Chapter Three

US Grand Strategy and the Global Order

This chapter seeks to address the following questions: (a) To what extent the US foreign policy had shaped the post-Second World War global order (b) How far the emergence of the US as the predominant power in the international system in the post-Cold War period had strengthened its unipolar status in the international system (c) To what extent the 11 September 2001 events has had an impact on the US grand strategy and where does Japan figure in the US grand strategy.

The culmination of the Second World War had thrown up two dominant powers in the international system. One was the United States of America and the other was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic. The other great powers of the era like the Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan and Italy were either defeated or sapped of their powers due to their war efforts. Only the US and Soviet Russia had the military and economic power to influence the outcome of the system.

Even though the United States entered the hegemonic war with the Soviet Union following World War II, its hegemonic ambitions and intentions could be traced much earlier. The prominent objective of nineteenth century American foreign policy was to achieve hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. It succeeded in bringing its objective to fruition by ruthlessly pursuing two closely liked policies: (a) expanding across North America and building the most powerful state in the Western Hemisphere, a policy commonly known as ‘Manifest Destiny’ and (b) minimising the influence of the United Kingdom and the other European powers in the Americas, a policy known as the ‘Monroe Doctrine.’¹

The Louisiana Territory on the western side of the Mississippi River was purchased from France in 1803 for $15 million. Florida was taken from Spain in 1819. Despite having won its independence from Mexico in 1836, Texas was annexed on 29

¹The phrase ‘Manifest Destiny’ was actually not coined until 1845. Nevertheless, as early as the middle of the eighteenth century, the idea that the English settlements in America were destined to embrace most of the continent was well-engrained in American and European thinking (Horseman 1985).
December 1845. The United States acquired a large swath of Oregon territories in the Pacific Northwest from Great Britain. In May 1846, it declared war on Mexico and went on to conquer California. The US purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867 (Mearsheimer 2001).

President James Monroe enunciated the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ in the annual message to the Congress on 2 December 1823. Accordingly, the United States would not get involved in Europe’s wars; the European powers would not be allowed to acquire new territory in the Western Hemisphere; to ensure that the European powers did not form alliances with the independent states of the Western Hemisphere or control them in any way (Mearsheimer 2001). The United States was largely successful in following the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ mainly because of two reasons: (a) most of the continental European powers had got mired in their own nationalistic wars (b) the United States grew more powerful than it was in the first half of the nineteenth century.

The US Strategy and the World Wars

The United States remained ‘isolationist’ till the early part of the twentieth century. The American involvement outside the Western Hemisphere, especially in the continental Europe, took place following the decimation of French and Russian forces in the hands of Germany. A German dominated Europe would not be in the interest of the United States. As any other dominant continental power would do once it gains control over Europe was to dominate the Western Hemisphere. In order to prevent a German victory, the US declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917 and sent its troops to Europe by the end of 1917. The war ended on 11 November 1918.

Although the United States had withdrawn most of the troops from Europe after the war ended, a small portion of it remained in occupied Germany till early 1923. The US remained largely aloof from continental European affairs in the 1920s and 1930s. The primary reason was that the Versailles Treaty had kept Germany in shackles. More importantly, the United States had no structural incentive to come out of its isolation and to seek hegemony in Europe (Layne 2006 b).

In addition to that, inter war Europe was multi-polar as Great Britain, France and even Germany and the Soviet Union remained as great powers. As a result, there was no antagonistic power that sought the dominance of Europe. Moreover, the multi-polar
situation in continental Europe was not conducive for the United States to exploit and expand at a low cost. Therefore, the absence of opportunity for expansion and the potential for resistance in case of attempts to dominate Europe precluded the US from exercising its hegemonic ambitions in Europe.

The rise of Hitler to power in Germany in 1933 and his aggressive postures and aggrandisement of power failed to provoke the United States, because the US played along with the continental powers in appeasing Hitler’s Germany. Sooner than later, the US had realised that Nazi Germany was a potential hegemon and its intentions were clear once it attacked Poland on 1 September 1939 – the Second World War began. In response, Great Britain and France declared war against Germany.

The United States stayed away from involving in the war initially as it did during the Great War. The fall of France in the summer of 1940 precipitated the situation. Nevertheless, the United States only continued its material support to Great Britain in its war efforts and refrained from dispatching troops. Hitler’s Germany played into the US’s game by declaring war against it four days after the Pearl Harbour attack i.e. 11 December 1941. The American troops landed in Europe only in September 1943.

As the war was in progress, the US policy makers realised that the end of the war could present an opportunity for the US to establish a powerful position in the international system. Added to that, the possible acceleration of Great Britain’s decline and the ‘political collapse’ of Europe would render favourable opportunities for expansion (Stoler 2000). Once the war ended, the US seized the opportunity to control the international system by acting hegemonically and shape the international order according to its interests. This was also facilitated by the vastly increased relative power and material capabilities of the United States.

The American ambition of global dominance was not without stumbling blocks – The Soviet Union. In 1940, the Soviet Union had annexed the three Baltic States – Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia – after signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact, thus expanded into eastern and central Europe and began to impose its control on Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania even before the end of the war. The Red Army’s defeat of Nazi troops in Stalingrad in 1942 and pursuing of the fleeing troops to Berlin spelled the doom for American ambitions (Hook and Spanier 2000).
The Soviet drive to control Eastern Europe, especially Poland was essentially linked to its security. Because, once the alliance that was formed to defeat a common enemy comes to an end, it had to deal with a new opponent. The Soviet had to guard against potential adversaries in a system characterised by conflict among states and a sense of insecurity and fear on the part of its members. The Soviet strategy was primarily influenced by two factors: a. the bloody European history and b. sufferings at the hands of German invasion twice within a span of thirty years.

During and immediately after the war, for economic and strategic reasons, the United States for the first time projected its power and influence into the Middle East. The need to protect US access to Middle Eastern oil generated a new post-war set of security and political commitments. The control of oil was recognised as key to post-war strategic interest (Yergin 1991). As America’s stakes deepened in the Middle East, the US also came to regard Greece, Turkey and Iran as strategically important (Stoler 2000).

As the US was strategising its move, the Soviets made the first foray into the Middle East. The Soviet strategic interest can be explained through its intention to expand southward to establish a warm-water port and to bring Soviet power closer to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. The USSR, as early as June 1945, made several demands to Turkey: cession of several Turkish districts lying on the Turkish-Soviet border, a revision of Montreux Convention governing the Dardanelles Straits in favour of a joint Soviet-Turkish administration and severance of its ties to Britain and conclusion of a treaty with the Soviets similar to it had with the Baltic states and finally to lease bases in the Dardanelles for Soviet naval and land forces to be used for ‘joint defence’. The US and Britain rejected the demands and sent naval forces to defend Turkey together.

Greece was under pressure through sustained and widespread guerrilla warfare, which began in the fall of 1946 following the victory of right-wing forces. In August 1946, the communist forces renewed the war in the north, where the Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe kept the guerrillas supply lines intact.

In the mean time, the Soviet Union pressurised Iran by refusing to withdraw its troops that had been there since 1941, when along with Britain to prevent Nazi onslaught. Even after the British withdrew, the Soviets stayed back in northern Iran. Once the
United States and Britain issued firm statements that they would be compelled to use force to defend, the Soviets relented and withdrew from Iran.

Therefore, even before the end of the Second World War the battle lines between the two upcoming great powers had been drawn. Each attempted to create their spheres of influence and satellite states. The Soviets to a greater extent succeeded in transforming its satellite states in Eastern Europe into communist governments and was striving to convert others outside Europe as well. The United States propagated liberal democracy and open door economic policy in its sphere of influence. Whilst ideology and principles were enunciated as the *raison d'etre* of these policies, the struggle for global dominance unambiguously explains them.

**The Cold War and Containment**

The growing hostilities between the United States and the Soviet Union evaporated all the good will that was gained following the war. The United States circumvented direct conflict with the Soviets. The nuclear option was not seriously considered though the Soviet bomb was in its nascent stages. The US ultimately chose the policy of ‘long-term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment’ (Hook and Spanier 2000).

As its policy toward the USSR evolved, the US wanted to maintain a favourable distribution of power by preventing Eurasian industrial power (West Germany, western Europe, and Japan) and natural resources (Middle Eastern oil and Southeast Asian raw materials) from falling under the Soviet’s control (Leffler 1984). Although the US could have assisted West Germany and Japan to revive and act as independent poles of power like pre-war time in order to counter the Soviet ambitions of dominance. But the United States acted on the contrary.

The US was apprehensive that Western Europe, Germany and Japan would bandwagon with the Soviet Union. In addition to that, America’s grand strategic aim was to secure its global hegemony by bringing these potential poles of power into its own orbit and thereby prevent them from emerging as challengers to US predominance (Layne 2006 b). The United States wanted to harness their power in furtherance of its own grand strategic objectives. The US aimed to secure its preponderant influence in the
international system by integrating Western Europe, West Germany and Japan into a US led orbit (Leffler 1992).

The declaration of Truman Doctrine on 12 March 1947 signalled the initiation of the policy of containment. Even though containment was conceived for European situation, changes in other parts of the world broadened it. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Asian perimeter of the Soviet Union and China became a second target of US containment. In contrast to Western Europe, many Asian states had only recently emerged from colonialism and their nationalistic and anti-Western feelings were very strong. The collapse of Nationalist China and the establishment of a communist Chinese government on the mainland in 1949 particularly weakened the US position in Asia.

The United States, then, confronted with the combined strength of two large, heavily populated, militarily powerful communist states. The pressure on Europe united the Western powers, whereas pressure on Asia divided them by producing a split over the character and nature of the new Chinese regime and the degree to which it threatened Western interests. Therefore, in order to support its globalist strategy, the United States focused on two areas: (a) created an international economic system to support commerce among the capitalist states (b) rebuilt the country’s military structures and created an elaborate web of alliances.

The Bretton Woods agreement created three institutions to promote economic growth among the capitalist states: (a) the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or World Bank would lend the funds needed by the member states to rebuild their industries (b) the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would govern currency exchanges and provide credits for member states facing short-term currency crises (c) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) would establish rules to promote open market and greater commerce across borders (Hook and Spanier 2000).

Apart from these the US had to revive the economies of Britain, France and Western Germany which were ruined in the war efforts. The reason being that the failure on the part of the United States to do so would not only give life to their nationalistic tendencies but also the danger of falling into the trap of the Soviets as many of these countries witnessed the emergence of left-wing parties in opposition to the US dominance. The result was the European Economic Recovery Programme (known as
Marshall Plan) through which the United States furnish the funds; the Europeans would deal with the initiative and planning.

The Marshall Plan was originally offered to all of Europe including the Soviet Union and eastern European countries. But the Soviets and its satellite states refused take the offer. In the place of the Marshall Plan, the Soviet Union created the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) to provide economic assistance to eastern European governments.2

Military measures followed economic initiatives. France and Britain had signed the Treaty of Dunkirk in March 1947 to provide for their mutual defence against a threat to their security. A year later, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Pact for their collective self-defence. In April 1949 these countries along with the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal created the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). It called for continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid among its members and an invasion of one shall be considered an attack against them all.

The US sought to use institutions subordinate the individual interests of the Western European states to the overarching interests of the Atlantic community, because a partial surrender of sovereignty in the realm of security would become a driving force toward further unification in Western Europe. In addition to that, NATO was the linchpin of the US strategy of preventing the re-emergence of European multi-polarity. The integration of Western European defence under the US command was meant to prevent any Western European state from acquiring military capability to support autonomous national security policies, and more specifically, to control the military power of renascent Germany (Lundestad 1998). The creation of NATO provoked the Soviet Union to establish the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, comprising the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe.

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2 Although $13 billion was sanctioned for the Marshall Plan, the amount actually spent between 1948 and the end of 1951, when the programme ended, was just over $12 billion. Britain, France and West Germany received more than half of this amount. The actual aid extended by Moscow, however, was modest compared with that of the Marshall Plan.
The US and East Asia

As the US was occupied in creating its economic and security structure in Europe, the Nationalist China collapsed in 1949, on which the US was counting in the emerging cold war. The establishment of People's Republic of China (PRC) under the leadership of communist leader Mao Zedong was followed by China's annexation of neighbouring Tibet. A treaty of friendship was also signed with the Soviet Union. The communist North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950 and the Korean War broke out. Both the North and South Korean governments claimed legitimacy over the land and in a way it presented a civil war situation.

The outbreak of Korean War altered the security situation in East Asia. As the US was forced to reckon with the situation, it was left with no allies in the region to mount the war efforts in Korea. As a result, the US quickly ended the occupation of Japan and signed a Security Treaty with it. Japan was made an ally in East Asia and a bulwark against communism. The US involvement in Korea is a good case in example for explaining the US grand strategy.

In order to preclude multi-polar tendencies, the US reassures its European and East Asian allies that their security concerns against external threats would be taken care of by the US. In addition to that, the United States would protect them from one another and defend their interests in the peripheries. By doing so, the US accomplishes two key grand strategic objectives: (a) it neutralises allies incentives to acquire the kinds of military capabilities that would put them in the same league as the United States, and (b) it regulates their external behaviour by preventing them from acting independently of Washington in security policy (Layne 2006 b).

The reassurance of US security umbrella to allies is vital; otherwise the credibility of US commitments to regional stability would be questioned. In that case, it could cause the allies and friends to adopt more divergent defence policies and postures, thereby by weakening the web of alliances and coalitions on which it relies to protect its interest abroad (Government of the United States of America 1997). Hence, if the United States remained inactive when South Korea fell to communist North Korea, it would not only encourage future aggressive acts but also demonstrate to the world that the US was either afraid of the Soviets or unconcerned about its allies.
As a result, the US brought its occupation troops from Japan to Korea to participate officially in a multinational United Nations peace keeping force. The UN involvement suited the US because one of the aims of American foreign policy was to associate its Cold War policies with the humanitarian values and peacemaking functions of the United Nations (Hook and Spanier 2000). The UN force led by General MacArthur successfully defeated the Northern forces and reached the 38 Parallel. The US government’s focus shifted from containment of Soviet expansion to the forceful elimination of a communist state.

Following the retrenchment of North Korea, China got itself involved in the conflict – by sending its regulars in the guise of volunteers – as it perceived the resulting march threatening. The fortune of the war was fluctuating and the US abandoned the total-war objective of unified Korea and the elimination of its government. It settled for the original limited aim of the war, the defence of South Korea. The war was concluded in July 1953. In August 1953, the United States signed a mutual security pact with South Korea designed to deter another attack from the North.

Sooner than later another conflict erupted in East Asia in the Taiwan Straits. The military of Peoples Republic of China (PRC) attacked its rival Nationalist led Taiwan in the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, allegedly in response to Nationalist assault against the mainland. The United States and the Nationalists had signed a treaty of mutual defence in 1953 under which the US guaranteed the security of Taiwan. In turn, the Nationalists agreed not to attack the mainland or to reinforce their offshore garrisons without the consent of the United States.

Once again in August 1958 the PRC resumed shelling of the offshore islands. The US threatened with force, if necessary with nuclear weapons. The attack was halted. The Chinese revolution and the Korean War had reoriented the grand strategy of the United States. The NATO alliance with the Western European nations had secured it Atlantic front; the Pacific front was secured with the alliances of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Through these alliances and security pacts the US not only assured itself of bases and ports to station its troops around the world and also guaranteed itself of allies for its said objective of containing communism.
The US and Middle East

The cold war rivalry between the capitalist block led by the United States and communist bloc led by the Soviet Union had not only engulfed Europe and East Asia and also Middle East. The bone of contention was Israel and Palestine. The United Nations partitioned Palestine into two independent states in November 1947, one Jewish and the other Arab, which was unacceptable to the Arabs. The armies of the Arab League (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia) invaded the new state on May 10, 1948, but later they were defeated by the Israelis.

The Arabs refused to recognise Israel. In September 1955, Egypt, the leading Arab power, concluded an arms deal with Czechoslovakia, acting for the Soviet Union. Abdel Nasser armed with larger quantities of ammunitions, MIG-15 fighter planes and tanks threatened to invade Israel and nationalise the Suez Canal. In this juncture, Israel took the offensive and quickly defeated the Egypt led Arab forces. The British and the French still lurking for fortunes intervened on Israeli behalf and took control of the canal.

The United States seized the opportunity to win over the Arabs to its side by condemning the invasion. This would also preclude the Soviets from claiming as the sole champion of Arab aspirations. The Soviet intervention in Hungary further strengthened its stand. Subsequently, the British, French and Israeli governments withdrew their forces. Once the American support evaporated, the Soviets issued threats against the British and French and elimination of Israel. Soviet’s move brought overwhelming support of the Arabs especially Egypt. Though taken aback by the Soviet move, the US Congress in 1957 passed a joint resolution known as the Eisenhower Doctrine that declared that the preservation of Middle East is vital to US security. The US was prepared to use armed force to assist any country that requires US help to counter military threats from any country controlled by international communism (Hook and Spanier 2000).

In 1967, Egypt along with Syria and Jordan surrounded Israel and blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba, which was a lifeline for oil and other goods. Their strategy was to cut Israel into two and declare the liberation of Palestine from occupation. Although the US

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3 The Soviet Union intervened in Hungary in 1956. But the Eisenhower administration allowed the Soviet crackdown to stand, despite its previous pledges to support the 'liberation' of Eastern Europe.
had recognised the right of Israel to send ships through the Gulf following its victory in 1956, it was not in a position to open a second front as it was already involved in Vietnam. The possibility of clashing with the Soviet Union was deterring as the Soviets already had their warships in eastern Mediterranean, fully supported the Arabs in their aims and continually denounced Israel as an aggressive tool of American imperialism.

The Soviet calculation was to expel western influence and establish itself as the dominant power in the region and Europe could be weakened, even neutralised. Apart from this, a successful blockade would deter the US navy and would damage its future commitments to Israel. In nutshell, it was an opportunity for the Soviets to replace the West as the region’s dominant power.

In the meanwhile, a diplomatic solution to the problem was eluding. Israel seized the opportunity and launched precise air strikes against the Egyptian forces successfully and reached the Suez Canal in three days. The Jordanian army was also routed; half of Jerusalem was captured along with the western bank of river Jordan. Finally Israel eliminated the Syrian army from the Golan Heights. This brought an end to the Soviet calculations and the US continued to remain as the dominant power in the Middle East.

The US and Latin America

Even though the Americans clamoured for democratic rule all over the world, the Monroe Doctrine had turned the entire Western Hemisphere into a US sphere of influence. The US had actively supported military rulers throughout Latin America and exercised their self-appointed ‘international police powers’ to maintain stability in the region (LaFeber 1993).

The Organisation of American States (OAS) was created in 1948. Through OAS the US effectively guaranteed the security of its neighbours throughout the hemisphere. As a result, the US was ensuring that communism would not take root in the region without a fight. Guatemala, one of the poorest and repressive states, was ruled by dictator Gen. Jorge Ubico. A popular protest had overthrown him and was replaced by Juan Jose Arevalo who became the first democratically elected leader in its history. He was soon replaced by radical leftist candidate Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. His attempts to take over land and plantations owned by American corporate drew American intervention. A coup was staged on the pretext that Guatemala imported weapons from Czechoslovakia.
Arbenz was removed from power and reforms were abolished and military took over the control.

A group of armed rebels under the leadership of Fidel Castro overthrew the US-backed dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista and established a revolutionary government on 1 January 1959 in Cuba. American capital controlled majority of Cuba’s utilities, mines, cattle ranches, oil and sugar. As the popular anti-Americanism grew, Cuba moved closer to the USSR. The Cuban army became stronger – with Soviet training, technical assistance and weaponry – second only to the US in the region. The Cuban economy also got integrated with the communist bloc.

The US had cut off diplomatic relations with Cuba in January 1961 and planned secretly for Castro’s overthrow with a small force of Cuban exiles. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) planned and supervised their execution. They assumed that once the exiles had gained a beachhead in the Bay of Pigs, some units of Castro’s army and much of Cuban population would welcome them as liberators. On the contrary, the operation ended in a dramatic failure.

The Cuban victory not only strengthened its case and cause and also dented the US prestige. It also ended the monopoly of US power in the Caribbean and Latin America. Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Soviets saw that the communist regime in Cuba was tolerated; they began to establish a missile base there. They were building launching sites for approximately seventy short-and medium range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

The American vacillation at the Bay of Pigs and afterward apparently convinced the Soviets that there would not be any reaction beyond diplomatic protests and the US would not fight to protect its vital interests. The Soviet calculation was that the failure to respond on the part of the US would convince its NATO allies that the United States had become vulnerable to attack and could no longer be relied upon to protect Europe. The success of the missile sites would also validate the Soviet claim of nuclear balance with the US.

The stakes were very high for the United States if it failed to respond appropriately; though it would only be a setback for the USSR. Eventually, the US ordered a blockade of Cuba to prevent any further missile shipments and demanded the
removal of the missiles already in place. Consequently, the Soviets called back the ships and ordered that the missile sites be deactivated. Though the reasons for Soviet withdrawal had been debated (Alison and Zelikow 1999), the naval superiority of the US in the Caribbean with which it could have mounted an invasion was one of the primary reasons.

**Vietnam and Containment**

Vietnam was a French colony. Failure to give independence following the World War II – Americans did in Philippines, the British in India, Burma and Ceylon – gave rise to Vietminh (or Viet Cong), a revolutionary movement, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh to create a classless communist society (Karnow 1983). The French appointed a puppet Bao Dai as Emperor. But people identified with the Vietminh and the French were viewed as illegitimate rulers.

The Vietminh’s victory over the French army at Dienbienphu forced the United States to declare that Indochina was of strategic importance to its security and warned China against direct or indirect intervention. But the US restrained from directly involving in the conflict as it just had withdrawn from Korea. The Geneva agreement signed between the French and the Vietnamese ended the war with temporary division of Vietnam at the Seventeenth Parallel. Two separate and interim governments, a communist north and a non-communist South Vietnam to be established and the election were due for July 1956.

The United States in order to prevent a communist takeover decided to support the new government of Ngo Dinh Diem, a staunch anticommunist. The prevention of elections forced the North Vietnamese to wage armed struggle in 1959 to unify the country. The US perceived that a communist victory would inevitably follow more victories – domino theory – and the containment strategy would fail. The US advanced this logic to justify intervention in Vietnam (Karnow 1983).

The US perceived that Ho Chi Min and Viet Minh were the puppets of China and through guerrilla warfare tactics they were trying to undermine a non-communist government within the US sphere of influence. Their success would add another country to the Soviet-Sino block and tilt the global balance of power. It would also set an
example for other revolutionary movements elsewhere that the US could be defeated despite its nuclear power and economic resources (Karnow 1983).

Despite massive troop deployment and indiscriminate use of air power, the US failed to break the resolve of the Viet Minh. The US army which was trained for conventional warfare failed miserably against the motivated guerrilla forces and hostile populace. The war came to an end in 1973 when both the Vietnamese sides signed an agreement in Paris. Two years later the North Vietnamese launched another attack and South Vietnam surrendered unconditionally.

**Balance of Power and Détente**

The United States had an atomic monopoly till late 1949. In 1950, the United States had about fifty bombs plus the means to deliver them, while the Soviet Union had only tested an atomic device. By the mid-1950s both had tested nuclear devices. From the 1950s to the late 1960s the balance of power had been asymmetric; the United States held strategic superiority and an intercontinental reach; the Soviet Union maintained conventional superiority and a regional reach. But by 1970 the Soviet Union's strategic power had achieved parity with that of the United States, and the Soviets could now reach American mainland and Europe with ease. The Soviet ability to neutralise American nuclear force had also developed, as a result its capacity to project its conventional power beyond Eurasia had also grown.

Along with the growing power parity with the USSR, the United States had also realised that fighting communism as a goal was increasingly getting diversified as a result of its fragmentation and internal divisions globally. The United States resigned to the situation that it had to accommodate the legitimate security needs of its principal challenger, the Soviet Union, in order to preserve peace and security. The recognition would satisfy the interests of other powers so as to gain acceptance for the present international system.

Détente as a strategy was selected to secure American interests at a lower level of tensions and costs but also continuation of containment at a time when the US had lost its strategic superiority. Détente was to be achieved by exploiting Sino-Soviet split. Détente was continuation of containment by other means (Hook and Spanier 2000). The US began it by ending regular patrol of the Taiwan Straits by the Seventh Fleet, and lifting of
trade and visitation restrictions against People’s Republic of China (PRC). This opened the way for President Nixon’s personal visit to China in February 1972.

In the Shanghai communique released at the end of Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972, the United States and China declared their opposition to the hegemony of any power in Asia—a clear reference to the Soviet Union. The US also declared that it would gradually remove all its forces and installations from Taiwan and would not interfere in a peaceful settlement between the communists and nationalists. On 1 January 1979, the People’s Republic of China and the United States exchanged diplomatic recognition and ambassadors. In return, Beijing accepted the American position that the Taiwan problem be solved peacefully.

As the US-China relations starting to thaw, the US-Russia relation also witnessed improvement. Though economic cooperation was a non-starter, the area of strategic arms control achieved greater importance. The continued conflict between these two powers fuelled arms race which would result in a cataclysmic outcome. To avoid such an outcome, each side built up its nuclear forces as a defence and negotiated agreements that reduced the chances of war breaking out. But as the basic conflicts continued and as nuclear weapons were unlikely to be abolished, the next best tactic was to manage the nuclear balance by instituting arms control agreements and promoting mutual deterrence (Gray 1986).

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) was at the centre of détente, which had four objectives. The first was to make the arms race more predictable by establishing, documenting, and reporting the number of strategic weapons possessed by each side. The second objective was to ensure parity. The assumption was that if the two sides had approximately the same number of nuclear warheads, neither could launch a crippling strike against the other. The third was to reduce threat to each side’s deterrent forces. The fourth reason was SALT’s importance for détente.

The first set of agreements, known as SALT I was signed in May 1972 and it had taken two and half years to negotiate and incorporated two agreements. The first limited each country’s ABM’ to two hundred launchers, later to be reduced to one hundred. The second froze offensive missile batteries at the number each side possessed at the time. Each side retained the right to improve its weapons within the overall quantitative
agreement, thus preserving parity. Although no on-site inspection to check for violations was established, both sides pledged not to interfere with each other’s reconnaissance or spy satellites, which would be the principal means for checking compliance with both accords.

The SALT II stipulated that each side would have an equal number of strategic weapons: 2,400 missiles and bombers; 1,320 of these delivery systems could have MIRVs. This agreement became controversial in the US. The agreement provided for real reductions of strategic launchers from the Vladivostok ceiling of 2,400 to 2,250. This meant the Soviet Union would have to reduce their force levels by about 150 older missiles thereby setting a precedent for SALT III, whose main aim was to bring about a major reduction in strategic forces (Freedman 1989).

The critical aspect about the SALT II ceilings was that they were so high that the agreement defined any reasonable interpretation of the words arms control. At the same time, despite equal numbers provided for both sides, the treaty would give the Soviet Union strategic superiority because Soviet missiles were considerably larger, could carry more and bigger warheads, and were becoming more accurate. Therefore, the Soviets would presumably be capable of destroying up to 90 per cent of America’s Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) (Freedman 1989). The Soviet intervention into Afghanistan in 1979 brought the debate on SALT II to a grinding halt, though the terms of SALT II were observed well into the late 1980s.

The détente neither prevented the US from engineering a coup against Marxist Salvador Allendale in Chile in 1973, nor the Soviet Union involvements in Angola (1975) and Somalia in 1977. The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 resulted in the first oil crisis. The US involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict neither cut much ice with the warring sides nor did it bring stable peace to the region. The United States along with the industrial world had to acquiesce to the risen oil price set by the Organisation of Petroleum Producing Countries (OPEC).

Apart from this, the American involvement in the Central American states of Nicaragua and Salvador ended in a disaster as its covert roles further fuelled the situation and resulting in civil wars between right-wing forces and left-wing guerrillas. The final straw was the helplessness and inability of the US when faced with a hostage situation in
the American embassy in Iran in November 1979. All these contributed to the perception of the decline of the US power.

**Cold War II and Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI)**

In the 1980s the US grand strategy witnessed a clear departure from 1970s. It was basically a return to the containment policy of the immediate post-World War II years. The primary emphasis was on East-West relations, on the Soviet Union as a communist expansionist state, and on the need to contain that expansion – by force if necessary. The American administrators viewed that its resolve to combat communism was diluted in the previous decade.

As a corollary, measures were taken to quickly modernise the US strategic forces so that they could continue to deter more direct Soviet challenge. At the centre of this rearmament programme was the MX (missile experiment) missile with ten warheads. This became highly controversial as it appeared to have the same first-strike capability attributed to Soviet ICBMs, the MX would, it was feared, create a mutual hair-trigger situation that could lead to a nuclear war that neither side wanted. The US under Reagan administration devised five-year $1 trillion defence programme (which actually totalled almost $2 trillion over Reagan's two terms).

The Reagan administration was strongly opposed to arms control – the centre piece of the US policies towards the Soviet Union in the previous decade. The rejection of SALT process reflected its conviction that past arms control efforts had led to America's relative decline. The US unveiled its Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in the midst of this controversy about arms control. It reliance on sophisticated space based technologies such as lasers and particle beams earned the name 'Star Wars'. The SDI would render nuclear missile impotent and obsolete as its layered defence using different technologies to destroy approaching missiles during each phase of the ballistic trajectory. Mutual assured survival would replace mutual assured destruction (Hook and Spanier 2000).

The SDI, if worked, would edge out the Soviets, because they had invested heavily in first-strike missiles for years, which were also the basis for the Soviet claim to superpower status. The SDI threatened the value of this Soviet investment in ICBMs and claims to equality with the United States. Although defence of the population and
elimination of all ICBMs were presumably the long-term goals of SDI, the system could potentially defend US land-based ICBMs in the future. A defence against these missiles would relieve the American fear that its ICBMs were vulnerable and increase Soviet uncertainty that they could launch a successful first strike. Thus, there would be no point in a Soviet strike in this sense. SDI could make US deterrence more credible.

The Soviets perceived that the SDI to be part of an offensive, not defensive strategy, a prelude to an American strike that would be launched once the US population could be protected. The SDI research and development would result in American technology taking a huge step forward at a time when Soviet technology already behind.

The US also prioritised the reversal of the Soviet gains during the 1970s in Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, Afghanistan and Cambodia after the Vietnam War. The US perceived that the Soviets and their allies had been using force to make inroads in these areas – direct force in Afghanistan, indirect force through proxies elsewhere. In Central America the Marxist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua was seeking to extend its influence to neighbouring countries especially El Salvador.

The US adopted national liberation strategy against governments that had not come to power by means of democratic processes. The US strategy was based on the assumption that the Soviet Union had become overextended in the 1970s; that the global balance of military power was increasingly favouring the United States; that the Soviet Union’s most critical problems were domestic; that, except for Afghanistan, only peripheral Soviet interests were involved; that the Soviet Union would not want to risk a confrontation with the United States; and that a democratic tide was sweeping across the developing world. The anticommunist forces were not strong enough to overthrow the Marxist regimes, but with American help they could keeps the wars going (Hook and Spanier 2000).

In continuation of this policy change the US intervened directly on the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada, where a military coup had led to the installation of a Marxist regime in 1983. The US military operation though bungled, had achieved the main objective of eliminating the Marxist regime. The United States initially supported the Sandinistas’ regime in Nicaragua with foreign aid. But their consolidation of power and militaristic behaviour was viewed as a challenge to its power. The US formed an
anti-Sandinista army known as the ‘contras’. They were trained by US military advisors in neighbouring Honduras; the soldiers staged a series of military raids against Sandinista regime from Honduras, which received increased military assistance for these purposes.

**Post-Cold War and US Predominance**

The fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 signified the end of cold war. The Bipolar balance of power the characterised the world politics in the post-World War II period had come to an end. The United States had become the only super power in the international system following the collapse of the Soviet Union – a unipolar moment. The United States’ possessed unmatched military power, economic assets and diplomatic clout that could not be challenged by any or a combination of powers at that moment. The power of the United States was greater than the combined power of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan. This was unparalleled in the entire history (Krauthammer 1990-1991).

The uniqueness of the current US position in the international system provoked a wide spread expectations. On the one hand, American military preponderance would deter other countries from challenging the status quo and the US dominance of the world economy would strengthen global commitments to private enterprise and free trade. On the other hand, the unclear nature of the upcoming adversary would pose difficulties in calculating how, where, and under what circumstances to exert its influence or expend its resources. Apart from this, states always tended to seek a balance against dominant powers; the rise of a global coalition seeking to counter the United States was not ruled out (Layne 1993).

The end of the cold war celebrated with much fanfare in the West as the end of history and triumph of liberal democracy and free-market capitalism (Fukuyama 1989). But in reality, it was also more vulnerable. It could not predict the origins of future challenges to it or even the identity of its new enemies. The prospects for confrontations and crises were even greater after the demise of the Soviet collapse because the opposition to the political and social regimes the United States sought to sustain in so many countries had became increasingly diverse and decentralised (Kolko 2007).

George Bush spoke of ‘new world order’ and the significance of multilateral organisations like the United Nations (UN) to uphold wide spread accepted norms of
international behaviour and finding a place for freedom and human rights in all nations. The Clinton administration spoke of the country's primary goal in the mid-1990s would be to achievement of strong economic growth that would depend on robust global economy; the issues that were neglected during the Cold War – ecology, rapid population growth and political repression – receive attention in the early 1990s and international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and World Bank should play a meaningful role in achieving the nation's goal (Hook and Spanier 2000).

As the post-Soviet global order was taking shape, the first crisis of the era unfolded in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The United States had three top priority interests in the Middle East: (a) the prevention of Soviet domination of the region (b) access to the region's oil resources for America and its allies (c) the security and well being of Israel (Quandt 2006). The collapse of the Soviet Union created a power vacuum in the Middle East. Iraq attempted to become the regional hegemon by annexing Kuwait in 1990. Iraq's intent was to control the Kuwaiti oil fields as a result the total output of the region and prices. The control of oil prices would not only augment its treasury and also would become the dominant player in the region deciding the political outcomes.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait surprised the US. At first the US decided to manage the crisis in line with the 'new world order' whereby, the major powers would co-operate to maintain international peace and the United Nations would work as originally intended. The US got the UN to condemn the invasion. The US also enlisted the support of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Negotiations failed to make any breakthrough.

The war with Iraq began on 17 January 1991. The US and its allies used over forty-seven days of air power to decimate the Iraqi army and its modern equipment. The 240,000 US soldiers plus 140,000 allied forces were use against 183,000 Iraqis in Kuwait alone. Military victory came very quickly (Schraeder 2006). The United States once again established it's pre-eminence in the Middle East.

Following the withdrawal of super powers, as in the Middle East, states in Africa such as Somalia, Ethiopia, and Rwanda plunged into civil war and anarchy. The United States perceived African continent more as a means of solving non-African problems; and preventing the further advances of the Soviet communism and therefore US
relationship with African regimes evolved according to their relative importance within the East-West framework (Schraeder 2006).

The US containment policies resulted in the emergence of the African continent as a battlefield for proxy wars as both the United States and the Soviet Union became involved in regional conflicts. In almost every case, regional conflict was exacerbated by one super power’s reaction to the other’s involvement in a particular crisis. Although democracy promotion was a said objective of the post-Cold War US policy, it never served as the principal foreign policy interest of the United States. At best, it has played a secondary role behind more self-interested pursuits (Schraeder 2003).

The US policy has evolved as concerns the potential threat posed by the state failure of varying degrees in Africa and other regions. Especially during the 1990s, the breakdown of central state authority fostered the emergence of several ‘warlord states’ and collapsed or ‘failed’ states. The test case of the post-Cold War era US intervention in such states was Somalia.

The end of the Cold War brought the closure of Gen. Muhammad Siad Barre regime in Somalia, which was backed by the US. A war of succession followed among rival factions; the government ceased to function and chaos prevailed. An estimated 300,000 Somalis died of starvation; another two million were in immediate danger. After months of delay, the US intervened through the United Nations with a dispatch of more than 27,000 troops in late 1992 to provide order and food. Their task was to accomplish mission Operation Restore Hope and withdraw once replaced a temporary contingent of UN forces.

As the withdrawal of outside forces would resume the warlords’ struggle for power and renewed killing and hunger, in 1993 the UN mission changed its mission from one of humanitarian relief to one of rebuilding Somalia’s political and economic structures. In the ensuing struggle with the Somali warlord Mohammad Farah Aidid, who controlled capital Mogadishu, UN troops including US soldiers were killed. The increasing number of causalities forced the US to accelerate their departure, and the UN suspended the mission in 1995.

In the wake of Somali debacle, the US president Clinton signed a directive in May 1994 that had placed strict conditions on US support for UN peacekeeping: (a) a clear
threat to US security (b) substantial public support for intervention (c) participation by other countries under UN supervision and an assurance that long-term 'nation-building' would not be necessary.

In the meanwhile, in the African state of Rwanda, in less than three months time in 1994 violence between the Hutus, who dominated the government and the minority Tutsi population, had resulted in more than 800,000 casualties, mainly Tutsi. The 'Somalia syndrome' prompted the US to block the dispatch of 5,500 troops requested by the UN despite popular demand. The US also avoided using the label 'genocide' to describe the conflict as it would not only foment domestic pressure and also trigger American obligations under international treaties dealing with genocide and its prevention (Jehl 1994).

As the US was dealing with these crises, another trouble was brewing in its own backyard – in the state of Haiti. The US backed Duvalier dictatorship lost power in the 1990 democratic elections to Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide as president. Aristide’s attempt to demilitarize the country and redistribute the wealth resulted in his ouster by the military and was forced to exile in the US. Haitian military under Gen. Raoul Cedras launched a campaign of terror and killing against all those who supported the reforms.

The US refused to take the refugees from Haiti and demanded Aristide’s return. A UN sponsored embargo was imposed on Haiti, but proved to have little effect. In 1993 president Clinton and the Haitian leadership reached an agreement that Aristide would return in exchange for amnesty for Cedras and other military leaders. The arrival of US and Canadian peacekeepers in Haiti to oversee the transition to civilian rule were greeted by armed demonstrators who denounced their arrival.

The trouble in Haiti continued into 1994. Eventually the US decided to intervene in Haiti militarily and issued public ultimatum to Cedras junta. At the last moment, Cedras agreed to leave peacefully once the invasion was imminent. The military assault on Haiti was then transformed into a semi-permissive occupation by 20,000 US troops, and it extended well into 1995. The US role as a state builder was staggering as the unemployment was soaring among largely illiterate populace and the foreign aid was drying up. The US faced with this monumental task, abandoned Haiti.
Although it appears that the US had acted without any grand strategy by resorting to incrementalism and adhocism, it in fact had adhered to a well-defined grand strategy. The adherence had been less than perfect due to the exigencies of politics in the real world. The post-Cold War policy was essentially the continuation of the Cold War strategies (Bacevich 2002). The Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) that was prepared under the guidance of Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary for Defense for George H. Bush, clearly underlines it. Accordingly, the US strategy was to focus henceforth on convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests.

Apart from this, American policies would sufficiently account for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging its leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. In case of failing to co-opt the willing, it was incumbent upon the United States to maintain mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger region or global role (Bacevich 2002). Though it was widely criticised for its language, and discredited, it clearly demonstrated the intent of the US.

Despite the US involvement in various regions of the world, its preoccupation with Europe never wavered. The US always viewed a stable Europe as essential to its security; specifically a balance among the European powers was required to prevent a single country from dominating the continent and in turn threatening the US. Even though the United States welcomed the creation of European Union and acknowledged its goals, still it was wary of it. Because a resurgent Europe could very well seek to detach itself from the United States and chart an independent course.

On the other hand, the Eastern European states which were under the Soviet control were in turmoil with growing split between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. The more prosperous among them became part of the integrated Western economy and gained early admission into Western political and military arrangements.

The US, NATO, and the Balkans

Besides, the future of European military security remained uncertain after the Cold War, especially the status of NATO. NATO provided for the collective defence of Western Europe against foreign attack and for the region’s collective security against its
own members, in a nutshell: to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down. Although the Soviet threat – one of the rationale for NATO's existence – disappeared after the Cold War, the desire and interest shown by the members of the former Soviet bloc provided the immediate rationale for its continuance.

The new power vacuum created by the abolition of Warsaw Pact was an incentive for NATO to fill this vacuum; otherwise countries such as Poland and Hungary would have to build independent military forces. The possibility of these countries creating another regional bloc was also not ruled out. Therefore, apart from the founding objectives, the US also found new explanation for its continuance and expansion. The Russian reservation over NATO making inroads into its traditional spheres of influence was overcome with Western aid. Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic were inducted as members of NATO in March 1999.

Notwithstanding Africa, the removal of Cold War restraints also unleashed nationalistic rivalries in Eastern Europe, especially Yugoslavia – a diverse federation of ethnic and religious groups, mainly Serbs (Eastern Orthodox), Slovenes and Croats (Catholic) and Bosnians and Albanians (Muslims). The country was held together under a communist regime headed by Marshall Tito. Following his death in 1980 the arrangement started to crumble; in 1989 along with other communist states collapsed and unleashed ancient religious rivalry resulting in mayhem.

The dominant Serbs opposed to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and wanted to create Greater Serbia including territories occupied primarily by non-Serbs. The provinces of Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in 1991 and were immediately recognised by the European community. The Yugoslav army intervened; inflicted great damage but both were admitted to the United Nations as new states. The Serb army redirected their attention to Bosnia and launched a self-described campaign of 'ethnic cleansing' in order to drive out Muslims from their communities so as to expand Serbian territory.

Despite the call for intervention, the US desisted. Primarily, the conflict appeared to be contained within the Balkan Peninsula, and posed little threat to other European powers especially the United States. Therefore, the US adopted this cautious view and adopted a negotiated settlement. An international arms embargo failed to deter the
Serbians; though it continued into 1995 along with economic boycott against the Serbian regime in Belgrade.

In 1995, the Croats and Muslims launched a counter-offensive against the Serbs and the power balance started to shift. Sensing the opportunity, NATO launched a sustained bombing campaign against Serbian munitions dumps, bridges and air defences that to further weaken the Serbs. A negotiation settlement was reached at Dayton in November 1995 and led to a ceasefire in 1996. As a result, nearly sixty thousand NATO troops were stationed in the region as part of Operation Joint Endeavour.

Notwithstanding this, the crisis in Kosovo intensified in 1998 because Albanian extremists resorted to arms to secede. It began at a time when the US was seeking an opportunity to impose its leadership over the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as well as to justify it ambitious role in Europe (Kolko 2007) The Rambouillet agreement brokered by the US and European powers to settle the conflict didn’t survive.

The US and NATO had to intervene militarily. The Kosovo war was NATO’s first encounter with combat and transformed it from a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union into an offensive coalition. The NATO bombing code named Operation Allied Force began in late March. The military intervention in the Balkans was to sustain American claim to leadership in Europe in the pretext of advancing the cause of human rights (Bacevich 2002).

The intermittent bombing failed to deliver the desired result – bringing the Serbs to the negotiation table. The NATO air strikes intensified targeting Serbian positions and other urban areas in spite of civilian casualties. Eventually, the Serbs agreed to withdraw their forces and allow displaced Kosovars to return to the remnants of their communities. This had achieved the general objectives of the NATO powers: (a) ending ten years of terror and destruction (b) it was achieved without a single NATO casualty (c) prevented a challenge to NATO’s leadership d. a threat to the future of the alliance was negated.

Nevertheless, the crisis exposed the inability of the European powers to take a concerted decision and action in a military situation and facilitated the US to prolong and persist with its presence due to their over dependence on it to keep peace in Europe. On the other hand, the Balkan crisis also revealed the extent to which the post-Cold War system had strayed from the ‘new world order’ that was proclaimed earlier in the decade.
The US and NATO not only side stepped the UN Security Council and also damaged the credibility of the US in the process. This paved the way for further involvement of the United States and its NATO allies without the US sanction.

**11 September and New Global Order**

The post-Cold War period witnessed the emergence of the United States as the pre-eminent power in the international system. The United States interventions in the Gulf (Iraq), Eastern Europe (Bosnia and Kosovo), Central America and Africa were all not successful missions though, still the US established itself as the dominant power – militarily, economically, and diplomatically – in the international system. There were semblances of the US adhering to multilateral institutions such as United Nations (UN) in the case of Iraqi invasion in 1991 and other interventions in Eastern Europe. The US also involved its allies, mostly Western European, in these endeavours.

On 11 September 2001, members of an international terror network al Qaida flew commercial planes on a suicide mission into the World Trade Centre, New York and the Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia. An estimated 2,974 people of different nationalities killed in that attack. These massive attacks were unprecedented in the US history. Even though a comparison is made typically to the 7 December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, it was an outpost. The 11 September attacks achieved even greater surprise because it happened in America’s most important cities and was directed against the prominent symbols of US military predominance, the Pentagon and US economic dominance, the World Trade Centre in the heart of New York financial district.

The cause for the attack had given to many interpretations. One expert argues that the 11 September attacks represent a desperate backlash against the modern world, though it was not a war between the West and Islam, there were clearly cultural issues at play (Fukuyama 2002). But al Qaida attributed America’s support to corrupt regimes in the Middle East; supporting Israel against the Palestinian cause and general ill treatment of Muslims by US led Western countries.

Fukuyama further contends the view that American foreign policy in Palestine or toward Iraq was the real issue. He reasons that for a large group of radical Islamists and Muslims their religious identity overrides all other political values. Radical Islam purports to explain the loss of those values and cultural disorientation that modernisation
process had endangered (Fukuyama 2002). The root causes for the rise of Islamo-fascism in the 1980s and 1990s were poverty, economic stagnation and authoritarian politics in the Middle East (Fukuyama 2002). Nonetheless Fukuyama’s ascription to social and economic factors for the rise of radical Islam, he fails to factor in the US role in supporting and perpetuating the corrupt, authoritarian regimes which were responsible for their plight.

The attack has shaken the United States’ belief that its homeland is a fortress and no power could breach it. The asymmetrical nature of the attack had thwarted the conventional security structures and response to such attacks. It had also taken the battle fields from open to crowded city places. The US foreign and military strategy and plans defined after 1990 were now topsy-turvy and it had again lost control of its nominal priorities. The US response was swift and massive.

Immediately after the attacks, the US president George W. Bush in a speech delivered at the National Cathedral, Washington DC, outlined the course of action that would be taken (US President George W. Bush Jr 2001). The US prioritised the disruption and destruction of terrorist organisations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control and communications; material support and finances. The immediate focus was those terrorist organisations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors.

The defence of the US, its people, and its interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reached the US borders was given thrust. The US would strive to enlist the support of the international community, and would not hesitate to act alone, if necessary to exercise its right to self-defence by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists (US President George W. Bush Jr 2001).

The United States got the unequivocal condemnation of the United Nations. In the resolution, the United Nations not only condemned the attack but also called on all states to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stressed that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of these acts would be held
accountable. The international community was asked for an increased cooperation and redoubling of efforts to prevent and suppress acts of terror (UNSC 2001 a).

The United States swiftly organised a broad coalition of countries such as European Union, Russia and Pakistan under its leadership. Several attempts made by the US to Afghanistan, which was under Islamic Taliban regime, to extradite Osama bin Laden and other suspected terrorists failed to yield result. The uncooperative attitude of the Taliban and its disregard of the US ultimatum of 20 September 2001 provoked the UN Security Council to reaffirm the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence (UNSC 2001 b), thus authorising military action.

The Security Council ruling enabled the United States to legitimise military intervention in Afghanistan by stressing the right to self-defence laid down in Article 2, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. The UN, as a result provided the collective legitimacy for a war that otherwise could be interpreted as a unilateral US military intervention (Mallaby 2002). The Quadrennial Defence Review Report that was released on 30 September 2001 by the US Department of Defence laid out the blue print for US strategy following the 11 September attacks.

The report called for shifting of defence planning from ‘threat-based’ to ‘capabilities based’. The focus should be on how an adversary might fight rather than specifically whom the adversary might be or where a war might occur. The report also emphasised on transforming the US forces, capabilities, and institutions to extend America’s asymmetric advantages well into the future. The preclusion of hostile domination of critical areas, particularly Europe, North East Asia, the East Asia littoral and the Middle East and South West Asia.

The importance of US alliances and bilateral coalitions to shape the strategic landscape protect shared interests and promote stability was also emphasised. The new US strategic framework was built around four defence policy goals: (a) assuring allies and friends (b) dissuading future military competition (c) deterring threats and coercion against US interests and (d) if deterrence fails decisively defeat any adversary. The most significant aspect of the document was that the US forces must maintain the capability to impose its will and its coalition partners on any adversaries, including states and non-
state entities. Such a decisive defeat included changing the regime of an adversary state or occupation of foreign territory until US strategic objectives were met.

**The War in Afghanistan**

The United States assisted by coalition forces, began its military operation **Enduring Freedom** in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. The Taliban forces were expelled from Kabul on 12 November. The last Taliban stronghold, Kandahar, was captured a month later (Maley 2002). The US strategy was to minimise casualties and restriction of its military operations to air raids and certain missions by Special Forces and agents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The lessons of Vietnam were learnt well. In fact it resembled more of the recent Balkan war; the only difference was that the Afghan war was fought by the US for the US.

The war on the ground was fought by the so-called Northern Alliance, a coalition of Afghan anti-Taliban militias that received financial, military, and logistic support from the United States and Great Britain. These militias led by different war lords owing allegiance to various tribes were responsible for civil war and atrocities in the first half of the 1990s that divided the country into petty dominions and impeded any attempt at state building. Whilst the governance capacity of the Afghan Transition Authority (ATA), established by the US led coalition forces to administer prior to the formation of a democratic government, hardly ran beyond Kabul and the warlords controlled a major part of Afghanistan.

Even though US secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld declared on 1 May 2003 that the war in Afghanistan was all but over, US military operations involving between 5,000 and 10,000 Special Forces continued the search for remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaida in southern and eastern Afghanistan⁴. The US strategy of deploying a network of small, mixed civilian and military provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in Afghanistan, especially in the southern and eastern regions, indicated that the US ‘war on terror’ would

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be protracted and the military operations in Afghanistan would continue for a number of years.

The American involvement in Afghanistan was not just aimed at dislodging the Taliban regime; it had also recognised the strategic importance of that country. The US presence in Afghanistan would not only facilitate in handling volatile Pakistan with nuclear weapons, and also to face Iran. The American military presence in Afghanistan would prove a long-term asset in the containment of China. The US withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in very unlikely even if the ‘war on terror’ loses its relevance. The air base in Bagram, north of Kabul, is an ideal command centre for military operations throughout the region.

As the first phase of war in Afghanistan was drawing to a close with the Afghan Transition Authority (ATA) under the chairmanship of Hamid Karzai taking charge of the country’s administration, the US president George W. Bush unveiled a series of measures to combat terror. Apart from shutting down terrorist camps, disruption of terrorist plans and bringing terrorists to justice, it also included the prevention of the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world (US President George W. Bush Jr 2002).

It identified the regimes in North Korea, Iran and Iraq developing missiles, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), apart from aiding the terrorist networks. Bush declared that they constitute an ‘axis of evil’, and their arming was a threat to the peace of the world; by seeking weapons of mass destruction these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. These regimes could provide weapons to the terrorists who in turn attack or blackmail the US or its allies (US President George W. Bush Jr 2002). The US also resolved to develop and deploy effective missile defences to protect itself and allies from any future terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction.

Besides these strategic policy initiatives the United States had also withdrew from a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Landmine Ban Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Programme of Action on Illicit Trade in Small and Light Arms, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and a
new protocol designed to verify compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention. Wide spread condemnation and criticism followed the withdrawals especially the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Russia criticised that move as reverting to Cold War mind set. China was of the opinion that it was aimed at neutralising its small nuclear forces. Even America’s NATO allies were unwilling to acknowledge the rationale for it.

**The Iraqi Conundrum**

These unilateral tendencies of the Unite States gave rise to the notion of new global order. The US as the predominant military power with unparallel economic and military clout going about securing its real and imaginary interests with utter disregard for institutions, alliances and international community’s opinion. In the mean while, the US started to build the case for Iraqi invasion and destroying Saddam Hussein’s regime and its weapons of mass destruction. The US rationale was that Saddam was a particularly cruel and ruthless ruler; he had chemical and biological weapons and was trying to get nuclear ones; he supported terrorism and might have been involved in some way with *al-Qaida*; he was hostile to Arab-Israeli peace and gave support to radical Palestinian elements; he had flagrantly violated US Security Council resolutions (Pollack 2002).

Besides these familiar charges, there was much more to the current policy of the neo-conservative dominated US policy. It envisaged a totally radically new approach to the Middle East. Terrorism in the Middle East was not so much the product of frustrations born of Arab-Israeli conflict or of concrete socioeconomic conditions in countries like Egypt or Pakistan. Instead, there was civilisational component – illegitimate regimes such as those in Saudi Arabia or even Egypt would foment anti-American and anti-Israeli propaganda, allowing fundamental version of Islam to rule the public discourse as long as it did not question the existing domestic order.

To put an end to terrorism, they reasoned that the Arab Middle East and perhaps Iran must be forced to initiate new educational institutions, respect for women’s rights and above all democratisation. In short, Arab-Islamic world had to be modernised. This in line with the neo-conservative agenda for projecting US influence. The emphasis was

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5 There are four principles or themes characterise neo-conservative thought: a. a belief that the internal character of regimes matters and that foreign policy must reflect the deepest values of liberal democratic
on three tools: overwhelming military superiority; a renewed dedication to US alliances; and missile defence as a means of protecting the American homeland from counter attack (Kagan 2004).

Although the US policies appear to be influenced by neo-conservative ideology, the calculations and strategies were realist. The US proceeded with the Iraq war with Congressional support in 2002 and then started working on for a UN resolution to provide some justification for military action in the event Saddam refused to cooperate with weapons inspections. The support for US action was hard to come by unlike the Gulf crisis in 1990-91; the US had few allies except for Britain. Whilst a number of Arab regimes quietly endorsed Bush's plans and offered some cooperation, few were willing to offer public support.

Iraq responded by playing for time and allowed UN inspections without blatant restrictions. The pressure was building up as the inspections made no head way in finding weapons of mass destruction, and the lack of allied support added to it. The American invasion of Iraq began on 19 March 2003. In a matter of days, a large number of American troops poured into Iraq from neighbouring Kuwait. The troops were supported by remarkably accurate air power, and in a matter of weeks they were in capital Baghdad, without encountering much resistance from Saddam's Republican Guards.

This relatively easy military victory led to more difficult choices in the post-war Iraq. The turning over of power to Iraqis, who welcomed the American troops initially for over throwing Saddam, was discarded as the US realised that the complexities of the Iraqi political scene and the enormous task of providing basic security and reviving of the economy. No weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were found nor were facilities for their production located in Iraq.

The occupation of Iraq was proving to be harder than they imagined for the American and British troops. Despite the capture of Saddam in December 2003, the attacks on American forces continued at a steady pace. The Shia-Sunni clashes began to a

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societies b. a belief that American power has been and could be used for moral purposes, and that the United States needs to remain engaged in international affairs c. a distrust of ambitious social engineering projects d. Scepticism about the legitimacy and effectiveness of international law and institutions to achieve either security or justice.
take toll on the populace; suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices (IED) were ripping apart not only the American troops and also Iraqi citizens. The Iraqis started to grow weary of foreign occupation and was slowly descending into chaos.

The New Global Order

The unilateral decisions of the United States to abrogate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM); development of missile defence shield; the invasion of Iraq despite international community’s disapproval and criticism brings us to the question of change in the global order. Has the global order changed in the wake of post-11 September attacks? The answer is yes. This leads us to the next question to what extent has it changed? The current global order is characterised by unipolarity or American hegemony.

The global order, for centuries, has rested on two organisational principles: a diffusion and equilibrium of power among great powers and sovereign territorial states. Internationally power has been distributed among states, while, domestically, governments have had the ‘monopoly on the use of violence’ within their nation-state territory. The United States’ quasi-monopoly use of force at the international level and the increasingly lessening of state sovereignty demonstrate the state of current global order (Ikenberry 2005).

The rise of American unipolar predominance and the simultaneous unbundling of state sovereignty is a radically new distribution and manifestation of state power. In the post-Westphalian years, the security of states was maintained by ensuring the absence of an overarching power in the international system. Although the predominance of American power guarantees stability by wielding of power by a single state, the disparities of power are so vast that counterbalancing by the other great powers is not possible.

The rise of non-state actors in the form of terrorism as a threat to security has changed the perception threat by the states. The perception of common enemy threat that dominated Cold War and prior to that has been replaced by new fragmented security threats that countries experience in different ways. This transformation has the added effect of making American power and its use of power more controversial and contested (Ikenberry 2005).
But Waltz (2002) argues that 11 September attack has not changed the global order. The US consultation with other countries meant that it would divulge what it intended to do and go ahead with the decision without waiting for their approval. Except on limited and specific matters the practice has not changed. Fighting terrorists provided a cover that has enabled the US to do what wanted to do anyway.

He further argues that there was no change in the international system following 11 September attack for three basic reasons: (a) the gross imbalance of power has not been changed by terrorism. Instead, the effect of 11 September has been to enhance American power and extend its military presence in the world (b) the second basic fact of international politics is the existence of nuclear weapons. Terrorists do not change the fact that nuclear weapons govern the military relations of nations that govern them c. the prevalence of crisis that plague the world and in most of which the US is directly or indirectly involved. Terrorists do not change that persistence and accumulation of crisis. The increased terrorist activities rather than disturbing the continuity of international politics, is a response to changes that have been taken place in the past two decades (Waltz 2002).

Michael Cox (2002) agrees with Waltz on the account that the ‘new’ American hegemony was not new, but rather the by-product of a number of significant trends that had been transforming the shape of world politics throughout the 1990s. The Afghan war confirmed the United States’ strategic vision that stability in an uncertain world derives from power and the best way of maintaining and sustaining a stable global order wasn’t through multilateral agreements, or international treaties or international law, but through threat or the use of force.

This was clearly revealed with the way the US had dealt with growing indifference. The US decided to fight the war in Afghanistan without too much interference from its allies. The Europeans had been sidelined almost completely in an American war fought for largely American ends by American military personnel.

This explanation does not dispel the notion that American actions and strategies can be read as imperial. Although the United States did not resort to formal conquest and territorial annexation, continued to use force and coercion in pursuit of its interests. In areas where its hegemony has been long established, an in Latin America, the US
consistently used intervention and force even as the character of the broader international system underwent dramatic change (Hurrel 2005).

Historically the practice of informal empire involved a complex set of institutional norms and arrangements. A great deal of US power is exercised through the changing legal and normative structure of international society – through US influence on core norms (e.g. those relating to the use of force or to the changing character of sovereignty) through US influence on regimes and institutions that it often chooses not to join (e.g. International Court of Justice), through its capacity to influence choices between market and political modes of governance and through its cultivation of alternative modes of governance (Hurrel 2005).

The US hegemony depends on varieties of indirect rule such as constant and usually unstable process of negotiation between the strong and the weak like the empires of yesteryears. The US has also become deeply involved in attempts to remake and remould subordinate political units – the cases of Cuba, Haiti, and Philippines. Unlike British involvement in trade and in portfolio investment, the US economic interests involved investment in production and exploitation of raw materials. Moreover, the changing character of global economic regulation, most of which is related in one way or another to US interests, has increasingly come to involve deeply intrusive rules whose value depend on their internalisation and implementation within domestic societies. This a structural change.

Does this mean that the present American domination constitute an empire? Apparently it seems though, it is not. Nonetheless pre-emption along with a willingness to act unilaterally and maintain military preponderance were not always the strategy of choice, but they were always option, just as they remain today for the US. When the US perceived threats, especially in the Third World, it didn’t refrain from acting unilaterally – the US moved into Vietnam more or less unilaterally against the advice of the British and French.

Nevertheless the US attributed promotion of democracy as one of the factors for its intervention in Iraq, it was also the Middle East oil and regional dominance played a crucial role in that. America’s ideology has always been tailored to correspond with its quest for territory and markets (Leffler 2003). Pre-emption has a long tradition in
American history, then it is not new, but it has a place of special importance in the thinking of George W. Bush administration.

The American preponderance of power was a means to support a risk taking, often unilateralist diplomacy aimed at maximising situations of strength. The change that has occurred was with the balance between interests and ideals when the threat perception is high. The reliance on force is most of all a function of threat perception. 11 September transformed threat perception (Leffler 2005). This threat perception impelled an offensive strategy.

**Counter Proliferation and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)**

The US along with the ongoing ‘war on terror’ armed itself with the strategy of counter-proliferation to deter adversaries from employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against it or its allies. The US comprehensive strategy to combat WMD includes:

a. proactive counter-proliferation efforts. To deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. The key capabilities such as detection, active and passive defences and counter force capabilities are integrated into the defence transformation and homeland security systems. Counter-proliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine training and equipping of the forces and those of the allies to ensure that the US prevails in any conflict with WMD armed adversaries.

Besides these counter-proliferation measures, the US would also increase institutional efforts by enhancing diplomacy, multilateral export controls and threat reduction assistance that impede states and terrorists seeking WMD, and when necessary, interdict enabling technologies and materials. The US would continue to build coalitions to support those efforts, encouraging their increased political and financial support non-proliferation and threat reduction programmes (US President George W. Bush Jr 2001). The US also prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against its forces abroad and to help its allies if attacked. In order to attain that end, the US would not hesitate to act pre-emptively.

The US targets were Iran, Iraq and North Korea. They were also part of the so called ‘axis of evil’. The bogey of counter-proliferation was already being used for the invasion of Iraq. The immediate provocation for the US was that admission of North Korea that it was running a covert nuclear programme reneging on the Agreed
Framework of 1994. The counter-proliferation initiative had four objectives: (a) to keep weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology out of the wrong hands (b) to eliminate or destroy WMD capabilities should proliferation occur (c) to develop the capacity to fight in a WMD environment, if necessary and (d) to mitigate environmental consequences should WMD use by an adversary.

The counter-proliferation concerns were brought to sharp focus with the boarding of North Korean vessel So San in the Arabian Sea in December 2002. Although a shipment of Scud-type missiles bound for Yemen was found hidden in its cargo, the So San could not be detained nor could it cargo be seized as no existing regimes had been violated. In October 2003, the interception of a vessel en route to Libya, transporting a cargo for a German trading company, uncovered a shipment of components for a clandestine uranium enrichment programme. The evidence surfaced led to the exposure of the A. Q. Khan companies in Pakistan as the source of proliferated nuclear technologies (Cotton 2005).

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was announced on 31 May 2003. Ten countries originally joined with the United States to shape and promote the initiative. These countries were Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. An additional 73 countries including Russia have since publicly committed to the initiative. The PSI was described as a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of WMD, their delivery system, and related materials worldwide (Boese 2007).

The specific policies of PSI were: (a) measures to interdict the transport or transfer of WMD and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern (b) procedure for information exchange in such cases (c) commitments to strengthen applicable legal measures and (d) undertakings by member states to board ships and require aircraft in transit to land and have suspect cargoes searched and or seized. Although PSI gave its members the freedom to interdict, it had restrictions: the ships or aircraft concerned must be within the territorial seas or air space of member states, or; be flagged or registered by a member state, or; be flagged or registered by a state willing to cooperate in this specific case or on an ad hoc basis (Boese 2002).
Nevertheless the concerns over proliferation in the past, the possible nexus between nuclear proliferators and terrorist movements changed the situation. North Korea along with Iran had been identified by the US as of particular concern. The concerns about North Korean record of proliferation of WMD components and missiles had been extensive. North Korean shipping traffic was a concern for the US and other Western countries even prior to the PSI. In April 2003, a French ship was forced to unload in Egypt. The suspect cargo had 22 metric tonnes of aluminium tubes originating in Hamburg, which was ultimately bound for North Korea to be used in its highly enriched uranium programme. In the same month, the North Korean vessel *Pong Su* was captured in Australian waters with fifty kilograms of heroin that was part of a strategy to raise funds for North Korea’s WMD programme.

The PSI’s corner stone objective, interdiction of ships carrying weapons material, is a clear violation of the Law of the Sea Convention, which gives ships the rights of freedom of seas and innocent passage. Therefore, the capturing of the North Korean vessel was clear violation of the Convention by the United States and its allies. Because a ship may also be stopped if it is without nationality, that is, without flag and doesn’t demonstrate its state of registration. *So San* flew no flag and it was subjected to inspection but the cargo was not illegal unless the transporting country has agreed under treaty not to transport such goods (Kirgis 2002).

States have jurisdiction to prescribe law within their territory – that is, within its territory the state can determine what is legal and what is not, which includes territorial waters that extend twelve nautical miles from the shoreline. The decision to decide what is contraband or not and when to board the ship rests with the state (Friedman 2003).

The United States and its allies decision to intercept suspect shipments as they pass through narrow straits controlled by cooperating nations also violates the Convention. Although the Convention provides various rights for the territorial states with regard to boarding and other rights, transporting of missiles or WMD components is not mentioned and it is difficult to assert that such transport fits into any of the prohibited activities. In Article 23 of the Convention, ships carrying nuclear weapons are explicitly given the right on innocent passage (UN Law of the Sea Convention 1982).
Therefore, the United States’ grand strategy that was calibrated in the wake of 11 September attacks has not only infringed upon the sovereignty of states, such as Iraq invasion and also the territorial rights of states through interdiction of ships carrying suspect weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Even though the US was circumspect enough to exploit the international outrage over 11 September and got an approval from the UN for the invasion of Afghanistan. But the US did not show scant regard for the UN nor for the international community in the wake of its Iraqi invasion – were allies’ opinions also disregarded.

**Restructuring of Alliances**

As the United States was zealously pursuing its counter-proliferation strategies and proliferation security initiative (PSI), it was also attempting to restructure its existing alliances and forge new alliances. Military alliances, both multilateral and bilateral have been central to the diplomacy and national security strategy of the United States throughout the Cold War period. Alliances have always been contextual and contingent. Pageantry and proclamations accompany their creation, and permanent interests and eternal principles are invoked hopefully, but change over time eventually corrodes such institutions, which are ultimately rooted in particular historical circumstances (Menon 2003).

Circumstances, shared practical objectives which are vital for the endurance and continuance of any alliance. Any change in them leads to corrosion of the alliance. The Cold War alliances are changing on account of the transforming global order in the aftermath of 11 September events. The United States had formalised security relations with more than half of the countries and pledged to defend nearly fifty treaty allies in the event of an attack, primarily to support a strategy of containing communism. Some of the alliances were multilateral such as NATO, SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation), but most were bilateral arrangements between the United States and countries in all regions throughout the world.

Although the complex nature of the strategic environment and the diversity of security arrangements devised by states test the very notion of alliances (Tertrais 2004), the US alliance system is neither dead nor necessarily in decline, as proclaimed by Menon (2003). The nature and purpose of are changing in response to the challenges of
the new era. The US alliance system was in fact in a flux. There was change in emphasis among many alliances.

In the face of new security concerns, the United States has given more value to those alliances that could reliably support the US interests in the war on terrorism and participate decisively in coalitions of the willing. Nonetheless the emergence of European states as a single union with single currency and economic structure and shared legalities, militarily they remain weak and that was clearly demonstrated during the Balkan crisis. The European states created the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) following the Balkan crisis as an alternative to depending on the US to settle its problems. Even though they are combat trained, they cannot be called an army and contribution to their upkeep; command and control still remains a contentious issues, besides the popular indifference (BBC News Online 2001).

Indeed the split over Iraq was an important landmark in the strategic estrangement between the United States and France and Germany – pivotal members of NATO. However, later they have agreed to work together to relieve post-Saddam Iraq of some of the financial burdens.

There were three broad trend emerged in the US coalition making. One, bilateral alliances forged in the fight against communism have found a new purpose. Great Britain, Australia, Poland, Spain, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Japan, what Kurt M. Campbell (2004) calls new nuclear family, are part of a group of states that forms the basis of a new international cohort that has generally worked closely with the United States in the war on terrorism. A new nuclear family for the United States seems to be emerging, one primarily comprised of bilateral relationships and that differentiates between particular states within NATO.

Whilst the alliances with Spain, Poland, and other states were vigorous and growing, the US relations with Germany and France were not warming. Relations with other non-European, traditional members of the nuclear family were also troubled such as South Korea. The new nuclear family members of the US likely to remain smaller than the old one was, because of two reasons: (a) the current emphasis on bilateralism and (b) fewer states now seen willing to take the steps required to remain in that category. Their relationships arise out of shared values and views, rather than being bound by common
threats, and thrown together haphazardly (Campbell 2004) either by fate or geography or both. These new nuclear family friends of the US have received clear perks from the United States, including high level diplomatic attention, special preference on trade deals, and the right to bid on expensive contracts in the post-conflict reconstruction mission in Iraq.

Second, *ad hoc* coalitions or ‘new friends’ in Campbell’s phrase (2004) set up by the United States were not permanent alliances, have conducted the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq since then. These states may have had pre-existing relations with the United States but now they have been drawn closer to the United States largely because of the new strategic conditions of the war on terrorism. These new friends include India, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, Bahrain, Jordan and Singapore.

A few of them have been designated as ‘non-NATO strategic allies’ (Bahrain and the Philippines). These states represent critical regional access points for the US military and other forms of presence in areas of potential instability and lawlessness, as well as sites that might be breeding grounds for terrorism. Apart from regarded as the second front in the war against terrorism, Southeast Asia has also become important to the United States for over-flight and access rights for its military deployment to the Gulf (Acharya 2006).

The US recognition of Southeast Asia as the second front in the war on terror was based on the belief that after its defeat in Afghanistan, *al Qaida* had shifted its attention to Southeast Asians who have got trained in Afghanistan and returned home. The US-Philippines counter-terrorism cooperation and conducting of joint exercises between their troops against the Abu Sayyaf group testifies it. The US-Philippines military cooperation was also driven by other factors such as that it would not only give the United States another base in the region and also it would mitigate the long term concerns of the rise of China for both the US and Philippines.

In the aftermath of 11 September, the US redefined its strategic priorities of Central Asia like other regions, which meant bringing the Central Asian states to closer cooperation both qualitatively and quantitatively in military affairs. Uzbekistan, and to a lesser degree Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan emerged as key frontline partners in America’s war on terrorism and served as crucial military platforms for Operation
Enduring Freedom. It was the military necessities of the war in Afghanistan and the geopolitical position of Central Asia that have contributed to the US making the region a security priority (Schetter and Kuzmits 2006).

Moreover, the dangers inherent in the region’s long-term susceptibility to Islamic fundamentalist movements and the possibility of one or more Central Asian states might fragment or fail and become the ‘next Afghanistan’. The involvement of Islamist and terrorist groups in Opium trade for their financing was another concern for the US. Although Afghanistan is the world’s largest producer of Opium, the five Central Asian States were heavily involved in the shipment of drugs. This has naturally drawn the attention of the US in the war against terrorism (UNODC 2002).

Uzbekistan is the main US military partner in Central Asia. The United States has about 1000 troops in Uzbekistan, primarily at the former Soviet Khanabad air base near the town of Kharshi. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan along with Uzbekistan provide territorial access for logistical transfer. Besides these war contingencies, a more discrete objective of the United States involvement in Central Asia was the prevention of Russia or Chinese hegemony in the region (Schetter and Kuzmits 2006).

The US dramatically redefined its interests in South Asia following the 11 September attacks. The US wooed the ostracised Pakistan with aid programmes and dropped sanctions that prevented the sale of improved military technologies to Pakistan. The support of Pakistan was crucial to unseat the Taliban in Afghanistan and to eviscerate al Qaida. The renewed security relations with Pakistan was conducted cautiously so as not to upset the newly forged relationship with India, keeping the long-term interests in mind. The major contributing factor for this Indian tilt in the US policy was India’s growing economy and its willingness to expand defence contacts with the United States, and its ability to serve as a potential counterweight to future Chinese dominance in the region.

The United States accorded a greater priority to expanding defence ties with India. The US was also not keen on raking up non-proliferation issues with India. As a result, significant amount of military-to-military ties ensued; substantive exercises have been in the naval sphere as army and air force exercises are more complex and involve greater costs (Ganguly and Shoup 2006).
Therefore, the post-11 September US security strategy was to exploit the opportunity in order to perpetuate its dominance and furthering of its interests. Toward that end, the United States not only infringed the sovereignty of Afghanistan and Iraq, although in the name of self-defence, and also territorial rights of states by boarding North Korean vessels on the high seas. The United Nations – an institution for addressing disputes between states – was completely disregarded in the case of Iraqi invasion. The counter-proliferation initiatives have violated many of the Laws of the Sea. The United States restructured its existing alliances and forged new alliances in the wake of its war on terror. At this juncture, how Japan, being an alliance partner responds to the changes in the US security strategies that was shaping the global order is the question to be answered in the subsequent chapter.