political order that emerged under Stalin in the 1930s, are to be interpreted in terms of fundamental discontinuity or continuity. In the mid 1930's, Trotsky made his celebrated argument that Stalinism was its "Thermidorian negation" and "betrayal". The theory of a "straight line" between Bolshevism and major Stalinist coercive and bureaucratic policies has been recently popularised anew by Alexander Solzhenitsyn. It has been a


pivotal interpretation in the Soviet Studies academic.

Michael Karponich: "Great as the changes have been from 1917 to the present in its fundamentals Stalin's policy is a further development of Leninism", John S. Reshetar: "Lenin provided the basic assumptions which applied by Stalin and developed to their logical conclusion..." Zbigniew Brzezinsky: "Perhaps the most enduring achievement" of Leninism was the dogmatisation of the party, thereby in effect both preparing and causing the next stage that of Stalinism". Adam B. Ulam: Bolshevik Marxism determined the character of post-revolutionary Leninism as well as the main traits of what we call Stalinism". Finally H.T. Willets, who confirms that non-Soviet scholars regard Stalinism "as a logical and probably inevitable state in the organic development of the Communist Party". 29

The wholesale bureaucratisation along with forced collectivisation and industrialisation and terror - all this, it is argued, derived from the political, ideological programmatic and organisational nature of original

Bolshevism. It explained socio-political developments after 1917 almost exclusively by the nature of the party regime. Authentic interaction between the party-state and society is ignored.

Most Western theorists explain Stalin's upheaval as a continuation, culmination of an already ongoing process. Thus Merle Farnsod's classic summary "Out of the totalitarian embryo would come totalitarianism full-blown". E.H. Carr and Issac Deutscher, although both presented very different perspectives on many aspects of Soviet history, they saw a fundamental continuity between Bolshevism and Stalinist Bureaucratism. As Carr said: without Stalin's revolution from above, "Lenin's revolution would have ran out in the sand". And as Deutscher commented: "Despite Stalinism's repudiation of cardinal Bolshevik ideas and


grotesque bureaucratic abuses of the Bolshevik legacy, the Bolshevik idea and tradition remained ... the ruling idea and the dominant tradition of the Soviet Union." The first revision of the historiography of the reigning "totalitarianisms" school came in the early 1960s from mainstream scholars who looked Stalinist bureaucracies in the broader perspective of underdeveloped societies and modernizations. But they only reformulated the earlier standpoint.

The Bolshevism of 1917-28 did contain important seeds of Stalinism; but one has to note that Bolshevism also contained other important seeds and the seeds of Stalinism


could be found elsewhere - in Russian historical tradition, in events such as the Civil War and in the international setting etc. Bolshevism was in important respects a strongly authoritarian movement. But failure to distinguish between Soviet authoritarnism before and after 1929 means obscuring the very nature of Stalinist bureaucratism. Bolshevism was a far more diverse political movement ideologically, programmatically, generationally, than is usually acknowledged. Bolshevism was even a larger than Leninisms.35

As Roy Medvedev has pointed out that if Stalinist set-up was predetermined by Bolshenism, if there were no alternatives after 1917, then 1917 and Boshevism must have been predeterminede by previous Russian history".36

One argument is that the inner "political dynamics" of the Bolshevik party predetermined Stalinism. Another one insists that changes in the soviet political system under Bolshevism and Stalinism were superficial. But what is meant by "the party" as historical determinant when

35. For example, Bukharin's writings considerably influenced Leninist and Bolshevik ideology on imperialism and the state. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, pp.25-43. In a book, The Bolsheviks come to powers; The 1917 Revolution in Petrograd (New York, 1976), Alexander Rabinowitch shows us a Bolshevik Party in '1917 dramatically unlike the stereotype of a conspiratorial, disciplined vanguard, a party responding to, and gaining from, grass-root politics.

its composition, organisational structure, internal political life and outlook underwent far-reaching alterations between 1917 and 1921 alone? More importnat, the nature of Bolshevik ideology was far less cohesive and fixed. If ideology influenced events, it was also shaped by them. the Civil War had a major impact on Bolshevik outlook, reviving the self-conscious theory of an embattled vanguard and implanted in the once civilian-minded party what is known as "military Soviet culture". Above all official ideology changed radically under Stalin.37

The party's growing centralisation, bureaucratisation and administrative intolerance after 1917 certainly promoted authoritarianism in the one-party system and abetted the rise of Stalinist bureaucratism. To argue that these developments predetermined Stalinism is another matter. Even in the 1920s, after the bureaucratisation and militerisation the party remained oligarchical, in the words of one of its leaders, "a negotiated federation between groups, grouping, factions and tendencies."38

37. Bukharin, K. voproso O. trotskizme (Moscow and Leningrad, 1925), p.11. To put this point differently, the 1921 ban on factionalism in the party was not the culmination of Bolshivik-Leninist tradition, but a quixotic attempt by a panicky leadership to constrain or legislate away, its own tradition. As official historians have complained over the years, party history has been a history of "factional struggle" cited in S.F. Cohen, Op. Cit., p.17.

38. Tucker in Development of the USSR, p.33; Soviet Political Mind, pp.18, 179; Ibid.
Looking at the inner reality of the Soviet political system, R.C. Tucker suggested: "What we carelessly call the Soviet political system is best seen and analyzed as an historical succession of political systems within a broadly continuous institutional framework." The Bolshevik system had been one of party dictatorship led by an oligarchical leadership. From 1929 that one-party system gave way to an one-person-led centralised bureaucratic system.

Another view is that Stalin's wholesale collectivisation and heavy industrialisation represented the fulfilment of Bolshevik thinking about modernisation. The argument for programmatic continuity runs as follows: War Communisms was mainly a product of the Party's original ideological programatic ideas. These policies collapsed in 1921 because of the people's opposition. So NEP was brought as a socio-political order as being "merely a

39. See, for example, Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, p.165; Ulam, The Bolsheviks, pp.467-68; Paul Craig Roberts, "War Communism. A Rexamination", Slavie Review, June 1970, pp.238-61. Craig is arguing against the view that War Communism was primarily expediency, which he calls the "prevalent interpretation".

breathing spell", "a holding operation". \textsuperscript{41}

However, the fact is that the Bolsheviks had no well-defined economic policies upon coming to power in 1917. They had only certain vague goals and tenets. Secondly, the initial program of the Bolshevik government was not War Communism but what Lenin called in April, 1918, "State-capitalism". Thirdly, the actual policies of War Communism began as late as June 1918, in response to the threat of prolonged Civil War and diminishing supplies. \textsuperscript{42} During the NEP, the socio-polical order and social pluralism in economic, cultural-intellectual and even in political life, represents the historical model of Soviet Communist rule radically unlike Stalinism. \textsuperscript{43}

During 1923-27, if the rival policies can be dichotomized and personified, they were Trotskyist and Bukharinist. Stalins was with Bukharin who was pro-NEP,


\textsuperscript{42} For a discussion of NEP in this terms, see Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, pp.270-76; and Lewin, Political Undercurrents, Chaps.4,5,12.

\textsuperscript{43} Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, Chaps.6,8,9. For a different view of Stalin in he 1920s, see Tucker, Stalin As Revolutionary, pp.395-404. Tucker argues that much of Bukharin's programmatic thinking was antithetical to Stalin psychologically and that Stalin's later policies were already adumbrated in differences of emphasis between the two. Even so, the fact remains that there was no meaningful difference on the level of public policy and factional politics between 1924 and 1927. Opt. Cit., p.22.
moderate, evolutionary. This was the cement of Stalin-Bukharin that made official policy and led the party against the Left Opposition until early 1928. During these years there was no Stalinist ideas, only "Socialism in one Country" which was also Bukharin's. Though Bukharin's policies evolved between 1924 and 1928 toward great emphasis on planning, heavy industrial investment and efforts to promote a voluntary collective farm sector, he remained committed to the NEP framework of coexistence of socialist sector and a small-scale private sector. Bukharin's was a compromise between Bolshevik aspirations and Russian social reality.

Trotsky urged greater attention to heavy industry and planning and taming of the Kulaks, but through moderate, market oriented means. Even Preobrazhensky, the avatar of super-industrialisation wanted to "exploit" agriculture through market relations by artificially fixing state industrial prices higher than agricultural prices.

In fact, the revised Bukharinist program was adopted as the First Five Year Plan at the 15th party

Congress in Dec. 1927, and it represented a kind of Bukharinist - Trotskyist - amalgam. When Stalin abandoned this programme a year and a half later, he abandoned mainstream Bolshevik thinking about socio-economic change. The point is here to illustrate that Stalin's new policies in 1929-33 were a radical departure from Bolshevik programmatic thinking.

1929-33 were the formative years of Stalinist bureaucracy as a system. The murderous notion of an inevitable "intensification of the class struggle first appeared in Stalin's campaign to discredit Bukharinists and NEP ideas in 1928-30. Moshe Lewin has shown, during 1929-33, many administrative, legislative, class and ideological features of mature Stalinist bureaucratic state took shape as make shift solutions to the social chaos, generated by the destruction of NEP institutions during the initial wave of revolution from above. 45.

Stalinist bureaucracy could be termed as the bureaucracy which forms as a privileged social stratum and it has a deep contribution in post-1928 Soviet System's anti-egalitarianism, rigid stratification and cultural and social conservatism. In addition, revolution from above is

45. Medvedev, Let History Judge, pp.415-16, 536. David Schoenbaum's concept of a "revolution of status" in Hitler's Germany may apply here. See his Hitler's Social Revolution (Garden City, New York, 1967), Chaps.8,9, Ibid. p.28.
by definition a great expansion of state and its social functions, which means a great proliferation of official jobs and privileges. Not just the "Whole system of smaller dictators" throughout Soviet administrative life but millions of petty officials who gained opportunity and elevations of status. 46

In history no political revolution has remained for long in the hands of mass organisations, whether they are Jacobian clubs or Russian Soviets. Elites have soon taken over. In Russia, social pressures, as well as political and economic influences, served to widen the gap between the party apparatus and the rest of the country. The party failed during NEP to create any effective links between the political centre and the social community which could lead to eventual devolution of power to the masses. The party swelled in size, but the result was to establish a formidable party bureaucracy rather than human ties with the people. By the end of NEP, the new Soviet bureaucracy was isolating the party from an automated society. Once Rosa Luxemberg feared that unless Lenin's elitist party soon handed its sovereignty over to the masses, the Bolshevik regime would degenerate into a dictatorship. Trotsky once concluded that the growth of productive forces must

immitably lead to a liquidation of bureaucratic parasitism. However, historical development established that forced collectivisation and industrialisation provoked a social growth of bureaucracy, and enlargement of its intervention in the economy and in polities. It intervened in the social process as an autonomous force during Stalin's time. Rakovky interpreted the political split in the party in the 1930s as the result of the dissociation and organic splitting of the working class. The Party became the organ of the state bureaucracy, thus heralded a change in the balance of forces. This led to the liquidation of the workers state and the succession to a social corps of the state with the consolidation of Stalin's power. 47

Very rapid developments in technology during this century have given increased power to totalitarian regimes. Via Marx, the Bolsheviks inherited saint-Simon's interest in a technocratic society whose main objective would be efficiency in order to eliminate poverty.

However, the large-scale industrialisation, led by Stalinists, managed centrally by a strong bureaucracy without the mediation of any auxilliary organs, transformed technocratic dreams into realities. The Five-Year Plans were conducted by totalitarian will involving hundreds of

47. Ibid, p.316.
thousands of workers, by enlarging the ranks of a subservient bureaucracy with industrial managers. The untutored labour force powered into the factories without the defense of skills to bargain with or trade unions to shield them from central bureaucrats. This is the dehumanising nature of industrial society. The contours of this side Stalinist bureaucratism had been prophesied in NEP by Zamiatin. In his utopian novel, "My", people become mere numbers.

Stalin inherited a flourishing bureaucracy. Lenin regretted his negligence before his death and tried too late to stem the bureaucratic growth. Both political leaders had to rely on a bureaucracy for the social economic and political reasons, but Stalin worked through it out of personal ambition. As the years of NEP passed by and no intermediary organisation emerged between party and society the centralised bureaucracy took on ever greater authority in the name of the party. It is true that Lenin first set the party apparatus on an isolated pinnacle and remained extremely wary of all groups which contested this position. However, he tried to promote intermediary organs in order to promote devolution of authority. Whereas Lenin often struggled against the malignant effects of social tradition on political development, Stalin cynically manipulated them
for his own purposes. 48

To conclude, preexisting social traditions and political ideologies favoured a return to earlier historical patterns in both Germany and Russia after the first Great war, and led on to create totalitarian bureaucratic systems. However, while in Germany, the financial capital and industrial capital had enough autonomy while in the Soviet Union even of the 1920s the bureaucracy was taking over the control of the productive forces, by liquidating workers' control. Here one could add that the bureaucratic power grow either in an undeveloped society of shortage, or in a society where political and social development, since this situation can not develop a civil society of liberty, constitutionalism and participatory system.