Chapter V

Conclusion
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

It has thus emerged that throughout history, Tibet’s ambiguous political status has inevitably aroused immediate question pertaining to India’s security on her northern frontiers. The same continues to determine the course of India-China relations in the modern times. The British, all along, had followed a moderate or middle approach that put limits to Chinese power in Tibet, and at the same time encouraged Tibetan autonomy. While the British termed China’s status in Tibet ‘suzerainty’ the Chinese interpreted their traditional relationship with Tibet as ‘sovereignty’ while Tibet interolated it as nothing more than a ‘patron-priest’ relationship. Tibet’s political future suffered from British unwillingness to establish a protectorate over it. It has often been queried as to why the British opted to do so. The answers are not difficult to find. By recognizing China’s suzerainty over Tibet, the British could safeguard their commercial interests in China. At the same time, Tibetan autonomy prevented a direct military threat from China. Chinese presence in Tibet served as an effective deterrent from Russia expansion towards the south. Secondly, any other foreign power in Lhasa or even an independent Tibet would have created greater problem for the British by claiming the area of Lamaist influence in the border region of India.

It is indeed axiomatic that the genesis of the India-China border dispute can be directly traced to the British policy towards Tibet vis-à-vis China. Nevertheless China’s occupation of Tibet in 1951, the Indian position has been that there was obviously no single treaty between India and China that had delimited the entire boundary, but there were treaties between India and Tibet delimiting certain segments, while the rest of the boundary was well-known and established through customs and traditions. China questions the treaty making powers of Tibet throughout her history, and argues for invalidating all previous agreements effected by Tibet. The Chinese therefore persist in stating that the India-China border is entirety had never been formally ‘delimited’ and that there was only a ‘traditional customary line’ between the two countries that still required delimitation. What in effect the Chinese imply by ‘delimitation’ is actually what is universally understood as ‘demarcation.’
Given the ruggedness and inaccessibility of the terrain, physical making of the border (demarcation) was near impossible in the past: it may even be so now.

As a result, both countries have failed to agree upon a line that can from the international boundary between the two nations, for the purpose of bilateral negotiations on the issue, the India-China boundary has been sub-divided into three sectors – Western, Middle and Eastern Sectors. The dispute in each of these sectors is different and unique. The assessment of the current situation is that China is in occupation of the Aksai Chin area (approximately 33,000 square kilometers) in the Western Sector which India claims, based on historical treaties with Tibet but India had failed to exercise effective jurisdiction over region. This is obvious from the fact that Chinese activities in the region remained relatively unknown to Delhi for nearly a decade. Aksai Chin is desolate and difficult terrain, but it is far more accessible to Chinese that Indian side. It was therefore, but natural for the Chinese forces to take the Aksai Chin route into Western Tibet. Indeed this was the only practicable route because of the Sinking ‘Gobi’ (desert) to the North. Finding it unoccupied and suiting their strategic interest, the Chinese undertook survey for the Sinkiang-Tibet highway between 1954 and 1955. The highway was possibly constructed between 1956 and 1957. It was only in mid-1958 that India learned of developments in the area. The principle of ‘possession’ takes precedence over the right in ‘customs and administration,’ which India would find increasing difficult to substantiate. In a sense, therefore, the Chinese do have some grounds to claim the area—even if the claim is only tenuous.

In the Easter Sector, the McMahon line (boundary between outer Tibet and India) was drawn on maps (two sheets), of the scale one inch to eight miles. The line was drawn with a thick pen, and considering the survey and cartographical means available in 1914. The Chinese attitude lends substance to the viewpoint that China claims 32,000 square miles of territory in the Easter sector only for the purpose of using it as a bargaining power against India’s claim to the Aksai Chin in the Western Sector as argued in 2005 agreement on boundary issues. Eastern sector China cannot easily dispute the legal validity of the 1914 agreement because it has recognized it in the case of Burma (Myanmar).

In the Middle Sector, the boundary should be delineated along the highest watersheds. The Barahoti pastures should remain free access to graziers from both sides in order to monitor
the movement and activity of the greziers and resolve any local dispute, a joint check post
should be established. A similar check should be establish in the vicinity of the Lipulekh
pass which would facilitate the trans-border trade and annual Kailash Mansrover Yatra
(pilgrimages). This will create a confidence building measure among local people of both
sides.

It is obvious that good neighbourly ties between two countries representing ancient
civilisations, a third of humanity and two huge and growing economies is desirable for the
peace and stability of the region and a new and better ordering of international relations.
Greater trade and many-sided exchanges are postulated within a framework of cooperation.
This is welcome. However, it is the decision to appoint high level political representatives to
expedite a boundary settlement and to open up trade.

The 1914 Simla Agreement and 1954 Panchsheel Agreement were signed in contexts not
only separated in time but also with changed politico-economic conditions of the parties
involved. China from a rather weak position in 1914 moved to a stronger position in 1954,
whereas India moved from the a colony under British during Simla Agreement (1914) to a
peace loving decolonised Panchsheel country at Peking in 1954. It has been interesting to
study the way the treaties worked out three important aspects of bilateral agreements,
namely Tibet issue, and Boundary and Trade. The 1914 Simla agreement was a chess move
on the Great Game rivalry of the time, where British India sought to keep away not only
Russia but also to create a buffer state in the form of Outer Tibet. In addition to that there
was perhaps also a conception of empire so beautifully articulated by ever-youthful Lord
Curzon in 1909.

In such a grandiose scheme of things concerning India’s self perception, 1914 Simla
Agreement sought to define the political status of Tibet in precise terms, and hence the
McMahon line. The agreement though did not refuse the Chinese influence on Tibet, carved
out a territorial and political niche for its imperial-strategic goals in Tibet. Chinese side
never accepted the McMahon line-surrounding Tibet, Its subdued opposition bordering on
reticence made the agreement go well with British India’s favour. Tibet signed the 1914
Agreement thinking herself as an equal partner with China and India. However China could
never accept Tibet as a sovereign entity. British India wanted a semi-sovereign status for
Tibet as not only a counter weight to China but also as a buffer. The reality came to hilt when 1951 agreement between Tibet and China seemed to be patching up. The differences, which caught a newly independent India on a wrong foot. The revolutionary fervour in China was sweeping under the garb of greater family. The 1954 Panchsheel naturally flew from a context which was not only historically loaded against colonial conceptions of ‘buffers’ but was obliged to acknowledge agreements like 1951 between China and Tibet as expression of Tibet’s freewill, this was despite the full knowledge that 1951 was a period of Mao’s radicalism. India almost started losing its 1914 rights in Tibet. Unable to reenact 1914, nor convinced of it morally, Nehru’s other choice was of peace, which he perhaps sincerely believed till it collapsed. India gave away Tibet of 1914 in 1954 Panchsheel, and by the time when The Dalai Lama with 90,000 Tibetans, fled to India, it was too late for India.

Who best could have thought of organized trade if not the master traders themselves, the English. Colonel Younghusband’s expedition in 1904 under Lord Curzon surveyed the trade niceties between their conceived buffer, Tibet the same were incorporated in the 1914 Simla Agreement. Trade agency rights were procured all over Tibet and commercial domination established particularly in Outer Tibet. Unlike political setback in 1954 the trade aspect between Tibet and India were strengthened however sans the domination in Outer Tibet. In 1954 India recognized China’s complete control over Tibet, and voluntarily gave up its military, communication and postal and other rights which she had inherited from the British in accordance with British-Tibetan Treaties of 1904 and 1914. It is strange as to why India did not demand any reciprocal concessions. However unlike 1914, 1954 agreement is more elaborate on trade and pilgrimage, mentioning the particular passes and trade lines in the region. The Panchsheel theory of mutual benefit, peaceful coexistence created a fertile context for increased commercial and pilgrimage intercourse. The trade tempo began since 1914 saw further development in 1954 and has always since then formed a strong ground for negotiation of peace and settlement for the sake of commerce. In fact the trade and commerce had become the most workable Confidence Building Measures in themselves and also as a means and an end to solve vexed boundary issues.
The boundary question is a real tough one. The territorial boundaries form an essential component of a modern nation state, and compromises on them come at a very high cost. Today neither India nor China can find it easy to let go off a territorial settlement without risking a loss of public face. However there are a few pertinent issues that come up. First is the Chinese ambiguous stand on McMahon line. Chinese say they never accepted McMahon line and hence they never signed the 1914 agreement. It is strange on the part of China to accept same line when it is between them and Myanmar (then Burma), as attested in the 1960 agreement between China and Burma. Chinese have been selective and arbitrary with regard to McMahon line. Chinese propensity to produce older maps has made the relations between India and China hostage to a difficult decision-making. It is often argued or rather criticized that India lost an historical opportunity when it surrendered so many established rights of 1914 in 1954 without asking for a reciprocal move on at least Indian territorial claims. Things were more assumed in 1954 then in 1914, where the language was precise and demanding. There is some truth in saying that obviously India not only behaved politically naïve in surrendering Tibet to China, in a way but also failed in extracting a diplomatic deal out of China.

India, China and Tibet have formed a historical stretch that has seen a great deal of diplomatic exchanges for ages. It can be said that the British intervention in the region changed the diplomatic thrust in the region from cooperation to domination. It is not to say that the region was in perpetual peace before British advent, but it is certain that their presence increased the suspicion and made the region vulnerable to a consciousness of boundaries never before seen. The region lost its fluidity in the neat division of colonies and the concepts like ‘buffer state’ reduced cultures/civilizations into mere territorial issues. A big historical conclusion that can be drawn from this perspective might mean, and which is also empirically ascertainable that the countries of region, primarily India if not China has remained stuck in a confusion of British (India) thinking and present capacities to confront a rival militarily. That is to say that the Treaties of 1914 and 1954 are examples of India’s high and low, though that low can be well defended as a moral and ethical victory. On the other hand it was the other way round for China, 1914 was China’s low and 1954 high. From this one can move on to another perspective, that of realism, in the sense that the 1954 was a tactical surrender on the issue of Tibet for fanciful Panchsheel. In a way India lost its
solid leverage doll in 1954, which it might have utilized not only to press a Chinese vein for easing out on boundary issue and manipulating on it to keep it away from Pakistan. Today both India and China are Nuclear power so there is a nuclear deterrence as to avoid war on borders. Therefore it is all the mere important to settle the border problem specifically in the sprit of *Panchsheel* they should try to have more trade and other socio-cultural activities that build confidence, injects trust and triggers conversions on border disputes resolution each other could have understanding of other.

It is surely after 48 years after the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, to settle the boundary question in a pragmatic manner on the basis of ground realities. Territorial adjustments can be considered where they entail virtually no population exchanges at all. Inhabited areas pose more difficult problems and are best left alone. This would be a useful principle to keep in mind as the two sides get down to negotiating a boundary settlement as that of 1993 and 2005 agreements on boundary settlements. The gains from such a resolution could soon become manifest with the resumption of traditional economic and cultural ties between Tibet and Sikkim with regard to which there is no boundary dispute.

In longer time India can have better opportunity in dealing with China on border. CBMs and Joint Working Groups have been agreed by china but security relations not improving.

China is in physical occupying of large as 38,000 sq km of Indian Territory in Ladakh. 5,180 sq km northern part of Jammu & Kashmir was given by Pakistan in March 1963 as due of Pakistan-China agreement where Karakoram highway is built by China. 90,000 sq km area of Arunachal Pradesh claimed by china on the water shade of Lohit valley

After 1962 war Line of Actual Control (LAC) is yet to be physically demarcated on ground and military maps. There was clash in Nathu-la in 1967. Later in 1993, 1996 Joint Working groups formed. But failed to reach at Line of Actual Control and no exchange of maps. LAC can be best CBM.

After two decades of talks, India and China exchanged maps on the least controversial middle segment of their frontier in 2000 and three years later special envoys were appointed to map out a resolution of the dispute.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed an agreement on the "guiding principles" to resolve the dispute in 2005; China formally abandoned its claim to the Himalayan state of Sikkim. But there has been no concrete progress on demarcating the border.

China has solved border disputes with Russia, Vietnam and Myanmar by wants to leave with India for the future to solve this border dispute.

China’s policy of pearls of ring, secondly China has made Pakistan Nuclear State and china-Pakistan strategy. Can we become friend of China as PLA threats and challenges, 16 to 17 percent defence budget for Army in China, China’s most nuclear missile are short range which can be used against Taiwan and India. China does not recognize India nuclear weapon state more over China doesn’t want to discuss nuclear issue with India. Thirdly China’s military capacity built up in Tibet as 20 to 25 infantry divisions in Tibet, more air force and sea level air field are stationed.

The Dalai Lama who still embodies the Tibetan hope of some form of self-rule has been politically cold-shouldered by India for decades. India has indirectly done great service to China by keeping the Dalai Lama politically in check, inducing him, through denial of political support, to define his agenda for Tibet around the sensitivities and limitations of India’s China policy. The Dalai Lama’s realistic negotiating position on Tibet is in large measure a product of India’s temporizing policies.

With India and China regarded as the global powers of the future, any serious downturn in their ties would be viewed as baffling and self-destructive. Finally, India will have to cope with tensions with China alone. Even the US will not sacrifice its more expansive ties with China’s sake. We have; therefore, to build up leverage against China incrementally by creating political space for ourselves, much as China has done by simultaneously denying it is a threat and claiming Arunachal Pradesh, by professing friendship and supporting genuine Tibetan autonomy.
India and China are today the fastest growing large economies in the world. We should remember that China, India and Europe had almost equal shares of world income in the early 18th century. As the 21st century unfolds, both India and China stand poised to regain their weight in global economy, In India-China partnership, India should work together to ensure that she contribute to, even as she benefit from, the economic resurgence and integration of Asia. Our two economies are becoming engines of economic growth and must use our natural and human resources, technology for the common benefit of the region.

Today, in one way or another, all major powers seek to pursue a policy of “constructive engagement” or even “strategic partnership” with China because they realize that this is in their own political and economic interests. None of them surrender their vital interests in the process. They seek to negotiate mutually beneficial solutions to problems. This quest does not always succeed, but the danger of conflict is minimized and of cooperation to mutual advantage enhanced these are there in the Panchsheel which should be followed by both for progress.