Braganza-Cunha’s nationalist thought was shaped by his programmatic response to the political situations with which he was confronted. He was inspired by the Russian revolution, but was not a Communist; he was impressed by the philosophy of *ahimsa*, but was not a Gandhian; he wanted Goans to recover the cultural heritage of India, but was not a revivalist. The focus of this chapter is the heterogeneity of his discourse, which emerged in the course of three decades of activism and which reflects the diverse influences that he had been subjected to.

**The Myth of Cunha the Communist**

During his lifetime, Braganza-Cunha was denounced as a Communist by the Portuguese state and the church; most of the freedom fighters interviewed referred to him as a Communist or a leftist;¹ not in a derogatory manner but in a matter-of-fact way. However, in spite of searching for the Communist content in his writings, one is hard placed to find it, consigning the belief of ‘Cunha the Communist’ to the realm of myth.

¹Prabhakar Kamat, who was a student in Portugal when Braganza-Cunha was imprisoned there and consequently came into contact with him, did not see Braganza-Cunha as a Communist. According to him, it was the democratic practices which the Soviet Union and China adopted that impressed him: ‘He was more concerned about the manner in which they took decisions. Decisions were based on consensus, unlike in France or Portugal; there was no dictatorship of a single person’ (interviewed on 12 May 1991 at Panaji).
Braganza-Cunha was deeply impressed by the successfully concluded October Revolution led by Lenin, which gave birth to the Soviet Union. This is especially evident in a booklet titled *What is Imperialism*, his earliest accessible work, which is much on the lines of Lenin's lengthier booklet of the same name.

Lenin sees imperialism as the 'latest stage of capitalist economy' [1976:701]. Likewise, Braganza-Cunha asserts that imperialism is a modern phenomenon 'born of the disproportionate industrial development of certain countries in relation to others in a backward state of production' [1961:210].

In defining imperialism, Lenin outlines five features central to the concept of imperialism: (1) The creation of monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; (2) The merging of basic capital with industrial capital, and the creation on the basis of this 'finance capital', of a financial oligarchy; (3) The export of capital, as distinguished from the export of commodities, acquires exceptional importance; (4) The formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among themselves, and (5) The territorial division of the whole world among the biggest powers is completed [1976:700].

Tracing the path followed by a nation in attaining its imperialist phase, Braganza-Cunha is evidently informed by the Leninist definition of imperialism. He asserts: 'It begins with the development of a big industry which demands markets where its products might be placed.' He then outlines the process whereby territories and populations are conquered. With the increase and accumulation of capital resulting from the profits, the need arises to export the extra capital to countries which have not yet been exploited. The domination of
industrial capital by financial capital results 'in the growing appetite to increase the number of territories and populations by capturing markets and monopolizing raw materials.' Industrial and financial concentration lead to the creation of industrial trusts and banking oligarchies. Finally, rival international monopolies divide and distribute the world among themselves, which makes war inevitable [1961:211-212].

In this essay, Braganza-Cunha goes on to show that Portugal represents a different type of imperialist organization from the other colonial powers. He argues that while Portugal had an extensive colonial domain to which it justified its claim on the basis of historical right, it was not an independent power:

Its existence as a colonial nation is dependent on the imperial policy of Britain! . . . Portugal as well as Holland, though on a smaller degree, are satellite countries of the British Empire [1961:216].

This analysis is more or less in line with Lenin's characterization of Portugal's 'somewhat different form of financial and diplomatic dependence accompanied by political independence':

Portugal is an independent sovereign state, but actually for more than two hundred years, . . . it has been a British protectorate. Great Britain has protected Portugal and her colonies in order to fortify her own positions in the fight against her rivals, Spain and France . . . [1976:698].

Braganza-Cunha extends the Leninist analysis of the nature of Portuguese
imperialism, pointing out that Portuguese India was 'subjected to a double domination: if politically we were dependent on Portugal, economically we live under the British yoke' [1961:217]. He argues that a large civil, military and ecclesiastical bureaucracy was exported to Portuguese India in order to justify Portuguese domination over her colony 'in the absence of, industry, financial means and technical organization . . . to develop its colonies and derive benefit from them' [1961:217].

A significant point of difference to be noted between Braganza-Cunha's analysis of imperialism from Lenin's thesis is the way in which the collapse of imperialism is perceived. Lenin is unequivocal in his assertion that: 'Imperialism is the eve of the social revolution of the proletariat' [1976:640]. Braganza-Cunha instead, refers to 'rival imperialisms digging their own ruin' and 'the anti-imperialist current growing in the most populated countries of the world like China and India' [1961:218]. He concludes by referring to 'the supreme struggle against the absurd system which is an affront to human dignity' [1961:219].

While the absence of any references to standard Marxist terminology like 'proletarian revolution' or 'the bourgeoisie' may be interpreted as a tactical device to avoid the 'Communist' label, there is reason to believe that this is not merely a difference in language but reflects a divergence of conceptual frameworks. For Braganza-Cunha, the 'supreme struggle' was anti-imperialist, but was not necessarily a 'socialist revolution of the proletariat'.

He nowhere suggests that the people of Goa or India should shape their struggle on the lines of the Soviet experience or according to Marxist tenets.
Unlike Nehru, whose anti-imperialist stance necessarily brought him closer to communism, Braganza-Cunha steered clear of Marxist prescriptions for revolution.  

His concern was with waging an anti-imperialist struggle, but he was open to the idea that the form of struggle and the consequent socio-political organization may vary from the Soviet model, or from Lenin’s conception of the struggle. Other indices strengthen this belief. According to Marxist methodology, class analysis is of fundamental importance in formulating a programme of action. However, though Braganza-Cunha frequently analyses the conditions prevailing in Portuguese India, he offers little insight into the class structure of this society. His analysis of Goa’s economy is essentially informed by his integrationist framework, and by his attempts to establish and prove the artificiality of Goa’s separation from India.

Analyzing the economic conditions of Goa, Braganza-Cunha asserts that the Portuguese colonial domination had led to Goa’s artificial separation from India. The dependence of Goa on India for all essential commodities was an indication of the fact that Goa was naturally a part of India. He was optimistic that if this artificial barrier was removed, Goa’s economy could be strengthened.

As far as the method of struggle is concerned, Braganza-Cunha is consistent; he favors a popular, non-violent struggle of the people. In 1942, he talked of the

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1Jawaharlal Nehru asserted that ‘the nationalist movement had to be uncompromisingly anti-capitalist, anti-feudal, anti-bourgeois, ... and, of course, anti-imperialist’. The aim of the movement was to establish a democratic, socialist republic: ‘So I turned inevitably towards communism ... whatever its faults, it was at least not hypocritical and not imperialistic’ [Pantham 1986:262-263]. Braganza-Cunha’s conception on the form that the nationalist movement should take was comparatively ambiguous.
necessity 'to subject our action to general interest; to carry it out with the support of the majority' [1961:291]. Again, in 1954, in *Our Method of Struggle*, Braganza-Cunha is more explicit:

The first lesson (to be learned from the struggles of Dadra, Noroli and Khanwel, former Portuguese enclaves) is that, in an unequal fight between unarmed people and the people using modern deadly weapons, the chances of success rests in their moral courage and in the amount of support they can receive from the local people [1961:204].

It is also relevant to note that from the beginning of Braganza-Cunha’s activism in Goa, he did not try to establish links with the Communists, who had begun functioning in India from the 1920s. Nor were his activities in consonance with the guidelines drawn up by the Communist International (Comintern), initially under Lenin’s leadership. In the debate between Lenin and M N Roy (who had been deputed by the Comintern to lead the Communist Party in India) about whether Communists should form separate organizations, Lenin’s view prevailed and Communists were told not to form separate organizations from those in existence (like the Indian National Congress in British India).

However, following a number of events -- including the death of Lenin and the withdrawal of the non-cooperation movement by Gandhi, which the Communists in India viewed as a betrayal of the movement -- the Comintern reviewed its position at its sixth Congress in 1928 and advocated that revolutionary movements should be led by the proletariat, and that the
Communists should establish new organizations of their own, distinct from the already existing, 'bourgeois-led' organizations.

Significantly, in the same year, Braganza-Cunha established the Goa Congress Committee, with the objective of getting it affiliated to the Indian National Congress, indicating his independent stance. In fact, throughout his life he identified himself as a Congressman and viewed the Indian National Congress as being representative of Indian nationalism.

In an article appended to *What is Imperialism* titled *The Bolshevist Policy and the Colonial Peoples*, Braganza-Cunha expresses admiration for the 'open anti-imperialist policy' [1961:227] of the Soviet Union. This he saw manifested in Soviet policy towards the ethnic national minorities, according to which their language and culture was respected, and they enjoyed the right to autonomy, including the right to secession [1961:229]. He contrasts this with the language policy of the Portuguese in Goa, where 'intellectual degeneration and illiteracy are mostly due to the systematic banishment of the konkanni (sic) language from the schools' [1961:230]. He also commends the Soviet Union’s renunciation of all the privileges held by the former Czarist regime over China, Afghanistan and Turkistan. He saw this as added proof of the Soviet Union’s anti-imperialism [1961:227].

Consequently, Braganza-Cunha believed that all colonial and semi-colonial countries should see the Soviet Union as a ‘powerful force’ on their side [1961:235], but he had his own views regarding the course that Goa’s struggle to end colonialism should follow.
An examination of Braganza-Cunha’s nationalist thought and practice clearly reveal that he was not a Communist. Then why does he survive as one in the memory of his associates and followers?

Perhaps a reason for this was his atheism. Although he did not propagate his personal beliefs or give them a doctrinal form, he did not hide the fact that he was not a practicing Christian. Moreover, his exposition of the role of the church and foreign missionaries must have strengthened his irreligious image and given greater credence to the idea that he was a Communist, as propagated by the church and the state.

When the Portuguese government dubbed members of the Portuguese opposition whom it had arrested as ‘Communists’, Braganza-Cunha dismissed this as ‘the usual tactics of the reactionaries all over the world to brand as Reds all those on whom they exercise their highhandedness’ [Free Goa, 25 Sept 1954]. He was aware that these very same tactics were used against him. But over three decades after the departure of the ‘reactionaries’, it is important to set the record straight and debunk the myth of his identity as a Communist.

**Role of the Intelligentsia**

A vital point of departure of Braganza-Cunha’s conceptual framework from the Marxist mode is the central role he assigns to intellectuals in the nationalist movement. This is in contrast to Marxist doctrine, which holds that the oppressed

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1 His niece, Berta Menezes Braganza, was one of the few persons to deny that he was a Communist. Being an atheist herself, however, she admitted that he too was an atheist (interviewed on 14 June 1990 at Margao).
sections, particularly the proletariat, are the vanguard of the revolutionary struggle.

Braganza-Cunha sees a difference in consciousness amongst the 'educated class' and 'the people'. The intelligentsia, particularly that section which had been educated in Portuguese, had a tendency to see themselves as different from Indians. He saw this as a major obstacle in the development of nationalist consciousness, but did not see the predicament of Goa's educated class as unique. He observed:

In colonial countries, the very organization of public education in which the cultured class is formed has the sole aim of creating a helping element that will place itself at the service of foreign domination [1961:246].

However, he is not dismissive of this class because, according to him, 'the remedy has been produced by the very evil itself' [1961:247]. This was because the 'bureaucratic factories' -- the institutions of education -- produced more and more candidates which the officialdom was not able to absorb since it had a limited capacity and had, in fact, already attained its 'maximum expansion capacity' [1961:247]. The better paid jobs were filled in by Europeans, and educated Goans did not stand a chance of attaining these higher posts. Consequently, this led to the creation of an 'unemployed, intellectual proletariat', discontented at the crumbs thrown to them by foreign rulers. According to Braganza-Cunha, from this discontentment springs 'the origin of the growth of the nationalist idea in our intelligentsia' [1961:247].

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This trend could also be seen in the struggles of the students in China, Indonesia, Egypt and even in India. He asserts:

It is the most denationalized who aspire to reconstruct their national life, by fighting against the false notion of progress, which consists in servilely accepting everything that is imposed on them by the dominating nation [1961:248].

In contrast to the denationalized educated elite were 'our people who till now remained immune to the exotic influence, and have even maintained themselves hostile to the current that has led some of us to ape in everything the ways and customs that are foreign to this land' [Cunha 1961:248].

From Braganza-Cunha's formulation it is clear that 'the people' were more nationally conscious than the denationalized educated elite. But whereas the educated classes had the potential to articulate 'the nationalist idea' as reflected in struggles in different parts of the world, the people were not able to do so, though they would give their support to the nationalist struggle once it was initiated. Braganza-Cunha's writings are primarily addressed to this section on account of his conviction about the decisive role they were to play.

However, in the process, one is led to question his attitude towards 'the people'. In 1926, commenting on the political situation in India, he points to the alienation of political parties from the masses in India, resulting in their action becoming 'sterile' [1961:224]. Towards the last stages of his activism, one is led to question whether his own alienation from the people -- necessitated by the fact that he could not enter Goa -- led to a static approach to the nationalist struggle;
resulting in his exclusive reliance on the Indian government and his inability to conceive of any other programme of action for the solution of the Goa problem, in the wake of India's inaction.

**Approach to History**

In *The Denationalization of Goans*, Braganza-Cunha's concern with constructing an 'Indian' identity for the denationalized Goan is evident, as is his emphasis that Goa was a part of the 'Great India'. His view of history was also informed by this integrationist perspective. Consequently, his approach is consistently one of unequivocal affirmation of Goa's 'rich' heritage.

For Braganza-Cunha, the pre-colonial past signified the existence of values that are generally attributed to the enlightenment thought of Europe, whereas the encounter with western colonialism implied the destruction of these values.

In *Portuguese India*, one of the early pamphlets brought out by the Goa Congress Committee -- in which he has analyzed the conditions prevailing in Goa -- he tries to establish that historically, Goa came under the 'Indian Civilization'. He explains:

> Probably it formed a part of Asoka's great empire in the third century before the Christian era. It is however more certain that in the third century AD, it belonged to the Kadambas' empire

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4The use of the term affirmation is in keeping with Sudipta Kaviraj's examination of nationalist thought, distinguishing between the affirmative and negative responses of the nationalist to his own culture, as discussed in Chapter 1.
He emphasizes the values of tolerance and religious harmony that prevailed prior to Portuguese domination, stating that 'the Hindu rulers lived in such harmony with the Mahomedans that Jaykeshi I (founder of the Kadamba dynasty), chose a Mahomcdan to be the governor of Konkan' [1961:5].

In the contest for power, Braganza-Cunha asserts that the religious struggle between the Hindus and Muslims became more 'ferocious'. But in 1470, Goa fell into the hands of the Muslim rulers of Bijapur who, according to him, were also tolerant as was evident from the fact that Hindus held high offices under their administration, and temples and mosques stood side by side.

The explicit assumption is that while the contention for power was marked by Hindu-Muslim rivalry, once the struggles were resolved, religious tolerance was exhibited by the rulers. Tolerance was thus a value that existed in the pre-colonial history of the people, in contrast to the extreme intolerance that marked Albuquerque's entry into Goa.5

The manner in which Braganza-Cunha regarded the past is most explicit in *The Denationalization of Goans*. In this essay the Portuguese are portrayed as bearers of an inferior culture who deprived Goa of her rich heritage. While the colonizers had been 'ferocious in their zeal' for the destruction of traditional culture, they reduced the people to a state of 'inculture', to overcome which it was necessary to 'go back to the Indian tradition' [1961:86].

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5Braganza-Cunha's reading of history leads to his conceptualization of religious tolerance as a value that existed in the past, while religious intolerance was a colonial import. This is in line with Nandy's attempt at recovering the domain of religious and ethnic tolerance from the 'hegemonic language of secularism' [Das: 1990:69].
He argues that in the realm of art, science, technology, philosophy and human values, the achievements made in Goa had been equal to, if not superior to the achievements of the Portuguese. Commenting on the backwardness of Portugal, Braganza-Cunha states:

It is well known that the Portuguese have no scientific and technological literature... Albuquerque recognizes in his letters that the ships built in Goa were as good as those of Portugal and that 'cannons and guns better than those of Germany' were made in Goa. Viceroy and Archbishops had themselves treated by local physicians, our vaidyas and hakims, who had escaped religious persecution thanks to their science [1961:88].

However, Portuguese education had resulted in a state of amnesia among Goans. 'Indifference to everything national' had been 'shrewdly cultivated' among them, so that they were oblivious to the great achievements of the past. A prerequisite of nationalism in Goa was that the position of the past be reinstated in the memory of the people.

In this approach Braganza-Cunha has more in common with nationalist thinkers such as Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyaya, V D Savarkar and Aurobindo Ghose, each of whom reiterated the glories of the past. This was unlike the approach of thinkers like Gokhale and Nehru, who were more critical of the
past. For example, Nehru, while admitting that India had a rich cultural heritage, believed that in her march to progress India had to make a break with the past. He saw Indians as being inflicted with unreason, magic and superstition, which was in contrast with the 'rational and scientific temper of the west' [Pantham 1986:272].

The approach of Marxist nationalists was also marked by a negative response towards the past. They remained loyal to the assertion made by Karl Marx in his First Indian War of Independence (1857-1859) that:

England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerative -- the annihilation of the old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia [1978:29]

While the 'old Asiatic society' was seen as a model of collectivism, the assumption was that it did not contain within it the potential for progress. For this the intervention of the British was necessary.

This 'modernist' approach was in contrast to the approach of nationalists like Aurobindo Ghose or Mahatma Gandhi, who saw in the past the potential to empower the people with a confidence in their indigenous abilities, which could help the people to follow a self-determined road to progress.

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6 Bhikhu Parekh in his analysis of the ideology and practice of M K Gandhi in Colonialism, Tradition and Reform -- An Analysis of Gandhi's Political Discourse has classified nationalist thought into four categories in accordance with the direction in which nationalist leaders looked, in defining the course to be followed: the traditionalist, the critical traditionalist, the modernist and the critical modernist. The traditionalists saw British intervention as 'irrelevant', as Indian traditions were too strong to be affected by the colonizers. The critical traditionalists believed they should rely on the strength of their indigenous resources, borrowing selectively from the west that which was likely to enrich them. The modernists believed that Hindu society was 'beyond hope' and needed to be restructured along 'modern' or 'European' lines. The critical modernists or 'syncretists' were in favor of a 'creative synthesis of the two civilizations' [1989:35].
For Aurobindo Ghose, history played an important role in governing possibilities for the future. He states:

There is the sentiment of Indianism, there is not yet the knowledge... We have yet to know ourselves, what we were and may be; what we did in the past and what we are capable of doing in the future; our history and our mission [Minor 1978:153].

In the writings of Gandhi the 'moral being', elevated by the Indian civilization, is contrasted with the tendency of the western civilization 'to propagate immorality'. Consequently, he claimed that 'it behoves every lover of India to cling to the old Indian civilization even as a child clings to the mother's breast' [Murty 1967:122].

Braganza-Cunha shares this sense of pride in the past and a denial of the superiority of the west with these thinkers. However, the important difference between the approach of Ghose and Gandhi, and that of Braganza-Cunha, is that while there is a tendency to stress the spirituality and morality of the Indian civilization amongst the former, for Braganza-Cunha the past represented a stage in India's development from which further progress could be made. Indians in Goa had shown themselves to be capable in the past, and were capable of determining the path of their development in the future. Thus he stated:

Instead of taking for granted that we must pass from one master to another like cattle, we must acquire and cultivate the pride of race that a long process of Denationalization seems to have totally abolished in us [1961:98].
His affirmative response to the past is marked by an approach which is logical and rational, and devoid of nostalgia or sentimentality. In *What is Imperialism* he declares that 'the theory of superior and inferior races' which westerners used to explain the backwardness of certain peoples was untenable with the 'modern determinist concept of history'. His reading of the past is informed by this perspective. Accordingly, India would have progressed without the colonial interventions of Europe in its history.

Although Braganza-Cunha's response to the advent of the Portuguese has been compared with the Indian nationalists' response to the British, it must be borne in mind that they were addressing themselves to different imperialisms.

Earlier, we have seen that Braganza-Cunha viewed Portugal as a satellite of Britain. Aside from this, his casual remarks reveal that he not only saw the Portuguese as being culturally inferior to the Goan people, but he viewed Portugal as a country having a culture that was inferior to that of Britain or France.

He describes the Portuguese language as 'unsuitable to our country', and states that its imposition had led to the 'shocking illiteracy of the country'. Braganza-Cunha remarks that unlike English, 'it cannot even serve as a means to acquire universal culture and for commercial purposes' [1961:86]. In *The Goa Problem*, Braganza-Cunha asserts that very few Goans could speak in Portuguese and that:

> In matters cultural, unlike our brethren from Pondicherry, in touch with the high French intellectual achievements, we have in
Goa hardly any heritage worth preserving after four centuries old contact with the Portuguese, since their own culture has been deprived by their present masters of all qualities of universality and humanity by which any national culture is rendered precious to outsiders [1961:166].

While possessing a culture that was inferior to Britain and France, the methods used by Portugal in 'disfiguring the national character of the Goan people' had also been 'peculiarly tyrannical' [1961:59].

**Portuguese Historiography**

Braganza-Cunha was of the view that in order to gain acceptance from the people, the Portuguese conquerors had built myths to blur the brutality of their conquests, and he attempts to acquaint his readers with the 'true history' of the Portuguese in India [1961:5]. He endeavors to unravel the truth concealed by the myths that had been created. He specially dwells on the myths of Albuquerque's 'tolerance' and the 'miraculous' conversions to Christianity supposedly effected by the Jesuit Francis Xavier.

Braganza-Cunha asserts that Albuquerque's rule, far from being tolerant, was marked by the massacre of Muslims and the politics of intrigue. As an example, he cites Albuquerque's having instigated a Hindu 'Nambiadri' to slay the (Muslim) Zamorin of Calicut, for which he rewarded him with an assurance of protection to the Hindu religion and to the King of Cochin. Thus, the Hindu religion was 'protected' in Calicut only as a 'reward' for a political service
The massacre of Muslims and the destruction of mosques and temples in Goa could be traced to Albuquerque’s reign. Quoting from Albuquerque’s letters to King Dom Manuel, Braganza-Cunha tries to establish that far from being racially tolerant as was the common belief, Albuquerque had in fact harbored the hope of turning the ‘natives’ from the land and enabling Portuguese men to come and settle in Goa by encouraging them to take as wives the ‘fair and good-looking Turkish women’ [1961:67].

The mixed marriages that had taken place under Albuquerque, often cited as an example of his racial tolerance, were performed as a matter of political expediency. As it was difficult to bring Portuguese women to Goa, Albuquerque encouraged his men to marry native women, particularly the widowed Muslim women, ‘to tie down his people to the conquered land and to ensure the continuation of their predominance through these strange unions’ [Cunha 1961:64]. Aside from this, Braganza-Cunha argues that the mixed marriages were a means of conversion, as the women were necessarily converted to Christianity and the offspring of these unions baptized and raised as Christians.

He attempts to destroy the myth of Francis Xavier’s ‘miraculous’ conversions by quoting from correspondence that transpired between Xavier and the King D Joao III of Portugal, in which the former averred that ‘the only effective way’ to spread religion in India was for the king to proclaim that he would only place his trust in those officials who exerted themselves ‘to extend the reign of religion by

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7In his letters to the king of Portugal, Albuquerque referred to Muslim women as “Turkish women".
every means in their power' [1961:68,69]. Forcible conversions with the use of civil and military powers are traced to Francis Xavier, as is the establishment of the Holy Office of the Inquisition.

Braganza-Cunha's attempt at demystifying Francis Xavier was an extremely bold step, considering the reverence with which Francis Xavier is viewed throughout India. It is especially so in Goa among Christians, who regard him as Goencho Saib or Goa’s patron saint. This is evident from the millions that gather in Goa at the periodical expositions of his relics.  

In his treatment of history, Braganza-Cunha is concerned about the Portuguese use of the Christian religion to consolidate their political rule over Goa. However, he also addresses the problem of the inegalitarian nature of the ecclesiastical orders in Goa, pointing out that the Archdiocese of Goa in its life span of 400 years had not a single Indian bishop; comparatively in British India, 17 bishops had been appointed [1961:75].

Braganza-Cunha points to the tenure of Marquis de Pombal as a minister in Portugal, as a period in which ‘scanty freedom of worship’ was granted to Hindus and Muslims, though they continued to face some measure of discrimination. During this period the Goan clergy benefited, as they were protected from the injustices meted out against them by the European clergy. The Inquisition was also withdrawn during this time.

Of all the methods employed by the Portuguese, Braganza-Cunha believed the

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8 Teotonio R De Souza comments on the difficulty of critically assessing Francis Xavier because of the ‘emotional block’ of the saint’s devotees. He compares the sensibilities of the Christians with regard to Francis Xavier to the sensibilities of the Maharashtrians with regard to Shivaji [De Souza 1994:8]. One can imagine the intensity of the Christian reaction to Braganza-Cunha, when he critically referred to Xavier five decades ago.
Inquisition was 'the instrument that most served to change the customs of Goans' [1966:77]. The Court of the Inquisition issued an edict containing a number of bans which 'interfered with the smallest details of intimate life, on the pretext of curbing paganism' [1961:78]. But, paradoxically, the Portuguese not only preserved the caste system but co-opted it as a form of social organization within the church. He comments:

Most astonishing of all is that while the pious reformers ruthlessly waged war on Indian customs, they did not meddle with the castes of Hinduism . . . As a matter of fact, the Portuguese not only maintained the Hindu castes but even added a new one; the caste of Europeans and their descendants [1961:78,79].

The significance of this statement is that while Braganza-Cunha frequently hails the achievements of the past, he is largely silent on social and religious practices which had received the attention of Indian social reformers, and which most Indian nationalists commented on, even if their activism was not directed towards such issues. While one can sense Braganza-Cunha's opposition to the institution of caste, it is unclear whether like Nehru, Braganza-Cunha viewed caste as untenable with the principles of social equality, or whether like Ranade he saw a discrepancy between present practices and the original recommendations of the ancient scriptures, which called for rectification. From the general approach of rationality in Braganza-Cunha's writings, his approach towards the

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9 In reconstructing the history of nationalism in India, Chatterjee gives importance to the phase of social reform, when attempts at reform were self engendered and necessarily resisted colonial intervention. This phase he recognizes as a period of nationalism [Chatterjee 1993:6]. However, the influence of the reform movement, if any, was restricted to the New Conquests.
question of caste was probably closer to Nehru's 'modernist' approach, but his reticence to criticize any aspect of the past necessarily makes his discourse vulnerable to varied interpretations.

The achievements that the people had made in pre-Portuguese Goa had been noteworthy and were demonstrative of the fact that Goans did not need to look westward to be able to progress. The people needed to recover their 'pride of race' and to have faith in their indigenous abilities. This, according to Braganza-Cunha, would enable them to follow a self-determined road to progress.

**The Influence of Gandhi**

Braganza-Cunha identified Indian nationalism with the Indian National Congress, but his opinion of it was never static. The Congress evoked in him responses ranging from optimism to disillusionment, but he did not contest its basic ideology. The shaping of his nationalist thought can be understood by his varied responses to the Congress and its leaders; in particular, M K Gandhi.

On returning to India from France, Braganza-Cunha found himself at variance with Gandhi, whom he viewed as being 'pusillanimous' and 'opportunistic'. This extreme reaction was influenced by his perception of the non-cooperation movement, which he saw as a revolutionary rising of the masses, and which had nothing in common with 'the sentimental pacifism of the Mahatma' [1961:221-222].

Commenting on Gandhi's disassociation with the non-cooperation movement after the setback it had received, Braganza-Cunha states that it was only fitting
that Gandhi had recognized his inability to lead such a movement and limited
himself to social work [1961:222]. Further, he claims that it was only the illegal
groups -- which functioned secretly -- that enjoyed the support of the masses and
represented the real pulse of the people [1961:224].

This was in 1926 when, influenced by the recently concluded Russian
revolution and enthused by the anti-imperialist struggles waged in other parts of
the world, Braganza-Cunha believed that the Indian national movement was in
its final stage. This must have led to his impatient response to Gandhi. It
probably represents the furthest 'left' limit of Braganza-Cunha's thinking.

For, in the course of the events that followed, a change in his perception of
Gandhi took place, along with the assimilation of some of his ideas. As a result
of this, in the last polemical article written before his death, he is critical of the
'pseudo-Gandhians' who ruled over India [Free Goa 6.18.1]. He also believed
that the Goa problem persisted because Gandhi's advice had been ignored by the
Indian government [1954.17.1]. Thus, Gandhi, of whom he had been most critical
at the inception of his nationalist activism, became the Congress leader whom he
admired the most towards the end.

Even though he believed that Gandhi had been instrumental in causing the
downfall of the non-cooperation movement; unlike the Indian Communists --
whose response was to spurn the Congress -- Braganza-Cunha attempted to
integrate his political aspirations for Goa with those of the Congress.

Within two years of his caustic criticism of Gandhi and the Congress,
Braganza-Cunha established the Goa Congress Committee (GCC) with the
express intention that it function as a branch of the Indian National Congress.

After attending the Congress session of 1928, Braganza-Cunha's distrust of Gandhi seemed to recede and the GCC functioned according to the programmes taken up by the Congress. After the Congress announced its constructive programme, Braganza-Cunha apparently responded by requisitioning *charkhas* to distribute among people of different villages. Some of the GCC members adopted the use of *khadi*.11

As the influence of Gandhi could be seen in the practice of the GCC, his influence could also be discerned in Braganza-Cunha's conception of the nature of the struggle and his programmatic response to the problems of Goa.

The change in Braganza-Cunha's attitude towards the political use of violence is a case in point. In assessing the non-cooperation movement, Braganza-Cunha refers to the non-violent struggle as a struggle by the people, 'at the moment incapable of fighting with arms' [1961:221 emphasis added], giving the impression that he was not adverse to people fighting with weapons, though they were unable to do so then. His appreciation of the illegal groups functioning in India at the time serves to reinforce this opinion, as also his dismissal of Gandhi's 'pacifist ideas'.

However, his attitude towards violence seemed to change considerably as in place of the temporality of violence, his emphasis shifted to the 'moral forces' of

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10 Albert Cunha, a *bhaktar* who was a neighbour of Braganza-Cunha, recalled that Braganza-Cunha requisitioned *charkhas* to distribute among the people of his village (interviewed on 16 March 1992 at Cansaulim, Salcette).

11 Berta Menezes Braganza narrated that initially, she and her sister wore *khadi* dresses, but later they took to wearing *khadi* saris (interviewed on 14 June 1990 at Margao).
the people. He hails the liberation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli which had shown that 'non-violence with mass support is irresistible' and had avoided 'useless bloodshed' [1961:203].

When satyagrahis marching into India were fired upon by Portuguese troops, Braganza-Cunha upholds the struggle of the people 'who do not retaliate violence with violence even when they are in a position to' [1961:325 emphasis added]. Moreover, he contrasts the two 'opposite ways of thinking', reflected by those who abjured violence and those who worshipped it. Thus, he unwittingly advocates the desirability of non-violent struggle.

However, he does not advocate non-violence in the unequivocal manner of Gandhi. In 1957, he criticized the Indian government for failing to heed Gandhi's advice with regard to Goa. But while he does not rule out the fact that there were other non-violent means that could be used against Portugal, he states that India's refusal to use force to liberate Goa 'had neither political nor moral foundation' [1961:389]. This is quite contrary to Gandhi's advocacy of satyagraha in the face of the most brutal of oppressors, as according to him:

Even Nero is not devoid of a heart. The unexpected spectacle of endless rows of men and women simply dying rather than surrender to the will of the oppressor must ultimately melt him and his soldiery [Pantham 1986:326].

Braganza-Cunha condemns the use of military force for aggression, but believed the use of military force was justified if it was used for the legitimate defence of interests [1961:389].
The strongest point of agreement between Gandhi and Braganza-Cunha was in their rejection of the notion of western superiority. This has already been seen with regard to their responses towards the past. As in the case of Gandhi's thought, the essential features of Braganza-Cunha's discourse were influenced by his critique of the west. In *Hind Swaraj*, Gandhi stated: 'Those alone who have been affected by Western civilization have become enslaved... if we become free, India is free' [Murry 1967:123]. This is an essential argument contained in *The Denationalization of Goans*, and is a recurring theme in Braganza-Cunha's writings.

An area in which the views of Braganza-Cunha are clearly antithetical to Gandhi's is in his conception of the relationship between religion and politics. For Gandhi, religion and politics were inseparable. The methods to be used to bring about change, *ahimsa* (rejection of violence on the basis of the moral force of the soul), and *satyagraha* (force of truth), and the ideal state that he conceived of, *Ramarajya*, represented the unity of religion and politics. Whereas, Braganza-Cunha believed that any stress on religion could only lead to communalism [1961:182]. He is caustic in his criticism of the Portuguese use of religion, but refrained from any comment on religion as a belief system in spite of his personal atheistic inclinations.

Thus, Braganza-Cunha could not have been in agreement with all that Gandhi said and did. However, after the initial free flow of invective against Gandhi, no further criticism of him is to be found in his writings. Instead in his later writings, after Gandhi's death and India's independence, frequent appreciative references
to him can be found. More than the mellowing of Braganza-Cunha, what probably endeared him to Gandhi was the fact that he saw him as the only Congress leader, aside from Lohia, who did not merely pay lip service to the problem of Portuguese domination over Goa, but who gave the problem of Goa’s liberation serious attention. This was an important factor, given the general disappointment of nationalists with the apparent indifference of the Congress to the problem of Goa. Moreover, he saw him as an effective politician and ‘a great realist’ [1961:543], whose ‘genial statesmanship’ had facilitated the independence of India.

The undefined future

A peculiar feature of Braganza-Cunha’s discourse is his virtual silence on the future he envisaged for his ‘free Goa in a free India’, to achieve which he had dedicated his entire life.

His analysis of imperialism was shaped by Lenin, while his mode of opposition to imperialism was influenced by Gandhi and a desire to recover Goa’s ‘Indian past’. Yet, he does not advocate returning to the past; the past merely represented a stage in history from which progress could be made.

On a rare occasion, addressing the Asian Socialist Conference in 1956,

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12Gandhi in his individual capacity attempted to raise the Goa problem at various levels. On hearing that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Goa had been contributing to ‘lawlessness’, probably by his remarks against India, he asked the Archbishop of Bombay to investigate the complaint [Gandhi 1959:101]. He also prevailed upon the British Viceroy to at least make ‘a friendly remonstrance’ against the ‘harsh and unjust treatment of Indians’ [Gandhi 1959:100]. In Harjan he wrote: ‘In Free India, Goa cannot be allowed to exist as a separate entity in opposition to the laws of the free State. Without a shot being fired, the people of Goa will be able to claim and receive the rights of citizenship of the free State [Gandhi 1946 X.21:208]. Aside from this, he had issued statements condemning the arrests of Lohia and Braganza-Cunha, and publicized the situation in Goa in Harjan.
Braganza-Cunha referred to himself as 'a believer in socialism'. But he never defined what socialism meant to him. Like Lohia, did he believe in the 'equal irrelevance' of capitalism and communism and wish to build a third camp? Although he was critical of the Congress leadership, could the absence of criticism of the actual policies of the Indian government be interpreted as his endorsement of Nehruvian socialism? Or did he believe that it was up to the people (in some determinate or indeterminate manner) to shape their future once they had been freed from colonial rule? Unfortunately, with his vision for the future undefined, his discourse remains incomplete.