CONCLUSION
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From an economic point of view, a society in transition from capitalism to socialism is principally defined by the suppression of private ownership of the means of production, state monopoly of external trade and banking and the introduction of planning into the economy. Thereby, production is no longer governed by the law of value and the market forces. Consequently, there arises a fundamental contradiction between the mode of production, which is clearly no longer capitalist, and the mode of distribution which basically remains a bourgeois one. Marx talked of the continuity of inequalities during the transitional phase through norms of distribution, that is, material incentives, the struggle to maximize wages, inequality in consumption etc.¹

This crucial contradiction of the transitional period derives from the fact that the socialist mode of production presupposes a much higher stage of development of the production forces - a stage that would render bourgeois aspects of the norms of distribution unnecessary.

It is imperative to realize, these two tasks

¹. In pre-capitalist societies, these norms of distribution either do not apply or are present only in an embryonic form. In feudal society, for example, the quantity of goods at the disposal of individual is not so much a function of his income as of his social status.
simultaneously which is the source of all the main dialecties of the transitional period, resulting in: (1) the partial survival of commodity production at the same time as it progressively withers away; (2) the survival of class divisions at the same time as they too begin to wither away; (3) a strong state of proletarian dictatorship develops as a precondition to the withering away of the state itself. Clearly, the rapidity with which commodity production, social classes and the state withers away does not depend not only on the domestic class struggle, but on the international balance of class forces also.

The withering away of the state coexists with the coercive direction of the economic process. Here certain statist authoritarianism is inevitable. Statist authoritarianism, instead of being transitional degenerates into bureaucratic authoritarianism if the dictatorship of the proletariat fails to exist in reality.

These bureaucratic deformation would not be inevitable were the proletariat as a whole in a position, as soon as it takes power, to direct collectively, as a class, all spheres of social life. In Russia soon after the Revolution and particularly from 1929 the state dominated all spheres of social life. Partial commodity production, and the same capitalist production process which could not
be transcended internationally, consolidated inequities. Bureaucratic deformations, culminating in total political expropriation of the working class, was institutionalised.

Therefore, the inevitability of bureaucratic deformation in the transitional societies is linked in the last analysis to two fundamental factors. Insufficient development of productive forces and the survival of capitalist features in the post-revolutionary society. To these two factors we should now add a few other factors that lie at the roots of bureaucratic degeneration in the Soviet Union. In Soviet Union, the level of development was too low to assure a rapid achievement of the state of abundance required for socialism. Hence it was forced to accomplish the tasks of socialist accumulation at the same time as those of primitive accumulation - notably industrialisation. It was foreseen neither by Marx nor by other Marxists that the revolution would triumph first in a backward country. This fact had had a whole series of disastrous results in the Soviet system.

The isolated victory of the Revolution in a backward country meant that this country had to defend itself against the military aggression of all the advanced capitalist countries and to spend a big chunk of its national social surplus product for this purpose. At the
same time, the higher standard of living in industrialised countries exerted a strong ideological attraction upon significant sections of the population. These two "unforeseen factors" supplemented those which had already been foreseen by Marxists as 'normal' for a transitional society, lie at the roots of the bureaucratic degeneration in the Soviet Union.

There are other crucial factors which added to this bureaucratic degeneration in the Soviet system, as emerges from the discussions so far. The development of bureaucratic, authoritarianism in the USSR owed largely to the peculiar historical socio-economic context in which the October revolution took place and the unprecedented aftermath of the Revolution in the form of Civil War, devastation of the economy, sharp and dramatic fall in the national income, disintegration and declassing of the main torch-bearer of the Revolution - the working class; as a result no social force was identifiable, only the apparatus of the Bolshenik party remained to take up the job of rebuilding, with nearly no mass basis.

A capitalist production process and not a superior version was gradually taken over by the working class with a new relation of production which was far superior than the capitalist one. This led to the splitting of the proletariat
by turning a portions of them officials in the apparatus and the other as producers, therefore an antagonistic relation developed, which is further reinforced by a capitalistic distributive mechanism. The then state of the international working class movement, that is, the receding of the proletariat in the developed Europe also influenced this bureaucratisation.

The rise of this bureaucratic authoritarianism also owed to the lack of theoretical elaboration and concretisation of the post-revolutionary structure and function of the socialist-state on the part of the classical and later Marxists; the difference between socialist revolution in the abstract as pronounced by Marx and Engels and the nature and the context of the revolution actually happened in a semi-capitalist society; Leninist simplification regarding the management of the socialist state; Lenin's mixing of dictatorship and democracy, his banning of political faction and that of the existence of other parties in the system; his institutionalisation of the supremacy of the party above the rule of law, and so on.

Some other factors one should note for the rise of bureaucracy in the Soviet system: Rigid centralism and monolithism which was taking shape right from the Lenin's days; usurption of powers of all representative bodies and
merely using them as tools in modernisation; excessive stress on one-man management and lack of managerial accountability to the labours and elected people; and a complete break down in workers' control, because of its initial declassed nature, its splitting into managers and labourers due to the division of labor and material incentives and owing to the curtailing of trade unions activism and autonomy and to turn them merely as tools of resource mobilisation. All these hampered the cultural development of the people and took away their power of initiative. This led to the bureaucracy's unhindered, control over the productive forces, and their utilisation and distribution of the surplus product, deciding national targets and aims. The hierarchical system of administration, through a system of privileges only consolidated the power and position of the bureaucracy.

The widespread statisation process, the fusing of political and economic power at the hand of the state in the absence of the domination of the proletariat had only helped the bureaucracy to rise. Along side, the fursion of party-state apparatus and the bureaucratic-authoritarian legacy of the pre-1917 Russia hastened this bureaucratisation. Also, the concept of the organic labour-state enshrined in the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat, or rather the state-party apparatus made the enlarging and consolidation of the
socio-political development of a peripheral society lag for behind its industrial development then a kind of a bureaucratic privilege and predominance is bound to appear.

The theoretical-institutional errors and the specific socio-economic formation—these two poles are mediated by an increasing political passivity of the Soviet proletariat during the 1920s.² The increasing political passivity of the Soviet proletariat was determined by a whole series of historical factors: the physical elimination of a great part of the workers during the Civil War; disappointment following the failure of the world revolution; generalized hunger and misery; weakening of the institutions of workers' power, etc. Lenin saw the danger during his last years. From 1923 onwards, Trotsky and the Left Opposition argued for an economic policy at home and an internationalism strategy abroad that would objectively help the Soviet proletariat to resume its political life. These proposals were designed to create a situation where a faster development of productive forces would go hand in hand with the revival of the political climate in which Soviets would

². From a subjective point of view the actors in this situation were to a great extent unaware of what was at stake. Trotsky once suggested that if somebody in 1920 had been able to show Stalin that he is going to suppress all forms of workers' power, and to destroy the Bolshevik party and the Comintern, it is quite possible that Stalin would have committed suicide. The same is true of the other party leaders who rejected the Left Opposition platform and allied themselves with Stalin.
have had actually functioning and the proletariat would have had a direct role in the management of enterprises. However this strategy also depended a good deal on external factors like a world revolution to come to the rescue of the Soviet working class. In the 1920s, any Soviet international strategy for a world revolution was totally unrealistic. Thus the Left-Opposition sounded vague and did not find favour with the party cadres.

True, between 1923 and 1936 most of old Bolshenik leaders came to realise the dominating nature of bureaucratic power; but their failure to perceive the dynamics of the situation in time, coupled with their inability to see the historical significance of the factional struggles in which they took part, meant that the process of bureaucratic degeneration proceeded uninterrupted.

The Bolshevik Party apparatus became the unconceious instrument of a bureaucratic social stratum; this was made possible only because the party itself had become bureaucratized due to its integration into the state apparatus. What made the Party sociologically incapable of

3. Ideological breakdown is unfortunately not infrequent in working class movement. Every time the working class is confronted with a new and unforeseen major problem, a considerable section of its best cadres fail to respond to it correctly. One example was the failure, after 1909-10, to understand the nature of the coming imperialist war and period of revolution and the underlying causes of the social democratic betrayal.
putting a stop to the process is a number of crucial political and institutional mistakes it committed which aided the part and the state apparatuses and their simultaneous bureaucratisation.

The prohibition of factions inside the party heralded the end of internal party democracy, while in this stage of bureaucratisation a systematic generalisation of political differences through freedom of expression was quite necessary.

Lenin was not initially for suppressing other parties. Upto 1921, a number parties enjoyed legal existence. However from 1920 on, although no law was passed to that effect, the single party principle became a practice. The suppression of other parties was based on the fear that they might be used by the bourgeoisie and the peasantry to overthrow the new social order. The civil war also clinched the issue when the rest of the parties fought the Bolsheviks in the Civil War. However, history shows that the best way to combat the danger of capitalist restoration is the continuous political activity of the working class. Therefore, it was absolutely vital to create conditions favourable to the political reactivation of the politariat.

The most serious institutional error was the
failure to understand the organic links between Soviet power, collective ownership and the need for primitive socialist accumulation, that is, for competition with the private sector of the economy. The party believed that this would be won by the state enterprises through their higher productivity. Consequently, great emphasis was placed upon individual productivity, which demanded a high degree of centralisation. Since this principle could generate bureaucratic domination, the Party tried to guard the sanctity of trade unions through these measures: (a) a high degree of trade union autonomy (b) troika system, by which the power of the factory manager were to be strictly controlled by the party and the trade unions; (c) a very advanced social legislation designed to prevent abuses by the managers.

However, as the party was coming increasingly under bureaucratic influence it became extremely difficult for the already passive working class to keep up the

4. This failure derives from the opposition between the need to accumulate and the need to defend the producers as "consumers" characteristic of the transitional period. Within the framework of "market socialism", the immediate economic interest of the producers may come into conflict with the fundamental principles of a socialist economy, even in democratically managed enterprises. Examples of this can be found in Yugoslavia, where a democratically elected workers concil can vote to lay off 25% of the labour force in order to improve the images of the rest of the workers. This shows that the coincidence of interests between individual groups of workers and the proletariat as a whole is not automatic.
struggle against bureaucracy. In fact after 1927, Stalin removed all the various safeguards without encountering any substantial resistance from the working class.

There can be no doubt that the historical factors played a far greater role than the tactical errors made by Trotsky and the Left Opposition. Apart from all the institutional arrangements what was more important for the revival of the working class activism was a correct orientation of economic and international policies. Only the conjunction of these institutional reforms with a more balanced and rapid industrialization, step-by-step collectivisation and an intensification of working-class struggle in a more proper way in capitalist Europe would have effectively prevented the triumph of the bureaucracy. Then the historical evolution would have been different: internal democracy within the party would have survived, multiparty political life would have been maintained, workers management of the economy would have been institutionalized and strengthened. A Congress of Workers' Councils and not a handful of bureaucrats would have taken all the great decisions determining the basic orientation of the planned economy.

Under certain historical conditions when the balance of forces is very unfavourable to the proletariat,
the bureaucracy did acquire a considerable autonomy. The bureaucracy can never separate itself from the mode of production. The autonomy of the bureaucracy is limited by the mode of production into which it is inserted. One should distinguish very carefully between the demands of the historically objective socio-economic systems within which this bureaucracy functions and its interests as a socially privileged layer.5

Bureaucratic rule in general even after the degeneration has gone to the point where a hardened social layer has appeared, is characterised by the dual nature of the bureaucracy.

The first aspect reflects its relation to a society and a relation of production that is no longer capitalist. This aspect explains the forced collectivisation of the Soviet peasantry. This first aspect of the dual nature of the bureaucracy is related to the fact that this social stratum has acquired its privilege on the basis of the destruction of the old ruling class. These privileges can develop only within the framework of a non-capitalist relation of production. The economic attitude of the

5. The Polish activists Kuron and Modzelewski make a theoretical mistake by arguing that giving priority to heavy industry is a fundamental feature of bureaucracy. It in fact represent one particular phase of bureaucratic rule. This mistake can lead to the policy that the bureaucracy will have no material basis once heavy industry loses its preferential position in the economy.
bureaucracy as a social layer is not dictated by the laws of competition, or profit maximisation, by different motivations related to their role in the transitional period.⁶

The second aspect of the bureaucracy is its fundamentally conservative social outlook: its desire to maintain status quo in the international arena and hold back the advance of the world revolution. The reactivation of the proletariat poses a threat to the bureaucratic hegemony.

So, therefore the contradictory aspect of the bureaucracy in a workers' state is it defends the non-capitalist nature of the workers' state and at the same time it fears world revolution, thereby undermines the socio-economic basis of the workers' state.

This social layer, conscious of its interest and privilege, will not simply abandon them under the presence of an objective evolution - the development of productive forces and the growth of the numerical and cultural strength of the proletariat - that constantly modifies the balance of forces at its expense and makes its hegemony increasingly difficult. Only a political revolution will smash the power

⁶. For Marx the notion of "State-Capitalism", that is, the complete suppression of intra-capitalist competition, was inconceivable: capitalism cannot exist except as different capitals. The total suppression of competition would put an end to the accumulation of capital and economy growth under capitalism, as its motor would have disappeared.
of the bureaucracy and institute the power of the proletariat. In a social revolution, the mode of production is changed and power passes from one class to another. A political revolution, on the other hand, leaves the mode of production fundamentally unchanged and power passes from one layer of the class to another layer of the same class. 7

The political revolution in a workers' state makes one thing crystal clear: bureaucratized management of production is incompatible with the exercise of proletarian democracy. But the main pillars of the system - collective property, planning, the existence of some kind of market mechanism - would not be transformed. They would acquire a new meaning. From here it follows that the form of the state would undergo a transformation but its social nature would remain the same. 8

7. To Marx, the years of 1830 and 1848 in France were examples of political revolutions: the state power changed hands between various layers of the same class (financial bourgeoisie, industrial bourgeoisie). The industrial bourgeoisie had to fight to wrench political power from the financial bourgeoisie hence the revolution of 1848. But the 1848 revolution was fundamentally different from that which brought the Paris commune into existence: in the later case state power temporarily passed out of the hands of the bourgeoisie and into the hands of the proletariat.

8. The definition of the nature of the state rests exclusively on its relationship to a given mode of production. The change from fascism to bourgeois democracy in Germany in 1945 involved a considerable change in the form of the state without any change in the mode of production. So did the change between the second and third republic in France. The fact that many forms of state power are possible within a given economic formation does not mean that the change from one to another can necessarily be made in a reformist or gradual fashion.
The days of state run economies and enforced egalitarianism are over. Social democracy is taking over which is "socialism revised" in the course of democratic struggle.

The socialist creed can be summed up in three principles. First, that political society should be open and accessible to all. No one should be excluded from political participation.

Second, that the economy should be open to all its members. Economic power should be shared by the same people who share political power. It does not rule out market relation, it rules out market imperialism - conversion of private wealth into political power and social privilege.

Third, that the members of political society and economy are collectively responsible for each other's welfare.

Socialism doesn't imply a necessary commitment to any set of political or economic arrangements. It implies instead a commitment to experimentation, institutional revision and ideological openness.

But the driving purpose of socialist principles is not something simple and unqualified equality but rather the
overcoming of all the gross and degrading forms of inequality.

If people are't active, energetic it is not because they are dull on incompetent, it is because they are suppressed. But then the whole human history is a tale of hierarchy and subordination. And, socialism in the light of the ages, is a radically new idea. As Oscar Wilde stated it with elegant simplicity when he said that "socialism would take too many evenings".