Man, the human reality, the human self as constituting, structuring, creating, linguistic, interpreting agency.

In his book Philosophy and the Brain Y.Z. Young refers to Armstrong's view of science that 'only in science we reach an intellectual consensus about controversial matters'.

He further says that we humans are indeed ignorant and confused creatures, and we are surrounded by mysteries. He also examines the question what's in a brain. He says in order to understand what is meant by the word 'brain' as it is used by neuroscientists, we must bear in mind the evidence that this organ contains in some recorded form the basis of one's whole conscious life. It contains the record of all our aims and ambitions and is essential for the experience of all pleasures and pains, all loves and hates. In the brain lie the texts that make possible all one's knowledge. If I ask you the date of the Battle of Hastings, you reply '1066'. Where was that information before I asked? It was not in your 'mind', which then contained (perhaps) 'this is a strange book I am reading'. The date was somehow recorded in the brain, ready to be recalled when needed.

Included in the brain are all the rules and instructions for the actions of speech and writing by which we communicate with others. This implies all the conventions of logic and mathematics by which we reason. Moreover, somehow recorded are represented there are the data that allow recognition and recall of all sorts of shapes, of faces, of scenes and of pictures. In the brain again, in some notation are some versions of 'scores' of the music that we can recognize and can sing or play on an instrument. In short, the brain contains, as I say, all one's capacity for conscious life.
Meanwhile it may be useful to mention briefly a few of the types of
evidence which show that all these powers depend upon the brain. These
include the histories of those unfortunate people who suffer damage of the
brain through accidents, tumour or strokes, with a resultant loss of some or
even all of the ordinary capacities for emotion, memory and learning that most
of us have. Moreover, physiologists and surgeons operating on the brain for
the relief of epilepsy have shown how access to its store of information is to
some extent localized. The great mass of these results shows that particular
parts of the brain are involved in sensory, motor and emotional activities and
experiences.

Patients with injury to the visual areas of the cerebral cortex may be
unable to recognize and name familiar objects. One shown a picture of a pair
of spectacles, said 'Perhaps it is a bicycle'; shown a sketch of a face, he said 'It
seems to be an orange with slashes in it.' Patients with injuries to the right
parietal lobe may be unable to recognize faces.\textsuperscript{2} This defect, called
prosopagnosia, may be limited only to this one type of recognition, other
objects are readily identified. So this very important capacity to recognize your
fellows, which is characteristic of man as a social animal, depends upon the
integrity of that part of the brain. This does not mean that this region by itself
is capable of the feat of recognition, but it seems likely that it contains cells
that are responsive to particular faces. However, the nature of memory
records in the brain is still uncertain.

Consciousness is an aspect of the functioning of the brain, not
something that can exist apart from it. My brain and body are inseparable from
myself. It is an interesting philosophical and linguistic question whether we
should say that they are 'the samething'. I prefer to say that 'mind' is not a
'thing' at all, but that consciousness and mentality are characteristic properties
that accompany certain activities of the brain, rather as movement is a characteristic property of legs, or of a wheel, and calculation is of a computer.³

In the extreme case, in the absence of a functioning brain; the mental activities of an individual all cease. Conversely, all mental activities are accompanied by some corresponding cerebral activity.

It is tempting to say that events in the brain 'cause' mental events: a formulation used recently by Searle⁴.

But the 'laws' by which any given brain operates are extremely complex and are changing at least a little all the time as a result of ongoing experience. Your 'lawlike response' to the question 'what is your favourite picture?' is likely to change from time to time the question 'what is your name will be followed by nearly the same brain response every time: but not if it is asked several times in quick succession.

This complexity and adaptability of the brain means that precise forecasting of correlations between mental events and physical processes is never possible.

If damage to the brain has been severe, doctors may make a diagnosis of 'brain death', which for some purposes is regarded as the equivalent to the actual and legal death of the person. It is likely that in the future great discoveries will be made as to how the brain is related to consciousness.

For every individual his own conscious existence is the ultimate reality, beyond any possibility of doubt. The difficulty for each of us is to know how to characterize and name this entity - oneself. Correspondingly, how can we best refer to other people? We can call them plain humans, or persons or minds or souls, each word giving a slightly different emphasis. It is quite clear that one cannot describe oneself for others as 'simply brains'. Yet
paradoxically whatever a human person is depends completely on his brain, and if the brain changes greatly, the person (sadly) changes too. Indeed the brain changes daily throughout life as one learns, unless one is too old or has Alzheimer’s disease or has lost the hippocampus (Ch. 20).

These are paradoxes that science and philosophy cannot yet completely resolve. Perhaps they never will. The conscious experience of each person remains as the essential entity that is valued as human. It is not for the scientist to lay down the law as to how it should be regarded, but he insists that it only and always accompanies brain action.

The fact of human consciousness seems to separate us from the rest of the living world, and yet there is abundant evidence that all mental events are correlated with brain processes. The peculiar human brain processes may be the ones that accompany intentional mental events, especially those referring to future ends. It may be that our brains have evolved special powers to contain representations of situations that are not yet present. This power of anticipation is obviously a very useful facility for survival and may have been the basis for the evolution of our consciousness. The most conspicuous use of the capacity to form representations is the power that it gives to recognize a consciousness like one’s own in other people. This awareness of others provides the basis for our whole elaborate social, ethical and moral system and makes us naturally prone to what Strawson calls the participant attitude, in contrast to the objective or scientific attitude. He believes that we must accept the pervasive existence of these two distinct ‘stories’ about human life but perhaps further understanding of their neural basis may help to show the relations between them.

We are at present just beginning to understand how the brain operates to build representations of the world and of other people. Something is now
known about the selective formation of connection between nerve cells during learning and the influence of those parts of the brain that specify the needs of the person and influence his moods and satisfactions.

Such information from biology and neuroscience helps towards a better understanding of oneself. It provides information about the source of one's experienced life which could not be known only by introspection. It helps to provide a rational answer to the question: What am I? It tells me how I have come to my present state and something of the nature of the brain and its possibilities and limitations. This helps a lot by showing the implications of the fact that all we living things are very special self-maintaining homeostatic systems. We continually try to achieve the aim of promotion of life - especially our own. Human beings in particular have elaborate mechanisms in the brain and glands tending to make them act in the ways that they do. They are primarily selfish and may be aggressive, but as social creatures have special propensities to learn to love and to help each other.

He further says that he finds all such knowledge helpful and he thinks it is time that people stopped talking about reductionism as if increased knowledge somehow substracted from human dignity on the contrary, reductionism consists in seeing ourselves in terms beyond the simple impression of the senses and so enlarging our knowledge of our nature. This adds greatly to understanding of our possibilities and limitations and hence ability to conduct ourselves wisely and especially with the fullest respect for other human beings and indeed for all life however, by the same token no amount of reductionism can be applied to the study of subjective experience, since this is essentially one's own point of view.

The reality for me is my continuous living self, one entity experiencing a series of mental events, including those that indicate that I have a body and a
brain. The evidence shows that I and my brain are one; without a brain I should be nothing. If the person is inseparable from his brain it is senseless to ask which of them controls the other. We should not confuse ourselves with such questions but devote our energies to increasing understanding of how best to describe ourselves and our brains and so to improve the quality of life.

Kathleen Nott in *Philosophy and Human Nature* says that she doesn’t pretend to have answered the problems or even to have posed more than a few of them. All that she has suggested is that man is not only a subjective animal but a philosophical one. If he is to grow into human stature there are certain questions he has to ask himself about himself and his world - and these are universal, not ephemeral questions, and therefore not confined to economics and politics.

Man’s behaviour is greatly influenced by his view of man. Gardner Murphy has expressed it thus; “As man makes new images of himself, he indulges in self-fulfilling prophecies. He has always made himself, into what he imagined himself to be.”

Man is a holistic totality, a whole greater than the addition of his parts traits, processes and functions. He is self-determining, self governing. He is unique. These are the three interwoven conceptualizations in the view of man emphasized. Referring to the first conceptualization, we note that James F.T. Bugental states this as the defining characteristics of man: I propose that the defining concept of man basic to the new humanistic movement in psychology is that man is the process that supersedes the sum of his part functions. The very elusiveness of the self - James says that to grasp it fully in consciousness is like trying to step on one’s own shadow - proves that it is the ground of all experience. Although seldom salient itself, it provides the platform for other experience.
Man is self-governing, self-determining, responsible for his being and becoming. This second conceptualization regarding the nature of man rests on the first. Maurice Tamerlin explains: The relationship between personal responsibility and the experience of free choice is intimate: without a prior feeling of freedom to choose between alternatives, the individual does not view himself as responsible.

A sense of personal responsibility, then, seems to follow the experience of free choice. The sequence raises the question: what experiences precede a feeling of free choice? At the experiential level, choice depends upon an experience of self, or of personal identity. To choose implies an identity, a sense of self or "I", a person who chooses in terms of his own thoughts and wishes. Choice requires a sense of self, reciprocally, the exercise of choice is an affirmation of selfhood. "Man is never more human than at the moment of decision", as Tillich put it.

The third conceptualization Viz, man is unique, i.e., each person is like no other that now exists ever existed in the past or ever shall exist in the future, is especially stressed by the existentialist. To quote Allport again:

Each person is busy building his own peculiar constellation of ego-world relationships. His motives are his own, taking always the form of "personal projects". His inheritance is unique, all his ego world relationships are unique. Existence ultimately resides nowhere except in the individuals point of view. Certainly no counselor or therapist can succeed, unless he can understand the patients dilemma from the patient's standpoint. A million mortals will experience their ego-world quandaries in a million ways.

Thus, at bottom, the existentialist approach to man is urgently ideographic.
The holistic, self-determining and unique nature of man is summarized well in the following stimulating words of Abraham Maslow: ....... the human being is an irreducible unit, at least as far as psychological research is concerned. Everythin in him is related to everything else, in greater or lesser degree.

This has one important consequence. In his essential core, no human being is comparable with anyother. Therefore his ideals for himself, his path of growth must also be unique. His goal must arise out of his own nature, and not to be chosen by comparison or competition with others. Each man's task is to become the best himself. Joe Doakes must not try to be like Abraham Lincoln or Thomas Jefferson or any other model or hero. He must become the best Joe Doakes in the world. This he can do, and only this is necessary or possible..............

Let us have a brief yet comprehensive look at the view of man espoused by contemporary Humanism. According to Lamont, there are ten central propositions to the philosophy of Humanism. First, Humanism believes in a naturalistic metaphysics or attitude toward the universe that considers all forms of the supernatural as myth, and that regards nature as the totality of being and as a constantly changing system of matter and energy which exists independently of any mind or consciousness. Second, Humanism, drawing especially upon the laws and facts of science believes that man is an evolutionary product of the nature of which he is a part, that his mind is indivisibly conjoined with the functioning of his brain, and that as an inseparable unity of body and personality he can have no conscious survival after death. Third, Humanism, having its ultimate faith in man, believes, that human beings possess the power or potentiality of solving their own problems,
through reliance primarily upon reason and scientific method applied with
courage and vision.

Fourth, Humanism, in opposition to all theories of universal determinism,
fatalism or predestination, believes that human beings while conditioned by the
past, possess genuine freedom of creative choice and action, and are within
certain objective limits, the masters of their own destiny.

Fifth, Humanism believes in an ethics or morality that grounds all human values
in this earthly experiences and relationships and that holds as its highest goal
the this worldly happiness, freedom, and progress economic, cultural, and
ethical of all mankind, irrespective of nation, race, or religion.

Sixth, Humanism believes that the individual attains the good life by
harmoniously combining personal satisfactions and continuous self-
development with significant work and other activities that contribute to the
welfare of the community.

Seventh, Humanism believes in the widest possible development of art and the
awareness of beauty, including the appreciation of nature's loveliness and
splendour, so that the aesthetic experience may become a pervasive reality in
the life of man.

Eight, Humanism believes in far-reaching social program that stands for the
establishment throughout the world of democracy, peace, and a high standard of
living on the foundations of a flourishing economic order, both national and
international.

Ninth, Humanism believes in the complete social implementation of reason and
scientific method; and thereby in the use of democratic procedures, including
full freedom of expression and civic liberties, throughout all areas of economic,
political, and cultural life.
Tenth, Humanism, in accordance with scientific method, believes in the unending questioning of basic assumptions and convictions, including, its own. Humanism is not a new dogma, but is a developing philosophy ever open to experimental testing, newly discovered facts, and more rigorous reasoning.\textsuperscript{15}

George Wald: in determinacy, individuality and the problem of free will uses as a starting point for his comments on determinism, individuality and free will, the Heisenberg's Uncertainty principle which states that the more accurately one succeeds in measuring the position, at a given instant of time, of any elementary particle such as an electron, proton, neutron or photon, the less certain one is of its velocity, or vice versa. The ultimate uncertainty regarding the behaviour of particles is formidable and seems to represent a fundamental property of the nature of particles and hence of the nature of the universe since matter is composed of them. Thus we can confidently say that nature, and therefore man, is ultimately unpredictable. Wald mentions in this connections that.

In a discussion which stretched over many years, Einstein and Bohr argued this point, Bohr maintaining and Einstein continuing to doubt that the uncertainty principle expresses ultimate reality. Most physicists agreed with Bohr, and still do.\textsuperscript{16}

Wald then discusses the phenomena of individuality. He explains: ...... there are no two living cells, and would venture to say there never have been two living cells, that are or were identical. What kind of thing is a living organism to present this extra ordinary individuality?

For one thing, living organisms are enormously complex. They are organised associations of great numbers of very different kinds of molecules known to chemistry. The enormous complexity of the composition of living organisms in itself makes identity very improbable.
That complexity is compounded by the fact that living cells have not a
static but a dynamic composition. They are the loci of a constant inflow and
outflow of energy and material... living organisms are individual not only in
space but in time. They grow old; they acquire new characters; they bear the
scars of experience - and all these things make them recognizably different at
every stage in life.

A further reason for the rigorous individuality of living organisms is that
the genetic information that determines them - a monkey, an amoeba, a
bacterial cell - is laid out in such nucleic acid molecules....... in the form of a
molecular tape in which the four kinds of nucleotides which are the units of
nucleic acid structures are linked in specific sequences in one continuous chain.
It is the reading of those sequences that determine the entire eventual structure
and composition, and even aspects of the behaviour, of living organisms.\textsuperscript{17}

............. Through the factors we have been discussing, the complexity of the
organism, its dynamic state, and the constant intrusion of genetic disorder, one
can be quite convinced that each living thing, including every man, is unique,
and individual unlike any other in space and time. But to those factors one
must add another of ultimate importance. It is that living organisms store
history. Not only does each of us come into the world with a unique
composition and inheritance, but to those we begin to accumulate a unique
experience. That personal history, growing throughout our lives is ours alone.
That private self that is You or I is the unique composition and structure that
comes to us via metabolism and inheritance, coupled with a unique personal
history that is forever growing.\textsuperscript{18}

Finally, Wald refers to the perennial questions of how man can have free
will, i.e., freedom of choice when only a little earlier in the same article he has
been depicted as a completely determined organism. Wald says: .............. I
see no essential incompatibility between such a complete determinism of
behaviour and free will. Behaviour may all be determined, but it is surely not all
predictable; and I think that the essence of our free will lies in that
unpredictability........ the essence of free will is not a failure of determinism
but a failure of predictability.

Roger W. Sperry criticizes the materialistic approach that the brain -
behaviour sciences have espoused over the past half century. He considers
himself among the 01 percent or so minority group of brain researchers who
hold that mental phenomena like mind, consciousness, free will etc., are not
illusions and ignorable epiphenomena but the most central, the commanding -
governing realities. This latter approach - the mentalist view of man puts mind
over matter and is diametrically opposite to the materialistic view of man.
Sperry makes clear that the scientific facts necessary to decide conclusively
which of these two approaches is correct just do not exist at present. He
writes: ........ I think we must all agree that neither is going to win the match
on the basis of direct, factual evidence. The facts simply do not go far enough
to provide the answer, or even to come close. Those centermost processes of
the brain with which consciousness is presumably associated are simply not
understood. They are so far beyond our comprehension at present that no one
I know of has been able even the imagine their nature. 19

It is Sperry's opinion, however, that the mentalistic view of man, which
regards mind and consciousness as the central causal agents that direct the
brain's physiological - physical - Chemical processes more than vice versa, is
the correct model.

He comments:

.......... It is a scheme that idealizes ideas and ideals over physical and
chemical interactions, nerve impulse traffic and D N A. It is a brain model in
which conscious mental psychic forces are recognized to be the crowning achievement of some five hundred million years or more of evolution. 20

Sperry then attacks a second enemy of the humanistic view of man, viz., the prevailing, scientific rejection of free will. According to Sperry, man has a considerable degree of free will provided this is interpreted to mean self-determination. He gives his opinion thus:

It should be clear by now that in the brain model described here, man is provided in large measure with the mental forces and the mental ability to determine his own actions. This scheme thus allows a high degree of freedom from outside forces as well as mastery over the inner cellular, molecular, and atomic aspects of brain activity. Depending on the state of one's will power, the model also allows considerable freedom from lower-level natural impulses and even from occasional thoughts, beliefs, and the like, though not, of course, from the whole complex. In other words, the kind of brain visualized here does indeed give men plenty of free will, provided we think of free will as self-determination. To a very real and large extent, a person does determine with his own mind what he is going to do from among a large number of possibilities. This does not mean, however, that he is free from the forces of his own decision-making machinery. In particular, what this present model does not do is to free a person from the combined effects of his own thoughts, his own beliefs, ideals and hopes, nor does it free him from his inherited make up or his life time memories. All these and more, including, yes, unconscious desires, exert in the brain their due causal influence upon any mental decision, and the combined resultant determines the inevitable but self-determined and highly special and highly personal outcome ..................21
Finally, Sperry appraises the materialistic - behaviouristic view that man's brain gets its start in fetal life as a blank slate and is subsequently conditioned by the environment. He reminds us that:

.......... In this doctrine the mind or psyche, was believed to develop gradually out of a lifelong chain of successive conditioned reflex associations, starting in the infant from a few elementary reactions, like love and hate, fear and anger. The whole idea of the genetic inheritance of behaviour pattern was forcibly renounced, until the term "instinct" became highly discredited in professional circles, its defamation almost equalling that of consciousness.......... 22

Sperry them adds:

Much of the basic scientific thinking and evidence behind this view has since suffered a series of severe upsets, leading to a current stand that is almost diametrically opposed to the earlier doctrines..... the conditioned response, along with other forms of learning, continues to be recognized, of course, as a highly powerful influence, especially in man, but only within limits made narrower than previously supposed.

Within the specialized fields of scientific inquiry involved here, the pendulum of opinion continues at this data to swing in the direction of inheritance...23

William James's views on the nature of man has been presented as occurring in five stages in "An Exposition and Analysis of William James's views on the nature of man" 24 they are as under.

MAN IS AN ADAPTIVE ANIMAL:

This was James's original view. Essentially it states that man is an animal who, having arisen through the process of natural evolution involving
the survival of the fittest, strives to survive in the environment by adapting to it.

To Quote Charron:

.................. James argues that, functionally considered, the essence of mental life and physical life are the same - both are primarily and properly ordered to the practical end of securing the preservation and well-being of the physical organism................. 25

MAIN IS A MORAL HERO:

During the mid-1890's, James began to focus on man as a being that lived for the sake of serving ideals - such as honour, valor, truth, integrity, the humanization of man, etc. In the portrayal heroism and self-sacrifice in the service of an ideal world were the ingredients that specifically characterized man. Man was viewed as the being committed to high ideals and values; as one who was willing to preserve, suffer pain and martyrdom on their behalf. Thus, Charron explains:

For James, life appears to have a meaning for us only as long as it seems to be for the sake of something higher. No mode of living can ultimately be appreciated by man as an end in itself. As a result, life or any form of vital activity feels insignificant or meaningless when taken by itself. However, by assuming the heroic and strenuous mood, a man feels that his life has meaning because he feels he is living for the sake of some higher purpose. From this perspective, it is obvious that higher ideals are important to James only because commitment to them makes possible the release of man's energy for the heroic life............. 26
And he continues by adding:

.................... Zest for life is the mental state characteristic of those in the thick of a struggle for ideals: their blood is up, and their interest is keen. In short, the constitution of human nature is such that no matter what of a man's desires are fulfilled, if his propensities for life "in extremes" are not being utilized, he will eventually slip into deep depression.............27

What is needed, then to actuate a man's propensities for the ennobling type of strenuousness is an adequately stimulating ideal........... 28

For both James and Nietzsche, life is more becoming than being. The full intensity of life is realized in self-assertion and sacrifice, challenge and daring, not compromise and contentment, tranquility and security. It is only through his power to suffer for his ideals that a man senses most deeply the meaning and dignity of his existence as a living being............... For man, a perfectly painless life would be a subtle version of hell. He needs struggle and pain in his life in order to really feel he has life and to feel the dignity of that life............

For both these philosophers, James and Nietzsche, the great man is the man who distinguishes himself on the battlefield of life with a undaunted determination to fight for his ideals in the face of difficulties and absurdities that lay his weaker brethren low. The weaker one's he hedonistic comfort seekers and the stoical preachers of acquiescence, fail to meet the demands of human existence. The purpose of the human drama, for man, is indentity the great effort he can make and the personal power he can manifest in the pursuit of the ideals he sets for himself. The extent to which a man makes the heroic effort in struggling for his ideals is the direct measure of that man's worth as a man. 29
MAN IS A WITNESS OF DIVINITY

In the late 1890's, his probing into the questions of human immortality and phenomena like mysticism and spiritualism, led James to believe in a new view of man. This view defines man in terms of an extra-physical and divine dimension of reality that is, the conscious mind came to be viewed by him as only a small portion of man's total mind - the larger portion being his subconscious.

Thus Charron notes

James shifts the center of man's being from his physical organism, and even from his conscious mind to a subliminal or subconscious mind of man. This subliminal region of the mind allegedly constitutes the "larger" and "more important" part of man. This subliminal region is larger in that it is open to dimensions of reality that far exceed that dimension in which we live as physical beings and of which we are conscious as "normal" waking consciousness. This same subliminal region is more important to us in that the dimension of reality to which it is open is the divine order of reality. James contends that, from this divine order through his subliminal mind, a man receives the same "saving energies" that actuate saints, mystics and other religious giants... 30

In contrast to his earlier view, therefore:... James begins to minimize the role of positive volitional effort in the life of man. In relation to the larger subliminal self, James thinks that the waking self is an inferior self which attains its perfection by surrendering itself to the greater power of the subliminal order. Previously, in the middle of the 1890's, James had thought that the only gospel of salvation for man was the gospel of strenuous and heroic will effort... He now argues that the way to meaningful life is through a surrender to the deeper subliminal powers... 31
MAN IS A PURELY PHYSICAL PHENOMENON:

Beginning in 1904, James made a radical change in his most basic assumption. So far he had developed his theories within a dualistic framework i.e., man consists of an interacting mind and body. Now, James began to argue that there was no such entity as mind - that man is only a body. Thus, Charron notes:

........ James denies that there is any experience, even introspective experience, of anything that is immaterial, be it a soul, an inner spiritual life, a non-physical stream of consciousness, or what have you. Whether one considers another man or reflects unto himself, the only thing that is experienced is the body and various bodily changes that can be mistakenly interpreted as immaterial or spiritual events when in fact they are but felt physiological adjustments, strains, and tensions... all the basic facts of human behaviour can be explained without recourse to anything more than the body. All human endeavour is explainable in terms of the physical........32

MAN IS DIVINITY:

This was James’s view of man during the last few years before his death in 1910.

Once again, he focuses on man as an interacting synthesis of mind and body, but considers the mind more important than the body..... The human body was relegated to the status of a "weight" which dragged the mind's attention into the physical order. That part of man which is called the waking consciousness was claimed, by James, to be continuous with a wider, but hidden consciousness the so-called "subliminal consciousness", was held to be the source of many of the energies experienced by the waking self of man..........
Again............ James identifies man with the mind. And again he claims that the normal waking consciousness of man is continuous with a wider mind from which saving experiences come. However, James now goes further.... He now claims that the wider self, or wider consciousness, of each man is the one God. Before, in his religious writing, James had been content to imagine that the wider subliminal self of each man was separate and distinct from every other man's and he had been satisfied to picture the deity (or deities) as transcendent to man and as the environment and object (s) of each man's wider consciousness..... However, in 1908...... James's pantheism imagines God on the subject side of human consciousness, as a co-witness who is continuous with that human consciousness. As continuous with the larger consciousness which is God, the human consciousness can be viewed as an "internal part" of God........ 33

Man is (1) A communicative being: A relating, transmitting and receiving, sharing and exchanging being.
(2) Accepting of non-hedonic emotions: Accepting and appreciative of the reality, unavailability and value of affective experiences like pain, anger, fear, resentful, guilt, anxiety, boredom, loneliness, emptiness, weakness, etc.
(3) Always in process; Dynamic, ceaselessly changing, continuously becoming.
(4) Conscious/Aware: Aware of what is, of nature, but more specifically of himself (his likes and dislikes, his strengths and limitations and his practically infinite potentialities), of his fellow man, and the inter-relationship and inter-dependence between them.
(5) Creative: Explorative, constructive, productive, etc. of phenomena other than himself and his fellowman. The concept of creating his fellowman is included under the dimension 'other-affirming'.
(6) Forward-Thrusting: Proactive, initiative taking, constructively aggressive.

33
(7) Freedom-Cherishing: Desirous of safeguarding his freedom of choice, his right to be himself, and of enlarging his margin of freedom so as to be able to become all he can become.

(8) Future-imagining: An aspiring being; a personification of hope and faith; a dreamer of dreams.

(9) Goal-directed: Intentional, purposive, an objective setting and accomplishing being.

(10) Holistic/An integrated whole: An organized totality of body and personality; a unity.

(11) Intelligent: Able to solve problems, meet life's challenges, live fully through using his conscious and unconscious mind. The use of process like intuition, imagination, etc., are included in this category.

(12) Much like fellow man: Similar to other human beings in the world.

(13) Nature-appreciating: Appreciative and admiring of the beauty in nature, in the phenomena of life that pervades this infinite, eternal cosmos.

(14) Ontologically responsible: Responsible for his own selfactualization. (15)

Open to life/experience: Non-defensively aware, free to experience the world within him and outside of him.

(16) Other-affirming: loving and respectful of the other person: facilitative of his self actualization.

(17) Pleasure-loving: Desirous of feelings of joy and happiness.

(18) Prevent-confronting: Fully absorbed in living in the moment, in the here and now, intensely involved in whatever he does.

(19) Rational: Logical, sane, sensible, a user of reason.

(20) Risk-taking/Courageous: Daring enough to be his authentic self; adventurous.
(21) Self-active: Dependent on himself for motivating himself, for energizing himself, for propelling himself to be and become his full self.

(22) Self-actualizing/self-realizing: Being and becoming his authentic self; utilizing his practically infinite potentialities; becoming what he potentially is creative of himself.

(23) Self-affirming: Respectful and loving of himself, of his unique nature; authentic; naturally spontaneous.

(24) Self-determining: Self-defining and self-directing; self-choosing; living rather than being lived.


(26) Sexual: Biologically designed to desire intercourse with a member of the opposite sex.

(27) Socially responsible: Responsible for facilitating the selfactualization of his fellowmen.

(28) Ultimately unknowable: A mystery, despite all we know or can know about him, always beyond complete understanding.

(29) Unique: Distinct and irreplaceable; each man is like no other person that presently exists, has ever existed or shall ever exist.

(30) Other/Miscellaneous: This category is to be used to list any dimensions necessitated by the content analysis that cannot be reasonably accommodated in the other categories mentioned above. The following two dimensions were chosen for this category after a preliminary reading of the five theoretical positions:

30 a Reality-accepting
30 b Ultimately alone.

Ilubert Bonner has given his view of man in his book, *On Being Mindful of Man*. In this book he expounds the belief that man is a unique, open and
creative individual. The psychological processes of intentionality - and proaction, and the uniqueness of individual human behaviour, together compose the Leitmotiv of his thinking about psychological man...... that study has also confirmed his beliefs that man is not merely a machine but an integral being, not merely a reality but a potentiality; not merely an ordinary creature, but a superior being.

The view of man that emerges here may be interpreted as a blend of two ancient conceptions, namely, the Hebraic idea of responsibility or duty, and the Hellenic model of excellence or the full actualization of human potentialities. The first stresses a life shared; the second, a life individually perfected. The first is a life of discipline and self-control, the second a life of aspiration and freedom. 34

The following comments on the nature of man are based upon an analysis of the existential human predicament, i.e., the interactive merging of the human condition and the cultural situation:

...... although the principle of determinism operates widely, it is not a universal force in the affairs of men. A limited undeterminism is a fact of physical nature and of human life. Although life is governed by innumerable contingencies, it has a wide area of free choice.

However, modern man is moved far less by his capacity to choose than by his awareness of his own finitude..............35

Anguish, anxiety, and despair are ontological conditions. They are immanent in human nature. Psychotherapy, therefore, cannot eradicate them, and if it did, it would destroy man's human nature. Psychotherapy can perform the supreme task of helping man to understand them as guarantors of his own individuality.....36
We believe that the separation of man from nature, man from other men and from himself is fundamentally the convergent product of the human condition and the social situation. 37

Modern man, who is more mobile than man was in any prior period of history, has only incidental contacts with other men. 38 39 The grave violation of man's moral conscience is not a psychological state merely; not the easily understood guilt feelings, but a profound condition of human nature. It is ontological, and cannot be transcended by means of psychotherapy or religious redemption. It is a part of human nature. 39 thus man is guilty when he compromises truth, when he does not combat injustice, when he submits to evil, when he fails to actualize his potentialities. 40 We are guilty because we can choose. Guilt, like choice, is an attribute of our human nature, a potentiality of human life.

Bonner moves on to comment on man's freedom to choose:

.... When I choose, I incur an awesome responsibility not only toward myself but toward others as well, for when I choose I make a decision for all those in the orbit of my own behaviour and experience. 40 Human beings thus share a common burden, the awe-full responsibility of sealing their fate in the act of choice.

Any psychology that probes beneath the overt or public behaviour of human being is inevitably faced by the incontrovertible fact that they are profoundly motivated by their inner experiences. The subjective life has not been adequately described by the Freudian concept of the unconscious. On the contrary the fully human quality of this inner life is not unconscious but conscious. It consists in the capacity and the act of choice. 41
Experience thus persuades us to believe in the reality of self
determination, in the capacity of each of us to be an affective individual.
Wisdom, if it means anything psychologically, is the recognition by each of us,
that he is responsible for his own destiny .......... 42

All living stuff acts toward the consummation of a purpose. If its efforts
are frustrated, if its goals are blocked, the organism will reach for the same end
by some other route.

In the case of man this principle of goal-direction is normally a deliberate
and conscious one. It is an attribute of the human self. Indeed, the mature
self is the organized totality of self-regulations, of goal-directedness, of
intentions in the process of actualization. This intentionality is an act of free
choice among alternate goals, and an act of deliberation concerning the best
means of reaching them ............... 43

Man differs from all other animals in his capacity of choice. In choice,
also, lies his individuality and uniqueness. Modern geneticists have agreed that
every human being is unique .......... 44 ........... Moral behaviour is thus one of
the highest, if not the supreme, manifestations of volition, deliberation, and
choice. ............ For more than a century the prevailing psychologies have
ignored the problem of moral behaviour. This neglect is the natural
consequence of a view of man which admitted only the sole or the combined
influence of heredity or environment. Man was conceived to be the product of
one or both, factor, especially in early childhood experience. He could not
modify his behaviour in the light of his own purposes. He could not choose to
transform himself in accordance with his image of himself as a perfectible
human being ............. 45

............ at no other period in history has man been more confronted with the
inescapable fate of all men: The fact that all men must choose ........ 46.
No man in possession of his powers can escape accountability for his acts. He alone among animals, has the dreadful responsibility of choosing between good and evil, and he alone is conscious of possessing it.

For all the emphasis on the externality of behaviour in recent psychology, for all the panegyrics on the merits of social responsibility man is first, not last, a self-affirming being. The center of his existence is neither nature nor society but himself.

One proves his existence, or validates his individuality, by means of the courage to be himself. This self-validation through actualization of one's being is a matter of moral integrity.

In final analysis, the one important fact about the human being is that he is potentially the author of his own history. No existence, and most particularly no personal existence, is possible in the absence of man's regard for and commitments to, other human beings.

Freedom to choose, always incurs responsibility toward others, not only oneself. In the absence of this responsibility, freedom is exploitation. The person whose rights are protected by a free society is morally obligated to guard and enhance the freedom which sustains his own independence.

Contrary to the universal American philosophy that every individual fulfills his purpose in the attainment of happiness, the men who have left a mark upon their fellow beings, have been individuals with the passion to leave the world different from what it was before they were thrust into it.

Being thus freed from the complusive search for happiness, the proactive individual can lend himself freely in the service of others. Freedom without commitment is licentiousness.
The reality of the self is validated by its participation in the world of other selves. Ich Und Du - I and thou - together form the continuum of human existence. Apart from another, I am only an object never a complete person. The alienation of which existentialists have written so movingly, is not due solely to the partition of the individual, but to his separation from other individuals.  

Yet, all the conditions of contemporary experience point unequivocally to the fact that man's most desperate longing is not group-relatedness, but self-fulfillment. Man does not seek merely the happiness that a group can provide, but more profoundly the dedicated search for himself. Man is truly his own foundation.  

Bonner then focuses on the future oriented, self-transforming nature of man. All living things, and most profoundly human beings, complete themselves in the future.  

Man, we have said, is not a passive reactor to stimuli or situations. He is a seeker of future ends. He is not fixated on a single temporal dimension, but unites all of them in himself. His style of life is, nevertheless, an expression of a dynamic forward thrust.  

Psychology must widen its horizon to permit us to view man as a self-directing, freely-choosing, value-creating individual. The great moments in the history of human psychology, from Plato to the contemporary growth theories of human personality, have described human nature as always in the process of becoming. The view of man as a proactive being is nurtured in the belief in that which is not yet. It believes that, in real way, what gives every person his being, his personality, is the person himself. Each creates his reality, his being, in accordance with his vision of who he wants to be. Each of us is a being in the process of becoming.
Proactive or humanistic psychology is finding increasing evidence in support of the view that man is not wholly - or even largely - a seeker of stability and quiescence.

In so far as existence, or being, consists in its becoming, becoming is like the future dimension itself, the primary phenomenon of nature, both material and human.

Man desires not only safety and security, but the exultation that comes from adventure and the search for novelty. He has been known to abandon security for the risk of achieving greater fulfillment and a higher level of self-integration.

A fascinating aspect of this becoming is that the person who cares for the becoming of another person is himself swept along by the other's self-actualization. Each is directed forward by the becoming of the other. It is this mutuality as well as the sacrificial nature of creative human relationships, that lends to self-affirmation its other mindedness.

In proactive psychology, man is seen as the seeker after values which he sets up himself. From this point of view, more important than tranquility, security, and survival is the individual's desire to fulfill himself as a unique person.

Proactive life, which is to say the truly human life, is indeed an endless becoming.

In conclusion, Bonner writes: The controlling purpose in this book, which we have sedulously and single-mindedly pursued, is to lay bare the individuality of the human being; to show that his being is constantly changing in the direction implicit in his style of life. Man is a multiform being, seeking to actualize his potentialities. He cannot be meaningfully described by means of
such separate elements as drives, motives, memories, and cognitive structures. Rather, he must be viewed as a life-totality. 66

..... man is that species of animal who strives to attain a higher state for himself and his fellow human beings through his own efforts........67

..........The conscious self is thus not an epiphenomenon, not the fringe of experience, not a set of habits, but the core of organized and meaningful experience, the organizing and self-regulating capacities of the total personality. 68

The stress on the wholeness of the human being is a marked characteristic of the newer trend in personality theory. Whether we call it organismsmic, holistic, personalistic, or proactive, the stress is always the same: personality is a relatively consistent and unique whole..........69

The recurrent theme of this book is that man is a creative and proactive being..........Contrary to the belief that a proactive and humanistic psychology is too easy and optimistic, all the evidence that we can muster shows that self-transformation is the most difficult of all human tasks......70

Having said all this, we are nevertheless driven to the necessary conclusion that a holistic knowledge of man is an ideal, not a reality. A total knowledge of the whole man is impossible, and we must rest satisfied with partial insights into the whole. In this fact lies both the agony and hope of every sincere investigation of human behaviour........71

The threshold of our modernity is situated not by the attempt to apply objective methods to the study of man,72 but rather by the constitution of an empirico-transcendental doublet which was called man. (OT 319).

Man can never get behind his language to frame an objective account of how it began or how it works. Yet he uses language so he must in some sense already understand it. He takes up and employs his mother tongue "without
knowing it, and yet it must be known, in a certain way, since it is by this
means that men enter into communication and find themselves in the already
constructed network of comprehension" (OT 331)

Generalizing from this idea that language cannot be known objectively
precisely because it is always already a kind of know-how, the analytic of
finitude attempts to reappropriate the whole of history by showing that man
always already has a history precisely in so far as his social practices enable
him to organize all events in his own culture, historically. And more generally
still, it turns out that man's very ability to understand himself and objects, by
making projects on the basis of what is given, has a three-fold structure which
Corresponds to the past, present, and future. Thus man's know-how opens up
a temporal field in which time and history become possible. It is in him that
things (those same things that hang over him) find their beginning: rather than
a cut, made at some given moment in duration, he is the opening from which
time in general can be reconstituted, duration can flow and things, at the
appropriate moment, can make their appearance" (OT 332). In Being and
Time, which is the culminating example of this strategy, Heidegger argues in
detail that the origin or source of temporality can only be understood by
understanding the structure of authentic Dasein (Dasein is roughly equivalent to
human being).

As one would expect, given the logic of the analytic of finitude,
Heidegger is finally forced to the conclusion that man is condemned to the
fruitless project of attempting to get clear about the origin which in this case
amounts to trying to name being and thus drag the clearing into the open.
Indeed, early Heidegger comes to hold that this ontological error is definitive of
man. "Man errs. Man does not merely stray into errancy. He is always in
errancy" (BW 135). The inevitable forgetting of the inevitable hiddenness of
being, correlative with the attempt to get clear about man’s finitude, leads, according to Heidegger, to man essentially wandering in distress. "Dasein is a turning in need." (BW 137).

According to Heidegger to understand his own meaning man must grasp his origin, and yet it necessarily escapes him.

James F.T. Bugental’s view of man has been obtained from his book, the search for Authenticity. With the analysis of this book one can form a summarized version of his view.

We do not know very much yet about what it means to be a human being. We do not appreciate in any depth what the potentials of human imagination, creativity, and variation may be. We are more governed by superstition than fact, more limited by tradition than recognition, more inhibited by our own fears than by external constraints in exploring the whole world of our being. I believe we have made but the barest beginning on exploring this new hemisphere, this human frontier. 73

In the more than two decades since World War II began, educated thinking in America about man and his condition has undergone tremendous changes. Twenty-five years ago, psychology, psychiatry, psychotherapy, and related disciplines were barely emerging into a wholistic conception of the human being. By and large the dominant influences in these fields were reductionistic, mechanistic and part-function centered. In the intervening time, these influences seem to him to have reached and passed their floodtides. The orientation is, to be sure, still very much employed and productive, but a never, more inclusive perspective on the human experience is growing rapidly and appears to be the ascendant one. This emerging Orientation has been called variously, "the third force" in psychology (after psychoanalysis and behaviourism) "neo-phenomenology", and "humanistic psychology". 74
Man, as Man, supercedes the sum of his parts; When we speak of "Man" in humanistic psychology, we do so with the intent of characterizing a person rather than an "organism". Humanistic psychology is concerned with man at his most human or, to say it differently with that which most distinguishes man as a unique species.

Our first postulate states the keystone position that man must be recognized as something other than an additive product of various part-functions. Part-function knowledge is important scientific knowledge, but it is not knowledge of man as man. It is knowledge of the functioning of parts of an organism.

Man has his Being in a human context:

We postulate second that the unique nature of man is expressed through his always being in relationship with his fellows. Humanistic psychology is always concerned with man in his interpersonal potential. This is not to say that humanistic psychology may not deal with such issues as man's aloneness, but it will be evident that even in so designating it, "aloneness", we are speaking of man is his human context. The psychology of part-functions is a psychology that mechanically and incompletely handles this relatedness (actual or potential) of the human experience.

Man is Aware:

A central fact of human experience is that man is aware. Awareness is postulated to be continuous and at many levels. By so viewing it, we recognize that all aspects of his experience are not equally available to man but that, whatever the degree of consciousness, awareness is an essential part of man's being. The continuous nature of awareness is deemed essential to an understanding of human experience. Man does not move from discrete episode to discrete episode, a fact overlooked by experiments of the behaviouristic

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Man has choice:

There is no desire here to resume the hoary debate regarding free will versus determinism. Phenomenologically, choice is a given of experience. As man is aware, aware that his choices make a difference in the flow of his awareness, that he is not a bystander but a participant in experience. From this fact flows man's potential to transcend his creatureliness which is also to say that from this postulation we derive man's capability of change.

Man is Intentional:

In his choices, man demonstrates his intent. This does not mean "striving", but it does mean orientation. Man intends through having purpose, through valuing, and through creating and recognizing meaning. Man's intentionality is the basis on which he builds his identity, and it distinguishes him from other species.

The characteristics of man's intentionality need to be specified: man intends both conservation and change. Mechanistic views of man frequently deal only with drive - reduction and homeostatic conceptions. Humanistic psychology recognizes that man seeks rest but concurrently seeks variety and disequilibrium. Thus we may say that man intends multiply, complexity, and even paradoxically.

I will postulate that the primary value in human life is to live in accord with (indeed, as a part of) the way things really are. Of course, that is a
hazardous thing to say, for who can claim to know how things really are? The answer is, nobody and everybody. Nobody can prove he knows for sure, and everybody acts on the assumption that he knows. Probably, almost surely there is no one "way things really are", there are only various ways of seeing our situation..............

Now, just as I have postulated a primary value, I will point to a primary human process: awareness. Through awareness we discover ourselves and our world. Through awareness we can estimate our relation to world. It seems to me useful to think of that relationship as having these four characteristics:

We are limited in our awareness of ourselves and of world. We can act in ways that affect our awareness of ourselves and of world.

We have choice about which actions to take and not to take while each of us is in one sense alone, in another we are all related.

Throughout the whole of this thesis the fundamental concern is the authenticity of being. The distortions of being that give rise to the need for psychotherapy and inauthenticities. The celebrations of being that ontogogic therapy seeks to facilitate are the products of authenticity. The influence that makes the change possible is the response of awareness to the authentic in life. 76

A person is authentic in that degree to which his being in the world is unqualifiedly in accord with the giveness of his own nature and of the world. Authenticity is the primary good or value of the existential viewpoint.

The value of authenticity is postulated rather than argued........ when our being-in-the-world is in accord with the nature of ourselves in the world we are authentic. Authenticity is the term he has used to characterize both an
hypothesized ultimate state of at-oneness with the cosmos and the immense continuum leading toward that ultimate ideal. 77

Authenticity is a term used to characterize a way of being in the world in which one's being is in harmony with the being of the world itself. To say it differently, we are authentic to that degree to which we are at one with the whole of being (world); we are inauthentic to the extent that we are in conflict with the givenness of being. Clearly, I am here seeking to characterize an ideal or ultimate condition of authenticity with the recognition that we are always somewhat less than fully authentic. Also implicit in my description of authenticity, and of much more conceptual significance, is the recognition that authenticity amounts to the resolution of the subject-object split, the self-world dichotomy. As one approaches the stage of letting go to the suchness of Being without striving against it, one is attaining to full authenticity. 78

Fundamental to all else in the human experience is awareness. At least phenomenologically, world arises out of human awareness. It grows and evolves with experience. Learning importantly affects what one may become aware of and what will escape awareness. Emotional needs have similar effects. 79

Awareness discloses to each person (a) that he is finite, (b) that he has the potential to take action, (c) that he has some choice of what action he will take, and (d) that he is at once separate from, yet related to, his fellows. From these flow, respectively, the existential anxieties (a) of fate and death, (b) of guilt and condemnation, (e) of meaninglessness and emptiness, and (d) of loneliness and isolation. 80

It is awareness that fully confronts the existential anxieties of being and affirms its own being by incorporating those anxieties while yet avoiding their distortion. Man lives in contingency. He can and does take action that affects
his awareness and experience. He takes such action without ultimate guide
posts of universal values or built-in instincts. And man is in constant relation
with his fellows while yet being separate from them.

Of course, man does not ever fully accept the givens and their
atttendent anxieties. Instead he feels compelled at times to deny some parts of
his condition and to try to nullify their effects. When he does so, he distorts
his situation and becomes prey to neurotic anxiety and inauthenticity. 81

What are the attributes of being authentic?
(1) Being as fully aware as I can be at the moment.
(2) Choosing what possibility I will invest with my life, with actuality, at the
moment.
(3) Taking responsibility for the choice I have made while yet recognizing the
imperfection of my awareness and the fact that my choice gave this alternative
actuality and not some other.

Recognizing therein that tragedy is always potential and that neither my
limitations of awareness, nor my good intentions, nor my suffering, nor my
virture, nor any other extrinsic circumstances, can change that fact. 82

What is evident when we step beck from our preconceptions of habit
and language is that the business of being a person, a human being, is
enormously complex and endlessly varied. Most of us were taught much more
about how to manipulate certain relatively infrequently used mathematical
functions than about how to make certain crucial life decisions. 83

Man finds himself in "a world he never made," a world of apparently
infinite possibility. In this world, man is constantly confronted with choices for
which he must always be less than adequately prepared. Thus man is
constantly faced with uncertainly, with contingency, with the possibility that
his choices may fail to bring him the results he intends. That failure may range
from the simplest disappointment to a fatal misstep, from being late to a pleasant evenings recreation to being killed as he walks across his normally quiet, residential street.

This contingent plight is the constantly present and always overriding fact of our existence............. 84

Man finds himself thrown into a world of infinite possibilities where each moment is a choice point, each act gives life (actuality) to some possibilities and condemns others to oblivion. For each such choice branch unimaginable consequences. It is this very unimaginable quality that is at the base of man's living in contingency. Contingency here means that any act has an infinite array of possible outcomes and man can at any point recognize only some finite part of this infinite array. Man organizes his choices, his adaptations in terms of his estimation of the possibility of various outcomes and tries in the process to increase his chances of actualizing that which he wants in his life, while diminishing the probabilities of that which he does not want. The impossibility of assuring the outcome of one's actions, the consequences of one's choices, means that always there exists the possibility of tragedy ensuing from any choice which one makes. This is a possibility against which we can never be completely ensured. Tragedy, then resides in man's nature. Tragedy resides in the fact that we can never know enough to protect ourselves and those welfare we cherish against the unfortunate consequences of our own conscious and unconscious choices and actions. 85

Awareness in an evolving phenomenon.................. Awareness grows. It is not a static given quantum................... it is an evolutionary sequence - for the race and for the individual. 86
Actualization is the name he is suggesting for a way of being in one's life in which there is greater realization upon the potentials of human existence than is usual, at least in our culture. 87

Authentic living is characterized by the dropping away of happiness as a goal in itself. The actualizing person is busy with the concerns to which he has chosen to commit his living and seldom stops to assess his happiness. Very often, of course, it will be apparent that he is happy person - although by no means is this always so - but it seems to be only the neurotic and the unhappy that expend their concern explicitly and directly on their happiness. The impression is inescapable that happiness is a state that is pushed away by the hand that would grasp it but that tends to accompany the person who is alive to his own being. 88

The authentic person seems to have a perspective on life which enables him to take satisfaction in the very fabric of being....

The person who is actualizing his own being seems to have a style to his living, a certain artistic quality. Often this quality is not externally obvious, but to intimate it is apparent. 89

The wholeness of experience is discovered on a broader scale's a recognition of the essential humanness of those who formerly seemed so different or so hostile, an empathy with the human experience of people in general, a feeling for one's own participation in the general and of the universal human outlook being present in oneself. 90

Except for its immense importance, this over-coming of the subject - object split might be subsumed under the recognition of the wholeness of experience. It is certainly a part of that recognition. Discovery of one's essential rootedness in all mankind gives a sense of being uniquely oneself while yet related to all others. World no longer seems out there and in
opposition; rather the boundary between I and world is experienced as fluid and changing with one's awareness and experience. Similarly, one no longer feels the split within himself. 91

Centeredness:

This is Rollo May's term to express an awareness of being in one's own life. It is expressive of the direct intuition of being which replaces self-consciousness when that handicapping sort of awareness is surmounted. The centered person (not self-centered) is the person who is actualizing his being with aware choice. He recognizes the possibilities open to him, the contingencies that are within his ken the responsibility of commitment, and he chooses knowingly.

Centeredness is the positive aspect of the same process I have characterized as the freeing of the I from the false equation with the Me. As this handicapping linkage is dissolved, the person becomes centered in his being in the moment of actuality and leave behind the diffuse concern with the past or fruitless apprehensions of the future that characterise the inauthentic. Actualization occurs only in the moment. Now Centeredness is the active core of actualization. 92

Transcendence is an hypothesized point of full authenticity of being in which the person would emerge into oneness with the All. There is no nonmystical language really available for describing this concept. By its very nature it partakes of mystery or mysticism - it is unknown to our usual understanding. Transcendences implies the complete confronting and incorporating of existential anxiety in all its forms. It includes, by definition, the overcoming of the subject-object split both within the individual and between the person and his world. Transcendence is complete awareness and
full feelingful assent. We choose to include the concept of transcendence in our thinking because it is essential to put into perspective the other forms of ontologic freedom, emancipation and actualization. When these are set against the background of transcendence they may be seen as the significant but incomplete forms of being that they are. This is by no means to devalue the meaningfulness of emancipation and actualization. Each represents a truer affirmation of life than most of us now know. But transcendence provides the further value of opening our awareness to the true immensity of our potential.93

The basic fact of existence is existence. The basic significance of existence is the potentiality of being. The basic experience of existence is awareness. This much is the frame work within which I write; all that I say here after is derived from the inter course of awareness with existence, is the creation of our being from the is-ness of existence. Existence is, period One can say no more of existence as existence. The meaning and descriptions we write are neither purely discoveries about the giveness of existence nor yet are they purely our inventions imposed on existence. They are the outcomes of our being and of our being aware as a part of existence.94

When man encounters the givens of his existence he experiences existential anxiety. How man responds to that anxiety - whether with dread or with courage - tells the s story of his non-being or his being. The crossroads of life, existentially speaking, lie at the point of the confrontation of existential anxiety. 95

It (the core dynamic sequence through which the person comes to experience actualization or blockage of his existential needs) may be read schematically as follows: the existential givens of our being, once recognized, occasion deep feelings of existential anxiety. That anxiety is natural to our
being, but it may seem too overwhelming at times. Genuine confrontation of existential anxiety means taking into our very awareness of ourselves certain attributes of being in the world that may seem more than we can sustain. In such instances we may try to avoid being overwhelmed by distorting the nature of the givens of existence. When we do so, we experience dread and the feelings of neurotic anxiety. If, on the other hand, we confront existential anxiety authentically and take into our experience of ourselves the aspects of being that seem so threatening, we are making the courageous response and are freed for authentic being. Only when we are authentic in our being can we truly satisfy our basic existential needs.

The Core Dynamic Sequence:

I discover world through awareness. I am in the world. I am.................FINITE.................ABLE TO ACT.................ABLE TO CHOOSE......... SEPARATE. These are the Existential givens.

Because I am so, I find I am subject to.........FATE...........GUILT ..........EMPTINESS.......... LONELINESS.

These are the forms of existential anxiety.

I cannot escape existential anxiety. I can confront it. To confront it means to incorporate into my being-in-the-world.....CONTINGENCE........RESPONSIBILITY......AUTONOMY...............APARTNESS.

These are the existential confrontations.

If I find these too devastating to accept, I may seek to avoid existential anxiety. Thus I will fall prey to feelings of........POWERLESSNESS...............BLAME...............ABSURDITY............ESTRANGEMENT.

These are the forms of neurotic anxiety or dread.
On the other hand, if I do confront and incorporate existential anxiety, I am able to realize my being in the world through.... FAITH.......

COMMITMENT.......

CREATIVITY.......

LOVE.

These are the forms of authentic being or courage.

If I am authentic in my being in the world, then I am able to realize...

ROOTEDNESS.......

IDENTITY.......

MEANINGFULNESS.......

RELATEDNESS.

These are the existential needs.

The four forms of existential anxiety that have just been detailed are the cornerstones of the conception here being set forth. Each person must deal with each of these forms of anxiety in some fashion. Obviously, the manner in which one handles his experience of such anxiety will vary tremendously from person to person. However, as we have seen, there are two general ways of responding to the experience of existential anxiety. These are response of dread and the response of courage.

The response of dread is that which gives rise to neurotic anxiety. When the recognition of existential anxiety seems overwhelming and the person cannot support incorporation of that anxiety, then he must engage in maneuvers designed to distort the reality of his awareness of being. His experience of existential anxiety is transmuted, as it were, into dread, which in turn produces various forms of neurotic anxiety.

When a person confronts existential anxiety and accepts it and incorporates it within his being, we speak of his response being that of courage.

The response of dread is that which gives rise to neurotic anxiety. When the recognition of existential anxiety seems overwhelming and the person cannot support incorporation of that anxiety, then he must engage in
maneuvers designed to distort the reality of his awareness of being. His experience of existential anxiety is transmuted, as it were, into dread, which in turn produces various forms of neurotic anxiety.

When a person confronts existential anxiety and accepts it an incorporates it within his being, we speak of his response being that of courage. In such instances the forms his response takes are fulfilling of his existential needs. Saying it differently, we are postulating that to recognize that one lives in anxiety is a part of the response to that anxiety which makes it possible for one then to recognize his basic needs as a human being and set about fulfilling them. 98

Poised in the apparent chaos of raw contingency, finding no solid footing on any side, discovering all "realities" to be only probabilities, if I am aware and am aware only of contingency, then - quite literally- I will die or go mad. It does not seem likely that such a confrontation is endurable.

The anxiety attendant upon contingency, the existential anxiety of fate and death, may be incorporated and a rootedness achieved that makes for greater authenticity in being. How is this possible? The answer is what I have chosen to term "the response of faith".

Faith, as I use it here, is intrinsic faith. It is objectless faith. It is the I affirming its own being. It is a confronting of the infinitude of contingency with the declaration "I am I. This is my starting place. This is my certainty, though there be no other." 99

I find it useful to think about the process of living as that of a creative, artistic enterprise, not unlike the painting of a public picture. If we use this analogy in the present instance, we will see readily that the artist who hesitated to put an end to his picture, who created a masterpiece but then added canvas to canvas again and again and kept painting, would in time
destroy his picture. Saying it differently, a part of artistry is knowing when to stop. Part of artistry is knowing what to include and what not to include. Part of artistry is knowing where the frame goes around the picture, where the edge of the canvas is. Those who engage in photography will know how important it is in composing adequate picture to frame them properly, to know the limits, to set the limits by choice and not by chance. So it is with life, there are many opportunities for limits that can give artistry, grace, dignity, meaning to our living. If we are authentically in our lives, we use the opportunity to set limits esthetically and vitally. Of course many of us - and I certainly include myself among these - are not so creative. We are fearful of limits because we feel if we do not take all we can now, we may never get any more. In this fashion we can spoil so much that could be rich in our lives.

The exercise of my potential to take action affects what will be present in the stream of my awareness. What is in the stream of my awareness makes on emotional difference to me. The experiencing of this emotional difference we call responsibility. Responsibility is the subjective correlate of the existential given of the ability to take action. Thus it leads to the existential anxiety of guilt and condemnation. I am not indifferent but concerned about my actions and their consequences. I recognize that, my doing and not doing are importantly involved and that I must take the responsibility for such doing and not doing. Guilt and condemnation certainly evoke anxiety, but they are the expression too of the fact that I live my life rather than being lived by it. In my acceptance of the anxiety of guilt and condemnation I affirm my identity.

Commitment is, in paraphrase, the statement, "this I am; this I believe; this I do. I am the being, the believing, the doing." Commitment is not the place in which one stands. The tenet one believes or the act one does, however commitment is not a subscription to something external to the
person's own life no matter how worthwhile. Commitment, as we are using the term here, is not to world peace, not to the prevention of juvenile delinquency, nor to mental health, nor even to one's own future as such. Commitment is an awareness, an attitude, a clear and feelingful recognition of being fully present in the moment, making the choices of the moment, and standing by the consequences of those choices whether anticipated or not. Commitment is "playing for keeps" rather than vainly pleading for "slips (to) go over," as do small children in their games of marbles.

Authentic commitment is possible to the person who genuinely accepts responsibility in his life. 102

The experience of being created, being a creature, by itself would lead to the anxiety of absurdity and meaninglessness were it not that the experience of choice opens the possibility of transcending this creaturely status. As man exercises choice he takes part in creation and overcomes his object status to become subject in his world of experience. As subject and creator man creates meaningfulness this is a supreme achievement of man's choice: the creation of meaning where there was the threat of emptiness and the potential of absurdity.

World we discover, has few constraints. Perhaps only the four we have called the existential givens plus the physical limitations of gravity and hunger and such. World is so open. For some that openness is the terrorizing lack of meaning and control which makes it a rainy free-way without lines. For others it is the openness of a fresh canvas awaiting the artists' brush, a keyboard potent with music, a vast mountain range to be explored. The difference seems to be that the latter group responds to the emptiness with creativity, the former see only absurdity. 103
Creativity means not simply the public creations of artists and artisans. It means more importantly, the inner creativity that is potential to each person. It refers not to the product created but to the act of creation. To the extent that one makes his choices out of his own being and with faith in being, to that extent is he creative whether or not that which he produces has been made a million times over. To the extent one patterns his choices on that which is external to his own being, one is not truly creative although the product is hailed as unique by all who see it. 104

Man seeks relationship with man as a way of dealing with the fact of apartness and giving expression to his being a part of life. Separateness in itself has no emotional tone, but when experienced only in its lonely aspects it leads to the experience of loneliness. Relatedness is the concurrent need of man to give an answer to his condition of separateness. 105

"Love, the answer to the problem of human existence, is the title of a section in Erich Fromm's The Art of Loving. While I might take issue with calling human existence a "problem", I do not debate the central significance of love.

Existential love is an expression of one's whole being in relation to all Being. Existential love is - in its most transcendent form - participation in all Being, participation so complete that the subject-object dichotomy is obliterate and the essential unity of the All is revealed. Clearly, in such transcendent love, faith, commitment, and creativity are ultimately expressed. In speaking of transcendent love we are characterizing an ultimate realization of the human potential, a point at which apartness is absorbed into wholeness. Most of our concern, however, is with love as a response to the experience of apartness, as a confronting and incorporating of the existential anxiety of loneliness and isolation. This brings our attention to a realm of more familiar experience.
Here we may speak of actualizing love. Actualizing love is the "I-Thou" relation which Buber has characterized so well. It is the affirmation of one's own being in relation to another. Perhaps, in the terms we have been employing, it is the relation of I-process to I-process. 106

If we try to summarise Bugental's view of man we find that Bugental has given primary emphasis to the following dimensions (1) Man is self-determining (2) Man is conscious/aware. The areas of secondary emphasis were Man is accepting of nonmhedonic emotions, Man is a communicative being, Man is self-actualizing.

Like Bonner, Bugental gives primary emphasis to the concept that man is self-determining. At each moment, man is faced with choice, and being endowed with the freedom to choose he is responsible for both the personal and social consequences of his choices.

Unlike Bonner, however, Bugental gives primary emphasis to the fact that man is conscious/aware. He sees feelingful awareness as the central process of man's nature and being as fully aware as possible the prime requisite for authentically confronting the basic existential anxieties and being self-actualizing in his choices rather than self-destructive. For Bugental, man is guided in his choices toward authenticity (this may also be termed "genuine ontologic freedom" or "full self-actualization") by his feelingful awareness and not by any built-in instincts. For Bonner, man makes his progress toward full self-actualization as a result of his natural yet socio-culturally influenced pro action. In the content analysis, Bugental's concept of authenticity which incorporates the idea of full self-actualization, has been coded as aware plus self-determining plus ontologically and socially responsible. The former two dimensions each received primary emphasis in the final count. Thus, Bugental has actually given primary emphasis to the dimension 'man is self-actualizing'
although the percentage analysis table reveals only secondary emphasis for it. So Bugental has given primary emphasis to the concept that man is a self-actualizing being.

According to Erich Fromm modern man feels uneasy and more and more bewildered. He works and strives, but he is dimly aware of a sense of futility with regard to his activities while his power over matter grows, he feels powerless in his individual life and in society. While creating new and better means for mastering nature, he has become enmeshed in a network of those means and has lost the vision of the end which alone gives them significance - man himself. While becoming the master of nature, he has become the slave of the machine which his own hands built. With all his knowledge about matter, he is ignorant with regard to the most important and fundamental questions of human existence: what man is, how he ought to live, and how the tremendous energies within can be released and used productively. 107

Humanistic ethics is anthropocentric, not of course, in the sense that man is the center of the universe but in the sense that other judgements and even perceptions, are rooted in the peculiarities of his existence and are meaningful only with reference to it; man, indeed, is the "measure of all things." The humanistic position is that there is nothing higher and nothing more dignified than human existence. 108

It is one of the characteristics of human nature that man finds his fulfillment and happiness only in relatedness to and solidarity with his fellowmen. However, to love one's neighbor is not a phenomenon transcending man, it is something inherent in and radiating from him. Love is not a higher power which descends upon man nor a duty which is imposed upon him, it is his own power by which he relates himself to the world and makes it truly his. 109
Living itself is an art - in fact, the most important and at the same time the most difficult and complex art to be practiced by man. Its object is not this or that specialized performance, but the performance of living, the process of developing into that which one is potentially. In the art of living, man is both the artist and the object of his art; he is the sculptor and marble, the physician and the patient. 110

If ethics constitutes the body of norms for achieving excellence in performing the art of living, its most general principles must follow from the nature of life in general and of human existence in particular. In most general terms, the nature of all life is to preserve and affirm its own existence. All organisms have an inherent tendency to preserve their existence. It is from this fact that psychologists have postulated an "instinct" of self preservation. The first "duty" of an organism is to be alive.

"To be alive" is a dynamic, not a static, concept. Existence and the unfolding of the specific powers of an organism are one and the same. All organisms have an inherent tendency to actualize their specific potentialities. The aim of man's life, therefore, is to be understood as the unfolding of his powers according to the laws of his nature.

Man, however, does not exist "in general". While sharing the core of human qualities with all members of his species, he is always an individual, a unique entity different from everybody else. He differs by his particular blending of character, temperament, talents, dispositions, just as he differs at his fingertips. He can affirm his human potentialities only by realizing his individuality. The duty to be alive is the same as the duty to become oneself, to develop into the individual one potentially is.

To sum up, good in humanistic ethics is the affirmation of life, the unfolding of man's powers. Virtue is responsibility toward his own existence.
Evil constitutes the crippling of man's powers, vice is irresponsibility toward himself. These are the first principles of an objectivistic humanistic ethics. 111

Fromm then comments on human nature and character:

One individual represents the human race. He is one specific example of the human species. He is "he" and he is "all", he is an individual with his peculiarities and in this sense unique, and at the same time he is representative of all characteristics of the human race. His individual personality is determined by the peculiarities of human existence common to all men. Hence the discussion of the human situation must precede that of personality. 112

The first element which differentiates human from animal existence is a negative one: the relative absence in man of instinctive regulation in the process of adaptation to the surrounding world.

The emergence of man can be defined as occurring at the point in the process of evolution where instinctive adaptation has reached its minimum. But he emerges with new qualities which differentiate his from the animal: his awareness of himself as a separate entity, his ability to remember the past, to visualize the future, and to denote objects and acts by symbols, his reason to conceive and understand the world; and his imagination through which he reaches far beyond the range of his senses. Man is the most helpless of all animals, but this very biological weakness is the basis for his strength, the prime cause for the development of his specifically human qualities. 113

Self-awareness, reason, and imagination have disrupted the "harmony" which characterizes animal existence. Their emergence has made man into an anomaly, into the freak of the universe. He is part of nature, subject to her physical laws and unable to change them, yet he transcends the rest of nature. He is set apart while being, a part he is homeless, yet chained to the home he shares with all creatures. Cast into the world at an accidental place
and time, he is forced out of it, again accidentally. Being aware of himself, he realizes his powerlessness and the limitations of his existence. He visualizes his own end: death. Never is he free from the dichotomy of his existence: he cannot rid himself of his mind, even if he should want to; he cannot rid himself of his body as long as he is alive - and his body makes him want to be alive.

Reason, man's blessing, is also his curse, it forces him to cope everlasting with the task of solving an insoluble dichotomy. Human existence is different in this respect from that of all other organisms, it is in a state of constant and unavoidable disequilibrium... Man is the only animal for whom his own existence is a problem which he has to solve and from which he cannot escape. He cannot go back to the prehuman state of harmony with nature; he must proceed to develop his reason until he becomes the master of nature and of himself.

The emergence of reason has created a dichotomy within man which forces him to strive everlasting for new solutions. The dynamism of his history is intrinsic to the existence of reason which causes him to develop and, through it, to create a world of his own in which he can feel at home with himself and his fellow men. Every stage he reaches leaves him discontented and perplexed, and this very perplexity urges him to move toward new solutions. There is no innate "drive for progress" in man; it is the contradiction in his existence that makes him proceed on the way he set out.

This split in man's nature leads to dichotomies which he calls existential because they are rooted in the very existence of man; they are contradictions which man cannot annul but to which he can react in various ways, relative to his character and his culture.
The most fundamental existential dichotomy is that between life and death. The fact that we have to die is unalterable for man. Man is aware of this fact, and this very awareness profoundly influences his life.

That man is mortal results in another dichotomy: while every human being is the bearer of all human potentialities, the short span of his life does not permit their full realization under even the most favourable circumstances... Man's life, beginning and ending at one accidental point in the evolutionary process of the race, conflicts tragically with the individual's claim for the realization of all his potentialities. Of this contradiction between what he could realized and what he actually does realized he has, at least, a dim perception.

Man is alone and he is related at the same time. He is alone in as much as he is unique entity, not indentical with anyone else, and aware of his self as a separate entity. He must be alone when he has to judge or to make decisions solely by the power of his reason. And yet he cannot bear to be alone, to be unrelated to his fellowmen. His happiness depends on the solidarity he feels with his fellowmen, with past and future generations.

It is one of the peculiar qualities of the human mind that, when confronted with a contradiction, it cannot remain passive. It is set in motion with the aim of resolving the contradiction.

All human progress is due to this fact. 114.

Nicholas Rescher's book on Human Interests,115 Reflections on Philosophical Anthropology is a collection of rather general essays, clearly and often attractively written, on the human condition. They have titles such as 'what is a person?', 'Proverbial Wisdom,' 'Age and the stages, of Life', 'The Power of Ideals,' 'The Meaning of Life', and 'Rationality and Happiness'. In order to bring back such issues to the attention of philosophers, Rescher uses and discusses the work of Unamuno. His main theme is 'the ambiguous
position of reason on the guidance of human affairs', as both central to our nature and yet often out of place among the chaotic conditions of our life. He stresses both the uses and the limitations of rationality. On the whole he expounds Unamuno's view that 'For us humans, Reason is like a very difficult but indispensable mate - we cannot live without it and we cannot live with it.'

There is only one solution to his problem: to face the truth, to acknowledge his fundamental aloneness and solitude in a universe indifferent to his fate, to recognize that there is no power transcending him which can solve his problem for him. Man must accept the responsibility for himself and the fact that only by using his own powers can he give meaning to his life. But meaning does not imply certainty; indeed, the quest for certainty blocks the search for meaning. Uncertainty is the very condition to impel man to unfold his powers. If he faces the truth without panic he will recognize that there is no meaning to life except the meaning man gives his life by the unfolding of his powers, by living productively and that only constant vigilance, activity, and effort can keep us from failing in the one task that matters - the full development of our powers within the limitations set by the laws of our existence. Man will never cease to be perplexed, to wonder, and to raise new questions. Only if he recognizes the human situation, the dichotomies inherent in his existence and his capacity to unfold his powers, will he be able to succeed in his task: to be himself and to achieve happiness by the full realization of those faculties which are peculiarly his - of reason, love and productive work. 116

Fromm then proceeds to describe the productive character. Such a personality orientation, Fromm thinks is within the reach of every normal human being. Thus, he writes:
The "productive orientation" of personality refers to a fundamental attitude, a mode of relatedness in all realms of human experience. It covers mental, emotional, and sensory responses to others, to oneself, and to things. Productiveness is man's ability to use his powers and to realize the potentialities inherent in him. If we say he must use his powers we imply that he must be free and not dependent on someone who controls his powers. We imply, furthermore, that he is guided by reason, since he can make use of his powers only if he knows what they are, how to use them, and what to use them for. Productiveness means that he experiences himself as the embodiment of his powers and as the "actor", that he feels himself one with his powers and at the same time that they are not masked and alienated from him. 117

Productiveness is an attitude which every human being is capable of unless he is mentally and emotionally crippled. 118

While it is true that man's productiveness can create material things, works of art, and systems of thought, by far the most important object of productiveness is man himself. Birth is only one particular step in a continuum which begins with conception and ends with death. All that is between these two poles is a process of giving birth to one's potentialities, of bringing to life all that is potentially given in the two cells. But while physical growth proceeds by itself, if only the proper conditions are given, the process of birth on the mental plane, in contrast, does not occur automatically. It requires productive activity to give life to the emotional and intellectual potentialities of man, to give birth to his self. It is part of the tragedy of the human situation that the development of the self is never completed; even under the best conditions only part of man's potentialities is realized. Man always dies before he is fully born. 119
In conclusion, we note the following passage:

Man's task in life is to give birth to himself, to become what he potentially is.

He believes that man is the product of natural evolution; that he is part of nature and yet transcends it, being endowed with reason and self-awareness.

He believes that man's essence is as certainable. However, this essence is not a substance which characterizes man at all times through history. The essence of man consists in the above-mentioned contradiction inherent in his existence, and this contradiction forces him to react in order to find a solution. Man cannot remain neutral and passive toward this existential dischotomy. By the very fact of his being human, he is asked a question by life: how to overcome the split between himself and the world outside of him in order to arrive at the experience of unity and oneness with his fellow man and with nature. Man has to answer this question every moment of his life. Not only or even primarily with thoughts and words, but by his mode of being and acting.

He believes that there are a number of limited and ascertainable answers to this question of existence (the history of religion and philosophy is a catalogue of those answers); yet there are basically only two categories of answers. In one, man attempts to find again harmony with nature by regression to a prehuman form of existence, eliminating his specifically human qualities of reason and love. In the other, his goal is the full development of his human powers until he reaches a new harmony with his fellow man and with nature.
He believes that the first answer is bound to failure. It leads to death, destruction, suffering, and never to the full growth of man, never to harmony and strength. The second answer requires the elimination of greed and egocentricity, it demands discipline, will, and respect for those who can show the way. Yet, although this answer is the more difficult one, it is the only answer which is not doomed to failure. In fact, even before the final goal is reached, the activity and effort expended in approaching it has a unifying and integrating effect which intensifies man's vital energies.

He believes that Man's basic alternative is the choice between life and death. Every act implies this choice. Man is free to make it, but this freedom is a limited one. There are many favourable and unfavourable conditions which incline him - his psychological constitution, the condition of the specific society into which he was born, his family, teachers, and the friends he meets and chooses. It is man's task to enlarge the margin of freedom, to strengthen the conditions which are conducive to life as against those which are conducive to death. Life and death, as spoken here, are not the biological states, but states of being, of relating to the world. Life means constant change, constant birth. Death means cessation of growth, ossification, repetition. The unhappy fate of many is that they do not make the choice. They are neither alive nor dead. Life becomes a burden, an aimless enterprise, and busyness is the means to protect one from the torture of being in the land of shadows.

He believes that neither life nor history has an ultimate meaning which in turn imparts meaning to the life of the individual or justifies his suffering. Considering the contradictions and weakness which beset man's existence it is only too natural that he seeks for an absolute which gives him the illusion of certainty and relieves him from conflict, doubt and responsibility. Yet, no God, neither in theological, philosophical or historical garments saves, or condemns
man. Only man can find a goal for life and the means for the realisation of this
goal. He cannot find a saving ultimate or absolute answer but he can strive for
a degree of intensity, depth and clarity of experience which gives him the
strength to live without illusions, and to be free.

He believes that no one can "save" his fellow man by making the choice
for him. All that one man can do for another is to show him the alternatives
truthfully and lovingly, yet without sentimentality or illusion. Confrontation
with the true alternatives may awaken all the hidden energies in a person, and
enable him to choose life as against death. If he cannot choose life, no one
else can breathe life into him.

He believes, that there are two ways of arriving at the choice of the
good. The first is that of duty and obedience to moral commands. This way
can be effective, yet one must consider that in thousands of years only a
minority have fulfilled even the requirements of the Ten commandments. Many
more have committed crimes when they were presented to them as commands
by those in authority. The other way is to develop a taste for and a sense of
well-being in doing what is good or right. By taste for well-being, I do not
mean pleasure in the Benthamian or Freudian sense. I refer to the sense of
heightened aliveness in which I confirm my powers and my identity.

He believes that education means to acquaint the young with the best
heritage of the human race. But while much of this heritage is expressed in
words, it is effective only if these words become reality in the person of the
teacher and in the practice and structure of society. Only the idea which has
materialized in the flesh can influence man; the idea which remains a word only
changes words.

He believes in the perfectibility of man. This perfectibility means that
man can reach his goal, but it does not mean that he must reach it. If the
individual will not choose life and does not grow. he will by necessity become destructive, a living corpse. Evilness and self-loss are as real as are goodness and aliveness. They are the secondary potentialities of man if he chooses not to realize his primary potentialities.

He believes that only exceptionally is a man born as a saint or as a criminal. Most of us have dispositions for good and for evil, although the respective weight of these dispositions varies with individuals. Hence, our fate is largely determined by those influences which mold and form the given dispositions. The family is the most important influence. But the family itself is mainly an agent of society, the transmission belt for those values and norms which a society wants to impress on its members. Hence, the most important factor for the development of the individual is the structure and the values of the society into which he has been born.

He believes that society has both a furthering and an inhibiting functions. Only in co-operation with others, and in the process of work, does man develop his powers, only in the historical process does he create himself. But at the same time, most societies until now have served the aims of the few who wanted to use the many. Hence they had to use their power to smultify and intimidate the many( and thus, indirectly, themselves), to prevent them from developing all their powers : for this reason society has always conflicted with humanity, with the universal norms valid for every man. Only when society's aim will have become identical with the aims of humanity, will society cease to cripple man and to further evil. He believes that every man represents humanity. We are different as to intelligence health, talents. Yet we are all one. We are all saints and sinners, adults and children, and no one is anybody's superior or judge. We have all been awakened with the Buddha, we
have all been crucified with Christ, and we have all killed robbed with Genghis Khan, Stalin and Hitler.

He believes that man can visualize the experience of the whole universal man only by realizing his individuality and never by trying to reduce himself to an abstract, common denominator. Man's task in life is precisely the paradoxical one of realizing his individuality and at the same time transcending it and arriving at the experience of universality. Only the fully developed individual self can drop the ego.

He believes that the one world which is emerging can come into existence only if a New Man comes into being - a man who has emerged from the archaic ties of blood and soil, and who feels himself to be the son of man, a citizen of the world whose loyalty is to the human race and to life, rather than to any exclusive part of it; a man who loves his country because he loves mankind and whose judgement is not warped by tribal loyalties.

He believes that man's growth is a process of continuous birth, of continuous awakening. We are usually half-asleep and only sufficiently awake to go about our business; but we are not awake enough to go about living, which is the only task that matters for a living being. The great leaders of the human race are those who have awakened man from his half-sleep. The great enemies of humanity are those who put it to sleep, and it does not matter whether their sleeping portion is the worship of God or that of the Golden calf.

He believes that the development of man in the last four thousand years of history is truly awe-inspiring. He has developed his reason to a point where he is solving the riddles of nature and has emancipated himself from the blind power of the natural forces. But at the very moment of his greatest triumph, when he is at the threshold of a new world, he has succumbed to the power of the very things and organizations he has created. He has invented a
new method of producing, and has made production and distribution his new idol. He worships the work of his hands and has reduced himself to being the servant of things. He uses the name of God, of freedom of humanity, of Socialism, in vain; he prides himself on his powers - the bombs and the machines - to cover up his human bankruptcy; he boasts of his power to destroy in order to hide his human impotence.

He believes that the only force that can save us from self destruction is reason; the capacity to recognize the unreality of most of the ideas that man holds, and to penetrate to the reality veiled by the layers and layers of deception and ideologies; reason, not as a body of knowledge, but as a "kind of energy, a force which is fully comprehensible only in its agency and effects." a force whose "most important function consists in its power to bind and to dissolve." Violence and aims will not save us; Sanity and reason may.

He believes that reason cannot be effective unless man has hope and belief. Goethe was right when he said that the deepest distinction between various historical periods is that between belief and disbelief, and when he added that all epochs in which belief dominates are brilliant, uplifting, and fruitful while those in which disbelief dominates vanish because nobody cares to devote himself to the unfruitful. No doubt the thirteenth century, the renaissance, the Enlightenment, were ages of belief and hope. I am afraid that the western world in the twentieth century deceives itself about the fact that it has lost hope and belief. Truly, where there is no belief in man, the belief in machines will not save us from vanishing, on the contrary, this "belief" will only accelerate the end. Either the western world will be capable of creating a renaissance of humanism in which the fullest development of man's humanity, and not production and work, are the central issues - or the west will perish as many other great civilizations have.
He believes that to recognize the truth is not primarily a matter of intelligence, but a matter of character. The most important element is the courage to say no, to disobey the commands of power and of public opinion; to cease being asleep and to become human; to wake up and lose the sense of helplessness and futility. Eve and Prometheus are the two great rebels whose very "crimes" liberated mankind. But the capacity to say "no" meaningfully, implies the capacity to say "yes" meaningfully. The "yes" to God is the "no" to Cesar; the "yes" to man is the "no" to all those who want to enslave, exploit, and stultify him.

He believes in freedom in man's right to be himself, to assert himself and to fight all those who try to prevent him from being himself. But freedom is more than the absence of violent oppression. It is more than "freedom from." It is "freedom to" - the freedom to become independent; the freedom to be much, rather than to have much, or to use things and people.

He believes that neither Western capitalism nor Soviet or Chinese Communism can solve the problem of the future. They both create bureaucracies which transform man into a thing. Man must bring the forces of nature and of society under his conscious and rational control; but not under the control of a bureaucracy which administers things and man, but under the control of the free and associated producers who administer things and subordinate them to man, who is the measure of all things. The alternative is not between "Capitalism" and "Communism" but between bureaucratism and humanism. Democratic, decentralizing socialism is the realization of those conditions which are necessary to make the unfolding of all man's powers the ultimate purpose.

He believes that one of the most disastrous mistakes in individual and social life consists in being caught in stereotyped alternatives of thinking.
"Better dead than red", "an alienated industrial civilization or individualistic pre-industrial society." "To rearm or to be helpless," are examples of such alternatives. There are always other and new possibilities which become apparent only when one has liberated oneself from the deathly grip of cliches, and when one permits the voice of humanity, and reason, to be heard. The principle of "the lesser evil" is the principle of despair. Most of the time it only lengthens the period until the greater evil wins out. To risk doing what is right and human, and have faith in the power of the voice of humanity and truth, is more realistic than the so-called realism of opportunism.

He believes that man must get rid of illusions that enslave and paralyze him; that he must become aware of the reality inside and outside of him in order to create a world which needs no illusions. Freedom and independence can be achieved only when the chains of illusion are broken.

He believes that today there is only one main concern: the question of war and peace. Man is likely to destroy all life on earth, or to destroy civilized life and the values among those that remain, and to build a barbaric, totalitarian organization which will rule what is left of mankind. To wake up to this danger, to look through the double talk on all sides which is used to prevent men from seeing the abyss toward which they are moving is the obligation, the one moral and intellectual command which man must respect today. If he does not, we all will be doomed.

If we should all perish in the nuclear holocaust, it will not be because man was not capable of becoming human, or that he was inherently evil; it would be because the consensus of stupidity has prevented him from seeing reality and acting upon the truth.

He believes in the perfectibility of man, but I doubt whether he will achieve this goal, unless he awakens soon.
To conclude in his view of man, Fromm has given primary emphasis to the following dimensions: (1) Man is self-actualizing (2) Man is rational (3) Man is self-affirming. The areas of secondary emphasis were (1) Man is conscious /aware (2) Man is self-determining. The remaining dimensions received tertiary emphasis. Like Bonner and Bugental, Fromm also considers man's full self-actualization or the unfolding and utilization of his powers and energies in accordance with the laws of his specific, idiosyncratic nature, to be the aim and meaning of his existence. He sees man as having this one overriding need or value namely, to make himself into a productive personality, into a person who is able to love both himself and his fellow man.

However, whereas Bonner stressed man's proaction, and Bugental man's feelingful awareness, Fromm emphasizes man's powers of reason as the guide for his choices in his quest for full self-actualization.

Abraham H. Maslow's view of man has been obtained from his book, Motivation and Personality. In his book the Humanistic view of man Jaideep Singh has said 'If I had, had to condense the thesis of this book into a single sentence, I would have said that, in addition to what the psychologies of the time had to say about human nature, man also had a higher nature and that this was instinctoid, i.e., part of his essence. And if I could have had a second sentences, I would have stressed the profoundly holistic nature of human nature in contradiction to the analytic - dissecting - atomic - Newtonian approach of the behaviourisms and of Freudian psychoanalysis.'

While it is still necessary to be very cautious about affirming the preconditions for "goodness" in human nature, it is already possible to reject firmly the despairing belief that human nature is ultimately and basically depraved and evil. Such a belief is no longer a matter of taste merely. It can
now be maintained only by a determined blindness and ignorance, by a refusal to consider the facts. 121

The great advances of the last decade or so in the science of genetics has forced us to assign somewhat more determining power to the genes than we did fifteen years ago. 122

Maslow then looks at the nature of man from the point of view of what motivates him.

Our first proposition states that the individual is an integrated, organized whole. This theoretical statement is usually accepted piously enough by psychologists, who then often proceed calmly to ignore it in their actual experiments. That it is an experimental reality as well as a theoretical one must be realized before sound experimentation and sound motivation theory are possible. In motivation theory this proposition means many specific things. For instance, it means the whole individual is motivated rather than just a part of him. In good theory there is no such entity as a need of the stomach or mouth or a genital need. There is only a need of the individual. It is John Smith who wants food, not John Smith's stomach. Furthermore satisfaction comes to the whole individual and not just to a part of him. Food satisfies John Smith's hunger and not his stomach's hunger.

Dealing with John Smith's hunger as a function merely of his gastrointestinal tract has made experimenters neglect the fact that when an individual is hungry he changes not only in his gastrointestinal function, but in many, perhaps even in most other functions of which he is capable. His perceptions change (he will perceive food more readily than he will at other times). The content of his thinking changes (he is more apt to think of getting food than of solving an algebraic problem). And this list can be extended to almost every other faculty, capacity, or function, both physiological and
psychic. In other words, when John Smith is hungry, he is hungry all over; he is different as an individual from what he is at other times. 123

Man is a wanting animal and rarely reaches state of complete satisfaction except for a short time. As one desire is satisfied, another pops up to take its place. When this is satisfied, still another comes into the foreground, etc. It is a characteristic of the human being throughout his whole life that he is practically always desiring something. 124

Dewey and Thorndike have stressed one important aspect of motivation that has been completely neglected by most psychologists, namely possibility. On the whole we yearn consciously for that which might conceivably be actually attained. That is to say that we are much more realistic about wishing than the psychoanalysts may allow, absorbed as they are with unconscious wishes.

As a man's income increases he finds himself actively wishing for and striving for things that he never dreamed of a few years before. The average American yearns for automobiles, refrigerators and television sets because they are real possibilities; he does not yearn for Yachts or planes because they are in fact not within the reach of the average American. It is quite probable that he does not long for them unconsciously either.

Attention to this factor of possibility of attainment is crucial in motivations between various classes and castes within our own population and between it and other poorer countries and cultures. 125

The needs that are usually taken as the starting point for motivation theory are the so-called physiological drives. 126

Undoubtedly these physiological needs are the most prepotent of all needs. What this means specifically is that in the human being who is missing everything in life in an extreme fashion, it is most likely that the major
motivation would be the physiological needs rather than any others. A person who is lacking food, safety, love, and esteem would most probably hunger for food more strongly than for anything else.

If all the needs are unsatisfied, and the organism is then dominated by the physiological, needs all other needs may become simply nonexistent or be pushed into the background. It is then fair to characterize the whole organism by saying simply that it is hungry, for consciousness is almost completely preempted by hunger. 127

But what happens to man's desires when there is plenty of bread and when his belly is chronically filled?

At once other (and higher) needs emerge and these, rather than physiological hungers, dominate the organism. And when these in turn are satisfied, again new (and still higher) needs emerge and so on. This is what we mean by saying that the basic human needs are organised into a hierarchy of relative prepotency.

A want that is satisfied is no longer a want. The organism is dominated and its behaviour organized only by unsatisfied needs. 128

If the physiological needs are relatively well gratified, there then emerges a new set of needs, which we may characterize roughly as the safety needs (security; stability; dependency; protection freedom from fear, from order, law, limits; strength in the protector; and so on). 129

If both the physiological and the safety needs are fairly well gratified there will emerge the love and affection and belongingness needs, and the whole cycle already described will repeat itself with this new center. 130

All people in our society (with a few pathological exceptions) have a need or desire for a stable, firmly based, usually high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, or self-esteem, and for the esteem of others. These needs
may therefore be for strength, for achievement for adequacy, for mastery and competence, for confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom. Second, we have what we may call the desire for reputation or prestige (defining it as respect or esteem from other people), status, fame and glory, dominance, recognition, attention, importance dignity, or appreciation. This needs have been relatively stressed by Alfred Adler and his followers, and have been relatively neglected by Freud. More and more today, however, there is appearing widespread appreciation of their central importance.... 131

Even if all these needs are satisfied, we may still often (if not always) except that, a new discontent and restlessness will soon develop, unless the individual is doing what he, individually, is fitted for. A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must write, if he is to be ultimately at peace with himself. What a man can be, he must be. He must be true to his own nature. This need we may call self-actualization.....

This term, first coined by Kirt Goldstein, is being used in this book in a much more specific and limited fashion. It refers to man's desire for self-fulfillment, namely to the tendency for him to become actualized in what he is potentially. This tendency may be phrased as the desire to become more and more what one idiosynratically is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming.

The specific form that these needs will take will of course vary greatly from person to person. In one individual it may take the form of the desire to be an ideal mother, in another it may be expressed athletically and in still another it may be expressed in painting pictures or in inventions. At this level, individual differences are greatest.

The clear emergence of these needs usually rests upon some prior satisfaction of the physiological, safety, love, and esteem needs. 132
The remaining portion of this summarized version of Maslow's view of man is based on his study of self-actualizing people. The subjects were selected from among personal acquaintances and friends, and among public and historical figures. Maslow explains the meaning of self-actualization.

...... The positive criterion for selection was positive evidence of self-actualization (SA), as yet a difficult syndrome to describe accurately. For the purpose of this discussion, it may be loosely described as the full use, and exploitation of talents, capacities, potentialities, etc. Such people seem to be fulfilling themselves and to be doing the best that they are capable of doing, reminding us of Nietzsche's exhortation, "Become what thou art". They are people who have developed or are developing to the full stature of which they are capable...... 133

Since the need for self-actualization has been postulated as an instinctoid need in man, the characteristics of the self-actualizing people can be considered to be presently existing, though in the form of unrealized potentials, in man in general. Consequently, these are noted as part of Maslow's view of man. 134


The first form in which this capacity was noticed was an unusual ability to detect the spurious, the joke, and the dishonest in personality, and in general to judge people correctly and efficiently......

As the study progressed, it slowly became apparent that this efficiency extended to many other areas of life --- indeed all areas that were observed. In art and music, in things of the intellect, in scientific matters, in politics and public affairs, they seemed as a group to be able to see concealed or confused realities more swiftly and more correctly than others. 135
2. Acceptance (self, others, nature)

Our healthy individuals find it possible to accept themselves and their own nature without chagrin or complaint or for that matter even without thinking about the matter very much.

They can accept their own human nature in the store styles, with all its shortcomings, with all its discrepancies from the ideal image without feeling real concern. It would convey the wrong impression to say that they are selfsatisfied. What we must say rather is that they can take the frailties and sins, weaknesses, and evils of human nature in the same unquestioning spirit with which one accepts the characteristics of nature. One does not complain about water because it is wet, or about rocks because they are hard or about trees because they are green. As the child looks out upon the world with wide, uncritical, undemanding, innocent eyes, simply nothing and observing what is the case, without either arguing the matter or demanding that it be otherwise, so does the self-actualizing person tend to look upon human nature in himself and in others.

3. Spontaneity; Simplicity; Naturalness

Self-actualizing people can all be deserved as relatively spontaneous in behaviour and far more spontaneous than that in their inner life, thoughts, impulses, etc. Their behaviour is marked by simplicity and naturalness, and by lack of artificiality or straining for effect. This does not necessarily mean consistently unconventional behaviour. If we were to take an actual count of the number of times that the self-actualizing person behaved in an unconventional manner the tally would not be high. This unconventionality is not superficial but essential or internal. It is his impulses, thought
consciousness that are so unusually unconventional, spontaneous, and natural. 137

**Problem Centering:**

Our subjects are in general strongly focused on problems outside themselves. In current terminology they are problem centered rather than ego, centered. The generally are not problems for themselves and are not generally much concerned about themselves, e.g., a contrasted with the ordinary introspectiveness that one finds in unsecure people. These individuals customarily have some mission in life, some task to fulfill, some problem outside themselves with enlists much of their energies. 138

5. **The Quality of Detachment; the Need for Privacy:**

For all my subjects it is true that they can be solitary without harm to themselves and without discomfort. Furthermore, it is true for almost all that they positively like solitude and privacy to a definitely greater degree than the average person. 139

The quality of detachment may have some connection with certain other qualities as well. For one thing it is possible to call my subjects more objective (in all senses of that word) than average people. We have seen that they are more problem centered than ego centered. This is true even when the problems concern themselves, their own wishes, motives, hopes or aspirations. Consequently they have the ability to concentrate to a degree not usual for ordinary men.......... 140

..... My subjects make up their own minds, come to their own decisions, are self-starters, are responsible for themselves and their own destinies.......... 140

.........of my self-actualizing subjects, 100 percent are self movers.
Finally, I must make a statement even though it will certainly be disturbing to many theologians, philosophers, and scientists: self-actualizing individuals have more "free will" and are less "determined" than average people are.141

6. Autonomy; Independence of culture and Environment; Will; Active Agents

One of the characteristics of self-actualizing people, which to a certain extent crosscuts much of what we have already described, is their relative independence of the physical and social environment. Since they are propelled by growth motivation rather than by deficiency motivation, self-actualizing people are not dependent for their main satisfaction on the real world, or other people or culture or means to ends or, in general, or extensive satisfactions. Rather they are dependent for their own development and continued growth on their own potentialities and latent resources. Just as the tree needs sunshine and water and food, so do most people need love, safety, and the other basic need gratifications that can come only from without. But once these external satisfiers are obtained, once these receiver deficiencies are satiated by outside satisfiers, the true problem of individual human development begins eg. self-actualization.

This independence of environment means a relative stability in the face of the hard knocks blows, deprivations, frustration, and the like. These people can maintain a relative serenity in the midst of circumstances that would drive other people to suicide, they have also been described as "Self-contained."

Deficiency-motivated people must have other people available, since most of their main need gratifications (love, safety, respect, prestige, belongingness) can come only from other human beings. But growth-motivated people may actually be hampered by others. The determinants of satisfaction
and of the good life are for them now inner - individual and not social. They have become strong enough to be independent of the good opinion of other people or even of their affection.......

7. **Continued Freshness of Appreciation**:

Self-actualizing people have the wounderful capacity to appreciate again and again, freshly and naively, the basic goods of life, with awe, pleasure, wonder and even ecstasy, however stale these experiences may have become to others. What C. Wilson has called "newness" thus for such a person any sunset may be as beautiful as that first one, any flower may be of breath-taking loveliness, even after he has been a million flowers. The thousandth baby he sees is just as miraculous a product as the first one he saw. He remains as convinced of his luck in marriage thirty years after his marriage and is as surprised by his wife's beauty when she is sixty as he was forty years before. For such people, even the casual workaday, moment-to-moment business of living can be thrilling, exciting, and ecstatic. These intense feelings do not come all the time; they come occasionally rather than usually, but at the most unexpected moments.

8. **The Mystic Experience; the Peak Experience**:

Those subjective expressions that have been called the mystic experience and described so well by William James are a fairly common experience for our subjects though not for all. The strong emotions described in the previous sections some times get strong enough, chaotic, and widespread enough to be called mystic experience.

Apparently the acute mystic or peak experience is a tremendous intensification of any of the experiences in which there is loss of self or
transcendence of it, e.g. problem centering, intense concentration, muga
behaviour as described by Benedict, intense sensuous experience, self-forgetful
and intense enjoyment of music or art........... 144

9. Gemeinschaftsgefühl

This word, invented by Alfred Adler, is the only one available that
describes well the flavor of the feelings for mankind expressed by self-
actualizing subjects. They have for human beings in general a deep feeling of
identification, sympathy, and affection inspite of the occasional anger,
impatience, or disgust described below. Because of this they have a genuine
desire to help the human race. It is as if they were all members of a single
family........... 145

10 - Interpersonal Relations

Self-actualizing people have deeper and more profound interpersonal
relations than any other adults.................they are capable of more fusion;
greater love, more perfect identification; more obliteration of the ego
boundaries than any other people would consider possible.........

One consequence of this phenomenon and of certain others as well is
that especially deep ties with rather few individuals. Their circle of friends is
rather small. The ones that they love profoundly are few in number. Partly
this is for the reason that being very close to someone in this self-actualizing
style seems to require a good deal of time...........146

11. The Democratic Character Structure

All my subjects without exception may be said to be democratic people
in the deepest possible sense. I say this on the basis of a previous analysis of

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authoritarian and democratic character structures...... These people have all the obvious or superficial democratic characteristics. They can be and are friendly with anyone of suitable character regardless of class, education, political belief, race, or color. As a matter of fact it often seems as if they are not even aware of these differences, which are for the average person so obvious and so important.

They have not only this most obvious quality but their democratic feeling goes deeper as well. For instance they find it possible to learn from anybody who has something to teach them no matter what other characteristics he may have...........

Most profound, but also most vague is the hard to-get-at-tendency to give a certain quantum of respect to any human being just because he is a human individual. Our subjects seem not to wish to go beyond certain minimum point, even with scoundrels, of demeaning, of derogating, of robbing, of dignity. And yet this goes along with their strong sense of right and wrong, of good and evil. They are more likely rather than less likely to counterattack against evil men and evil behaviour. They are far less ambivalent, confused or weak-willed about their own anger than average men are. 147

12. Discrimination between Means and Ends, between Good and Evil.

I have found none of my subjects to be chronically unsure about the difference between right and wrong in his actual living. Whether or not they could verbalize the matter, they rarely showed in their day-to-day living the chaos, the confusion, the inconsistency, or the conflicts that are so common in the average person's "ethical dealings. " This may be phrased also in the following terms: These individuals are strongly ethical, they have definite moral standards, they do right and do not do wrong. Needless to say, their
notions of right and wrong and good and evil are often not the conventional ones. 148

13. **Philosophical, Unhostile, sense of Humor.**

One very early finding that was quite easy to make, because it was common to all of my subjects, was that their sense of humor is not of the ordinary type. They do not consider funny what the average man considers to be funny. Thus they do not laugh at hostile humor (making people laugh by hurting someone) or superiority humor (laughing at some one else's inferiority or authority-rebellion humor (the unfunny, Oedipal, or smutty joke). Characteristically what they consider humor is more closely allied to philosophy than to anything else....... 149

14. **Creativeness**

This is a universal characteristic of all the people studied or observed. There is no exception. Each one shows in one way or another a special kind of creativeness or originality or inventiveness that has certain peculiar characteristics......... The creativeness of the self-actualized man seems...... to be kind to the naive and universal creativeness of unspoiled children. It seems to be more a fundamental characteristic of common human nature...... a potentiality given to all human beings at birth. Most human beings lose this as they become enculturated, but some few individuals seem either to retain this fresh and naive, direct way of looking at life, or if they have lost it, as most people do, they later in life recover it. Santayana called this the "second naivete," a very good name for it. 150
15. Resistance to Enculturation: the transcendence of any particular culture

Self-actualizing people are not well adjusted (in the naive sense of approval of and identification with the culture). They get along with the culture in various ways, but of all of them it may be said that in a certain profound and meaningful sense they resist enculturation and maintain a certain inner detachment from the culture in which they are immersed. 151

16. The Imperfections of Self-actualizing people

Our subjects shows many of the lesser human failings. They too are equipped with silly, wasteful, or thoughtless habits. They can be boring, stubborn, irritating. They are by no means free from a rather superficial vanity pride, partiality to their own productions, family, friends, and children. Temper outbursts are not rare.

Our subjects are occasionally capable of an extraordinary and unexpected ruthlessness. It must be remembered that they are very strong people. This makes it possible for them to display a surgical coldness when this is called for, beyond the power of the average man..............152

Finally, it has already been pointed out that these people are not free of guilt, anxiety, sadness, self-castigation, internal strike and conflict. The fact that these arise out of non-neurotic sources is of little consequence to most people today (even to most psychologists) who are therefore apt to think them unhealthy for this reason.

What this has taught me I think all of us had better learn. There are no perfect human beings I persons can be found who are good, very good indeed, in fact, great. There do in fact exist creators, seers, sages, saints shakers and movers. This can certainly give us hope for the future of the species even if they are common and do not come by the dozen. And yet these very same
people can at times be boring, irritating, petulant, selfish, angry, or depressed. To avoid disillusionment with human nature, we must first give up our illusions about it. 153

17. Values and Self-actualizination

A firm foundation for a value system is automatically furnished to the self-actualizer by his philosophic acceptance of the nature of his self of human nature, of much of social life, and of nature and physical reality. These acceptance values account for a high percentage of the total of his individual value judgements from day to day. What he approves of, disapproves of, is loyal to, opposes or proposes, what pleases him or displeases him can often be understood as surface derivations of this source trait of acceptance. 154

The topmost portion of the value system of the self-actualized person is entirely unique and idiosyncratic --- character -- structure expressive. This must be true by definition, for self-actualization is actualization of a self, and no two selves are altogether alike. There is only one Renoir, one Brahms, one Spinoza. Our subjects had very much in common, as we have seen and yet at the same time were more completely individualized, more unmistakably themselves, less easily confounded with others than any average control group could possibly be. That is to say, they are simultaneously very much alike and very much unlike each other. They are more completely individual than any group that has been described, and yet also more completely specialized, more identified with humanity than any other group yet described. They are closer to both their specieshood and to their unique individuality. 155
18. The Resolution of Dichotomies in Self-Actualization

At this point we may finally allow ourselves to generalize and underscore a very important theoretical conclusion derivable from the study of self-actualizing people. At several points in this chapter - and in other chapters as well - it was concluded that what had been considered in the past to be polarities or opposites or dichotomies were so only in less healthy people. In healthy people, these dichotomies were resolved, the polarities disappeared and many oppositions thought to be intrinsic merged and coalesced with each other to form unities.

For example the age-old opposition between heart and head, reason and instinct, or cognition and conation was seen to disappear in healthy people where they become synergic rather than antagonists, and where conflict between them disappears because they say the same thing and point to the same conclusion. In a word in these people, desires are in excellent accord with reason. St. Augustine's "Love god and do as you will" can easily be translated, be healthy and then you may trust your impulses.

The dichotomy between selfishness and unselfishness disappears altogether in healthy people because in principle every act is both selfish and unselfish. Our subjects are simultaneously very spiritual and very pagan and sensual even to the point where sexuality becomes a path to the spiritual and "religious". Duty cannot be contrasted with pleasure nor work with play when duty is pleasure, when work is play, and the person doing his duty and being virtuous is simultaneously seeking his pleasure and being happy. If the most socially identified people are themselves also the most, individualistic people, of what use is it to retain the polarity? If the most mature are also childlike? And if the most ethical and moral people are also the lustiest and most animal?
Similar findings have been reached for kindness - ruthlessness, concreteness - abstractness, acceptance - rebellion, self-society, adjustment - maladjustment, detachment from others - identification with others, serious - humorous, Dionysian - Apollonian introverted - extraverted, intense - casual serious frivolous, conventional - unconventional, mystic-realistic; active-passive, masculine-feminine, lust-love, and Eros-Agape.......

In this, as in other ways healthy people are so different from average ones, not only in degree but in kind as well, that they generate two very different kinds of psychology. It becomes more and more clear that the study of crippled, stunted, immature, and unhealthy specimens, can yield only a cripple philosophy. The study of self-actualizing people must be the basis for a more universal scene of psychology. 156

We can conclude that in his view of man, Maslow has given primary emphasis to the following dimensions: Man is self-actualizing, Man is self-affirming, man is holistic. An integrated whole, man is other-affirming. Man is unique.

As in the case of Bonner, Bugental and Fromm, Maslow also gives primary emphasis on the concept that man is a self-actualizing being. Simultaneously, however, he gives primary emphasis to the concepts of 'self-affirming' and 'other affirming'. It would appear that these three interrelated concepts can be brought under the one idea that man is synergic. In other words, man's nature is such that he values not only his own self-actualization but, simultaneously, he values the self-actualization, of the other person. Man's choices can then no longer be labelled as selfish or unselfish because the synergic person transcends this dichotomy and aids his fellow man to achieve a fuller realization of humane values at the same time as he does this for himself. Thus, though Maslow explicitly points to self-actualization as an instinctoid need

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of man's deeper/higher nature, he could be better understood as saying that man has an instinctoid need for synergic actualization.

A similar idea is expressed by Sir John Eccles. Sir John Eccles, neurophysiologist and dualist was occupied in his first series of Gifford lecturers in sketching "the scientific story of the way that led to us from the Big Bang". 157

If the Bang had been even a little smaller, or faster, the universe would not have lasted long enough for biological evolution to occur. If the mutual annihilation of electrons and positrons had not followed the chance course it did, or protons had not ended up outnumbering neutrons by six to one, the universe would have been unimaginably different, and unsuited to us. If the solar system and its third planet, had not had just the right composition, mass and temperature, life would not have evolved here. Sir John makes great play with the notion that it is our presence in the universe which 'explains' these contingencies, though it is not clear from the text whether he is accepting them as an argument for design, or as a hint that the universe has infinitely many variants, or had undergone infinitely many cycles in either of which latter cases it would not be surprising that we looked out upon a relatively suitable environment.

Turning to biological history, he contends that no observer could ever have predicted the emergence of life, of vertebrates, of human culture. Nothing that went before, and no properties of the elements, could determine or explain the result. Human cultural experience, and self-consciousness in particular, has to be regarded as of radically different kind from and apparently analogous structure in animal experience.

The possibility of Naturalism: A philosophical Critique of the contemporary Human Sciences by Roy Bhasker tries to attack positivism and
the way human beings are studied by objective methods. In this book although ostensibly concerned with the philosophy of the social sciences, the author examines numerous related issues and in particular attacks positivist doctrines in their various guises, while at the same time arguing for a transcendental realist theory of science applicable in both the natural and social spheres.

Anti-positivist themes dominate in a number of other places, especially in the discussion of reductionism and his claim that human action cannot be reduced to social neurological or chemical activity. He continually argues for the need to acknowledge individual minds and that any philosophy which, like behaviourism; tries to deny them is conceptually inadequate. Such antipositivist sentiments sometimes lead the author into excesses. He endeavours, for example, to distinguish society from nature by saying that the former is an open system while the latter is a closed one. This in, is his opinion, makes experimentation an unappropriate method in the social sciences.158

Rollo May's view of man has been obtained from his book, *man's search for himself*. Relevant passages from this have been quoted below to form a summarized version of his view. May first addresses himself to some of the problems that man experience.

It may sound surprising when I say, on the basis of my own clinical practice as well as that of my psychological and psychiatric colleagues, that the chief problem of people in the middle decade of the twentieth century is emptiness. By that I mean not only that many people do not know what they want; they often do not have any clear idea of what they feel.159

While one might laugh at the meaningless boredom of people a decade or two ago, the emptiness has for many now moved from the state of boredom to a state of futility and despair which holds promise or dangers.... the human
being cannot live in a condition of emptiness for very long: If he is not growing toward something, he does not merely stagnate: the pent-up potentialities turn into morbidity and despair, and eventually into destructive activities. 160

Another characteristic of modern people is loneliness. They describe this feelings as one of being "on the outside", isolated, or, if they are sophisticated, they say that they feel alienated. 161

Anxiety, the other characteristic of modern man, is even more basic than emptiness and loneliness. For being "hollow" and lonely would not bother us except peculiar psychological pain and turmoil called anxiety. 162 Anxiety may take all forms and intensities, for it is the human being's basic reaction to a danger to his existence or to some value he identifies with his existence. As soon as the threat becomes great enough to involve the total self, one then has the experience of anxiety. Anxiety strikes us at the very "core" of ourselves; it is what we feel when our existence as selves is threatened.

In its full-blown intensity, anxiety is the most painful emotion to which the human animal is heir. 163

Having said this, May goes on to elaborate on the two themes of his view of man.

(1) Man has consciousness (awareness) of himself, and he must use this

(2) Man also has other unique powers which too he must use to fulfill his own potentialities.

Thus, May notes:

around the age of two, more or less, there appears in the human being the most radical and important emergence so far in evolution, namely his consciousness of himself. He begins to be aware of himself as an "I". As the foetus in the womb, the infant has been part of the "original we" with its mother, and it continues as part of the psychological "we" in early infancy.
But now the little child—for the first time—becomes aware of his freedom. He experiences himself as an identity who is separated from his parents and can stand against them if need be. This remarkable emergence is the birth of the human animal into a person. 164

This consciousness of self, this capacity to see one's self as though from the outside, is the distinctive characteristic of man. 165

... Man's consciousness of himself is the source of his highest qualities.... 166 This capacity for consciousness of ourselves gives us the ability to see ourselves as others see us and to have empathy with others.... No matter how poorly we use or fail to use or even abuse these capacities, they are the rudiments of our ability to begin to love our neighbour, to have ethical sensitivity, to see truth, to create beauty, to devote ourselves to ideals, and to die for them if need be.

To fulfill these potentialities is to be a person. 167 Almost every adult is, in greater or lesser degree, still struggling on the long journey to achieve selfhood on the basis of the patterns which were set in his early experiences in the family. Nor do we for a moment overlook the fact that selfhood is always born and grows in interpersonal relationships. But no "ego" moves on into responsible selfhood if it remains chiefly the reflection of the social context around it. In our particular world in which conformity is the great destroyer of selfhood— in our society in which fitting the "pattern" tends to be accepted as the norm, and being "well liked" is the alleged ticket to salvation—what needs to be emphasized is not only the admitted fact that we are to some extent created by each other but also our capacity to experience, and create, ourselves. 168

What does it mean to experience one's self or a self? The experience of our own identity is the basic conviction that we all start with as psychological
beings. It can never be proven in a logical sense, for consciousness of one's self is the presupposition of any discussion about it.... 169

We do not need to prove the self as an "object". It is only necessary that we show how people have the capacity for self relatedness. The self is the organizing function within the individual and the function by means of which one human being can related to another. It is prior to, not an object of, our science; it is presupposed in the fact that one can be a scientist.

Human experience always goes beyond our particular, methods of understanding it at any given moment, and the best way to understand one's identity as a self is to look into one's own experience......... 170

The experience of one's own identity or becoming a person, is the simplest experience in life even though at the same time the most profound..... 171 Every organism has one and only one central need in life, to fulfill its own potentialities......... yet man does not grow automatically like a tree, but fulfills his potentialities only as he in his own consciousness plans and chooses. 172

Man, furthermore, must make his choices as an individual, for individuality is one side of one's consciousness of one's self. We can see this point clearly when we realize that consciousness of one's self is always an unique act -- I can never know exactly how you see yourself and you never can know exactly how I related to myself. This is the inner sanctum where each man must stand alone. This fact makes for much of the tragedy and inescapable isolation in human life, but it also indicates again that we must find the strength in ourselves to stand in our own inner sanctum as individuals. And this fact means that, since we are not automatically merged with our fellows, we must through our own affirmation learn to love each other. 173......... Consciousness of self actually expands our control of our lives
and with that expanded power comes the capacity to let ourselves go. This is
the Truth behind the seeming paradox, that the more consciousness for one's
self one has, the more spontaneous and creative one can be at the same
time. 174

- In the achieving of consciousness of one's self, most people must start
back at the beginning and rediscover their feelings.......... 175

Awareness of one's feelings lays the groundwork for the second step:
knowing what one wants .......... 176

The third step, along with rediscovering our feelings and wants, is to
recover our relation with the subconscious aspects of ourselves......... 177

The upshot of the chapter has been to show that the more self-
awareness a person has, the more alive he is; "The more consciousness",,
remarked kierkegaard, "the more self" Becoming a person means this
heightened awareness, this heightened experience of "I -ness", this experience
that it is I, the acting one, who is the subject of what is occurring. 178

May then describes some of man's other unique powers. A fundamental
characteristic of man is his freedom to choose. Thus, May writes :

Freedom is man's capacity to take a hand in his own development. It is
our capacity to mold ourselves. Freedom is the other side of consciousness of
self : if we were not able to be aware of ourselves, we would be pushed along
by instinct or the automatic march of history, like bees or mastodons.......... 179

consciousness of self gives us the power to stand outside the rigid chain of
stimulus and response, to pause and by this pause to throw some weight on
either side, to cast some decision about what the response will be.

That consciousness of self and freedom go together is shown in the fact
that the less self-awareness a person has, the more he is unfree. That is to
say, the more he is controlled by inhibitions, repressions, childhood.
Conditionings which he has consciously "forgotten" but which still drive him unconsciously, the more he is pushed by forces over which he has no control.179

As the person gains more consciousness of self, his range of choice and his freedom proportionately increase. Freedom is cumulative; one choice made with an element of freedom makes greater freedom possible for the next choice. Each exercise of freedom enlarges the circumference of the circle of one's self.

We do not mean to imply that there are not an infinite number of deterministic influences in any one's life...... But no matter how much one argues for the deterministic viewpoint, he still must grant that there is a margin in which the alive human being can be aware of what is determining him. And even if only in a very minute way to begin with, he can have some say in how he will react to the deterministic factors.

Freedom is thus show in how we relate to the deterministic realities of life....180

The arguments of "freedom versus determinism" are on a false basis, just as it is false to think of freedom as kind of isolated electric button called "free will". Freedom is shown in according one's life with realities - realities as simple as the needs for rest and food, or as ultimate as death. Meister Eckhart expressed this approach to freedom in one of this astute psychological counsels, "when you are thwarted, it is your own attitude that is out of order" Freedom is involved when we accept the realities not by blind necessity but by choice. This means that the acceptance of limitations need not at all be a "giving up", but can and should be a constructive act of freedom, and it may well be that such a choice will have more creative results for the person than if he had not had to struggle against any limitation whatever. The man who is
devoted to freedom does not waste time fighting reality; instead, as Kierkegaard remarked, he "extols reality".

................. Freedom is most dramatically illustrated in the "heroic" actions, like Socrates' decision to drink the hemlock rather than compromise; but even more significant is the undramatic, steady day-to-day exercise of freedom on the part of any person developing toward psychological and spiritual integration in a distraught society like our own.

Thus freedom is not just the matter of saying "yes" or "No" to a specific decision: it is the power to mold and create ourselves. Freedom is the capacity, to use Nietzsche's phrase, "to become what we truly are", 181

The essence of existentialism, of the Sartrian as well as other varieties is its belief in the capacity of the individual to care greatly about his freedom and inner integrity, enough to die or commit suicide for them if need be......

We agree with the fundamental Sartrian precept that the individual has no recourse from the necessity of making final decisions for himself, and that his existence as a person hangs or falls in these choices; and to make them in the last analysis in freedom and isolation may require literally as well as figuratively an agony of anxiety and inward struggle. But the fact that human beings can at times die for this freedom (both very strange things, quite contrary to any simple doctrine of self-preservation) implies some profound things about human nature and human existence........ 182

Freedom does not come automatically, it is achieved. And it is not gained at a single bound; it must be achieved each day..... The basic step in achieving inward freedom is "choosing oneself". This strange sounding phrase of Kierkegaard's means to affirm one's responsibility for one's self and one's existence. It is the attitude which is opposite to blind momentum or routine existence: it is an attitude of aliveness and decisiveness; it means that one
recognizes that he exists in his particular spot in the universe, and he accepts the responsibility for this existence. This is what Nietzsche meant by the "Will to live" --- not simply the instinct for self-preservation, but the will to accept the fact that one is one's self, and to accept the responsibility for fulfilling one's own destiny, which in turn implies accepting the fact that one must make his basic choices himself. 183

When one has consciously chosen to live, two other things happen. First, his responsibility for himself takes on a new meaning. He accepts responsibility for his own life not as something with which he has been saddled, a burden forced upon him: but as a something he has chosen himself. For this person, himself, now exists as a result of a decisions himself has made to be sure any thinking person realizes in theory that freedom and responsibility go together: If one is not free, one is an automation and there is obviously no such thing as responsibility and if one cannot be responsible for himself he can't be trusted with freedom. But when one has "Chosen himself this partnership of freedom and responsibility becomes more than a nice idea: he experiences it on his own pulse: in his choosing himself, he becomes aware that he has chosen personal freedom and responsibility for himself in the same breath.

The other thing which happens is that discipline from the outside is changed into self-discipline. He accepts not because it is commanded for who can command -- and someone who has been free to take his own life? -- but because he has chosen with greater freedom what he wants to do with his own life; and discipline is necessary for the sake of the values he wishes to achieve. This self-discipline can be given fancy names --- Nietzsche called it "Loving one's fate" and Spinoza spoke of obedience to the laws of life. But
whether bedecked by fancy terms or not, it is, I believe, a lesson everyone progressively learns in his struggle toward maturity. 184

The next characteristic that May mentions is man's conscience thus, he notes:

Man is the "ethical animal" - ethical in potentiality even if unfortunately, not in actuality. His capacity for ethical judgement - like freedom, reason and the other unique characteristics of the human beings - is based upon his consciousness of himself. 185

Man can "look before and after". He can transcend the immediate moment, can remember the past and plan for the future, and thus choose a good which is greater, but will not occur till some future moment in preference to a lesser, immediate one. By the same token he can feel himself into someone else's needs and desires, can imagine himself in the other's place, and so make his choices with a view to the good of his fellows as well as himself. This is the beginning of the capacity, however imperfect and rudimentary it may be in most people, to love thy neighbour and to be aware of the relation between their own acts and the welfare of the community.

The human being not only can make such choices of values and goals, but he is the animal who must do so if he is to attain integration. For the value the goal he moves toward - serves him as a psychological center, a kind of core of integration which draws together his powers as the core of a magnet draws the magnet's lines of force together. Knowing what one wants is essential for the beginnings of the child's and young persons capacity for self-direction. Knowing what one wants is simply the elemental form of what in the maturing person is the ability to choose one's own values. The mark of the mature man is that his living is integrated around self-chosen goals: he knows what he wants, no longer simply as the child wants ice-cream but as,
the grown person plans and works toward a creative love relationship or
toward business achievement or what not. He loves the members of his family
not because he has been thrown together with them by the accident of birth
but because he finds them lovable and chooses to love them, and he works not
merely from automatic routine but because he consciously believes in the value
of what he is doing. 186

Man is the ethical animal: but this achievement of ethical awareness is
not easy. He does not grow into ethical judgement as simply as the flower
grows toward the sun. Indeed like freedom and the other aspects of man's
consciousness of self, ethical awareness is gained only at the price of inner
conflict and anxiety. 187

Conscience is not a set of handed-down prohibitions to constrict the self,
to stifle its vitality and impulses. Nor conscience to be thought of as divorced
from tradition, as in the liberalistic period when it was implied that one decided
every act de novo. Conscience, rather, is one's capacity to tap one's own
deeper, levels of insight, ethical sensitivity and awareness, in which tradition
and immediate experience are not opposed to each other but interrelated. The
etymology of the term reveals this point. Composed of the two latin words
meaning "to know" (seire) and "with" (cum), conscience is very close to the
term consciousness.......

We wish thus to emphasize the positive aspects of conscience -
conscience as the individual's method of tapping wisdom and insight within
himself, conscience as an "opening up," a guide to enlarge experience. This
what Nietseche was referring to in his paean on the them "beyond good and
evil", and what Tillich means in his concept of the transmoral conscience. With
this view it will no longer be true that "Conscience cloth make cowards of us
all" Conscience, rather will be the taproot of courage. 188
May proceeds to discuss the quality of courage:

In any age courage is the simple virtue needed for human being to traverse the rocky road from infancy to maturity of personality. But in an age of anxiety, an age of herd morality and personal isolation, courage is a sin qua non.189

Courage is the capacity to meet the anxiety which arises as one achieves freedom. It is the willingness to differentiate, to move from the protecting realms of parental dependence to new levels of freedom and integration. The need for courage arises not only at those stages when breaks with parental protection are most obvious - such as at the birth of self-awareness, at going off to school, at adolescence, in crises of love, marriage and the facing of ultimate death - but at every step in between as one moves from the familiar surroundings over frontiers into the unfamiliar "Courage, in its final analysis" as the neurobiologist Dr. Kurt Goldstern well puts it, "is nothing but an affirmative answer to the shocks of existence which must be borne for the actualization of one's own nature"

The opposite to courage is not cowardice: that, rather is the lack of courage, To say a person is a coward has no more meaning than to say he is lazy: it simply tells us that some vital potentiality is unrealized or blocked. The opposite to encourage, as one endeavours to understand the problem in our particular age, is automation conformity.

The courage to be one's self is scarcely admired as the top virtue these days. 190

What we lack in our day is an understanding of the friendly, warm, personal, original, constructive courage of a socrates or a spinoza. We need to recover an understanding of the positive aspects of courage -- Courage as the inner side of growth, Courage as a constructive way of that becoming one's
self which is prior to the power to give one's self. Thus, when in this chapter we emphasize standing on one's own belief we do not at all imply living in a vacuum of separateness, actually courage is the basic of any creative relationship. 191

Courage is necessary in every step in a person's movement from the mass - symbolically the womb to becoming a person in his own right; it is at each step as though one suffers the pangs of his own birth. Courage whether the soldier's courage in risking death or the child's in going off to school, means the power to let go of the familiar and the secure. Courage is required not only in a person's occasional crucial decision for his own freedom, but in the little hour - to - hour decisions which place the bricks in the structure of his building of himself into a person who acts with freedom and responsibility. 192

It requires greater courage to preserve inner freedom to move on in one's inward journey into new realms, than to stand defiantly for outer freedom. It is often easier to play the martyr, as it is to be rash in battle. Strange as it sounds, steady, patient growth in freedom is probably the most difficult task of all, requiring the greatest courage. 193

May than moves on to appreciate man's ability to live in present, yet be able simultaneously to imagine the future and utilize the past. He notes:

The power to "look before and after" is part of man's ability to be conscious of himself. Plants and animals live by quantitative time: an hour, a week or a year past, and the tree has another ring on its trunks. But time is a quite different thing for human beings: man is the time surmounting mammal. In his works on semantics, Alfred Korzybski has insistently made the point that the characteristic which distinguishes man from all other living things is his time - binding capacity. By that, says Korzybski, "I mean the capacity to use the fruits of past labors and experiences as intellectual or spiritual capital for
developments in the present. I mean the capacity of human beings to conduct their lives in the ever-increasing light of unherited wisdom; I mean the capacity in virtue of which man is at once the heir of the by-gone ages and the trustee of posterity. 194

Psychologically and Spiritually, man does not live by clock alone. His time, rather depends on the significance of the event. Psychological time is not the sheer passage of time as such, but the meaning of the experience, that is, what is significant for the person's hopes, anxiety, growth. 195

The less alive a person is -- "alive" here defined as having conscious direction of his life -- the more is time for him the time of the clock. The more alive he is, the more he lives by qualitative time. 196

May concludes by mentioning that:

The first thing necessary for a constructive dealing with time is to learn to live in the reality of the present moment. For psychologically speaking, this present moment is all we have. 197

When a person looks directly into himself, all he is aware of is his instant of consciousness at that particular moment of the present.

It is this instant of consciousness which is most real, and must not be fled from. 198

It is by no means as easy as it may look to live in the immediate present. For it requires a high degree of awareness of one's self as an experiencing "I". The less one is conscious of himself as the one who acts, that is, the more unfree and automatic he is, the less he will be aware of the immediate, present.

But the more awareness one has that is, the more he experiences himself as the acting, directing agent in what he is doing -- the more alive he
will be and the more responsive to the present moment. Like self-awareness itself, this experiencing of the quality of the present can be cultivated... 199

The most effective way to ensure the value of the future, as we have mentioned, is to confront the present courageously and constructively... an essential characteristic of the creative act done in human consciousness is that it is not limited by quantitative time. No one values a painting according to how long it look to point it or how big it is: should we judge our actions by more superficial standards than a painting? 200

The present moment is thus not limited from one point on the clock to another. It is always "pregnant", always ready to open, to give birth. One has only to try the experiment of looking deeply within himself, let us say, trailing almost any random ideas, and he will find, so rich is a moment of consciousness in the human mind, that associations and new ideas beckon in every direction the moment always has its "finite" side, to use a philosophical term, which the mature person never forgets. But the moment also always has its infinite side, it always beckons with new possibilities. Time for the human being is not a corridor; it is a continual opening out. 201

In his view of man, May has given primary emphasis to the following dimensions: Man is conscious/aware, self-determining, risk-taking/courageous, ontologically responsible, socially responsible. Secondary emphasis has been given to the dimension: Man is present-confronting. The remaining dimensions received tertiary emphasis. May has given only tertiary emphases to the concept that man is self-actualizing. This would, however, be an erroneous interpretation of his view of man for he has specifically stated that: 

......... Every organism has one and only one central need in life, to fulfill its own potentialities......... 202

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May sees full self-actualization, in the sense of fully utilizing his potentialities, as the primary need-value-task of man. In his view of man, May has given primary emphasis to those powers of man which he must particularly use in order to effectively satisfy his one central need.

Like Bugental, May considers man's consciousness to be his most distinctive source of guidance for the choices that he must make to satisfy his hunger for self-actualization. In addition to this, however, he places an equal degree of emphasis on man's conscience—his feeling of responsibility for facilitating both his own and his fellow man's self-actualization. Finally he gives primary emphasis to the part that courage plays in shaping the manner in which man meets the anxieties of existence and fulfills his potentialities. Needless to say, the powers of consciousness, conscience and courage are, like all concepts concerned with man, deeply interrelated and interdependent. The use of any one of them fosters the use of the others, and simultaneously the growth and fulfillment of the person as a whole.

May talks of the ability of man to live in the present, imagine the future and utilize the past. A similar view is expressed by S.H. Vatsyayan in his book *A sense of time --- An exploration of time in theory, Experience and Art* in this book he takes up the question What is time? He further says that the interesting thing about that question is that we all know the answer to it till the question is put to us. Some readers will recall St. Augustine's confession of his dilemma; 'What, then is time? If no one asks me, I know; If I wish to explain to him who asks, I know not'.

He further says we cannot stop the flow; even more important we cannot alter the direction of its flow. The flow of time is uni-directional and irreversible. When one speaks on time one is reminded of Martin Heidegger. 'Time is the basic category of existence', wrote Heidegger, referring very
definitely to time as experienced by the individual. Time is 'the immediate datum consciousness,' said Bergson, focussing his attention also upon time as experienced, and going on from there to the experience of 'duration'.

But at the same time as these thinkers were concentrating upon the qualitative aspects of time, whether in itself or for the implications of that aspect for the human self, Science was developing the idea of quantitative units of physical time. Time in these two aspects seemed unrelated and discontinuous. This lack of relationship and discontinuity raised further problems of human identity; while man experiences time as flux or change he also experiences it in terms of the growth of the self. Experientially time and self are so ultimately related that the question 'What is man? immediately and inevitably converts itself into 'What is time'? A fragmentized or discontinuous view of the self and of personality any attempt to put, Humpty Dumpty together again translates itself into the effort to re-integrate time into a continuous whole or flow. But the study of time and the personality together reveals further quirks of the human psyche, for we have to reconcile the fact that 'the self grows in time' with the fact that the same self exhibits the capacity to arrest time, or to touch a static dimension of time utterly inconsistent with the notion of time as flow.

The experience of time as movement in the direction of death where do we put it in the scheme of things? Again to quote Heidegger, man alone of all the animals, being self-conscious, had fore knowledge of his own death -- or rather the inevitability of death. What may he do with this knowledge?

Kalo na Yato Vayameva Yatah -- Bhartrihari.

Never send to know for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee ---

--- John Donne.

Time devours our lives ..... Baudclaire.
The flower that has once blown forever dies ----

---- Fitzgerald (Omar Khayyam)

The course of my life is deathward set -------

--- D.H. Lawrence.

I am a sack puffed out with air, Tied at the mouth with ageing and promised to death ---- Ajneya.

I have picked out a few expressions at random, but the fact of this knowledge has been expressed in many ways in many different ages throughout the world. What may man do with the knowledge that he must die? Live in fear? Counter it with the hope of salvation a life beyond? These courses have been recommended and tried: but it should be obvious that they will only work in a faith --- centered system of thought. Not positing god or an after life. What may one do? Repress the knowledge, put it into the timeless order of the subconscious, and hope for that kind of liberation? But repression takes its own toll in terms of anxieties resort to drugs? that too has been tried, with results that are not better than the neuroses.

Are there positive responses possible? I might quote a few examples, again at random: 'Time is invention, or nothing at all'

-------- Bergson.

'What I value most is transitoriness .................

............... It is the very soul of existence.................

Transitoriness creates time ------- and time is the essence' -------- Thomas Mann.

Certainly these positive responses are somewhat exceptional and very rare, the more common one is that of the meaninglessness of time or the absurdity of existence, to be met with, at best by the courage of despair.
It goes without saying that a work of art also displays this quality of timelessness, not only in the sense in which Eliot referred to the timelessness of the Chinese for. 'moving perpetually in its stillness', or Keats to the timelessness of the Grecian Urn, but also in that art, as a 'way of life', can place us beyond the temporal perspective, of death. This need not be described pejoratively as 'aestheticism', nor denounced as an 'escapist', outlook; for what I am suggesting is only a detachment from the tyranny of time: an orientation towards these qualities of experience which seem to reverse or halt the consciousness of time's progress towards death.

I am simply a sack puffed out with air,
Tied at the mouth with ageing,
And promised to death:
And yet there's this other thing, this love,
That can set me free right in the middle of life.
This child of an instant can toss aside,
As if in play, Time's stunning hammer.

Time as experienced by man in modern technological society increasingly exhausts itself in quantitative units measurable here and now. Therefore there is an inner distance from the past which obliterates its form and divests it of meaning the past is not only behind us, it has slid into limbo; it is also psychologically dead. Not only in history but also in the personal history of the individual the past has died because links with it have worn down and broken.

Kenneth G. Denbigh in his book 'Three concepts of Time' deals with Time and consciousness. He makes a reference to the sense of thoughts and emotions as being one's own, as belonging to oneself. When he talks of the unity of consciousness he tackles the question what is this mysterious unity, this selfhood?
Popper (1974: 277) has suggested that one of the factors on which the unity depends is the having of an idea of time. It needs, he says, an almost explicit theory of time to look upon oneself as possessing a past, a present and a future; as having a personal history; and as being aware of one's personal identity (linked to the identity of one's body) throughout this history.

He further says that to be sure, other creatures as well as man have histories. Yet man is probably alone among the organisms in knowing this i.e. in knowing that he lives from birth to death. For lack of extensive memory and other mental powers, it seems likely that animals, though having perhaps a lively sense of spatial relationships, have little sense of temporality, but live rather as if from one moment to another. They are 'present-centered', to use a phrase of ornslein's (1975: 89). In the case of humans, on the other hand, each individual is aware of his own history and of his self-hood and is also aware of the history and selfhood of others. This is perhaps a necessary condition for cultural evolution. Man conceives himself as having obligations towards the histories of those who will succeed him, and this implies planning for the future -- even for that part of the future which will occur long after his own individual death.

R. Daine Harris in the article *CAN WE HAVE A COMMON HUMANITY?* says there is really only one human problem -- being human. Among all the animals, man is the only one that has a problem being what he is. He is the only one that has a problem realizing his own potential as an individual and developing his possibilities as a species. None of the other animals have a problem being what they are. Spiders have no problem being spiders. Cats have no problem being cats and earthworms have no problem being earthworms, even if they are plagued with having to make both lateral
and horizontal decisions about their next move forward. Only man has a problem being what he is. His problem is being human.

Although we do not know much about the inner life of earthworms and spiders we doubt if they, like man, are capable of having ideals and values. They just do what they have to do by natural instinct, and that is that. They do not consider whether or not they are measuring up to their potential in whatever they are doing. A spider just spins a web and it is the only web that it can spin. It does not have to worry about different designs and patterns or the tensile strength of the strands that support its web. It naturally does the best it can in any given situation. But this is not the case for us. Rarely do we ever do what we are actually capable of doing. In response to a challenge we decide the degree to which we are to exert energies to that challenge and also the degree to which we are going to live up to our own ideals and values in reference to the situation at hand. We are the only species with capacity to accept or reject values, and thus the only capable of sinning.

In the Article 'The Archaeology of the Human Sciences' it is said that the threshold of our modernity is situated not only by the attempt to apply objective methods to the study of man, but rather by the constitution of an empirico -- transcendental doublet which was called man (OT 319).

It further says that man can never get behind his language to frame an objective account of how it began or how it works. Yet he uses language, so he must in some sense already understand it. He takes up and employs his mother tongue "without knowing it, and yet it must be known, in a certain way, since it is by this means that men enter into communication and finds themselves in the already constructed network of comprehension" (OT 331).

Generalizing from this idea that language cannot be known objectively precisely because it is always already a kind of know -- how, the analytic of
finitude attempts to reappropriate the whole of history by showing that man always already has a history precisely in so far as his social practices enable him to organize all events, including events in his own culture historically. And more generally still, it turns out that man’s very ability to understand himself and objects, by making projects on the basis of what is given, has a three-fold structure which corresponds to the past, present, and future. Thus man’s know-how opens up a temporal field in which time and history become possible. "It is in him that things (those same things that hang over him) find their beginning: rather than cut made at some given moment in duration, he is the opening from which time in general can be reconstituted, duration can flow, and things at the appropriate moments can make their appearance" (OT 332).

In Being and Time, which is the culminating example of this strategy, Heidegger argues in detail that the origin or source of temporality can only be understood by understanding the structure of authentic dasein. (Dasein is roughly equivalent to human being).

As one would expect, given the logic of the analytic of finitude, Heidegger is finally forced to the conclusion that man is condemned to the fruitless project of attempting to get clear about the origin, which in this case amounts to trying to name being and thus drag the clearing into the open. Indeed, early Heidegger comes to hold that this ontological error is definitive of man, "Man errs. Man does not merely stray into errancy. He is always astray in errancy" (BW 135). The inevitable forgetting of the inevitable hiddenness of being, correlative with the attempt to get clear about man's finitude, leads, according to Heidegger, to man essentially wondering in distress. "Dasein is a turning in need" (BW 137).

According to Heidegger to understand his own meaning man must grasp his origin, and yet it necessarily escapes him.
In this paper entitled "A Twentieth century Image of Man" Bronowski has a natural scientists view of man. He further says that the realization that scientific knowledge must of necessity have a personal component came first in physics; and although physics is not central in his theme, he ought to glance at it. When Quantum physics first made the headlines, early in this century what was stressed was the breach that the new work opened in the classical doctrine of determinism; its expositors liked to suggest that through this loop-hole free will might slip into the scientific universe. But that vague speculation, even if it means anything (Which I doubt), is beside the point. Werner Heisenberg in 1927 put his finger on the intellectual point in quantum mechanics. The principle that no description of an event, however minute, can be complete. Our knowledge of the real world is verifiable, yes and we can exchange information about what we see in the world, but only with a finite tolerance. There is an unsurmountable limit to the precision with which we can formulate experience and make it public.

In a deep sense, this had already been said by Albert Einstein when he announced the principle of relativity in 1905 he further says that he does not want to labor a concepts in physics, except to underline its human significance. Einstein showed that the laws of physics are universal, that is, are formulated in the same terms by every observer --- but only because he carries his own universe with him. Time as you measure it may be different from my time, mass as you measure it may be different from my mass, speed and momentum and energy may all be different it is only the relations between them that remain the same for us both. Each of us rides his personal universe, his own travelling box of time and space, and all that they have in common is the same structure or coherence; when we formalize our experiences, they yield the same laws.
These principles express a far-reaching revision in the idea of knowledge. They shift the emphasis away from the impersonal record, and they put in its place a relation from which the human observer cannot be abstracted. The scrutiny of experience is no longer idealized as an activity that could be carried out by a machine. There is no reality, there are no laws, that can be separated from the process of their discovery; the human condition is also the necessary condition for the recognition of order in the world.

The place of man in the world has become a subject of driving scientific interest for another reason. As the century has gone forward, the preoccupation of science has been moving from physics to biology. The watershed came after 1945, when many young scientists turned away from their war work and seized the chance to enter a new and different kind of field. About this time, it was found that the basic carrier of heredity in all animals is not (as had been supposed) a complex protein, but a fairly simple nucleic acid. When the geometrical structure of the acid was unravelled by Francis Crick and James Watson shortly after, in 1953, biology came of age as an intellectual discipline; and it has attracted the best minds ever since.

We naturally study first the machinery of life that is shared by all species: for example, we have learned much in the last twenty years about the cellular biology of man by studying some bacteria. But it is also important and revealing to ask what is his biological equipment has made man take a different path from the other animals has made him, for example, adapt his environments to himself instead of the other way about. Man is the newcomer in biological evolution his first recognizable fossil ancestor (found by Raymond Dart in Africa in 1924) is not much more than two million years old. How have we come so far in so short a time? Questions like this have transformed the image of man in the twentieth century. It has become clear
that man is unique in being predominantly a cultural animal. Even his biological evolution has been culture driven by which I mean that evolution has taken the direction to homo-sapiens as a result of the elaboration of a cultural skill that his early ancestors discovered, namely the manual dexterity to make stone tools and the mental foresight and imagery to store them for use in the future. The enlargement of the brain, the development of speech, the march over the whole globe, the use of fire and the planning first of hunting, and then of agriculture, all flow from that beginning. More recently man has been able to make cultural evolution take the place of biological evolution altogether --- since the end of the last Ice Age, roughhly ten thousand years ago.

A central component in this progress, this ascent of man, has been the manipulation of mental imagery and its expression in language. There is a biological locus for that in and around the speech areas in the brain, which are unique to man; and the projection into the future which they serve is localized in another adjacent part of the human brain, his great frontal lobes. These structures testify that homo sapiens is rightly distinguished as a planning animal, and that his plans depend on a rational analysis of the world of the kind that is formalized in his languages including the languages of mathematics and science. In this sense, man is unique because he prepares for his actions by seeking knowledge, and is able to separate that from the other responses which his environment evokes.

He comes to rest on these two concepts: planning and knowledge. He further says since we now understand that human knowledge is necessarily incomplete, it follows that our plans are not simply calculations. A calculation is, as it were, a tactical plan, to solve an immediate and finite problem of action. But the large problems of conduct which shape our lives are not immediate and finite; and for them we have to devise much more general plans,
namely the grand strategies, that we call values. This how we derive and this is what we mean by such values as justice, loyalty, devotion, respect, dignity, affection, and integrity. Values are the strategies by which we guide our conduct in the face of the insoluble problems of human relations, and walk the knife-edge between our solitary desires and our social needs. Thus values are now seen to be as integral a part of human nature, the biological nature of man, as is a large brain or our inability to oxidize uric acid in our cells.

There is a familiar argument in philosophy, usually ascribed to G.E. Moore, which asserts that values cannot be derived from knowledge: to argue from "what is" to "how we ought to behave" is stigmatized as a naturalistic fallacy. What I have constructed in this twentieth century image of man is a different and lesser argument, namely that we now understand that the elaboration of values is as characteristic a human activity as is the search for knowledge. But we can take the argument further, and show that it is a philosophical error and a misreading of the nature of reality to suppose that values are independent of knowledge. The fact, the scientific fact is that knowledge does not exist until we search for it, and the phrase "what is" has no meaning for us until we take pains to discover it. We learn to know, we learn what is, only by behaving in a certain way: and how we ought to behave is therefore prescribed in fundamental way by our search to know what is. Human beings create their values, they form an ethic because they direct their aspirations towards the command of nature not by the means which other animals use, but by the road of knowledge. And that road is a biological necessity for us, it is our world line, which characterizes our nature as human nature. The image of man has become clear and exhilarating in the twentieth century and I will describe it in a picture that I have drawn once before.
Like the other primates, man is noisy, inquisitive, cooperative, intelligent, skillful, thoughtful, and as busy with himself as with his environment. These features are not common in the rest of the animal world, singly or in combination.

He (Bronowski) emphasizes that man, the predominantly culturally evolved animal, is distinguished by his planning and knowledge-seeking nature. Through his ability to plan man has, over the past few million years, incorporated values like affection, respect, justice, etc. into his biological nature as surely as he has created for himself a large brain.

There is a serious gap in the knowledge of the learned about the working of the nervous system and the brain. They have no clear idea yet about the relationship between the nervous system of the brain and the processes of thought, nor about the energy that fuels the former. It is surprising that, with such a void in our knowledge, relating to consciousness, any open-minded student can be rigid in his views and dogmatic in his beliefs as is the case without a few psychologists and biologists of our day.

Confident of their own erudition but, at the same time, oblivious to the lacunae in their knowledge, they reject and ridicule certain statements, not because they are wiser, but because they are not able to see the error in their own thinking, based on a study of which the bottom is missing. The author in the book "The wonder of the Brain" says when he does not even know the most rudimentary facts about thought, namely how it is generated and in the process of thinking, what energy do we consume? That the brain is nourished by blood and sugar in the blood does not explain the position. If thought has no substance, no material composition and is only an incorporeal, etheric stuff, a living vacuum or thinking, emptiness, it cannot be nourished by blood. For that would involve transformation of matter into 'nothingness' - a predicament.
for science. If it has substance, however subtle that might be, it must have an energy system of its own to generate replenish and renew it. Where is that?

It is obvious that the materialists on the one hand and the idealists on the other, the skeptics on this side and the believers on that, the evolutionists and the creationists and all other mutually contending schools of thought on this subject are wrangling over an issue which, at the base, is paradoxical. No one of the contestants knows, with certitude, what he is talking about. What is the nature of the entity which forms the ground for the debate, what is its relationship to the brain and its position in the universe? Both sides deploy vast arrays of proofs, arguments and authorities—all hypothetical for no one knows positively anything basic about the chief actor involved, namely the mind, save that it exists.

One side takes it for granted that the world we see around is an objective reality, and that the human mind is an accurately reflecting mirror which presents its true image before us. Everyone believes that from whatever part of the earth we look the Universe, the picture would be the same. Even the latest concept of physics about the underterminate nature of matter, at its ultra microscopic levels, do not change the position that our mind is an accurate, unalterable and undoubtable instrument to observe, assess and measure that which it perceives. All our present-day knowledge of science and philosophy is based on this assumption. All our ideas and beliefs and grounded on this supposition. Even our concepts of soul, God and the hereafter are the harvest of our faith in the integrity of our mind and the credibility of the intellect. To cast doubt on the reliability of the mind is to loose faith in the accuracy of our own observations and to create anarchy in every branch of human thought.
Time after time, the special class of men and women, known as mystics, visionaries and sages tried to convince the crowds of a new form of perception attained by them, in which the objective universe loses its corporeality and multiplicity to fuse into one indescribable and incomprehensible unity, that bears no resemblance to the objective realities perceived before. As is natural, under the firm convention that the normal human mind is the only accurate and standard instrument of cognition available to us, the experiences of this exclusive class are treated either as purely visionary excursions into the subliminal areas of consciousness of encounters with God or a cosmic intelligence or even as delusion or, as Bertrand Russell puts it, not rational and real, but only emotional, subjective experiences.

He further says that the present world is woefully deficient in the knowledge of the brain and that the learned, in dealing with mind or the origin and nature of the universe usually leave the encephalon out of count, as if human intelligence exists incorporeally and independently, and does not depend for its manifestation, quality and performance on the activity of an organic instrument, beyond our scrutiny at present. The result is that much of our knowledge, at the moment, is unilateral and speculative, nescient of the nature of the 'Knower' itself. An intelligent species with a brain that shows an altered perception of time, an easy possibility, would frame an entirely different picture of the universe.

In his article Zero state of mind in thinking Tsung I Dow says that the advancement of computer technology and information has been more revealing about the essence of mind than the world could ever have imagined. Yet what it really discovered is the mystical power of mind which is far beyond our comprehension. Researches on artificial intelligence have found that in the mind different functions are performed by different parts of the brain linked by
an illogical network of connections. Scientists have been unable to endow the computer with any of the very simple human thinking skills. The brain is like a vast electrical network at one level. But at its most microscopic level it is not connected or arranged like any known man made network. A precise point to point wiring cannot occur. If we attempt to identify, Gerald M. Edelman noted, a particular neuron, which input comes from which, no one can find out.

What brain mechanisms actually produces synaptic change is an unsolved mystery. Many researchers feel that we have two different representational systems, a language system that is thinking in words and a pictorial system that is thinking in pictures. We are trying to think of complicated matters and idealize them away. But the mechanism of thought itself is limited. Not all idealizations are correct. A computer model depicting the brain's microstructure is far from certain.

Except for what the mind does, science provides no convincing answer to the question: What is the mind? Even the problem of whether the mind can be the subject of analysis remains to disturb the thinking mind. To think of thinking itself is a problem.

The author of the book "the wonder of the brain" says that the aim of his writing a book like this (i.e. the wonder of the Brain) is to draw attention to this serious lacunae which keeps us in ignorance about our own selves. The position that he has taken up is that the human mind, as we know it at present, is not a constant, unalterable entity. It can change and with it the whole picture of the universe, which we perceive with our senses. He further says that this is a bold statement to make, and is not likely to be accepted for the simple reason that it undermines the very foundations on which science is built, namely the reality of objective world and the validity of the empirical observation conducted by the mind.

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The issue boils down to this: If it is admitted that the human mind is variable and that this variation can affect the very image of the universe, and all the phenomena observed, it would clearly imply that the cosmos is not, in reality, as we perceive, assess and measure it with our intelligence, but only a creation of our mind liable to change in other dimensions of the preceptive faculty. From this it would follow that the temporal knowledge gathered by us is relative also and that what is accumulated in one dimension of consciousness can prove incomplete, deceptive or erroneous in the other.

"Our conception of the structure of the Universe," says William de Sitter, "bears all the marks of a transitory structure. Our theories are decidedly in a state of continuous, and just now, very rapid evolution. It is not possible to predict how long our present views and interpretations will remain unaltered and how soon they will have to be replaced by perhaps very different ones, based on new observational data, and new critical insight in their connection with other data. Where from is this new critical insight to come except from a more evolved mind and brain?

An affirmation of the same position comes from no less than an authority than Max Planck. He says: "How do we discover the individual laws of Physics, and what is their nature? It should be remarked, to begin with, that we have no right to assume that any physical laws exist, or if they have existed up to now, that they will continue to exist in similar manner in the future. It is perfectly conceivable that one fine day Nature should cause an unexpected event to occur which would baffle us all; and if this were to happen we would be powerless to make any objection, even if the result would be that, inspite of our endeavour, we should fail to introduce order into the resulting confusion. In such an event, the only course open to science would be to declare itself bankrupt. For this reason science is compelled to being by
the general assumption by the general rule of law dominates throughout Nature". 212

Once the position is accepted, the conclusion becomes unavoidable that all the contexts of our day-to-day experience of the world the events which befall and the sights we see, the good and evil, noble and base, beautiful and ugly we meet, or the ideas of God, soul and the hereafter we entertain, all emerge from the unfathomable depths of our consciousness. This means that all we come across during the pilgrimage of life is not an objective reality, but a stupendous, realistic drama, presented by our own mind, and another enigmatic stuff, we call material energy the latter is becoming more and more of a paradox and the more we try to reach its bottom the more paradoxical and unpredictable it becomes. For all we know, it might be a twin brother of our mind, both off-shoots of the same tree or a projected image of mind itself. The corollary that follows this view of creation; forced on us by the latest concepts in physics, is that since our brain is the junction-point, where this incredible exchange between the mind and his brother takes place, it is to the brain that we must look for a solution of the mystery.

The matter does not end there. What should now become obvious, beyond doubt, is the fact that when contemplating a grand spectacle of nature, during the day, or the shimmering firmament at night, the sense of admiration, awe or wonder felt does not come from the magnificence, loveliness or the vast extent of these external objects, in inherent or dwelling in them, but from the grandeur, beauty and the immensity residing in our own consciousness. In other words, it is we who lend grandiosity, charm and vastness to an object, also horror, cheerfulness, humour or sadness to what appears to us as a dreadful merry, ludicrous or tragic scene. What the world will look like to a
mind, dead to emotions and bereft of the sense of beauty and colour. It is
difficult to imagine.

This still does not complete the picture. The other conclusions that
follows is that all the over four billion human creatures on the earth the multi-
millionaire and the pauper, the kind and the beggar, the strongman and the
cripple, the philanthropist and the thief, the beauty -queen and the leper, as
long as they live, share the same incredible, wonder in their interior, as they
share the sun, the moon, the stars, the air and water, the precious bounties of
nature that make life possible on earth.

It is a staggering position. But there is nothing incongruous in what I say.
The scriptures of all the current faiths point to the same conclusion. Since the
soul is held to be immortal, incorporeal and divine, it must always stay
immaculate, above the corporeality and the blemishes of the mortal frame. It
would be blasphemous to say that there can be a sightless, lecherous, leprous
or penniless soul. It is because of an impure frame of mind which attaches,
more importance to the externals of religion than to its beatific interior that we
are denied exce to the glory that dwells in all of us, irrespective of our station
in life.

The main task of religion is to bring awareness of the divinity within to
every human being. In this unique treasure of heaven no one is richer,
stronger, superior or better than the other. This divine splendour all share
alike, irrespective of their position, wealth, learning, intelligence, strength or
looks. Like the brilliant orb of the day, it shines alike on the rich and the poor,
the wise and the fool. The glaring differences and discrepancies, elegance and
squalor, virtue and vice or excess and want we see around, belong to the
stage and the dress of clay and not to the devine actor, ever undefiled, like a
dancing beam of light. The aim of human life is to explore this "wonder" in every one of us whose pleasure ground is the universe.

This is the Message which for the last over three thousand years the exalted class of true mystics has brought to the world. This is the Message which juvenile science, at first cared not to heed like an impetuous youngster refusing to listen to his more seasoned elders, ultimately in his declining age to regret the rebellious thoughts of his early years. There are myraids who, in their closing days, review with sorrow their reckless youth. Were there no surprises and no innovations in the province of thought in store for the human wit in the ages to come, we should die of boredom in a few centuries. It is change that keeps her alive. The pendulum is now swinging in the other direction to usher in a new era of thought in which the spirit and not matter, the mystic and not the skeptic will dominate.

An indication of this change is provided by the thoughts expressed by many eminent scientists of recent times. This is a sample of one of them: "Yet I repeat once more," declares William James, "the existence of mystical states absolutely overthrows the pretention of non-mystical states to be the sole and ultimate dictators of what we may believe. As a rule, mystical states merely add a super-sensious meaning to the ordinary outward data of consciousness. They are excitements, like the emotions of love or ambition, gifts to our spirits by means of which facts, already objectively before us, fall into a new expressiveness and make a new connection with our active life. They do not contradict these facts as such, or deny anything that our senses have immediately seized. It is the rationalistic critic rather who plays the past of denier in the controversy, and his denials have no strength, for there can never be a state of facts to which new meaning may not truthfully be added, provided the mind ascends to a more enveloping point of view. It must always
remain a open question whether mystical states may not possibly be such superior points of view, window through which the mind looks out upon a more extensive and inclusive world. 213

The present day concepts of physics no longer contradict the experience of the mystic but, on the other hand, find it more consistent with the new insights into the nature of the physical world. This view has been expressed by many among the leading physicists of our time. "A rainbow described in the symbolism of physics", Writes Eddington, "is a band of are thereal vibrations arranged in systemic order to wave-length from .00004 centimeters to .000072 centimeters. From one point of view, we are pattering with the truth whenever we admire the gorgeous bow of colour, and should strive to reduce our minds to such a state that we received the same impression from the rainbow as from a table of wave lengths. But although that is how the rainbow impresses itself on an impersonal spectroscope, we are not giving the whole truth and significance of experience the starting point of the problem if we supress the factors wherein we ourselves differ from the spectroscope. We cannot say that the rainbow, as part of the world, was meant to convey the vivid effects of color; but we can perhaps say that the human mind, as part of the world, was meant to perceive it that way." 214

Another eminent physicist James Jeans writes "In more recent times, Bertrand Russell has expressed what is essentially the same arguement in the words. 'So long as we adhere to the conventional notions of mind and matter we are condemned to a view of perception which is miraculous. We suppose that a physical process starts from a visible object, travels to the eye, there changes into another physical process, causes yet another physical process in the optic nerve, and finally produces some effect in the brain, simultaneously with which we see the object from which the process started, the seeing being
something "mental", totally different in character from the physical processes which precede and accompany it. This view is so queer that metaphysicians have invented all sorts of theories designed to substitute something less incredible..........................

"Everything that we can directly deserve of the physical world happens inside our heads, and consists of mental events which form part of the physical world. The development of this point of view will lead us to conclusion that the distinction between mind and matter is illusory. The stuff of the world may be called physical or mental or both or neither as we please; in fact the words serve no purpose. 215

"Even if the two entities which we have hitherto described", continues Jeans, "as mind and matter are of the same general nature, there remains the question as to which is the more fundamental of the two. Is mind only a by-product of matter, as the materialists claimed? Or is it, as Berkeley claimed, the creator and controller of matter?

"Before the latter alternative can be seriously considered, some answer must be found to the problem of how objects can continue to exist when they are not being perceived in any human mind. There must, as Berkeley says, be 'some other mind in which they exist.' Some will wish to describe this, with Berkeley, as the mind of God; others with Hegel as a universal or Absolute mind in which all our individuals minds are compressed. The new quantum mechanics may perhaps give a hint, although nothing more than a hint, as to how this can be". 216

"It seems, at least, conceivable," Jeans adds, "that what is true of perceived objects may also be true of perceiving minds; just as there are wave-pictures for light and electricity, so there may be a corresponding picture for consciousness. When we view ourselves in space and time, our consciousness
is obviously the separate individuals of a particle -- picture but when we pass beyond space and time, they may perhaps form ingredients of a single continuous stream of life. As it is with light and electricity, so it may be with life; the phenomena may be individuals carrying on separate existences in space and time, while in the deeper reality beyond space and time we may all be members of one body. In brief, modern physics is not altogether antagonistic to an objective idealism like that of Hegel”. 217

In this book the author says, I know it will be hard for me to make myself understood, as I tread on unmapped territory in the effort to bring into focus in the province of religion and science both, a vital element that has been ignored so far, namely, the centre of life in the body, that is the brain. Since the organ is indispensible for all our activity and even existence in the human form, it is inconceivable that our consciousness can take a leap beyond its normal periphery without affecting its substance in any way. There is no historical precedent of a higher animal, say a horse ever attaining the mental stature of a human being, a co-mingling with other humans on a basis of equality. How can it then be possible for a human being to consort with gods without some kind of change in the brain? Those who long for self-awareness, clairvoyant gifts, miraculous power, communication with the spirit will, encounters with masters, or adventures in the occult realm would do well to give second thoughts to their cherished dream. The world did not produce another Christ or Buddha, Vyasa or Socrates, Plato or Mohammed, Rumi or Shankaracharya, Francis of Assisi or any other great mystic or master of the occult, because the mystery of the part played by the brain in these accomplishments remains unsolved so far. The aim of this writing is to make this hidden knowledge accessible to humanity.
In his paper 'Do Animals Feel Pain' Peter Harrison suggests that the issue of animal pain is not so easily dispensed with as the evidence brought forward to demonstrate that animals feel pain is far from conclusive.

Three kinds of arguments are commonly advanced to support the contention that animals feel pain. The first involves the claim that animal behaviours give us clues to alleged mental states, about what animals are feeling. Thus animals confronted with noxious stimuli which would cause human beings pain, react in similar ways. They attempt to avoid the stimulus. They show facial contortions, they may even cry out. From these "pain behaviours" it is inferred that the animals must be experiencing pain.

A second argument asserts that by virtue of a similarity in structure and function of nervous systems it is likely that human beings closely related to the human species will experience the external environment in much the same way. It is assumed, for example, that primates have visual experiences similar to our own, feel hunger and thirst as we do, and so on. Presumably when they encounter noxious stimuli, they, like us, feel pain.

A third line of argument is derived from evolutionary theory. Organic evolution implies that there is no radical discontinuity between human and other species. It is likely, on this view, that human minds evolved from animal minds, and that closely related species would experience similar mental events. The evolutionary model would also suggest that pain is an essential adaptation for organisms in that it helps them avoid those things which would reduce their chances of survival and reproduction.

An even more compelling illustration of the generation of certain mental states in the absence of appropriate structure comes from John Lober's engaging paper 'Is your Brain Really Necessary?' Paediatric neurologist Lober reports on a number of individuals with hydrocephalus, a condition
which resulted in their having virtually no cerebral cortex. The most intriguing case cited by Lorber is that of a mathematician with IQ of 126. A brain scan revealed that this, young man had, in Lober's words, 'Virtually no brain'. The supratentorial part of the intracranial cavity contained only a thin layer of brain tissue, between one and two millimeters thick, attached to the skull wall. No 'visual cortex' was evident, yet the individual, who by all accounts should have been blind, had above average visual perceptions. It is likely that the functions which would normally have taken place in the missing cerebral cortex had been taken over by other structures. Cases such as this show that certain aspects of human consciousness have a tenacity which confounds our understanding of the link between brain structure and consciousness.

Lobar's discoveries are a striking example of the fact that an advancing neuroscience, far from establishing concepts links between brain states and mental states, is actually deepening the mystery of how the brain is causally related to human consciousness. It need hardly be said that when we cross the species boundary and attempt to make projections about animals' putative mental lives based on the structures of their nervous system. We are in murky waters indeed. Two further examples illustrate this.

The brains of birds, such as they are, do not contain a 'visual' cortex. Thus if we are to argue that similar brain structures give rise to similar experiences, then it is unlikely that the visual experiences of birds will be qualitatively similar to our own. On the other hand, the behaviour of birds would seem to indicate that they can 'see'. While we assume from the behaviour of birds that their visual experience of the world is much the same as ours. If we are committed to the view that like mental states are generated by like brain structures, we are bound to admit that the assumption is unfounded. We might of course be tempted to revert to the first argument -- that
behaviour, not structure, give the correct cues to mental states. But this seems to commit us to the view that computers, flies, and amoeba have states of consciousness like our own.

Another illustration which concerns visual experiences is the much discussed phenomenon of 'blind sight'. As we have already mentioned, the visual or striate cortex is thought to be necessary for human vision. Individuals suffering from damage to the striate cortex may lose sight in part of their visual field. Larry Weisenkranz and his colleagues have carried out a number of experiments on one such individual who claimed to be blind in his left field of view. Simple shapes were presented to the subject in his blind field of view. Though he denied being able to see anything, the subject could, with reasonable consistency, describe the shape of the object and point to it. In each instance he insisted that his correct response was merely a guess. Examples of blindsight indicate, amongst other things, that it is possible to have visual experiences of which we are unaware. The blind sight phenomenon thus open up the possibility that there might be non-conscious experiences to which we can nonetheless respond with the appropriate behaviour. Blindsight individuals can learn to respond as if they see, even though they have no conscious awareness of seeing something. The significance of this for a discussion of animal behaviours is that animals might respond to stimuli as if they were conscious of them, while in fact they are not. Thus birds which lack the human apparatus of conscious vision (as do blind sighted subjects) might not simply have qualitatively different visual experiences as suggested above, they might not have conscious visual experiences at all. It may be concluded that an animal's experience of stimuli which we would find painful might be qualitatively different (that is, not painful) or may even be nonconscious. Animals might react to such stimuli by
exhibiting 'pain behaviour' and yet not have that mental experience which we call 'pain', or perhaps not have any conscious experience at all. 223

So far our discussion of neural circuitry and how it relates to putative mental states has focused upon the inability of contemporary neuroscience to bridge the gap between brain and mind. There are those, of course, who have asserted that it is impossible in principle to bridge that gap. It is significant that Thomas Nagel, one of the chief spokesmen for this group, has alluded to animal consciousness to make his point.

In the seminal paper 'what is it like to be a Bat?' 224 Nagel leads us into the subjective world of the bat. These curious mammals, he reminds us, perceive the external world using a kind of sonar. By emitting high -- pitched squeals and detecting the reflections, they are able to create an accurate enough image of their environment to enable them to ensure small flying insects, while they themselves are airbone. Nagel points out that we might observe and describe in detail the neurophysiology which makes all this possible, but that it is unlikely that any amount to such observation would ever give us an insight into the bat's subjective experience of the world -- into what it is like to be a bat. As Nagel himself puts it :

For if the facts of experience -- facts about what it is like for the experiencing organism -- are available only from one point of view, then it is a mystery how the true character of experience could be revealed in the physical operation of that organism. 225

Nagel thus asserts that the construction of subjective experiences from the observation of brain states is in principle impossible. 226

For our present purposes it is not necessary to enter into the argument about whether mind states are reducible to brain states. Suffice it to say that there is sufficient confusion about how brain structure and function relate to
mental states to rule out any simple assertion that animal nervous systems which resemble our own will give rise to mental states like ours.

It seems then, that pain, a mental state, can be neither perceived nor inferred by directing the senses on to behaviours or on to the brain itself. But what of the third argument for animal pain --- that based on evolutionary theory?

Evolutionary theory provides the most convincing case for animal pain. Because evolution stresses continuities in the biological sphere, it breaks down the distinction between human and animal. Thus any special claims made on behalf of the human race -- that they alone experience pain, for example -- require justification. Before examining how, in evolutionary terms, we might justify treating Homo sapiens as a unique case, we ought to consider first how animal pain might conceivably fit into the evolutionary scheme of things.

Natural selection 'designs' animals to survive and reproduce. An important sort of adaption for organisms to acquire would be the ability to avoid aspects of the environment which would reduce their chances of survival and reproduction. Pain, we might suppose play this adaptive role by compelling organisms to avoid situations in their world which might harm them. This view of the matter receives some measure of support from cases of individuals born with a congenital insensitivity to pain. Such unfortunate people frequently injure themselves quite severely in their early childhood, and must be taught how to avoid inflicting damage upon themselves. That such a condition can lead eventually to permanent disability or death would suggest that pain has considerable adaptive value for human beings at least.227 Animals which are similarly insensitive to damaging stimuli, we might reasonably infer, would have little chance of survival. Yet there are difficulties with this interpretation.
Strictly, it is not pain (real or imputed) which is the adaptation, but the behaviour which is elicited when the damaging stimulus is applied. Those who are insensitive to pain are not disadvantaged by the absence of unpleasant mental states, but by a lack of those behavioural responses which in others are prompted by pain. We tend to lose sight of the primacy of behaviour because we get caught up in the connotations of 'expression'. That is to say we consider some animal behaviours to be expressions of a particular mental state. Even Darwin, who should have known better, was guilty of this infelicity when he spoke of the 'expression of the emotions in man and animals'. Such locutions are misleading because they suggest certain aspects of animal behaviour are arbitrary outward signs which signify some conscious state. But the simplest application of the theory of natural selection would only allow that such behaviours as violent struggling, grimacing and crying out, serve some more direct purpose in enhancing an animal's chances of survival and reproduction (Darwin admittedly stressed the communicative aspects, of these signs). To exploit another example which I have drawn upon in an another context a wildebeest which is being torn apart by dogs will die in silence, while a chimpanzee, will screech out in response to some trivial hurt like a thorn puncturing its foot. It seems that the chimp gives expression to its pain, whereas the wildebeest does not yet neither expresses its pain. Rather each behaves in a way likely to enhance the survival of the species. The chimpanzee communicates either to warn its conspecifics, or to summon aid. The wildebeest remains, silent so that others will not be lured to their deaths. It is the behaviour, rather than some hypothetical mental state, which adapts the organism.

Another linguistic usage which holds us in thrall is the language of 'detection' We assume that 'detection' entails' conscious awareness of' this
leads us to believe that an animal cannot respond to a stimulus unless in some sense it consciously 'knows' what it has encountered. The reason such insectivorous plants as the Venus fly trap capture our imagination is that they behave as if they are aware. How, we ponder, do they 'know' that the fly is there? Again we need to remind ourselves that the simplest of organisms are able to detect and respond to stimuli, yet we are not there by committed to the view that they have knowledge of beliefs. The same is true of more neurologically complex organisms. There is an important truth in that litany of behaviourists: animals acquire behaviours, not beliefs.

If it is granted that the behaviour rather than some postulated mental state is what adapts an organism, we are next led to unique whether organisms might exhibit 'pain behaviours' without that attendant mental state which we call 'pain'. As we noted at the outset, many invertebrates to which we do not generally attribute feelings of pain exhibit 'pain behaviour'. In higher animals too, as we have already seen, it is possible that relevant behaviours might be performed in the absence of any conscious experience.

But is it probable? Must pain be introduced to cause the behaviours or might these be caused more directly by the stimulus, or perhaps by indifferent conscious states? We might at this point simply opt for the most parsimonious explanation. This is in fact the upshot of Lloyd Morgan's famous dictum: In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty. If it can be interpreted as the outcome of one which stands lower in the psychological scale. 229 'We must ask in other words, if we can explain all animals' reactions to noxious stimuli without recourse to particular mental states. Our blindsight examples show that it is possible for organisms to respond appropriately to stimuli in the complete
absence on mental states. If the general case is true, then the same might be said for the specific performance of 'pain behaviours' in the absence of pain.

The thrust of Morgan's canon can be reinforced epistemologically with the arguments of Descartes: As we know, Descartes' radical doubt led him to propose that all we can know for certain are the truths of logic and the existence of our own mental states. Fortunately one of the truths of logic was the existence of a god who could guarantee, to some extent, the veracity of perceptions of the world. Yet strict application of the criterion of doubt permits us to ascribe minds to other creatures only if they demonstrate (verbally), by signs, or by rational behaviour) evidence of mental activity. From the lack of such indications from animals, Descartes concluded that we have no evidence which would enable us legitimately to infer that animals have minds. Not having minds, they cannot feel pain. Descartes thus provides epistemological grounds for denying that animals feel pain.

If we adopt the conservative stance of Morgan or Descartes, then it seems that we have no grounds scientific or philosophical, for asserting that animals feel pain. Yet this is a much weaker claim that the positive assertion that we have good reasons for believing that animals do not feel pain, or, to put it another way, that only human beings feel pain.

Certainly a reasonable case could be advanced that given our admitted ignorance, we have moral grounds for giving animals the benefit of the doubt. We shall return to this point later. For the moment, let us consider the positive statement of the case. Do we have reasons for believing that only human beings feel pain? Or recasting the question in evolutionary terms, why should pain have adaptive values for the human species, if it would serve no purpose in other species?
Pain is a mental state, and mental states require minds. Our inquiry, then, is in part an investigation of the selective advantage conferred by the possession of a mind. A mind's reflection in its on activities, amongst other things, enables us to predict the behaviour of other human beings, and to a lesser extent, animals. By reflecting upon our reasons for behaving in certain ways and by assuming that our fellow human beings are similarly motivated, we can make a predictions about how they are likely to behave in certain situations. But more than this by ascribing consciousness and intelligence to other organisms we can also make predictions about how they will behave. Such ascriptions, whether they have any basis in fact or not, can thus help the human species survive. As H.S. Jennings remarked almost ninety years ago, if any amoeba were as large as a whale, it is quite conceivable that occasions might arise when the attribution to it of the elemental states of consciousness might save the unsophisticated human from destruction that would result from lack of such attribution. Along with human self-awareness then, came a tendency to attribute a similar awareness to other creatures. That animals, intentions and pains like our own could be nothing more than a useful fiction which gives us a shorthand method of predicting their behaviour.

There is, then, some value in the belief that animals suffer pain, for it provides, a reasonably reliable guide to how they will behave. But it is not an infallible guide. If, for example, we were to pit ourselves against a chess-playing computer, the best strategy to adopt would be to act as if the machine were a skilled opponent, possessed of certain intentional states - a desire to win, particular beliefs about the rules, and so on. However, there might be occasions when it would be better to adopt another attitude towards the computer. Let us imagine that the computer was programmed to play at three levels - beginner, intermediate, and advanced. Set at the 'beginner' level, the
computer might show itself to be vulnerable to a basic 'fool's mate', so that whenever this simple gambit was used, it inevitably lost. A human opponent could thus be confident of beating the computer whenever he or she wished. Now this exploitation of the computer's weakness would result from the adoption of quite a different stance. No longer would the computer be treated as if it had desires and beliefs (or more importantly as if it had the ability to acquire new beliefs), for a human opponent in the same situation would quickly learn to counter the 'fool's mate'. Instead, predictions of the computer's behaviour would be based on the way it had been designed to operate. Thus, our wildebeest, on our intentional account, should exhibit 'pain behaviour'. Only when we adopt a 'design stance' (the animal was 'designed' by natural selection to behave in ways which would enhance the survival of the species) do we get a reasonable explanation of why it dies in silence. The general point is this. The ascription to animals of certain mental states usually enables us to predict their behaviour with some accuracy (such ascription increasing our own chances of survival). But there will always be instances where this intentional model will break down and explanations which refer to selective advantages will be preferred.

Another reason for attributing pain experiences only to human beings is to do with free-will and moral responsibility. While there has been some dispute about whether animals ought to be the object of our moral concern, we do not usually consider animals to be moral agents. Animals are not generally held to be morally responsible for their own acts, and not with standing some rather odd medieval judicial practices, animals do not stand trial for antisocial acts which they might have committed. What is absent in animals which is thought to be crucial to the committing of some wrong is the mens rea -- the evil intent. Animals are not morally responsible for the acts they commit.
because while they may have behavioural dispositions, they do not have thoughts and beliefs about what is right and wrong, nor can they, whatever their behavioural disposition, form a conscious intent. Or at least, so we generally believe. Animals, in short, are not 'free agents', and this is why they are not regarded as being morally responsible. But what does the determined nature of animals' behavior have to do with pain? Simply this, that if animals' behaviors are causally determined, it makes no sense of pain as an additional causal factor.

One way of seeing the force of this is to explore some of the contexts in which we use the term 'pain'. There are many ways we have of talking about pain which exclude animals. Consider the following: (I) 'For the long-distance runner, it is a matter of mind over matter. He must break through the pain barrier' (2) 'The hunger striker finally succumbed and died'. (3) 'Even though she knew it would mean a horrible death at the stake, she refused to recant'. (4) 'The pain became unbearable. He cried out'. If we attempt to substitute animals for the human agents in these statements, the result becomes complete nonsense. Our inability to fit animals into the logic of these expressions is not merely because animals are not (contingently) long-distance runners, or hunger strikers, or religious martyrs. The key lies in statement. (4) We must ask: Do animals ever find pain unbearable? and, what reasons could they have for bearing it?

Consider this sentence in which a suitable substitution might be made. 'The man's hand reached into the flames, and was immediately withdrawn with a cry'. We could easily substitute 'ape' for 'man' here and the statement will retain its sense. But what about this: 'The man plunged his hands into the flames again, knowing that only he could reach the value and stem the flow of petrol which threatened to turn the sleepy village into an inferno'. Now the
substitution becomes impossible, for. What could conceivably cause the ape to plunge its hand back into the flames? Nothing, I suspect, for apes do not have reasons for bearing pain.

Now it may seem unsatisfactory to proceed on the basis of certain linguistic practices to make some claim about how things really are. (This, I suspect, is why Anselm's ontological argument always leaves one feeling a little uneasy). But the exclusive nature of the grammar of 'pain', or more correctly of 'bearing pain', reveals the unique province of pain. Pain operates as one kind of reason which free agents are bound to take into consideration when they decide on a particular course of action. Pain can be borne if there are reasons. But an animal never has reasons either to bear pain, or to succumb to pain. And if pain never need be brought into the sphere of reasons - the mind - then there is no need for it, qua unpleasant mental event, at all. Thus, while it is undeniable that animals sense noxious stimuli and react to them, these stimuli only need be represented as unpleasant mental states if they are to become the body's reasons in the context of other reasons. Only as various degrees of unpleasantness can they be taken seriously amongst reasons, and this only necessary in the mind of a rational agent.

Another way of thinking about this is to consider the attribute of the long distance runner, the hunger striker, the martyr, the hero of the sleep village. We could say that they had mental strength, great courage, or moral character. But we would never predicate these of animals. The wildebeest dies silently and does not endanger the herd. But does it die courageously? Does it bear the pain to the end? Does it have a reason for remaining silent? No, because it does not have a choice. All wildebeest behave in this fashion. And if it does not have a choice, there is no requirement for the dismemberment of its body to be represented mentally as pain.

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Pain is the body's representative in the mind's decision-making process. Without pain the mind would imperil the body (as cases of insensitivity to pain clearly show). But without the rational decision-making mind, pain is superfluous. Animals have no rational or moral considerations which might overrule the needs of the body. It is for this reason that Descartes referred to pain, hunger and thirst as 'confused modes of thoughts' which can only be predicated of creatures which can think.236

In his article Tolstoy, Death and the meaning of life, 237 Roy W. Perret says that questions about the meaning of life have traditionally been regarded as being of particular concern to philosophers. He further says that it is sometimes complained that contemporary analytic philosophy fails to address such questions, but there do exist illuminating recent discussions of these questions by analytic philosophers.238 Perhaps what lurks behind the complaint is a feeling that these discussions are insufficiently close to actual living situations and hence often seem rather thin and blind compared with the vivid portrayals of such situations in autobiography or fiction. I therefore want to focus on two works by Tolstoy - one autobiographical, one fictional - and try to see what philosophical lessons can be learned from them, particularly with regard to questions about the relation of death to the meaning of life.239

Tolstoy's A Confession (1879) is a vivid record of his own crisis connected with his search for the meaning of life. He tells how in middle life, in full possession of all his physical and mental powers, a happy man with family, wealth and fame, he suddenly suffered an 'arrest of life' as he began to ask himself, 'what is it for what does it lead to?' (p. 15). And to these questions he could find no answer that satisfied him in the face of his own inevitable death. His family and his art, which had formerly been the center of his life, could no longer provide meaning to life in the face of death:

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Today or tomorrow sickness and death will come (they had come already) to those I love or to me; nothing will remain but stench and worms. Sooner or later my affairs whatever they may be, will be forgotten, and shall not exist. Then why go on making any effort? (pp. 19 - 20).

He studied science and philosophy hoping for some aid but to no avail. The experimental sciences seemed to him to refuse to acknowledge his problem, addressing themselves instead to their own independent questions. Philosophy, on the other hand, while recognizing his problem as legitimate seemed to have no answer. Indeed, as Tolstoy puts it, 'though all the mental work is directed just to my question, there is no answer, but instead of an answer one gets the same question, only in a complex form (p. 30). Hence the question he had posed himself remained unanswered. 'Is there any meaning in my life that the inevitable death awaiting me does not destroy?' (p. 24).

In his despair it seemed to him that there are only four possible responses. The first is not understanding that life is absurd. But this was obviously not available to Tolstoy himself since 'one cannot cease to know what one does know' (p. 39). The second, adopted by the majority of his circle, is 'epicureanism', i.e. making the most of the pleasures of life while recognizing its ultimate hopelessness. But such conduct Tolstoy found himself unable to imitate, lacking the requisite 'dullness of imagination'. The third option is suicide and this seemed to Tolstoy the 'worthiest way of escape' (p 41). But it was the fourth way, that of 'weakness', that he himself adopted. To his self-disgust he found himself 'seeing the truth of the situation and yet clinging to life, knowing in advance that nothing can come of it (P. 41).

At this point in his personal story Tolstoy's thoughts suddenly take a different turn.
The reasoning showing the vanity of life is not so different, and has long been familiar to the very simplest folk: yet they have lived and still live. How is it they all live and never think of doubting the reasonableness of life? (P. 43).

Thus he infers that "there is a whole humanity that lived and lives as if it understood the meaning of its life, for without understanding it, it could not live" (p. 43). This led him to break away from his own narrow circle of social equals in order to attend to what the simple folk had to teach him. And this in turn led him to conclude that:

Rational knowledge presented by the learned and the wise, denies the meaning of life, but the enormous masses of men, the whole of mankind, receive that meaning in irrational knowledge. And that irrational knowledge is faith. (p. 47).

But in this conclusion he found no comfort, for "it appears that in order to understand the meaning of Life I must renounce my reason, the very thing for which alone a meaning is required" (p. 47) that is, though the problem of the meaning of life can only arise for a rational being, it is hardly a solution to it to abandon rationality.

In the face of this paradox he tries to clarify the distinction between 'rational knowledge'. In terms of rational knowledge he now recognizes why his question is unanswerable.

The solution of all the possible questions of life could evidently not satisfy me, for my question, simple as it at first appeared, included a demand for an explanation of the finite in terms of the infinite, and vice versa (p. 48).

The answers given by faith, however, though 'irrational and distorted' attempt to provide such a relation between finite and infinite, which is unavailable through rational knowledge and yet 'without which three can be no solution' (p. 49). Consider the catechism:
How am I to live - According to the law of God. What real result will come of my life? - Eternal torment or eternal bliss. What meaning has for that death does not destroy? - Union with the eternal God: heaven (P.50)

But faith is not to be identified with these propositional elements so far as Tolstoy is concerned, for he admits these 'answers' to be 'irrational and distorted'. Rather 'faith is knowledge of the meaning of life in consequence of which man does not destroy himself lives' (P. 51).

Though faith is not to be identified with these propositional elements, they are nevertheless still involved. Tolstoy says 'I was now ready to accept any faith if only it did not demand of me a direct denial of reason - which would be a false hood' (pp. 53 - 54). But inevitably he found himself confronted with rival faiths and interpretations so that reason is once again introduce to his prolonged and serious study of the Gospels and Theology.

Tolstoy's position on faith is very much in keeping with modern nonpropositional accounts of revelation and faith. He is opposed to the traditional propositional account that makes faith the acceptance of a body of propositional truths which are not accessible to human reason. This view posits an evidential gap between revealed truths and the truths of natural theology. That in turn typically leads to an emphasis on the role of the will in religious faith, for volitional response is supposed to bridge the gap. Faith becomes the willing to believe something that cannot be known through reason (Tolstoy's irrational knowledge'). But this is not the view of faith Tolstoy himself wants to embrace. Rather for him faith is an experiencing of the world as significant. It is not therefore opposed to rational knowledge, as it is on the propositional account. While reason is not allowed to displace experience as the source of the basic data, it is involved in the systematic formulation and criticism of what is believed on the basis of faith. Faith then is a non -
propositional knowledge of how to live, though this knowledge may imply certain propositions that are open to rational criticism. This account of faith has become widespread within protestant Christianity in this century and it accords well with Tolstoy's own radically protestant attitudes to scripture and theology as expressed in what I Believe.

This resume of Tolstoy's argument is brief and fails to capture the power of the original. However, let us pause to consider more closely, two important philosophical points that arise. In the first place recall Tolstoy's claim that the peasants must understand the meaning of life, since without understanding it they could not carry on as they do. Now it might seem that there is no reason why the peasants should not just carry on and spend their time as Tolstoy had spent the first fifty years of his life, ignoring the suspicion that there is any problem about meaningfulness. To this Tolstoy would presumably reply that the peasants lack the opportunities for diversion which enabled him to avoid facing the problem squarely for so long. Antony Flew, however, has challenged Tolstoy's original inference here on other grounds. Flew suggests that though the peasants do not suffer from Tolstoy's arrest of life', this does not imply that they possess some knowledge of life's meaning that Tolstoy does not. Flew invokes Ryle's distinction between knowing how and knowing that: 'the peasants may indeed know how to live their lives free of all sophisticated psychological disabilities, but this by no means presupposes the possession of any theoretical knowledge not vouchsafed to their unfortunate social superiors. (pp. 162 - 163). The secret that the peasants have and Tolstoy lacks is not the knowledge that things are thus and thus, but the knowledge how to go on living and in this case Flew claims, this is 'only another way of saying that they all enjoy rude mental health' (p. 164).
This analysis is not fully convincing. It is true that to know the meaning of life is to know how to live (as Tolstoy did not at the time of his crisis), but it is not clear that to admit this is to rule out the possibility that some knowledge that is nevertheless involved here. This is because of the epistemic point that knowledge how and knowledge that are not as entirely unrelated as Flew's analysis suggests. If I know how to speak Japanese this knowledge how need not be reducible to a set of knowledge that statements. None the less, the truth of the claim 'I know how to speak Japanese fluently' generally implies the truth of other sentences like 'I know that the Japanese word for cat is "neko"' and so on. Or again, if we think of knowledge how as knowledge of a technique (like the craftsman's knowledge) we generally imply that the knower has some understanding of the principles involved in the activity in question. He may not actually be able to articulate these principles in practice, but they are nevertheless theoretically formulable. In other words, knowing how implies some knowing that even if knowing how is not reducible to knowing that:

Nor will it do to weaken the sense of 'knowing how' used here in order to try to save the analysis. As Ronald Hepburn acknowledges, there is a weak sense of 'knowing how' used in ordinary language such that it is applicable to the baby who knows how to cry or even the bird that knows how to build a nest. But this is not enough for Flew's analysis to hold. In the first place it is surely misleading to call these latter types of cases instances of knowing how at all. Rather we need to draw a distinction between knowing how to do something and being able to do it. It seems preferable to reserve 'knowing how' for cases where the knower has some implicit understanding of the principles involved in the activity. I am able to bend my forefinger but I do not know how to do this similarly animals are able to do many things but it seems reasonable to be agnostic about whether they knew how to do these things.
the second place, even if we conclude that this weak sense of 'knowing how' is indeed knowing how, then we lose an important dimension of the problem that such 'knowledge how' is being claimed to be the solution of. As Hepburn points out (pp. 215 - 216), the knowledge how that the peasants have on this interpretation of 'knowing how' is no longer the knowledge Tolstoy was searching for, because their 'knowledge' is too unproblematic to be a solution to his problem. It is the dimension of a problem struggled with and solved that is lacking in this case.

The second point I want to comment on in Tolstoy's account is the way in which he might seem to assume that the finality of death entails the meaninglessness of life. Flew takes him to task for this, pointing out that it is by no means obvious that 'nothing can matter unless it goes on forever; or at any rate, eventually leads to something else which does' (p. 160). Now Flew is surely correct in saying that we value some things precisely because of their transitoriness: consider the Japanese cult of the cherry blossom. And again, think of Tolstoy's question 'what for?' asked of activities like his work on his estate, or the education of his son, or the writing of a book (p. 16). If what is being assumed is that an intelligible justification for these activities must lie in something that goes on forever, something outside mortal life, then this is also wrong: just how would Tolstoy's immortality have justified these activities? Furthermore, if these immediate activities can be called into question, then so too can any larger scheme of justification that is put forward as giving point to these activities.

But clearly Tolstoy was aware of this. Doesn't it indeed generate his crisis? So Flew is wrong to claim that Tolstoy contends that 'our lives can have meaning only on the assumptions of the existence of God and of human immortality' (P. 154). The catechism from A confession (P. 50) which Flew
Quotes is not Tolstoy's own view. As I have pointed out, it is offered as an illustration of the irrational and distorted replies given as propositions to be believed on faith, where 'faith' is interpreted in the traditional propositional sense. Moreover in his later work what I Believe (ch. VIII), Tolstoy denies that christianity should involve any belief in physical resurrection and sternly renounces the idea that immortality is a necessary condition of the meaningfulness of life. Similarly Tolstoy's own doctrine of God is a rather thin demythologized one. Flew himself notes that Tolstoy's faith is an diosyncratically attenuated form of christianity. Nor is Tolstoy guilty of any obvious muddles about the limits of explanation and justification; consider this passage towards the end of A confession where he tries to express the special character of the religious knowledge that gives meaning to life:

I shall not seek the explanation of everything. I know that the explanation of everything must be concealed in infinity. But I wish to understand in a way which will bring me to what is inevitably unexplicable. I wish to recognize anything that is unexplicable as being so not because the demands of my reasons are wrong (they are right, and apart from them I can understand nothing), but because I recognize the limits of my intellect. I wish to understand in such a way that everything that is inexplicable shall present itself to me as being necessarily inexplicable and not as being something I am under an arbitrary obligation to believe (pp. 80 - 81).

Hence Flew's interpretation is too ungenerous a reading of Tolstoy's views on death and meaning. In what I Believe, Tolstoy wisely remarks: 'To live rationally one must live so that death cannot destroy life' (P. 430). A confession records the experienced collapse of the supposed rationality of one man's life in the face of the realization of his own inevitable death. the life
Tolstoy was living was one that death would defeat, built as it was upon attachment to his family and his art -- attachments conquerable by death:

I felt that what I had been standing on had collapsed and that I had nothing left under my feet. What I had lived on no longer existed, and there was nothing left (P. 17).

The possibility of living a life not built upon attachment of this sort is the goal before us. And to know how to live such a life is to discover the meaning of life. That this seems platitudinous should not surprise us. The knowledge that involved in knowing the meaning of life may simply be some truth as unsurprising as this. This is why knowledge that is not sufficient to live meaningfully; we also have to know how to live in terms of this knowledge that. There is a parallel here with our experience of art. When pressed to say what we have learned from a work of art we often can only come up with some platitude. We can only say we know that P, where P, is some proposition we surely already knew to be the case. But perhaps what we are sometimes trying to say is that although we already knew that P, now we know how to operate with our knowledge that. If this is so then it is no accident that many of these matters are illuminated for us in Tolstoy's great story: The Death of Ivan Ilych (1886).

In A confession, Tolstoy tells how his questions 'what is it for' what does it lead to? Seemed at first of no real relevance. But their continual reappearance began eventually to disturb him as 'like drops of ink always falling on one place they ran together into one black blot' (p. 16). He immediately follows this simile with a striking passage:

Then occurred what happens to everyone sickening with a mortal eternal disease. At first trivial signs of indisposition appear to which the sick man pays no attention; then these signs reappear more and more often and
merge into one uninterrupted period of suffering. The suffering increases and, before the sick man can look round, what he took for a mere indisposition has already become more important to him than anything else in the world -- it is death (P. 16).

The prefiguring of the Death of Ivan Ilych is remarkable.

The Death of Ivan Ilych tells of a man suffering from fatal illness who sees that in the face of his imminent death the life he has led is to be judged meaningless. Although it is Ivan’s life that the story presents for us, it is also quite clear that his case is to be viewed as an entirely typical one: “Ivan Ilych’s life had been most simple and most ordinary and therefore most terrible (P. 11). Appropriately he had been a member of the court of Justice and, as he had judged others, so he is forced to come to judge himself. His life had been a story of steady and reliable progress in his own sphere of government legal appointments. He had always done his duty as it was expected of him for 'he considered his duty to be what was so considered by those in authority will similarly do their duty by him and steadily promote him. And this expectation is duly satisfied. Although he briefly suffers one unpleasant setback in his career expectations, in his eyes order is soon restored and he is appointed to the position of power he sees as his due: 'after a stumble, his life was regaining its due and natural character of pleasant lightheartedness and decorum' (p. 34). But at the height of his triumph he suffers an apparently trivial accident -- 'he made a false step and slipped' (p. 26) -- that brings on an internal illness which eventually proves fatal. He is confined to bed and forced to confront his imminent death. In the face of this he realizes that the life he has led is empty.

When Ivan first realizes that he is dying his reaction is one of despair; for 'not only was he not accustomed to the thought, he simply did not and could
not grasp it' (P. 44). Although he must have known that he was to die some
time, he has never really lived in terms of that knowledge. Death is something
that happens to other people:

The syllogism he had learnt from Kiezewether’s Logic : Caius is a man,
men are mortal therefore caius is mortal’, had always seemed to him correct as
applied to caius, but certainly not as applied to himself. That caius man in the
abstract -- was mortal, was perfectly correct, but he was caius, not an abstract
man, but a creature quite quite separate from all others (pp. 44 - 45).

Ironically in the opening pages of the story we see Ivan’s one -- time
colleagues treating Ivan’s own death in an identical fashion, complacent that ‘it
is he who is dead and not I’ (p. 2). Sehwartz winks at Peter Ivanovich ‘ as if to
say : "Ivan Ilych has a mess of things -- not like you and me" ’ (p.3). And Peter
Ivanovich sees in the expression on the corpse’s face a warning to the living
that seems ‘out of place, or at least not applicable to him’ (p.5) When told of
Ivan’s terrible sufferings in his last days Peter Ivanovich pauses for an instant :

‘Three days of frightful suffering and then death ! Why, that might
suddenly, at any time, happen to me’, he thought and for a moment felt
terrified. But -- he did not himself know how the customary reflection at once
occurred to him that this had happened to Ivan Ilych and to him and that it
should not and could not happen to him. After which reflection Peter, Ivanovich
felt reassured, and began to ask with interest about the details of ivan Ilych’s
death, as though death was an accident natural to Ivan Ilych but certainly not
to himself (p. 9).

This is the spirit of deception that screened Ivan from his own death until
it was imminent and caused his family to try to deny that his dying was really
happening.
The awful terrible act of his dying was, he could see, reduced by those about him to the level of a casual, unpleasant, and almost indecorous incident (as if someone had entered a drawing-room diffusing an unpleasant odour) and this was done by that very decorum which he had served all his life long. (pp. 51 - 52).

The only exception to this falsity, this refusal to recognize death as inevitable for everyone, is the peasant lad Gerasim who serves Ivan in his last days. It is Gerasim who reminds Peter Ivanovich at the beginning of the story: 'It's God's will. We shall all come to it some day' (p. 11). And it is Gerasim who says frankly to Ivan:

'We shall all of us die, so why should I grudge a little trouble?' -- expressing the fact that he did not think his work burdensome, because he was doing it for a dying man and hoped someone would do the same for him when his time came (p. 52).

But for Ivan, whose whole way of life has screened him from having to face this truth about death, dying is an incomprehensible and terrible business. He comes to realize that the life he had felt to be pleasant is in fact 'something trivial and often nasty' (p. 63). As he looks back on his it begins to seem to him that only in his childhood is there something worthwhile. Everything else is a gradual decline:

'It is as if I had been going downhill while I imagined I was going up. And that is really what it was. I was going up in public opinion, but to the same extent life was ebbing away from me. And now it is all done and there is only death (p. 64).

In the face of this realization Ivan experiences life as 'Senseless and Horrible' and in terror searches for some meaning to it all. Then he glimpses something:
'May be I did not live as I ought to have done', it suddenly occurred to him. 'But how could that be, when I did everything properly?' he replied, and immediately dismissed from his mind this, the sole solution of all the riddles of life and death, as something quite impossible. (p. 64).

It takes Ivan quite some time to admit that his flawlessly correct life is not the life he ought to have lived, to see that 'all that for which he had lived was not real at all, but a terrible and huge deception which had hidden both life and death' (p. 69). As he resists this notion he screams, 'I won't' and then just, 'Oh! Oh!' as he feels himself being forcibly thrust into a black hole. The screaming continues for three days until on the third day he stops:

'Yes it was all not the right thing?' he said to himself, 'but that's no matter. It can be done. But what is the right thing?' he asked himself and suddenly grew quiet (p. 72).

At this Point he becomes aware of the suffering he is causing his family as he catches sight of his distraught son and wife. Then the answer to his question, 'what is the right thing?' becomes clear:

And suddenly it grew clear to him that what had been oppressing him and would not leave him was all dropping away at once from two sides, from ten sides, and from all sides. He was sorry for them, he must act so as not to hurt them: release them and free himself from these sufferings (p. 73).

And now ' in place of death there was light'. Ivan says to himself 'Death is finished .......... It is no more I and he dies.

Ivan had built his life upon attachments conquerable by death. This is why he suffers so much in the face of death, for what he has lived for is rendered meaningless by death:

This is wrong, it is not as it should be. All you have lived for and still live for is falsehood and deception, hiding life and death from you (p.70).
His life had been built upon his desire for control and power. Hence his distress at minor flaws in the environment he has created --- a stained table cloth, a chipped plate, a scratched table, or even the way his daughter's hair is done (pp. 27, 31, 47). His increasing concern with his illness results in a corresponding sensitivity to any lack of control:

He had formerly borne such mischances, hoping soon to adjust what was wrong, to master it and attain success, or make a grand slam. But now every mischance upset him and plunged him into despair. (p. 35).

But it is the letting go of such control that is required. Death inevitably defeats such control and the attempt to hold on to it in the face of death causes Ivan terrible suffering. It is only when he recalls the suffering. It is only when he recalls the suffering of his family and desires to 'release them and free himself from these sufferings' (p. 73) that the fear of death leaves him. Then 'in place of death there was light'. Until then the kind of life he has led has screened him from the reality of death and the way in which it will destroy all he has built his life on. When he glimpses this truth about death he is horrified and resists this knowledge. But eventually he admits it, together with the associated judgement of the meaninglessness of the life he has led. He considers not himself and his control and power, but other people. Having forgone this old desire for control and power, he can say to himself, 'Death is finished .......... It is no more', for new death cannot defeat him.

How does this connect with our original questions about death and the meaning of life? First, it is the knowledge of death that once again generates the crises. Ivan (like any adult person) must know that he will die, but since he refuses to face this fact he has no idea of how to live in the light of it. He does not know how to live. In the face of his death he comes to know that the way he has lived is wrong, for his death renders meaningless the life he has led by
destroying that to which he is so attached. Viz. power and control. Once again it is the peasants who provide us with a positive paradigm. In this case it is Gerasim, who knows that he will die as will we all and who knows how to live in terms of this knowledge. He does not grudge Ivan his services but just sees them as what is needed by a dying man and hopes that some day someone will do the same for him.

We need to draw a distinction between what I shall call the 'objective' meaning of a life and the 'Subjective' meaning. (This terminology need not commit us to any particular position on the objectivity or subjectivity of value in general). A life can have subjective meaning in so far as it instances states of value for the person whose life it is. Thus pleasure can confer subjective meaning on a life in this ways, though sickness and death will rob a life of such subjective meaning -- not in the sense of making it no longer eternally true that the life instanced pleasure at some time, but in the sense that the life instanced pleasure at some time, but in the sense that the life does not now instance pleasure. This devaluation of a life is quite compatible. With the truth that this does not render the life valueless while it is pleasurable. If a life as a whole is only subjectively meaningful its value ceases when the life ends. But a life can also have objective value in so far as it instances states of value for others, and death does not destroy such values in the way it destroys subjective value. Personal pleasure can only have subjective value in this sense, and this is why Nero's pleasures are no longer significant since Nero's death. Other states like compassion can instance value for others and hence not be devalued by death as are subjectively valuable states like pleasure.

Worries about the meaning of life are typically worries about how to integrate both senses of 'meaning'; that is to live a life which instances objective meaning that is not destroyed by death and also to enjoy such a life.
as affording subjective satisfaction to the person who leads it. The life that
Ivan Ilych led before his illness was one that instanced only subjective
meaning. It was built upon the values of 'pleasant light heartedness and
decorum' (p.24). He had been able to incorporate temporary set backs
precisely because he had always believed things would soon be restored to
their even tenor. Death brings home to him the realization that the subjective
meaning his life has cannot guarantee objectively for it and such subjective
meaning as it has will be destroyed by his death.

Understanding the meaning of life does indeed involve knowledge how.
But in relation to death it also involves, (as knowledge how generally does),
knowledge that. In this case the knowledge that we shall all die ought to lead
us to the obvious conclusion that it would be irrational to build our lives on
what can be destroyed by death. A confession and the Death of Ivan Ilych
record instances of men coming to the knowledge that their lives are so built
and hence rendered meaningless by death. Knowing how to live a life not so
built, knowing how to integrate the subjective and objective significance of a
life, is what is involved in understanding the meaning of life. An important of
such knowledge how (a part Tolstoy dwells upon to great effect), is the
knowledge that we shall all die and that 'to live rationally one must live so that
death cannot destroy life'. Tolstoy sees the peasants like Gerasim as having
such knowledge. As to the prospects of others gaining such knowledge,
Tolstoy seems pessimistic. Ivan gains it only after terrible suffering and too
late for him to do more than die well. And at the start of the story we see that
Ivan's family and colleagues have learned nothing from his death. Presumably
the only hope is that the reader of the story might learn something from Ivan's
death. It might well turn out in the end that the 'Ile' of the last chapter will be
the reader, the person who Tolstoy hoped would understand.
In his article 'Is life Absurd?' --244 Jonathan Westphal and Christopher Cherry says that Thomas Nagel believes, with some existentialists that life is absurd. 245 Bertrand Russell says 'Brief and powerless is man's life : on him and all his race the slow sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction , omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way. ----

To avoid this cosmic Version of the external perspective, all we have to do is to recognize it for the colourful rubbish it is.

In this connection one is reminded of the concept of subjectivity in Kierkegaard’s philosophy. 247 Subjectivity is a key concept of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy. It opens our view to his entire thought -- process, and helps us to realise the significance of his contribution to the growth, of philosophy in the west. Not only is his influence pervasive but also his relevance is being increasingly recognised in the current context of the age of technology and science. Man's loss of faith 248 in his destiny, in the uniqueness of his individuality, his freedom 249 and sense of values and moral responsibility is indeed too terrifying to imagine. He needs a fresh philosophical reflection and analysis of his vital concerns, and salvaging of his faith in his own, self, which has been lost under the debris of scientific universalism and socialistic massiveness. Kierkegaard seems to be more relevant now than he was in his own age.

Kierkegaard is not against science and its objective criterion of truth. He is, however, opposed to scientism, which seeks to reduce even man to objectivity; makes man to look as if he were an object in a mass of objects, not governed by anything from within his own self, but by the laws of nature like the laws of biological evolution or the law of gravitation. Such a man loses all dignity and freedom, even his selfhood. He cannot own any responsibility for his acts.
According to Kierkegaard, subjectivity is the truth of man who, as an authentic being can act as a free agent, own ethical responsibility for his actions and make as a free choice the greatest commitment of his life. This commitment of free choice with faith is his religion. Kierkegaard, as a matter of fact, restores religion to its proper place, which, though, in the current context, has become a lost force or a mere ritualism.

Hegel's rationalism is the source of Man's self-alienation. He has become a stranger unto himself in the vastness of the universe. Scientific study of man has also resulted in his complete objectification. With his great powers and with erosion of faith in his spiritual destiny and moral responsibility, the world has to experience the trauma of the First World War. Nobody wanted the war, and yet no one could prevent it. This only proved man's helplessness as a creature of circumstances created by himself. So the serious thinkers the world over were rudely awakened by man's self-estrangement. It was at this stage that Kierkegaard was remembered, and the existentialist movement of philosophy took shape. In this sense, he can be regarded as the source of inspiration of existentialism with its many variants. He has inspired and influenced his successors, as he goes back to his predecessors to the Greek past of Europe's history.

This stress on the subjective nature of the self sounds peculiar to the Western thought in general. Right from the age of Aristotle, the history of European philosophy has been dominated by such concepts as universality, objectivity and extra-validation. Even christain theology accepted the Aristotelian norms of truth. Plato was idealistic, but even his supermundane Idea was universal and transcendental. In Descartes, we first discover a sign of revolt against the dogmatism in religion and philosophy. He takes note of the mind and experience. But his mind is not the subject or self par excellence,
and his shift in approach is only methodological rather than metaphysical. His philosophy led to an objective universal Idealism, of Spinoza, Leibnitz, etc., or to solipsism and nihilism of Hume. The mind of the modern empirical sciences was also an object seeking its truth and validation from outside self.

The worse happened under the impact of nationalism, particularly, under the Hegelian brand of it. What is the place of the human self as a free, creative subject, as master of its own thoughts and agent of its actions. The universal, absolute reason is something into which the subject as self is completely merged and dissolved. That is its final destiny and realisation. All its doings and thinking, its judgements and decisions melt in the oven of the universal reason. The individual derives his being from it and returns to it in final synthesis. This is denial of the subject rather than its affirmation.

Science completed the process of self alienation, which began with the empirical thinking of Bacon, etc. The self and its property like consciousness do not exists because these are not experienced as objects. Its esse est percipi as Berkely taught, then the thinking, acting deciding grieving and enjoying kind of self has no existence since it is not an object of perception. Hume was right when he pursued the first principles of his logic to its limits declare that there is no my mind, no matter. Nothing exists except a chain of ideations. This was a last blow to subjectivism, given the final burial by Scientism declaring that no proof, empirical or rational is available to establish that men exists at all except as a part of evolutionary process. The process itself is universal and objective, natural and necessary. And, thus disappeared the free creating man, master of his destiny and responsible for his doings and decisions. Self -- alienation was complete.
The contemporary empiricist schools, i.e. Logical positivists, Logical Empiricists, Scientific Empiricists or Analysts are moving away from speculative philosophy and towards exact sciences.

At present philosophy shows an excessive zeal for scientific principles, postulates and methods. It means that the contemporary philosopher is tempted towards the objectivity, verifiability, accuracy, certainty and universality in his philosophical system. Therefore, he also shuns the subjective element in philosophy and seems to veer deftly away from the metaphysical, the ethical and the religious problems. The metaphysical propositions seem to be meaningless for a Logical empiricist. The subject, the thinker himself, is being ignored in this thought. Even pragmatism contains nothing positive beyond the pleasant desire to make things comfortable because a pragmatist is afraid to face the evil.

There are also some contemporary philosophical systems which though take up the problem of 'man', they are becoming more and more socially -- oriented. In medieval period, importance was attached to God. The modern philosophy tries to base the philosophical systems on scientific grounds, and so they could not do justice to the 'existence' of man. This rationalistic attitude towards the human -- problems got its highest fruit on in Hegelianism, where the existence of man was only conceptual. At present, with some exceptions, the philosophical systems try to get rid of the conceptual man. The present philosophical trend attaches due importance to the human existence, but in the social environment. Life other science and humanities, philosophical problems are also becoming national and international. This widening of the sphere of the problems is making philosophy the philosophy of men. In this attempt, the danger is that man's individuality and his uniqueness may again become submerged under the mass of social milieu. Humanism is the example of this
tendency. Men in plural, or humanity as a whole may be saved, but man as singular, individual is lost under debris of 'Socialistic' thought.

"The present generation is intensely self--conscious. It has a profound sense of historic importance ................. But its acceptance of the historic role is not with the ease, confidence and complacent assurance of its predecessors: rather it is faltering and fearful, charged with the anxiety that has become so dominant a characteristic of the present temper....... the deeplying solicitude for the future........ has displaced the claim assurance of progress that marked the theories of a half - century ago. For the nineteenth century's faith in the saving power of science and education ............ has retreated in the face of practical adversity. Various forms of pessimism and near pessimism ............ give articulate expression to the anxiety of the time." 250

This is the actual picture of the contemporary period. Certainly, the man today finds it difficult to forget his traumatic experiences and sufferings of the two world --- wars. If anything the man, the individual, in flesh and blood, has become more important than his thought about himself, rather, he has become the focal -- point of his entire thought process.

In this contemporary context, there is a system of thought, i.e. Existentialism, in which with other dissimilarities, a common point is the importance of existence, and of the individual, man and not the men of the masses.

Soren Aabye Kierkegaard, a Danish Philosopher, was born in 1813. At that time the thinking process was progressing towards more and more idealism and intellectualism. The final outcome of these tendencies was the absolute idealism or abstract intellectualism. Rationalism be the religion of man. Kierkegaard was born a christian, but found christianity all idealistic,
completely remote from human life. He tried to study Hegelianism and gained a deep insight into the Philosophy of the Absolute. There also he found a complete negation of an individual personality. In his personal life, he experienced a complete dejection. These tensions and sufferings made him a kind of revolutionary. He attacked traditional christianity and revolted against utterly abstract universalism. At this time, he was condemned for his rebellion and was forsaken by his contemporaries. His ideas were never appreciated by his other fellow thinkers.

When at the beginning of the 20th century, the first world debacle was about to breakout, a kind of despair took possession of the human mind. The common man received no proper solution of his problems either from idealism or from intellectualism. The destructive weapons of science filled him with the dread an despair. At this stage, philosophy tried to re-discover man as an individual and in doing so, it came to discover the philosophy of Kierkegaard, which was left to disappear out of history after his death, in 1885.

Kierkegaard was the important philosopher, who made a kind of re-discovery of the individual lost in the massive universality of sciences. The faith, feelings, emotions, and passions in a man were emphasized by Kierkegaard. He created new grounds for faith. His philosophy was the resurrection of faith and the individual.

The great merit of scientific thought was and is its freedom to fly skyhigh, to explore to analyse and to arrive at verifiable truth. It explored and analysed the truth of man also. But what it got as a result of anlytic exploration is a formula about man, which is getting more and more remote and complicated. This is really the self - stultifying outcome of modern science. So man today doubts if science can solve his personal and spiritual problems.
Here arises the problem of self-estrangement. The man is becoming stronger to his own self. He knows more about the world than about himself. This is the problem of cognitive alienation which is invested by Hegel in the history of philosophy. He knows about himself as an object, something outside from him.

Self-estrangement is the product of the age of technology. Hegel used the word self-alienation in the sense, that an artistic creator of the Absolute Reason becomes alien to his own creations. In technological age, man has been reduced to a thought or a concept. A thought or a concept becomes alien from the thinker, so man, the thinker, has become stranger to the man, who lives and feels. Kierkegaard's philosophy has a relevance in the context as outlined above. Kierkegaard's subjectivity alone can salvage man and can be his relevant philosophy.

Existentialism, in general, and in Kierkegaard, in particular, is an articulation of a particular mood. This mood is the outcome of the age. The main contents of this mood are despair and dread, anxiety and a feeling of being at war with one's own innerself. In short, the mood is that though thinking may be good and thought may give us some knowledge, yet it cannot, and has not been able to solve man's basic problem of living. The gravest spiritual problem of the technological man today is, as I have said above is his self-orientation or the loss of his individuality and uniqueness under massiveness of humanism. What can solve his problem and save him is his going back to the Philosophical position of Kierkegaard. As a matter of fact, Kierkegaard is more relevant to our age than to any other age or ages.

In reference to Kierkegaardian Philosophy, St. Augustine should be considered as an existential thinker. His autobiography --- confessions is an example of existential work where he asked the questions about his
whereabouts. His 'who am I?' Was not the rational or intellectual curiosity but it was related to a self -- questioning. Reason for Augustine was 'a hollow ring' as far as seeking an eternal happiness.

Kierkegaard uses 'Subjectivity' in theological sense as opposed to epistemological and metaphysical sense. This theological aspect of human life is reflected in Augustinian philosophy. St. Augustine emphasises the helplessness and the limitation of finite being. Man cannot have faith in reason to overcome these limitations, but he has to take a leap from reason to faith. Faith in God can only save him from overwhelming despair, dread and fear. God is the highest majesty, where inquietitude and anguish of his life come to an end.

Augustine did not look upon man as an object. Man is composition of body and soul but he is endowed with the grace of freedom, the essential feature of subjectivity. His message is to appropriate the Truth which counts man's spirit and not the orthodox rituals of the church.

The modern age in philosophy begins with Descartes, a mathematician-philosopher. Descartes, for the first time, raised the question of knowledge. He, through his logical base, proved the existence of man. His 'cogito' Ergo, Sum' was his most important formula. He suggested that the mind can know only itself, its own ideas and thoughts.

Other rationalist thinkers introduced some new methods to solve the problem of knowledge. Whether they were the rationalists or the empiricists, their approach towards the problem of knowledge was objective in nature, and therefore, they could not give the proper solution for the riddle of thing and thought.
Kant raised the question of the relationship between the thing and the thought. Common man's view is that both of them exist separately; there is a kind of correspondence between the thing and the thought.

Kant's answer is: thought and things are separated and distinct. Thought can never know the thing -- in -- itself. Thought can only know the impressions of things. Since all men think alike according to innate forms of thoughts -- processes, the thought itself becomes objective. A thought is treated as an object.

Hegel said that this distinction of thought and thing a phenomenon and numenon is false. The truth is that as a matter of fact, there is no distinction between thought and thing. They are the same at bottom. Pure thought evolves itself in history. In the process of historical evolution thought itself evolve into thinghood. The world as we know it is the objectified thought. This objectified thought and the process of objectification is the process of Reason. So according to Hegel Reason is the reality.

At this stage Kierkegaard takes the following position: If rationality is reality and rationality is complete objectivity, then reason cannot lead us to the truth of myself as a subjective being. Reason makes me deal with myself as an object, which is contraposed to my subjectivity. This means reason leads me to cognitive alienation, a flight from myself and an estrangement from my being. Reason can yield to us what is my negation, that is, to my essence but not my existence. Only subjectivity can lead me to my being and my existence. And this can come from faith.

Kierkegaard's philosophy is a reaction to excessive rationalism and its condemnation of the irrational aspect of the nature. In rationalism there is no place for human feelings, passions and desires Kierkegaard establishes the need for irrationalism.
Kierkegaard believes in the total contra--position of reason and faith. Christianity according to him, hob-nobs with both. Therefore, Kierkegaard rejects and condemns the Christianity but he believes in the true Christian spirit, which is the assertion of faith and total negation of reason.

"Blaise Pascal is a forerunner of existentialism because he begins with the human situation as received from within, instead of something objective". 251

His famous but unfinished writing "The Pensees" is very much like the "confessions" of St. Augustine. It contains writer's reflections on the human situation and human approach.

Pascal was the passionate student of science. But Pascal himself experienced that due to the mechanization of human existence man lost the meaning of existence. He became homeless. Pascal says, "the silence of these infinite spaces frightens me". The horror of solitary life compelled man to rethink of his own existence. Thus he became existentialistic like Kierkegaard.

There is a remarkable similarity in this thinking "Where am I?", "who am I" "who is it that buried me into the world and now leaves me there?" "Why was I not consulted?" 252 And "What a chinera then is man?" "What a novelty! What a moniter what a chaos, what a contradiction, what a prodigy, judge of all things, imbecile worn of the earth; depository of truth, a sink of uncertainty and error, the pride and refuse of the universe." 253

Pascal accepts the non--rational aspects of human life. "The heart has its reason which reason does not know", is a beautiful expression of his concept.

He like Kierkegaard accepts the primacy of religion as compared to reason. He condemned cartesian philosophy for his 'Cogito Ergo Sum' and for
his 'concept of God', which only gives the concepts and thus leaves man helpless and alone.

With the advent of 20th century, the peace, hope and the state of equilibrium showed the signs of breaking up, and the prospects of war loomed large and it became clear that the individual would be sacrificed for the benefit of the group. Nationalism, or the growth of rationalism had reached its peak at the end of 19th century. It was at this juncture Kierkegaard with his stress on individuality and his philosophy of subjectivity was remembered by the thinkers. This is how Kierkegaard may be said to have influenced the French and the German existentialists of the 20th century.

The idealistic and conceptualistic philosophies of 19th century dominated the world of the philosophy for a longer period. The idealistic philosophers, were the philosophers of a world completely remote from suffering and pain, of a world which was considered by them as an abode of perfect happiness. This ideal world consoled the common mind and provided the psychological assurance of happy life. So was case of rationalism. Rationalistic philosophies based their concepts on scientific postulates. Outwardly, they seem to be perfectly logical and scientific in their outlook. There was no question of doubting against these perfect ways of thinking. Thus a man, Kierkegaard, who realized the technological alienation making man hallow inwardly, was ignored at his time. Kierkegaard warned the philosophers of his time against attaching excessive importance to scientific concepts in the field of philosophy. For him, the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious aspects of human life cannot be interpreted in terms of objectivity.

His existentialist successors, whether French or German, developed his concepts. Which were neglected during his life -- time. Kierkegaard in other words, laid a foundation of the philosophy of commitment.
Jaspers is a German, Protestant, Kantian existentialist and Marcel is a French, Christian thinker. Jaspers and Marcel both accept the question of self -- 'What am I?' but not with Kierkegaardian fervour. For Marcel 'man' is not a problem but mystery. It cannot be reduced to an objective problem but the existence of 'I' is to be revealed and illuminated. And here it differs from Kierkegaard's concept of human subjectivity.

Faith and the leap are the terms of Jaspers and Marcel. Like Kierkegaard, both the thinkers oppose the application of methods and attitudes of science to human problems the rationalistic approach and metaphysical systems limit man to a certain formula which, generally, existential thinkers never accept. But these thinkers adopt an optimistic attitude towards life as opposed to Kierkegaard.

The problem of man in Heidegger's philosophy is the problem of Being. The cause of despair and dread in human life is his disassociation with Being. So it is Being which denoted the fact of existence. Heidegger makes a clear difference between Being and beings. Disharmony in life is due to this confusion of beings and Being. Being is the pure subject and when we look upon it as an abstract, general and empty object, tensions arise. Thus Heidegger is less interested in man and his personal and ethical interests. Man for him is only an access to Being.

'Truth is subjectivity does not mean that the nature of the world is revealed in some personal and in communicable premonition rather than by objective inquiry, but that every thing anyone does, including his search for the objective truth, gets its value from the way in which it is willed or decided by him.

Subjectivity for Kierkegaard is something, the real nature of a man, through which he commits himself before God. This inner nature of man is free
to exercise choices. The concept of freedom is corelated with the concept of subjectivity. When a man is free to choose himself, the whole responsibility of his choice lies in him because responsibility proceeds from freedom. This awakening or self -- consciousness of an existing individual makes him aware of his separation from God. He realises his guilt of becoming an object in this huge world, and thus arises the problem of misproportion between the finite and the infinite. For this misproportion Kierkegaard uses the terms sin fear and trembling, dread, sickness. This sickness can be overcome by the repetition or by becoming committed to ethical and religions life. By the grace of God man frees himself from the sickness and attains his highest aim, the contemporaneousness with christ.

In "Either/or" he categorises three stages, namely the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious. The aesthetic stage is that at which one seeks pleasure in worldly objects. 'Eat, drink and be merry' is the slogan as the aesthetic stage. Kierkegaard also standardises the aesthetic tastes. Music, literature, painting, the drama, architecture are also the means of satisfaction. But he says one thing clearly that the thing tastes good not by being good in the market of valuation but it tastes in so far as it allows man in having his own way. He gives an example of wine and water. Wine may cost, and not water. But wine does not quench thirst as water does.

In the classical, or the Aristotelian tradition, there existed a dichotomy of knowledge as subjective and objective. The subjective knowledge is meant to be one which depends on the subject's view point, his emotional and volitional make-up, his passing moods and attitudes. It considers the subject as a mental container of knowledge impressions, cut off from the surrounding world. Objective knowledge is independent of the personal whims and moods and is
therefore something enduring, universal, unchangeable and always valid. In objective knowledge the existence of the knower becomes negligible.

Kierkegaard invested the term 'Subjectivity', with a new meaning in the philosophical era. It is not basically an idealistic or neotic subjectivism. Subjectivity for him is just not the converse of objectivity. Subjectivity is the very essence of the spiritual life. It is freedom and moral responsibility. "Subjectivity, for Kierkegaard, does not mean the angularity that attaches to every man, the quirks of temperament to which we are all subject. It does not mean the capriciousness of wish and will, that intermittently inclines us to one or another folly". 254

Subjectivity refers rather to the process by which the individual appropriates what he thinks and so brings the truth into existence. The true nature of human being is subjectivity. The subject is an existent being as interacting with other persons and things.

According to Kierkegaard man is free to choose. His choice is not suppressed. Thus freedom of choice makes man responsible for his decisions. When he chooses, he knows the risks and feels the dread of responsibility. The essential characteristic of subjectivity is unfettered freedom of making decisions and choosing the good against the evil. If this unfettered freedom is once denied the spirit of man becomes completely objective, that is to say, an object, conditional and governed by the laws which are not of his own choosing.

If the self is not governed by its own nature and by its own laws it cannot live a genuinely moral life which is the authentic life. By the phrase, 'its own nature'. I do not mean to be anything objective, external or universal since each person is unique in one's own self and this uniqueness of a person is his subjectivity.

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Kierkegaard does not accept the conditioning and governing by external laws, because this makes human behaviour mechanistic, and universalistic. The whole philosophy of Kierkegaard is against this mechanistic universalistic attitude. Any attempt at defining man in universal and objective terms would reduce him to an abstract motion, devoid of any flesh and blood, feelings and emotions. Such a defined notional human being is incapable of any responsibility, decision and commitment.

Also Kierkegaard would refuse to accept man as a part of the totality. A man is to him unique and complete in himself and not just a member of a society. As a part of the massive totality, again; he is reduced to nothing.

Kierkegaard was a religiously oriented thinker. So his interpretation of subjectivity has a religious overtone. The highest aim of man is to attain the complete inwardness. Inwardness is the relationship of the individual to himself before God.

The fame of introducing the notion of subjectivity is associated with the name of Kierkegaard yet from the very beginning of human reflection, whenever man turned inward and asked questions about himself, his source and nature of being, his 'wherefrom', 'wherefore', and 'whereto' the existential tendency emerged in philosophy.

Kierkegaard accepts the philosophy of socrates by saying "My task is a socratic task". He was steeped in Greek philosophy.

Socratic "know thyself" indicates his subjective acceptance in decisions. The example of his personal life supports the notion of subjectivity as it is propounded by Kierkegaard. The process of inwardness in order to enter into the depths of his own being is the message delivered by socrates. Socrates is of the view that one cannot know what one can do (from a moral point of view) unless one has some implicit knowledge of oneself.
Like Kierkegaard, Socrates also accepts the primacy of inner voice (daemon) in order to reach the truth. Socrates was against dealing with the metaphysical problems. He was rather interested in the problem of man and his existence.

The following passage supports the idea: "In the socratic view each individual is his own center, and the entire world centers in him, because his self knowledge is a knowledge of God. It was thus Socrates understood himself, and thus he thought that everyone must understand himself in the light of this understanding, interpreting his relationship to each individual with equal humility and with equal pride. 255

Kierkegaard thinks that the individual can be free, creative and truly his own authentic self, when he accepts his pains and suffering and accepts his guilt through his, ethical and religious commitment. By eating the fruit of wisdom, Adam separated himself from the being of his lord, and committed the original sin and suffered. By his complete surrender to him alone, he could regain his true self.

Thus Kierkegaard's philosophy of subjectivism asks and answers the most fundamental and vital questions of man's life. This is the only answer to the modern man whose individuality is being crushed under the wheels of machinery and the socio-economic systems of his age.

Hegel's philosophical "Absolutism" is criticized by Kierkegaard because it fails to explain the paradoxes of human existence and the prerequisites of faith. The paradoxes are:

(a) Man is never 'is', because by nature man is 'not'. Man is 'possibility' and not 'certainty'. In certainty, there is no freedom, choosing and becoming. So the reflective thought system cannot provide the scope of freedom, choosing and becoming in its certain doctrines.
(b) Man is both eternal and temporal. He is known to be an intersection of eternity and temporality. His actions are in time. His decisions take place in the reference of fading nature of the time yet he has eternity in his action because he acts always. He is a in a continuous process of becoming and not seized by a particular moment, so the paradoxes of human soul cannot be materialized by the abstract intellectualism.

According to Kierkegaard the truth of life is the movement from present to the future, which is unborn, unseen and unknown. Such a movement is truth creative. It is free but full of dread and pain. Tension is the mark of this creative movement. Hence men’s reality lies in tension and the creative movement. "In this tension and in pathos he has his life. Such an existence is pure and subjective.

System cannot explain the nature of freedom that is essential to selfhood. The self-hood is realized through actions and performances which cannot be programmed by philosophical thought. The solution of man’s problem can come only from subjective thinking, a thinking born in passion rather than in disinterested curiosity, not from contemplation of life in general but from the conduct of life in particular.

"A human -- being is a freedom caught in the intersection of time and eternity. 256 Such is the fate of human existence that he must suffer, from the contradictions because that is the price of existence which is passion and possibility. It is the predicament of becoming one's self.

If we substitute society for reason and intellect, the result will be the same deprivation of freedom. Society can give security to man but robs him of his true subjectivity. Since man is individual, he cannot take his decisions on the basis of the collective code of society, just as he cannot take his decisions on the basis of Universal Reason, on the ethical principle or on the basis of a
law of nature. Freedom is the franchise of human spirit. Therefore, man has to remain essentially alone, always isolated from the multitude of human beings with the problems, pain and prospects of his own person.

"Sprung from nature but cut loose from her umbilical, capable of knowledge but deprived of a certainty equal to the demands of action, the existing individual also stands in the midst of his fellow men, essentially alone".257

Kierkegaard is of the view that truth which needs to be proved from any source outside of itself is not truth. It cannot give us certainty of knowledge. Therefore, according to Kierkegaard subjectivity alone can be the source of certainty of knowledge and of truth. Any objective source would make truth depend on something alien to an independent truth itself. Nothing else can give us the truth. Subjectivity is the key -- stone of Kierkegaard's thinking.

But what is subjectivity? Kierkegard inverts the cartesian formula 'sum, Ergo, Cogito'. It means that the proof that I am an existing being is intuitively and subjectively known to me. For this I need not depend on any reflection, ratiocination, concatenation of objective proof. I am subjectively certain; I can never be certain in any subjectivity the only authentic proof of subjectivity is intuition. Therefore Kierkegaard thinks that "I am" is truth. It is the authenticity of myself. It is my subjectivity as an existing being and 'cogito', that I think and reflect follows from 'Sum' rather than 'sum' following from 'Cogito'.

Finally authentic existence for Kierkegaard "is always personal" "this person is concerned and passionately committed, though he does not confuse his own faith with world structure. He knows himself as a limited and contingent existence." 258
Kierkegaard does not negate the objective importance of the world. Besides the objective world, there is something which eludes man in the objective world and that is the real essence or Spirit of man, i.e. subjectivity. Subjectivity is the fundamental concept in Kierkegaard's philosophy, which amounts to avoiding excessive attachment to reason. Objectivity is not, altogether, fruitless or absurd. But there is an error where everything is sought to be explained in objective terms. The inner nature of man should never be talked about in objective language because, this is 'he' who lives and not the concept of 'He'. Not the universality but uniqueness in the truth of man. He is one of the society but he preserves his identity, and individuality. And it is never objective.

Jacques Maritain is another most widely known and most influential of contemporary catholic philosopher. Like his fellow existential thinkers Martian is also deeply dissatisfied with the prevailing intellectual atmosphere, rationalism, positivism and scientism. Existentialism, itself, is a kind of revolution against these tendencies that prevailed after world war. Existentialism in a general form, rejects objectivisation and universalisation. Maritian is no exception to it. Maritian is highly influenced by Thomist philosophy, but it does not mean that there is nothing his own but Thomism. Maritian is diverted towards the more practical problems with which he is preoccupied at the very initial stage. He was not reluctant to challenge the "pseudo metaphysics of scienticism". Thus, he is also, nearer to Kierkegaard in this respect.

As an existential theologian Maritain deals with the nature of God as well as the problem of man and existence. He is against universalisation and objectivisation of man like other existentialists.
"Subjectivity as subjectivity is inconceptualisable; is an unknowable abyss. It is unknowable by the mode of notion, concept or representation or by any mode of any science, whatsoever introspection, psychology or philosophy." Subjectivity as such is beyond definitions; it is not possible to know it by the means of notions. It can be known only by "concomitant" or spontaneous consciousness. "Subjectivity is not known. It is felt as a propitious and enveloping night. Like Indian Philosophy, the consciousness of one's inner self lies even in having consciousness of 'I'.

Maritain classifies, three specific and distinct forms of having knowledge of subjectivity, which are though, fragmentary and imperfect, are only possible means of knowing one's inner self. One, the practical knowledge, justifies the ethical and moral action of the man, and by this justification proves the inner conscience and moral prudence. The scale of good and evil and a natural diversion towards the higher good proves that man is not only what he seems to be but also has spiritual self in it, which constantly forces him to be good.

Second, the poetical knowledge lies in the creativity and aesthetical work of the being. The essential nature of man makes him able to something new, original and artistic. There is a natural bent towards beauty in human beings and this is beyond any objectification. Beauty is one of the highest values of human life and no one can negate the importance of this natural tendency.

Third and the last means of knowledge is mystical which indicates towards the things, Divine. There is a clear indication of the divinity in man. Man does not only think and feel, and is not confined to being ethical and aesthetical alone but he has also a thirst, for the Divine. Without this spiritual element, he cannot be a 'a true man'. This is the essential nature of being.

But it is not proper to consider these methods as the only means of knowing, because these methods are the notions of human mind and not free
from objectivity. The innerself of man is essentially subjectivity and beyond any definition or law.

It is evident that man is a part of society. He is a member of group and a very small unit of this universe, yet he maintains his individuality. He is not only one of the crowd but has his own importance which cannot be diminished by the crowd. "I know that I am one of the herd, no better than the rest, worth no more than the rest. I shall have been a tiny crest of foam, one moment goal in the twinkling of an eye, on the ocean of nature and humanity perspectives. ......... But whatever happens to the others is a mere incident in the picture but what happens to me, what I myself have to; is of absolute importance. 261 Thus he is nearer to Pascal and Kierkegaard in depicting the image of individual of subject.

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simply do not possess the cognitive faculties necessary to solve the mind-body problem cognitive closure, prevents our ever having access to that vital natural link which presumably exists between brain states and conscious states. See Colin McGim, 'can we solve the Mind - Body Problem ?', Mind 98 (189), 349 - 366.

On Congental insensitivity to pain.


229. Quoted in Robert Boakes, From Darwin to Behaviourism (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 40. This dictum is actually a version of the Aristotelian principle, "Nature does nothing in vain", couched in evolutionary terms.

230. Meditation II.


232. It may seem that Morgan and Descartes, are making the same point but they are not. Morgan's canon was virtually a biological application of the second law of thermodynamics, asserting that a complex biological system would not evolve if a simpler one could perform the same function of course, in applying this canon to 'Psychical' functions. Morgan seems to have committed himself to the view that more complex mental states require a more complex physical apparatus.

233. Philosophical Letter. 244. Thus Descartes admitted in his letter to More that his Thesis about animals was only probable.

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235. The terms 'Intentional stance' and 'design stance ' are D.C. Dennett's see his Brain Storms (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978), 3 - 22.


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249. Cp. S. Radha Krishna's "Man is subject, not object. This subjectivity gives him inwardness and freedom", The present Crises of Faith, p. 85.


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PART II

The word anthropology was first used in the philosophical faculties of German universities at the end of the 16th Century to refer to the systematic study of man as a physical and moral being. Philosophical anthropology is thus, literally, the systematic study of man conducted within philosophy or by the reflective methods characteristic of philosophy, it might in particular be thought of as being concerned with questions of the status of man in the universe, of the purpose or meaning of human life, and, indeed, with the issues of whether there is any such meaning and of whether man can be made an object of systematic study.

The term "philosophical anthropology was first introduced by A. G. Baumgarten in his Metaphysics and was sanctified by Kant. It meant than quite a different thing, namely empirical sociology or empirical social anthropology or, more accurately, at least in Kant's work, empirical sciences of man. What Kant has or would have labelled philosophical anthropology in our sense is, "The metaphysical foundations of morals", or "the metaphysical foundations of anthropology". 1 Il.Wien, has dealt with the origins of the modern term "philosophical anthropology" similar to the views of Max Scheler and Helmuth Plessner, and its meaning as the principle of a synthesis of all sciences dealing with man. 2

Modern philosophical anthropology originated in the 1920s. During the 1940s it became the representative branch of German philosophy. It arose with, and has absorbed, Lebensphilosophie existentialism, and phenomenology, although it is not identical with them.

Herder was the first German author to correlate biology and the philosophy of man. From him stems the conception of man as a deficient being

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who must compensate for his lack of natural tools and weapons by the creative use of weapons and technology. Hegel's theory of alienation and its Marxist version has become a vital element in philosophical anthropology's comprehension and critique of society.

Philosophical Anthropology

What does a philosophical anthropology include? What is anthropology in general and how does it become philosophical? "Anthropology" denotes a science of man. It comprises all the information that can be obtained about the nature of man as a being composed of a body, a soul, and a mind. The domain of anthropology includes not only those given verifiable properties which distinguish the human species from plants and animals but also man's talent abilities and the differences of character, race, and sex. And inasmuch as man not only appears as a natural being but also as a being that acts and creates, anthropology must also seek to know what man as an active being can and should "make of himself". His powers and obligations depend finally on certain basic attitudes which man as such is always capable of adopting. These attitude are called Weltanschauungen and the "psychology" of these includes the whole of the science of man.

Since anthropology must consider man in his somatic, biological and psychological aspects the results of such disciplines as characterology, psychoanalysis, ethnology, pedagogic psychology, the morphology of culture, and the typology of Weltanschauungen must converge in it. Hence, the content of such a science is not only vast but also fundamentally heterogenous of basic differences in the manner of formulating questions, the necessity of justifying the results acquired, the mode of presentation of the facts, the form of communication, and finally the essential presuppositions (of each of the
component disciplines). In so far as all of these differences and, in certain respects, the totality of the essent as well can be related to man and thus classified under anthropology, anthropology becomes so comprehensive that the idea of such a science loses all precision.

Anthropology today, there is not only the name of a discipline; the term denotes a fundamental tendency characteristic of the present position of man with regard to himself and to the totality of the essent. According to this tendency a thing is known and understood only when it receives an anthropological explanation. Today, anthropology not only seeks the truth concerning man but also claims to have the power of deciding the meaning of truth as such.

No other epoch has accumulated so great and so varied a store of knowledge concerning man as the present one. No other epoch has succeeded in presenting its knowledge of man so forcibly and so captivatingly as ours, and no other has succeeded in making this knowledge so quickly and so easily accessible. But also, no epoch is less sure of its knowledge of what man is than the present one. In no other epoch has man appeared so mysterious as in ours.

From the point of view of both the inner structure and the outer expression there is nothing more enigmatic in the world than man. No theory about the nature of man has ever claimed to be complete. There is something basically paradoxical regarding man's knowledge of himself. He finds himself to be there as a knowing consciousness and at the same time discovers, while he is in the knowledge situation, that there is an expanse of the unknown spread around what is known. Man's knowledge of himself, and of course of the world, is shrouded in an ocean of ignorance. Our pursuit of self-knowledge is a sort of dog-running-to-catch-its-own-tail game. Our being escapes from
our own act of knowing: we know thing and yet do not know enough what we know of it; somewhere our knowledge retains an eternal lack. 4

Formely, man was threatened not primarily by man, but by nature. Today, through science, nearly all natural phenomena have been or can be brought under man's control. Man is threatened neither by nature nor by the god who made nature, but by his own use of nature. Man's enemy is man, man made structures, or the god who made man. We are the first generation we are told in which man has become fully and thoroughly problematical to himself; in which he no longer knows what he, essentially, is but also at the same time knows that he does not know. In Kafka's simple but shattering phrase I lack nothing except myself. Samuel Beckett's Molloy listens, "and the voice is of a world endlessly collapsing". Such is our mood and milieu but, are we not responsible for what has happened? The loss of reality is due to a series of abdications and wrong choices. The image that we see focussed on the screen of history is our own projection. The wounds are selfinflicted. 5 "Will no one tell me what I am?", cried the anguished old king Lear. On the modern waste land there is no lack of voices to tell us what man is, rather what man is not. The insecure human being, is an extreme situation, that gives our epoch its physiognomy. Why we are here, is an old, impenerterable question, hard to avoid and beyond our means to answer. As a psychiatrist reported: "why is the world :" a question to which a mental patient could find no answer but from which he could also find no relief.

Man's ambivalence towards TRUTH and KNOWLEDGE remains a continuing dilemma. From the dawn of human civilization Man has yearned for knowledge and yet resisted it. The path-finders have been ridiculed and persecuted, sometimes to death, and then accepted and admired sometimes even worshiped. The discoveries of nature have encountered stubborn
emotional blinders. However inner reservations and irrational hesitations to the understanding of man have been much stronger, despite the long-cherished ideal of "know Thyself". The task has been made immensely more difficult because of the complexity of the subject-matter. Evidently the science of man is more elusive than the science of Nature. We know a little about Nature and also about human body, though in these areas also we remain ignorant about many things. We cannot predict earth quakes, nor do we understand fully psychosomatic illnesses. But our knowledge of human nature and personality is less satisfactory being partial, atomistic and fragmentary. And our knowledge about society is even more superficial.

Man remains an unsolved riddle and will continue to be so far more years. It is too early to attempt an integrated concept of man. We do not have all the pieces to complete the jigsaw puzzle of human personality. We need more information and our existing information need more refinement and greater accuracy. The understanding of man has to be multidisciplinary drawing upon biology, genetics, biochemistry, physics, physiology, sociology, anthropology, psychiatry and psychology. The Science of man has to await developments in all these fields. It has to wait for its Newton and Einstein, and though it may be a long waiting, it certainly will not be boring at all; instead, it will be filled with the thrills and excitements of the visions of new horizons.

"I regard anthropology as the principle of all research" says claude Levi strauss, and he makes it clear that he means all research, not only all social research: he quotes (note, p.248) the logician E. W. Beth (The Foundations of mathematics, Amsterdam, 1949, p. 151), to say "Logic and logistics are empirical sciences belonging the ethnography rather than psychology". This is an extreme form of anthropologism.
The whole of modern culture and technology is a stimulating phenomenological introduction to the philosophical knowledge of the interiority of man. The wonder that we feel before the marvels of technology is an invitation to admire the grandeur of the author of technology.

Prior to the birth of science and technology, man had already given proof of his greatness by his marvellous creations of art, poetry, and music. Phenomenology of the human subject is constituted by the works of his own ingenuity and by his ever increasing dominion over the world. Man, as a cosmic reality, occupies the summit of the pyramid of existents and contains all their values. Man knows no limits in scientific and technological progress. This limitless and ever progressive development calls for a philosophical exploration of the human subject to find the most radical justification which undoubtedly lies in the nature of thought and its relationship to existence.

In his study of man, Michael Polanyi discusses at length the thesis that since machines operate to specifications, technology is not reducible to physical science. To say that man is a machine, he says, is true, since we may patent inventions which operate to the same specifications to which animal organs operate. Yet, he concludes, this is not the reduction of physiology to physical science. But, in addition, man is higher than mere machines or other animals. "Animals may be lovable, but man alone can command respect: (p. 59) he possesses language, art, science. These are creatures of "cultural standards" such as the respect for the truth which enables one to stand up against the society which has taught him these standards (p. 61-2). Polyani follows this idea to the conclusion that men have minds above and beyond their mental capacities (p. 65).

As Alexander Pope said some centuries ago, "the proper study of mankind is man". If that was true when Pope wrote An Essay on man, it is
even more true today. It begins to dawn upon us that all the questions which
arise from our being in the world converge to the one overwhelming question:
what is man?

Questions of the form "What is it like to be such and such?" are not
always significant questions. The following, for example, are not significant
questions: "What is it like to be a planet?", "What is it like to be a mountain?",
What is it like to be a prime number?" Why are these questions non-significant?
These questions lack significance because, for a question of the form "What is it like to
be a planet?", "What is it like to be a mountain?", "What is it like to be a prime
number?" Why are these questions non-significant? These questions lack
significance because, for a question of the form "What is it like to be such-and
such?" to have significance, it is essential that being such-and-such should
involve having experiences on the part of whatever it is that is such-and-such;
and because being-a-planet, being-a-mountain, being-a-prime number, do not
require that certain configurations of matter or certain numbers should have, or
be capable of having, experiences of any kind for a question of the form "what
is it like to be such-and-such"? to have significance, it is not sufficient that
being-such-and-such should involve being-an-experient.

Consider some examples of questions of the above form which are
significant questions. "What is it like to be pilot?", "what is it like to be a
father?", "what is it like to be a prime minister?" Why are these questions
significant questions? Clearly they fulfill the condition that being-such-and-such
should involve crucial condition, such as the following one: For a question of
the form "what is it like to be such-and-such?" to be a significant question, it is
essential that whatever is such-and-such should not only, or merely, be such-
and-such. If a person is a pilot, he is not only, or merely a pilot; if a father,
then not only or merely, a father; if a prime minister, then not only, or merely,
a prime minister. What the fulfilment of this condition insures can be brought out in the following way. If a person is a pilot, but not only, or merely, a pilot, then he can compare and contrast his being-a-pilot with other actual or possible modes of his existence; e.g. being-a-father, being widely-travelled, etc.; and he may find, and we may agree with, that there were some experiences of his which illuminatingly tied up with his being-a-pilot. In this way we could expect from him, or on his behalf, an illuminating answer to the question "what is it like to be pilot?". The questions 'what is it like to be a father?', "what is it like to be a prime Minister?", also fulfil this condition, and achieve significance.

Jacob Bronowski in, "The Identity of man", claims in the final section, "Man is a machine by birth but a self by experience", Does the machine have experience and does experience render it a self? In section 6 of Part I Bronowski says 'Even a machine can become unique ......... a machine acquires an individuality. Can then a machine be active? The question hinges on the sense of action - that of a free agent - and so on the sense of freedom not subject to law in all respects. This links with individuality and experience by the thesis, Section 2 of part I, man's procedures for getting experience cannot all be formalized". To the extent that this is true of machines as well, adds Bronowski, it is so because "a machine is not a natural object, it is a human artifact". This is also the chief thesis of Norbert Wiener's classic, "God and Golem, Inc., A comment on certain points where cybernetics impinges on Religion".

Popper views man as a problem-solver and thus as a non-machine. Admittedly machines too can solve problems, but only to complete programming. Hence man indeed any animal - is an unprogrammed problem-solver. To this the standard reply is, we can have random programming. This,
replies, popper, is like random writing of books. It can be done, but then who will decide which few of the very many random books make sense and which few of those are interesting? The same idea is much elaborated by the great writer Jorge Luis Borges in diverse essays and stories. (Interest, of course, is purposeful)

The two yes-or-no-questions, is man divine in part, and is man good, and both central to philosophical anthropology of all ages throughout western-and even oriental thought. Strangely enough, the predominant answer is, man is divine in part and he is (due to his non divine or animal part) downright evil. The radicalist anti-traditional, anti-religious, enlightened, or rationalist, view is that man is wholly animal, yet (naturally) good. The argument for man's goodness thus from the assumption that matter is not good it does not follow that it is evil, it can be indifferent. Indeed, the material world, i.e. the world as a whole, is actually morally indifferent. All there is, then, is just facts, devoid of all motive power. And reason, whose task is to comprehend or copy reality, is thus likewise quite indifferent. What, then, activates us? Nothing but our animal drives drive us. The most famous saying on all this is David Hume's (Treatise, Book II, Part III, Section III). "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions". Clearly, Hume's saying expresses the doctrine of the natural goodness of man.

Man is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. And as a phenomenon and true to the nature of a phenomenon, he is partly disclosed and mainly in the nature of potentiality. Since his disclosed being in man is physical-behavioural, it has to be reconstructed from cosmogenesis and physical anthropology. man is said to be a neogenetic phenomenon, meaning thereby the gradual evolution of mind or mental property, and having a sub-mental legacy behind him. The very idea of studying man in a cosmogenetic context, rather than in a cosmological
one is prompted by an obvious dynamic consideration. The human phenomenon can certainly be studied in a static cosmological or physical framework. But by following the hominization or evolutionary process perhaps we could have a clearer image of what man is and what possibly he can be.

The relevance of physiology and psychology to the study of physical man is indisputable. But while these two disciplines are mainly concerned with particular men and examine their individual mental acts and behaviours, anthropology focuses attention on men in groups, on races and peoples and their happenings and doings. There is something in the very nature of man, or one might say, in man's own identity, in the recapture the changing identity of the past, and present, his own future image about himself. While the cosmogenetic evolution is marked by diminishing simplicity of elements and increasing complexity of their permutations and combinations, curiously enough, the human evolution is characterised more by the process of convergence and less by that of divergence. This is perhaps the main reason for man's uniqueness in the scheme of natural phenomena. He is an abnormal phenomena in the normalcy of nature. 13

It may be true, after all, that man is a rational animal, a mimetic animal, a symbolic animal, a tool-making animal, an information-processing animal, characterized by an eccentric positionality, from which he will not escape as long as he lives. The answers are there - and the quest goes on. For, though being a rational animal, man is at the same time the animal which, driven by selfishness, malice and fear, destroys its fellowbeings and, eventually, destroys itself (and there are for man, many ways of destroying himself). But even that is not the whole story, for man is, as far as we can see, the only being that in a world ravaged by anguish, hatred and terror and what not, desperately dreams the reckless dream of peace.
What mainly differentiates man from the rest of the animal world is his ability to signify and symbolize. All human achievements, propositions and speech acts to potteries and material relics, have an obvious common generic character. One might say, this is their symbolic character. Man's inalienable ability to comprehend objects, including sounds, stands in his way to blind imitation or faithful reproduction. His comprehension transforms imitation into production. It is only by introducing machine and relying on it that man can provisionally put stop to his generative-productive capacity. Whatever man does is marked by an element of volition. Even his faithful reproduction or representation of his own experience is somewhat unfair to the fact of his own experience. This unfairness is not an act of design or a part of a plan. Inspite of his organic ability and alertness, the human response to environmental stimulus is not exactly quantifiable. It is mainly for this reason that the radical theory of behaviourism miserably fails in the paradigm of symbolic activities, in the field of linguistic behaviour.

Whether we like it or not, we cannot avoid reference to 'internal states' like wills, impulses, feelings, purposes and so on. A rock's motion and a man's emotion, for example, are not objects of the same category. Even if we follow the rigorous scientific method of physics in physiology and psychology, we cannot totally dispense with the notions of internal states. There is always an element of psychological alchemy accounting for the lack of one-to-one correspondence between the input and output of the human communication and information. The tests devised to confirm or contradict a particular hypothesis regarding the input output relationship are themselves governed by a certain subjective considerations. Computerization of information theory is not an answer to this irremediable subjective element in the matters of theory construction and theory testing.
Language may be studied both from the descriptive or synchronic and the historical or diachronic points of view. It would be wrong to suggest that a historical structure is a succession of descriptive structures superimposed on one another and there is no distinction between the two. The descriptive approach is more suitable for the purpose of organizing and explaining a finite corpus while the historical approach can take better care of irremediable fragmentary volume of data and the changing features of the same or similar data under different circumstances or situations. The descriptive or taxonomic study of linguistics fails to account for the transformative features of language. That a language is indeed a form of life and that like all other forms of life it also undergoes silent but steady changes cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms of radical behaviorism or an archaic view of stimulus-response.

No sense nor instrument, no matter how powerful and accurate, is capable of grasping the difference between existence and the existent, between running and the runner, between studying and the student. This appears to have no importance and yet it is of fundamental importance. It is the task of philosophical anthropology to attain the deepest understanding possible of man in action.

Like all other existents, man presents himself as a total subsistent with a double basic structure, he is a body endowed with vegetative life like plants and with sensitive life like animal; but on the other hand, he is endowed with intellective life.

Like all the existents of cosmos, man presents himself as a dual structure: he is matter and yet, at the same time, more than matter. As a rose is more than matter, man is something more than his body. The things of the world are materialised - ideas i.e. matter shaped in such and such a grade of
existential perfection. Now, the person is a stupendous idea, a living word which shapes the body by endowing it with characteristics that have no counterparts in other forms of life. What then is the intimate structure of this being that is so singular and unique? There has been strenuous anthropological effort to explain the mystery called man, but without total success. All the sciences including ethnology, history, sociology, constitute an interesting introduction to philosophical anthropology but they are no substitute. Only philosophy is capable of going to the very root of anthropology, without the philosophical apprehension of existence, anthropology rests on sand.

Man is not only a multi-dimensional being, he is also an ambiguous being. His multi-dimensionality and ambiguity are intimately interrelated. His consciousness is transparent but not his body. Even of his consciousness it has been said that, though in itself it is diaphanous, it is not represented so to us. The presentation of consciousness to itself in a form or idea of consciousness is a matter of a very old controversy. To counter the thesis of body-as-form-of-consciousness, another thesis, consciousness-is-function-of-body, has also been offered long ago and its different formulations are popular in the pre-naturalistic quarters, both marxist and Positivist.18

The quest for the hidden logical structure of natural languages turns out be elusive for several reasons. First, it tends to deny the ontological commitment of natural languages. Secondly, the attempt to deontologize or dilute the referential character of logical language proves abortive.19 Finally, one is struck by the gradual discovery of a system of rules enabling one to penetrate the phonetic disguise of other man's thought. Successful actions and communications prompt us to believe that in terms of a language man can not only encode but can also decode the intentions of his "ghostly" thoughts and
"mysterious" encounters with the hidden reality. By virtue of his insight and symbolic ability man can penetrate the orthographic clothing of reality. 20

Men want not only a peaceful world but also a beautiful world. We want that our life, both individual and collective, should not only be perfect but also pleasant. We want peace and happiness. The haunting spectre of poverty and misery could not destroy our hope for better days, light and delight.

Hoping is inherent in the human nature. Man knows that he is mortal He lives his life under the shadow of death; yet he talks of immortality, develops elaborate systems and detailed arguments in support of his understandable belief in the immortality of soul. Not only that man cannot meet his own end, he even hates the idea of death. He dislikes it. It makes him deeply sad. the shadow of death brightens up and depends his consciousness and makes it more creative. It reveals one of the most noble and yet "unrealistic" dimensions of the human being.

Human existence is unique, unique in the sense that it is more potential then what is disclosed of it behaviorally and otherwise. The human existence is multi-dimensional, a bottomless pit or to change the metaphor, an endless height. The limits of the metaphor have to be clearly borne in mind. We have also pointed out that man is finite, fallible and mortal. Here lies the ambiguity of the human identity. While his consciousness and action are functionally subject to many conditions, in principle his potentiality is infinite. And therefore we find his perpetually a self-exceeding being.

We must recognise that concreteness is not the same as materiality. The foundations of philosophical anthropology begins with the rediscovery of integral human experience in all its existential dimensions.

Man is the only existent that is capable of experience by means of the intellect. In man the experience of infrahuman existents is gathered up,
intensified and amplified. Human experience assumes the dimensions of the intellect which is the faculty of the act of being.

Existence is the radical perfection that constitutes existents in their singularity as well as in their totality. To experience this perfections. The intellectual experience. In this sense, it is transcendental, i.e. total and universal.

Man is a being who is capable of experiencing the totality of things because he is capable of experiencing them at their root where there is both commonness and "properness". To limit man to the level of pure sensible experience and to preclude him from the most intimate and penetrative mode of grasping things (nothing is more intimate to things than existence), is to impoverish his vital space. It is to shut him up in a prison where the life of the spirit is suffocated. To deprive man of this radical experience is to cast him into a radical alienation, sooner or later, his spirit will revolt, it will contest and protest against a culture that has subordinated him to things, making him their slave which is worse than alienation.

All phenomanalistic philosophies alienate man because they deprive him of that which is proper to him - the intellectual grasp of the existence of things. To restore man to the fullness and plenitude of his experience is to restore him to himself and to liberate him from a fundamental alienation.

Scientific technological conquests are not sufficient for human developments and self-fulfilment; even the overthrow of social injustice is insufficient. Prior to giving back to man what is his own, it is necessary to restore him to himself, to give him the possibility of conducting himself with his intellect in the world in which he lives.

Man's fallibility freedom and mortality rationally suggest what sort of a just society he should try to realize. Because of his mortality he would
naturally like to achieve the aims and objectives which he himself believes in and shares with his fellow human beings. Time, especially his own life-time, is very important to him. This does not necessarily lead to a myopic and hedonic ideology: for his self-exceeding character is no less influential than the time which heavily weighs on his being.

In the last resort the question of philosophical anthropology is not: what is man? a question to which, theoretically, an answer might be found, and then we finally have the definition we have for such a long time been looking for in vain. In the last resort the question is: who am I? The human sciences cannot tell me who I am, even though they can say many things about me—many more than I care to know philosophy cannot tell me who I am, even though the great pictures of man can give me an inkling of what it is to a human being. I have to decide all by myself who I am and by my decision I say at the same time who I desire to be. The answer is not a scientific one, it is admittedly, utterly unscientific out of tune with all the answers which the university so eagerly teaches—but then, man is certainly not a scientific animal; as soon as he becomes a scientific animal, he ceases to be man. It is not even a philosophical answer. The answer is a commitment and I alone can commit myself.

The sciences—natural, biological, social—have made available to us a vast storehouse of information about human being and their modes of existence, about the forms and structure and processes of development of their social organization, and so on. Nevertheless all this information, perhaps it should even be called knowledge, pales into insignificance when it is contrasted with the qualitatively utterly distinct and unique and special understanding each one of us has of what it is like to be a human being, we not only are human beings, we are self-conscious creatures, we have an immediate and inward
acquaintance with what it is like to be a human being. And this acquaintance, it should be called knowledge, is not, unlike scientific knowledge about human beings, of an inherently fragmentary kind. Our grasp of what it is like to be a human being is of its nature holistic. One could say that selfconsciousness fills the space of our beings, although it is constantly developing. A man's inward understanding of what it is like to be a human being may not, unlike scientific knowledge about human beings, enable him to predict and control the course of human affairs, including the course of his own life, in any remarkable way. Nevertheless it is only the former, and not the latter, kind of the knowledge that constitutes, authentic understanding of a human being.

There can be, and indeed are, two distinct approaches to the understanding of human reality: One outside-in and the other inside-out. Although ultimately the answer to the question what is man? Will have to comprehend explanations of all the factors that go to constitute the entire human reality, the outside-in approach is at the basis of all empirical sciences and rational analyses and the inside-out approach is crystallized in ontologies.

The empirical studies of human phenomena begin with the consideration of man as an object, an incarnate and observable being, i.e., one that can be dissected, experimented on, manipulated with instruments, measured, x-rayed. The empirical view of man, therefore, tries to avoid every reference to his inside, his feeling self. It is the basic requirement of this view to objectify man, to investigate him by divorcing him from his inwardness, to attempt into to state the unstatable existential meaning of "being human". For this view man must be explained outside-in, i.e., he must be regarded as a specimen of the behavioural set and brought under scientific laws. man, as a biological, physiological, psychological, chemical and social entity, according to the
outside-in approach, is a fully analysable system. Whatever we wish to know about him, therefore, is possible to be articulated by means of empirical laws.

There is no doubt that the scientists outside-in access to man has remarkably advanced our knowledge of various characteristics of the human species. When scientists analyse a human being, for instance, they reduce him to a definite behaviour pattern. The behaviour pattern thus established and stated in scientific language provides us with an account of the actual and possible human effects to different stimuli.

The outside-in explanations for the phenomenon of man, so far as their logical character is concerned, are invariably flawless because they make it a point not to construct unwarranted or transempirical hypothesis. They try to strictly adhere to the principle of stating only what is observed or observable, of establishing the truth of every proposition strictly empirically. So in many of the scientific philosophies today, where solutions to problems seek to be outside-in, every statement referring to man's inside is translated into the statement of behaviour. Statements about mental acts, about consciousness or ego, existential experiences, statements of private meanings, are all reached through the behavioural and physical formulations. In the process, man's subjectivity-his "inner space". One of the eternal mysteries into which our inward seeking sensibility continually runs, is lost.

The design of the inside-out study of human consciousness is to bring out the ontological structure of what we are. In fact this study is more than scientific for it proceeds from the "roots" of consciousness's very act of experiencing. It tries to grasp those roots and find out that expressions they take in our overt behaviour. Unlike the domain of scientific philosophy, for the ontological understanding of man the testability of statements or syntactically "clear" verbalisations are not the exclusive criterion of human experience. The
inside of man is to be seen first and articulated latter, to be felt before it is ratiocinated. It is to be mapped out by the inward - seeing sensibility\textsuperscript{21} i.e., a sort of transcendentated vision - whether the findings of such sensibility satisfy or not the requirements of logic and language and reason.

The thesis that human consciousness is intentional - originally put forward by Edmund Husserl and now unhesitatingly accepted by phenomenologists and existentialists suggests perhaps the most primordial quality of our existence. Consciousness is always the "consciousness of". The awareness I have of the physical world and of myself as an embodied mind cannot be separated from my being. To-be-conscious-as-man is to be worldly, i.e., to have a psychic structure directed towards objects, to contain and know that the world is there. Thus "being intentional" is being directed toward the world" both the expressions point out what can be termed the arrow - head character of man's entire psycho-physical existence.

However, our inside has dimensions that cannot be exhaustively fathomed. We reach them by an act of transcedence. In its inward journeys so to say consciousness can see itself running into a volley of meanings, nuances, perspectives, each of which appears like a creation, an occurrence from nowhere. Actually the unfolding of the archaeology of these meanings is one of the most interesting although most difficult - tasks in the ontological studies of consciousness. Creativity is the very core of our inner life; it is the very spirit of man.\textsuperscript{22}

Self-transcendence is the essence of human consciousness. In every experience or act of his, man surpasses himself-as-given, figures as something more than his cognitive self. Human consciousness does not contain itself like an object. Being a ceaseless flux, its inward movement is without any boundaries. This is why its precise characterisation is not possible. It
constantly creates its views toward the given, generates and re-constructs meanings and throws them on to the given. There is thus no preconceived rational scheme which our inside adheres to. It is a person, an urge, a pure spontaneity, freedom.

So far as the ultimate reach of the transcental process in man is indeterminate, the whole consciousness he has of the world is seen by him as if it had no origin. Every experience bears an internal mobility, a vagueness of contents, a hollowness at its very bottom. If we try to account for its origin or to determine its necessary and conclusive ground we will find ourselves merely fumbling in a domain of sheer emptiness.

This emptiness pervades the depth of our inside. One intuits, it as a vast limitless, vacuous expanse from which intensions emerge totally spontaneously. There are no laws-and perhaps there could not be any-for the emergence of these intensions. Like Plato's Ideas, they appear to descend on us from a totally unfamiliar "otherworld". We know them only after they settle down in definite linguistic and logical moulds, after they are apprehended within specific modes of thinking.

Man's conception of the world is largely the result of these transcendentally originated intensions or meaning-residue. There seems to be a strange, "dark" territory behind our consciousness a pre-conscious, pre-reflective territory - from which our weltanschauung emanates. Everything that our existence - in - the - world means to us the feeling of being-present-in-the-world and of being-posed-amidst-objects-and-persons, our time-and space-consciousness, our mode of thinking and using a language, etc. - arises from this territory. In this connection one is reminded of Martin Heidegger's words. In his brief uber den "Humanismus" (1947; Brief letter on Humanism), Heidegger wrote:
Are we really on the right track toward the essence of man as long as we set him off as one living creature among others in contrast to plants, beasts and God? When we do this we abandon man to the essential realm of animality but attribute a specific difference to him: In principle we are still thinking of homo animalitas even when anima (soul) is posited as animus sivemens, and this in turn is later posited as subject, person, or spirit (geist). Such positing is in the manner of metaphysics.

Naturalistic definitions of man fail, because like all traditional metaphysical definitions they naively assume that we know what we mean when we ascribe being to it.

Unless view of the inside of man is complete we cannot claim to know human life and human behavior fully. The elementary pre-conscious sphere which borders on a void or nothing impinges on our notion of the empirical reality and becomes the subjectivity - stuff that we basically are. It is the sphere of freedom, creativity and Being of which we are ordinarily unaware, or only intermittently aware.

Consciousness, as it is directed toward something or other, figures as a kind of gleam discovering whatever it falls upon. It is a capacity to radiate meanings, to present to itself this or that, and, in absence of anything concretely given to present itself to itself. It is this activity of discovering-by-radiation concerning man's inside that was most perspicaciously suggested by samkara one of the most wonderful inside-out theoreticians in the world-by characterising the self as light (prakasa). It is the very nature of human reality to discover itself by discovering the world, to find itself to be there as a watchful witness of itself, to reveal itself by revealing itself-in-the-world. If we are able to define the exact nexus between consciousness's act of experiencing
and that toward which this act is directed, the noesis and the noema, we will have found an answer to the riddle why the world is there as it is.

Our inside performs a ceaseless act of transcendence over the outside, over the given; it perpetually runs towards the pre-conscious, the pre-reflective, the pre-meant, as if this latter area were its only primitive source. Those Being philosophers like Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Samkara and Josiah Royce who tried to show that man as he is in the world is an urge toward being, i.e., toward his transcendental foundation, rightly looked upon him as imperfect and alienated. To surmount his state of imperfection, to seek a unison with that from which he has fallen apart, is the final objective of man. Human consciousness is a striving for the realization of that which would fill up the "lack" in it, make it super human so to say, convert it into pure freedom.

The man-in-the-world is a structure, a total being, on the surface of which lies the sense - experience and a the innermost core the pre-conscious limitless chiaroscuro. Although, therefore, our being-in-the-world is committed to objects it cannot be exhausted by them. Even when one studies the world scientifically, i.e., outside-in, by applying ones rational faculty and observational technique, one is primarily "intentional" toward it, one cannot help bearing a certain a priori view of it. One necessarily takes it as meant in a specific way. Man's intentionality pervades the whole of his outlook towards life and the world. It is the most unconditioned, the most fundamental reach of human consciousness in regard to its objects. And it is pregnant with nuances with a panorama of meanings, most of which remains untraceable in articulation. This is why one can have different perspectives on the same perceived or known object. One can look at it from multiple points of view. Thus what is intentional has its rise in the pre-conscious, the pre-reflective, and therefore is
for ever shrouded in mystery. It is this mystery that makes man ontologically one of the most ambiguous entities on earth.

Adolf Portmann's (bioanthropologists) central concept is "internality", the fact that individuals are centers of purposeful activity who use the external shell of the body as a means of self-expression and of communication with other individuals. Portmann does not claim that the affirmation of man's individuality and sociability provides the "meaning of life". Although specific mysteries of man's biological structure have been solved, he claims, the "basic fact" for philosophical anthropology continues to be man's "mysteriousness". Man has no built-in evolutionary mechanism leading to an equilibrium; there is only a creative variability (Disponibilität) of the human situation. Man's spontaneous individuality creates new self-images; his sociability spreads and maintains them.

Human consciousness's reach out to the outside and to the inside to the real object (whatever it may itself be) and the pre-conscious, to the given in experience and pre-given in itself, speaks of its inner bouncing from one sphere to another without losing its identity. Man has the peculiar quality of stretching his inside along a spectrum of meanings, a variety of noesis-noema combinations, a total comprehension of which would lead one to the depth of the "subterranean" regions behind consciousness. Indeed, the noesis-noema structure is epistemically positive. It has an experimental purview, a colligation of meanings grasped as present in time, a solid nucleus around which the meaning consciousness keeps on hovering. This meaning-consciousness need not express itself in a linguistic behavior-its manifestation in language is something contingent, and very often directed toward a social purpose.

The task of phenomenological philosophy is to examine and make explicit all the intentional objects of human consciousness. Transcendental
phenomenology is concerned with the conditions immanent in experience which make any scientific knowledge possible. As the critique of consciousness phenomenological philosophy is essentially philosophical anthropology since it seeks in human consciousness the source of "objective" reality & meaning.

The concept of the Lebenswelt is the connecting link between modern anthropology and phenomenology. Contemporary anthropologists frequently describe cultures as 'the designs for living' historically constructed by man for life in society. A culture represents one possibility of existence which has been realized in a particular ecological environment.

The anthropologist studies man as a part of nature subject to natural law in interaction with his ecological environment. But man is also a being with an intentional autonomous consciousness, which is the source of his experience of nature & of his cultural creativity, which is not given by nature. Cultural reality introduces a new dimension of experience not given by the order of nature, it is a mode of reality which has to be willed into existence through human work and invention. For the anthropologist man is both the subject and object of his cultural experience. He is both free to create his cultural life-world and yet is determined by it once it has been created and brought into existence. This is the ultimate "paradox of human subjectivity" being a subject for the world and at the same time being an object in the world", as Heussler puts it.24

Like existentialism and Lebensphilosophie, philosophical anthropology studies man's existence, his experiences, and his anxieties, combining the subjectivism of existentialism with the cultural objectivism of Lebensphilosophie. It uses the phenomenological methods of verstehen and reduction. Philosophical anthropology shares with existentialism, phenomenology, and Lebensphilosophie a critique of society. Yet these
currents are not identical. Heidegger and Jaspers, for example, refuse to be identified with philosophical anthropology, despite their great impact on it.

Philosophical anthropology seeks to interpret philosophically the facts that the sciences have discovered concerning the nature of man and of the human condition. It presupposes a developed body of scientific thought, and accordingly in its program it aspires to a new, scientifically grounded metaphysics. It seeks to elucidate the basic qualities that make man what he is and distinguish him from other beings. It combines, and mediates between, what Kant designated as physiological and pragmatic anthropology.

Physiological anthropology studies man's natural limitations; pragmatic anthropology deals with man's potentialities with what he, as a free agent, makes of himself, or is able and ought to make of himself. Thus, philosophical anthropology studies both man as a creature and man as the creator of cultural values - man as seen by a scientific observer and man as interpreted by himself. (Aussen - and Innenansicht). Accordingly, most philosophical anthropologists wish to combine scientific methods with an imaginative philosophical approach.

Philosophical anthropology seeks to correlate the various anthropologies that have developed with the specialization of the sciences. Max Scheler distinguished between scientific, philosophical and theological anthropologies, or interpretations of the fundamental structure of human activities, which know nothing of one another.

Several years ago, Max Scheler said of philosophical anthropology. "In a certain sense, all the central problems of philosophy can be reduced to the question of man and his position and metaphysical situation within the totality of Being, the world and God". But Scheler also saw, and with great clarity, that the many determinations relative to the essence of man cannot be simply
packed together, as it were, in a common definition. "Man is so broad, motley, and various a thing that the definitions of him all fall a little short. He has too many sides".

By co-ordinating and interpreting fragmented knowledge, philosophical anthropology aims at a new understanding of man's essential qualities and potentialities. It aims to accomplish this by the development of suitable methods, by a factual elucidation of the perplexities inherent in human institutions, and by borderline research (coordinating different branches of the sciences) used as a basis for a new "map of knowledge".

Philosophical anthropology embraces most of the social sciences. Some leading practitioners, such as Arnold Gehlen, emphasize the concept of action, rather than man, as the distinguishing feature of philosophical anthropology, and define it as a new empirical discipline, Handlungs wissenschaft (similar to "behavioral science" and the "theory of action"), as distinct from the natural sciences and the Geisteswissenschaften.

Philosophical anthropology is an attempt to construct of a scientific discipline out of man's traditional effort to understand and liberate himself. At the same time, however, it is pervaded by the same antiscientific currents that mark existentialism, Lebensphilosophie, and phenomenology. But it is its dialogue with science that gives philosophical anthropology its peculiar character.

Philosophical anthropologists see a crises of science", a crisis first brought into view by three "humiliations of man". First, the humiliation of copernican astronomy removed man's habitat, the earth, from the center of the universe; Second Darwin's biological evolutionism "shamed and degraded" man and third, the historical schools revealed the relativity of religious and national cultural values.
An anthropology may be said to be philosophical if its method is philosophical, i.e., if it is pursued as an inquiry into the essence of man. In this case anthropology strives to distinguish the essent we call man from plants, animals, and every other type of essent, and by this delimitation it attempts to bring to light the specific essential constitution of this particular region of the essent. Philosophical anthropology then becomes a regional ontology of man, coordinated with other ontologies with which it shares the whole domain of the essent.

It is also possible for anthropology to be philosophical if, as anthropology, it determines either the objective of philosophy or its point of departure or both at once. If the objective of Philosophy lies in the development of a Weltanschauung, then anthropology must define the position of man in the cosmos. And if man is accepted as that essent which, in the order of establishing an absolutely certain knowledge, is absolutely the first given and the most certain then it is inevitable that, following the plan of philosophy thus conceived, human subjectivity be placed at the very center of the problem. The first task is compatible with the second and both, as modes of anthropological inquiry, can avail themselves of the method and the results of a regional ontology of man.

Philosophical anthropology rejects the cartesian dualism of body and soul: man is not part animal and part spirit but a being sui generis, distinct from animals in physical condition and in aspirations. This attitude, together with philosophical anthropology's theological roots, may account for a nearly universal (although currently weakening) rejection of Darwin and Freud for allegedly appealing to the forces of primitivism and animality in man. At the same time, many philosophical anthropologists reject modern intellectualism, their rejection of rationality, like that of many existentialists and
Lebensphilosophies, has its roots in the romantic reaction to the enlightenment and the French Revolution. In its suspicion of Verwissenschaft ("Scientism"), philosophical anthropology perpetuates the traditional German attacks on *Reflexions-philosophie*, in which the non-rational aspects of reality are alleged to be ignored.

Philosophical anthropology's conception of method was formulated by Wilhelm Dilthey and Edmund Husserl. Husserl's non-empirical phenomenological approach to philosophical questions was claimed to be presuppositionless, wholly scientific, and logically prior to the natural sciences. It is concerned with meanings, an intuitive comprehension of directly experienced essences, and it involves a distinct method for "analyzing" (or rather, interpreting) facts, qualities, relationships, and the basic categories of human nature and culture—a method of analysis different from that which results in an explanatory theory. However, such thinkers as the biologist Adolf Portman and the psychologist Karl Jaspers attempt to combine the scientific and interpretative approaches.

Philosophical anthropology sees man as essentially *homo absconditus*, inscrutable, an open question. Man must formulate his destiny so that he is not held rigidly in one role but safeguards his creative freedom. The direction in which his freedom permits man to fulfill himself is not amenable to scientific discovery, and thus science is devalued. Man's choices depend on his philosophical understanding of his own position in the world. An infinite variety of choices is open to man. What distinguishes man's nature is not how he chooses, but that he does choose that he is not determined by his biological and physiological constitution but is formed in the light of cultural values he himself has created and internalized. Philosophical anthropology's contribution to the study of culture is its emphasis on the creative element in the unfolding of the various conceptions of man's position in the world. Therefore, man's
self-understanding, or self image, is a central theme of philosophical anthropology.

What we need in our post-modern culture which has, with much clash of arms done away with all the grands recits, is contradictory. We need a new vision of man, of his humanity and his responsibilities, of what it is to be a decent human being. This may look, and it may well be that it even is, old-fashioned, but no society can continue to exist without a compelling vision of man. Deconstructionism is perhaps one of the ways in which man can destroy himself. At the same time however, and here is the contradiction, philosophy has to guard against a situation in which the quest for man ends, because finally a confortable answer for a brave new world has been found. It is exactly in this fight against post-modern relativism and against totalitarianism that philosophical anthropology has its home.

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