Chapter-7
Rational psychology and paralogism of pure reason

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7.1 Introduction:

In paralogism of pure reason Kant makes his famous critique or rational psychology or the concept of self of classical metaphysics. When Kant uses the term ‘rational psychology’, he does not refer any existing school of psychology but he refers to the rationalistic tradition of modern western philosophy. Kant wants to derive a fallacy about the conclusions, which are generally made for the nature of self. These conclusions which are transcendentally fallacious are derived by the inappropriate employment of pure reason. Before investigating the meaning of the term ‘rational’ psychology further, it is necessary to see the meaning of the term paralogism according to Kant. Kant defines the terms ‘logical paralogism’ and ‘transcendental paralogism’ in the following words.¹

“A logical paralogism is a syllogism which is fallacious in form, be its content what it may. A transcendental paralogism is one in which there is a transcendental ground, constraining us to draw a formally invalid conclusion. Such a fallacy is therefore grounded in the nature of human reason and gives rise to an illusion which cannot be avoided although it may, indeed, be rendered harmless.”

Here Kant’s definition of paralogism requires some closer attention. First if we take the example of logical paralogism, Kant defines it as a syllogism which is fallacious in its form. Kant says that logical paralogism is not related with the content of the propositions which it contain. Now here it is not clear that which type of syllogism is under consideration, but from the context it may be concluded that here Kant refers categorical syllogism. Because only categorical syllogism generates the transcendentally illusory idea of self. But what is the meaning of the statement that a syllogism which is fallacious in its form. The form of a categorical syllogism is determined by the place of middle term and occurrence of three terms each of which should occur twice in the syllogism. The fallacy of form may be of different type. It may be the fallacy of four terms or any violation of the rule of valid categorical syllogism. So from at logical point of view, for Kant a formal fallacy is either the fallacy of four terms or any other fallacy which occurs due to violation of the rules of valid syllogism. And so any of 241 modes of syllogism which are invalid may furnish the example of a logical paralogism. But here Kant is not concerned with logical
paralogism but his main object of thought is transcendental paralogism. Here Kant defines transcendental paralogism as a syllogism in which a formally invalid conclusion is drawn on transcendental grounds. So according to Kant even a transcendental paralogism is formally invalid as a form of categorical syllogism but the ground of this invalidity is transcendental. Now this concept is not logical here. Kant’s epistemological discourse comes in-between. Because as it become clearer later on in this chapter, this type of transcendental paralogism contains four types of metaphysical propositions about self. But all these propositions are about ‘I’ and so Kant takes this capital ‘I’ as the fundamental ground of rational psychology. And he states his view in the following words.  

“This is the concept or, if the term be preferred, the judgment, ‘I think’. As it easily seen, this is the vehicle of all concepts, and therefore also of transcendental concepts, and so it is always included in the conceiving of these latter, and is itself transcendental. But it can have no special designation, because it serves only to introduce all our thought, as belonging to consciousness. Meanwhile, however free it be of empirical admixture (impressions of the senses), it yet enables us to distinguish, through the nature of our faculty of representation, two kinds of objects. ‘I’, as thinking, am an object of inner sense, and am called ‘soul’.”

Here Kant heavily relies on the rationalistic doctrine of self. He takes ‘I think’ as an inferred judgment and due to certain logical reasons, he thinks that as in the proposition I think or any other proposition which contains ‘I’ as a term, this ‘I’ must occur at the place of subject term. From this, as we will see in greater detail further, he derives that the substantial nature of I is a logical result of this fact that ‘I’ cannot be predicated on any subject. This requires some closer consideration.

According to Kant, logically, a substance is that which can occur only as a subject term in a categorical proposition. In 20th century Bertrand Russell has also taken this view, and he based his criticism of absolute idealism and classical concept of substance on this account. But when Kant says that something is substance because it cannot be predicated to any subjects, he deviates much from the classical concepts of substance. For entire rationalistic tradition, the term substance is defined in a different context. First of all, either for Descartes or for Spinoza, there is no relation of identity between substance and ‘I’. For Descartes matter or extended substance can equally be called a, substance which has nothing to do with ‘I’ or ‘I think’. While for Spinoza, ‘to think’ or ‘to be conscious’ is only one of the infinite attributes which
constitute the essence of a substance and extension is just one of them. So it cannot be logically concluded that this definition of which is being used by Kant in the derivation of paralogism matches with any definition of substance which is accepted in rationalistic tradition either by Spinoza, Descartes or Leibnitz. Moreover in first analogy of experience, Kant defines the principle of permanence of substance in a different context. Kant say that:\(^3\)

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Principle of permanence of substance:
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In all change of appearances substance is permanents; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished”

So here for Kant substance is that which is permanent in all changes and so it can always, be a subject it cannot be predicated to a subject. But the use of the word in a categorical proposition in the form of a subject or a predicate is a context relative factor. There is no word which, by its linguistic capacity, can be used only as subject. When we say that ‘I think’ ‘I’ is a subject but when we said that it is I who think it functions partially as a predicate. Therefore Kant’s emphasis on this point is not totally supported on the ground of the logic of predication.

7.2 Syllogism and paralogism:

It has been already made clear in the introductory subsection of this thesis that Kant is making an essential difference between logical paralogism and transcendental paralogism. In their formal structure, both are syllogisms and though it has not been made explicitly clear by Kant, they are categorical syllogisms. We have discussed the matter of categorical syllogism in previous chapter but here it requires some anticipation about the nature of syllogism and paralogism. Before considering this matter in the context of paralogisms of pure reason or Kant’s critique of rational psychology, it is necessary to say something about Kant’s view of categorical propositions and their classification.

In entire transcendental analytic Kant has made an essential difference between transcendental and formal logic. According to transcendental logic, the quantity and quality of categorical judgments are to be classified into three different sub-divisions. According to Aristotle, in classical logic the quantity is limited up to universal and particular proposition and quality is up to affirmative and negative. The other divisions which are added as singular propositions in quantity and infinite propositions in quality. Kant has not made it clear that whether the logic which is
being applied in transcendental illusions is formal or transcendental. But the
distinction between logical and transcendental paralogism clearly indicates that Kant
has not given up this distinction completely. So in this universe of discourse, the
categorical propositions may be singular or infinite. But this classification may
contribute something more in the metaphysical deduction of categories. It is very
much difficult to comprehend that this transcendental logic can make any significant
effect in Kant’s derivations of paralogisms. At the stage it is sufficient to say that
Kant’s reliance on Aristotelian logic is directly effective in this derivation of
paralogism. The further observations and implications will be drawn, when Kant’s
actual arguments about paralogism will be examined. This will be the subject of
subsequent subsection.

7.3 First paralogism – critical evaluation:

Kant classifies paralogisms under the description of ‘the rational doctrine of
soul.’ Though Kant classifies this under rational psychology, actually he attempts to
examine certain metaphysical propositions about consciousness or self. According to
Kant there are four types of paralogism which are described in the first edition of the
critique of follows.6

1. The soul is substance

2. As regards its quality it is simple

3. As regards the different times in which it exists, it is numerically identical, that is, unity (not plurality)

4. It is in relation to possible objects in space”
These four statements are descriptions of metaphysical properties of self which indicate its substantiality, simplicity, unity and its interaction with outer world. All these are nothing but a different exposition of Cartesian consciousness and its principle of inter-actionalism. In the second edition Kant makes a different type of exposition of these four in the following way.7

“1. I think,

2. As subject,

3. As simple subject,

4. as identical subject in every state of my thought ”

Among these four paralogism, the first paralogism which is currently being discussed is about substantiality. In this syllogism it is derived by Kant that this ‘I’ which is the subject of every conscious awareness can be thought only as a substance. Before evaluating the actual statement of Kant and his criticisms in both editions of critique, it is necessary to see Kant’s actual observations about this paralogism in both editions. In first edition, Kant states the so called derivation of soul as a substance in the following way.8

“FIRST PARALOGISM OF SUBSTANTIALITY.

That the representation of which is the absolute subject of our judgments and cannot therefore be employed as determination of another thing is substance.

I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible judgments, and this representation of myself cannot be employed as predicate of any other thing.

Therefore, I, as thinking being (soul), am substance. ”

In this syllogism or in the language of Kant, in this paralogism, the conclusion is a universal affirmative proposition and the first premise is also a universal affirmative proposition. The second premise is an exposition of particular Kantian stand of his epistemology. According to it this, self consciousness cannot be predicated on any subject. It means that this syllogism can be presented in a simpler way in the following manner.

All absolute subjects are substances.
I am an absolute subject.
Therefore I am a substance.

Clearly in this form there is no logical fallacy. This is a syllogism which is in first figure and with AAA mode. And naturally this is a valid form categorical syllogism. Even in the second edition, Kant almost repeats the same argument in the following way.\footnote{9}

“That which cannot be thought otherwise that as subject does not exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance.

A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject.

Therefore it exists also only as subject, that is, as substance.”

The logical form of this syllogism or paralogism is exactly same as it is in the first edition. In a simpler version this is also 1\textsuperscript{st} figure AAA mode and clearly it is valid. But here Kant does not examine simply the formal validity. So it is necessary to seek the truth of both of the premises. The first premise state that all absolute subjects are substances. Now the very term absolute subject is not logical but it is rather epistemological. Nowhere in the history of metaphysics, the definition of substance is provided in this way. Neither Aristotle nor Descartes nor Spinoza takes this meaning of substance. Logically, among infinite collection of all possible subjects only one as a thinking being cannot be chosen as absolute subject. Even if in general linguistic use, I usually stands in the place of subject but that does not mean that I is logically superior to all other subjects in its subjectivity. But Kant assumes that rational psychology derives the substantiality of self on the ground of its unpredictability. But the main objection of Kant is not logical but rather epistemological. Here Kant wants to state that according to him if soul or self is to be established as a substance then mere its absolute logical subjectivity is not sufficient but somehow we must have a representation of this ‘I’ without any empirical manifold. And according to Kant this is impossible. Kant states this impossibility in the following words.\footnote{10}

“Consciousness is, indeed that which alone make all representations to be thoughts, and in it, therefore as the transcendental subject, all our perceptions must be found; but beyond this logical meaning of the ‘I’ we have no knowledge of the subject in itself, which as substratum underlies this ‘I’, as it does all thoughts.”

In Kant, it is true that all different empirical representations are containing this ‘I’ consciousness, but Kant says that without any empirical content or manifold we
have no knowledge of this substantial ‘I’. This simply means that I know everything which can be possible object of my knowledge but I cannot know myself as a pure ‘I’ because according to Kant this type of knowledge demands a corresponding sensible intuition parallel to this ‘I’ knowledge and this is impossible or rather paradoxical. When I say that I know X it means, that X is given before me in my empirical manifold. But if I say that - I know ‘I’- then either it may be a trivial tautology or no possible predication of a subject on itself is possible even in Aristotelian logic. It may be a trivial example of the law of identity but it does not establish ‘I’ as substance. And therefore Kant concludes that this concept of the substantiality of soul is a ‘pseudo rational doctrine’ and ‘this concept does not carry a single step further in the knowledge of soul’. In the second edition of the critique of pure reason, Kant examines another aspect of substantiality. Here he equates the substantiality of the soul with the permanence of the soul. Kant concludes that in classical metaphysics, it is generally believed that soul is permanent and therefore it is to be taken as a substance. This permanence is to be amounted from its simplicity. As self is a partless simple unit, its dissolution or destruction is metaphysically impossible. In the second edition, after the derivation of first paralogism, Kant adds a second note with the title refutation of Mendelssohn’s proof of the permanence of the soul. In this refutation Kant criticizes the position of Mendelssohn and Plato both. First he observes about Plato in the following way.

“In his Phaedo he endeavored to prove that the soul cannot be subject to such a process of vanishing, which would be a true annihilation, by showing that a simple being cannot cease to exist.”

Here Kant evaluates the famous argument of Plato, about the immortality of soul which is based on its substantial character. This substantial character includes simplicity and this is Kant’s subject of second paralogism. But here Kant states that even if the dissolution of a particular entity is impossible it can be thought that it could be vanished. If consciousness as a characteristic and if it has some degrees regarding its manifestation then its disappearances or vanishing is possible even if it is a permanent non-structural entity. For this type of logical possibility, Kant uses a particular word ‘elanguescence’. This term is particularly used by Kant in this reference and by this he means that even if something is permanent and if this permanence is being claimed on the ground of its non-structural existence then it may
be possible that its disappearance is possible through gradual harm to its intensity. Kant states his arguments in the following words 13

“He failed, however, to observe that even if we admit the simple nature of the soul, namely, that it contains no manifold of constituents external to one other, and therefore no extensive quantity, we yet cannot deny to it, any more than to any other extence, intensive quantity, that is a degree of reality in respect of all its faculties, may, in respect of all that constitutes its existence, and that this degree of reality may diminish through all the infinitely many smaller degrees. In this manner the supposed substance- the thing, the permanence of which has not yet been proved- may be changed into nothing, not indeed by dissolution, but by gradual loss (remissio) of its powers, and so, if I may be permitted the use of the term, by elanguescence.”

Thus from this refutation Kant wants to establish that the permanence of soul is nearly an object of inner sense. The empirical fact that I always remains I is an empirical fact and it may be continued throughout the whole empirical life. But it does not provide a proof for the permanence of soul at metaphysical level. No synthetic proposition can be derived simply from the concept of I, for example if matter is to be taken as a physical substance then we may say that extension is included in a physical object even if it may be an analytic proposition. According to Kant from the awareness of I no such proposition can be derived. And the connection between idealism and this type of derivation is stated by Kant in the following word.14 “Now in this system of rational psychology these beings are taken not only as being conscious of their existence independently of outer things, but as also being able, in and by themselves, to determine the existence in respect of the permanence which is necessary characteristic of substance. This rationalistic system is thus unavoidably committed to idealism.”

So, according to Kant, this representation of I which may appear as a permanent substantial entity in rational psychology, it does not provide any ground for the acceptance of soul as a permanent substance. Moreover Kant wants to derive it very much clearly that we do not have any knowledge of this I and therefore the very first claim of rational psychology about the substantiality of self turns out in a paralogism. Now it is a question that how far Kant is consistent with his own views when he derives this type of impossibility is to be dealt after the evaluation of all four paralogisms. But in the current sequence it is necessary to examine the second paralogism about the simplicity of self, which will be dealt in the next subsection.
7.4 **Second paralogism – critical evaluation:**

The first paralogism is about the substantiability of self. And the sole ground for the justification of this is taken by Kant in the impossibility of predication of ‘I’ on logical subject. In rational psychology or in classical metaphysics, another ontological characteristic which is assigned to self is its simplicity. Generally, nowhere self is taken as a material subject, and so it is impossible to think that the self can be taken as a collection of different elements. According to Kant, this also a paralogism: there is no cognitive assertion or knowledge which can take the responsibility of the simplicity of self. In the first edition of critique of pure reason Kant states this paralogism in the following way.\(^{15}\)

“SECOND PARALOGISM OF SIMPLICITY

That, the action of which can never be regarded as the concurrence of several things acting, is simple.

Now, the soul, or the thinking ‘I’, is such a being. Therefore etc. “

The premise of this paralogism state that it is impossible for a thing to be thought as a concurrence of several thing is simple. But this is, in a particular sense, is the definition of simple. Because when we talk about simplicity in ontological reference, we do not mean that any given object of knowledge is contingently simple. When we are calling something simple it means that it is ontologically simple and this means that it is ultimate part less unit. This is the position which Kant defines with the phrase, ‘Can never be regarded as the concerned of several things acting.’ So if this is a definition of simple then it can be replaced by the term simple and so in first premises with this replacement it becomes that which is simple as simple. So formally this paralogism can be restated in the following way.

All simple things are simple.

‘I’ is a simple thing.

Therefore ‘I’ is simple.

If we want to construct this argument in a syllogistic form then we have to make a little bit difference between simple and simple thing and even in that case this becomes an example of the first figure of categorical syllogism with AAA mode and again this is trivially valid.\(^{16}\) It is also true that in the first edition of critique the conclusion is not explicitly stated but it is summarized in ‘etc’. But it is clear and the conclusion is therefore ‘I’ is simple. Now it is important to undertake a closer study of
Kant’s argument which is states in the critique of the second paralogism which is according to Kant belonging to transcendental psychology. First we shall see what Kant says about the composite substances and their actions in the following words.17 “Every composite substance is an aggregate of several substances and the action of a composite, or whatever inheres in it as thus composite, is an aggregate of several actions or accidents, distributed among the plurality of the substances. Now an effect which arises from the concurrence of many action substances is indeed possible, namely, when this effect is external only (as, for instance, the motion of a body is the combined motion of all its parts.)”

Here Kant states some important things implicitly about composite substance and possibility of externally verified actions. If a particular substance is simple then there can be no physical actions which can be perceived in a simple substance. But here again there is a dilemma in the concept of composite actions. This can be demonstrated in the following way. The problem of the divisibility of substance is a very ancient problem. The things which are before us are composite but they can be considered as having some elements as their parts. But these parts might have another parts but this cannot go up to infinity. So we must accept a layer where only simples are there and simples are such which cannot be taken as the concurrence of several things in the language of Kant. But if a particular object is a collection of such simples then certain actions like motion can be thought but in the language of Kant this can be only as the combined motion of all its parts.18 And so Kant rightly concludes that ultimately this is possible ‘only in a single substance’ which, not being an aggregate of many, is absolutely simple.19 This simplicity, of self cannot be inferred from the proposition ‘I’ think. For Kant simplicity means that in the representation of ‘I’ nothing can be contain which is empirical manifold. Kant state this clearly in the following words.20 “Nor is the simplicity of myself (as soul) really inferred from the proposition, ‘I think’, it is already involved in every thought. The proposition ‘I am simple’, must be regarded as an immediate expression of apperception, just as what is referred to as the Cartesian inference, cogito, ergo sum, is really a tautology, since the cogito (sum cogitans) asserts my existence immediately. ‘I am simple’ means nothing more than that this representation ‘I’, does not contain in itself the least manifoldness and that it is absolute (although merely logical) unity.”
Here again, Kant is taking the same stand which he has taken in the case of first paralogism. Kant thinks that ‘I think’ is the basic proposition from which every other metaphysical characteristic is to be derived. According to Kant the proposition ‘I am simple’ is nothing but ‘an immediate expression of apperception.’ So the proposition ‘I am simple’ is not a synthetic judgment at all. In the same reference Kant states that the Cartesian inference cogito ergo sum is really a tautology. In the same way, ‘I think therefore I am’ does not provide the implication of ‘I think therefore I am simple’. Moreover Kant’s observation about Descartes is not correct from a logical point of view. Because according to modern propositional logic, the proposition ‘cogito ergo sum’ is not a tautology. Still less it is not truth-functionally compounded proposition at all. Because the English word ‘therefore’ or the French verb ‘ergo’ is not a truth functional connective in its normal usage. And therefore cogito ergo sum is neither a tautology nor a truth functionally connected proposition in the sense of modern logic.²¹

Metaphysically the simplicity or soul or self is generally considered as a supporting argument for the immaterial nature of self. Kant admits this position but states that from simplicity this trans-phenomenal character of soul is very much hard to be deduced. He states his view in the following words.²²

“Everyone must admit that the assertion of the simple nature of the soul is of value in so far as I can thereby distinguish this subject from all matter, and so can exempt it from the dissolution to which matter is always liable. This is indeed, strictly speaking, the only use for which the above proposition is intended, and is therefore generally expressed as ‘the soul is not corporeal’.

So from the simplicity of soul, no trans-phenomenal characteristic of soul can be deduced and therefore ‘I think therefore I am simple’ turns out as a fallacious statement according to Kant. The next characteristic is about numerical identity or personality which is to be examined in the next sub section.

7.5 Third paralogism-critical evaluation:

Together with simplicity and substantiality, the next important metaphysical characteristic in the nature of self is that of personality. The term has a wider range of connotation. It includes psychological, social and cultural aspects also. But in classical metaphysical discourses, the term indicates the “sameness” of consciousness with an unbroken stream of empirical consciousness. This is often termed as
‘numerical identity’ or more precisely ‘numerical identity in the successive stage’ of time. So in any case the concept of personality is closely related with the concept of time. But time has a peculiar role in Kant’s epistemological discourses. So, this empirical fact of ‘sameness’ of consciousness, according to Kant, amounts to a paralogism. In the first edition in the following words.23

“Third paralogism: of personality

That which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself at different times is in so far a person

Now the soul is conscious etc.

Therefore it is a person.”

Here as it is natural the term ‘etc’ is supplemented with the phrase ‘of the numerical identity’ of itself at different times is in so far a person. Here Kant firmly relates the concepts of numerical identity and the concept of personality. When identity is to be defined logically, this type of temporal connotation is not coming in between. Historically stated definition of identity does not amount to the reference of temporality. This definition was given by Leibnitz somehow in the following way.

If every property of x is the property of y and if every property of y is the property of x, then x and y are said as identical with each other. Formally this can be symbolized in the following way24

(F) (x) (y) [Fx ≡ Fy] ≡ (x = y)

This abstract definition of identity does not say anything about “same-ness” of the same object in a continuous flow of time. Yet Kant has to define the term personality in epistemological reference and so he states the concept of personality, with reference to “same-ness” in different successive time. First Kant states the position of numerical identity of any external object in the following words.25

“If I want to know through experience, the numerical identity of an external object, I shall pay heed to that permanent element in the appearance to which as subject everything else is related as determination, and note its identity throughout the time in which the determinations change.”

So far as the question of the establishment of the numerical identity of an external object is concerned, Kant states it very much rightly that, the permanent status of this external objet can be viewed in time because at the level of empirical description, for Kant, the time is somehow linear, continuous and absolute.26 But for the case of soul or self the situation is altogether different. Because if we look into the metaphysical
descriptions of the nature of self or soul, it is basically taken as beyond space and
time. Yet even in the epistemology of Kant, time as it functions as the pre-
determining condition of inner sense the establishment of a soul as a numerically
identical entity at different times, cannot be established at the level of external
objects. Kant makes this difference clear in the following words.27

“Now I am an object of inner sense, and all time is merely the form of inner sense.
Consequently, I refer each and all of my successive determinations to the numerically
identical self and do so throughout time, that is, in the form of the inner intuition of
myself. This being so, the personality of the soul has to be regarded not as inferred but
as a completely identical proposition of self-consciousness in time; and this, indeed, is
why it is valid a priori. For it really says nothing more than that in the whole time in
which I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of this time as belonging to the unity
of myself; and it comes to the same whether I say that this whole time is in me, as
individual unity, or that I am to be found as numerically identical in all this time.”

As time is the inner sense which determines the empirical apperception of
synthetic unity and as there is no “time” which is transcendentally real, the
establishment of numerical identity in time through time presents a type of argument
in a circle or, at a certain level, a situation of semantical paradox. In other words,
Kant wants to point out the personality of soul is not an inferred proposition from the
“consciousness of numerical identity” of itself at different times but it is an analytic a
proposition which follows directly from the afore-said proposition. This is so because
time is not an empirical condition for the construction of self consciousness. But it is a
formal condition which states the possibility of the very existence of soul. So the
unchangebility of ‘I’ follows analytically from the identity of consciousness. Kant
makes it clear in the following words.28

“The identity of the consciousness of myself at different times is therefore only a
formal condition of my thoughts and their coherence, and in no way proves the
numerical identity of my subject. Despite the logical identity of the ‘I’, such a change
may have occurred in it as does not allow of the retention of its identity, and yet we
may ascribe to it the same sounding ‘I’, which in every different state, even in one
involving change of the (thinking) subject, might still retain the thought of the
preceding subject and so hand it over to the subsequent subject”.

This identity of consciousness from which the characteristic of personality is
to be deduced is being interpreted by Kant is the simple formal tautology. In another
sense what Kant wants to point out is this that if we want to derive the conclusion, ‘I am a person’, from the premise, ‘I am I’, then it becomes a simple analytic derivation. Mere addition of the temporal permanence in the predicative portion of ‘I’ does not make any difference in the situation because in this sense the first premise of the third paralogism goes in this way,

When we say ‘I am I’ then the ‘I’ which is there at the place of the predicate term contains further statement that this ‘I’ contains perception of different time with the same degree of sameness and through this continuous perception it appears in classical rational psychology, there provides a ground for the personality of ‘I’. And so it is assumed that with different temporal perceptions ‘I am a person’ is derived from ‘I am I’ is a synthetic judgment. But what Kant wants to emphases is this that as time is a formal condition of our inner sense and as empirical unity of apperception is determined by inner sense, time becomes an inherent part or condition of self consciousness. In this case with the help of same temporal successions the personality cannot be predicated on self consciousness merely on the ground that this self consciousness is aware of itself throughout the entire flux of time.

Here there is another question regarding the momentriness and permanence in the flux of time. Even for external objects this type of rigid formal condition is not easy to frame. On the other hand, it is also true that a sheer momentriness of anything which is given either in the form of subjective or objective conditions, the referred objects are not a tenable position. If it were the case than Kant’s epistemological system cannot be saved from the charge of subjective idealism or Kant’s view of self cannot be differentiated from that of Hume. Kant makes it clear with reference to Heraclitus in the following way.29

“Although the dictum of certain ancient schools, that everything in the world is in a flux and nothing is permanent and abiding, cannot be reconciled with the admission of substances, it is not refuted by the unity of self consciousness.”

Here Kant makes it clear that on the ground of objective validity, the status of unconsciousness as an unchanging ‘I’ does not refute or confirm the Heraclitian position of the theory of a universal flux. What is to be concluded is this that by our representation of our own self consciousness, it cannot derive the permanent personality of our self. This is excellently exposed by Kant in the second edition of Critique of pure reason in this words.30
“The proposition, that in all the manifold of which I am conscious I am identical with myself, is likewise implied in the concepts themselves, and is therefore an analytic proposition. But this identity of the subject, of which I can be conscious in all my representations, does not concern any intuition of the subject, whereby it is given as object, and cannot therefore signify the identity of the person, if by that is understood the consciousness of the identity of one’s own substance as a thinking being, in all change of its states. No mere analysis of the proposition ‘I think’ will suffice to prove such a proposition; for that we should require various synthetic judgments, based upon given intuition.”

So, in this way, Kant refutes another basic idea of rational psychology as transcendental illusion. Throughout temporal permanence or awareness of the same consciousness in different times does not provide any proof of metaphysical personality. What remains is this that self is a non-material entity and it establishes a problematic relationship with material object. This is another statement of mind-body problem which Kant takes in the fourth and last paralogism of pure reason. this is dealt in the next subsection.

7.6 Fourth paralogism- critical evaluation:

In critique of pure reason Kant has criticized up to this stage, three basic pillars of rational psychology or the concept of self in classical metaphysics. They are about substantiality, simplicity and unity or personality of soul. These three criticisms are directed towards the internal status or structure of self. In other words, only these metaphysical characteristics have been criticized which belong to the very nature of self but there is an important dimension about self and that is its ideality. The term idealism or ideality is somehow vague and requires a proper clarification in a given particular reference. Here Kant’s reference is historically concerned with this concept as it is stated in modern western philosophy. From Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, all the subsequent development of western epistemological thinking are centered around a particular thesis and the thesis is this that mind is somehow epistemologically more certain and so ontologically more real than these external objects which are perceived or known by it. This thesis implies that epistemologically one cannot be so certain about the existence of external things as one can be about the existence of mind. This very thesis is called idealistic hypothesis and this is taken as a common feature of all idealistic philosophies by those who have criticized it. Before coming to the actual
position of Kant’s presentation of this paralogism and its subsequent clarifications, it is necessary to evaluate this position with reference to certain contemporary criticisms of idealism. Historically idealism is criticized from many dimensions and by various thinkers in philosophy but a criticism which is based on logical ground and rational approach comes from the beginning of analytic philosophy. The criticism begins with the Moore’s famous article with the title ‘Refutation of idealism’ which somehow, he borrows from Kant’s critique of pure reason. In this article Moore distinguishes two aspects of idealism. One belongs to ontological discourse and second with epistemological. Ontological thesis of idealism is this that Reality is somehow spiritual, and as Moore says, this is not the subject matter of his criticism in this article. What he wants to criticise is this that idealism somehow makes the existence of material objects dependent on knower who perceives them. Or, in other words, he criticized the position of Berkeley which he stated in the proposition ‘esse est percipi’. The main emphasis of Moore’s criticism is the argument that in the above mentioned statement the French verb ‘est’ or English verb ‘is’ does not function in its existential sense and so there cannot be any identity relation between existence and perception. So what is perceived is neither epistemologically uncertain nor ontologically unreal. In the same way Russell also criticized the thesis of idealism in epistemological reference. Russell states that knowing process is not a mystical process which can put the ontological status of mind over the matter. There is no mystery in the occurrence of a cognitive state in an appropriate portion of brain than an event which happens in a radio transistor which converts an electromagnetic wave into sounds. All these criticisms are directed towards the points which deal with ideality of mind. The methodological position is this that what we perceive are our own percepts. Kant wants to examine that whether this very position is a result of a paralogism or not. Kant says that this ideality presupposes the doubtful existence of external objects on epistemological grounds. This becomes clear when we look into the detail of the statement of the fourth paralogism which is given in the first edition of critique of pure reason as follows

“That, the existence of which can only be inferred as a cause of given perceptions, has a merely doubtful existence.

Now all outer appearances are of such a nature that their existence is not immediately perceived, and that we can only infer them as the cause of given perceptions.
Therefore the existence of all objects of the outer senses is doubtful.”

Here Kant states in the first premise that the existence of external objects can be inferred as a cause of given perception. Here again Kant is aware that his epistemological position is not to be identified with Berkeley’s subjective idealism. On the other hand, Kant very well recognizes the fact that solipsism has a methodological justification in the sense in which the cognitive awareness of a conscious knower is limited to the sense data which are presented before it. In the same way Kant is also aware that a certain amount of priority regarding the apprehension of cognitive awareness, must be given to the knower. In this regard he confirms the position of Descartes in the following words,

“Let us first examine the premises. We are justified [it is argued], in maintaining that only what is in ourselves can be perceived immediately, and that my own existence is the sole object outside me (if this word ‘me’ be taken in the intellectual [not in the empirical] sense) is never given directly in perception. Perception is a modification of inner sense, and the existence of the outer object can be added to it only in thought, as being its outer cause, and accordingly as being inferred. For the same reason, Descartes was justified in limiting all perception, in the narrowest sense of that term to the proposition, ‘I, as a thinking being, exist’. Obviously, since what is without is not in me, I cannot encounter it in my apperception, nor therefore in any perception, which, properly regarded, is merely the determination of apperception.”

Kant’s position about the uncertainty of doubtfulness of the existence of external objects is the historical perception in entire modern-western epistemological position. When it is stated that the existence of an outer object is to be inferred, here the term inference is not used in the sense of a logical inference and so the use of the term doubtful becomes necessary. Here doubtful means in a particular sense probabilistic. What Kant says is this that external objects are put before inner sense through the medium of outer sense. Now the formal condition of inner sense is time and any presentation before it, is to be made through space. And so any perception is nothing but a modification of an inner sense. So as our intuition is not intellectual and manifold of object cannot be put before consciousness directly, all our perceptions are somehow indirect representations which are being put before us by our outer sense through inner sense and so they cannot be the subject of apperception directly. This somehow is an idealistic position and therefore Kant make same divisions of idealism and explain them before the further derivation of fourth paralogisms.
The philosophical position of the acceptance of self consciousness as more real than that which is perceived by it, is, somehow a form of idealism. What Kant again affirms is this. 37

“(I myself with all my representations) is immediately perceived and its existence does not allow of being doubted.”

But it is also altogether clear that according to Kant idealism does not mean subjective idealism. Kant does not deny the existence of external objects by taking them as merely states of cognitive consciousness. By idealism, as it appears, Kant wants to deny the possibility of a direct confrontation between knowing subject and known objects. Nothing can be directly given to the consciousness and this lies in the very root of the nature of consciousness. So, in accordance with his theory of Copernican revolution the meaning of the term idealism has been made clear by Kant in these words. 38

“The term ‘idealist’ is not, therefore, to be understood as applying to those who deny the existence of external objects of the senses, but only to those who do not admit that their existence is known through immediate perception, and who therefore conclude that we can never, by way of any possible experience, be completely certain as their reality.”

So it is clear from the above mentioned observation that Kant does not want to deny the existence of outer objects altogether. They are ‘somehow’ dependent on the status of self-consciousness or more correctly, on the very conditions and process of knowledge which occurs in the nature of self consciousness. These conditions refer to the transcendental grounding of the very existence of knowing process. What is important is this that at the level of empirical discourse, the existence of external objects can hardly be doubted. So Kant wants to make a differentiation between empirical idealism and that idealism which ‘becomes’ idealism only at the level of transcendental discourses. This difference is clarified in these words. 39

“I have first to remark that we must necessarily distinguish two types of idealism, the transcendental idealism and the empirical. By transcendental idealism I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all representations only, not things-in-themselves and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objects viewed as things in themselves. to this idealism, there is opposed
a transcendental realism which regards time and space as something given as themselves, independently of our sensibility.”

Here Kant wants to define transcendental idealism in the very reference of the nature of space and time. Again, this is in the very root of his Copernican revolution. If space and time are ‘real’ or they belong to ‘that’ which is actually ‘real’ which type of epistemological position can be derived from this type of ontological acceptance? Besides, it is also true that, apart from Leucippus and Democritus, in pre-Socratic early Greek philosophy, nobody has taken space (and also time) as ultimately real in the field of metaphysics. Yet what Kant wants to emphases is the implications of the acceptance of ultimate reality and un-reality of space and time. If space and time are to be taken as transcendentally real, then there can be hardly any epistemology which can be said ‘epistemology’ in the real sense of the word. The perplexing or somehow paradoxical situation lies in this way: If both knower, and known have to perform their epistemological functions in a frame of pre-existing space and time then the first question is this that what can be the epistemological status of space and time themselves? They cannot be the active parts of knowing process. They cannot be known. In these circumstances, the process of epistemological activities simply means to make a copy of reality and this can hardly be taken as a tenable epistemological stand.

So in this circumstances, Kant unhesitatingly declares his position in the favor of transcendental idealism. Kant states this in the following words

“If from the start, we have declared over sense in favor of this transcendental idealism: and our doctrine thus removes all difficulty in the way of accepting the existence of matter on the unaided testimony of our mere self-consciousness, or of declaring it to be thereby proved in the same manner as the existence of myself as a thinking being is proved.”

If this declaration clearly states Kant’s position as transcendental idealist then what is the philosophical implication regarding the status of external world which is to be accepted by Kant. Here Kant takes a flexible or liberal stand. He states that a transcendental idealist may be an empirical realist or a dualist who admits the existence of matter without going outside his mere consciousness. So this transcendental idealistic position which Kant reconfirms in the derivation of fourth paralogism is somehow helpful to him. In the derivation of this paralogism what Kant states about the paradoxical situation of this paralogism is this that Kant wants to
make a dialectic use of argumentation which is mainly based on the view that this paralogism is a result of making no distinction between appearances and things in themselves. This view is also confirmed by Michelle Grier in his work where this dialectic character is taken as the fundamental ground for the derivation of paralogism. In the same way Norman Kemp Smith also states this position in the following words.

“This argument differs from that of the other Paralogisms in that the fallacy involved in traced, in agreement with the requirements of the introductory sections of the Dialectic, to a failure to distinguish between appearances and things in themselves.”

Kemp Smith naturally criticizes the interpretation of Caird which is mainly made in Hegelian character. Moreover apart from this refutation of absolute idealistic interpretation of Kantian texts, it is also clear that this empirically realistic version of Kant’s position is in consistency with the view of empirical psychologist who take a realistic stand about the existence and function of mind as well as its relation with external world. Kemp Smith also confirms this position of transcendental idealism with reference to Kant’s critical philosophy in the following word.

“This paralogism does not concern itself with the nature of the soul. It refers exclusively to the mode of existence to be ascribed to objective appearances. None the less, Kant contrives to bring it within the range of rational psychology in the following manner. He argues that rational psychologists are one and all adherents of empirical idealism. They confound appearances in space with things in themselves, and therefore assert that our knowledge of their existence is inferential and consequently uncertain. The errors of empirical idealism are thus bound up with the dogmatic assumptions of the rationalist position. They are traceable to its failure to distinguish between appearances and things in themselves. Such dogmatism may take the form of materialism or of ontological dualism, as well as of spiritualism. All three, in professing to possess knowledge of thing-in-themselves, violate critical principles. If the chief function of rational psychology consists in securing the conception of the soul against the onslaughts of materialism, that can be much more effectively attained through transcendental idealism.”

Kemp Smith rightly observes in his observation that ontological determination either in the form of materialism or Kant’s agnostic position of spiritualism, does not make any difference in basic paralogistic results. As we have seen, the fourth
paralogism is an outcome of the dialectic which proceeds with the assumption of a supposed similarity between thing in itself and that which appears. In Kant’s case the fundamental problem is this that space is the pure form of intuition and appearances are to be presented before us as those which are outside us. Now what is actually outside us is an ambiguous question. And this ambiguity is reflected in the following observation of Kant.48

“The expression ‘outside us’ is thus unavoidably ambiguous in meaning sometimes signifying what as thing in itself exists apart from us, and sometimes what belongs solely to outer appearance. In order, therefore, to make this concept in the latter sense-the sense in which the psychological question as to the reality of our outer intuition has to be understood-quite unambiguous, we shall distinguish empirically external objects from those which may be said to be external in the transcendental sense, by explicitly entitling the former ‘thing’ which are to be found in space.”

So far as the noumenal interpretations and conditions of experience are concerned there is nothing which can be called outside to anything. Actually the word ‘outside’ itself does not apply to thing-in-themselves or noumena. In this case when we are establishing the ideality of self due to its supposed relation or interaction with outer world the term ‘outside’ is to be taken in empirical sense. Yet when this sense is transformed at the level of transcendental discourse, and as a result of this transformation we makes the derivation of this paralogism which is fallacious as Kant has indicated it.

In the second edition of critique of pure reason the fourth paralogism is presented very much briefly. We conclude this section with the reference of that fourth paralogism in the following words.49

“That which cannot be thought otherwise than as subject does not exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance. A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject. Therefore it exists also only as subject, that is, as substance.”

In this short observation, Kant again reconfirms his earlier views that without making any distinction between phenomena and thing-in-itself, this paralogistic result cannot be avoided. With these four paralogisms, Kant states that the very idea of self or soul having certain metaphysical properties, is nothing but and transcendental illusion. With this, we conclude our estimation of paralogism of pure reason, some
important remarks by Kant about the solution of mind-body problem have been taken in the concluding subsection of this chapter.

7.7 Conclusion:

Paralogisms are first examples of transcendental illusion by Kant. They are results of the ambiguous identification of thing-in-itself with phenomena. But a question remains open whatever may be the nature of self, what can be the possible solution of the mind-body problem. Kant here clearly affirms that there can be no such solution and this problem is completely beyond the limits of human knowledge. Kant clearly state this in the following words.50

“How in a thinking subject outer intuition, namely, that of space, with its filling in of figure and motion, is possible. And that is a question which no human being can possibly answer. The gap in our knowledge...can only be indicated through the ascription of outer appearances to that transcendental object which is the cause of this species of representations, but of which we can have no knowledge whatsoever and which we shall never acquire any conception.”

So Kant does not provide any supposed solution to this unsolved problem. But paralogisms are not the only examples of transcendental illusion. There is a possibility that human intelligent may attempt to acquire knowledge by making an idea free from its empirical employment. This is not possible in the case of certain types of categories and which generates the transcendental illusion about the universe as a whole. This is the subject of rational cosmology and also the most important part of the present research work which will be dealt in the next chapter.
Notes and reference

2. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid A_342/B_400,P.329
3. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid A_182/B_225,P.212
4. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid A_71/B_96,P.107

As we have made it clear in chapter-4 Kant takes categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive title in the classification of relation. But as on going discussion and narration clearly indicates, the division of quality and quantity definitely applies to categorical propositions and so any advancement in transcendental logic regarding the classification of proposition does not make any difference in the structure of syllogism so far as their role in paralogisms is concerned.

5. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid A_344/B_402,P.330
6. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid A_344/B_402,P.331
7. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid B_420,P.376
8. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid A_348-A_349,P.333
12. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid B_414,P.372
13. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid B_415,P.373
14. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid B_418,P.375
15. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid A_351,P.335
16. In our argument, we are making a difference between ‘all simple things are simple’ and ‘all things which can never be regarded as concurrence of several things acting is simple. This distinction amounts to Quine’s famous example of ‘All bachelors are bachelors’ and ‘All unmarried men are bachelor’. First example is analytic on the account of the law of identity but the second example, in the sense of Quine, requires a ‘lexicographical reference to a particular language L. While in Kant this reference becomes phenomenological in part. cf. Quine W.V. (2001) ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’ in Roseignberg, et. al. (2000) ‘The philosophy of science’, RKP London.
17. Kant Immanuel (1968) op. cit., A_352,P.335
18. Since the time of Newton, there is no concept of motion in physics apart from the motion of a point particle. We do not have the mathematical machinery to access and
evaluate the motions of two dimensional or three dimensional objects. Whenever there is a concept of the dynamics of a body that body is always considered as a system of particles. The situation is fundamentally changed with the arrival of string theory or M-theory, where body of any dimensional object can be considered in motion as a brane. But so far as three dimension or space of Newton is concerned, Kant observation is right. cf. Schwarz J. H., Becker and Becker (2007) ‘string theory and M-theory, Cambridge University press, Cambridge.

19. Kant Immanuel (1968) op. cit., A352,P.335
20. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid, A355,P.337
21. According to modern logic a compound proposition is called truth functionally compounded proposition if each of its components is a truth functional component. So I think therefore ‘I exist’ is not a truth functionally compounded statement at all. cf. Copy I. M. and Cohen Carl (2010) ‘Introduction to logic’, PHI Delhi, P.226
22. Kant Immanuel (1968) op. cit. A357,P.338
23. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid, A361, P.341
25. Kant Immanuel (1968) op. cit., A362,P.341
26. As we have stated, particularly in the fourth chapter of this research work, Kant has taken the concept of absolute time and space in the sense of Newtonian physics. In it, it is also assumed that time is continuous and the external object which is supposed as holding the ‘sameness’ in different times, is not being affected by the flow of time in which it is supposed as located or pressed. Here it is also assumed that the stream of temporal events is linear and there is no possibility of closed time like curves. cf. Hawking S.W. and Ellis J. R. F. (1973) ‘The large scale structure of space-time’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. In this work it is discussed that there are certain solutions of the field equations of Albert Einstein which allow the existence of closed time-like curves. One of such solutions is Gödel’s solution. In the validity of these cases there can be no establishment of the numerical identity of any external
object. But evidently in the reference of Kant, these possibilities are naturally excluded.

27. Kant Immanuel (1968) op. cit. A\textsuperscript{362}, P.341
28. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid, A\textsuperscript{363}, P.342
29. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid, A\textsuperscript{364}, P.342
30. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid, B\textsuperscript{408}-B\textsuperscript{409}, p.369-370
32. From a modern point of view there are three functions of the verb ‘is’. The first function is existential which occurs when a propositional function is existentially quantified. For example, some stars are Neutron stars. Another use of the verb ‘is’ is to make an identification between two names or phrases. For example, ‘Moon is the only satellite of the earth’. Third use is the predicative use which states a qualitative or relational predication of a predicate on a subject. For example ‘Kant was a philosopher’. What Moore wants to say is this that the use of the verb ‘is’ in existence in perception is not a use which indicate an identity relation. cf. Copy I. M. (1999) ‘Symbolic logic’, Prentiss hall, India, PHI, Delhi.
   In this book, in the very first chapter ‘My present world view’ Russell makes this clarification that there is no mystical gap between mind and matter, also cf. Russell Bertrand (1916) ‘Our knowledge of the external world’ George Allen and Unwin, London.
34. Kant Immanuel (1968) op. cit. A\textsuperscript{367}, P.344
35. This is somehow a plain epistemological fact which is recognized, even by analytic philosophers. Even Carnap in his ‘The structure of the outer world’ takes a position which come very close to afore-mentioned state with the name of methodological solipsism. Historically, Shlick objected this position on Carnap. And though after justification in defence, abandons, the use of the word methodological solipsism in his future writings. cf. Carnap Rudolf (1937) ‘Testability and meaning’ in classics of analytic philosophy edited by Ackermann et. Al, George Allen and Unwin, London.
36. Kant Immanuel (1968) op. cit., B\textsuperscript{368}, P.345
37. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid, A\textsuperscript{368}, P.345. Here Kant puts emphasis on immediate perception through inner sense which is impossible in the case of outer objects which are subject to spatial presentations.


Here Kant partly depends on his basic Copernican revolution in the field of epistemology according to which 'knowledge does not conform to object but object conforms to knowledge'. cf. the preface of the second edition of critique of pure reason.

39. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid., A\textsuperscript{369}, p-p.345-346

40. Thilly Frank (1951) ‘A history of philosophy’, even other atomism like Anaxagoras and Empedocles do not believe in this type of qualitative atomism.

41. Kant Immanuel (1968) op. cit., A\textsuperscript{370}, P.346

42. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid, A\textsuperscript{370}-A\textsuperscript{372}, p-p.346-347


46. Kant Immanuel (1968) op. cit., A\textsuperscript{373}, p-p.347-348

47. Smith N. K. (1962) op. cit., P.463

48. Kant Immanuel (1968) op. cit., A\textsuperscript{373}, P.348

49. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid., B\textsuperscript{411}, P.371

50. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid., A\textsuperscript{387}, P.356