Chapter -6
Kant’s transcendental dialectic

Index

6.1 Introduction
6.2 Kant’s view on possible experience
6.3 Kant’s view on Reason
6.4 Kant’s view on Idea
6.5 Syllogisms and transcendental dialectic
6.6 Conclusions
Chapter 6
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6.1 Introduction:

It has been observed and remarked in the conclusion of the previous chapter that with the section of phenomena and noumena, a definitive goal of Kant’s ‘critique of pure reason’ has been achieved. The goal was to present and articulated a transcendental analysis of experience or in the world of H. J. Patton ‘the metaphysics of experience’. What is the result of this entire painstaking exercise and which type of content is left, which is now the subject matter of transcendental dialectic. Before starting the considerations on these in general, it is necessary to make an anticipatory recollection in this particular reference of the final results of Kant.

According to Kant what is generally called ultimate reality or unconditioned or thing-in-itself, is completely unknown for any epistemological discourse. What is the subject of knowledge is that which comes in the possible field of experience. If this dichotomy is exclusively established, then so far as the positive content of ‘critique of pure reason’ is concerned, the work is to be considered as open. But Kant did not prove it and takes much care for the indication of certain transcendental illusions. The possible explanation of this further enterprise can be summarized as follow.

So far as the construction of knowledge is concerned, Kant has clearly indicated that there are only two faculties which are responsible for the construction of knowledge. These faculties are sensation and understanding. For any construction of knowledge, these are the only fundamental sources of mind which are responsible for the generation of knowledge. Yet human knowledge generally does not consist in the different epistemological judgments. So for the systematization and articulation of judgments, a separate agency from the side of knower is required. So according to Kant it is true that knowledge start with sensation but there must be a higher faculty than understanding, where it is to be ended. Kant states his views about this highest faculty in following words:

“All our knowledge starts with the senses, proceeds from thence to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is no higher faculty to be found in us for elaborating the matter of intuition and bringing it under the highest unity of thought.”
It is not altogether clear before the critics of Kant that what he means when he says that knowledge ends in reason. And in which sense the reason is to be considered as a superior faculty to sense and understanding. Kant provides his explanation in the subsequent description according to which the function of the faculty of understanding is somehow the establishment of cognitive judgment. While the function of reason is to make mediate inference. Now it is implicitly assumed that this function formally and cognitively differs from immediate inference. But this formal distinction does not make anything clear. Reasoning is a process or it may be a faculty of knowledge but what its legitimate use is, and in which sense it is confined to that use, is to be shown. Here Kant totally relies on Aristotelian concept of syllogisms. This is a point which is to be undertaken a little bit later on but at present, it is necessary to say something about reason in general.

For Kant the possible field of experience is determined by the scope of the schematization of categories. That means, in simple words, if there is no raw material which is to be furnished before the faculty of understanding through senses, understanding cannot impart any cognitive judgment merely by the use of pure categories. Now it is not always the case that understanding functions only in its legitimate scope, no doubt there are occasions and circumstances where Kant himself inquires in the implicit condition of the knowledge. The examples of transcendental deduction of categories in general and synthetic unity of apperception in particular are sufficient for the establishment of the claim. But according to Kant it is the transcendental use of categories. Now in the philosophy of Kant it is very much important to recognize the distinction between transcendental and transcendentl.4

In general, the term transcendent means that which is beyond any possible experience. But that is ‘noumena’. And reason does not search for it at least in Kant. Then which type of transcendent use of reason becomes inevitable is an important thing which is to be investigated in the next subsection.

6.2 Kant’s view on possible experience:

Kant’s entire transcendental dialectic is based on his basic assumption that the legitimate employment of categories must not transcend the realm of possible experience. There is certain inherent epistemological confinement whose violation results either epistemological impossibility or transcendental illusion. In his famous
section of critique of pure reason that is phenomena and noumena. Kant classifies the field of possible experience as an island in the following words.\textsuperscript{5}

“We have now not merely explored the territory of pure understanding, and carefully surveyed every part of it, but have also measured its extent, and assigned to everything in its rightful place. This domain is an island, enclosed by nature itself within unalterable limits. It is the land of truth enchanting name! surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive appearance of farther shores, deluding the adventurous sea far ever anew with empty hopes, and engaging him in enterprises which he can never abandon and yet is unable to completion.”

The field of possible experience, which is termed as an island by Kant, is roughly the empirical field of space and time and in this field the categories of understanding are to be employed with the help of sensations. But as we have made it clear in the previous sub-section that dogmatic as well as skeptical idealism are not accepted by Kant then that which appears in space and time before an epistemological knower is not a subjective interpretation of the sense-data but it is grounded in noumena which is beyond the possible field of experience. It is very much important in the reference of the present research work that we should make a distinction between noumena and those supposed objects of transcendental illusion. In other words the question may be legitimately asked that what the difference between a particular thing-in-itself and universe is. Both are not the objects of our possible experience. At this stage it is necessary to see what Kant says about noumena in its negative and positive sense.\textsuperscript{6}

“If by ‘noumena’ we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the term. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensible intuition, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely, the intellectual which is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot comprehend even the possibility. This would be ‘noumenon’ in the positive sense of the term.”

So far as the case of a non-sensible intuition is concerned, Kant does not accept any possibility of this kind for human being, or more generally, for any finite beings.\textsuperscript{7} So in the definition of noumena, the possibility of a non-sensible object cannot be considered in the philosophy of Kant. So Kant generates a new
classification of concepts and that is problematic concept. Kant defines and explains this concept in the following way.¹⁸

“If the objective reality of a concept cannot be in any way known, while yet the concept contains no contradiction and also at the same time is connected with other modes of knowledge that involve given concepts problematic.”

This definition may be necessary for Kant for his refutation of idealism but logically it is surprising. That concept which contains no contradiction is called a logically possible concept. Now logic, according to Kant, is the excellent example of a discipline which can be called a science. This is a peculiar characteristic of Kantian logic and epistemology that if anything is to be called a science then it must contain synthetic a priori propositions. This stands correct even for ethics according to Kant.¹⁹

Now if noumenon is a problematic concept, then so far as the absence of non-contradiction is concerned, it is a logical concept. The only thing which makes any difference is its fundamental unknowability. So according to Kant those logically possible concepts become problematic concept whose corresponding object of knowledge cannot be known even in principle. Here there is no question either about error or illusion. There are no illusions in Kant about the pseudo-knowability of thing-in-itself in Kant. Now the question is this that if there is an absolute distinction of all objects into phenomena and noumena, and if phenomena are knowable and noumena are unknowable then what can be the possible ground of the generation of transcendental illusion? Moreover, there are some basic inconsistencies in the problematic concept of noumena. That which is beyond any possible experience it cannot even be the subject of the category of number. So the linguistic distinction between noumenon and noumena also becomes artificial, yet in the view of the present consideration it is necessary to have a deeper investigation in the roots of these transcendental illusions. For that it will be appropriate to have a closer look in the Kant’s view of reason which is undertaken in the next sub-section.

6.3 Kant’s view on reason:

We have already remarked in the first sub-section of this chapter that according to Kant, knowledge starts with senses, proceeds from understanding and ends with reason. Reason in Kant is not a completely different faculty of knowledge which has to deal with those objects which are not the subjects of either senses or understanding. Kant observes that understanding deals with judgments while reason
deals with principles. The difference is transcendental or epistemological because in formal logic all universal propositions are to be considered at the same level. Kant defines the term ‘principle’ in the following way:

“Every universal proposition, even one derived from experience, through induction, can serve as major premises in a syllogism; but it is not therefore itself a principle. The mathematical axioms (e.g. that there can only be one straight line between two points) are instances of universal a priori knowledge, and are therefore rightly called principles, relatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them.”

The distinction between a judgment by understanding and a principle by reason is not formal. For example-‘that everything that happens has a cause’ is a universal affirmative proposition and formal logic is not concerned whether it is to be employed as a principle in the realm of natural sciences or not. So Kant himself stats that:

“All universal propositions however, may be spoken of as ‘principles’ in a comparative sense”

So in Kant reason is playing a role somehow of a unifying principle. So there is a unity in reason but this unity is fundamentally different from the synthetic unity of understanding. But according to Kant there are two employment of reason.

1. logical employment
2. pure employment

In logical employment reason functions only in the limit of possible experience. So far as the formal process is concerned, the devices of the functioning of reason are syllogisms. And formally, there are three type of syllogisms and in the discourse of Kant, they are either categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive.

It may be observed that Kant’s emphasis on syllogism and his supposed inevitability of syllogistic reasoning may be doubtful in the light of modern logic. There are asyllogistic inferences which are formally valid and yet they cannot be classified within these three types of syllogisms. Russell provides the following example of a valid asyllogistic inference.

Horse is an animal.

\[ \therefore \text{ The head of a horse is the head of an animal.} \]

So it may be concluded that according to Kant the entire function of reason works in syllogistic discourse. If this is so then question simply remains regarding the formal
fallacies of a syllogistic inference or, in another option, the employment of reasoning in those types of concepts whose empirical counterpart cannot be found. Apart from these two logically conceivable options there is another root for a fallacious employment of reason which Kant anticipates in the following way.  

“Can it be that this requirement of reason has been wrongly treated in being viewed as a transcendental principle of pure reason, and that we have been overhasty in postulating such an unbounded completeness of the series of conditions in the objects themselves? In that case, what other misunderstandings and delusions may have crept into the syllogisms, whose major premises (Perhaps rather an assumption than a postulate) is derived from pure reason, and which proceed from experience upwards to its conditions?”

The necessary conditions for the legitimate employment of pure reason lie in the legitimate schematization of categories. But here Kant wants to establish the occurrence of an illusion whose roots are in the very nature of reason itself. So for the investigation of these roots it is necessary to see that what the epistemological ingredient of the faculty of reason is. In Kant the function of reason is generally considered with ideas. So it is necessary to estimate the notion of idea in general, according to Kant which will be done in the next sub section.

6.4   Kant’s view on Idea:

The term ‘idea’ is a very general term and it is generally used for any definite content of thinking process. In Kant, and particularly in transcendental dialectic, the term idea has a definite use. Kant deals this matter in his book-1 of transcendental dialectic which is entitled as ‘The concepts of pure reason.’ The starting point is this that in which way the concepts of understanding and concepts of reason are to be differentiated in the very next paragraph of this chapter Kant makes this difference in the following way.

“The title ‘concept of reason’ already gives a preliminary indication that we are dealing with something which does not allow of being confined within experience, since it concerns a knowledge of which any empirical knowledge (perhaps even the whole of possible experience has ever been completely adequate to it, yet to it every actual experience belongs. Concept of reason enables us to conceive, concepts of understanding to understand.”
Here the difference which is being indicated by Kant between concepts of reason and concepts of understanding is somehow artificial and depends on concepts of reason enable us to conceive. What is the objective meaning of this assertion? And how does it epistemologically differ from that which is understood by us, which according to Kant, is the characteristic of the concept of understanding. There are many concepts which were conceived in the beginning as the concept of reason and which were later on turned out in the form of empirical concepts. For example, atom was a concept of pure reason since the time of Democritus, and it acquires the status of the concept of understanding when Neels Bohar propounded his modal for atoms. In the same way there are many concepts which were conceived in a time but later on it was observed that they do not have the necessary empirical counterpart and so they are to be ruled out from the concerning discipline. For example, Ether was a concept in electrodynamics in Maxwell but with the arrival of Einstein’s special theory of relativity, this concept was given up. So in general case it is very much difficult to make an effective distinction between the concept of understanding and concept of reason. In normal circumstances this is very well known to Kant. But in his entire transcendental dialectic Kant wants to indicate that there is something which is inherrentedly inbuilt in human reason and that generates transcendental illusion. Here again the epistemological status of this transcendental understanding. Moreover Kant explains it in length that his ideas are not metaphysically abstracted, universal and he does not want to prove any transcendental status in the realm of ontology to ideas. For this clarification Kant wants to present a differentiation between his views of ideas and Plato’s views. First Kant states the Plato’s view in following words:

“Plato made use of the expression ‘idea’ in such a way as quite evidently to have meant by it something which not only can never be borrowed from the sense but far surpasses even the concepts of understanding (with which Aristotle occupied himself), inasmuch as in experience nothing is ever to be met with that is coincident with it. For Plato ideas are archetypes of the things themselves, and not, in the manner of the categories, merely key to possible experiences.”

Here for Kant Plato’s ideas are ‘archetypes of the things themselves’ and so in the language of Kant they belong to noumena. In the framework of Kant’s critical philosophy, this is impossible. And therefore he does not accept this type of transcendental status of the concept of pure reason or ideas. But Kant recognizes that the faculty of human knowledge cannot be satisfied simply with that which is
provided before it through sense experience. And so he states his agreement and understanding with Plato’s position in following words:

“Plato very well realized that our faculty of knowledge fells a much higher need then merely to spell out appearances according to a synthetic unity, in order to be able to read them as experience.”

This higher need of the faculty of reason is somehow inherentedly there and so we cannot avoid the function of reason which attempts to transcend the possible field of experience. Therefore, for Kant up to this stage, idea is something which is not like the concept of understanding which can be known and which can play any role in the construction of knowledge. On the other hand, ideas are not things-in-themselves, which is a problematic concept whose logical possibility imparts its position in order to avoid the charge of subjective idealism. So, according to Kant ideas are not empirical or pure concepts of understanding because any concept according to Kant is either empirical or pure but ideas are notion and Kant explains this term in the following words:

“The concept is either an empirical or a pure concept. The pure concept, in so far as it has origin in the understanding alone (nothing pure image of sensibility), is called a notion. A concept formed from notions and transcending the possibility of experience is an idea or concept of reason.”

The difference between concept and notion is important. Notions are not the images of sensibility corresponding to which any empirical object can be found. But ideas are somehow a demand of reason which seeks a type of unity in the totality of the sequence of appearances. Before undertaking Kant’s actual estimations of these transcendental ideas, it is necessary to have some anticipation about the logical concept of totality and unity. Because the three basic transcendental ideas or notions which are transcendental illusions according to Kant are self, universe and God. All these three are not noumena according to Kant. But they are the results of reasons higher need or demands for a type of totality in the given collection of the sequences of appearance. I want to stress that the very idea of the search of totality with reference to a given property or characteristic is paradoxical. I want to explain this as follows.

The concept of totality or the legitimate use of the word ‘all’ presupposes certain mathematical and logical assumptions. When we say that there can be a collection of all red things then, mathematically, we are sure that we can construct a
set or a collection which can include all those objects which are red. Actually, in the terminology of set theory, this is an axiom of extension which state that for any given property or quality, a set can be formed to which all the objects which are having this property or quality belong. Formally this axiom can be stated in this way:

\[(x) \ (\exists A) \ \{ \ x \in A \equiv \phi (x) \}\]

But in the axiomatization of set theory this axiom of extension is not an innocent axiom. As, it appears fairly well that we can easily make a collection of all those things which are red or all those objects which are neutron. So if \( \phi \) is a characteristic then we can make any collection or set of such objects which are having this property. But this seemingly innocent axiom is paradoxical and it amounts to Russell’s paradox in the following way.

According to Russell this property \( \phi \) is now to be identified with being those types of sets, which are not members of themselves. Symbolically call the set of all sets which are not members of themselves by \( R^- \). Now whether \( R^- \) belongs to itself or not. The answer is paradoxical. \( R^- \) belong to itself if and only if \( R^- \) does not belong to itself. Or formally,

\[ R^- \in R^- \equiv R^- \notin R^- \]

The remedy of this paradox will bring us in the formal field of axiomatic set theory which would be a rather undue enterprise. But it can be said that a ramified version of this axiom presupposes the existence of an already constructed set to which this axiom is going to be applied but with reference to the present context it can be said that what is generally demanded by normal intuitive reason may be mathematically or logically paradoxical. So when we undertake the Kantian concept of transcendental illusions in the form of reasons demand for unconditioned unity, we must bear in mind that even at the level of normal discursion, reason may find its own mistake.

It is peculiar characteristics of Kant’s transcendental dialectic that he attempts to discover the exact number of the pure concepts of reason or transcendental ideas on the basis of the exact number of syllogisms. As there were only three possible types of syllogisms which were known to Kant in the realm of classical logic, Kant derives that there are only three pure concepts of reason or transcendental ideas. Kant’s attempt for this derivation and its critical evaluation has been presented in the next sub section.
6.5  **Syllogisms and transcendental dialectic:**

In transcendental analytic, Kant discovers pure categories of understanding on the ground of the possible types of judgments. In the same way Kant attempts to derive three basic transcendental ideas on the ground of the three possible types of syllogisms. Kant is not concerned here with the formal fallacies of syllogisms. He wants to show that, as reasoning is essentially syllogistic, pure concepts are somehow grounded in the nature of syllogism. According to Kant, the basic ideas of self, universe, and God are the result of the pure employment of reason in the transcendence of the possible field of experience. Regarding this number of syllogisms and corresponding transcendental ideas Kant states his views in the following words.\(^{24}\)

“The number of pure concepts of reason will be equal to the number of kinds of relation which the understanding represents to itself by means of the categories. We have therefore to seek for an unconditioned, first, of the categorical synthesis in a subject, secondly, of the hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series; thirdly, of the disjunctive synthesis of the parts in a system.”

These considerations are indicating a particular logical bias or dogma which was a common characteristic among modern philosophers. Before coming to a critical evaluation of this position it is necessary to explicate the relation of transcendental ideas and syllogisms by the method of table in the following way.\(^{25}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of syllogism</th>
<th>Subject of unconditioned totality</th>
<th>Types of transcendental ideas corresponding to syllogism</th>
<th>Field of knowledge of those transcendental ideas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Categorical</td>
<td>Unconditioned totality about subject</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Rational psychology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hypothetical</td>
<td>Unconditioned totality about cosmos</td>
<td>Whole universe</td>
<td>Rational cosmology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Disjunctive</td>
<td>Transcendental idea about God</td>
<td>God</td>
<td>Rational theology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table states that from categorical syllogism we have a transcendental illusion of self. From hypothetical syllogism, the result is the idea of a cosmos and from disjunctive syllogism; we get the transcendental illusion of God. At this point it is necessary to state some critical observations regarding the nature of syllogisms and their corresponding transcendental ideas.

In classical logic, the use of this three types of syllogism is quite common but it is necessary to see that how a categorical syllogism can generate the transcendental idea of self or in which way the idea of universe is connected with the formal structure of hypothetical syllogism and more surprisingly how the idea of God or ultimate reality is connected with disjunctive syllogism and not with other two type of syllogisms. For a better clarification a symbolic presentation of these syllogisms may be helpful.

Hypothetical syllogism in modern symbolic logic is presented as an elementarily valid argument form. If p, q and r are statement variables then the form of hypothetical syllogism can be written as,

\[ p \supset q \]
\[ q \supset r \quad / \quad \therefore \quad p \supset r \quad \text{H. S.} \]

In the same way, with same notation, the form of disjunctive syllogism can be written as,

\[ p \lor q \]
\[ \neg p \quad / \quad \therefore \quad q \quad D. S. \]

In normal propositional logic the above mentioned symbolic proposition is quite straightforward. But what about the formal structure or symbolic form of categorical syllogism? It is quite clear, even from the preliminary knowledge of symbolic logic that there is no unique formal structure which can be taken as a formal representation of categorical syllogism as it has been done in the previous cases of two syllogisms.

So before inquiring into the formal structure of categorical syllogism it is necessary to see the formal definition of it. The definition somehow runs like this.\(^{26}\)

“A categorical syllogism as a deductive argument consisting of three categorical propositions that together contain exactly three terms each of which occurs in exactly two of the constituent propositions.”
This definition clearly indicates that the assessment of categorical syllogism does not come in the field of propositional logic. Actually speaking if we limit ourselves to the techniques of propositional logic then many arguments in the form of categorical syllogism are invalid. Moreover with four figures and four types of categorical propositions the total numbers of possible argument forms in the form of categorical syllogism in 256. Out of them, according to classical logic, only 19 modes are valid. And if we include the fallacy of existential import the number of valid forms or modes is only 15. These 15 modes are given below:

“The fifteen valid forms of the standard-form categorical syllogism

In first figure (in which the middle term is the subject of the major premise and the predicate of the minor premise):

1. AAA-1 Barbara
2. EAE-1 Celarent
3. AII-1 Darii
4. EIO-1 Ferio

In the second figure (in which the middle term is the predicate of both premises):

5. AEE-2 Camestres
6. EAE-2 Cesare
7. AOO-2 Baroko
8. EIO-2 Festino

In the third figure (in which the middle term is the subject of both premises):

9. AII-3 Datisi
10. IAI-3 Disamis
11. EIO-3 Ferison
12. OAO-3 Bokardo

In the fourth figure (in which the middle term is predicate of the major premise and the subject of the minor premise):

13. AEE-4 Camenes
14. IAI-4 Dimaris
15. EIO-4 Fresison”

Among possible 256 argument forms only these 15 arguments forms are valid if we include the fallacy of existential import from a modern point of view. Now it is very difficult to understand that what Kant actually means when he says that the
transcendental idea of self is generated from categorical syllogism. Moreover when Kant says that from ‘All men are mortal’
We can validly derive the proposition ‘Caiuse is mortal’
only as a mediate inference, which require the existence of middle term ‘men’ which suppose that we can be predicated on ‘caiuse’ as ‘caiuse is a man’ Moreover it is also fallacious to suppose that we can derive in the form of immediate inference from ‘all man are mortal’ the existential proposition ‘Some man are mortal’. The traditional square of proposition take this inference as a valid inference in the form of sub alternation. But from a modern point of view the argument is invalid. Yet in the perspective of classical logic, it is also true that in the traditional square of opposition, the sub alternation from universal affirmative to particular affirmative or universal negative to particular negative is valid. But here the question is this that in which sense Kant connects the transcendental illusion of self as a substance with categorical syllogism? And in which sense hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms are concerned with transcendental illusions of universe and ultimate reality of God. It is also true that an entire Kantian discourse in transcendental dialectic, Kant does not take a uniformly consistent meaning of the function of reason or nature of idea. Therefore it is little bit ambiguous that what is the actual sense in which Kant wants to connect this type of syllogisms with transcendental illusion. So it would be appropriate to examine each of the transcendental illusions in separate chapters among which following Kant’s texts ‘the paralogism of pure reason’ is the subject of next chapter.

6.6 Conclusion:

The very title of Kant’s text in the form of the ‘critique of pure reason’ states the importance and significance of transcendental dialectic. It is also true that knowledge does not simply end with judgments. It proceeds by the methodology of inference which is the subject of reason. According to Kant, as we have seen, there is some inbuilt difficulty or fallacy with human reason that it becomes a subject of transcendental illusion. It is also clear that here Kant does not mean either an illusion of optical type like the bending of pencil in the glass of water by the law of diffraction or appearance of mirage in a desert. Neither Kant means some type of logical fallacy which occurs either in mediate or immediate inference. That is transcendental
illusions are not the subject of formal fallacies like the fallacy of undistributed middle or the supposed invalid inference in the form of the conversion of a particular negative proposition. So according to Kant these three basic content of classical metaphysic are transcendental ideas and they are transcendental ideas of pure reason, it means that self, universe and God are ideas of pure reason, they are not the concept of understanding. As we have clarified, they do not even encompass Kant’s agnosticism. Now the question is this why it is so that human reason through somehow in appropriate use of syllogisms, necessarily directed towards this type of illusion. Following the text of Kant, we are going to discuss and evaluate Kant’s view about self in his second book of transcendental dialectic which contains a chapter with the title ‘paralogisms of pure reason’. This will be dealt with the next chapter.
Notes and reference

3. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid A_{299}-B_{356},p.300
5. Kant Immanuel (1968) op. cit. B_{295}/A_{236},p.257
6. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid B_{307},p.268
7. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid B_{72},p.90
8. Kant Immanuel (1968) B_{310},p.271
10. Kant Immanuel (1968) op. cit. A_{300}/B_{357},p.301
11. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid B_{358},p.302
12. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid A_{307}/B_{364},p.306
13. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid B_{361},p.304

\((x) \left( \exists x \supset Ax \right) \vdash (x) [(\exists y) (Ey \cdot Hxy) \supset (\exists y) (Ay \cdot Hxy)]\)

The inference is perfectly valid. But Kant’s formal or transcendental logic does not accept the occurrence of nested quantification in the formalization of general propositions. cf. Irving M. Copy (1999) ‘Symbolic logic’, prentice hall of India private limited, New Delhi
15. Kant Immanuel (1968) op.cit.A_{309}/B_{366},p.307
16. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid A_{310}-A_{338}/B_{367}-B_{396},p-p.308-326
17. Kant Immanuel (1968)ibid A_{311}/B_{368},p.308
19. Kant Immanuel (1968) op. cit. A_{313}/B_{370},p.310
20. Kant Immanuel (1968) ibid A314/B371, P.310
23. Patrik Suppeus (1971) ibid
24. Kant Immanuel (1968) op. cit. A322/B380, P.316
25. Baxi M.V. (2011) Kant nu tattvajnan’ (philosophy of Kant) University granthnirman board, Gujarat rajya, Ahmedabad, P.185
27. Irving M. Copy and Carl Cohen (2010) ibid P.161
29. The invalidity of this argument can be easily seen in the following way. The symbolization gives the following form
   \((x) (Hx \supset Mx) \therefore (\exists x) (Hx . Mx)\)
   If we interpret this argument even on a modal which contains single element then we find the corresponding truth functional argument in the form
   \(Ha \supset Ma \therefore Ha . Ma\)
   This is invalid. If we assign the truth values to the simple singular propositions of this argument in the following way

   \[
   \begin{array}{cc}
   Ha & Ma \\
   F & T \\
   \end{array}
   \]
   Then premise is true and conclusion is false. Hence the argument is invalid.