CHAPTER IV
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SELF /
CONCIousness / EGO

Nothing in recent philosophy approaches the supreme confidence with which Husserl announced his triumphant beginning of a new science of philosophy, an "absolute" discipline achieved by means of an elaborately worked out method. It was advanced as the real positive outcome of the philosophical efforts of the centuries. In fact all preceding philosophers were classified by him as either adumbrating or falling short of the ideals of phenomenology. There is something majestic and heroic about the tone of Husserl. His is not an opinion hastily advanced. More than fifty years of consecutive reflection and hard work, resulting in numerous superb examples of descriptive analysis, have made it necessary to greet his claim with respect and to give his contentions a hearing. The thought and contributions of one of the most penetrating and thorough of the philosophers of the last century deserve more widespread attention than they have received. A thoroughgoing consideration of his philosophy is now made all the more necessary in view of the insistent claim that his philosophy is still unknown,¹ and the philosophers own repeated assertion that he had been misunderstood.

Prominent in philosophy at the close of the nineteenth century was a standpoint known as "psychologism". The philosophy of a given period has always been conditioned and influenced by the leading scientific ideas, particularly, by those which were new. Thus rationalism in modern philosophy reflected the advances in the mathematical and physical sciences. In the period under consideration the rising science of psychology had a two fold significance for German philosophy: it suggested a sure way of solving perplexing problems of logic and the theory of knowledge, and it afforded either a substitute or a
supplement to the idealistic standpoint in philosophy. Psychologism had already been prominent in English philosophy, J.S. Mill having been a recent representative. In Germany, Wundt, Sigwart, and Lipps may serve as example. Natorp, Brentano, Stumpf, and later Frege are of particular importance, as providing the main historical background for Husserl. The reaction against psychologism was clearly illustrated in Natorp's early writings.

Psychologism was an extreme point of view and a reaction was inevitable. Natorp's review of Theodor Lipps 'Basic Facts of Mental Life' is an early indication of such a reaction Lipps regarded psychology as constituting the basis of philosophy, but Natorp expresses doubt as to the possibility of "basing" logic and the theory of knowledge upon psychology. Lipps considered such topics as the psychological ground of the principle of contradiction and the general function of concepts in knowledge. In this view, the genetic derivation of the basic laws of knowledge out of original facts of psychical life was identical with their "epistemological" foundation; the theory of knowledge was a branch of psychology. Every one will concede to Lipps, Natorp remarked, that psychical facts are represented in the laws of knowledge, and that these facts, as psychical, are also an object of investigation for psychology. Knowledge is admittedly only a psychical process, in the form of concepts and theories, or in general as consciousness. Even the truth as something objectively valid must be investigated by means of the consciousness which thinking beings have of it. The concepts and the truth of geometry are psychical facts in that sense, and yet Euclid's axioms are not regarded as psychological laws by anyone, nor does anyone suppose that its objective certainly depends, upon the psychological understanding of geometrical presentations. Natorp merely emphasized the fact that the consciousness of truth is independent of all genetic explanation by means of
general psychological connections, and called attention to the independence of an objective foundation of the principles of knowledge. The critique and the psychology of knowledge, in his view, require and condition each other. An indication of his point of view is given by his assertion that a law of knowledge is a priori, just as every law is a priori as opposed to that which is subject to the law.

Natorp's early reaction against psychologism is also expressed in a paper on the objective and the subjective foundation of knowledge\(^3\), in which he argued that there is either no logic, or it must be build entirely on its own ground, and not borrow its foundations from any other science. Those that make logic to be a branch of psychology assume that psychology is the basic science, and that logic is at best an application of psychology. Natorp asserted that not only the meaning of logic but the meaning of all objective science is ignored and almost perverted into its opposite, if one makes the objective truth of knowledge to be dependent upon subjective experience. To base logic upon subjective grounds would be to annul it as an independent theory of the objective validity of knowledge. Hence Natorp was not only defending sense of the term, but also the claim to objective validity that is made by all science, when he maintained that the objective validity must also be objectively founded. He formulated as a presupposition of objective science the precept that true scientific knowledge may depend only upon those laws which can be brought to certainty in the inner connection of science, and which are developed in a logical form, independently of all presuppositions that might be introduced from elsewhere. Thus all recourse to the knowing subject and its capacity for objective science is ruled out as completely foreign. Natorp was very clear in affirming that the objectivity of science requires the
"overcoming" of subjectivity. His view of scientific truth is compatible as far as it goes, with Husserl's later ideal of a regorous science of philosophy, but it does not go so far as even to suggest the idea of a universal science, or of a "root-science" of philosophy. The object of Natorp's criticism was psychologism, however, and he succeeded in formulating the issue clearly. He pointed out that scientific truth as illustrated in mathematical natural science, becomes certain for us on the basis of objective presuppositions, and he insisted upon autonomy of such science. The mathematicism and the physicist were not to look for the ground of the truth of their cognitions in psychology.

The expression "objective validity" was used to indicate independence of the subjective aspect of knowing. Its positive meaning was less clear to Natorp. The idea that there are objects outside of and independent of all subjectivity would be one answer, but Natorp believed that the "being-in-itself" of the object was itself a riddle, in conformity no doubt to his unresolved kantianism. He held that the object's independence of the subjectivity of knowing could only be understood by means of an abstraction, for objects really are given to us only in the cognition that we have of them. Thus it would be necessary to abstract from the content of subjective experience. In Natorp's view, the true beginnings and bases of knowledge are final objective unities. In mathematics it is not the phenomena that are basic, but rather the fundamental abstractions, which are expressions of the unity of the determination of possible phenomena, such as point, line, straightness, and equality of magnitude. All of these involve the fundamental function or "objectification", and the Kantian and Platonic "Unity of the manifold". It is only in this way that the uniquely determined "phenomena": of science are possible. Natorp argued that there must be determining and "positing" function, in order to make this positivity possible. In a later discussions he
understood to see how the kind of foundation which he used was objective in the sense in which mathematical procedure is objective, and to show that formal logic must be based upon the logic of objective knowledge, or transcendental logic.

Another important idea of the time was the ideal of freedom from presuppositions in philosophical procedure. This ideal was taken by Husserl in the Logical Investigations as an obvious requirement that is to be imposed upon epistemological investigation.

It is possible to point out the direct influences upon his thought at the beginning of his career. They were derived from a few sources to begin with although Husserl was later to approach philosophers who were at first avoided or neglected. Natrop, Volkelt, Schuppe, and Rehmke may be singled out as typical representatives of the rising generation of idealists whose works were to be prominent in the philosophical literature of the coming decades. Their published writings were either closely read by Husserl, as in the case of Natrop, or they may be regarded as developments parallel to Husserl's which responded to similar motives. The Orientation to Kant's philosophy, always prominent in Germany, was to be of great significance for Husserl. Brentano, who is not easily classified, combined scholasticism and the philosophy of Aristotle with empiricism. He inaugurated a fruitful period of development in psychology, Stumpf being one of his earliest productive disciples. The modern development of symbolic logic which was begun in England by Boole, was carried on in Germany by Schröder and Frege. These scholars may be cited particularly in reviewing the philosophical scene into which Husserl entered when he joined the faculty of the University of Halle in 1887. They represent a special section of the German philosophical world of the time reflecting his early interests.
Husserl was a Disciple of Brentano "My teacher Brentano" was an expression frequently heard in Husserl's classroom. Intellectually his debt to Brentano was considerable in the early period; but it was the moral element and the personal example of Brentano which led him to choose philosophy as a life work, and which constituted a lasting influence upon him. Husserl was a greatful student of Brentano, whom he accompanied, along with Stumpf on occasion, during vacation trips. He was not at the time prepared, however, to profit fully by such contact. The effectiveness of Brentano as a teacher is sufficiently shown by the number of noted scholars owing their start to him, a group including Stumpf, Husserl, Meinong, Höfler, and Marty.

Among the men who exercised a lasting influence upon Husserl was Marsaryk, whom he met during his first semester in Leipzig, in 1876. Husserl was seventeen years of age at the time, and Marsaryk, his senior by eight years and already a doctor, guided his younger compatriot. Because of Husserl's dominant interest in astronomy, Marsaryk's advice that he go to Brentano was not taken at the time. After three semesters he went to Berlin; where he found in Weierstrass a teacher who impressed upon him the ideal of the impersonal devotion to truth of the real scientist. Having taken his degree and completed the customary year of military service in Vienna, he renewed personal contact with Marsaryk, who was then instructor in the University of Vienna. It was then that he heard Brentano, and made the crucial decision to become a philosopher. His feeling of personal indebtedness to Brentano outlasted the inevitable philosophical break with the latter, a step which cost him much inner struggle.

Husserl has left a revealing tribute to Brentano in his contribution to a Brentano memorial volume. He attended Brentano's lectures for two years, from 1884 to 1886, after having completed his formal university studies in
which philosophy had been a minor subject. Brentano lectured on practical
philosophy elementary logic and its necessary reforms, and also on selected
psychological and aesthetic questions. Husserl was then in doubt as to
whether he would devote himself to philosophy or remain with mathematics,
and Brentano’s lectures decided his choice. Although he had been repeatedly
advised by his friend Masaryk to study with Brentano, he relates that it was
out of curiosity that he first attended the lectures, for Brentano was much
discussed in Vienna at the time, admired by some, and reviled by others as a
Jesuit in disguise. He was impressed from the beginning by the slender form
with the mighty head. The expressive facial lines seemed not only to bespeak
mental labor, but also deep mental struggles. Brentano impressed him as one
who was always conscious of having a great mission. The language of the
lectures was free from all artificiality and display of wit. The peculiar soft,
veiled, tone of voice and the priestly gestures made him appear to be a seer of
eternal truths and an announcer of another world. Husserl relates that he did
not long resist the power of his personality despite all prejudices. It was from
these lectures that he gained the conviction that Philosophy is a field for
earnest work which can be treated in the spirit of the most rigorous science
and this led him to choose philosophy as a life work.

Brentano was most effective in the seminars, in which the following
works were studied. Hume’s Enquiry concerning Human Understanding and
Principles of Morals, Helmholtz’s speech on “The Facts of perception”, and Du
Bois-Reymond’s “Limits of Natural Knowledge”. He was at that time especially
interested in questions of descriptive psychology, which he discussed with
Husserl. In the lectures on elementary logic he treated the descriptive
psychology of continua and took account of Bolzano’s Paradoxes of the
Infinite, and also the differences between “intuitive and non-intuitive”, “clear
and unclear" "distinct and indistinct", "real and unreal", and "concrete and abstract" ideas. Other topics included the investigation of judgement and descriptive problems of phantasy. How great an influence was due to Brentano is amply shown by Husserl’s early writings as well as by later investigations in logic and the theory of knowledge. His indebtedness to Brentano was explicitly and gladly acknowledged. It is interesting to note that Brentano felt himself to be the creator of a philosophia perennis, although he did not remain fixed in his views and never really stood still. He required clarity and distinctness of fundamental concepts, and regarded the exact natural sciences as representing the ideal of an exact science of philosophy. This ideal was opposed to the tradition of German idealism, which was in his view degeneration of philosophy.

Brentano is best known for his psychology from an Empirical standpoint (Psychologie vom empirischen standpunkt, 1874). The recent publication of his works by Kraus and Kastil has made more clear the reasons for the extraordinary influence exercised by him. Husserl was indebted to Brentano for his interest in the concept of intentionality and the descriptive investigation of inner perception, and undoubtedly learned how to become a philosophical investigator by being shown concrete examples of descriptive analysis and how to recognize problems. It was inevitable that his development should run parallel to and overlap to some extent that of Brentano. Although it would also be easy to overdraw the amount of Husserl’s indebtedness, it may be said that the study of the main elements of Brentano’s thought is indispensable for the genetic understanding of phenomenology.

When Brentano left Vienna he even went so far as to say that the natural scientific method is the only correct one, and that this has now been settled. 'No where, therefore, is the method of the natural sciences rejected
by Brentano (nor is it later on by Husserl). Yet we can say that Brentano had become conscious of the limited applicability of the inductive method. It is certainly correct, but has a limited validity because it is not in a position to provide the foundations for the apriori laws which are at the basis of the normative sciences. He calls the attempt to do this 'an aberration' of scientific method. Brentano, like Husserl, was apprehensive of the relativistic consequences of a monopolisation of the inductive method in naturalism and historicism. This method cannot answer questions about what should be, or, as Husserl said in Die Krisis der Europaischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (the crisis of European science and Transcendental phenomenology) "It is not in a position to answer the "highest and most ultimate questions", "The specific questions pertaining to mankind". It is precisely because this method fails here that descriptive analysis is needed. It is characteristic of Brentano's 'rationalism' that he does not leave the question, 'What should I do?' to the irrational powers of Weltanschaung and myth that which is good and right is not to be an arbitrary dictate of some positive power. These are, after all, typical 'questions of reason', according to Husserl. Practical reasons must be subordinated to rational norms. Brentano finds these in an a priori descriptive analysis of consciousness.

Science, therefore, will not be diminished in order to make room for the belief in a Weltanschauung No, natural scientific reason must make room in this area for another form of reason. Husserl's logical treatise shows that he was a good student of Brentane in this respect as well. It is not reason that is to be rejected, says Husserl, but the aberrations of reason under the spell of the natural sciences. Both the positivism and the historicism of the philosophy of Weltanschauung are rejected by Husserl when it comes to establishing the foundations of the normative sciences. The correct method here, says Husserl,
is the analysis of essences. In this way we can construct a philosophy that is not one of the natural sciences but is still, 'a rigorous science'.

All knowledge 'begins with experience', but it does not, therefore, 'arise' from experience, as Kant has said.\textsuperscript{11} The basis of the judgement is the universal object as ontic correlate of the universal concept or the universal meaning. When Husserl speaks of knowledge 'purely from the concepts', he means knowledge based upon he essences, the iedal objects.\textsuperscript{12} This knowledge is analytic as well, but it analyses essences rather than concepts, and could thus be called ontologically analytic. Heidegger was right when he wrote, 'To disclose the a priori is not an a prioristic construction'. Edmund Husserl has not only enabled us to understand. Once more the meaning of any genuine philosophical empiricism, he has also given us the necessary tools.\textsuperscript{13}

The concept of intention is important both for Brentano and Husserl, although their use of the term was by no means the same. It means, broadly, a relationship to an object or objectivity of any kind. Whether in purely cognitive experience, or in willing, wishing, etc. As used in phenomenology, it names a universal and essential characteristic of consciousness. The term intention is derived from medieval scholasticism, but the phrase "intentional object" was used by Brentano, so that the suggestion of a scholastic theory of knowledge was avoided.\textsuperscript{14} This concept enabled Brentano to distinguish psychical and physical phenomenon.\textsuperscript{15} He held that everything psychical is characterized by that which the scholastics called the intentional, or mental "inexistence" of an object, and which he called the relation to an object or immanent objectivity. Each psychical phenomenon contains something as an object, although not in the same way. Thus in a presentation something is presented, in a judgement something is acknowledged or rejected, in love something is loved, and in desire something is desired. This "intentional
inexistence" was regarded as exclusively peculiar to psychical phenomena and hence they were defined as phenomena which intentionally contain an object in themselves. In a note written in 1911, Brentano corrected a misunderstanding resulting from the use of the expression "intentional inexistence". Because this expression had been taken to involve purpose and the pursuit of a goal he proposed to avoid its use. He observed that the scholastics used the expression "objective" more frequently than "intentional". What is the question, in his view, is that something is an object for a psychical being, and is to a certain extent present in his consciousness. He close the term "intentional" because he thought the danger of a misunderstanding would have been still greater if he had described that which is thought, as it is thought, as "objectively existent".

In his psychology from an Empirical standpoint Brentano did not restrict objects to real things. He later changed his point of view, holding it to be erroneous to admit "irreal" objects as Husserl and Meinong had done on the basis of his earlier view psychical phenomena are perceived only in inner consciousness, whereas only outer perception is possible for physical phenomena, a difference he believed to be sufficient for the characterization of psychical phenomena. Physical phenomena were regarded as existing merely phenomenally and intentionally, as distinguished from psychical phenomena, which exist actually as well as intentionally. Thus knowledge, joy, and desire exist actually, but color and heat exist only phenomenally and intentionally examples of physical phenomena are a figure or a landscape that I see, and heat, cold, and odor that I sense.

In a supplement to the "classification of psychical phenomena", written in 1911, Brentano stated that what is characteristic of every psychical activity is the relationship to something as an object. This is a more
satisfactory expression of his meaning, which is merely the fact that one has something, whether a thing or an essence, as an object, or that one is related to it mentally. The misleading interpretation of "immanent objectivity" as a mode of being of a thing in consciousness is avoided thereby.

Only when Brentano promoted psychology to being a science of vital intentional experiences was an impulse given that could lead further - though Brentano himself had not yet overcome objectivism and psychological naturalism. The development of a real method of grasping the fundamental essence of spirit in its intentionalities and consequently of instituting an analysis of spirit with a consistency reaching to the infinite, led to transcendental phenomenology. It was this that overcame naturalistic objectivism, and for that matter any form of objectivism, in the only possible way, by beginning one's philosophizing from one's own ego, and that purely as the author of all one accepts, becoming in this regard a purely theoretical spectator. This attitude brings about the successful institution of an absolutely autonomous science of spirit in the form of a consistent understanding of self and of the world as a spiritual accomplishment. Spirit is not looked upon here as part of nature or parallel to it; rather nature belongs to the sphere of spirit. Then, too, the ego is no longer an isolated thing alongside other such things in a pregiven world. The serious problem of personal egos external to or alongside of each other comes to an end in favor of an intimate relation of beings in each other and for each other.

Husserl said that without Brentano's researches 'phenomenology could not have come into being at all. Brentano's descriptive psychology is doubtless very close to what Husserl originally took phenomenology to be. But in the philosophical problems that are central to it, and in the precise analytic manner with which Brentano dealt with them, his descriptive psychology is also
very close to the 'philosophy of mind' or 'philosophical psychology', that is now of concern to philosophers in the analytic tradition.

The descriptive psychologist, according to Brentano, 'investigates the constituents of human consciousness, he seeks out its elements and attempts to determine as exhaustively as possible their modes of combination'.

Unlike genetic or explanatory psychology, descriptive psychology is not concerned with the causal status of psychological phenomena or with the relations that they bear to physical and chemical processes. It is related to genetic or explanatory psychology; according to Brentano, in the way in which anatomy is related to physiology and in the way in which 'geognosy' is related to geology (hence the term 'psychognosie'). Unlike genetic psychology, descriptive psychology is an 'exact science'. It is the basic discipline of philosophy, (descriptive psychology is an exact science. It is the basic discipline of philosophy), according to Brentano; without it, he said, metaphysics, logic, ethics, and other disciplines of philosophy 'would dry up; like branches cut off from a tree.'

In the Vienna lectures of 1890-1, Brentano formulated several rules for descriptive psychologist, or 'psychognostician'. For example, the descriptive psychologist must learn to notice what is there; moreover, he must fix upon what he has noticed in order retain it in the corpus of his data. This will involve describing, an accurately as possible, just what it is that he had noticed. (Brentano gives an excellent example of a psychological description, in his lectures on practical philosophy, when he shows how an 'act of will' may be constituted out of elementary psychological phenomena). These were the lectures incidentally, that I lusserI attended.

There are three questions that immediately present themselves, and these are likely to be of especial concern to those who approach philosophy
from British and American traditions. (1) What is the difference between merely having an experience and noticing an experience? (2) How can one arrive at 'apodictic' universal laws by describing psychological phenomena? And (3) What are the 'elements of consciousness? By considering these three questions, we may make somewhat more clear just what Brentano took descriptive psychology to be.

The first of these questions ---'what is the difference between merely having an experience and noticing an experience? -- is familiar to many British and American philosophers as a result of wittgenstein's penetrating discussions in part II, section XI, of his Philosophical Investigations. Brentano's own discussions of noticing in the lectures of 1890-1 is itself an important contribution to descriptive psychology. 27

Our question might be put as a puzzle: 'If there is a difference between experience that is noticed and experience that is not noticed, how could it ever be known, unless someone notices an experience that he does not notice?'

To deal with the puzzle, let us first remind ourselves of what it is in our experience that is said to go unnoticed. The clearest examples are to be found in what has traditionally been called 'confused perception', as distinguished from 'distinct perception' (To be faithful to Brentano, we should note that we are here concerned with 'inner perception'). The experience of the colour violet, according to Brentano, involves as components the experience of red and the experience of blue. The experience of orange, similarly involves the experience of red and the experience of yellow. Thus Brentano said: 'A sense experience often comprises in its object a multiplicity of parts. The experience is related to the whole object in its totality, and therefore it must be related to the parts implicitly insofar as they are given with the object. But it may not explicity relate to each of its parts. 28 Another example of such a whole,
according to Brentano, would be the hearing of a chord, where in the particular
notes that make up the chord are experienced only ' implicitly' but not noticed
' explicitly'. The distinction between ' explicit' and ' implicit' has its analogue in
application to judgement; thus Brentano says that a man may notice what he is
judging without noticing everything that is implicit in what he is judging. Still
another sense in which experience may be said to escape notice, according to
Brentano, is this: One may compare different types of psychological
phenomena --- for example, seeing and hearing, or (what is of more interest to
the philosopher) feeling and judging and then fail to notice certain respects in
which they are alike, or certain respects in which they differ. (Brentano
believes that many moral philosophers have failed to notice important analogies
that hold between feeling and judging).

Our third and final question is: 'What are the "elements of
consciousness" that constitute the subject --- matter of descriptive psychology"?
Brentano's answer to this question seems to me to be correct and to be of
basic metaphysical importance.

One may wish to say that the "elements of consciousness" are mere
phenomena or appearances. But a phenomenon or appearance is an
appearance to something, or to someone. And thus Brentano wrote: 'For
what do we understand by a phenomenon? Something that appears to one. It
is contradictory to assert that something exists as a phenomenon, but that
there is nothing in itself to which it is a phenomenon. If one wishes to say, of
that to which something appears, that it, too, exists only as a phenomenon,
then one must say that there is something else to which it, in turn, appears
only as a phenomenon, and that this something else exists in itself and is
apprehended as such. 29
Brentano emphasises, moreover, that it is a mistake to suppose we are conscious only of phenomena or sense impressions. The data of descriptive psychology are not restricted to mere sense experience. One is aware of oneself, not only as being appeared to, but also as thinking, judging, desiring, inferring, planning, remembering, endeavouring.

Here, then we have a partial exposition of the way in which Brentano deals with the question "What are the elements of Consciousness?" He is led to conclude, correctly, it seems to me, that whatever the nature of the rest of the world one individual thing or substance, is the person who is the subject of experience. And this confirms an observation that Brentano makes about the value of descriptive psychology: It is of superior values, he says, since unlike the natural sciences it gives us direct knowledge of something as it actually is it enables us to know directly the nature of ourselves.30

To ask what phenomenology is can mean either to inquire into Husserl's philosophical motives or to turn directly to his work and attempt to discern its immanent character and implications. The former leads to a history of Husserl's intellectual career, the latter to a systematic analysis of his philosophy. Obviously, the two are intertwined profoundly, but it is possible to explore them in contrapuntal fashion. As a discipline concerned with the description and analysis of phenomena, phenomenology has always maintained a structural stance with respect to its subject matter, that is, phenomenology is concerned with the essential form of what it investigates rather than with contingent content. Phenomenology's business is with the architecture of phenomena, not the steel and cement of buildings. Accordingly we may say that one of the prime characteristics of Husserl's thought is its insistence on formal aspects of phenomena.

There are three aspects of phenomenology which may help us to
understand the vitality of the question, what is phenomenology? First, the reader coming fresh to Husserl is bombarded with a variety of different phenomenological emphases: the search for essence, the emphasis on the intentionality of consciousness, the methodology of phenomenological reduction, the repudiation of psychologism, the turn to transcendental questions, the radical thematization of the natural attitude, and the celebration of the life-world. How can Husserl be chasing so many hares in one hunt? If we ask what phenomenology is in a searching, genuinely attentive manner, then we may begin to recognize that we can understand essence only by comprehending the status of intentional objects, that intentional objects are rendered available for inspection and analysis by way of reduction, that so long as we restrict ourselves to the psychological origin and actuality of thinking we can never attend to structural features of phenomena, that opening up the phenomenological field is, ultimately, to inquire into the conditions, a priori, for the possibility of there being a field at all, that the mundane world of our daily, taken-for-granted activities itself harbors the most complex philosophic commitments, and that the naive life we live as common-sense men possesses an infinitely rich logic upon which the whole of reality is founded.

Phenomenology is a science of "beginnings". The genuine beginner is an adept, not a novice. To begin, in this sense, is to start from the primordial grounds of evidence, from oneself as the center (not the sum) of philosophical experience. Such self centeredness is the opposite of philosophic hubris; it is confession of humility: The admission that unless the inquirer has turned to himself in full awareness of his life, he cannot claim to have sought, let alone found the truth.

In its very nature phenomenology is self-questioning, and the phenomenologist is; at every stage in his inquiry, raising the question, what is
the rigorous and fundamentally warranted way into the characterization of the phenomena?

Despite the many expositions of Husserl's thought available today, there are still deeply grounded questions, reservations, and suspicions about its utility. Many social scientists are unconvinced that reliable, intersubjectively warranted knowledge can be attained through the method of what they take to be, if not a solipsistic, at least a deeply introspective philosophy. There is also an unwillingness to recognize the intuition of essences as anything more than another version of private, idiosyncratic, and insulated theorizing. The phenomenologist in these terms is a person who asks, "What is the essence of man, of society, of the state:" and proceeds to list dark properties, tricked out in transcendental garb, or else presents a series of generalizations which may be a priori true but are empty of any empirical content or consequence phenomenological banalities.

Phenomenology cannot present its method or its results in empirically verifiable terms because it does not accept empiricism as an adequate philosophy of the experiential world. Moreover, the phenomena at issue are either presupposed in empirical philosophy or unavailable to its procedures. So, for example, the phenomenologist is deeply interested in the logic of prepredicative experience, in passive syntheses of meaning, in the covert no less that the overt aspect of action, and in the many facets of intentionality which are involved in tracing out the sedimentation of meaning.

Phenomenology and empirical science operated at qualitatively different levels. They relate to but do not contradict each other. At the same time, it is necessary to understand that the relationship between the scientific and the phenomenological is an intimate one, for the phenomenologist, is concerned with the unity of philosophy and knowledge, with the reconstruction of
experience in its integrity. In these terms, Husserl maintains that phenomenology can provide a foundation for the conceptual vocabulary and grammar of such a discipline as psychology. But phenomenology is not to be confused with psychology. Husserl writes:

I may state from the outset most emphatically, in the face of prevailing and far spreading misinterpretations, that the pure phenomenology is not psychology, and that is not accidental delimitations and considerations of terminology, but grounds of principle, which forbid its being counted as psychology.\[^{31}\]

Properly understood, phenomenology and empirical sciences are coworkers in a many-leveled realm, asking different questions but not always heeding each other's voices.\[^{32}\] In the end, however, phenomenology claims to be a grounding discipline for psychology because it investigates those questions which transcend empirical science: questions of the philosophical roots of the familiar, everyday world which includes us all.

The phenomenologist is concerned with possibility, not actuality. More positively put, philosophical application may be said to move within an orbit which is defined by the continuity between the inquirer and the object of his inquiry. The inquirer theorizes in a priori terms, just as the object of his analysis is not reality but irreality. As Schutz expresses it, "phenomenological description does not refer to existence and real experience of existence. Its aim is the investigation of the apodictically posited frame of possibilities within which the empirical realities occur"\[^{33}\].

Phenomenology aims to clarify the essential laws which determine the manner in which the objective world sinks its roots into transcendental subjectivity, i.e. The laws which make comprehensible the world as a constituted meaning.
Phenomenology is anti-metaphysical only with respect to the tradition. It attempts the construction of a priori sciences on the basis of concrete intuition—such sciences as pure grammar, pure logic, pure law, the eidetic science of the world intuitively apprehended, etc.; and the elaboration of a general ontology of the objective world which embraces everything. This is metaphysics, says Husserl, if it is true that the ultimate knowledge of being may be called metaphysics. Rejecting the traditional metaphysics because of its speculative excesses, he sets up his own "apodictic" theory. Eidetic descriptions of constitutive experiences take the place of physical reality. Despite Husserl's inclination to construe reality in subjective terms, it must always be borne in mind that one is concerned with meaningful experiences in phenomenology.

An important function of phenomenology as Husserl sees it is the great task of giving to science a new and higher form. His sketch of investigations concerning "the transcendental constitution of the world" begins the clarification of the meaning and origin of such concepts as world, nature, space, time, animal being, man, spirit, organism, social community, culture, etc. These concepts, without being analyzed and clarified, serve as fundamental concepts in the positive sciences. But in phenomenology they are to be engendered with a clearness and distinctness that does not admit of possible doubt. All the a priori sciences are regarded as branches of the transcendental tree, the universal a priori being innate in transcendental subjectivity. Transcendental phenomenology, systematically and fully developed, is eo ipso a "universal ontology" not a merely formal ontology, but one which contains all the possibilities of existence. Thus is constituted an absolute foundation for the sciences.

The phenomenological method is designed to be monistic in the sense that the "reduction" to pure consciousness, which is accomplished by means of
the "elimination" of all beliefs and of existential posittings of any kind, results in
the delimitation of a unified sphere for reflecting analysis; and this is to serve
as an adequate basis for the constitution of all knowledge and reality. By
means of the phenomenological method it is possible to get "back of" the
natural attitude or the theoretical attitude, etc.

Truth on the phenomenological plane does not mean the denial of truth in
a naturalistic setting, or in any other sense. Its purely descriptive character is
of value in two senses. (1) The "Origin" of the concept of truth in experience is
clarified, as has been seen; (2) The reflection attitude which makes that
possible is at the same time presupposed by the examination of truth and its
criteria in any universe of discourse, or with any other attitude.

One of the most striking and at the same time disconcerting expressions
of the aims of phenomenology is presented by Fink in an essay which is
endorsed completely by Husserl as representing his own views.34
Characteristic of this version of phenomenology is the assertion that all positive
sciences begin in a dogmatic situation i.e., they are based upon presuppositions
which they can themselves no, longer know. In so far as philosophy refers to
the sphere of presuppositions, it is supposed to make transparent the ground
upon which the positive sciences are based, and to found them in a sense
which they themselves cannot realise in their "bases". Philosophy thus
functions as a transcendental theory of science.

In section 34 of ideas Husserl begins a series of observations "within
which we are not troubled with any phenomenological epoche. We are
directed to an 'outer world', and, without forsaking the natural attitude, reflect
psychologically on our ego and its experiences.35 This psychological reflection
forms part of a wider investigation whose purpose is to disclose what is left
over when the whole world is "bracketed" i.e., what remains as the
"phenomenological residium", as the field of study of the new science of phenomenology, after the phenomenological epoche has been performed.36 This wider investigation in turn, is designed to fulfill one of the aims of Ideas as a whole, namely, to lead the reader to a new scientific domain and to do so in a way which sharply distinguishes it from all other scientific domains and its science from all other sciences. Of special concern in this regard is distinguishing the domain of phenomenology from mundane domains and its science from mundane sciences (especially from psychology).37

The phenomenological epoche is introduced in sections 31 and 32 as the method for revealing this new domain. This method of access is in keeping with the just mentioned aim of Ideas, specifically the aim of distinguishing phenomenology from the "positive" sciences of the world. These latter sciences are rooted in the natural attitude in the sense that they take their respective domains to be aspects of that actuality which is unquestionably on hand to all of us, and take them to be available to whatever special intuitions their methodologies prescribe. Their striving toward truth is a striving to bring to knowledge what is taken to be already there in itself. But in performing the phenomenological epoche one deprives oneself of this basis of acceptance, one brackets the world by putting the general thesis of the natural attitude "out of action".38 "This means that although the thesis remains a moment in our experiencing of the world, we render it inoperative in our phenomenological intuitions and judgements so that the world is no longer simply accepted by us as the thesis posits it and as it continues to present itself despite our new theoretical attitude. With this new scientific attitude in effect, the question naturally arises of what domain of objects is left which we may take for granted, on whose basis we may generate judgements and to which we may return with these judgements yielding to its dictates in their ultimate
verification "Is not 'the world' the name for the universe of whatever exists?" 39

This private characterization of the method of epoche determines the ostensible movement of thought in sections 33 - 55 of Ideas as the search for a residuum, for something to fill the void that seems to be left. This void is to be filled by "'pure consciousness' with its pure 'correlates of consciousness', and ...... its 'pure ego' .........." Although the imagery which Husserl employs in these sections often lends the impression that the world is excluded from the field of phenomenological research, nothing could be further from the truth. Not only do these psychological reflections attempt to establish consciousness as an essentially independent realm of being despite its factual status as a reality in the world, but as well they try to show that the world in a certain sense is "contained" within this realm as a "pure correlate of consciousness". As Husserl states it, just after the end of the psychological investigations, "although we have 'suspended' the whole world ...... (W)e have literally lost nothing, but have won the whole of absolute Being, which, properly understood conceals in itself all, transcendencies 'constituting' them within itself". 40

Thus what on the surface appears to be a single movement of thought by the image of the search for a residuum, is actually a two fold movement. On the one hand there is the separating of consciousness and world as distinct realms of being, a movement which includes the development of the idea of consciousness, through a descriptive disclosure of its various forms, and the determination that consciousness so disclosed is a realm of being independent from the world, through an investigation of its essence. On the other hand there is the relating of consciousness and world through descriptive analyses and through the argument they support which attempt to show that the world is a dependent realm of being, ie., is a being for
consciousness. The former "separating" movement seems to be the dominant concern, its development being continuous, apparent and essentially complete. The latter "relating" movement is quite different. Although its conclusions are emphatically stated, the developments leading to them are not clearly identified (in fact they often also form parts of the former movement) and certain aspects which would seem to be essential for this movements completion must be supplied.

There are a number of things which phenomenology conspicuously does not do or mean: (1) It does not "tear the meaning loose from the act" \(^{(41)}\) (2) It does not deny or reject the external world. \(^{(42)}\) (3) It does not try to answer all questions, and is not intended to be an all-inclusive method for all purposes. (4) It is also not intended to be a substitute for other methods, and above all for those involving factual and hypothetical elements. (5) It does not deny inductive truth, nor does it fail to distinguish between different types of "truth" (6) It is not a trap for metaphysical purposes. As a descriptive, preliminary discipline, its findings may be used for metaphysical (or dialectical) purposes, just as are the results of logical analysis. But it is not a short-cut to spiritualism in metaphysics, for one thing.

In contrast to these misunderstandings, there are a number of things that phenomenology does do or mean: (1) It is the first method of knowledge because it begins with "the things themselves", which are the final court of appeal for all knowledge, and also in a logical, explanatory sense, because it seeks to point out all presuppositions.

(2) It views everything factual as an exemplification of essential structures, and is not concerned with matters of fact as such. (3) It deals not only with "real" essences, but also with "possible" essences. (4) Direct insight, evidence in the sense of the self givenness of the objectivity is the ultimate test for it. (5)
Despite the "reduction", the phenomenologist still has a brain (an "evolutionary" brain), in the same sense that he breathes. That statement is as true as it is irrelevant to the method. 43

As a peculiarly philosophical method, the method of phenomenological analysis is of significance for all knowledge. It does on a universal scale, and in a thoroughgoing manner, what is only partly done by other methods. Its complete epoche and technique for philosophical analysis represents an ideal of methodological rigor that cannot but be generally helpful. But it must be strictly limited to description.

In Ideas, Husserl tells us that his interest there is to find a "new eidetic science' whose field is a "new region of being", "pure consciousness' with its pure" "correlates of consciousness" and its "pure ego".44 This science is transcendental phenomenology. Why is this science sought? In the first section of Ideas, entitled "Fact and Essence", the nature of eidetic sciences and their relations to one another and to sciences of fact are delineated. For every region of being, formal or material to which an eidetic science (a formal or material ontology) pertains, there are fundamental and a priori truths which express what must belong a priori to an individual object of the region. It is the task of the pertinent eidetic science to formulate these truths.45 Developed independently from the sciences of fact, these eidetic sciences nonetheless furnish essential laws which are binding for any possible concrete objects of the factual sciences.46 What Husserl has in mind here is exemplified by the relation of the eidetic science of space and spatial form, geometry, to the factual science of objects in space, physics. Husserl's major concern here is the relations between the regions of being and correspondingly between, their respective sciences. He tells us that phenomenology is needed for a radical "classification" of the sciences, and for the separating of the regions of being.
As an example of this he mentions the two regions 'material thing' and 'soul'. Here, as elsewhere, phenomenology would clarify the intrinsic essence of each region and the manner in which they relate to one another, and in this case shed some light on the age old "mind body" problem.

Thus I lusserl tells us, in a remark which pertains as well to the factual sciences, that 'phenomenology supplies the definitive criticism of every fundamentally distinct science, and in particular there with the final determination of the sense in which their objects can be said 'to be'. It also clarifies their methodology in the light of first principles'. The sciences themselves are incapable of supplying this self-criticism in principle, while phenomenology can criticize itself. Modern philosophy (since Descrates.) has sought to provide this criticism of the sciences, but has thus far failed. In this sense, phenomenology is the "secret longing " of modern philosophy.

How phenomenology can perform this service becomes clearer in the last chapter of Ideas, where I lusserl explicitly takes up the topic of the connection between phenomenology and the formal and material ontologies. In the sections of the book between "Fact and Essence" and the last chapter, the main structures of consciousness are delimited. The last chapter begins with an outline of the phenomenological inquires into formal logic and formal ontology which are extensively elaborated in Formal and Transcendental Logic.

It is often wondered why I lusserl included the "Fact and Essence" chapter in Ideas in page 404 of Ideas Husserl connects the themes discussed in "Fact and Essence" with the rest of the book. There it becomes clear that the problem of a philosophical grounding of the sciences, or, more generally expressed, the critique of the reason and cognition, is for I lusserl what motivates the turn to transcendental subjectivity. This is not only true historically, ie., with regard to I lusserl's personal biography, but more...
importantly, it is also true in terms of the systematic position of this problem in
his whole philosophy. In so far as the "way" into transcendental
phenomenology means "motivating problem", the problem of cognition provides
the only "way" in Husserl's thought.

The corresponding schematic parts of cartesian Meditations and Formal
and Transcendental Logic also point to the need for transcendental
phenomenology to provide a foundation for the sciences. In the former work,
the nature of this need, only hinted at in Ideas, is elaborated, and in the latter
the development of the problems culminating in this need takes up more than
half of the volume. The factors crucial for an understanding of the need for
transcendental phenomenology, intentionally omitted from Ideas, are dealt
with in these works: (1) an explanation of why the "positive" sciences
themselves cannot perform the role assigned to phenomenology, and (2) why
there is a need to clarify the fundamentals of the sciences in the first place.
Cartesian Meditations develops the first point by attempting to show that any
positive science, including practically all of previous philosophy, is incapable
of a radical self-criticism. The reason for this is that their objects are given
in the "naive" experiencings and the concepts pertaining to these objects are
generated in "naive" producings, i.e., experiencing and producings which
contain hidden, "anomymous" functions. As a result of this, these sciences
deal with objects and concepts with undisclosed horizons which form
"presuppositions" they cannot clarify. The ultimate presupposition of these
sciences is the world. Transcendental phenomenology, which has developed
a method for disclosing these intentional functions and horizons, can illuminate
these presuppositions and, at the same time, its own presuppositions by the
same method. It can thus provide the ultimate foundation for all sciences,
including itself.
From the beginning, then, we can see what, according to Husserl, distinguishes phenomenology from any other philosophy, i.e., what makes it alone truly scientific, and only a scientific philosophy can be truly philosophy. Phenomenology, then, will be satisfied only with a cognition that is absolutely certain and it will be concerned only with an object that is absolutely necessary, in no way contingent or "factitious", which is but another way of saying that it is the object of an absolutely certain (ultimately "rational") cognition. This sort of philosophy will refuse to accept any conclusion that has not been verified as absolutely valid for all men and for all times; thus it wants to be science in direct contact with absolute being. For Husserl however, absolute being can only be essential being, and the whole orientation of his phenomenology will be to a knowledge of the essential. He will not deny the existence of a world, not even an extramental existence; he will simply deny that such an existence can have any significance for philosophy, since existence can only be contingent.  

Now, for Husserl a strict science of philosophy is one that, though systematic in its procedures, is not a "system". Phenomenologically speaking, he has grasped the 'essence' of science in meditating on the positive sciences, where results are verified one after another and thus accumulate to form a store of established truths. The science of philosophy, then, must make a new beginning as it attacks each problem and must accept only those conclusions that have been thoroughly verified according to the only method capable of verifying philosophical truth at all. It is in this sense—and only in this sense—that the philosophical endeavor must be a cooperative endeavor. Again and again he pleads for a restoration of philosophy to its proper dignity—as we shall find him doing in his latest writings always with the assumptions that only the phenomenological method can achieve this restoration.
According to Husserl the sciences need a clarification of their fundamental concepts. But why do the sciences need this clarification of their fundamental concepts? The answer to this is only hinted at in Cartesian Meditations. Because concepts like "world", "nature", "space" and "social community", which pervade a given science and determine the sense of its objects and theories, originate naively, such a science has "problems of fundamentals, paradoxes unintelligibilities". What are these problems? Husserl provides examples of these problems in Formal and Transcendental Logic from the sphere of logic. Although it has become a special science, for Husserl logic occupies a unique position among the sciences due to its "historical vocation". It is the science of science, i.e., a science which prescribes norms for genuine science.

The sense of this "genuineness" is given in the "Introduction" to Formal and Transcendental Logic, where Husserl refers in a general way to the "problems" of the (European) sciences. The sciences, in their present condition, "have lost their great belief in themselves, in their absolute significance. The modern man of today, unlike the 'modern' man of the Enlightenment, does not behold in science and in the new culture formed by means of science, the self-objectivation of human reason or the universal activity mankind has devised for itself in order to make possible a truly satisfying life, an individual and social life of practical reason. The belief that science leads to wisdom ....... that is great belief, once the substitute for religious belief, has (at least in wide circles) lost its force. Thus men live entirely in a world that has become unintelligible, in which they ask in vain for the wherefore, the sense, which was once so doubtless and accepted by the understanding, as well as by the will". The blame for this condition rests primarily on logic, which, understood as a philosophical discipline, embracing
both the theory of judgements (apophantics) and the theory of objects (ontology), has strayed from its task of providing the proper guidance. Thus we see that the "genuineness" of science does not refer, in its deepest import, to technical proficiency, practical usefulness, or even explanatory efficacy; rather, it refers to the ethical ideal of a genuine human life, a rational life.64 Only a "transcendental logic", according to Husserl, can guide cognition to such genuineness.65

Husserl wants to establish a science which will provide the foundation for all sciences, including itself, ie., a foundation for all cognitive endeavors. Such a science is needed to express it most generally, because modern humanity has lost faith in reason as a means toward a truly satisfying life. This loss of faith is occasioned by certain developments in the sciences, which have not only made them unsuitable for this grander purpose, but which have also produced problems internal to them. To every actual or conceivable empirical explanatory science there corresponds an eidetic science, a regional or material ontology which formulates the a priori truths valid for the specific region of being.66 There are also purely formal eidetic sciences. For instance, formal ontology deals with the concept "anything whatever" in formal universality, and apophantic logic concerns propositions and systems of propositions in their formal aspect. These two sciences form branches of an all-embracing formal science which Husserl designates "pure formal logic." This one science would be the science of science. Husserl is primarily concerned with providing a foundation for all these eidetic sciences, and only through them is he concerned with having an effect on empirical sciences. His predominant concern is with "pure formal logic", understood as a discipline which formulates the formal conditions of possible truth and possible existing being, that is, with reason, which, as he says, is a 'form concept"67 but with reason in the service of
cognition. For Husserl, the ultimate clarification of the fundamental concepts of the sciences can only be achieved by an investigation of transcendental subjectivity.

"Philosophy as Rigorous science": begins with a brief backward glance at the history of Western philosophy. This survey reveals to Husserl that philosophy has always felt a need that up to the present has remained unfulfilled. Philosophy is as yet not merely an incomplete or imperfect science, it simply is not science at all; there is no objectively valid philosophical "systems", there are only philosophical "tendencies", which do not add up to "philosophy". Philosophy's constant failure to develop into a rigorous science might lead one to conclude that it is philosophy's essence to be non-scientific and that it should abandon its misguided efforts to become scientific. This is a conclusion, however, which Husserl refuses to accept.

There follows a criticism of "naturalism", the strongest contemporary pretender to the title of scientific philosophy. Naturalism, it is true, recognizes the need of a scientific philosophy, but it is the greatest obstacle to the realization of such a philosophy, based as it is on principles that make philosophy impossible. Naturalism, as Husserl here characterizes it, is the doctrine that recognizes as real (wirklich) only the psychical. As a science of the factual it either refuses any reality to the ideal or else "naturalizes" it by making it a physical reality. It is precisely by naturalizing consciousness and ideas, however, that it defeats itself. Husserl institutes, therefore, a positive critique of naturalism, i.e., of psychophysical psychology's pretention to be the scientific philosophy.

Now, the demands that psychology cannot satisfy, phenomenology does satisfy. What phenomenology does is to analyze consciousness; where alone objectivity is absolute. Phenomenology, then, is a study of consciousness, but
it is not a psychology, a notion impossible to grasp until one sees consciousness as not a physical something.

Moreover, not only is empirical psychology not philosophy, it is not even psychology in the most significant sense. Because it is afraid of introspection, it refuses any direct grasp of the data of consciousness, thus blocking any access to the essence of the very concepts with which it must work. Nor is it aware of the deficiencies in its own procedures but seeks to overcome the essential weakness of its methods by employing these same methods. In doing this it rejects the only method that would make it truly a psychology, the phenomenological method. It wants to get to "things themselves" without even knowing what 'things" are.

In this its basic error is a confusion between the comprehension of experience precisely as experience and the analysis of the experience of nature merely as a psychological process. In other words, in describing experience we are forced to employ a set of concepts that are derived not from experience but from an essential analysis of the acts of consciousness. It is true, of course, that we must have experiences in order to have concepts, but the concepts are not justified by experience; their validity transcends, experience. The question, then, of a scientific knowledge of what experience presents cannot be answered by experience; it is a question of "sense", which is a transemperical element in all knowledge. By "naturalizing" consciousness psychology is bound to miss this its essential character. Thus phenomenology is a study of essences only, whereby it escapes the objections against introspection, which is an observation of factual psychological processes and not of ideal objectivities.

Husserl rejects the philosophic claims of naturalism and psychologism because they are inadequately scientific, the tendency, represented by
historicism and Weltanschauung philosophy finds naturalistic science too scientific for philosophy. In so far as this tendency remains immersed in a certain relativism based on the empirical facts of psychic life, however, it resembles naturalism and is no less to be rejected by those who seek the ideal of a rigorous science of philosophy.

One can look at the life of the spirit from a historical point of view and legitimately recognize in it a "structure of becoming", but he must not be led by this to conclude that in it nothing is stable, not even objective truth.68

The "historicism" that I lusserl now criticizes is not history; rather it is an attempt to interpret all reality and all truth as relative to historical development. Taking Dilthey as the most significant representative of this attitude, I lusserl agrees that history manifests a vast diversity of philosophical positions in the ongoing life of the spirit.69

Weltanschauung philosophy, unlike historicism, does not consider the variety of successive philosophical positions. Rather it looks upon a certain loose unity of all scientific thought at any time as expressing the spirit of that time; and this it calls "philosophy". Precisely because it is not a unifying "science", however, but only a unifying Anschauung, this sort of thing is suspect. Its attitude is humanistic; looking at the same historical facts as does historicism, it finds that they are not all equally invalid, but rather all equally valid, since each performs in its age an important function in the development of the human spirit. Thus philosophy serves to develop the person (or the community); its concern is not objective truth. Ultimately it is practically synonymous with "culture", whose goal is to give within the limits of a particular time and place as good an answer as possible to the problems of life. It is, then, a sort of "wisdom" or "science of living", and it calls itself a
"philosophy" of the loftiest human values. A rigourously scientific philosophy is a human value which must be attained; nothing can be substitute for it.

Weltanschauung and rigourously scientific philosophy, then, are distinct human values. Whether one chooses one or the other depends on the fundamental inclination by which one is guided, be it theoretical or practical.

If, as in the sciences of nature, a strictly philosophical discipline had already been constituted, the man whose inclination is to the theoretical would have no choice at all—weltanschauung would have no attraction for him. Since, however, the necessities of life can dictate a decision, even the scientific spirit cannot always wait to make practical decisions. Where a decision must be made, even an Anschauung is better than nothing. Still our responsibility to future generations forbids undue haste; philosophy is an eternal value which is not to be sacrificed for a temporal one, no matter how attractive the latter only a scientific philosophy can satisfy modern scientific man. The only solution, then, is that such a philosophy be constituted; no matter how great the labor involved. The triumphant advance of science will not stop before philosophy, and no compromise with a weltanschauung can be tolerated. Still, scientific fanaticism need not go to the other extreme and destroy Weltanschauung. There are still personal and cultural values to be assured, and thus weltanschauung will retain its significance for humanity.

In fact, a deeper penetration into the general life of the spirit offers the philosopher a more original and hence more fundamental research material than does penetration into nature for the realm of phenomenology, as a theory of essence, extends immediately from the individual spirit over the whole area of the general spirit, and if Dilthey has established in such an impressive way that psychophysical psychology is not the one that can serve as the "foundation for the humanistic sciences", I would say that it is the phenomenological theory of
essence alone that is capable of providing a foundation for a philosophy of the spirit.

Thus *Weltanschauung*, philosophy and Scientific philosophy are sharply distinguished as two ideas, related in a certain manner to each other but not to be confused. Herein it is also to be observed that the former is not, so to speak, the imperfect temporal realization of the latter. For if our interpretation is correct then unto the present there is no "system of doctrines", even an incomplete one, objectively set forth in the unified spirit of the research community of our time. On the other hand, there were already *Weltanschauung* philosophies thousands of years ago. Nevertheless, it can be said that the realization of these ideas (presupposing realizations of both) would approach each other asymptotically in the infinite and coincide, should we want to represent to ourselves the infinite of science metaphorically as an "infinitely distant point". The concept of philosophy would thereby have to be taken in a correspondingly broad sense, so broad that along with the specifically philosophical sciences it would embrace all particular sciences, after they had been turned into philosophies by a rationally critical explanation and evaluation.

Philosophical necessity as a need for *Weltanschauung* forces us. This need becomes constantly greater the wider the circle of positive sciences is extended. The extraordinary fullness of scientifically "explained" facts that they bestow on us cannot help us, science in principle, along with all the sciences they bring in a dimension of riddles whose solutions become for us a vital question. The natural sciences, have not in a single instance unraveled for us actual reality, the reality in which we live, move, and are. The general belief that it is their function to accomplish this and that they are merely not yet far enough advanced, the opinion that they can accomplish this-in-principle has revealed itself to those with more profound insight as a superstition. The
necessary separation between natural science and philosophy in principle, a
differently oriented science, though in some fields essentially related to natural
sciences in process of being established and clarified. As Lotze puts it, "To
calculate the course of the world does not mean to understand it." In this
direction, however, we are no better off with the humanistic sciences. To
"understand" humanity's spirit-life is certainly a great and beautiful thing. But
unfortunately even this understanding cannot help us, and it must not be
confused with the philosophical understanding that is to unravel for us the
riddles of the world and of life.

The spiritual need of our time has, in fact, become unbearable. Would
that it were only theoretical lack of clarity regarding the sense of the "reality"
investigated in the natural and humanistic sciences that disturbed our peace
eg., to what extent is being in the ultimate sense understood in them, what is
to be looked on as such "absolute" being, and whether this sort of thing is
knowable at all. Far more than this, it is the most radical vital need that afflicts
us, a need that leaves no point of our lives untouched. All life is taking a
position, and all taking of position is subject to a must that of doing justice to
validity and invalidity according to alleged norms of absolute validation. So
long as these norms were not attacked, were threatened and ridiculed by no
scepticism, there was only one vital question: how best to satisfy these norms
in practice. But how is it now, when any and every norm is controverted or
empirically falsified and robbed of its ideal validity? Naturalists and historicists
fight about Weltanschauung, and yet both are at work on different sides to
misinterpret ideas as facts and to transform all reality, all life, into an
incomprehensible, idealess confusion of "facts". This superstition of the fact is
common to them all.
It is certain that we cannot wait. We have to take a position, we must bestir ourselves to harmonize the disharmonies in our attitude to reality—to the reality of life, which has significance for us and in which we should have significance—into a rational, even though unscientific, 'world-and-life-view'. And if the Weltanschauung philosopher helps us greatly in this, should we not thank him?

Our age wants to believe only in, "realities". Now, its strongest reality is science, and thus what our age most needs is philosophical science.

To some, science implies obscurity but this is false; true science is essentially clear. Even the exact sciences, it is true, have had their long periods of obscurity, and just as they have passed this stage in their development, never to return to it, so may we expect philosophy to attain maturity. If, however, it is to satisfy the exigencies of science, such as the modern world understands them, philosophy must rid itself of all presuppositions, it must begin a new. The new philosophy will not come from old philosophies; it will be dictated by the very sense of the problems to be solved.

In our age understands what is to be accomplished and has the will to do so, it will accomplish it. Great names will mean nothing to it; valid position is to be adopted, no matter who held it; truth is truth. We must begin at the beginning. We must see with our own eyes and forget prejudice. The fact that the positive sciences have succeeded by the use of indirect methods does not mean that these methods are essential to science as such. The true scientific method in philosophy is that of the direct, intuitive grasp of essences. It is such a science, phenomenological science, which opens up infinite perspectives for philosophical investigation.
In his lectures on Logic, Kant has stated that the three central questions of philosophy, namely, what can I know, what ought I to do, and what may I hope for depend upon and pre-suppose the answer to the fourth question, what is man.\textsuperscript{72} Heidegger in his interpretation of Kant's philosophy, \textit{Kant and the problem of Metaphysics}, has shown how this problematic of man structures the whole of his philosophy; he further shows how this concern with what is man is not to be taken as anthropologism, but rather as preparing the way for fundamental ontology.\textsuperscript{73}

In a very different, but equally emphatic manner, Husserl also had held that the whole project of transcendental phenomenology was bound up with a philosophical theory of man; indeed in his \textit{Phenomenology and the crisis of the European sciences}, he claimed that philosophy is the bearer and custodian of the idea of man and that the vocation of the philosopher is to be the functionary of mankind.\textsuperscript{74} This commitment to the human essence has been given expression in different philosophies in different ways; the idioms may vary, the tone and passion may be different, yet, whether it is phenomenology or existentialism, philosophical Marxism or analytic philosophy or pragmatism, every philosophial trend has stood by this humanist concern. It need not be understood as humanism in the sense in which humanism is one type of kind of philosophy among others, but the human concentration. I am now trying to describe is far deeper and more pervasive and general than any creed or doctrine, in this broad sense all philosophy has been humanistic.

The purpose of "Philosophy and the crisis of European man" is to delineate philosophy's role in making Western man the spiritual being that he is. Conversely, it is western man's failure to live up to his philosophical destiny that has brought him to the crisis before which now stands. He is sick, and there seems to be no available cure for his illness. There is a science of
medicine to cure his sick body, but there is no science of the spirit to cure his sick soul. If there is to be such a science-and there must be-it cannot simply satisfy itself with empirical observation; only a strict science will do. Nor can such a science of the spiritual subject who is man be a merely psychophysical science-though it cannot spurn the help of this latter. It is important to realize that it cannot be science of nature at all; it cannot be "objective" the way a science of nature must be. The world it is to study is not the objective world of nature but the "environing world" (Unwelt) of the spiritual subject.

To make his point more tellingly, Iusseri points out that science itself is a product of "spirit" and cannot, therefore, be investigated by the kind of science whose object is "nature". Thus the problem of western man is not one that "objective" science can solve; its solution lies in a science of the spirit-and its task is to grasp the spirit that characterizes and animates western civilization.

Iusseri now leaps over centuries to contrast the "true rationalism" of the greek spirit with the "objectivistic" rationalism of Europe from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. It is in this mistaken rationalism, this "objectivism", that he finds the roots of Europe's cultural crises. It is reason that distinguishes man from the beast; and it is philosophical reason ("universal rationality") that raises him to a new level and characterizes all his culture the philosophical ideal, in fact, is the nerve center of European culture, without which Europe is not Europe.

The conclusion reached here is that not only must spirit be studied scientifically, but only spirit can be studied scientifically, in the full sense of that term. The kind of rationality required by an ultimate science can be gained only in genuine insight, and only in "intentional" investigations do we have the
required intellectual insight. To investigate intentionality, however, is to investigate the spiritual subject, the ultimate source of all intentionality.

In summary, then, it is necessary to say that the only goal worthy of western man is the infinite goal set by strictly scientific reason. This we can understand in the light of an historical teleology of reason; and if Western man is to meet the "crises" which faces him, he must be reborn in the spirit of scientific philosophy.

Husserl begins section 27 of Ideas with the following statement: "We begin our considerations here as human beings who are living naturally, imagining, judging, feeling, willing, "in the natural attitude". He then proposes that we reflect along with him to discover what this means. The investigation, which follows, extending through section 30, attempts to characterize the general features of the natural attitude from the standpoint of that attitude itself. The features Husserl uncovers are these: (1) when I am awake, the world is continually on hand (Vorhanden); (2) I belong to this world, as do others to whom, I know, the world is also continually on hand; (3) Anything of the world of which I am aware through experience and prior to any thinking, bears in its totality and in all its articulated saliencies the character: "there" (da), on hand. These features form what Husserl calls the "general thesis" (General thesis) of the natural attitude. Husserl sums up the general thesis in this way: "I find continually on hand and standing over against me the one spatio-temporal actuality (Wirklich Keit) to which I myself belong, as do all other human beings found in it and related in the same way to it. The "actuality", as the word already tells us, I find to be an actuality that is there (daseiende) and also take it just as it gives itself to me, as being there."

This thesis or positing is not, as Husserl explains, a particular or explicit act of consciousness; it is something which pervades, and is implicit in, all
mental processes which are directed toward the world.\textsuperscript{83} This means, for example, that it is not solely a component of a theoretical attitude, although Husserl's text sometimes misleads us on this point.\textsuperscript{84} Nor is this thesis one which only pertains to the world in some general sense, to an all-embracing structure or the like; it pertains to what is in the world as well.\textsuperscript{85} Husserl does not tell us what sort of thesis the thesis of the natural attitude is in sections 27 through 30 of Ideas.

What Husserl terms the 'natural attitude' is an essential dimension of all possible experiencing in and of the social world. It is an inescapable term of any phenomenological discourse which seeks to interpret man as a social being, and so we must try to be as clear as possible about what phenomenologists mean by it. Husserl's own characterization of the natural attitude (or natural standpoint) may serve as a point of departure for our discussion:

I find continually present and standing over against me the one spatio-temporal fact-world to which I myself belong, as do all other men found in it and related in the same way to it. This 'fact-world' as the word already tells us, I find to be out there, and also take it just as it gives itself to me as something that exists out there. All doubting and rejecting of the data of the natural world leaves standing the general thesis of the natural standpoint. "The" world is as fact world always there; at the most it is at odd points "other than I supposed, this or that under such names as 'illusion', 'hallucination', and the like, must be struck out of it, so to speak; but the "it" remains ever, in the sense of the general thesis, a world that has its being out there.\textsuperscript{86}

Within the field of our activities in everyday life certain philosophical matters remain outside the scope of reflection: that there is a world accessible to all men; that this world is real; that it is essentially the same for all normal men; that it continues to be itself through the flow of historical time; that the
sector of the world we perceive is a reliable clue to those portions we do not perceive and may never come to know. Problems, puzzles, impasses, and even minor aggravations of day-to-day existence manifest themselves (and are expected to continue to do so) against the backdrop of the continuous texture of everydayness. The problem may be severe and Worrisome; the reality within which it turns up to nettle us is taken for granted. To say that such matters are not reflected on means only that they are the grounds on which mundane reflection operates. When man in the natural attitude does think about the basic philosophic contours of his reality, one of two things may be going on: first, he may entertain the idea of the oddness of reality, in the sense in which an employee of the postal service may occasionally ponder the strangeness of mail being delivered at all, of there being a postal system. Such thinking is not so much scattered or fragmented as it is a kind of skimming of reality, for there is no urge or reason to penetrate the momentary insight and explore its underlying implications. Occasional surface reflection in this context is a mode of epistemological dilettantism.

There is a second kind of naive philosophical musing within the natural attitude which centers on particular problems: the snares of communication, the phenomenon of generational transformation, the deceits of language, or the ephemeral character of life itself. To speak of problems here means that the individual who is "philosophizing" has been led to his reflections by something exploding within his immediate world, whether it be a dramatic failure in trying to express something of great importance in conversation feeling the impact of suddenly finding himself regarded as part of the Establishment, finding out that language can, trap him despite his devotion to her, or being hurled into the uncanniness of another's death. In both kinds of reflection, the reflector-man himself is supported by the familiarity of the world turned strange, turned sour,
or psychologically decomposed. For I lusserl, it is "the world" which hides the more subtle features of philosophical concern, and it is man's behaving in "the world" which persists, a granite of common sense which is impervious to anything less than truly radical philosophical analysis.

It would be misleading to separate what we have referred to as "the world" from our believing in it. In fact, the natural attitude reflects a unity of the two. Within the world I act as though its elements, however puzzling they may be, are at least discernible as facets of mundane reality. The turn in reflection to an examination of the natural attitude may utilize examples or situations within daily life as a starting point, but they should not be confused with phenomenological analysis. Very often, writers not only in philosophy but in other disciplines will commence the analysis of the theme or will approach a problem by turning to their own concrete situation in space and time at the moment of their reflections. The device is common enough in both literature and science and has the advantage of picking up the reader in the most direct way. It is not necessary to be an expert on the nature of space to follow the author's simple description of where he is writing, nor, must the reader have special knowledge about the phenomenological theory of "horizon" in order to be led by the author from what is immediately at hand to the hills beyond. Two examples of what I have in mind can be cited, the first from a social scientist, the second from a philosopher. Kenneth E. Boulding begins his The Image this way:

As I sit at my desk, I know where I am. I see before me a window; beyond that some trees; beyond that the red roofs of the campus Stanford University; beyond them the trees and the roof tops which mark the town of Palo Alto; beyond them the bare golden hills of the Hamilton Range. I know, however more than I see. Behind me, although I am not looking in that
direction, I know there is a window, and beyond that the little campus of the center for the Advanced study in the Behavioural sciences, beyond that the coast Range; beyond that the pacific ocean .........

And here is how Alfred Schutz opens his Reflections on the problem of Relevance:

Having decided to jot down some thoughts on the matter of relevance, I have arranged my writing materials on a table in the garden of my summer house. Starting the first strokes of my pen, I have in my visual field this white sheet of paper my writing hand, the ink marks forming one line of characters after the other on the white background. Before me is the table with its green surface on which several objects are placed my pencil, two books, and other things. Further on are the tree and lawn of my garden, the lake with boats, the mountain, and the clouds in the background. I need only turn my head to see the house with its porch, the windows of my room, etc. I hear the buzzing of a motorboat, the voices of the children in the neighbor’s yard, the calling of the bird...........88

In both cases the author is interested in inspecting the matrix of the individual’s perceptual world, but he begins with the essential placement of the individual-his here-and-now being. For building the outline of being situated in the world of everyday life are sufficient for orienting the reader to his subsequent theme. In Schutz, the effort is to explore in philosophic detail as well as phenomenological depth the nature of the preliminary elements introduced: the meaning of "here" and the ways in which one is motivated to attend to what is not only "there" but what is in the far reaches of what typically concerns man in the natural attitude. The bare recognition of being present in the world is presupposed by the two authors, the first for purposes of establishing on orientation to his topic, the second for distinctly
philosophical ends: to achieve a radical stance in terms of which the natural attitude itself can be thematized.

There are, then, at least two senses of being "in" the natural attitude. On the one hand, man naively lives his everydayness, does his chores, goes to work, enjoys his leisure, dreams his pleasures, and suffers his disappointments. At this level, there is no self-conscious awareness that all of this is going on. On the other hand, the individual may indeed think about his being in the business world, at his desk, on the phone, dictating, maneuvering. The second level of awareness involves a separation of the Circumscribed activity from its larger relationship to the economy in general, world trade, etc. However, both levels share the same essential identification with the natural attitude, for they build upon what Husserl calls the 'general thesis' of the natural attitude: the prereflective believing in the reality of both the delineated problem and its larger background.

The return of phenomenology to the life-world completes the circuit of our discussion, for in raising the theme of the crisis of western man Husserl has sought, in a new way, to present an approach to the meaning of his own philosophy. The subtitle of his last work is "An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy". After a long lifetime of phenomenological labor, in which all of his books may be said to bear the same subtitle as the crisis Husserl still asks himself and his reader 'what is phenomenology?' It should be evident that the force of the question leads us to reconsider the nature of all theoretical inquiry. The many themes we have examined—the natural attitude, typification method, and the uses of phenomenology are philosophical adumbrations of one reality, the realm of man seeking his own truth in the truth of philosophy. Phenomenology insists on reraising the question of its own meaning because it knows that initial presuppositions are decisive in all
theoretical work. Moreover, self scrutirig is itself philosophical analysis. Husserl sought for an ultimate foundation on which the edifice of all certain knowledge of the whole of man’s experience could be founded. The social sciences are part of that unitary pattern. Taken together, phenomenology and social science are ways of honoring philosophy by reaffirming the privileged station of reason.

Husserl’s conception of the life-world—the immediately experienced reality of man as a mundane being—contains within it a number of different though related themes. First there is the distinction between the character of naively lived experience (man in the natural attitude) and the scientific interpretation of that experience. Historically, there has come to be a replacement of man’s self-understanding in mundane life by a fundamental abstraction out of recognizable experience into a mathematical-physical formalism whose roots go back directly to Galileo. Second, the meaning of "subjectivity" has been obscured and degraded by the philosophical attitude underlying much of the positivistic and naturalistic interpretation of the social world. Not only has “subjectivity” been made synonymous with the purely psychological sense of individual attitude it has been made an object for behavioral investigation, the assumption being that the main consideration in the analysis of the subjective is what the observer can make of it. Third, the role of philosophy in reclaiming the domain of the life-world has undergone a pernicious transformation in our time: philosophy, in fact, has lost its position as the discipline committed to wisdom and has instead settled for becoming the spokesman for a world view in which objectivism replaces lived experience and the methodology of the natural sciences becomes the sole claimant to a veridical account of human experience. Finally, with the turn from the truth of subjectivity to the objectivity of a naturalistic view of man a double void appears. On the one
side, if a genuine philosophy of the subjective is abandoned, there arises in its place an irrationalism, affectivity unbound, which heralds an attack against philosophy itself; on the other side, the price paid for accepting the logic of the natural sciences as unquestionably the proper instrument for the study of man is the avoidance of the richness of everyday life—its wealth of subtly structured typifications, its remarkable prepredicative organization, and its history of sedimented meanings which brings to the present the intonations of human continuity.

Far from Husserl's ideas being out of date, phenomenology has become the most contemporary of philosophies because it is most faithful to the oldest tradition. For the social scientist, Husserl's message is a simple but devastating one: "know theyself".

The crisis of science in general, of the sciences of man, and of philosophy leads to an irrationalism. Reason itself appears to be the contingent product of certain external conditions. From the beginning of his career, Husserl recognized that the problem was to give a new account of how all three—philosophy, science, and the sciences of man—might be possible. It was necessary once again to think them through to their foundations. He saw that these different disciplines had entered into a state of permanent crisis which would never be overcome unless one could show, by a new account of their mutual relations and their methods of knowing, not only how each alone might be possible, but how all three exist together. It must be shown that science is possible, that the science of man are possible, and that philosophy also is possible. The conflict between systematic philosophy and the advancing knowledge of science must cease.
Husserl raised this problem at the beginning of the century, and he raised it again at the end of his life in 1936 in the last work he partially published: *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften.*

Philosophy has been traditionally regarded as the science of eternal truths. If we are to be exact, we should, rather, follow Husserl in the last years of his life and call it the science of the all-temporal that which holds throughout all time, instead of a truth which would absolutely escape from the temporal order. This is a deepening of temporality. There is no passing beyond it.

During the whole career of Husserl, therefore, the struggle is on two fronts. On the one hand it is a struggle against psychologism and historicism, in so far as they reduce the life of man to a mere result of external conditions acting on him and see the philosophizing person an entirely determined from the outside, lacking any contact with his own thought and therefore destined to skepticism. But on the other hand, it is also a struggle against logicism, in so far as this is attempting to arrange for us an access to the truth backing any contact with contingent experience, Husserl is seeking to reaffirm rationality at the level of experience, without sacrificing the vast variety that it includes and accepting all the processes of conditioning which psychology, sociology, and history reveal. It is question of finding a method which will enable us to think at the same time of the externality which is the principle of the sciences of man and of the internality which is the condition of philosophy, of the contingencies without which there is no situation as well as of the rational certainty without which there is no knowledge.

The importance of the life-world for phenomenology of the social sciences is related to the "crisis of European Sciences" which gives part of the title of Husserl's last work. The crisis of European Sciences" which gives part
of the title to Husserl's last work. The crisis has many facets. In one way, the acceptance of a formal account of man's social being in place of a rigorous examination of the immediate experimental world he inhabits permits the substitution of what is empirically observable for the way in which the social world is perceived and interpreted by those who constitute distance between what is intended by common sense men and the constructions offered by the social scientists leads to a loss of philosophical coherence: Man can no longer recognize himself in the accounts which certain of his fellow men offer of him. In another way, the crisis of which Husserl speaks is the product of a loss of confidence in human reason, a sense that science no longer offers men a productive understanding of human existence, and the feeling that below the conceptual systems swell of passion and sentience which can sweep away the edifice of knowledge. In historical terms, of course, Husserl was thinking out his philosophy of crisis during the convulsion of Nazism and the torment of the years which led to its rise. Taken in this context, the refusal of and retreat from reason amounted to a negation of the meaning of coherence and order in the life-world and a repudiation of any philosophical as well scientific effort to comprehend mundanity. The sundering of reason from experience, of philosophy from life, is nihilism, for what denied is the validity of inquiry itself, of consciousness coming into self-responsible clarity. The crisis of western man consists in the denial of reason and the affirmation of conceptual fragmentation.

WHAT IS THE NATURE of the present crisis to which phenomenological philosophy is asserted by Husserl to offer a solution? If the existence of Western man appears critical and problematical, it is because he has allowed himself to become unfaithful to his idea, the very idea that defines and constitutes him as Western man. That idea is no other than the idea of
philosophy itself: the idea of a universal knowledge concerning the totality of
being, a knowledge which contains within itself whatever special sciences may
grow out of it as its ramifications, which rests upon ultimate foundations and
proceeds throughout in a completely evident and self-justifying fashion and in
full awareness of itself. Closely connected with this idea, whose inception in
ancient Greece in the 7th and 6th centuries BC marks the historical beginning
of western man, is the idea of a truly human, i.e., philosophical, existence, an
existence oriented towards the ideas, ideals, and norms of autonomous reason,
which alone permits Western man to live in conformity and at peace with
himself.

Paradoxically enough, it is owing to the one-sided and, therefore,
distorting as well as distorted realization of the idea of philosophy since the
Renaissance viz., its realization through the positive sciences-that Western man
has lost sight of the idea which makes him what he is and has thus become
alienated from himself. In the course, of their development, expansion, and
growth (which Husserl is ready to admire), the sciences have undergone a
process of specialization and technization. Perhaps this was unavoidable; but it
has led to forsaking those very philosophical aspirations out of which Western
science was born and by which it had been sustained in the 17th and 18th
centuries. Who indeed can today look at sciences as the thinkers of those
centuries did? Who can still maintain that science has the function of enabling
Western man to renew himself under the idea of his rationality, to lead an
authentic existence as a rational being, to order freely and reasonably his
relations to his environment, his fellow-men and himself? In the prevailing
positivistic interpretation, the sciences appear as expedients to predict facts
and events and to manipulate them. All questions concerning human reason
which is but a title for "eternal" or a temporal ideas and norms-among them
true knowledge, authentic value, genuinely good action, etc—are eliminated from the sciences, not only from the natural sciences which anyhow confine themselves to the corporeal aspect of reality but from the humane sciences as well. In the latter, too, man is regarded merely as to his factuality, as an object like any other one in whose study the objectivistic methods of the natural sciences must be emulated. However, if the human mind and human rationality are either overlooked or explained away in a naturalistic fashion, the sciences themselves become un intelligible. Since they are products and creations of the human mind, the foundations upon which they rest, the sense of their procedures and accomplishments, and the limitations of their legitimacy cannot be brought to light except by referring the very products to the generating and producing (leistende) mental activities. If this most essential context is overlooked—int the sciences appear as most ingenious technical devices which one may learn to use and which, if properly handled will yield most remarkable, even marvelous, results but whose interior mechanism and functioning remain utterly obscure.

The crisis of the Western sciences does not concern their technical validity. What is in question is the meaning of the sciences in a philosophical sense and, no less important, their human significance. The familiarize us with facts and their concatenations, with conditions under which certain facts occur. In a world in which there are merely facts and in which man himself appears as nothing but a most complex fact, there is no room for the norms and ideas of reason. They become unintelligible. Science, it seems, has nothing to say regarding things that matter most for human existence. Hence the growing skepticism, if not hostility, with regard to the sciences extends to reason itself, whose paramount manifestations and creations the
sciences are. Losing faith in reason, Western man loses faith in himself. All the irrationalistic and anti-intellectualistic tendencies which have of late made their appearance on the Western scene are symptoms of the disease which has be fallen Western man, of his estrangement from himself, of his betrayal of himself, that paradoxical betrayal through partial realization. For his salvation, Western man must not only try to escape from himself; on the contrary, he must endeavor to find himself again. At this point phenomenological philosophy appears in its historical significance and mission. It purports the return to the idea of philosophy, though certainly not to any philosophical system of the past. Resuscitating the idea of philosophy in the classical sense in which it was conceived in Greece, re-orienting western man towards this idea as the TEXOS of his historical existence, phenomenology permits him to become again true to himself. 92

It is not by an ancient or through a blind fate that Western man has fallen into his present existential crisis. To show how that crisis grew organically in the history of western thinking and to convince his readers that at the present historical stage phenomenology is necessitated by the meaning of western history, or, more correctly, by the sense of the historicity of western man, if the very foundations of his historical existence are to be retrieved, Husserl engages himself in historical considerations of a particular kind. 93

A highly paradoxical situation arises in which Husserl sees the germ or even the incipient phase of the present crisis of the sciences. They are in a flourishing growth, they proceed from one theoretical conquest to the other, not to speak of their practical success. They seem to bear the stamp of exemplariness and finality. The ways of reasoning and the methods of the sciences, especially the mathematical and physical sciences cannot but appear
conclusive and absolutely evident to whomever follows those lines of thought. Yet, when the attempt is made to account for this conclusiveness and for the accomplishments of science in terms of the functions and operations of the mind whose products and creations the sciences are, it appears in the light of Hume's analysis that the sciences and the evident conclusiveness of their methods are utterly unintelligible.

Since the time of Galileo up to the present day, modern philosophy Husserl maintains, is torn between the opposite tendencies of objectivism and transcendentalism. Objectivism has found its realization in the establishment and growth of the positive sciences, which, in the course of time, have undergone increasing specialization and technization. Technization of the science means their transformation into arts by means of which one may accomplish many admirable things but which rest on unclarified foundations and on unquestioned presuppositions.

At the root of the present crisis of philosophy, Husserl discerns the breakdown of objectivism, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the failure of transcendental subjectivism to consolidate itself. In this situation two problems have to be faced. The one concerns the Lebenswelt, for which, as we have seen, modern science has substituted a tissue of ideal constructions which passes for reality. The other problem is that of an adequate conception of the mind; this leads to a discussion modern psychology and of the very idea of psychology itself.

The crisis goes even deeper. Supported by a kind of nominalism of the spirit, those who deny the centrality of reason in historicopolitical terms also abandon the mission of philosophy in its classical form. Nihilists are the "know-nothings" of philosophy, the suicides of Delphi. The kind of nominalism I am speaking of here is one who manifests itself less in
programmatic utterances than it does in a refusal to recognize the possible legitimacy of eternal truth, of essential knowledge, and of universal science. In place, of the ideal of what Husserl called "rigorous science", primordial apodicticity, there is proclaimed the superiority and even the desirability of patchwork analysis, limited questions posed in restricted ways, in order to achieve partial results. Circumscription is elevated into a new ideal. No indictment of science is intended here, for the problem is not the adequacy of concrete procedures and results in the various sciences but the philosophical nature of the scientific enterprise. Husserl raises his voice in warning against the abandonment by philosophers no less than scientists of their common heritage and ultimate responsibility: the justification and celebration of reason. In Aron Gurwitsch's formulation:

The crisis of the Western sciences does not concern their technical validity. What is in question is the meaning of the sciences in a philosophical sense and, no less important, their human significance. They familiarize us with facts and their concatenations, with the conditions under which certain facts occur. In a world in which there are merely facts and in which man himself appears as nothing but a most complex fact, there is no room for the norms and ideas of reason. They become unintelligible. Science it seems, has nothing to say regarding things that matter most for human existence. Hence the growing skepticism, if not hostility, with regard to the sciences extends to reason itself, whose paramount manifestations and creations the sciences are losing faith in reason, Western man loses faith in himself. 94

Philosophy, in these terms, is the discipline of all disciplines, for it calls man back to his own justification. For Husserl, it was the privileged task of phenomenology to remind philosophy of its inner meaning and to return the philosopher to his proper business. Although it may seem a brazen claim to
say with Husserl that phenomenology seeks the redemption of philosophy, it is, in truth, the voice of humility which speaks. Husserl is convinced that, amidst the destruction of our time, phenomenology alone can recall man to his philosophical senses, introduce him again to the meaning of philosophy.

Phenomenological philosophy is a line of thinking which alone offers a way out of the crisis that has befallen Western man.\textsuperscript{95} The crisis of European existence can end in only one of the two ways: in the ruin of a Europe alienated from its rational sense of life, fallen into a barbarian hatred of spirit; or in the rebirth of Europe from the spirit of philosophy, through a heroism of reason that will definitively overcome naturalism. Europe's greatest danger is weariness.

The importance of Phenomenology for the social sciences is no less forcefully expressed in Husserl's characterization of the sickness of Western man. To the extent to which philosophy is excluded from social-scientific inquiry or relegated to a marginal position self-reflection becomes impossible and the social scientist cuts himself off from a purview of his own activities. More and more, social science retreats from any attempt to comprehend man in the actual context of his immediate experience, his life-world. An element of the absurd enters the scene of the sociologist's performance: Once the teleological bond between action and justification is severed, the activity of the investigator is reduced to conceptual rubble. It is rather like Camus image of the man in the glass telephone booth. We see his gesturing, his mouth opening and closing, his facial animation, but we hear nothing. Perhaps we might say, what appears to be a delightful conversation is an anguished effort to communicate, what seems to be a diversion is business routine; we may be witnessing the act of an informer or a placer of anonymous calls. Cut off from the unity of the conversation as given to both parties, all we have to go in is
the surface scene; the jaw working up and down, one hand waving about, sudden thrusts of the head back in what we assume is laughter. Without the reality of the person at the other end of the line and without the microcosm they share, within which the conversation occurs, the phenomenon of the telephone both would be splintered into absurd bits: the physics of the mandibles, the calculus of a flickering tongue. In Husserl's image, knowledge divorced from its telos results in the shattering of reason and the deformation of the life-world. The social scientist cut off from his own philosophical roots finds himself a stranger to the life-world.

Phenomenology, on the contrary, has been established and developed by Husserl as a philosophical, not a positive, discipline and as a philosophical discipline in the most radical sense conceivable. Phenomenology concerns itself with the fundamental problems of knowledge and experience, both scientific and the pre-theoretical experience which we have of the surrounding perceptual world and by which we are guided in our everyday life. Whereas positive sciences take for granted the objects with which they deal and concern themselves with their exploration and theoretical explanation; phenomenology poses the question of the existence of objects and of the meaning of their existence. The term "Objects" is here used in the most inclusive sense so as to comprise real objects, natural things (animate as well as inanimate) and cultural objects (e.g., instruments, books, works of arts and the like), and ideal unities of the kind which play a role in mathematics and logic and, further, historical and social entities such as political institutions, economic systems, legal orders, etc.

Since its beginning phenomenology has been attempting to solve a problem which is not the problem of a sect but, perhaps, the problem of our time.
Living in the "natural attitude" (naturliche Einstellung), which is the attitude not only of everyday experience but also of any activity whatever (with the sole exception of radical philosophical reflection as carried out in specific phenomenological considerations), we simply accept the existential character with which the perceptual world and whatever it contains present themselves. 96

The essential reference of objects to acts of consciousness motivates the phenomenological reduction. First of all this reference has to be rendered explicit. As a consequence, consciousness comes to be disclosed as a unique and uniquely privileged realm, prior to every domain, including the perceptual world. 97

By the phenomenological reduction, the integration of consciousness into the real world is severed. Consciousness is no longer regarded as a particular mundane domain among other domains, nor are acts of consciousness considered as mundane events which occur in the real world and, therefore, depend causally or functionally upon other mundane events. Under the phenomenological reduction, acts of consciousness are considered solely as experience of objects, as experiences (this term understood in the broadest possible sense) in and through which objects appear, present themselves, and are apprehended as those which they are and as which they count. By the phenomenological reduction, consciousness is fully disclosed as a unique realm of absolute priority because it reveals itself as the medium of access to whatever exists and is valid. 98

Phenomenology is nothing but the systematic and comprehensive study of the correlation between the world and the consciousness of the world - more generally, between being of every kind and description and acts of consciousness through which being appears and in which it originates.
To illustrate the problems which arise in the field opened up by the phenomenological reduction and the nature of phenomenological analytical work, Husserl refers in the main to the phenomenology of perception as established in his earlier writings, especially *Ideen zu einer reinen PhÄnomenologie und phÄnomenologischen philosophie* and *cartesianische meditationen*. Keeping in line with general orientation of the *Krisis*, Husserl does not develop the theory of perception in a systematic fashion. Rather, he brings out some of the pertinent topics as representative examples of phenomenological problems.

A thing may be seen, touched, smelled etc. These perceptions differ from one another; still they are all experienced as perceptions of the same thing. Abiding by visual perceptions, we again find that the same thing may be seen from different sides, under varying aspects and perspectives. To acquire perceptual acquaintance with the thing, it is necessary to pass from perception to perception, so that the thing may show itself from many sides and progressively reveal its attributes and properties. What presents itself through each particular perception is the thing itself appearing, to be sure, in a one-sided manner, and yet experienced as perceivable from different points of view as capable of appearing in further modes of presentation. Each particular perception thus contains more than it offers in direct and actual sense experience. This "more" consists in references to, or anticipations of, further perceptual appearances of the same thing. Every actual perception implies an horizon the inner horizon of possible perceptions which are expected to occur when the thing is seen from the appropriate point of observation. Here we encounter the role which inactualities of consciousness play in actual experience. Among such inactualities are the acquisitions of the past . . . i.e. acquisitions which once had the mode of actuality but no longer have it, though
they may be reactivated. Even when they are not reawakened, they contribute
towards determining the present actual experience which proves to be
encompassed by a horizon or immersed in an atmosphere of inactualities which
function only implicitly but function nevertheless.

In addition to the preception of a thing being pervaded and permeated by
references, anticipations, and other inactualities, the thing perceived appear
amidst other things simultaneously perceived, within a perceptual field or outer
horizon. To be sure, the perceptual field is not the world; yet it is experienced
as a segment of the world. The outer horizon points and refers beyond itself;
these permanent references convey our permanent awareness of the world as
the universe of possible objects of perception.100

Husserl advocates an egological conception of consciousness. Every act
of consciousness emanates or issues from the ego who lives in that act which
by this very token, etc. are centralized in the ego, or, as Husserl prefers to
say, ego-pole, as the identical performance of all operations and productions
(identischer vollzieher aller Geltungen) It is the identical age - pole who passes
from one phase to the next of his conscious life, retains past experiences, and
connects them with the present ones, anticipates such further experiences as
will fit into a progressively growing coherent system. Through a multiplicity of
presentations the ego directs himself towards the object - pole (that which
appears in varying modes or that towards which the varying modes are
polarized) as the goal of his intention, and intention which, in the course of the
process of experience, is eventually fulfilled. By means of his activities, which
may assume different forms, the ego explicates the objects as to their
attributes and properties; his activity may be solicited by affections, etc.
Correspondingly, inter subjectivity is interpreted as inter linkage between a
plurality of egos, as I-thou synthesis or we synthesis. The intersubjectively
identical Lebenswelt is; as we have seen an index of, multiplicities of modes of appearance and presentation, systematically organized. Through these multiplicities, the several egos -- and each one not merely through his own - direct themselves, towards intend, and experience the world as the common field of all their activities.

We mean by egos human beings, an apparently insuperable, paradox is bound to arise. Human beings are themselves mundane existent among other such existents; they belong to, and are part of the world. How then is it possible for a part to constitute and to produce the very whole of which it is a part? If the general program of phenomenology is to account for the world in terms of human subjectivity or intersubjectivity, this program proves to be beset by an utter absurdity, because it amounts to accounting for the world in terms which by their very nature imply and presuppose that which is to be accounted for. Obviously, the paradox hinges on the dual role of man, who is at the same time both mundane existent among others, an object within the world, and a subject with respect to the world derives the sense of its existence.

To surmount that paradox and to achieve some clarity concerning the ambiguous position of man, it is, according to Husserl, both necessary and sufficient to perform the phenomenological reduction with utmost consistency.

In the first of the 1907 lecturers Husserl says that the term 'phenomenology' denotes a science, a system of scientific disciplines. But it also and above all denotes a method and an attitude of mind, the specifically philosophical attitude of mind, the specifically philosophical method. Husserl admits that phenomenology may be taken in that sense as a science, a system of scientific disciplines. He insists that what is important in a phenomenological philosophy, however, is
not the set of doctrines defended, but the method used in their defence. To him phenomenology is primarily a methodology of philosophy.

On the phenomenological programme, philosophy is to be an inquiry into conscious human behavior, and the method of the inquiry is to be experimental and descriptive. This appears in the 1907 lectures. Husserl maintains that philosophy has to deal with cognitive, and parallel, phenomena, that is to say with the phenomena of conscious behaviour. And it has to deal with these phenomena, he says, under two aspects: as acts of the subject and as objective correlation to those acts. Philosophy has to provide an experience, or the receptivity to data, Husserl uses the term 'intuition'.

Husserl maintains that philosophy is a matter of experience and description. He argues that philosophy should avail itself of a special experience of conscious phenomena, and then described them. According to Husserl, then philosophy 'sets out to be a science and a method which will explain possibilities -- possibilities of cognition and possibilities of valuation -- and will explain them in terms of their fundamental essence. There is a second aspect to Husserl's philosophical experience, it is supposed to be an eidetic experience, an experience of essences.

It is clear that Husserl regarded phenomenology as above all a method of philosophy, if, indeed, not the only possible method and he connected this with another fundamental idea, that of 'philosophy as a strict or regorous science' (philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft), an idea which seems to run through all his works. And this point is again connected with his idea of philosophy as something which forms of foundation for all other branches of knowledge, so that they cannot really be satisfactorily pursued if it has not properly laid their foundations. This means that philosophy cannot have anything uncertain about it. The Scandal is that so far it had not succeeded in reaching this necessary
certainty. Husserl even bizarrely envisaged the possibility that, once the foundations had been truly laid by his own work, generations of phenomenologists could each perform his descriptive task, confident that the validity of the method would guarantee the certainty of their results. Such descriptive activity would presumably not need great philosophical skill any more than the research students of great scientist need any such. The application of the method to the problem at hand is all that is required.

That Husserl did mean something like this is, I think, fairly clear. In his *Philosophy as a Rigorous science* (1911) he remarks: 'Kant was fond of saying that one could not learn philosophy, only to philosophise. What is this but an admission of philosophy's unscientific character? As far as science, real science, extends, so far can one teach and learn, and this everywhere in the same sense. His contrast is with the sciences of mathematics and physics and his aim was to make philosophy like them.

IN OUR DAY AND AGE it has become fashionable to denounce rationalism a source of evil and to hold it responsible for the present crisis, both intellectual and moral. This view is the more dangerous because it contains a half-truth. According to Husserl the present crisis is the crisis of naturalistic objectivism or objectivistic rationalism, the crisis of Western science in the phase of extreme technization in which it has forsaken those philosophical aspirations from which it historically arose. In other words, it is the crisis of a specific historical form of rationalism, the form which rationalism has assumed since the Renaissance.

Phenomenology, Husserl claims, opens up a new chapter in the history of rationalism by establishing a new form of rationalism which, on account of its radicalism, is to supersede the historically transmitted forme-radicality understood in the etymological sense of going to the roots. It is the very idea
of rationalism that motivates and necessitates this transition at the present of
the historical development of both philosophy and the sciences. Far from
abandoning the idea of rationalism, phenomenology brings it to higher
fulfillment.
Husserl's Notion of Intentionally

In Brentano's view the true method of philosophy is the method of the natural sciences. He accordingly regarded philosophy as being scientific in character; and he thought that the possibility of basing knowledge upon immediate evidence would provide a presuppositionless beginning in philosophy. The following five propositions may serve to characterize Brentane's philosophy: (1) The basic structure of human existence or of subjectivity is intentionality (2) Every intentional act refers to something real; "real" meaning everything that comes from concrete intuition, or that can be presented (3) Every cognition refers to an existing thing (4) Every existent is a single or individual thing (5) Every cognition approaches the existent as something general. Brentano's belief that there is an Archimedean point in philosophy which assures it a permanent foundation represents a motive which becomes prominent in the philosophy of Husserl, beginning with his first programmatic discussion of a scientific philosophy in his essay on "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science".

The lectures on the consciousness of Inner Time (1905 - 1910) and the logos essay, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" (1911), illustrate respectively the nature of phenomenological description and the programatic ideal of phenomenology as the most rigorous of all the sciences. In this period the clarifying function of phenomenology is assigned to an autonomous discipline which serves as the prelude to all other knowledge.

The phenomenological attitude requires the suspension of all assumptions. The existence of the World, and of everything that is "posited", is "bracketed". The phenomena that remains are the subject-matter of phenomenology which is defined as the science of pure transcendental consciousness. The discussion of noesis and noema is especially important in
bringing to light some fundamental structures of experience, and as indicating a
fruitful field for research. The "reduction" opens up a universal field for
philosophical investigation which is free from all prejudgements and
assumptions, hence its crucial methodological importance. Husserl is careful
to distinguish eidetic reduction (proceeding from fact to essence) from
transcendental reduction, according to which the phenomena are characterized
as "irreal", and are not ordered in the "actual world". The method of
phenomenological reduction is applied in order to achieve the presuppositionless
field of philosophy in the consciousness of an individual ego to begin with,
which involves the suspension of all beliefs in transcendent realities.
Phenomenology now becomes the most fundamental science and the
"absolute" ground of all knowledge.

Throughout ancient philosophy until the beginning of the High Scholastic
period, intentio, simply had the practical meaning of 'striving toward', intent to
do something', 'exertion'. The first passages where the expression has thus
far been detected with a divergent, theoretical meaning are the translations of
Arabic philosophers from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, especially the
translations of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) by Dominicus Gundissalinus and Johannes
Hispanus in Toledo. In order fully to understand the meaning and the
motives for these translations, one would need to explore Arabic philosophy.
There, 'intentio' seems to correspond principally, to the word 'ma' 'na', which
denotes sense, meaning, idea concept, matter. The Latin expression seems
to be just as ambiguous. But throughout, intention is understood as something
which is the object of an act.

Brentano had introduced the notion of intentionality into modern
philosophical discussions in the following famous paragraph from his
psychology from an Empirical standpoint:
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the middle ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not be understood here as meaning a thing), or inmanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. 105.

The concept of the "intentionality of consciousness" is the foundation of phenomenological philosophy. Going back to scholastic philosophy, Franz Brentano had maintained in his psychologie Vom empirischen standpunkt (1924) that the difference between physical and mental or psychical phenomena is to be found in the fact that mental phenomena refer to, and are directed toward, and object which they intend. Husserl adopted Brentano's notion of intentionality and refined it.

Let us take an example to understand Husserl's concept of intentionality for eg. it is indeed a fact, a simple fact determined by external conditions, that I am going to such a concert today and that I am hearing the Ninth symphony. But I am able to discover inside this experience, as I live it through, something which is independent of the factual conditions which have brought forth my decision. The Ninth symphony is not enclosed within the time during which I am listening. It appears in the different performances of different orchestras. It is a cultural object which is brought forth under the baton of this director and though the playing of these violinists. But it cannot be reduced to any single performance that one gives of it. Hence if I succeed in bringing out of my
experience all that it implies, in thematizing what I have lived through at this
time, I come to something which is neither singular nor contingent namely, the
Ninth symphony in its essence. This Orientation of consciousness toward
certain "intentional objects ", which are open to an "eidetic" analysis, is what
Husserl calls intentionality.

One can say that, by its antecedent conditions, my consciousness is
bound to the contingent events which act on me. But in so far as it envisages
certain terminations in so far as it has a "teleology", in so far as it is concerned
with certain cultural entities which are not divided by their different
manifestations at different moments of my life or in different minds, it is open
to a different kind of analysis. According to Husserl, the seeing of essences, or
wesensschau is nothing but the clarification of the sense, or essence, toward
which our consciousness in directed. He says in the Ideas that we should give
neither a mystical nor even a platonic meaning to the word wesensschau. It
does not involve the use of a super-sensible faculty absolutely strange to our
experience and exercised only under exceptional conditions. Wesensschau is
constant, he says, even in a life that conforms most closely to the natural
attitude.

For Husserl, the intentionality of an act is mediated by way of an
intentional content, which in Ideas, he calls the noema. The noema is to be
distinguished from the object intended; at the same time, it is also not a general
essence. David Woodruffe Smith takes it as an abstract or ideal entity. 106
Husserl further says that it is by way of the noema that an act refers to the
object; noema mediates intentional reference. The approach of Husserl
therefore requires a three-fold distinction between, act, noema and object. The
content, or the noema, gives the act its peculiar and characteristic intentional
directedness to the object. It is this which is specifically intentional but it itself is not the object intended.

MacIntyre and Woodruff Smith summarize the essential feature of Husserl's theory in the form of six major theses:

1. The content of an act is to be sharply distinguished from the object; whatever is true of the object is bracketed out in the transcendental reduction and hence is not available for a phenomenological explication. The content which makes the act intentional is not itself seen or noticed in the ordinary attitude. It is revealed only in transcendental reflection after the opoche.

2. The content alone confers intentionality on the act; it is this which gives the act an relation like the character of being 'of' or 'about' some object.

3. If the intention is successful, the act reaches an existing object and not any other because it is this object to which the content directs it.

4. But even if the intention is unsuccessful, even if there is no such object prescribed by the content, the prescribing or 'pointing' character of the content is unaffected. The act's intentional character is independent of the existence or nonexistence of the object.

5. On the other hand, the content of the act is closely connected with the conception or ways of conceiving the object.

6. The object of the act is transcendent in the sense that it has further properties than what are included in the content.

From these discussions, we may distill the following characterisation:

1. Every act includes a constituent part, a noesis which is meaning-giving.
2. The noesis of an act entertains exactly one noema which is a sinn or meaning.

3. Although for every noesis, there is one noema, the same noema may be entertained by different noesis. The relation between noeses and noema is a many-one relation.

4. Different noeses and hence different acts may entertain the same noema.

5. The noema is an ideal entity; it is not a real event either in consciousness or in the external world. Noema are meanings or 'sinne'.

6. Since noema are not real components, they can be grasped only after all objects are suspended by the epoche.

7. The noema is distinct from the object.

8. Yet there is an intimate relation between the two, for intentional reference to the object takes place by way of the noema.

9. The noema prescribes the object by way of the determinations contained in it, eg. "The author of Waverly' prescribes Scott as determined in a certain way, or as having a certain property.

10. But the same transcendent object could be referred to by different noema, in the sense that it could be identified as having other properties. Hence, different noema may converge upon the same object.

For Husserl, the noema determines the reference of the intentional act. The basic question to be answered is how exactly the noema fulfills this directive function. We are offered a highly significant clue which we are told that the noema is a sinn or meaning.

Husserl distinguished the act of knowing (noeses) from the object (noema), whether existent or imaginary. To be conscious is to experience an
act of knowing in which the subject is aware of an object. A conscious act is an act of awareness in which the subject is presented with an object.

The notion which is at the center of the Husserlian conception of consciousness: namely, that of intentionality. It has all too often been remarked that, according to this conception, every act of consciousness is a consciousness of something, that every act of love is a love of something, and so on. It is necessary, however, to analyze the phenomena more precisely instead of contenting ourselves with a formula which is almost merely verbal.

To understand Husserlian conception of intentionality let us take the example of the perceptual process. I perceive a house from a certain point of view, and this house (it does not matter whether it is familiar to me or not) presents itself under a certain aspect, in a certain perceptual adumbration, in a certain orientation (from far or near, in front of me or at the side, and so on). Perceived from another point of view, the same house presents itself under a different aspect, and it is between these aspects (which very according to the points of view) that the perceptual synthesis is passively established. What, then, is this house perceived, as presenting itself under a certain aspect rather than another? The question concerns the house qua perceived, precisely and strictly as it appears through a determinate perceptual act or, more briefly, the house perceived as such. Obviously, the house qua perceived in the above sense cannot be considered as a mere sum of sensory data in the sense in which Hume uses the term. No more can the house qua perceived be taken as the real house qua physical things, a thing which can be perceived from diverse points of view and present itself under different aspects. For here we have to do with the house appearing under one well-determined aspect and not under another one.
Finally, one must distinguish the thing perceived as such from the perceptual act. A rather simple reflection will serve to make this clear. Suppose that we place ourselves at a certain point of observation from which we look at the house without moving, and suppose that we alternately close and open our eyes. Each time we open our eyes we experience an act of perception which, once it is past, can never recur, as this generally holds for all acts of consciousness. Thus we have to distinguish the perception which we experienced before closing our eyes from the one which we are experiencing now that we have opened them again. We find, therefore, a multiplicity of perceptual acts which differ from one another (be it only because of their places in phenomenal time) and which can be enumerated. Meanwhile we perceive not only the same house qua physical thing but are also confronted with the same thing as presenting itself to us under the same aspect; briefly, we are faced with the same house perceived as such. The latter being neither the physical house nor an act of consciousness, we have to recognize the perceived qua perceived as a special and specific entity -- "perceptual noema" is the technical term which Husserl uses. For this entity there was no place in traditional thought, because the only distinction admitted was that between things or physical events, on the one hand, and, on the other, acts of consciousness.

The analysis of the example taken from our perceptual experience has made us aware of both an opposition and a correlation between an identical and identifiable unity -- the perceptual noema -- and an indefinite multiplicity of act of consciousness, all different from one another, if only by their respective places, in phenomenal time. Acts of perception are intentional acts because, through each of them, perceived thing appears under a certain aspect and in a certain mode of perceptual presentation because, in one word, to each of them
there corresponds a perceptual noema and we remember the same noema can correspond to a multiplicity of acts. What is fundamental here is the notion of noema. According to a very telling remark made by Berger some years ago, Husserl has discovered a category which in more fundamental than that of being or of non-being; namely, the category of the object intended as such, of the object as intended through a concrete act of consciousness.

This phenomenon or noematic sense is that "content" of the transcendental noema by virtue of which the noema, and through the noema, consciousness, is related to an object. The noematic sense is correlated specially with the "sense-giving" moment (the apprehension) on the noetic side of consciousness and refers to the same object to which that noesis refers. The object referred to, considered in abstraction from its predicates, is also said to be part of the transcendental noema and of its sense. It is the "determinable subject of its possible predicates" - The pure X in abstraction from all predicates the identical moment in different transcendental noemata which refer to a "Same". By "predicates", Husserl means determinations of the perceived object, and not as we shall see, of the appearance of the object. In the case of a mere thing, these predicates would comprise whatever could be said of an object in formal or material ontological terms on the basis of a given perception, for example, it is a "thing" it has this or that "shape" and "color", it is "hard", "rough" etc. Thus, the noematic sense is that part of the transcendental noema which is "described in objective terms only".

The best was of presenting this dimension of the noema is through an example. Let us imagine that we are seated at one end of a long rectangular table looking at its top surface, whose color is brown, and that we perform the phenomenological ophere, i.e., We reflect on what we see, but in our reflection
act we refrain from participating in the "actuality" of what we see. We say: "In this perceiving there is a 'table' which is 'rectangularly shaped', is 'infront of me' and is 'brown'. This is a description of the noematic sense the single quotation marks serving to signal the change of meaning the words have as a consequence of the epoché, and indicating in each case that we are now talking about a "phenomenon of ............" 'In front of me' denotes what I 116. These also belong to the transcendental noema and to the noematic sense in its "fullness" 117 Although they are not predicates of the object per se, but are objective determinations of the situation. In addition to those, the table is experienced to be one having many other predicates not directly seen, for instance, four legs, an underside which has some color or other, perhaps not the same as the top, etc. Such predicates make up the implicit moments of the noematic sense.

Let us concentrate now on what is visible to us of the table, seated, as we are, before it. We suppose this to be only the top surface. I 118. If we walked around the table, viewing it from different distances, we would experience a continuum of sides. Let us suppose that we rise from our seated position, but do not move from the table, so that it is still only the top of the table is visible, no new determinations of the table coming into view. During our movement the same side is given, and the shape of the side (i.e., of the table top) is experienced to remain unchanged. Yet, something changes. If our mental glance is properly directed we may note, for instance, that as we rise the angles formed by the left and right edges of the table top and its far edge seen to get "smaller", and that, from our standing position, the left and right edges seen more "parallel" than...
before. These changes are not experienced to be changes in the table itself, i.e., in the "side", but in the mode of givenness of the side. Husserl calls a mode of givenness of a side an "aspect" (Aspekt)\(^{119}\) or a "perspective"\(^{120}\). "Aspects" are adumbrations on the noematic side of consciousness,\(^{121}\) and are correlative to the (apprehended) hyletic data on the noematic side, i.e., to the noematically understood adumbrations.\(^{122}\) We are not usually aware of such perspectival changes described above, although, according to Husserl, changes in orientation are necessarily given through such perspectival adumbration,\(^{123}\) are things generally.\(^{124}\)

The difference between an appearance and noematic sense is indicated by Husserl in another way in an unpublished manuscript.\(^{125}\) There, Husserl distinguishes a "side" from an "aspect" by noting that an aspect, unlike a side, has no inner or outer horizon. This means that the aspect has no details which could come into view if one "stopped closer" to it, nor can it be seen in another perspective.

Husserl's analysis begins by uncovering what can be found in the flow of mental life of an awake subject. His purpose is to develop the concept of "process of consciousness (Bewusstseinserslebnis).\(^{126}\) He first discloses what is called "attentional consciousness", i.e., when we subtract all the subjective appearance (e.g. illusory appearances which arise because of conditions affecting our perceptual processes. It is perhaps because of their deceptive nature that Husserl says that they must be "struck out of" the world from the world, we are left with the world as it is in itself. Thus we have here a new concept of "Itself" or "Itsself" (Ansich). Before, an "Itself" was conceived as something which is on hand with respect to attentional consciousness, and as part of that, was something whose being-there was independent of attentional consciousness mental processes (Erlebnisse), such as perceptions, in which an
ego is turned toward an object. This is consciousness in the mode of actuality (Aktualitat). But, as Husserl says, "the stream of experience can never consist wholly of actualities". When we attentively perceive an object, we are also aware of other objects around it and this awareness is also a process of consciousness, albeit in the mode of inactuality.

The thesis that consciousness constitutes the world is the thesis that the being there (Da - sein) for us of the world and of anything that is in it is an achievement (Leistung) of consciousness. This thesis is not the seemingly obvious one that I must "be conscious", that is, be awake, for the world to be given to me. Such a thesis would consider consciousness to be a state or condition which I must be in so that what is there all along and on its own and become manifest to me. Becoming conscious in this sense is like experiencing the lighting of a dark room, and like the phenomenon of light consciousness can be thought to be a transparent and homogeneous medium which allows the existence as well as the true structures and qualities of objects to be revealed to me -- but precisely by being itself unstructured and without qualities.

In the literature on Husserl's philosophy there has been considerable discussion of what it is that consciousness achieves when it is said by him to "constitute" the world. All responsible interpreters are in agreement about what this achievement is not. It is not a creating of the world in the sense of "causing" it to be. But there seems to be less agreement on what this achievement is. For Sokolowski, "consciousness constitutes the world" means that it is a necessary condition for the world to become real, it "allows (objects) to emerge as real. Carr denies that this is what Husserl means. In this interpretation, consciousness is constitutive of the world in the sense that it is responsible for the giveness of objects, for the being of
objects for me. Consciousness renders objects present. For Mohanty, constitution in Husserl means constitution of the sense of objects.

Husserl attempts to demonstrate that consciousness constitutes the world. But the sense and import of this demonstration cannot be understood until one more thought, which may have occurred to the reader, is dispelled. It might be asked: "In saying that 'it is through consciousness that a world is there for us', don't you simply mean that consciousness in intentional? Isn't that Husserl's response to the problem of cognition? But the intentionality of consciousness is not something that Husserl sets out to demonstrate through an argument; it is simply a descriptive finding".

Consciousness includes within itself intentional subjective processes of such scope complexity, and joint functional efficacy so as to make the world, with its "whole content and ontic validity" there for me. Demonstrating this thesis, then, involves showing (1) That consciousness has such a scope that its intentional content is wide enough to be coextensive with the world, and (2) that the transcendent reality of the world can be accounted for in terms of consciousness.

When Husserl's various "introductions to phenomenology" are looked at together in order to discern the structure of the line of thought which runs through them all, one finds after a discussion of the motivating problem an attempt by Husserl to demonstrate that consciousness constitutes the world, i.e., that the being there for us of the world and of what is in it is an achievement of consciousness.

Thus consciousness, as we have understood it thus far, is not only "medium of access" to the world, and subjective apprehensions do not, as it were, enclose us completely such that the world is only given to us through
them. Rather, consciousness has "holes" through which the world "shines" directly in on us and through which the world is given to us as it is in itself.

The epoche brings about intuitive access to the world as a being-for-consciousness and to consciousness in its functioning to constitute the world. Describing the epoche as a "liberation" from the natural attitude, Husserl writes, "Given in and through this liberation is the discovery of the universal, absolutely self enclosed and absolutely self- sufficient correlation between the world itself and world-consciousness". The epoche creates an attitude of focussing on this correlation and in this attitude the world becomes itself something subjective, a "transcendental phenomenon". As a remarked earlier, the reduction of the world to a subjective transcendental phenomenon does not imply the world is seen as a really intrinsic part of consciousness. The world is immanent in consciousness "ideally", it is an immanent "objective sense of consciousness". States generally, the problem of the "constitution" of the world and of mundae objects concerns the disclosure of how an "actually existing world" and "actually existing worldly objects" arise for us a noematic senses and are maintained as valid through a correlative constitutive intentionality.

It is possible (by means of the example of the perception of a stable thing) to demonstrate the superiority of the Husserlian conception of consciousness as against that advocated by Kant. The problem which we have in view there is concealed in Kant because of the preomimence he gives to the relation of causality in both the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft and Prolegomena. To bring this problem out, we shall take a glance at the Kantian analysis of the relation of causality.

Suppose we have the same experience or do the same laboratory experiment on several occasions. For instance, we heat a metal rod and
observe a certain elongation. It is common to speak of a repetition of the same observation, of the same experience or the same process. Let us consider this more carefully. Each time that we do the experiment in question, we measure the length of the rod, we heat it and measure it length again. Each experience furnishes us with a series of sensory data: the first one with the data \(a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n\); the second one with the data \(b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_n\) and so on. Comparing these two series, we find that the sensory data respectively resemble one another: \(a_1\) is similar to \(b_1\), \(a_2\) is similar to \(b_2\), \(a_n\) is similar to \(b_n\). One can go even further to say that these sensory data are totally like each other respectively, but they can never be taken as identical because the first series occurred, let us say, twenty minutes before the second. Though there may be similarity between the sensory data - even, if one wishes, perfect likeness - there can never be identity what is identical is the law which governs the relation between the rise of the temperature and that extent of the elongation. According to Kant, the identity of the law is guaranteed by the identity of the function pertaining to the pure transcendental apperception which on each occasion, operates in the same manner. Properly speaking, there is no repetition of the same process; there is only an identical law which governs an entire series of processes. Furthermore, there is a similarity or likeness between the sensory data which appear each time the experience is had.

This brief analysis will help us to understand the difficulty which the Kantain theory faces when it deals with the perception of a stable thing. Let us consider the example of which Kant himself made use (without, however, sufficiently analysing it): the perception of a house. Kant remarks that I can look at this house from top to bottom or else from the bottom to the top. Sensory data successively follow one another in each observation; but their
succession is not ratified by the pure transcendental apperception; in contrast, in the case of the causal relation where the sensory data succeed one another not only in fact but also by rights. To simplify the matter, let us suppose that we always look at the house in the same direction, say, from top to bottom, and that we do this several times. Each time we experience a sequence of sensory data: the first time, the sequence $a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n$; the second time, the sequence $b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_n$, and so on. Here again, $a_1$ and $b_1$ and $a_2$ and $b_2$ up to $a_n$ and $b_n$ are similar to one another or are respectively alike, but they are in no way identical. Contrary to the causal relation, there is here nothing identical, not even a law. Now, therefore, can we speak of the "something" and maintain that is is perceived on several occasions? Under these conditions, it is hard to see how the consciousness of identity could ever emerge or by what right we say, as in fact we do at every moment and without the least hesitation, that the diverse perceptions are all, in spite of the differences between them, perceptions of the same house.

Kant's theory fails in the face of a problem which, we repeat, is concealed in the case of the causal relation. Before, we were confronted not only with different sequences of sensory data but also with different physical processes (the actual elongation of the rod each time it is heated). In the case we are now considering, however, the perceived thing stands, in its very identity, over against a multiplicity of perceptions or sensory data.

We have taken these sensory data as psychical facts, refusing to adopt the interpretation of Paton, who has suggested that Kant deliberately identified "sensory data" with "sensible qualities" as states of things. If this interpretation is in keeping with Kant's intentions, the criticism which Husserl has expressed as regards Locke and the entire empiricist school also applies to
Kant. This criticism consists in pointing out the confusion of sensory data (Empfindungen) considered as psychical facts with the sensible qualities of things which, while presenting themselves by means of sensory data, in no way coincide with these. Husserl considers this confusion as an hereditary vice of modern thought, both philosophical and psychological; it is facilitated and even suggested by the same words — such as "red", "hot", "hard".

Husserl distinguishes further between perception and intuition. One may perceive and be conscious of the fact that one perceives an object without understanding its essence, what it is, its principle of being an identity. Intuition of the essence of an object is the source of meaning and intelligibility of the particular phenomena. Eidetic intuiting (Wesensschau) is insight into essences through the experience of exemplifying particulars. Such particulars may be given in either perception or imagination. Intuition is intrinsic to the exercise of understanding and is not to be thought of as involving some faculty independent of reason. Intellectual reflection is not mere passive introspection of facts or mental events but involves the active effort of a subject who grasps and understands the objective meaning of his experience.

Heidegger's theory of the temporality of Dasein in Being and Time has more in common with Husserl's conception than the terminology would lead us to expect. Even if Heidegger avoids some of the basic terms of Husserlian phenomenology, such as consciousness, experiences, and others one can say first of all that both theories concern not a conceptualized but alived temporality.

The priority of the future drives from the projective character of Dasein. This character can be seen as corresponding roughly to Husserl's concept of intentionality. Things have meaning the world has meaning, because Dasein projects their being, that is, grasps them in terms of their purposes (waraufhin).
But this happens only in so far as Dasein projects itself, i.e., grasps itself in terms of its possibilities. In this sense, Dasein is, as Heidegger says, always ahead of itself. 142 For Dasein according to Heidegger, possibility stands "higher" than actuality in the sense that what is understood in the light of possibility. Thus the present and past are grasped together and interpreted by way of the future.

As Mohanty puts it, what is involved in Heidegger's critique of Husserl is the entire issue of the primacy of consciousness. 143

Any philosophy which takes intentionality to be basic may be called a philosophy of consciousness. Hence the shift involved in the movement from Husserl to Heidegger is the shift from a philosophy of consciousness to a philosophy of being. What is involved in this shift is the questioning of the primacy of consciousness. At this level, a hermeneutical philosophy appears as a critique of consciousness.
Husserl and Dilthey

The central aim of Dilthey's long working life was to gain knowledge of the human world, the social -- historical reality, as he often called it. All his particular undertakings -- his massive Schleiermacher biography and shorter biographical sketches, his literary and historical studies, his work on education, music and law were intended to be parts of more comprehensive studies of German culture, of the basis of individuality or of the history of the human studies. Ultimately they were all to contribute to a general understanding of man.

His theories are based on his recognition that the human world with which the social sciences deal, differs significantly from the physical world which is the subject-matter of such sciences as physics, chemistry or biology. Human beings, unlike stones and trees, or even insects and guinea pigs reflect what they do. They interpret the situations they are in, set themselves deliberate aims and plan for the future, communicate with each other, adopt conventions and follow traditions; we cannot study man without taking these into account. To this we must add that in the human disciplines men study themselves and their fellows. They bring an immediacy of insight to the study of human world but are also exposed to the danger of prejudice.

Some of the salient features of Dilthey's methodology are: (1) We must start our investigation with painstaking descriptions and careful analysis of the most complex phenomena we encounter; these include the mental processes of nature, cultured personalities, the imagination of poetic geniuses, the strong will of great statesmen, the functioning of elaborate cultural systems or sophisticated social organizations, the structure of rich languages and systematic philosophies.
Dilthey thus rejected the analytical or back and mortar approach which starts, from simple elements and attempts to reconstruct more complex entities from them. He believed that human life as we know it cannot be accounted for by a hypothetical combination of elementary responses, instincts observed in animals or children and artificially elicited laboratory responses.

Complex structures can, and should be analysed so as to reveal the elements they consist of but, if we begin with these, we cannot easily recapture the richness of experience which gives human life it distinctive qualities. For this reason advocated and illustrated in his own work the use of autobiographies, literary works, letters and diaries as suitable material for research.

Social -- historical reality consists of individual human beings for they alone think, feel and act and so produce languages, religions/and institutions. Dilthey was convinced that such mysterious entities as the collective mind, the common will or a national spirit have no real, independent existence. This conviction did not convert him to methodological individualism (ie he did not believe that the individual was the only subject-matter of the social sciences)\textsuperscript{144}. He considered that to reduce all social and cultural phenomena to the activities of individuals was methodologically impossible and believed that the use of various impersonal, theoretical entities was both necessary and justifiable. When people share beliefs and attitudes or act together to produce particular results and achieve a common purpose we can attribute ideas, policies or actions to classes, nations and associations. We can speak of the decisions of committees, and the spirit of an age.

Social studies/sciences deal with 'Man'. There are natural sciences which deal with nature. Are these two types of studies same? Can we use one method to study both of them? William Dilthey (The German Philosopher) put
forward the thesis that the method of natural science cannot be used in social
science because physical and social phenomena cannot be equated. He said
that there are two categories of sciences (1) Monothetic and idiographic i.e.
sciences about nature i.e. naturwissenschaften and human social sciences i.e.
Geisteswissenschaften/kulturwissenschaften. Natural sciences for e.g. physics,
chemistry, geology, Zology etc study the structure, constitution, mass, they
fragment/dissect etc. So they are objective while social sciences dealing with
man has within it geist /mind because human phenomena conceal behind them
purposes, motives, intentions, designs, will etc. i.e. subjective states of men
which are private and unverifiable. Dilthey in order to emphasize this point
pointed out that studies such as history, psychology, economics, sociology,
anthropology, comparative, jurisprudence comparative, religion, criminology etc
in which both the observer and the observed are meaning givers. One can't
look at mind by isolating it from culture.

Because Dilthey pioneered and lovingly elaborated an approach to the
human studies based on understanding and hermeneutics he has often been
understood as advocating this approach as a complete methodology
superseding and excluding other methods. To set the record straight one must,
first of all, eliminate an ambiguity in Dilthey's use of the term
Geisteswissenschaften which makes him responsible for some of these
misapprehensions. Dilthey used this term - though with some misgivings as to
its adequacy-as a translation of 'moral sciences' i.e. the human disciplines like
history sociology, jurisprudence, linguistics and literary criticism. But he also
used Geisteswissenschaften in contrast to the Naturewissenschaften which
deal with matter for the disciplines which deal with mind and its products.
These are only accessible to understanding and require interpretation. If men
were disembodied minds the studies of man would coincide with the studies of
mind. Obviously this is not so, a fact which Dilthey recognized and stated emphatically. So Geisteswissenschaft, in the sense of the study of mind, can only be a part, through a crucial one, of the Geisteswissenschaften in the sense of the studies of man. This ambiguity has, inspite of Dilthey’s warnings, led many commentators astray.

Dilthey was concerned with the whole human being who, for him, was a physical unit, a person. Mind and matter were, merely convenient concepts arrived at by abstraction from the rich variety of experience. So, having differentiated the sciences from disciplines which deal with mind in terms of subject -- matter, we must put them together again in the study of man. This was Dilthey’s programme and he was passionately interested in the development of physiological psychology, man’s place in the evolutionary scale and the role of the physical environment, all of which envolve the use of scientific methods. This is obscured by the fact that Dilthey made no original contributions to these spheres, but it should be stressed that his theoretical framework can accomodate any kind of approach from ethnomethodology to physiological psychology.

Dilthey’s views on man reminds one of Schiller’s views. Schiller’s statement that the proper study of mankind is man is very close to what Dilthey says.

The human studies embrace many physical facts and are based on knowledge of the physical world. If one could imagine purely mental beings in a community which only consisted of such beings then their emergence, preservation, development and extinction would be dependent on purely mental conditions (whatever idea we may form of the background from which they emerged and into which they receded); their welfare would be based on their relation to a world of mind, their contact with each other and their interactions
would be purely mental and would result in purely mental consequences; even their eclipse from the realm of such beings would have its cause in the 'Geistewissenschaften'. In fact, an individual like any other animal originates, survives and develops through the functioning of his body and its relation to his physical environment; his sense of life is at least partly, based on this functioning; his impressions are conditioned by his sense- organs and the way they are affected by the environment; the wealth and flexibility of his ideas and the strength and direction of his acts of will are, in many ways, dependent on changes in his nervous system. His acts of will contract muscles and so his impact on the outer world is tied to the molecular movements of his body; the permanent effects of his acts of will only persist as changes in the material world. If we want to separate outer man's mental life it must be abstracted from the psycho-physical unit which is the whole man organized into society men from the reality which is subject-matter of the historical social disciplines.

Whatever the metaphysical facts may be, man as a whole may be regarded from two points of view; seen from within he is a system of mental facts but to the senses he is a physical whole, introspection and perception are separate acts as we can never grasp what goes on in man's mind at the same time as we observe his body. So a scientific approach which tries to find out the relationship between the mental and the physical expressed in the unity of body and mind is compelled to adopt two irreducible points of view. If I start from inner experience I find that the whole external world is given in my consciousness and that all the always of nature are subject to the conditions of my consciousness and therefore depend on them. This is the point of view which German philosophy at the turn of the eighteenth century described as transcendental philosophy. But if I start from the physical world as I see it, I notice that mental facts have their place in the temporal and spatial
arrangements of the external world and the changes in mental life result from interference natural experimental -- with the nervous system. Observation of human growth and of the illness extend these impressions into a comprehensive picture of how the mind depends on the body, this is the origin of the scientific approach which proceeds from the external to the internal, from material to mental changes. The antagonism between the philosopher and the scientist is conditioned by the contrast in their starting points.

The Human world, that is human society and history, is the highest phenomenon of the emplirical world. Therefore, to understand this human world, we must know about the system of physical conditions which constantly determines its development. Man, because of his position in the causal context of nature, is conditioned by a double relationship to it.

Dilthey described himself as a philosopher of life because his thinking rested on three related theses. The first was his version of the empiricist principle that all knowledge is based on experience. The second was the theory that all philosophy arises from and refers to the problems of everyday human life. The third embodied the idea of that philosophy must be closely linked to the knowledge of life acquired by the empirical human studies.

Nietzsche represents and articulates the final consequence to be drawn from the denial of discoursive, logical knowledge. Man as a creator of culture is, for him first, the artist then the scientific consciousness and finally, because he despairs of that mission too the philosopher who creates and sets values.

Let us turn our gaze from man's body to his spirit, the theme of the so-called humanistic sciences. In this sciences theoretical interest is directed exclusively to human beings as persons, to their personal life and activity, as also correlative to the concrete results of this activity. To live as a person is to live in a social framework, wherein I and we live together in community and
have the community as a horizon. New communities are structured, in various simple or complex forms, such as family, nation or international community. Here the word 'live' is not to be taken in a physiological sense but rather as signifying purposeful living, manifesting spiritual creativity in the broadest sense, creating culture within historical continuity. It is this that forms the theme of various humanistic sciences. Now, there is an obvious difference between healthy growth and decline, or to put it another way, between health and sickness, even for societies, for peoples, for states. In consequence there arises the not so far fetched question: how is it that in this connection there has never arisen a medical science concerned with nations and with international communities? The European nations are sick; Europe itself, they say, is in critical condition. Nor in this situation are there lacking all sorts of nature therapies. We are, in fact, quite overwhelmed with a torrent of naive and extravagant suggestions for reform. But why is it that so luxuriantly developed humanistic sciences here fail to perform the service that in their own sphere the natural sciences perform so competently?

The greatness of the natural sciences consists in their refusal to be content with an observational empiricism, since for them all descriptions of nature are but methodical procedures for arriving at exact explanations, ultimately physico-chemical explanation. They are of the opinion that "merely descriptive" sciences tie us to the finitudes of our earthly environing world. Mathematically exact natural sciences, however, embraces with its method the infinities contained in its actualities and real possibilities. It sees in the intuitively given a merely subjective appearance, and it teaches how to investigate intersubjective ("objective") nature itself with systematic approximations on the basis of elements and laws that are conditionally universal. At the same time,
such exact science teaches how to explain all intuitively pre-given concretions, whether men, or animals, or heavenly bodies, by an appeal to what is ultimate, i.e., how to induce from the appearances, which are the data in any factual case, future possibilities and probabilities, and to do this with a universality and exactitude that surpasses any empiricism limited to intuition. The consistent development of exact sciences in modern times has been a true revolution in the technical mastery of nature.

"In normal practical life", writes K. C. Bhattacharyya, nature is not consciously exploited as a tool but is negotiated in the primitive spirit of sociableness. It is the arrogant exploiting attitude of science toward the object that provokes a self, healing reaction of the spirit in the form of philosophy or some cognate discipline. The spiritual demand is that nature should be contemplated and not merely used or manipulated.

In the humanistic sciences the methodological situation is unfortunately quite different, and this for internal reasons. Human spirituality is, it is true, based on the human physics, each individually human soul life is founded on corporeality, and thus too each community on the bodies of the individual human beings who are its members. If then, as is done in the sphere of nature, a really exact explanation and consequently a similarly extensive scientific practical application is to become possible for the phenomena belonging to the humanistic sciences, then must the practitioners of the humanistic science consider not only the spirit as spirit but must also go back to its bodily foundations, and by employing the exact sciences of physics and chemistry, carry through their explanations. The attempt to do this, however, have been unsuccessful (and in the foreseeable future there is no remedy to be had) due to the complexity of the exact psycho-physical research needed in the case of individual human beings, to say nothing of the great historical communities. If
the world were constructed of two, so to speak, equal spheres of reality - nature and spirit -- neither with a preferential position methodologically and factually, the situation would be different. But only nature can be handled as a self-contained world; only natural science can with complete consistency abstract from all that is spirit and consider nature purely as nature. On the other side such a consistent abstraction from nature does not, for the practitioner of humanistic science who is interested purely in the spiritual, lead to a self-contained "world", a world whose interrelationships are purely spiritual that could be the theme of a pure and universal humanistic science, parallel to pure natural science.

It is said that a strictly empirical human science, if is to account for the most distinctive features of man's behaviour, is simply impossible. The reason for this contention is that such a science cannot account for the meaning of man's actions, although it can perhaps deal with their physiological aspects or conditions. Furthermore, it is said here that man's behaviour is not governed by uniformities and laws, because of the fact that it is essentially intentional, purposive, free, temporal, historical, and reflexive. This separatist view has been defended among others by Winch, Oakeshott, Peters, Tayfel, Gewerth, Turner, and Malcolm. Some of these authors have suggested the idea that a further development of Dilthey's conception of interpretative science could ultimately lead to a non-naturalistic, but still strictly scientific study of man's behaviour. It is not impossible that Weber's publications have contributed to this later view. 146

1. Another set of arguments for the impossibility of a science of man whose methodology coincides with the rest of the sciences, rest on an alleged inability of the scientific method to capture the uniqueness of human

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phenomena. Since it is to the uniqueness of human activities and events that
the scientists interest is turned and since the method of science is capable of
systematizing only by generalizing it follows that some method other than the
usual scientific ones must be employed by the human sciences. P.Winch in his
book *The Idea of a Social science* exemplifies this basic thesis.

Individual human beings and groups are sensitive to values, they are
attracted to purposes, and they make projects. But how is it possible to
measure 'values'? And even if we accept an 'objective hierarchy of human
values' and believe that the appreciation of values gives rise to motives which
determine a man's action, how do we know what an individual man or group is
going to decide and choose? Are we not here fully in the realm of the purely
subjective where no science is possible? These authors argue, the
difficulties mentioned here point to reasons why the empirical study of man is
affected with serious difficulties. In the phenomenological literature we find the
view according to which every empirical approach to the human reality is
doomed to failure in principle and that the only legitimate approach to man is to
be found in the phenomenological this latter term to be interpreted either in the
sense given to it by Husserl in his *phenomenologische psychologie* (1925),
or in the sense given to it by Heidgger in *sein und Zeit* (1927). Other
phenomenologists have argued that an empirical approach to man's behaviour
is indeed, possible within certain limits, but that the genuinely human meaning
of the results of this type of investigation is to be clarified by a *Philosophical*
study of man which at the same time must give the ultimate foundation to
empirical research and its results. It is assumed here that this 'philosophical
anthropology' is to be developed within the confines of the phenomenological
or existential philosophies. There are a great number of phenomenologists who,
following both Husserl's and Heidegger's deeper intentions, defend the view
that empirical research in the realm of social phenomena is possible and necessary, but that such an approach is to be complemented by descriptive and interpretative approaches which take as such are not yet philosophical in character. 150

The current sciences of man have gravitated into a situation of Crisis. A discord has settled in on this scene, producing a veritable Tower of Babel in which each of the several human sciences speaks with its own tongue, resulting in a distressing breakdown of communication not only within the human sciences but within the republic of human knowledge more generally.

As anyone acquainted with the literature can testify, we are not alone in this assessment. Already in 1928 Max Scheler called our attention to the troubled condition affecting the scientific and philosophical study of man. Man is more a problem to himself at the present time than ever before in all recorded history --- we have a scientific, a philosophical, and a theological anthropology, in complete separation from each other. We do not have a unified idea of man. The increasing multiplicity of the spiritual sciences, valuable as they are, tend to hide man's nature more than reveal it.151

Two decades later, Ernst Cassirer, admittedly approaching the issue from a somewhat different perspective, nonetheless came to a remarkably similar general conclusion: "psychology, ethnology, anthropology, and history have amassed an astoundingly rich and constantly increasing body of facts.............. But our wealth of facts is not necessarily a wealth of thoughts. Unless we succeed in finding a clue of Ariadne to lead us out of his labyrinth, we can have no real insight into the general character of human culture; we shall remain lost in a mass of disconnected and distingegrated data which seem to lack all conceptual unity.152 In still more recent times, the two French philosophers, George Gusdorf and Paul Ricour have echoed the very
concerns of Scheler and Cassirer. Gusdorf writes: "We need only to consider the present state of the human sciences to ascertain that they are in complete confusion. They are developing, most certainly, and they are multiplying their works, but the technicians of the various disciplines usually do not know precisely what they want nor what they are doing." 153 Paul Ricoeur provides a consummate assessment of the situation when he concludes: "The sciences of man are dispersed into separate disciplines and literally do not know what they are talking about." 154

Heidegger too closely associated the travel of the human sciences with the entrapment of technology. According to Heidegger the advent of the scientific -- technological frame (Gestell) has produced a crisis of technification that goes to the roots of all scientific thinking. Scientific thought has itself become technologized, which means that science is no longer capable of thinking in an originative sense. Science calculates, but it does not think. Only poetic dwelling is capable of thinking in an originative sense, and it alone has the power to liberate us from the technification of thought and praxis that has been ushered in by the natural fusion of science and technology.

Environing world is a concept that has its place exclusively in the spiritual sphere. That we live in our own particular environvironing world, to which all our concerns and efforts are directed, points to an event that takes place purely in the spiritual order. Our environing world is a spiritual structure in us and in our historical life. 155 Here, then there is no reason for one who makes his theme the spirit as spirit to demand for it any but a purely spiritual explanation. And this has general validity; to look upon environing nature as in itself alien to spirit, and consequently to desire to support humanistic science with natural science and thus presumably to make the former exact, is nonsense.
Obviously, too, it is forgotten that natural science (like all science as such) is a title for spiritual activities, those of natural scientists in cooperation with each other; as such these activities belong, as do all spiritual occurrences, to the realm of what should be explained by means of a science of the spirit.

Blinded by naturalism (no matter how much they themselves may verably oppose it), the practitioners of humanistic science have completely neglected even to pose the problem of a universal and pure science of the spirit and to seek a theory of the essence of spirit as spirit, a theory that pursues what is unconditionally universal in the spiritual order with its own elements and its own laws. Yet this last should be done with a view to gaining thereby scientific explanations in an absolutely conclusive sense. The preceding reflections proper to a science of the spirit provide us with the right attitude for grasping and handling our theme of spiritual Europe as a problem belonging purely to science of the spirit, first of all from the point of view of spirit's history.

In an article entitled "Life and culture in the analysis of the relationship between man and nature" Angela Ales Bello.\textsuperscript{156} says 'The dilemma of life or culture, which began first to enfold in philosophical speculation at the close of the nineteenth century, is both a false dilemma and a true one.

Looking back over the history of Western civilization, one realizes in what way this civilization was constructed and what image it has given of nature and of man. The sciences of nature and those of the spirit or to use a more recent term, the human sciences -- these latter making their mark from the positivist period, onward have claimed to be instruments of the "true" interpretation of the natural, psychic, social, and historical reality. The human sciences in particular, have not only modeled themselves on the natural sciences, but have also endeavoured to preserve a specificity of their own; the
reason for this ambiguity has to be sought in the contrasting trends toward a positive valuation of the methods of the natural sciences, considered to be exemplary, and toward the drawing of a distinction between the ambit of the psyche and that of physical existence. Toward the end of the last century, in fact, this distinction became the banner of the antipositivist reaction that attempted to remove research on man from the ambit of science.\textsuperscript{157}

The extraordinary successes of natural knowledge are now to be extended to knowledge of the spirit. Reason had proved its power in nature. "As the sun is one all --- illuminating and warning sun, so too is reason one" (Descartes) \textsuperscript{158}. The method of natural sciences must also embrace the mysteries of spirit. The spirit is real, \textsuperscript{159} and objectively in the world, founded as such in corporeality with this the interpretation of the world immediately takes on a predominantly dualistic i.e., psychophysical, form. The same causality only split in two embraces the one world; the sense of rational explanation is everywhere the same, but in such a way that all explanation of spirit, in the only way in which it can be universal, involves the physical. There can be no pure, self-contained search for an explanation of the spiritual, no purely inner oriented psychology or theory of spirit beginning with the ego in psychical self -- experiences and extending to the other psyche.\textsuperscript{160} The way that must be travelled is the external one, the path of physics and chemistry. All the fond talk of common spirit, of the common will of a people, of nations ideal political goals, and the like, and romanticism and mythology, derived from an analogous application of concepts that have a proper sense only in the individual personal sphere. Spiritual being is fragmentary. To the question regarding the source of all these difficulties the following answer is to be given: this objectivism or this psychophysical interpretation of the world, despite its seeming self -- evidence, is naive one -- sidedness that never was understood.
to be such. To speak of the spirit as reality (Realität), presumably a real (realen) annex of bodies and having its supposedly spatiotemporal being within nature, is an absurdity.

At this point, however, it is important for one problem of the crisis to show how it is that the "modern age", that has for centuries been so proud of its successes in theory and practice, has itself finally fallen into a growing dissatisfaction and must even look upon its own situation as distressful. Want has invaded all the sciences, most recently as a want of method.

In our time we everywhere meet the burning need for an understanding of spirit, while the unclarity of the methodological and factual connection between the natural sciences and the sciences of the spirit has become almost unbearable. Delthey, one of the greatest scientist of the spirit, has directed his whole vital energy to clarifying the connection between nature and spirit, to clarifying the role of psychphysical psychology, which he thinks is to be complemented by a new, descriptive and analytic psychology. Efforts by Windelband and Rickert have likewise, unfortunately, not brought the desired insight. Like everyone else, these men are still committed to objectivism. Worst of all are the new psychological reformers, who are of the opinion that the entire fault lies in the long dominant atomistic prejudice, that a new era has been introduced with wholistic psychology (Ganzheitspsychologie) There can, however, never be any improvement so long as an objectivism based on a naturalistic focusing on the environing world is not seen in all its naivete, until men recognize throughly the absurdity of the dualistic interpretation of the world, according to which nature and spirit are to be looked upon as realities (Realitaten) in the same sense. In all seriousness my opinion is this: there never has nor ever will be an objective science of spirit, an objective theory of
the soul, objective in the sense that it permits the attribution of an existence under the forms of spatio temporality to souls or to communities of persons.

The spirit and in fact only the spirit is a being in itself and for itself; it is autonomous and is capable of being handled in a genuinely rational, genuinely and thoroughly scientific way only in this autonomy. In regard to nature and scientific truth concerning it, however, the natural sciences give merely the appearance of having brought nature to a point for itself it is rationally known. For true nature in its proper scientific sense is a product of the spirit that investigates nature, and thus the science of nature presupposes the science of the spirit. The spirit is essentially qualified to exercise self-knowledge, and as scientific spirit to exercise scientific self-knowledge, and that over again. Only in the kind of pure knowledge proper to science of the spirit is the scientist unaffected by the objection that his accomplishment is self-concealing. As a consequence, it is absurd for the sciences of the spirit to dispute with the sciences of nature for equal rights. To the extent that the former concede to the latter that their objectivity is an autonomy, they are themselves victims of objectivism. Moreover, in the way the sciences of the spirit are at present developed, with their manifold disciplines, they forfeit the ultimate, actual rationality which the spiritual Weltanschauung makes possible. Precisely this lack of genuine rationality on all sides is the source of what has become for man an unbearable unclarity regarding his own existence and his infinite tasks. These last are inseparably united in one task: Only if the spirit returns to itself from its naive exteriorization, clinging to itself and purely to itself, can it be adequate to itself.

Phenomenological analysis not only takes up once more the theme of "suspicion" a theme that is not new in the history of human thought and speculation, but even makes it the central theme. Indeed, epoche is precisely
this attitude and not that of some one who completely abandons himself to life; it is neither ingenuous nor a crtical, but it is rather the prudent and suspicious attitude of someone who desires to understand and not just to organize reality according to his own ideas. 164

The reading of nature and of man in a phenomenological key therefore responds to the need to comprehend reality by limiting the claims of the natural sciences and the sciences of man; it shows us how these sciences absolutize themselves how they can become instruments of alienation rather than of comprehension. One may note, in particular just how useful phenomenological analysis may be vis-à-vis epistemology itself, which in its most recent elaborations seems to have arrived at an aporetic situation: it no longer succeeds in justifying a realistic vision of scientific knowledge and, if it admits that this latter be understood as a "construction", it is also compelled to accept its own failure. It is therefore essential to continue the inquiry already begun by Husserl in Crisis which was aimed at demonstrating the elaborative modalities of science as a work - part of a process of objectivization that can be valid, always provided that it does not put itself forward as an ultimate and definitive interpretation of reality.

Husserl was striving in an egological and monological manner for clarity in his own thought. He constructed the world - which he had bracketed - rationally, from within. Nevertheless, Husserl and Delthey were aiming at totality in a certain way and both were struggling for the authenticity of lived experience.

Husserl showed that Geisteswissenschaft is a science of concrete spirit, of concrete subjectivity which as such cannot be transcended. This concrete subjectivity has as its correlate the whole - including the world of nature - as cultural world. Its name is "philosophy" (See Illua, IX, suppl. V from 1926,
From this absolute or universal Geisteswissenschaft which is finally called "universal Geisteswissenschaft as anthropology" or "universal anthropology" (I lua, XV, opp. 480 ff. from 1932) we can separate the, so to speak, "naive" Geisteswissenschaften (in the plural). At the same time, the individual separate Geisteswissenschaften render service to the universal Geisteswissenschaft.

Even natural science turns out to be a phenomenon of the Geisteswissenschaften in so far as it is founded in lived experience and in intellectual activity. Basically, this had already been claimed by Dilthey (see GS, VII 82ff.) Dilthey's arguments for the methodological independence of the human sciences and his fight against the wrong application of the methods of the natural sciences within the domain of the human sciences gave rise to the wrong impression that he was deviating the natural science and nature. Actually Dilthey's writings contain remarkable contributions concerning the problem of the structure and foundation of natural science, which deserve to be pursued further. Nature is seen as the foundation of phenomena in the spiritual sphere in Dilthey and in Husserl, although intellectual activities lead to the institution of the natural sciences and so are the first condition for the understanding and investigation of nature. Husserl sometimes formulates this more clearly than Dilthey and this presumably because he upholds a philosophy of constitution.

In this centennial celebration of Wilhelm Dilthey's first major philosophical work, Eionleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (Introduction to the Human sciences), it is perhaps desirable to explore the multifacted ways in which he has influenced the development of phenomenological philosophy. One area of his influence is discussed in the paper "Nature" in the Human -scientific perspective: An Husserlian response to Dilthey by John E. Jalbert
is the role his thought plays in the philosophical program of Edmund Husserl. In selecting forth a philosophical position whose ultimate goal Husserl accepted but whose methods to achieve that goal Husserl could not accept. Dilthey served as a major motivating force behind much of Husserl's work in the area of phenomenological psychology.

For Husserl, the personal surrounding world (i.e. the world given in the personalistic attitude) encompasses both nature and spirit and, thus, a human science that claims to provide the necessary foundation for the concrete human disciplines must render "nature" as well as spirit comprehensible. It is further submitted that, in Husserl's view, Dilthey failed to properly recognize and study the implication of the fact that "nature", purely as experienced, is a theme belonging within the purview of human science. Accordingly, in an effort to realize Dilthey's project, Husserl devotes considerable attention to sketching and elucidating some of the principle tenets of a phenomenology of the nature.

Part of Dilthey's strategy was to demonstrate that what counts as nature in modern science is in reality a product of the scientific method:

The intelligible world of atoms, ether and vibrations is only an intentional and highly artificial abstraction from what is given in lived and ordinary experience.166

This view, expressed by Dilthey, anticipates one of the basic features of Husserl's interpretation of modern science as developed in his Crisis. Because Husserl agreed with the thrust and aim of Dilthey's thought in general and his psychology in particular, it became increasingly clear to Husserl that certain aspects in Dilthey's formulations would have to be clarified and developed more thoroughly and consistently. One such theme is "experiential nature".

Husserl probably has Dilthey as well as other human scientists in mind when he writes in an unpublished manuscript: Ordinary human science: it
does not have pre-given nature as a correlate of subjectivity as a theme. It presupposes material intuitive nature as existing and does not make subjective (of, "manner of givenness") constitution into a theme. 167

A clue that statements such as the one just cited should indeed be understood to include Dilthey is provided by a remark that Husserl writes in the margin of his personal copy of George Misch's study, Lebensphilosophie und Phanomenologie. In the section where Misch characterizes Dilthey's conception of the philosophical enterprise as one which seeks to elucidate in a satisfactory manner the phenomena of poetry religion and metaphysics, Husserl interestingly writes: But the whole world ? (!) not only of culture and the world of persons but also nature, thus it must give a satisfactory account of the universal phenomenon of existing world validity.

The world, says Husserl, is in the first place the world of values, practical objects like glasses, tables, the world of friends and strangers, the world of beauty, suffering, life and death, human communication, as well as of new experiences. 168 Here indeed, the sciences and their method are integrated within an endless and receding horizon. Husserl himself even called it the "promised land", seen by him from distance. 169 But in this passage from Ideen he pointed to his well-known program of a "rigorous science" as the "decisive step" toward the "transcendental subjectivity". 170

Husserl's aim is not to demonstrate the independence of the human from the natural sciences but also to halt the ever increasing alienation of natural science from life. Not only culture, but nature too, had become incomprehensible. Yet, despite this fact, natural science was able to proceed with its program and to even advance its control over nature. But the price paid for this success was that natural science had increasingly less to say to human beings and the only way that this situation could be turned around was
to take a fresh look at "experiental nature" and to proceed on the basis of the results of this investigation to reinterpret the natural scientific conception of nature. If Husserl appears to be moving in a direction similar to that pointed to by Dilthey at the end of the Einleitung, we should not perhaps be altogether surprised for if it is true that Dilthey was the first to make Husserl aware of the great relevance of phenomenology for the problems besetting the human sciences, then it is probably also true that Dilthey awakened Husserl to the urgent need for a genuine "understanding" of nature. 171

In the 1000's, before Husserl read any of his work or he Husserl's, Dilthey distinguished between inner and outer experience as two sides of the same generic, integral experience, but viewed from different perspectives. There is only one experience, he wrote, which is applied in a double direction. 172 The twofold elaboration of lived experience gives rise, on the one hand, to the human sciences, which remain close to the concrete standpoint of life, and, on the other, to the natural sciences, where in understanding is mediated by hypothesis.

Dilthey, from the perspective of the human sciences, emphasized differences between the way facts are given in the human sciences and the way facts are given in the natural sciences, in order to urge the development of a descriptive and analytic method in psychology as opposed to the constructive and hypothetical method developed in the natural sciences.

The particular character of each individual science is to be determined according to the way in which the objects of that science are given to experience. Accordingly, Dilthey presents a point by point contrast between the way the objects of the natural sciences are given and the way in which psychic life is given, as a basis for insisting upon a distinctive method in psychology: the facts which form the objects of the natural sciences are given
in consciousness as coming from without, as phenomena, and as isolated,
whereas the facts which form the objects of the natural sciences are given in
consciousness as coming from without, as phenomena, and as isolated,
whereas the facts which form the objects of the human sciences are given
from within, as reality, and as an active nexus. Consequently, the natural
sciences must supply a nexus to nature inferentially, hypothetically; but no
such procedure is required for the human sciences, since the nexus of psychic
life is originally given as their foundation (GS, V. 143).

Heidegger in 1925 credited Dilthey as "the first to understand the aims
of phenomenology" Like the neokantians, Husserl denounced the confusion of
fact and idea (the reduction of idea to fact just revenges itself by leading to the
"Superstition of the fact") and went on to announce "Science is a little
standing for absolute, time less values". 173

The recent volumes of Nachlass material have made it clear that for
Dilthey inner experience of mental life is not subjective or "merely" subjective.
(How it came to be so regarded as this "merely" is one of the great motifs of
Dilthey’s own intellectual history, just as it is Husserl’s later thought.) From the
start Dilthey’s inner experience is, to borrow Brentano’s terms, intentional and
evidential. It is experience of life, the "otherness" of life, and other life, not of
a self - contained, anaclastic self back on itself, nor a stream of Humean
sensations. We can have "repeated" experience” of................. "only if
experience has structured content. Inner experience can be reflected upon
because it is not reflexive; as evidence, it is referential, not self - referential.
This "aboutness" and "givenness" of inner experience is ultimately directed to
life. Life, too.has its valences : Life is both something private and almost
ineffably personal but also something public, social, and cultural. Life is more
primorial than the distinctions subjective/objective, phenomenal/real, and
inner/outer. What is analytically separable is realiter connected. On the one hand Dilthey seems to draw a veil over the deepest features of life, at least considered as an imponderable "whole":

The expression "Life" conveys to everyone what is most familiar and most intimate and yet what is darkest, even unfathomable. What life is, is in an insoluble riddle. All musing serious inquiry, and thought arises from this unfathomable thing. All knowledge is rooted in this never fully cognizable thing. (GS, XIX, 346).

Any notion such as "total objectivity"-- or total subjectivity, for that matter -- in the human world is a pipe -- dream, a contradiction in terms (like absolute knowledge), which flies in the face of the delinitation and "horizon" which is constitutive of objectivity in the first place. The absolute demand can only lead to absolute disappointment, like Kant's bird which imagines it could fly more easily without the air to impede it. There is only provisional, selective objectivity -- even with regard to inner experience, permeated and inflicted as it is with objective mind. There is only relative or "correlative"objectivity, in the human sciences : but relative in a peculiar double sense which, to my mind, very much blunts the charge of relativism : (1) relative to the structures of experience within the various coherences of life ; (2) relative to a concrete subjectivity engaged in expanding its horizon -- structure. Such correlative objectivity is "partial" by comparison to some putative "whole truth" (without limitation and selection); however, Dilthey's more critical and modest "partial" objectivity can be "impartial" within its own frame of reference.

This brings us to the question of world views and Weltanschauungslehre, which was Husserl's main avenue of access to Dilthey's thought. It is alleged that the doctrine of world -- views makes Dilthey's relativism truly "radical". Dilthey did not invent the notion of world -- view anymore than he could be
said to have invented "life"; what he did do was to project a science of "doctrines" of world-views which could explicate them out of their ordinary and thoughtless familiarity and "massive matter of -- coarseness" into reflective recognition. Dilthey was not trying the contrive another Weltanschauung but rather a historical -- systematic discipline which would interpret, compare, and excavate them from their "ground" in lived experience and live - values. "The deepest root of a world -- view is life". Dilthey says (GS, VIII, 8), and, like life, it structure, regularity and patterned coherence. Science too, has roots in the ground of life, but Dilthey was far from saying that grounds, roots, trunks, branches, and fruits are all the same thing. Dilthey saw different valencies for sciences considered as a cultural phenomenon and for science considered as valid systematic theory and knowledge. To Husserl he wrote that there is crucial difference between the historical life forms such as world -- views, constitutions, religions on the one hand and the sciences on the other. "Such forms have a special relation to life, one that is different from that of the objectively valid sciences". 174

By the time (around 1880) Dilthey came across the physiologist's concept of structural differentiation he had made little or no use at all of the word "structure". His basic antropological and psychological concepts, however, were such that the term "structure" seemed merely replaced by some German synonyms, such as "Geifuige" or "Ghederung". His preparatory work for his chef - d' oeuvre, the Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (Introduction to the Human sciences) (1883) show how close he had come by that time to the approach which some years later is clearly characterized by the use of 'structural" analysis and description. Whereas the Einleitung as Dilthey published it is 1883 did not contain many of these ideas, the earlier parts
written down during his years in Breslau and therefore called "Breslau Drafts" (GS, XIX, 58 ff.) -- show how the concept of "structure" was incorporated.

Especially chapter 6 of the Breslau Drafts can serve as an illustration. The title, "Die Gliederung der Tatsachen des Bewusstseins (the Articulation of the facts of consciousness) indicates that Dilthey here draws some consequences from what he called the second Basic principle of philosophy. The first had been: everything given to me in outer and inner experience is only there -for-me as a nexus of facts of my consciousness Dilthey would call thus the principle of phenomenality, indicating that the problem of reality can only be solved by starting with the analysis of what is given to me in my consciousness. But if this principle were the only guideline for epistemology it would lead to a radical phenomenalism by which reality is reduced to mere appearance from a purely cognitive subjects in whose Veins "flows no real blood" (GS, I, XVIII). This lack of real blood in the cognitive subject had compelled schopenhauer, representative of such a radical phenomenalism, to find his way out of the world as mere representation -- back to metaphysics. Dilthey in a conscious effort to overcome this schopenhauerian paradox, tried to counter balance the principle of phenomenality by a second principle: The facts of consciousness cannot be reduced to a sphere of images, as it were, for a merely on looking subject, detached from concrete relations with the outer world. Facts of consciousness are also -- and above all the experiences of pain, pleasure joy, hope, fear, satisfaction etc., starting with the most elementary experience of resistance exercised by an outer world, against the movements of my body. Here lived experience (Erlebnis) is brought in as the basic epistemological category, set against the concept of representation (Vorstellung). Thus the second Basic principle holds that the facts of consciousness are given in the "totality of psychic life" (GS, XIX, 75) and that
a merely epistemological grounding of the human sciences has to be replaced by a more comprehensive psychological and anthropological self-reflection (selbstbesinnung) this would be the task of a purely descriptive psychology which on the basis of an analysis of lived experience in its entirety would, at the same time, have to bring in all the anthropological findings which the history of language, mythology, religion and poetry can provide. It is of no great importance whether we call this kind of self-reflection "philosophy of life", "Erkenntnisanthropologic" (as K.O. Apel would call it), "philosophical anthropology" or "phenomenology" as long as we make sure that it is not psychology in the narrow sense of "psychologism" (implying a nomothetical and reductionist quest for psychic laws).

The interplay of cognitive, emotive, and volitive processes might be called that "real blood" Dilthey found missing in the veins of the merely cognitive subject as both empiricist and rationalist epistemology had constructed it. It is "life itself".

Whenever we find the words "this is life itself" in Dilthey's writings we find them connected with the idea that the interaction between self and milieu means in the first place the interplay of impression and movement (or stimulus and response). Before adopting the term "Structure" Dilthey occasionally spoke of the "anthropological schema" which meant the interconnectedness of "feeling--sensation--impulse transformation into movement--satisfaction, etc" (G.S. XVIII, 234, 183f.) Or he would describe this interaction as a circular process ("Kieslauf der psychischen Tätigkeit," "Kreislauf der Lebensfunktionen" etc). (GS. XVIII, 182f; XIX. 415). Such expressions show the importance of connecting impression (stimulus) and movement (response) by feeling as an intermediary. In this connection, when trying to find his way from anthropology to history, he uses the word "Struktur--Differenzierung (GS,
XVIII, 160), probably for the first time. The direct influence of spencer) Ribot is visible in his notes on these authors. The term "structure" is still used in a tentative way there. Whatever the further development of this concept may have been, it is not until about 1885 that "structure" becomes a definite term. In his lectures on psychology in 1885/86 the term "inner structure of the soul" is used to alter an earlier version of the same passage. The lecture on “Dichterische Einbildungskraft und Wahnsinn (Ethical Imagination and Insanity)” of 1886 (GS, VI, 90ff.), and above all the Poetics of 1887 introduce the new concept at great length. I quote from the latter essay:

There is a structure of psychic life which is as clearly recognizable as that of the physical body. Life always consists in the interaction of a living body and an external world which constitutes its milieu. Sensation, perceptions, and thoughts constantly originate from the play of external stimuli. Changes in our affective state on the basis of a general feeling are also aroused. The feelings then evoke volitions and the strivings of desire and will. Volitions result in external actions of the will and among them the most powerful are those that are permanently embedded in bodily states such as the impulse for self-preservation the need for nourishment, the impulse to propagate, and the love of offspring. Almost as powerful are the need for esteem and the social instincts which are embedded in the will ether volitions produce inner changes in consciousness. The hierarchy of the animal Kingdom is based on this structure. We see the most simple, bare form of life where a stimulus in which feelings are sensation are undifferentiated, produces a movement in an animal.175

In the lecture of 1886 this passage in concluded by the words: "This constant interaction between the self and the milieu in which we breathe, suffer and act: this is our life" (GSV, 95). In various contexts, such as
educational theory (GS, V, 95; GS, IX, 185), ethics (GS, X, 48), epistemology (GS, V, 95), theory of world -- views (GS, VIII, 16), even in the essay in literary archives (GS, IV, 559) not to mention, of course, the "Ideas concerning a Descriptive and Analytic psychology" of 1894 (GS, V, 212) -- the same idea is repeated again and again. That this concept does not belong merely to a "psychologistic" phase which was overcome by the "hermeneutical" approach of the later writings is shown by the fact that the essay of 1907, "The Essence of Philosophy", almost literally repeats earlier passages. Here again Dilthey sums up with words: "This is human life" (GS.V. 373).
Husserl and Descartes

The phenomenological method forbids all prejudgements and dogmas. It ideal is the elaboration of a descriptive philosophy by means of a radical method. Proceeding with the greatest possible freedom from presuppositions. It is a scientific tendency in philosophy, and its constructive program gives great promise of positive results.

The phenomenological attitude involves a "reduction" to pure consciousness, really carrying out the attempt made by Descartes (who, to be sure had a very fragmentary idea of the goal envisaged by phenomenology). The world and I as a body and empirical subject are "put out of play" eliminated (ausgeschaltet) and bracketed(eingeklammert). The pure sphere of transcendental subjectivity can only be attained by means of the phenomenological attitude, which requires the performance of an "epoche". The stream of my cogitations is immediately and apodictically given; and the world is there as a cogitatum, or as the corresponding object of experience. The objects of experience are then not limited to the factual world, but include all possible objects (as cogitata), such as ideal objects, so called impossible objects, etc. That is the gain, since this attitude is then directly useful for epistemology, logic, and metaphysics.

The phenomenological "suspension" is an entirely peculiar operation. It does not mean that a thesis is abandoned which was laid down, or that a conviction has been altered. The thesis in question is as it were "placed out of action", "eliminated", "bracketed". It remains in this bracketed form; it is still an experience, but we "make no use of it". This peculiar epoche can be examined with regard to every thesis; it involves a certain abstention from judgement, which is compatible with a unshaken conviction of truth. The judgement becomes a "bracketed judgment". In the case of phantasied objects...
one eliminates the judgement or assumption. "I think it as being such and such". Instead of the universal doubt of Descartes, then, Husserl proposes this universal "epoche". A new scientific domain is thus determined. All the sciences which refer to the natural world are also eliminated: no use is made of their propositions and results. They may only be "assumed" in brackets, and not as propositions presuming validity. That remains when the entire world is eliminated (including us with all "cogitare") is "pure" or "transcendental" consciousness. That is the phenomenological residuum.

Beginning with a generous expression of indebtedness to Descartes, Husserl portrays phenomenology as the historical completion of the subjective movement inaugurated by Descartes' *Meditations*. The central idea of Descartes, judged from Husserl's point of view, was the return to the self, or to the stream of experiences, by means of the method of doubt. The reform of the sciences and the establishment of their essential unity on a philosophical basis are themes which are prominent in both thinkers. That Husserl sees more in Descartes in some respects than is warranted is due to his own interest in exploiting the method of doubt for purposes of transcendental phenomenology that explains his painstaking elaboration of Descartes' "beginning". That which has historical significance for Descartes as a reaction against a tradition harboring obscurity, dogma, and authoritarianism is appropriated by Husserl as an essential part of the technique for developing a philosophy out of pure consciousness.

Voicing his discontent with the state of Philosophy, Husserl proposes to begin with Descartes' starting-point, the pure ego *cogito*, and to lead the way from there to transcendental phenomenology, which is submitted as the proper basis for unity in philosophy. Like Descartes, Husserl holds that the evidence of the existence of the world is not apodictic, for it is capable of being doubted
without contradiction. The ego cogito indicates the province of transcendental subjectivity, which is the domain of certain and first-being. But Descartes failed to make any philosophical capital out of his discovery of certainty. This error is rectified by Husserl, who proceeds to sketch the field of transcendental experience and its general structures. The indubitable data of self-consciousness form a stream of experiences, which may be regarded from the side of the act of experience (the cogito), or as its correlated, that which is thought (the cogitatum). The already well-known distinction between natural reflection and transcendental reflection, the "intentional nature of experience and its basic characteristics, such as identification and the element of time, indicate leading stages of the investigation.

In the of "radicalism" of understanding, the phenomenological method require a "reduction" to individual consciousness first of all; and it must then face the problem of establishing the reality of other subjects. The method may be said to be "radical" in the sense that all possible beliefs are suspended, and only the most certain data are admitted as a beginning. In carrying out the method, the world and all human beings except myself are "bracketed". But this first reduction must be carried a step further, in conformity to the ideal of the method. If I as an individual ego "eliminates" other human beings, I must also suspend all judgements based upon them or involving them. The phenomenological residuum becomes correspondingly narrower. What does it comprise? This is answered by a more precise application of the phenomenological method. With the natural attitude I find myself in the world, along with other human beings. If I abstract from the others, I am "alone" that which is peculiar to my ego is my concrete being as a "monad". For the purposes of method it is important to begin by extruding from the field of investigation not only the reality of others for me, but all modes of
consciousness referring to what is strange to me, i.e. everything referring to "Others", such as predicates expressing cultural values.

Thus Husserl attempts to achieve the determination of a completely individual sphere of consciousness proceeding with what is given in intuitive experience.

Having eliminated all strange elements, there remains "the phenomenon of the world", as the transcendental correlate of the experience of the world. The sphere which comprises my own world represents the extreme limit which is attainable by phenomenological reduction. This is "first", and it must be attained order to constitute the experience of "an other ego distinct from me"; and without having the latter idea I am not able to have the experience of an "objective world". But I do not need the experience of an objective world or of another ego in order to have "my own world".

Husserl's point of view shows the Kantian influence. He is concerned with pointing out the necessary presuppositions or conditions of an ordered process of experience, including social experience.

The cartesian Meditations is fittingly concluded with an expression of reverence toward the subjective tradition. Stating that positive science is a science of being which is lost in the world, Husserl adds that it is necessary first to lose the world by the method of reduction in order to find it later in the field of universal self-consciousness. The words of saint Augustine, to the effect that truth is to be founded in the self, express the dominant idea of the Meditations. It follows then either that objective or "outer" truth is inaccessible, in which case we are committed to agnosticism; or that an absolute consciousness (whatever that may be, as one may observe with the natural attitude) conditions and constitutes reality itself, and not only our
meaningful experience of reality. It is the latter alternative which is accepted by transcendental phenomenology as an idealistic philosophy.

It is not a question of choosing either the phenomenological method or the natural view of the world. The method has its usefulness in the theory of knowledge or in descriptive psychology, as well as in general philosophy, and it thus supplements our knowledge. In a systematic, analytic sense it may be said to provide the foundation of all ordered knowledge. Its clarification of basic concepts and structures extends to all fields of knowledge including the social sciences. 176

References


8. Ibid, p. 103.


18. Ibid, p. 120. Cf. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. II, part 2, p. 243; and also chs. XII, B and XV; Dherein.


25. Ibid, p. 92

26. Ibid, p. 93

27. Ibid, p. 93

28. Ibid, p. 94

29. Ibid, p. 98

30. Ibid, p. 100


32. In the next chapter Merleau - Ponty points out that the balance is not one sided : "Most of the time phenomenologists have not understood what might be basically convergent with their own inspiration in contemporary psychology" (p. 49).

33. Schutz, Collected Papers, III, 45.

34. Cf. Eugen Fink, "Die Phanomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der Gegenwärtigen Kritik", with a preface by a Edmund Husserl, Kantstudien (Berlin, 1933), pp. 319 - 383. Husserl states that he agrees with every statement in the essay. Dr. Fink was his private assistant at the time.
35. Ideas, Section 34, p. 114 - translation modified see Ideen I, p. 74. This psychological investigation extends from section 34 through at least section 46 and perhaps through section 49.

36. Ibid, Section 33, pp. 112 - 13. The wider investigation extends from section 33 through section 55.

37. Ibid, "Introduction", pp. 41 - 47

38. Ibid, Section 32, p. 110.


40. Ideas, Section 50, pp. 154 - 55.

41. Cf. Husserl's reply to Palagi.

42. The term "discard" as used by W. Koehler in his The Place of Value in a World of facts is also unfortunate, for the "convictions about existence" are simply "Suspended", and continue to be of interest phenomenologically.

43. The present conception of phenomenology in its relationship to other methods may also serve to indicate the direction of a reply to the interesting line of argument of V. J. McGill ("A Materialist's Approach to Husserl's Philosophy") and Charles Hartshorne ("Husserl's and the social structure of Immediacy") in Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl. Other in the same volume, not mentioned thus far but pertinent for the present subject, include the following: Herbert Spiegelberg, "The 'Reality phenomenon' and Reality", Helmut Kuhn, "The Phenomenological Concept of 'Horizon', "Jacob Klein, "Phenomenology and the History of Science" Fritz Kaufmann, "Art and Phenomenology", Louis O. Kattsoff "The Relation of Science and Philosophy in the light of Husserl's thought".
Of interest also are the essays by William E. Locking ("Outline - Sketch of a System of Metaphysics") Gerhart Husserl ("Men and the Law"), and Hermann Weyl ("The Ghost of Modality").

44. Ideas, Section 33, p. 112. See Section 16, p. 77 for the definition of "region".

45. Ibid., Section 16, pp. 77 - 78.

46. Ibid., Section 8, pp. 63 - 69.

47. Ibid., Section 17, p. 79.

48. See Ludwig Landgrebe, "Seinesregionen und regionable ontologien in Husserls Phanomenologie", in his Der Weg Der Phanomenologie (Gutersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1963) for a discussion of Husserl's treatment of the relationship between these two regions of being.

49. Ideas, Sections 62, p. 103.

50. Ibid. p. 182.

51. Ibid, p. 103

52. Ibid, Sections 146 - 53, pp. 404 - 27.


54. Ideas, "Introduction ", p. 45. Here Husserl says that the second book of Ideas will explain the relation of phenomenology to the other sciences. On this, see the editor's introduction to Edmund Husserl, Ideen, Zu einer reinen Phanomenologice und phanomenologischen Philosophie, Second book.
55. A "positive" Science is a science that presupposes the world (crises, p. 261). This seems to be the same as what Husserl calls a "dogmatic" (Versus a "Critical") Science in Ideas, Section 26.

56. Strasser's Comment, in his introduction to the Husserliana edition of cartesian Meditations, that the "Way" to phenomenology represented by that work is not through logic, can be misleading, as can be the whole discussion of "ways" into transcendental phenomenology. Once one sees Husserl's "introductions" to transcendental phenomenology in their systematic realatedness, as I am attempting to do here, One sees that they all pertain to logic; in the all-encompassing sense in which Husserl understood it, i.e as the theory of science. There are indeed differences between these "introductions", and these differences no doubt have to do with different "ways". But exactly what these differences are cannot be seen until the common themes are seperated out. In so far as"way" refers to "motivating problem" there are no differences between the "introductions". See Edmond Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, Ilusserliana I, 2nd ed., ed. S. Strasser (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), p. XX III.


58. FTL, pp. 223 - 31.

59. CM, pp. 151 - 57.

60. "Philosophy as Rigorous Science " reveals how strong was Hume's influence on Husserl. For the former, whatever could be thought of as not being, could not - be, since, its not - being involved no contradiction. Husserl, therefore, will accept as an object of Philosophical thought only


62. FTL, pp. 1-4, 26 - 29.

63. Ibid, p. 5.

64. This theme is taken up again in crisis and was already present in the 1911 work "Phenomenology as Rigorous Science" (in Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the crisis of Philosophy, trans. Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).

65. FTL, p. 16.


67. FTL p. 29.

68. Precisely because the objective is ideal and not empirical can it be stable amid factual diversity.

69. Like Descartes, Husserl finds the very existence of opposed philosophies disturbing.

70. Here a new characteristic of the scientific ideal in philosophy is introduced. Not only must it produce objectively valid results, but like the positive sciences it must create a community of philosophers who, basing their investigations on the same principles, can share a community of scientific truths that accumulate as scientific investigation advances.

71. Husserl will not have us think that the attitude of the philosopher is one of indifference to life's problems - truth for its own sake. The philosopher is
to "understand" for the true needs of life that which "Science" presents in a manner adequate to its own needs. It is not the scientist, as scientist, but the philosopher who sets in judgement on the results of science.


75. Ideas, Section 27, p. 101 - translation by William R. Mckenn, See Ideen I, p. 57. This section is entitled "The world of the Natural Attitude: I and my surrounding world".

76. Ibid, Secton 30, p. 105.

77. Concerning "awake", see Ibid : Section 27, last paragraph, p. 103 and Husserl's emendation to the text he published which is included in Biemel's edition of Ideen I, p. 63, lines 6 and 8. See also Beilage VII in that edition.

78. One must consult the German text of Sections 27 - 30 to see the consistency with which the word "Vochanden" is used, for it is rendered in many ways in the English translation.

79. Ideas, Section 29, p. 105.

80. Ibid, Section 31, p. 107, See Ideen I, p. 64.

81. Ibid, Section 30, pp. 105 - 6.

82. Ibid, p. 106 - translation modified, see Ideen I, p. 63.

83. Ibid, Section 31, p. 107.

84. See Ibid, Section 50, p. 154, Second paragraph and Section 1, p. 51 first paragraph. Husserl indicated an emendation to the former paragraph.
which is included in Biemel's Husserliana edition (p. 110). There instead of "naturlichen theoretischen Einstellung", the text reads "naturlichen erfahrenden und theoretischen Einstellung".

85. Ibid, Section 50, p. 155.
90. We have set forth the naturalistic conception of man as it prevails especially in the contemporary psychological and social sciences in our article "On contemporary Nihilism", Review of Politics, VII (1945).
91. Husserl argues exclusively on the theoretical level, since he had not yet the opportunity to appreciate the crisis of Western science under the politico-practical aspect with which we have become acquainted during the last decade. This aspect has been brought to the fore by E. Voegelin in his
most illuminating article "On the Origins of Scientism", Social Research, and V (pg. 48).

92. Husserl's description of the crisis of Western science is reminiscent of that which Max Weber had given about 20 years before. Cf. "Wissenschaft als Beruf", in Gesammte Aufsätze Zur Wissenschafterlehre (1922), pp. 537 ff. There is, however, a significant difference whereas Weber is prepared to resign himself to the given state of affairs. Husserl holds out the prospect of a regeneration of Western man under the very idea of philosophy, into the unity of which the sciences have to be re-integrated.

93. Husserl's late orientation towards and his conception of history and historicity have been analyzed in an excellent and highly instructive article by P. Ricoeur, "Husserl et le sens de l'histoire", Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, LIV (1949).


95. Husserl speaks of "Europe" and "European man" but notes explicitly that these terms are not meant to be understood in a geographical sense. We may therefore safely replace his terms by the wider ones of "West" and "Western man".


97. The privilege and priority of consciousness in the sense under discussion was formulated for the first time by Descartes in his meditations.
Summarizing his analysis of perception, Descartes writes (Philosophical Writings, selected and translated by N.K. Smith (New York, 1958, 1911), pp. 190 ff): "What now shall I say of the mind itself, i.e., of myself? What am I to say in regard to this I which seems to apprehend this piece of wax so distinctly? Do I not know myself much more truly and much more certainly, and also much more distinctly and evidently, than I do the wax? For if I judge that the wax is or exists because I see it, evidently it follows, with yet greater evidence that I myself am or exist, in as much as I am thus seeing it. If the apprehension of the wax has seemed to me more determinate and distinct when sight and touch, and many causes besides, have rendered it manifest to me, how much more evidently and distinctly must I now know myself, since all the reasons which can and in the apprehension of the wax, or of any body whatsoever, afford yet better evidence of the nature of my mind".


100. For a comparatively detailed study of Husserl's notion of horizontal consciousness, cf. H. Kuhn, "The Phenomenological concept of 'Horizon'" in Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl, ed. M. Farber (Cambridge, Mass, 1941). The connection between horizontal consciousness and the awareness of the world has been brought out by L. Landgrebe, "The world as a Phenomenological Problem", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research - 1 (1940).
101. Cf. Brentano, *über die Zunkunft der philosophic* ed. by O. Kraus (Leipzig, 1929). p. 317. This is one of the twenty-five "habilitation" these added to this volume.


104. Another relevant expression besides Ma'na is Maqsad especially in combination such as Osas Tani (i.e. secunda intentio) (Averroes, *compendiode Metafisica*, Madrid, 1919, p; 800) and maqsad alkalam (aim of speech); I am (Herbert Spiegelberg) indebted for the reference dto the late Max Mayerhof in Caire.


110. Ibid; Section 90, p. 62.

111. Ibid, Section 129, p. 363.

112. Ibid; Section 131, p. 267.

113. Ibid; Section 131, pp. 365-66. As analytic concepts, the "pure X" mentioned here is not the same as the "empty X" mentioned above as the substrate of purely mathematical predicates (above, p. 52). Husserl is
referring here to perceived objects and perceived predicates. In terms of
the intentionality of scientific thought, however Husserl's analysis finds
them to have the same referent --- see Ideas, Section 52. pp. 159-61. In
later works Husserl uses the phrases "noematic pole" (Ideen Zu einer
reinen Phanomenologic und Phanomenologischen Philosophic. First book,
Husserliana III. Edited by Walter Bienel.
The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1950 p. 136) and "objects --pole" (see
Edmund Husserl, The crisis of European sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology : An Introduction to Phenomenological philosophy, trans.
instead of "pure X".

114. Edmund Husserl, Ideas : A general Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,
Section 130. p. 364.
115. Ibid; Section 99, p. 290.
116. Edmund Husserl Ideas : A general Introduction to pure Phenomenology,
117. See Edmund Husserl, Ideen Zu einer reiner Phanomenologic und
phenomenologischen Philosophic, first book, Husserliana III, ed. Walter Bienel
118. Claesges, Raumkenstitution, p. 59, n. 5 ; Husserl, MSD 13 l (1921). p.2
this manuscript, which is in the Husserl Archive, contains the clearest
presentation of the distinction being made here). Quoted from WilliamR.
Mckenna Husserl's "Introductions to phenomenology" Martinus Nijhoff
publishers p. 136.


123. Ideas p. 418. It is different to tell if Husserl’s comment about perspectives here in Ideas is intended noetically or noematically, but it surely holds either way. See also pp. 157-58 and MSD 13 I, p. 6.


125. MSD 13 I, pp. 3-5

126. Ideas, Section 234.

127. Ideas, Section 35, p. 118.
128. Ibid.; p. 117

129. Unless otherwise specified, the expression "the world" will serve as an abbreviation for "the world, and all the objects, persons, events etc in it".

130. See, for instance David Carr, Phenomenology and the problem of History (Evanston: North-Western University Press 1974), p. 15; J.N. Mohanty, The concept of Intentionality (St. Louis: W.N. Green, 1972), pp. 115-16; and Robert Sokolowski,


134. Ibid, p. 15.


139. See William R. Mckenna's Husserl's introduction to phenomenology" Interpretation and critique 1982, Martinus Nijhoff publishers, the Hague Boston/London p. 49. Husserl sometimes expresses this by saying that the world is an "immanent transcendance" i.e., it is "intentionally immanent", but "really (recall) transcendent". Sec Doehm's essay
"Immanenz and Transzendenz", in his book Von Gleichzpunkt der phanomenologic. Boohm explains how the phenomenological reduction gives now new meaning to the concepts of immanence and transcendence so that expressions like "immanent transcedence" can be meaningfully formed.


144. A detailed discussion of methodological individualism is to be found in Modes of Individualism and Collectivism ed. J.O 'Neil, London, 1974.

145. The notion of "horizon", which played such an important part in Husserl's earlier writings has here taken on a somewhat broader connotation. Formerly it signified prim rily these concomitant elements in consciousness under consideration. In every act of consciousness there are as acts of the object that are not directly intended but which are recognized, either by recall or anticipation, as belonging to the object intended. These as acts constitute its horizon. In the present essay "the community as a horizon "signifies the framework in which experience
occurs, conditioning that experience and supplying the diverse aspects of
objectivity that are not directly intended in any one act of consciousness.

146. Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and other Essays (London ;
Methuen, 1962); Peterwinch, The Idea of Social Science (New York :
Humanities Press, 1950); R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (New
York : Oxford University Press, 1946); Ala Gewirth, 'Voluntarism. Social
Uniformities Depend on the choices of Man', Philosophy of Science 21
(1954), 229-41, 'subjectivism and objectivism in the social sciences',
Philosophy of Science 21 (1954) : 157-165; R.S. Peters, The concept of
Motivation (London Routledge and Veg n Paul, 1958); R.S. Peters and H.
Tayfel, 'That Behaviourism cannot, Account for Human Thinking' in
Krimerman, pp. 279-88; Ralph Turner, ' conventionalism. Social
Uniformities Are Covert Definitions,' in Krimerman, pp. 220-39; Norman
Malcolm, 'Intentional Activity cannot Be Explained by contingent causal
Laws, in Krimerman pp. 334-49.

147. 4.29.cf. S. Strasser, Phenomenology and the Human Sciences (Pittsburgh:
Duguesene University Press, 1963); pp 0-9.

148. 5.32. cf. Phenomenology : "The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its
Interpretation pp. 410-51.

149. Martin eidegger, Being and Time,trans. John Macquarrie and Edward

150. This view has been defend explicity by Edmund Husserl, Jean Paul sarte.
F.J.J. Buystendijk, Jan Linschoten, H.G. Gadamer, Jurgen Harbermas, K.O.
Apel, and many others.


155. In the connection one should consult the second cartesian meditation, where Husserl insists that the only reality that the world can have for one who would approach it scientifically, is a phenomenol reality. If we are to understand it scientifically, our analysis of it must be purely phenomenological, i.e. it is the phenomenon "world" that we must anlayze. "We shall direct our attention to the fact that phenomenological epoche lays open (to me, the meditating philosopher) n infinite realm of being of a new kind, as the sphere of a new kind of experience: transcendental experience" (cartesian Meditations, p. 66). f. ibid., p. 69: "Now, however, we are envisaing a science that is, so to speak, absolutely subjective, whose thematic object exists whether or not the world exists".


157. Husserl's contraposition of Geisteswissenschaften and Nature wissenschaften must also be seen in this perspective even though he displaces it from its cultural environment. Husserl's merit undoubtedly consists of having placed himself beyond this distinction, but at the same
time one must not underestimate his acceptance of a scheme that was widely diffused in his way.

150. Regular ad directionem ingenii, Rulex 1. The quotation is verbally inaccurate (probably from memory), but the sense is the same.

159. For Husserl, real has a distinctively different meaning from recell. The former is applied only to the materia world of facts; the latter belongs to the ideal of intentionality. cf. Ideen I, pp. 210-20.

160. cf. Husserl's Encyclopaedia Britannica article, "Phenomonology" where he develops the notion of a "pure" psychology independent of psychophysical considerations.

161. "Dualism" and "monism" are terms whose meanings are not easily determined. As a convinced "idealist" Husserl considered himself monist, and he criticized Kant strongly for remaining a dualist. Hegel, on the other hand, criticizes Fichte (whom Husserl resembles closely in this) for not escaping dualism. One might well make a case for designating as monism a theory that accepts only one kind of reality, to which both matter and spirit (or the "factual" and the "ideal") belong. By this criterion Husserl's distinction would be "dualistic". Perhaps the best that can be said is that Husserl is. In intention at least, epistemologically a monist. Spirit alone is being in the full sense, because only of spirit can there be science in the full sense. One conclusion from all this, it would seem is that the terminology involved bears revision.

162. If the proper function of true sciences is to know "essences", there seems little question that the sciences of nature neither perform nor pretend to perform this function. If, in addition, essences are, only insofar as they are "constituted" in consciousness (ultimately spirit), then only a science of spirit can legitimately lay claim to the title.
163. One is reminded of Hegel's dictum that when reason is conscious to itself of being all reality it is spirit. The difference in the paths by which Hegel and Husserl arrive at this conclusion should be obvious.


170. Ibid., p. 139.

171. The author (J.E. Jalbert) wishes to thank the Husserl Archives in Leuven, Belgium and its director, Prof. S. Ijsseling, for providing access to and permission to cite from archival materials.


174. "Dilthey - Husserl correspondence", p. 204. Queentin Lauer observes soundly : "It is doubtful wheteher Dilthey was a 'realivists' as Husserl makes him out to be, or that Husserl was as 'absolutist' as Dilthey thought'. Phenomenology p. 124.


176 cf. Alfred Schuetz, "Phenomenology and the social sciences" in Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl.