CHAPTER I

J. KRISHNAMURTI AS A PHILOSOPHER OF RELIGION

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Jiddu Krishnamurti is one of the most controversial figures of our time. He denies all religions and yet talks of a religious mind as a light to disperse the darkness of all human miseries and sorrows. That he speaks of human life and its basic problems cannot be denied. It also cannot be denied that he sees the solution of all problems in the complete transformation of the human psyche or the human mind into a state of choiceless awareness or a state of religious mind. He does not make a sharp distinction between our daily practical living and the religious life. He points out that the humanity as a whole faces a grave threat of destruction from the rat-race of power, prestige, ideologies etc. He wants man to be free from this competition and comparison. Only the religious mind, according to him, can solve the problem posed by this threat.

People from all walks of life and all parts of the world read, listen to, and discuss his teachings. His popularity seems to be increasing day by day. But he remains an enigma to a common man. People revere him, listen to him with rapture, appreciate the seriousness of his purpose, are impressed by the passion with which he talks and his serene look and smile. They see the importance of what he says when they listen to him. But when they leave the venue of his discourse, they feel that they are returning empty and have got nothing. One author, in the very title of his book, describes Krishnamurti's teachings as "Ever over flowing yet not spilling out." People

1. Alone - Ever over flowing yet not spilling out.
are generally at a loss to know whether Krishnakurti's teachings are iconoclastic, destroying all authorities, all religions, all faiths, leaving man in the void, or whether it is a construction of a new philosophy, a new religion and a new culture.

Such a teaching needs serious consideration from the academic philosophers but on the whole academicians seem to have ignored him. This may be because Krishnamurti talks of religious and other basic problems of human life, he is not an academic philosopher. He not only lacks formal training in academic philosophy but also denies to have read any books either on religion or on philosophy. He also disclaims to have any theory or philosophy of his own. The fact remains that no much serious work seems to have been done to estimate Krishnamurti as a philosopher and especially as a philosopher of religion. A few have taken cognisance of his teachings academically but their works are mostly expository nature. No one seems to have done a critical evaluation of his views about religion. It, therefore, seems essential to examine what Krishnamurti means by religion and the religious mind. He has given new significance to such concepts as religion, meditation, attention, morality, virtue, beauty, truth, discipline. His unique approach to religion leads to a new concept of philosophy of religion. No traditional philosopher seems to have viewed religion from this new perspective.

His views about religion are neither the product of
speculation nor of erudition. He has arrived at them by actually going through different stages of religious life. While passing through these stages, his alert mind doubted in the moment of sorrow and equally in the moment of ecstasy. His intelligence is never cowed down by any authority. His clear and direct perceptions lead to his utterances of self-luminous truth. On the basis of first-hand knowledge he discusses the nature of religious mind. He holds that all the traditional organised religions with their scriptures and authorities, creeds and dogmas, rituals and sacrifices, Gods and souls, heavens and hells have completely lost their significance. His enquiry into what is religion is so unorthodox, unique and novel that philosophy of religion would be poorer if it does not take serious note of it.

In case of a philosopher who does not discuss questions of human life, human values and human happiness but devotes himself to very technical and specialised questions of logical analysis, it is no use getting acquainted with his life in order to appreciate his philosophy. This is because his life seems to have no bearing on the problems he discusses and the solutions he offers. But in the case of a philosopher who devotes himself to the questions of human life, human good and human happiness, and especially one like Socrates or Spinoza, the Buddha or Shankara, for whom philosophy is not merely a way of thought but a way of life, it is profitable to get acquainted with the life of a philosopher with a view to appreciate his philosophy. J. Krishnamurti belongs to the latter type. Moreover his life is full of events from his
early childhood and has great religious significance. It would, therefore, be both of interest and help in understanding his teaching to see how he struggled against authority and tradition and came out unscathed through the heavy conditioning. It may also show us how he has a very alert mind with a piercing insight. This unconditioned mind gives humanity a unique religion with its unique philosophy.

(II)

Krishnamurti, born in 1895, being the eighth child in the family, was named Krishnamurti, after the Lord Krishna. In 1909 at the age of fourteen, Krishnamurti with his brother Nityananda, happened to be seen by C.W. Leadbeater, a co-worker of Dr. Annie Besant. Leadbeater was believed to have power of clairvoyance. As he saw these two brothers, he declared that Krishnamurti had an extraordinary aura and he was going to be a spiritual leader of the world. He also found that his brother, Nityananda had the same kind of aura, but to a lesser extent. Krishnamurti's outward appearance was not at all so impressive as to be selected for any special mission, but because of Leadbeater these boys were adopted by Dr. Annie Besant. This selection suddenly brought about a drastic change in the lives of the two boys.

In the year 1911, to prepare for the coming of the World-Teacher, Dr. Annie Besant started 'The Order of the Star in the East' of which Krishnamurti was the head.
In the same year the two brothers were taken to England and then to France for further training. About the course of their education Dr. Annie Besant and Leadbeater started getting instructions from their masters with occult powers. Krishnamurti did not shine in his academic career, while his brother passed his matriculation in his first attempt. For about ten years from 1911 to 1921 Krishnamurti stayed in England as his head-quarter, where he was taught different languages such as English, Latin, Sanskrit. Eminent Professors were his tutors. Side by side he had to participate in the activities of theosophical society and prepare himself for the coming of world teacher. Krishnamurti was following the instructions of elder members of the society and was undergoing training, but inwardly he was having conflict in his mind. This uneasy mind was the beginning of the manifestation of his rebellious personality. He was gaining confidence and wanted to take his own responsibility instead of following the instructions of theosophists. He writes to Leadbeater in 1913, "I think it is time now that I should take my affairs into my own hands. I feel I could carry out the master's instruction better if they are not forced upon me and made unpleasant and I have been dragged about like a baby".

He was continuously among religious people and was trying to continue with the activities of the society. But he was doing this with an alert and awakened mind. He did not accept the views of others passively. He was a critical observer of himself and others. This could be noticed in his
occasional utterances and writings. As early as in 1915 when he was in a desperate, unhappy mood he expressed his disgust by saying "Why did they ever pick me on?" And in 192 we became bold enough to criticise the theosophists. He says "Lord what fools we mortals are. We believe in anybody that shouts loudest and the so-called theosophical birds cry in jungle of fools and fools swallow what it pleases them most and it does them no good." I am in a most rebellious mood -- I don't want to belong to anything of which I am ashamed.

In spite of these occasional moods he kept himself engaged in the programmes of the theosophical society such as giving lectures, writing in periodicals, having seminars and discussions. He started giving lectures from 1920. Till 1926 he sincerely believed that he would be able to guide the world through the order. Like a religious leader, he was preached about god, attainment of heaven, incarnation, immortality, union with the beloved etc. But at the same time he used to become an indifferent observer of religious activities. In 1921 in his Editorial Notes he mentions how an impression of god, who looks after, was given to us by parents and says "the god is squeezed by us into the grooves we want." In the same notes he further writes, "We do not want any leader to tell us what are the great truths."

1. Mary Lutyens, The Years of Awakening 86
2. Ibid. p121
3. Ibid. p122
4. J. Krishnamurti, Editorial Notes, p-5
5. J. Krishnamurti, Editorial Notes, p-5
His mind seems to be critical and reflective even in his early writings and lectures. He was rebelling against authoritative teaching. It seems that he was influenced by the Buddha during this period. He mentioned the Buddha with respect. "Take the portrait of Lord Buddha, the large one. When I see it, I say to myself, I am going to be like that." The Buddha also revolted against all authoritative teachings.

While Krishnamurti was in a sceptical and rebellious mood inwardly, the theosophists were preparing in all possible ways to receive the world-Teacher in Krishnamurti. A huge property was amassed in his name as a head of the order. The centres were opened in most of the continents to welcome the world-Teacher. There were thousands of followers of Krishnamurti all over the world.

In 1925 Annie Besant announced that Krishnamurti was the chosen vehicle of the World-Teacher. Krishnamurti was trying to become responsible to fulfil Annie Besant's expectations. During the same year an important event took place in his life which had an immense effect on his philosophy of life. It was the death of his brother, Nityanand, who accompanied him till the age of thirty. This was the second major blow in his personal life, the first being his mother's death before joining the society. His happy moments in childhood were centred around her memories. His brother's death became a

1. J. Krishnamurti *Towards discipleship* p-32
turning point in his life in his youth. They accompanied each other and shared their experiences. Krishnamurti served his brother with affection in his last sickness in California with all the faith that he would be cured. Krishnamurti had to come to India to attend a convention. While sailing to India he received a telegram about his sickness and then about being serious. But Krishnamurti had faith in his Master. He was confident that his brother would not die, otherwise, his master would not allow him to leave his brother, and also that as his brother's life was essential for Krishnamurti's mission, he could not be allowed to die. But his faith in masters and the occult powers shattered when he received the news of Nityananda's death on the board of the ship. His sufferings knew no bounds.

Later on he tried to philosophise the sorrow by saying; "Sorrow is wonderful if you can taste it on the divine cup". The death of his brother had great significance. Firstly, the faith in his master, about which he was confident, was shattered. He cried, "But none could give me comfort. I have prayed, I have worshipped but the gods have remained silent"

Secondly, it led to his complete transformation. He says, "I have suffered, but I began to free myself from all by which I was bound, till I was united with the Beloved, till I entered the ocean of liberation and established it within myself."
In December of the same year (1925) at Madras, Krishnamurti suddenly declared that the World Teacher had come, by mentioning himself in the first person, "I come to those who want sympathy...". To this declaration the theosophists reacted in different ways. They insisted on different ceremonies and different costumes for Krishnamurti. Krishnamurti was inwardly disturbed. Long before the announcement of the arrival of the World Teacher, a tendency to rebel was unfolding in him. This tendency got momentum with the severe differences that had cropped up among the members of the society. It seems that for quite a long time Krishnamurti tried to remain loyal to the views and ideologies of the society and specially to Dr. Annie Besant. He tried to remain engrained in the programmes which were thrust upon him by the senior members of the order. But he could not stop declaring the truth that was being revealed to him. He said, "I still maintain that all ceremonies are unnecessary for spiritual growth". In 1927 his reflections were, "When I began to think for myself which has now been for some years past, I found myself in revolt. I was not satisfied by any teachings, by any authority. I wanted to find out for myself what the World-Teachers meant to me-- and what the truth was behind the form of the World teacher"

He observed the severe differences among the theosophists. His occasional utterances against ceremonies, authority etc. did not fit into the norms of the order and made the members...

1. Metthorst Kuiper, Krishnamurti p.24
2. Metthorst Kuiper, Krishnamurti
3. J.Krishnamurti, J. Krishnamurti 1928 p43
bewildered. Their reactions were varied. Krishnamurti was disillusioned by clear perception of his inner conflicts and confusion among the theosophists. Now the difficult task of disbanding the order of the star, was left. From 1927 to 1929 he was preparing for the moment. He warned the people that the order might be abolished if it claimed to hold the truth.

On the 3rd August 1929 in a camp at Omen he declared that as the head of the order he had dissolved the organization. This sudden declaration was stunning for the followers but it was an act of daring for an observer from outside. "It was a magnificent act" said some people. A person, having thousands of followers from all over the world, enjoying position of honour and status, having support of enormous wealth and man power could instantly disown them. It was splendid, but shocking for the followers.

One may also appreciate his clarity of thinking, clarity of perception, and action according to perception. His perception was action, as he preaches now. He was honest to his understanding and purpose. As soon as he realised the emptiness of theosophists' expectations of coming of the world-Teacher and saw that even if the World-Teacher came he was not going to make difference to people, he set himself free from the order of the Star and declared his intention to set man free. Thus Krishnamurti destroyed the last illusion.

His life's mission is to set man free. Now for over fifty years he is moving around the world and speaking to those who are interested in understanding life. Those who have.
interest in his speeches, organise his talks, publish the periodicals, sell the tapes. These activities are done by Krishnamurti Foundation. It also runs schools in which children grow and learn in a different climate.

Thus we have seen how Krishnamurti has undergone heavy religious conditioning on the theosophical pattern yet he could come out of it unscathed. Krishnamurti saw from time to time the images that he was conditioned to see. Thus, for instance, even before he joined theosophy, he adored the image of the lord Krishna with his flute. After joining theosophy he saw the Master, Lord Maitreya, Lord Buddha, and finally he talked about the beloved. He says: in 1927 at Eerde "When I was a small boy I used to see Shri Krishna, with the flute, as He is pictured by the Hindus, because my mother was a devotee of Shri Krishna and she used to talk to me about Him--- when I grew older and met with Bishop Leadbeater and the Theosophical Society began to see the Master again in the form which was put before me. Later on as I grew I began to see lord Maitreya. Now lately it has been the Buddha whom I have been seeing. But my Beloved goes beyond all those forms"1 He realised that those images were projections of mind, and he dropped them. Then he identifies himself with the beloved that goes beyond all, "My beloved is the open skies, the flower, every human being"2

1. Methorst Kuiper, J.Krishnamurti 26, 27
2. J.Krishnamurti, Krishnamurti 1923 p. 45
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This image also disappeared in 1928. At Eerde camp he talked about life as ultimate truth. "I am life—the life that dwells in each one of you. ¹ It can be observed here that at this stage, before the dissolution of the Order in 1929, he came out of all illusions and rejected the truth in any form that mind had projected. He was very precise in his thinking and expression in his talk at Eerde on the 6th August, 1928. The gist of his teaching may be found in this talk,—life is the only truth; love, and not fear, should be the source of judgement; and we miss the truth because labels, names, organisation, individual become important. He says, "Truth which is life, is like the sunshine—Because you are not in love with life you judge by your standard of morality—by good and evil, by the fear of heaven and hell, and hence place a barrier on that love, that understanding of life—You are in love with labels and not with truth—what has life to do with these names?—But if you can realise that there is no comfort but understanding. You will not be caught up in words, in ideas, in books or in the shades of the remembered Gods—Truth which is life has nothing to do with any person, with any organisation—You do not want life and the fulfilment of life which is truth, but a passing shade of comfort either in this organisation or in that—Because you place organisation before life, the authority of another before life,—you are caught and strangled."² During the same period he shows clearly how one

1. J. Krishnamurti, Let Understanding Be The Law p. 22
2. J. Krishnamurti, Let Understanding Be The Law p. 17-20
has to be responsible if one wants to place life before everything else. Carlo Suares quotes from his talk in 1928, "I want to show that the moment you understand life as it is taking place around each one of you, then you understand Truth —— There is no God except a man purified, and there is no Power exterior to himself which controls him— no guide other than himself. There is no heaven or hell, good or evil, except that which he creates himself, and hence man is solely responsible to himself, to no one else"¹

Thus he arrives at a truth inspite of heavy conditioning. We have also seen that his life is the evidence of his alert, revolting and doubting mind. He was not conditioned because he invited doubt in all moments of pleasure and pain. He admired doubt. He says, "Doubt is as precious as ointment —— I tell thee, invite doubt when in the fullness of thy desire. I tell thee, Doubt brings forth eternal love. Doubt cleanses the mind of its corruption, so the strength of thy days shall be established in understanding. As the fresh winds from the mountains that awaken the shadows in the valley, so let doubt call to dance, the decaying love of contented mind —— Doubt is as precious ointment, though it turns, it shall heal greatly"²

Thus the doubt heals, purifies mind and awakens love. This doubt helped Krishnamurti to disentangle himself from authority, beliefs, images etc. and to become a rebellion in the universe of religion. His rebellious and doubting

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¹ Carlo Suares, Krishnamurti and the Unity of Man p. 101
² J. Krishnamurti, The Song of life p. 54, 55
mind is responsible for his religious development - from a traditional spiritual head of religious organisation through a destroyer of such beliefs and organisations to a truly religious man.

A man who has passed through such phases of religious life now attacks the very concept of traditional religion and yet speaks of religious life. His enquiries into validity of traditional religions and possibility of new religious life can be said to present a unique philosophy of religion. But before discovering how far Krishnamurti can be called a philosopher of religion and what are Krishnamurti's views about religion i.e. what is Krishnamurti's philosophy of religion, it is essential to enquire into the nature of philosophy of religion.

(III)

It is not easy to define philosophy of religion because both philosophy and religion are open concepts or 'essentially contested' concepts viewed from various angles and defined in various ways at different stages. And a still more difficult task, which looks almost impossible, is to regard Krishnamurti as a philosopher of religion, in view of the facts (i) that he has been constantly denying that he has any philosophy to offer and (ii) that he has always been a severe critic of all religions.

It may be in logical order to define and delimit the scope of philosophy of religion before going into the problem as to how far Krishnamurti is a philosopher of religion, and
before assessing the scope of philosophy of religion, it
is essential to see what we understand by the terms 'religion'
and 'philosophy' in general.

(a) *What is Religion?*

As a dominant aspect of human society religion has
become an object of interest and study for many thinkers,
yet arriving at the definition of religion has many diffi-
culties. Firstly as Krishnamurti observes. "The root meaning
of the word 'religion' is rather uncertain. We can give any
meaning to it we like and generally we do. 1. There is hardly
any unanimity of views among the thinkers. One of the
difficulties in arriving at precise concept of religion is the
divergent approaches and attitudes of the thinkers towards
religion. Trigg has rightly pointed out that morality and
religion are notorious areas where humanity seems to speak
with many voices 2. An approach of a thinker is delimited
by the problems in which he is interested and by the standpoint
or conceptual frame-work which he accepts. The study of religion
will depend upon the interest of an individual in one or another
aspect of religion and his standpoint. Since any philoso-
phical reflection presupposes a certain conceptual frame-work,
no neutrality seems to be possible in reflections on religion
also.

The next difficulty is that the nature of religion itself
is not uniform to define. It has passed through various phases
and it is existent in varied forms even to-day. Those who
regard dogmatism as the *sine qua non* of religion, regard

1. J. Krishnamurti, *Beyond Violence* p. 51
2. Trigg, *Reason and Commitment* p. 1
Marxism as a new religion. Those who consider belief in god as the essence of religion, have to exclude Jainism and Buddhism, which do not accept god. Whether the expressions of foodgathering tribes towards nature or ancestors can be considered as religion, would similarly depend on what we consider to be the essence of religion. There do not appear to be any common feature or essence in terms of which religion can be defined, even if the study is limited to the existing major religions. One may even doubt whether search for the common essence in all religions is a genuine one. Following Wittgenstein one may say that there is nothing common in all religions, but there are some 'family resemblances' between them, that religions form a family. William James expresses similar difficulty in finding the essence of religion. He says, "the word 'religion' cannot stand for any single principle or essence, but is rather a collective name." 

Notwithstanding these difficulties in finding out the common essence of religion, the complexities of the notion of religion and the attitudes of thinkers, religion may be described in a broad sense as consisting mainly in relations of human beings with something that is other worldly or transcendental which is regarded as sacred or holy. History of religion tells us as Bambrough points out, that the relation of man with gods beyond nature in Homeric Poems have logical and Historical link with present expressions of man about his relation to transcendent god. The origin of religion is traced in the human aspirations to establish...

1. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 39
2. Bambrough, *Reason, Truth and God*
relations with something, that is of the other world; the need to establish such relations might be due to fear or any other emotion. With the development of religion the nature of the transcendent object may be viewed differently; but on the whole, it may not be far from truth, if religion is understood as man's relation to some transcendent spiritual being or state.

(b) Philosophy of Religion

Like the concept of religion the concept of philosophy also, is equally difficult to define. The concepts of both philosophy and religion have, through the ages undergone many changes. So it is difficult to delimit the scope of philosophy of religion. Looking to the history of philosophy of religion we find that at the critical stage religion and philosophy were hardly separated. The interest of ancient philosophers, in intellectual understanding of objects of religion was inspired because of their concern with religion. On the contrary the present philosophy claims to be secular, unrelated to religion and tries to understand religion as one of life along with morality, arts, science and so on. M.J. Charlesworth expresses the difficulty in defining philosophy of religion by saying, "What is meant therefore by the philosophy of religion is something very loose and imprecise. If it is defined as the philosophical investigation of the issues raised by religion, we have to realise that what a 'Philosophical investigation' is on the one hand and what religion is on the other, remain undefined ———"¹

¹ M.J. Charlesworth, Philosophy of Religion The Historie approach p. XI
We have tried to say roughly what religion means. Religion is studied empirically by sciences like Psychology, Sociology, History and Anthropology. These sciences are not concerned with the validity or invalidity of religious beliefs. Philosophical investigation of religion is basically different from these empirical studies. Philosophy is concerned with examining the rationality of religious beliefs, truth of religious assertions and validity of reasoning in religion. It is interested in the logical analysis of religious language. It may be also occupied with the problems of origin of religion, significance of religious experience, possibility of new forms of religion, possibility of human society without religion. Empirical study depends upon the factual data collected through survey and observations, while philosophical study depends upon intellectual speculations or critical analysis. Philosophy of religion is the logical investigation into the validity of invalidity of religious beliefs, religious knowledge, religious experiences and so on.

Since these investigations depend more upon the philosophical predilections of a thinker than upon the actual observations, they are liable to be affected by the standpoint of the thinker. When a philosopher starts his examination of religious beliefs, assertions and reasonings, he cannot start with a blank mind. He adheres to a certain standpoint in general philosophy, operates with certain criteria of truth and validity. His investigation is thus determined by his predilections in general philosophy. This results in basic difference in the point of view with which Philosophers
approach religious ideas. The theist as well as the atheist, the materialist, the agnostic as well as the positivist may reflect over religious form of life, each from its own perspective and thus give rise to different conceptions of philosophy of religion.

Further a philosopher's discussions are restricted by his interest in one or the other aspect of religion. He may be interested in social, psychological, historical, economic implications of religion. Among the various thinkers some do philosophy of religion directly because their subject of interest is religion; but some other have to go into the problem of religion as it comes in their way while doing investigations in other aspects of human life.

For example Marx investigated validity of religious concepts with a view to bring about a social revolution. He was an atheist. With his dialectical materialism he tried to show how the social changes were going to take place and there is no place for religion and god in that society. His ultimate aim was to eradicate religion, therefore he showed how religion came into existence in the course of human history. It was an accidental phenomena, and not a necessity to man. Marx shows how religion is irrelevant to human society by using logical reasoning. This has become his philosophy of religion.

In a similar way Freud's investigation into religion is basically part of his psychoanalysis. But while showing that the origin of religion is unconscious, he challenges the
validity of religious beliefs. Freudian psychology seeks the origin of religion in Totem. Totemism is explained as a result of suppressed desires of Oedipus complex that gives rise to taboos. Lauzen shows how Freud wants to prove the invalidity of religion. Lauzen says, "-- he (Freud) was resolving to go further yet and to give systematic form to an idea which he had long cherished; that of proving the ultimate foundation of religion to be 'the infantile helplessness of humanity' "¹. Freud also thought of the possibility of man being free from the obsession of religion; Stefan Zweig says, "Looking out into the future, Freud now proceeds to ask whether it is likely that man will ever be able to overcome this unrest, will at length escape from the cleavage in his mind. Tossed to and fro as he is between the fear of God and the pressure of his animal impulses --- tyrannised over as he is by the obsessional neurosis of religion, will man ever find a way, of escaping from the dilemma of civilization?"²

Freud's investigations have philosophical relevance so far as he tries to show religion to be invalid on the basis of reasoning and psychoanalysis. Though Freud approaches religion from the point of view of psychology, the conclusions he arrives at have philosophical significance.

Taking into consideration the various difficulties and implications involved in delimiting the scope of philosophy of religion, we may broadly say that philosophy of religion includes the enquiries about the validity and rationality of religious beliefs, experiences, knowledge and expressions; the analysis of religious language and the examination of various features.

¹. Lauzen, Sigmund Freud, The Man and His Theories p. 71
and forms of religion. As John Hick says, "A complete treatise on the philosophy of religion would have to investigate the nature of religion in general and would deal with all the main ideas of the many different religions."

(IV)

As pointed out before, philosophers with different conceptual frameworks, with different stand points in general philosophy, and adopt different approaches to religion. If we study the history of philosophy of religion, we find mainly three philosophical approaches to religion. They are:

(a) The non-positivistic approach adopted by the theists, the atheists and the agnostics.

(b) The logical positivist approach and

(c) The approach of the later Wittgenstein and the ordinary language Philosophers.

(a) The Non-Positivist Approach—The approach to philosophy of religion mainly prior to the logical positivists, is based on the assumption that religious language is cognitively meaningful. For example the theist, the atheist, and the agnostic all agree that religious assertions like 'God exists', 'The soul is immortal' are meaningful. They discuss whether such assertions are true or false or whether one can determine the truth or falsity of such statements and if so, how. But what they do not do, is discard religious assertions

1. John Hick, Philosophy of Religion p. 3
as nonsense. They assume that religious concepts and assertions are meaningful. Thus they come to hold the same view about the philosophy of religion. According to them, the function of philosophy of religion, is to enquire whether and how religious beliefs can be rationally justified.

Almost all religions accept the beliefs in the existence of God, soul and the survival after death, and it is thought to be the main function of philosophy of religion to consider critically the validity of these beliefs. Theists and theologians provide justification for such religious beliefs on the basis of revelations or reasoning. Thus we have revealed theology and natural theology. An atheist also gives reasons in support of his view that religious beliefs are not rationally justified, and that they are false. And these discussions of the atheist also belong to the philosophy of religion. The agnostic holds that the arguments put forward in support or against religious beliefs are not conclusive. He may even show that various arguments involve certain fallacies e.g. the ontological argument involves the fallacy of regarding existence as predicate. The agnostic, like Kant, may argue that the pure or theoretical reason is not competent enough to prove or disprove the ideas of God, Soul etc., but they are the necessary postulates of practical reason and thus may make room for faith.

Thus a philosopher who holds the theistic, the atheistic, or the agnostic stand point, subscribes to the same conception of philosophy of religion, according to which philosophy of
religion is justificatory i.e. according to which the function of philosophy of religion is to consider the rationality or validity of religious beliefs.

The theists and the theologians do philosophy of religion to justify their beliefs in objects of faith. They make use of speculations to prove the existence of god, the immortality of soul etc., on rational ground. They meet objections raised against religious beliefs and thus confirm the faith. Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel, Galloway, in the west, and Vivekananda, Aurobindo, Radhakrishnan, in the east, may be said to have subscribed to this view of philosophy of religion.

All these philosophers defend religion and religious beliefs. God or some transcendent power becomes the central figure in most of the religions. These philosophers accept the existence of such a power beyond doubt and then try to justify it with rational arguments. Their speculations centred round the existence of god and other articles of faith. All the western religions have belief in god as an essential feature and so the religious philosophers in the west start their arguments with the assumption that god exists. Their main task is to justify the belief that god exists. The function of philosophy and religion is to preserve and defend the faith. Charlesworth quotes Aquinas as saying, "The task of philosophy of religion is above all a defensive one or apologetical one, justifying the 'preambles' of religious faith and defending the 'articles of faith'."

Hegel starts his philosophy of Religion with the assumption

that, "reason is a part of that spirit in which God reveals himself of that consciousness and its content i.e. God, are not separate." We further argues, "The heart is already full of the idea of God—— but the philosophy of Religion will give fullness to it by appealing to thinking."  

Galloway's stand is not much different, though he stresses the nature of philosophy to be unbiased, speculative study. His speculations spring from his theistic frame of mind, from his absolute belief in God. His conception of philosophy of religion follows from his conception of philosophy in general. According to him, "The philosophy of religion shows that the truth of religion is speculative idea of God, while philosophy shows how the idea or absolute, has differentiated itself in nature, in spirit and in religion, as phase of the movement of spirit." Galloway's philosophy of religion is also based on some assumption that arise from his faith that religion is a living fact. He says, "A philosophy of religion therefore presupposes religion as a living fact in the development of the race and recognises the existence of inner experiences of which religious acts are expressions." So the investigations done by these philosophers remain confined to either revealed theology or natural theology. This philosophers are basically religious and theistic. They raise doubt against the existence of God for the sake of argument and for the confirmation of belief.

1. Hegel, Philosophy of Religion p.44
2. Ibid p.91
3. Galloway, Philosophy of Religion p.42
4. Galloway, Philosophy of Religion p.27
They cannot deny the existence of God, and cannot imagine that religion may be accidental and not a necessity.

"The older notion," says Galloway, "that religion was artificially invented is now universally admitted to be absurd --- religion is a normal and constant aspect of human life and the utterance of a permanent need of man's spirit".

Similarly Radhakrishnan also sees the need of change in the form of religion, to suit to the present human society, but he does not accept the possibility of mankind without an institutional religion.

The above philosophers try to establish faith with the help of arguments based on reasoning and the agnostics make room for faith by showing the limitations of reasoning. The room is made for faith by agnostics by keeping the region of faith beyond reasoning, beyond rational arguments. In showing the limitations of reasoning and its inability to examine religious concepts, the status of religious faith is raised by these philosophers. Pascal says, "If we submit everything to reason our religions will have no mysterious or supernatural element." Kant, Tillich, Kierkegard put forward logical arguments to show the limitations of philosophy in comprehending the absolute, or God. According to them, "Philosophy can neither prove nor disprove the objects of religious faith".

Though the existence of God cannot be proved by reason, Kant is eager to show that God has to be presupposed in moral

1. *Ibid*  
2. M.J. Charlesworth, *Philosophy of Religion: The Historic Approaches* p. 27  
3. *Ibid* p. 142  
4. *Ibid* p. k42
action. He says, "what is beyond the reach of speculative reason may nevertheless be meaningful for 'practical reason'. The task of philosophy is to infer the existence of God, soul etc. by realising its own limitations. In keeping faith beyond reason the agnostics serve the cause of religion. Indirectly they confirm the faith.

The atheists and the materialists accept religious language to be meaningful but their avowed aim is to show that religious beliefs are false or invalid or not rationally justified. Thus their views in philosophy of religion are anti-religious. Their investigations are basically atheistic in nature. The religions in the west - Islam, Christianity, Judaism are founded on the strong belief in God as the ultimate reality, as the creator and sustainer of the universe. So the atheists rejection of the existence of God comes as an anti-religious bolt to these religions. Both the theists and the atheists alike hold that to deny God is to deny religion.

Feuerback, Freud, Marx, Engels systematically and intellectually develop philosophy which denies the existence of God and thus goes against religion. Marx's atheism comes from his naturalistic humanism. He sees religion as an exploiter of mass as harmful to human society. He also sees the invalidity of religion. He regards religious concepts as fantasies of human mind and holds that a frightened mind imagines supernatural power. So God is a projection of mind.

1. Ibid p. 142
It is a superstition. Thus in showing the invalidity of religious beliefs in the existence of spiritual objects, the materialists develop a philosophy of religion.

(b) The non-positivist philosophers of religion have assumed without question that religious concepts and statements are cognitively meaningful; that religious beliefs are genuine, and they restrict their arguments to the consideration whether there is sufficient evidence for or against such beliefs. It does not occur to them that one can question the genuineness of these concepts. They assume these concepts to be meaningful. The logical positivists, however, challenge these basic assumptions of the traditional philosophers of religion. By applying the verification criterion of cognitive or literal, for factual meaning, they show that religious concepts are not meaningful; that they are pseudo-concepts. According to them only two types of statements are significant: synthetic statements which are verifiable in sense-experience and analytic statements which are tautological. They then argue that since religious utterances do not belong to either of these classes, they cannot be said to have any meaning. Hence they are pseudo-statements.

Since religious utterances are meaningless they have no validity whatsoever. The question of determining their validity does not arise. The business of a philosopher of religion, therefore, is to declare that religious concepts are pseudo-concepts and that religious statements are pseudo-propositions. He can neither prove nor disprove a
religious statement of the form 'God exists' because it does not express a proposition at all.

Religious phenomenon can be studied empirically by sociologists or psychologists. They may survey and collect facts about religion, its origin and role in a society. But such an empirical study of religious phenomenon does not come under the purview of Philosophy of religion. Therefore, there is nothing more for the philosopher of religion to do except to discard the religious-talk as meaningless.

The traditional philosopher who tried to prove or disprove religious statement have unknowingly played the role of a preacher. They have used religious language. A philosopher of religion does not use religious language but tries to understand it. Positivists sharply distinguish the role of a philosopher of religion from that of a religious preacher. The latter uses religious language while the former aims at the analysis of religious language. Philosophy of religion is, therefore, a second-order activity. It is about religion. It is meta-religion. The traditional philosophers have confused these two roles. It is not the function of philosophy of religion to criticise or to justify religion. Religion does not stand in any need of such a justification and philosophy is not capable of providing such a justification.

Philosophy of religion, therefore, is the logical analysis of religious language. Logical analysis shows that religious language is not cognitively meaningful hence it is not governed by any rules of logic. The logical positivists,
sharply distinguish their standpoint about the religious beliefs from those of the atheist and the agnostic. Ayer says, "It is important not to confuse this view of religious assertions with the view that is adopted by atheists or agnostics. For it is characteristic of an agnostic to hold that the existence of a god is a possibility in which there is no good reason either to believe or disbelieve, and it is characteristic of an atheist to hold that it is at least probable that no god exists. And our view that all utterances about the nature of God are nonsensical, so far from being identical with, or even lending any support to, either of these familiar contentions, is actually incompatible with them. For if the assertion that there is a god is nonsensical, then the atheist’s assertion that there is no god is equally nonsensical, since it is only a significant proposition that can be significantly contradicted. As for the agnostic, although he refrains from saying either that there is or that there is not a god, he does not deny that the question as to whether transcendent god exists is a genuine question. He does not deny that the two sentences, "There is a transcendent god" and "There is no transcendent god" express propositions, one of which is actually true and the other is false. All he says is that we have no means of telling which of them is true, and therefore ought not to commit ourselves to either. But we have seen that the sentences in question do not express propositions at all. And this means that agnosticism also is ruled out".

(c) Like the positivists, Wittgenstein in his earlier phase, subscribed to the concept of truth functional logic, to the verification principle, as the criterion of cognitive meaning, and to the conception of philosophy as logical analysis. He held the natural or ordinary language to be defective and aimed at constructing an ideal language, which would be free from deceptive appearances. He held the picture theory of meaning. But Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy, gave up his earlier conception of language, meaning and philosophy. He saw the mistake of identifying the meaning of a word with the bearer of the name. Instead of looking at words as labels, he started looking at words in language as tools in a tool box. We cannot claim to know a tool or an instrument simply because we know its name. To know an instrument is to know its use. Similarly he says that, to know a word is to know how it is used in different contexts. He says, "Don't ask for the meaning, ask for its use". He gives up the view that language must conform to very rigorous rules of logic, and that sentence which are not amendable to such rules must be regarded as non-sensical. He now holds that 'every statement has its own logic'. He thinks that ordinary language, with all its looseness, is expressive of the true form of life. These changes in the perspective of looking at language and meaning have very great repercussions on his conception of philosophy in general and subsequently on his conception of philosophy of religion in particular.
According to the positivists, the only function of philosophy of religion is to say that religious concepts are pseudo-concepts and religious assertions are pseudo-propositions. Since religious assertions are pseudo-propositions, the question of their validity does not arise. The concept of philosophy of religion was determined by the positivists' concept of language as truth functional, their verification theory of meaning and their conception of philosophy as logical analysis of language. Thus the scope of philosophy of religion was narrowed down. Philosophy of religion consists only in showing that religious assertions are pseudo-propositions and therefore unanalysable. Any further enquiry into religious phenomenon might be done by empirical sciences, like psychology, sociology or anthropology.

The later Wittgenstein sees mistakes in his first conception of philosophy. Instead of seeing one and only one final analysis of proposition he sees many possible alternatives. This view gives a new insight for looking at to the philosophy of religion. With the positivist's view, the scope of philosophy of religion was practically shrunk to nothing; it is once again rehabilitated by Wittgenstein's new stand point. We may now see how this new stand point of Wittgenstein has influenced the scope of philosophy of religion.

Firstly, the aim of philosophy according to Wittgenstein was not to search for an essence. Therefore, philosophy of religion cannot aim at finding the essence of religion or
defining it. There may not be any common essence but only family resemblances in all religions. All religions may form a family but there is no essence which they may all share in common. What he says about games is equally true about religions. He says "We see a complicated net work of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing—- I can think of no better expression to characterise these similarities than family resemblances".

Pitcher points out that Wittgenstein admired William James who expressed a similar difficulty in finding essence in all religions, and called religion a collective name.

Secondly, the function of philosophy is not to justify or explain in a form of life but to describe it. Wittgenstein says, "We must do away with all explanations, and description alone must take its place". In this sense philosophy of religion is not supposed to explain or justify religious phenomena or religious form of life but to describe it.

Thirdly, according to Wittgenstein, philosophy can understand a form of life by understanding the language used in that form of life. He uses the expression, 'language game' to mean the whole form of life. The same word has different meanings in different language games i.e. in different contexts. The meaning of the word can be decided not by looking at the essence, but from the context in which the word is used. According to Wittgenstein, "The meaning of a word is its use in the various language games in which"

1. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 32
2. Ibid. p. 47
it plays a part. Thus philosophy of religion can understand the nature of religious form of life through the analysis of language actually used in religious form of life.

Fourthly, each form of life has its own logic. It would be wrong to apply one criterion or reasoning to all forms of life. The logical positivists make a mistake in thinking that a reasoning which is applicable in science and mathematics is equally applicable in the religious form of life. Wittgensteinians say that this way of applying reasoning is forcing 'an alien logic' upon religious language. According to them the task of philosophy of religion is to study the logic of religious language. Charlesworth says "There is distinctive religious game with its own criteria of meaningfulness and that the task of philosophical analysis is to bring out the peculiar significance and intelligibility of religious language, and in general to show that 'religious statements at their rock bottom are in order i.e. their own kind of order'".

The main findings of Wittgenstein about religious form of life are organised by Hudson under three headings, "(i) The logical distinctiveness of religious belief (ii) Religious belief as using a picture and (iii) The essential difference between religious believer and unbeliever." With Wittgenstein's general philosophical views about

1. G. Pitcher, Philosophy of Wittgenstein p. 249
2. M. J. Charlesworth, Philosophy of Religion: The Historic Approach p. 162
religion, philosophy of religion gets a wider scope for investigation, which was denied to it by the logical positivists. When philosophers like Wisdon, Braithwaite, Hare Bambrough and others, approach religious language with this new insight, they find that religious beliefs are like commitments which change the whole course of life. According to Braithwaite, religious utterances are similar to moral statements. They are commitments to a way of life and help to live agapastic life. Religious utterances according to Hare do not assert any empirical fact but direct a kind of life. He introduces a term 'blik' to describe attitude towards life. No explanation of religious behaviours may be possible without a 'blik'. Masih says, "Bliks according to Hare, are neither true nor false, they determine as to what is to be taken as a fact or an illusion". A blik directs the way of life, and religious utterances function as bliks. Thus religious utterances are neither verifiable nor falsifiable simply because they are not empirical hypotheses. But they have meaning so far as they affect the way of life. They influence a person's entire behaviour, his feelings and attitudes.

While saying that Wittgensteinians' views about religion have offered a wide scope for understanding of religion, it is also necessary to see the criticism of their views by other philosophers of religion.

Firstly, when it is said that religious utterancqas are not meaningless because they bring about changes in human way of life, but this function of religious utterances is limited

to a particular form of life. Religious form of life has its own logic, so it is not possible to decide, which of the rival commitments, is reasonable nor is it be possible for a person to understand the logic of rival commitments or language games. Kai Neilson paints out that these language games are self content and may not be accessible for criticism from outside, because of its distinctive logic. Commitment is a matter of choice and there are no neutral objective criteria to decide between alternative commitments. There cannot be mutually acceptable ground to establish communication and dissolve the differences between the rival commitments. Wittgenstein shows this impasse by saying "Where two principles really do meet, which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic."

Secondly, a religious believer may not be much relieved to find that the Wittgensteinian approach has saved religion from the empiricist attack. This is because what a religious believer wants to establish is that religious beliefs can be shown to be valid or true by impartial reasoning and what Wittgensteinian approach does, is to show that religious beliefs are found rational by those who are religious. But this obviously cannot satisfy a religious believer. Kai Neilson says, "Conceptual relativism may save religion from empiricist and 'Scientific realist' attacks, through establishing that religious discourses are conceptually autonomous and have their own distinctive order and rationales.

1. Trigg, *Reason and Commitment* p. 16
with their own distinctive conceptions of reality, rationality, knowledge, evidence, intelligibility and the like. But such a 'salvation' may pave the way for its ultimate destruction or utter transformation.\(^1\)

Thirdly, the scientific realist may not be happy because his monopoly in deciding the truth is deprived of by stating that any other theory or belief is equally true in its own context. In spite of the above objections, from the point of view of different trends of thought, one may say that Wittgenstein's approach to religion leads to a better understanding of religion and makes discussion possible, which is denied by the positivists. He tries to understand religious phenomenon with a new insight and new perspective.

Secondly, his understanding may be more impartial as he is not committed to any standpoint either religious or antireligious. This, however, raises a problem as to how far it is possible to be perfectly neutral. But in accepting that ordinary language is in order as it is, he might be said not to be committed so rigidly to any standpoint as the traditional philosophers are. He is likely to have better understanding because he is not obsessed by any system of philosophy. He can see the possibility of various forms of life because he is not committed to any particular form of life.

The fact that he could free himself from the system of philosophy which was formulated by him in the Fructatus Logico Philosophicus, shows that he was a free mind. Pitcher

1. G. Pitcher, Philosophy of Wittgenstein p. 172
admires him as "being possessed of the highest kind of intellectual honesty". Intellectually honest persons like him can break with the tradition, when they find that it lends us. They are real revaluationaries. But Wittgenstein did not question the traditional concept of religion. This may be because he believed that the functions of philosophy was to describe but not to justify or criticise forms of life.

We have so far discussed three main conceptions of philosophy of religion found in the history of Western philosophy. Philosophy of religion as a distinct discipline or branch of philosophy is developed especially in the west. It is, therefore, almost exclusively devoted to the consideration of problems posed by the religious ideas prevalent in the West. "These are the ideas of Christianity and Judaism centering upon the concept of God. Guided by the Semitic concept of religion, some philosophers of religion have gone to the extent of saying that Buddhism and other non-theistic religions are not religious at all. "Consequently", as Charlesworth admits, "to the extent that by the 'philosophy of religion' we have understood here 'the philosophy of the Judaico-Christian religion', our findings and conclusions are correspondingly limited in scope. If we had, for example, focused our attention on Hinduism or Buddhism instead, it might be that other quite different issues would have arisen for consideration and that the whole question of philosophy's relations with the religious order would have appeared in a rather different light."

1. John Hick, Philosophy of Religion, p.3
2. M.J. Charlesworth, Philosophy of Religion: Historic approaches
Following Zachner we may distinguish two traditions of religion - the prophetic and the mystical. According to the prophetic tradition, religion means obedience to a revelation believed to be God-given and the worship of God in accordance with the content of that revelation. Thus the belief in the existence of God is taken to be the hall-mark of religion. On the other hand, the mystical religious tradition, which is mainly the Eastern tradition, is not theocentric. Both Jainism and Buddhism were originally atheistical creeds, and in Hinduism the core of religion is never felt to depend upon one's personal views about the existence or non-existence of God. Deliverance from the cycle of birth and death seems to be the core of religion according to this tradition. These religions hold that we live in bondage, ignorance and suffering. The problem of religion is how to end this state of affairs and live a life of freedom, enlightenment and bliss. These religions may be called 'religions of enlightenment'. Naturally, philosophical problems posed by these two traditions would be very much different from each other.

As philosophy of religion has concerned itself with the problems posed by Judaeo-Christian religion, its problems and findings, may, its very conception of religion has become extremely limited. However, recently, philosophers of religion in the West have started feeling the need of taking cognisance of the oriental religious traditions. This may be because of

the fact recorded by Zachner that "for many Europeans and Americans Christianity has been tried and found wanting and so a new interest in oriental religion has sprung up— for oriental religion — does not ask you to believe what many regard as being impossible and incomprehensible things."

Another reason why Western philosophers of religion have started taking cognisance of oriental religions seems to be that the whole world has become 'one world' because of 'communicational unity'. Now no religion can live in isolation from other religions. There is a growing mutual influence of religions on each other. Phenomena that present themselves as religion is so diverse and conflicting, that a philosopher of religion finds it necessary to ask which of these phenomena can be regarded as truly religious. Philosophers of religion have started realising that "our view of the philosophy of religion in the west has for the most part been an extremely myopic one". Consequently they have started broadening the scope of philosophy of religion by considering some of the problems posed by some oriental beliefs such as the beliefs in the law of Karma and rebirth. This way of extending the scope of the philosophy of religion would merely increase the number of problems. But this won't give it a new direction. It would be moving in the same old grooves. If the philosophy of religion is to rise to a totally different level, it must be able to question its basic assumption. All the three approaches to philosophy of religion—the non-positivist, the

1. R.C. Zachner, The Concise Encyclopedia of Living Faiths, p. xi
2. M.J. Charleworth, Philosophy of Religion: The Historic Approaches p. 175
positive and that of ordinary language philosophers—have assumed uncritically that to be religious is to accept certain beliefs. Krishnamurti questions this basic assumption and thus raises philosophy of religion to a totally different level. Krishnamurti has revolted against the traditional concept of religion and has freed religion from the letter of theology and dogmatism. He thus gives a totally new way of seeing at religion. Having rejected all the preconceptions, he finds out for himself what a true religion is. And the views he propounds on the basis of his direct perception may be called his philosophy of religion.

(v)

Krishnamurti as a Philosopher of Religion

The historical facts that he was discovered as a would-be world teacher, brought up and trained to be a religious leader and that he was the head of a religious organisation and biographical facts, that he had varieties of religious experiences and even now he claims to live in that unconditioned, free of state of mind which according to him is the essence of religious mind, are not the only reasons for labelling him as a philosopher of religion. The main reason is that the subject which he generally chooses to talk upon, also shows that he does philosophy of religion. The problem he discusses and talks on falls into the category of religion even when the term religion is understood in the traditional sense. He denies that he has any philosophy or theory to offer.
It may therefore appear that any attempt at extracting a philosophy, and that too a philosophy of religion, from his talks and discussions would go against what he says. It would appear to be unjust to attribute views to a person who repeatedly says that he has no views. The objection prima facie seems to be sound and difficult to answer. But a person who raises such an objection has an equally difficult task of explaining what Krishnamurti has been engaged in for all these fifty years. He is ceaselessly moving around the places, giving lectures, holding discussions and almost all his verbal activities have been recorded and published. He uses words and language to communicate with people and uses social media of meetings, group discussions and personal discussions. He wants to communicate something to people as he continues to give talks, hold discussions and allow recording of his talks and their publications. What is the purpose of this? This audiovisual material available in abundance is for being heard, read and understood. It would be possible for a listener or a reader to construct a consistent system of thought out of this material. One of the inevitable consequences of these modes of communications is that intelligent people take cognisance of them and try to understand him in their own way and sometimes face the difficulty in understanding him and raise the question as to what he really wants to say. But anyone who glances at the headings of the topics of his talks would find that he chooses to talk on sorrow and the need to put an end
to it, the conditioned mind, truth, reality, beauty, death, energy, time, attention, meditation, guru religion, violence, fear, problems of the living, total revolution and such other problems. He does not discuss what economical system or political system we should have, nor does he discuss any problem from history, sociology or astronomy etc. The problems he discusses do not belong to any particular science. They are the most general problems about life. In this most general sense, we can say that Krishnamurti discusses the problems of philosophy of life. If the goal of philosophy, to use the expression of Isaiah Berlin, is "to assist men to understand themselves and thus operate in the open, and not wildly, in the dark" then Krishnamurti must be regarded as a philosopher par excellence. In the problems he chooses to discuss and also the manner of his discussion, he may be compared to Gautam the Buddha, who also chose to discuss the problem of human suffering and putting an end to it; disposed of all metaphysical speculation and theorising and proclaimed that "The Tathagota has no theory". Therefore, though Krishnamurti is not a philosopher in the scholastic sense, i.e. a person spinning out theories and defending them by logical arguments or undertaking logical analysis of language, he is a creative philosopher who has a vision of life, love and wisdom. The sense of vision, which according to Waismann qualified every

1. Isaiah Berlin, Concepts and Categories p.11
great philosopher, is obvious in Krishnamurti. Waismann says, "From Plato to Moore and Wittgenstein, every great philosopher was led by a sense of vision: Without it no one could have given a new direction to human thought or opened new windows into the not-yet-seen." Is not Krishnamurti giving a new insight?

The problems, he deals with, are not only the problems of philosophy of life but they are also the problems of philosophy of religion. In fact they are not separate problems for him. He does not divide the life into religious and secular. The life which is indivisible is a holy or a truly religious life. The organised religions of the world, whether they succeed or not, aim at setting man free; at putting an end to sorrow; at giving man bliss, beatitude and total inward conversion. Krishnamurti also aims at the same things, but not through organisation.

Krishnamurti is not a social reformer who believes that a human life can be improved by introducing reforms in social institutions, nor a political idealist who traces the root cause of all social evils to wrong political ideology, nor a psychologist who accounts for everything abnormal and normal in terms of certain psychological causes. His sole concern is with the total inward change, the fundamental change in human psyche. He does not doubt the possibility and the urgent necessity to live on a different plane. What he denies is that any organised religion can bring about this total change. Thus his is solely a religious concern.

1. Waismann, "How I see Philosophy", in Logical Positivism (Ed) A.J. Ayer
The so-called religious men have divided life into compartments such as religious and non-religious. For Krishnamurti, religion is not one aspect of life but the whole of life. The truly religious man does not divide life into fragments.

His approach to religion is not a sociological or a psychological approach. He is not concerned with describing social utility or disutility of religion as a social organisation. He is not concerned with describing different rituals, different beliefs of different religions. He is not concerned with the problem of development of religions. His concern is with the validity of religions. He wants to explore what is meant by a true religious mind and whether a mind which accepts any faith can be truly religious. This is the task of philosophy of religion. Philosophy of religion unlike sociology or psychology of religion, is concerned not with historical or psychological causes of religious phenomena, but with their validity. Philosophy of religion is the critique of religion. And criticism implies criterion. Naturally, therefore any philosophy of religion must first ask what is meant by religiousity? What is the nature of religious mind? What is the nature of a true religion? How far do the organised religions satisfy the criterion of a true religion? What is their significance to man? Can the so-called religious organization with a great hierarchy, large property, propaganda, great following, heavy dogma, beliefs, rituals and so on be regarded as truly religious? Krishnamurti raises such questions.
Since he investigates into problems about religion he is to be regarded as a true philosopher of religion.

Lastly the religion about which he talks is along non-traditional line. According to William P. Alston, to consider the possibility of religion along non-traditional line is one of the problems of philosophy of religion. Krishnamurti discusses the possibility of religion without beliefs, and further asserts that such a religion is the true religion. A religion without belief is surely a religion along non-traditional lines. So in this sense also Krishnamurti does philosophy of religion.

(VI)

Some unique features of Krishnamurti's Philosophy of Religion.

When we come to Krishnamurti as a philosopher of religion, the first thing that strikes us is that he is not a philosopher of religion in the academic sense of the term. He not only lacks formal training in the academic philosophy, but he also disclaims to have any philosophy or theory of his own. Moreover his interest in religion is not theoretical or academic but primarily practical and spiritual. Traditional philosophers of religion approach religion and try to study it either through speculations, or through analysis of language or phenomenologically through the analysis of different religious attitudes by bracketing ontological problems. Krishnamurti however, feels that the true

significance of religion or religious life cannot be understood through any of these methods, i.e., either through language or merely through logic and reason. It can be understood only by direct perception, by first-hand knowledge or acquaintance with religious mind. This perception is non-verbal and not mediated by thought.

Krishnamurti’s interest in religion being practical, he discards all speculations and scholarly explanations. He says, "It is important to understand from the very beginning that I am not formulating any philosophy or any theological structure of ideas or theological concepts. It seems to me that all ideologies are utterly idiotic. What is important is not philosophy of life but to observe what is actually taking place in life."

Secondly, his approach is revisionary and not descriptive. He is not content with accepting the traditional view of religion. Philosopher of religion of all shades and convictions—whether theist, atheists, agnostics, positivists, or ordinary language philosophers—have assumed, in common that to be religious is to hold certain beliefs about god, soul, immortality and so on. Krishnamurti questions this basic assumption. He challenges the traditional concept of religion, accepted uncritically by all philosophers of religion. He not only thinks that it is possible to be religious without accepting any beliefs but also holds that a truly religious mind must be free from all commitments and beliefs; thus his

1. J. Krishnamurti: Freedom from the Known p. 16
approach is not only revisionary but revolutionary, in so far as he does not substitute one set of beliefs for another, but discards all beliefs whatsoever.

Thirdly, according to Krishnamurti's approach the chief problem of philosophy of religion would be to explore the possibility of religion without belief. A mind which is conditioned by the religious propaganda of thousands of years would not be ready to consider such a possibility. It is only when a mind sees the falsity of all religions based on theological and other supernatural beliefs, and yet is serious to bring about a radical change in the present human life and made it pure and sacred, full of love, peace and compassion, that it would be ready to enquire into the nature of true religion. Among the traditional philosophers of religion, theists, agnostics and the ordinary language philosophers fail to see the futility or the falsity of the traditional religions, though for different reasons. Atheists and positivists have seen the falsity and meaninglessness of traditional religions, but they lack the positive urge to find out what a true religion is. Therefore their philosophy of religion ends with the destructive task. Though Krishnamurti's approach recognises the importance of this negative function of the philosophy of religion, it does not regard it as the final step. It is a stepping stone towards a positive task of explaining the new significance of religious concepts from the level of the unconditioned mind. Thus according to Krishnamurti's approach, philosophy of religion will have three important tasks (1) to show the invalidity of the
traditional religious beliefs, (ii) to explore the possibility of a religion without belief and (iii) to explain the new significance of the concepts of religion, religious mind, meditation, freedom, discipline, sacred, holy, awareness, attention, love and so on.

Fourthly, the traditional philosophers regard religion as only one aspect of life, as one social organisation among many. Krishnamurti on the other hand holds that religion is not merely one aspect of life but it is the total life. We cannot separate religious life from our daily living. He also holds that religion cannot be organised. Thus for him religion is not a social organisation at all.

Fifthly, the traditional philosophers approach religion from a commitment to some general philosophical standpoint. The commitment may be either religious or anti-religious. Therefore their enquiry is biased by their commitments. There are other philosophers who are indifferent to religion, but in their attempt at putting forward a comprehensive philosophical system they are required to give some account of religion consistently with their general philosophical position. Their philosophy of religion, therefore, is a by-product. Krishnamurti, however, is genuinely interested in finding out what a true religion is. He is neither committed to any particular religion or to any antireligious stand-point nor is he indifferent to religion. Thus his enquiry is unbiased. This, according to him, is a necessary condition of a genuine enquiry into the nature of true religion.
It is generally believed that a religious person must be credulous, must have faith in some authority and must believe in the existence of some transcendent objects. An atheist or a positivist or a sceptic who is not credulous, who lacks faith and who rejects beliefs in the existence of transcendent objects as false or meaningless cannot be religious. Krishnamurti, on the contrary, holds that it is only a person who rebels against tradition, who challenges and rejects all authority, who questions everything and who is in constant revolution that is fit to be truly religious. He thus rejects fideism of Wittgenstein as the proper description of a truly religious life though it may be true of a religious person as traditionally understood.

In so far as Krishnamurti rejects all authority in religion, he can be said to be an anarchist in philosophy of religion. He says, "It is a most extraordinary thing that although most of us are opposed to political tyranny and dictatorship, we inwardly accept the authority, the tyranny, of another to twist our minds and our way of life. So we completely reject, not intellectually but actually, all so-called spiritual authority". Thus he asks us to start by denying something absolutely false—the traditional approach—without creating another pattern. Similarly, we have also to reject "our own inward authority, the authority of our own particular little experiences and accumulated opinions, knowledge, ideas and ideals". When a mind throws off the dead weight of authority, it is free from fear and it has

1. J. Krishnamurti, *Freedom from the Known*, p. 11
2. Ibid., p. 19
a tremendous amount of energy and "that energy itself produces the radical inward revolution and you do not have to do a thing about it". In this energy in which there is no fear at all — no fear of making a mistake, no fear of doing right or wrong — there is freedom. When there is freedom, it can never do anything wrong... There is no such thing as doing right or wrong when there is freedom. Such a mind that has no fear is capable of love. And where there is love, it can do what it will. For Krishnamurti, therefore, a religious mind accepts no standard, no norms. It does not conform to any pattern, to any tradition. It is in constant revolution.

Philosophy of religion, like philosophy of science or philosophy of mathematics, is a second-order activity. A person who wants to perform the second-order activity of philosophising on a particular form of life or a particular first-order activity like religion, science or mathematics, must possess an adequate knowledge of the corresponding first-order activity. Thus a person who has first-hand knowledge of mathematics alone can do philosophy of mathematics and a person who has good grounding in science alone can become a good philosopher of science. The same is true in the case of philosophy of religion though this truth does not seem to have been generally recognised. This truth is not recognised probably because it is assumed that a religious form of life is not a specialized activity of like science or mathematics, but is an aspect of life of almost every ordinary person. Though this assumption is true, the philosophy of religion which is content with depending, criticising or describing religious life as lived

1. Ibid., p.18
2. Ibid., p.18-19
by ordinary men, is bound to be more naive, superficial and poorer than the philosophy of religion which analyses the religious form of life as lived by an enlightened, truly religious person. Thus it seems that a person (i) who lives a truly religious life, whose mind is enlightened, holy and sacred, whose mind is capable of love, peace and compassion, i.e., who has a first-hand knowledge of a true religion or a true religious mind and (ii) who has the capacity to give a penetrating analysis of such a mind, who has clarity of thought and language, is the most competent or qualified person to be a philosopher of religion. Many philosophers of religion lack the first-hand knowledge of a truly religious life. They are, what Krishnamurti calls "Second-hand people" living on what we have been told, either guided by our inclinations, our tendencies or compelled to accept by circumstances and environment. We are the result of all kinds of influences and there is nothing new in us, nothing that we have discovered for ourselves; nothing original, pristine and clear. On the other hand, persons who live a religious life lack the capacity to analyse it. We find in J. Krishnamurti this rare combination of a highly sensitive religious mind and a very critical, unbiased intellect. He talks from the first-hand knowledge of what he has discovered for himself and gives a very clear, logical, penetrating analysis of it.

It may not be an exaggeration to say that J. Krishnamurti is one of the most qualified philosophers of religion who has brought about a true revolution in the very concept of religion.

1. J. Krishnamurti, Freedom from the Know, p.10
and consequently in the very concept of philosophy of religion. He seems to be the first person to have successfully propounded the idea of a *religion without belief* and thus freed religion from the clutter of cosmology, theology and all supernatural beliefs. His philosophy of religion has two aspects - negative and positive. He first shows that all the organised religions which accept beliefs have their root in fear and consequently how they are all religions of escape. If we squarely face the facts of life including fear, frustration, sense of insecurity and so on, and do not try to escape from them through any of the projected ideas and ideologies, then out of this perception emerges a new mind with its new religion. This is the positive aspect of his philosophy of religion, wherein he explains the new significance of such concepts as religion, perception, freedom, awareness, love, meditation, discipline, virtue, beauty, beatitude and so on.