Perhaps one of the most outstanding achievements of Braganza-Cunha was his graphic detailing of the cultural and social penetration achieved by Portuguese imperialism in Goa, in his noted essay *The Denationalization of Goans*, first published in 1944.

According to Ashis Nandy, Frantz Fanon (1926-61), a psychiatrist and social philosopher involved in the Algerian liberation struggle, was one of the first to realize the psychological dominance of European middle-class cultures in the colonies1 [Nandy 1983:4]. However, more than two decades before Fanon’s first work was published, Braganza-Cunha had recognized that imperialism was not just political and economic in nature, but led to ‘intellectual servility, the degeneration of its (the people’s) culture, the negation of progress and the death of its personality’ [Cunha 1961:218]. *The Denationalization of Goans* is an analysis of the process which had led to the enslavement of the minds of Goans, and which prevented them from resisting colonial rule.

Nandy observes that while one form of colonization had been defeated, the second form of colonization persisted:

This form of colonialism colonizes minds in addition to bodies...

1Fanon’s noted works were *Black Skins White Masks* and *The Wretched of the Earth*, published in 1952 and 1961 respectively.
it helps generalize the concept of the modern West from a geographical and temporal entity to a psychological category. The West is now everywhere, within the West and outside; in structures and in minds² [1983:XI].

Braganza-Cunha displays an acute awareness of the impact of colonial rule on the intellectual modes of the colonized people, especially the elite sections. His concept of the 'Denationalization' of Goans shares much in common with Fanon's conception of the process of the 'mutilation' of the people and the 'colonization' of native intellectuals in Algeria. 'Denationalization' is the process through which the people, especially the elite sections, had lost touch with their own culture and lost their 'pride of race'. Similarly, Fanon is concerned with the manner in which the colonized intellectuals had adopted 'Mediterranean' values, resulting in the 'spiritual penury' of this class and the 'profoundly cosmopolitan mode' that its mind was set in, causing it to be distanced from the people. Both of them believed that the process of mental enslavement of the elites enabled the colonial rulers to sustain their rule over the colonized with their consent.

An important difference between Braganza-Cunha and Fanon is that the former is exclusively concerned with the plight of the enslaved elite, while the latter pays a great deal of attention to the role of the 'natives' (the ordinary people, especially the peasants) in the nationalist struggle. The reason for this is their divergent perceptions of the course that the nationalist struggle had to

²While Nandy is concerned with the colonization of minds that persists after the departure of the colonizers, Braganza-Cunha was concerned with the strength, persistence and even seeming 'popularity' of ongoing colonial domination, because the minds of the people had been enslaved.
take in their respective countries.\textsuperscript{3}

While there is a tendency to attribute the absence of a nationalist struggle to the repressive nature of Portuguese colonialism; according to Braganza-Cunha the stranglehold of Portuguese imperialism over the minds of the colonized had resulted in a loss of the will to resist the rule of the colonizers.

Braganza-Cunha is most remembered by his contemporaries for this essay. At the very mention of his name, freedom fighters interviewed recalled this essay and viewed it as one of his distinguished achievements. As one freedom fighter remarked: 'His (Braganza-Cunha's) whole life he fought against the Denationalization of Goa. There was no Hindu leader of his stature.'\textsuperscript{4}

However, the popular interpretation of this essay is that it is an analysis of the plight of Goan Christians. This view sees the Goan Christians as denationalized in contrast to the Hindus, who by implication were imbued with a greater level of national consciousness.\textsuperscript{5}

An examination of this essay and Braganza-Cunha's use of the term 'denationalized' will serve to show the incorrectness of this interpretation.

**Etymology of the term 'Denationalization'**

The concept of 'Denationalization' first appears in Braganza-Cunha's essay *What*

\textsuperscript{1}Fanon views the peasantry as a revolutionary class having 'nothing to lose and everything to gain'[1963:47]. According to him the struggle against colonialism was necessarily violent, entailing the use of arms. While Fanon is wary of the vacillating nature of the 'colonized intellectuals', Braganza-Cunha felt that the struggle had to be initiated by this class, although the source of its strength would be the participation of 'the people'.

\textsuperscript{2}Personal communication at an interview with Dr D S Sukhtankar on 10 December 1990 at Bandra, Bombay.

\textsuperscript{3}This view is elaborated upon in the section of this chapter titled *The 'Denationalized Christian' - A Viewpoint*. 110
is Imperialism, published in 1928. In a section of this essay titled The Indian Nationalism, Braganza-Cunha emphasizes the fact that the people of Goa are part of India, and that the Indian national movement should be of concern to them.

He is astounded by the phenomenon whereby:

Our educated class, aiming at official posts and formed by an absurd education . . . renders it alien to its country, finds itself socially and intellectually denationalized [1961, 219].

Interestingly, within Portugal the term 'Denationalization' was used in quite a different sense. Antonio de Figueiredo, who was born in Portugal and worked in Mozambique as an underground activist opposing the Portuguese regime states:

Writers and thinkers (in Portugal) who had, through contact with their European cultures discovered the obscurantism of their own, were to be known in Portuguese history as the estrangeirados -- 'the foreignized' or those influenced by imitation of foreigners. To this day they are the target of hatred of the regime's 'ultras' who regard them as 'dogmatic masters of Denationalization' [1975:147].

Attempting to project the satyagraha of 1955 as being conducted mainly by Indians, Salazar stated:

Once the supply of the few denationalized Goans had run out -- and they were essential to give color to the protest -- Indians had to be exclusively resorted to [Salazar 1955:5]

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*As quoted by Figueiredo from Murias, Manuel, *Retrato de Salazar - In Memorian*, Lisbon, 1971.*
In 1914, arguing in favor of imparting primary education in the mother-tongue, Konkani, rather than in Portuguese, Menezes Braganza wrote:

What makes us to hesitate to follow that course is, perhaps, the danger of denationalization about which so much is talked now-a-days (sic) [Menezes Braganza Memorial Committee 1972:58].

If the term 'denationalized' was commonly used by Portuguese officialdom in this manner, Braganza-Cunha possibly adopted its usage in a paradoxical fashion. The term 'denationalization' is not commonly used by nationalist thinkers, and it is difficult to ascertain exactly how Braganza-Cunha came to use this term.

In the mid-1870s, Keshab Chandra Sen remarked: 'Truth is not European, and it would be a mistake to force European institutions upon the Hindus, who would resist any attempt to denationalize them' [Chatterjee 1993:40]. Around 1910, Aurobindo Ghose used this term in an editorial he authored for his journal Karmayogin. He wrote of how Indians had lost their spirituality and needed to regain their Brahmatej but, he lamented:

Our educated class have become so unfamiliar with the deep knowledge of their forefathers that it has to be translated into modern European terms before they can understand it. For it is the European ideas alone that are real to them... so well has British education done its total denationalizing work in India [Grover 1992:152-153].

It is perhaps mere coincidence that Braganza-Cunha was in Pondicherry as
a student when Aurobindo Ghose decided to take up residence there. It is doubtful whether Braganza-Cunha’s actual usage of the term ‘Denationalization’ was inspired by him. However, in his formulation of the concept he was possibly influenced by the mode of thinking of Aurobindo Ghose and other nationalists like Tilak and Bipin Chandra Pal, who emphasized the rich tradition and culture of India which people had forgotten in their encounter with the west. Bipin Chandra Pal, for example, asserted that the problem of India’s domination by the British was not of politics, economics or administration:

> It was a simple, psychological problem . . . you ought to be able to find it yourself, now, this problem . . . the government of 300 millions and more of aliens by less than 3 lakhs people over a vast continent [Murthy 1967:163].

Thus the denationalizing effect of imperialist education, the need to affirm the achievements of the past and the problem of dominance being a psychological one, were concepts that had been suggested by nationalists prior to and contemporaneous to Braganza-Cunha. But in the early phase of his activism, Braganza-Cunha attempted an analysis of the concept of denationalization which encompassed all these aspects, as he saw the denationalization of Goans as the main obstacle for the development of nationalism in Goa.

**The First Premise - the Indian Nation**

In the first chapter, the lusitanisation endeavor of the Portuguese has been

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3From 1926 to 1946, the period of his activism in Goa.
examined. Braganza-Cunha's formulation of the thesis of the denationalization of Goans addresses the process of lusitanisation; however, denationalization necessarily implied the process by which Goans had lost their 'Indianness'.

His attempt is to show the primordial affinity of Goa to the mother nation, India, in order to create an Indian identity for the Goan. This was in fact an instrumentalist construction, considering that the creation of 'India' was preceded by the definition of Goa.8

What made Braganza-Cunha identify himself as an Indian is a mystery, especially when one considers that his father edited a conservative, pro-Portuguese journal, O Nacionalista, and given the fact that the greater part of his youth was spent in France. But possibly his self-identification as an Indian sprang from his stay in France, which facilitated his contact with thinkers like Romain Rolland and nationalists from other parts of the world like Chou En Lai and Ho Chin Minh, at a time when the nationalist movement in India was attracting international attention (see the biographical essay in Appendix 2).

Braganza-Cunha was deeply impressed by the Congress-led nationalist movement in India, which helped him -- a 'denationalized Goan' himself -- to gain a sense of national identity. As he rarely wrote about himself, it is difficult to ascertain exactly how he came to identify himself as an Indian, but the fact is for him, the nation was the 'Great India'. However, there were other nationalist

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8 As pointed out by Kaviraj in The Imaginary Institution of India. 'India' was a product of a conjuncture of modernity, which nationalists tried to portray as a 'community which was lost -- to be regained' (Chatterjee 1993:21). Braganza-Cunha identifies the empires of Asoka and the Kadãñhas as representative of the 'Indian Civilisation' (1961:4.5). See the section titled Approach to History in Chapter 6.
imaginings.

Among the nationalists, there was a section that viewed Goa as a part of Maharashtra. Braganza-Cunha was critical of this trend, which according to him was responsible for sowing distrust among Christians regarding their future in a free Goa.

As seen in Chapter One, a section of the elite comprised lusitanised Goans, for whom the parent nation was Portugal. They identified themselves as being Portuguese.

Among the nationalists, a small section sought autonomy for Goa, temporarily under Portuguese sovereignty. Though most nationalists were extremely critical of this section and viewed it as ‘anti-national’ or ‘pro-Portuguese’, proponents of this section identified themselves as being ‘Goans’, and wished to make Goa into a small, autonomous state like Monaco [The Goa League 1956:34].

Commenting on a manifesto making the plea for an autonomous Goa, Braganza-Cunha says these nationalists acted ‘as if Goans belonged to a nationality of their own distinct from any other’. He remarks in Free Goa: ‘Obviously, Sheikh Abdullah has succeeded in making disciples among Goans’ [25 Jan 1958:2]. According to him, an appeal to the Portuguese government for autonomy necessarily implied an acceptance of Portuguese sovereignty. He responded to the move for autonomy in a series of two articles in Free Goa: Our

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9Purshottam Kakodkar (interviewed on IS May 1992), supposedly one of the nationalists who had initiated the autonomy move, declined to comment when asked about it.
Braganza-Cunha believed in the Leninist concept of the right of nationalities to self-determination in the context of the Soviet Union, but was extremely critical of Sheikh Abdullah's attempts to build a movement for Kashmir's liberation from Indian sovereignty or even its autonomy. He obviously did not believe this concept to be relevant to the Indian situation.

There are instances when Braganza-Cunha refers to Goa or to 'Portuguese India' as a 'country'. His use of the word 'country' is to indicate a definite space or a particular territory, be it Goa or 'Portuguese India'. However, he never refers to Goa as a nation. India was the nation to which Goa belonged.

**Agencies of Denationalization**

*The Denationalization of Goans* starts with a statement which must have startled his readers:

In the whole of India no people is so denationalized as Goans. A complete lack of national consciousness and the most shameful subjection to foreign rulers, either Portuguese or British, render the Goan and particularly the Goan Christian a stranger in his own land [1961:59].

The causes for the denationalization of Goans are manifold. First, the long tenure of Portuguese rule had brought about a 'pronounced deformation of
character’. But more than this, what had led to the ‘disfigurement’ of the national character of the Goan people was ‘the peculiarly tyrannical and intolerant ways of the Portuguese rulers’ [1961:59].

To facilitate the continued mental enslavement of the people of Goa, the Portuguese created myths which dominated the historiography of their rule over Goa11 (discussed in Chapter 6). The result of this was that Goans who had received Portuguese education grew up believing Albuquerque to be tolerant and in favor of inter-racial integration, and nurtured the belief that Francis Xavier had effected conversions miraculously. Consequently, many Goans were in awe of the Portuguese.

Braganza-Cunha demolishes the myths contained in the Portuguese historiography of its conquest of Goa. He examines their impact on the people, details the manner in which the language of the people, Konkani, was destroyed and shows how the traditional culture of the people was replaced by an imitative culture. He argues that although politically and economically, Goa was an integral part of India, an ‘artificial barrier’ separated Goa from the mother-nation.

For Goa to be liberated, it was essential that the people become conscious of their present state of degradation and that they cultivated pride in their nationality, identifying with the nationalist struggle being waged in India.

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11Kaviraj has stated: ‘To give itself a history is the most fundamental act of self-identification of a community’ [Chatterjee 1993:16]. Hobsbawn, commenting on the role of history in the formation of national identity, states that some nationalist movements are compelled to reach ‘far back, beyond the real memory of their peoples in the search for a suitable (and suitably impressive) national state in the past’ [1992:76]. The use of historiography in the construction of identity can be seen in the Portuguese endeavor to lusitaniise the Goans, as also in the appeal of the nationalists to the Goans that they should assert their Indianness.
Braganza-Cunha concerns himself with the different methods utilized by the Portuguese to enslave the minds of the Goans. He identifies the media, the Portuguese system of education, the church and the state as the agencies of denationalization.

All printed matter had to be approved by the colonial administration's censors before it could be published. According to Braganza-Cunha, the Portuguese virtually determined what people in Goa read, as the media in Goa was controlled by the Portuguese press (the reference is obviously to the stringent legislation introduced after 1928). This had the effect of 'deforming our vision' and was responsible for Goans viewing ideas and facts that were foreign to them, from an angle of vision opposed to their own interests, as exemplified by letters in the local newspapers, expressing admiration for the fascist regime of Mussolini in Italy [1961:135-36]. News of the nationalist struggle in India was censored, so that Goans lived in ignorance and isolation in relation to the rest of India [1961:219].

Education in government schools was conducted in Portuguese, which severely limited the number of people availing of education, Braganza-Cunha contends. Moreover, anything pertaining to India was excluded from the curriculum. Thus the education was alien to its country and contributed to the denationalization of those who availed of it. Its only function was to make its recipients aspire for official posts.12

He identifies the Portuguese state working in conjunction with the church as

12For a more detailed discussion on education, refer to the section on education in Chapter 1.
being the principle agencies of denationalization and analyses the dynamics of the process of denationalization as effected by these agencies.

**The Special Role of Religion in the Denationalization Process**

In the introduction to the essay Braganza-Cunha states:

Our aim is to expose the attempts of foreign agencies to enslave the minds of our people and split the country into rival factions [1961:55].

The 'foreign agencies' were inclusive of the church and the missionaries based in Goa. However, right at the outset Braganza-Cunha clarifies that the Goa Congress Committee, responsible for the publication of the essay, was not anti-religion and was 'strictly neutral in the matter of religion' [1961:57]. But the conditions prevailing were such that certain interests were keen on foisting sectarianism among Goans, similar to the manner in which individuals and groups in India, under a religious or anti-religious banner, were creating dissensions among Indians. Consequently, 'more than just a passive neutrality' was needed and communalism, be it of caste or religion, had to be opposed. It is with this perspective that Braganza-Cunha undertakes the task of highlighting the nexus between the church and the state and explicitly states:

We do not fight religion but we expose the exploitation of religion for the benefit of the foreign rulers and to the disadvantage of India's unity.

Therefore our organization is anti-communalist; that is, it is
against all individuals or groups who, under a religious or anti-religious banner, create dissensions among Indians and thereby play into the hands of imperialists or their agents [1961:57].

He views the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League as communalist parties and sees the functioning of the foreign clergy in a similar manner.

Braganza-Cunha traces forcible mass conversions to the period immediately after the conquest of Goa when, in the wake of the mass massacre of Muslims, marriages were encouraged between Portuguese soldiers and the 'native' women, mainly Muslim widows.

He quotes from various official sources and correspondence of the clergy to show that conversions were not brought about through preaching and doctrine, but through a series of administrative measures that prescribed severe disincentives for non-conversion. Further, he notes that forcible conversions had a profound effect on all Goans:

This regime of permanent violence of the people's convictions produced a debasement of moral qualities. And it affected both the Hindus and Christians . . . It destroyed their self-respect and enslaved them to the point of rendering them incapable of reacting against the tyranny of their rulers [1961:76].

Referring to the peculiar effects of conversions on Christian Goans, he comments:

And worst of all it imbued in the Christian Goans the false idea
that there must be a certain solidarity among them and their Christian rulers, for the mere reason that they are both Christians, when as a matter of fact the interest of the imperialist rulers and the ruled are essentially opposed whatever their religion may be [Cunha 1961:76].

Thus, Braganza-Cunha shows how religion was utilized by the colonizers to bring about an identification of the colonized with the colonizers. Moreover, he shows that religion had unwittingly become linked to political consciousness. On the one hand, the Hindu religion bore the seeds of a 'national resurgence' constituting a danger to foreign domination. On the other hand, the Catholic religion was an 'imperialist weapon of subjection' [1961:279].

However, Braganza-Cunha clearly states that even those who had not been converted, had been psychologically affected by the use of force made by the Portuguese to bring about conversions. He observes that conversions served to loot one half of the natives of their properties, to the advantage of the Portuguese, while they reduced to 'impotent submission' the other half. 'In the name of religion, the Hindus were robbed and the Catholics enslaved. Both were terrorized for the greater security of the usurpers' [1961:76 emphasis added].

This showed that the Portuguese state had actively used religion to advance the aims of empire. It was further illustrated by the fact that the Concordat between the dictatorship and the Holy See had made provision for the overseas dioceses and missions to be helped by the state, to enable it to perform its tasks of civilizing and exercising a 'national influence' in the colonies.
As per the Concordat the ecclesiastical authorities were ‘to see that in the teaching of special subjects such as history, the legitimate Portuguese patriotic sense be taken into consideration.’ According to Braganza-Cunha, this clearly confirmed that ‘for them (the Portuguese) religion is a tool of our denationalization’. Consequently, ‘The Catholic Goans should be conscious of and think over the role assigned to religion by imperialistic politics’ [1961:77].

Portugal had consciously utilized religion to create a support base to ensure its continued rule. While the non-Christians did not identify with the Portuguese rulers in the same manner as the Christians did, a mentality marked by servility had been cultivated amongst them. Barring the retrograde caste system which, according to Braganza-Cunha, was seen by the Portuguese as an effective means of keeping the people divided, every aspect of the culture of the people had been violated. The people were reduced to imitating the culture of their colonizers and had lost a sense of their national dignity.

**The ‘Denationalized Christian’ - A Viewpoint**

In common parlance, the denationalized Goan has become synonymous with the Goan Christian. Divakar Kakodkar believed that *The Denationalization of the Goans* was Braganza-Cunha’s most important contribution to the nationalist struggle, as it contained a ‘correct’ analysis of the condition of Christian Goans. This was a view shared by many others. Kakodkar stated:

The theory of denationalization put forward by Cunha is correct

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1Quoted by Braganza-Cunha from Article 20 of the Concordat [1961:77, emphasis added].
... Although 29 years have passed since liberation, the process of denationalization has not been arrested. Re-nationalisation has not yet started. The church is responsible for this. It has played an anti-national role... The Christian masses were afraid. They did not want a change of regime... They (Hindus) identified with what was going on in Maharashtra -- Tilak, Sarvajanik Ganapati, the reformist movement -- all affected Hindu Goans. Christians were unaware of these.  

According to Kakodkar, the denationalized Goan was necessarily the Christian Goan. Similar sentiments were voiced by other freedom fighters. George Vaz stated:

_The Denationalization of Goans_ was not read by many people.

Most Christians read very little nationalist literature.

However, as we have seen, Braganza-Cunha makes it quite clear that while the Christian Goan may have been more denationalized (and a much larger proportion of the Christian Goans were denationalized), Hindu Goans were not exempt from the process of denationalization. Braganza-Cunha is very precise in his writings. When he wishes to refer specifically to the Christian population, he does so in clear terms, referring to 'the Catholic Goan woman', 'the Catholic population' or 'Christian Goans'. But here, the more frequent reference is to 'Goans', inclusive of Hindus and Christians. This is adequately clear in a

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14 Personal communication at an interview with Divakar Kakodkar on 28 January 1991 at Curchorem, Quepem.

15 Personal communication at an interview with George Vaz on 18 June 1990, at Assonora, Bardez.
paragraph of the conclusion:

The terroristic method of conversion under threat of exile and confiscation is responsible for the physical and moral cowardice, the habits of dilation and adulation, and the debasement of the character produced in the Goan people, both Christian and Hindu [1961:96].

There are two reasons that explain why The Denationalization of Goans is seen as an analysis of the condition of Christian Goans. First, in tracing the problematic course of nationalism in Goa, religion was cited as a factor that came in the way of the participation of Christians in the national movement. On account of the lack of sympathy for the movement among Christians, the Christian Goan assumed the identity of the denationalized Goan. Second, while Braganza-Cunha asserts that Hindus were also denationalized, he does not illustrate the condition of the denationalized Hindu in as much detail as he does the denationalized Christian. Each of these reasons is examined separately.

In the context of the first reason cited, the response of a freedom fighter on the question of religion is noteworthy. Flaviano Dias asserted:

The basis of nationalism for Hindus differed from the basis of nationalism for Christians. The nationalist sentiments of Hindus were often inspired by religion. Many Hindus derived their nationalism from nationalists like Veer Savarkar and Lokmanya
Tilak, who were exponents of Hindu nationalism.¹⁶

On the other hand, Dias felt, in order to facilitate the growth of nationalist thought, Christians first had to develop an 'anti-church' consciousness. Developing an 'anti-church' consciousness did not necessarily mean giving up Christianity, but it was part of the process of developing an anti-Portuguese consciousness.

While a pre-requisite for the development of nationalist consciousness among Christians was the recognition of the role played by the church in strengthening Portuguese rule, many Christian nationalists were compelled to look westward for their nationalist inspiration, as conversions had served to sever their connection with their 'Indian heritage'. The influence of western thought as epitomized by the French revolution was an important factor in shaping the nationalist consciousness of Christians.

Dias shares Braganza-Cunha's point of view that for Christians to become nationalists, it was imperative that they recognized the political use the Portuguese had made of Christianity. This viewpoint was reinforced by Ravindra Kelekar who, while admitting that many Christians played a leading role in the struggle, stated:

Most Catholics who joined the movement had to liberate themselves from the church. Many of us were suspicious of

¹⁶Interestingly, in 1955, V D Savarkar said at a Shuddhi (A movement for re-conversion to Hinduism) function in Bombay of Christian fisherfolk, that had Hindus attended to Shuddhi earlier, the problems of Goa and Kashmir could have been averted. According to him, if Goa had a Hindu population the Portuguese would have left much earlier. He recommended that Hindus spend as much on Shuddhi as foreign missionaries did on conversions [Kear 1960:495].
Catholics unless they had been imprisoned at one time or other.\textsuperscript{17}

Thus, in the case of the Christians there was a direct relationship between religion and the process of denationalization, leading to the perception of the Christian as the denationalized Goan.

In the case of the Hindus, the relationship between their religion and the process of denationalization could not be established, but as in the case of Christians, their culture had also been denationalized. They were deprived of the educational, literary or cultural use of their language -- a point that Braganza-Cunha stresses time and again.

However, to fill the vacuum created by the state of 'inculture' to which Hindus were reduced, unlike the Christians, they did not have to look westward. Instead, they appropriated the culture that was most accessible to them, this being the dominant Marathi culture of the neighboring province, later to become the state of Maharashtra. Moreover, the resurgence of Marathi culture in the nineteenth century -- reflected in the emergence of several great thinkers like Jyotiba Phule, M G Ranade, Tilak and Agarkar, to name a few -- made Marathi culture an attractive alternative for the denationalized Hindu Goan.

Consequently, the process of denationalization resulted in the identification of the Hindu with Marathi culture. As this was part of the 'Great Indian culture' which Braganza-Cunha sees as the ideal, he is not as critical of the Hindu Goan as he is of the Christian Goan, who imitated the culture of the colonizers.

\textsuperscript{17}Personal communication at an interview with Ravindra Kelekar on 25 October 1990 at Priol, Ponda.
The Aping Culture

Braganza-Cunha identifies the chief cause of the 'cultural bankruptcy of Goans' as being the persecution of their languages, particularly Konkani, and the imposition of the Portuguese language. The Inquisition, the religious orders and the officialdom were responsible for the persecution of Konkani with the result that not a single Konkani school existed and the level of illiteracy was appalling.

The literature produced in Goa was in Portuguese, Marathi and English and, according to Braganza-Cunha, was devoid of 'the creative spirit and originality which are the privilege of those who are inspired by the deep consciousness of the race'. Instead, 'an ape-like literature' was produced 'which lacks vitality because it has no roots in the soil where it was born' [1961:87].

Braganza-Cunha is critical of Goan intellectuals who, instead of encouraging the use and spread of Konkani, concerned themselves with the 'pedantic question of ascertaining if Konkani is a language or dialect' [1961:86]

As the people were deprived of their language, the Portuguese hindered the growth of a 'national culture'. This was evident in the fields of literature, art, science and technology, which were marked by an imitation of the Portuguese masters. Braganza-Cunha describes the consequences of this on the field of art in colorful terms:

As for painting, we have the portraits of Viceroys exhibited in the Government Council Hall; monstrous scarebugs made in series

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18It is interesting to note how in recent times some pro-Marathi political leaders have upheld Braganza-Cunha as the 'Father of Goan Nationalism', ignoring the essential tenets of his nationalist thought, particularly his definitive views on the language question.
which may serve to terrorize our councillors ... A few samples of applied art exhibited by girls' schools and convents ... only prove that they diligently cultivate bad taste in their pupils.

In the fields of science and technology the achievements of the Indian people had been far superior to those of the Portuguese conquerors on the eve of their conquest. However, four centuries of Portuguese domination had led to regression, and progress had become synonymous with 'a mock-westernization'.

Not only had the process of 'cultural denationalization' taken place so that the culture of the people of Goa was imitative in all respects, best described as an 'aping culture'; he contends that the people of Goa lived in utter cultural bankruptcy.

Braganza-Cunha is particularly concerned with the political implications of the process of denationalization and holds that while this process had taken place in other colonies, its effects were most pronounced in Goa. This is evident from his statement:

In fact no people has sunk so low into indignity as Goans. They have been deprived of the most elementary human rights ... But in spite of all tyranny and humiliation not a single public protest was ever uttered against the brutal colonial rule. On the contrary, Goan renegades shamelessly boast in their press and their speeches that they are tied to Portugal for ever ... [1961:91].

Consequently, he traces the reticence of Goans to involve themselves in the struggle for India's independence and Goa's liberation to the denationalization
process that they had undergone.

Essential to Braganza-Cunha’s thesis of the denationalization of Goans is the understanding that an assertion of the endogenous culture of the people would facilitate the growth of nationalism in Goa. ‘Forced westernization’ had resulted in the creation of ‘submissive servants’ [1961:96] and their ‘denationalized culture’ had made Goans ‘the tools of their own enslavement’ [1961:90]. Consequently, for nationalist consciousness to develop in Goans, it was necessary for them to identify with the ‘Great India’ from which the origins of Goa could be traced.¹⁹

For Braganza-Cunha, acceptance of the ‘Great India’ is not just a political concept, but is a cultural concept implying a rejection of the superiority of the west and a vigorous reaction against the colonial rulers in the ‘political, ideological, social and economic fields, and even in the most everyday habits of our life’ [1961:97 emphasis added]

Thus, during the period of Braganza-Cunha’s activism in Goa, his prime concern was to evoke in Goans an awareness of the denationalized state of their culture and an identification with the ‘Great India’. He saw the generation of this awareness as essential for facilitating Goa’s integration with the Indian ‘nation’. The emphasis given by Braganza-Cunha to the cultural penetration of imperialism, and the basis for nationalism being the recovery of the traditional culture, is a result of the peculiar nature of Portuguese colonialism. Two decades

¹⁹Anderson, in his formulation of the nation as an ‘imagined community’ has discussed the ‘cultural roots’ of nationalism and has suggested that nationalism could be understood by aligning it with the cultural systems which preceded it [1992:12]. The assertion that Goa was an intrinsic part of the ‘Great India’ was essential to Braganza-Cunha’s discourse of nationalism.
after *The Denationalization of Goans* was published. Amilcar Cabral, a thinker-revolutionary fighting for Guinea-Bissau’s liberation from Portuguese colonial rule, declared: ‘Liberation is an act of culture.’ He talked of the necessity of penetrating ‘the wall of silence’ built around the colonized people by Portuguese colonialism and the attempt of the Portuguese to project the colonized Africans as ‘happy Portuguese of color’ [Davidson 1968:1]. Cabral referred to ‘the ineffaceable marks of colonialism’ on the minds and bodies of the people [Davidson 1968:3]. This is an indication of the fact that for those fighting Portuguese colonialism, the assertion of nationalism necessarily implied an assertion of the culture of the colonized.