Chapter Two

Evolution of Japan's Security Policy

This purpose of this chapter is to historicise the evolution of Japan's security policy. How has Japan’s security policy evolved over the years? The process of investigating this question begins with other questions in order to locate Japan’s behaviour toward other countries in the broader context. They are: What were the factors that determined Japan’s historical relations? What are the changes and continuities in Japan’s behaviour?

Modern Japan has been influenced and shaped to a greater extent through its interaction with the international system since the days of ‘Chinese Middle Kingdom’. The international system has had a powerful impact on Japan’s interaction with other states. Japan also responded to the changes in the system in its characteristic style when confronted with stronger powers.

The Chinese World Order

The first phase of Japan’s interaction with the outside world occurred during the ‘Chinese world order’, which embraced continental China, the Korean Peninsula, and parts of Northeast, Central and Southeast Asia from the establishment of the T’sang dynasty (CE 618-906) through to the mid-nineteenth century (Hook et al. 2001). China, as the most powerful civilisation of the day, also known as ‘Middle Kingdom’, created a structure of hierarchical suzerainty.

The Chinese empire was at the centre of the world and accompanied by a degree of integration on the economic, political and security dimensions of international relations among various East Asian tributary kingdoms. The kingdoms of East Asia were tied to the suzerain in terms of their duty to pledge political allegiance at the imperial court and to perform military service in overseas expeditions. The Chinese hegemony established a congruent and regional system characterised by a measure of economic, political and security interdependence and a shared identity (Hook et al. 2001).

Japan was incorporated into this Sino-centric order. But by virtue of being an island, it could afford to remain in isolation and be indifferent to continental powers.
Nonetheless, Japan was forced to acknowledge the reality of superior Chinese civilisation and were drawn towards the economic, political and security benefits accruing from association with the Middle Kingdom. Japan’s submission to China’s political and military suzerainty was evident its dispatch of naval forces to support the Chinese empire’s position in Korea in the mid-seventeenth century (Hook et al. 2001).

Japan’s political and security alignment with China led to its entanglement with continental Asia. The attempted Mongol invasion of Japan in 1274 and 1281 demonstrated the dangers of military attack from dominant powers in China and the Korean Peninsula. Apart from this, the Japanese rulers at times challenged the Chinese regional and world orders, either by attempting to usurp the middle kingdom’s political and military position, or by a defiant withdrawal and isolation from them. Japanese made their bid for regional and consequently world hegemony during the rule of Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537-98) by launching invasions of Korea in 1592 and 1597 (Cullen 2003). These were intended to open the way for the conquest of China.

The advent of foreigners – Portuguese, Dutch and the Spanish – into Japan for trade purposes began in the sixteenth century. Japanese perceived that foreigners presented a military challenge because of the size of their vessels, their gun power and their sheer aggression towards Asians and one another. Christianity with its missionary drive added to Japan’s trading and military challenges (Cullen 2003). Besides the foreign threat, the military failures of Japan in East Asia persuaded the rulers – Tokugawa Shogunate – to retreat into isolation from the world and the destabilising influence of external forces. Despite its isolationist tendencies, throughout the Tokugawa period (1600-1868), Japan tried to establish its own international system on a limited scale (Pyle 2007). Japan claimed a central position in the East Asian sphere and sought legitimacy by asserting that the Ryukyus, Korea, Siam and other states were sending tribute to Japan.

**The Imperial World Order**

Japan’s relative isolation lasted for about two centuries. The technologically, militarily powerful Western powers arrived in East Asia in the mid-nineteenth century. The Western powers had also brought with them a hierarchical structure of territorial states and empires and tried to acquire East Asian colonies such as Philippines, Indonesia. China was dismembered and the Chinese world and regional order was
fractured (Hook et al. 2001). Japan was also dragged into a new imperial world order following the collapse of the Sino-centric order.

Great Britain emerged as predominant power following the Napoleonic wars, which determined the character, governance and the rules and mores of the international system. The industrialised European powers attempted to organise the international system through the power of market. In order to avoid the burden of ruling countries and to minimise and maximise profit the Western imperial powers exercised 'informal imperialism', i.e. imposing treaties that assured free trade (Gilpin 1981).

The Black Ships of Commodore William Perry of the US appeared in the Edo Bay in 1853. The military might of the Western powers had unnerved the fragile Tokugawa government. On 11 March 1854, the historic Japan-United States Treaty of Friendship or Treaty of Kanagawa was signed, which opened the doors of Japan to foreign powers. Subsequently Britain and Holland demanded and treaties were made with them as well. Japan’s treaty with Russia stipulated for the first time the principle of extraterritoriality (Kajima 1965). Following this, the United States also received this privilege.

Japan-United States Treaty of Amity and Commerce or Treaty of Ansei was concluded in July 1858. The treaty had not only retained the extraterritorial rights for Americans but also had no stipulation for customs autonomy; therefore it was unequal in nature. Soon Holland, Russia, Britain and France signed such treaties of commerce. Japan entered a world order characterised by an ‘informal imperialism’ embodied in the unequal treaty system (Kajima 1965). The institutions of this first new order in East Asia, a sub-system of the Pax Britannica (Pyle 2007) were devised for an unfettered access to trade in East Asia.

The unequal treaty system – informal imperialism – infringed upon the sovereign rights of the states. Ports were given access; land was leased for foreign settlements; tariff was fixed under international control and fixed at minimum levels and foreigners had extraterritorial privilege. The system took on a multilateral, cooperative, collaborative character as a result of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause inserted in the treaties. Rights and privileges granted to one power were to be extended to the others (Pyle 2007).
Japan’s Imperial Journey

Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japanese developed a new sense of understanding of international system. The significance of military power and diplomacy was realised. The primary foreign policy goal of the Meiji government was to do away with the unequal treaties that guaranteed extraterritoriality and lacked customs autonomy. On the other hand, Japan sought such rights from China, though unsuccessfully. Japanese were able to only sign a Treaty of Amity and accompanying trade regulations in 1871.

Korea also rejected the initial Japanese advances in this regard. A controversy ensued; Japanese forces finally arrived and demanded a treaty to be signed. The Treaty of Kanghwa of 1876 was forced upon Korea and this effectively ended the Sino-centric order in East Asia as Korea was China’s vassal. This also marked Japan’s accommodation to the new international order (Pyle 2007).

The international order also witnessed a change at the end of the nineteenth century; the rise of several new powers; the relative decline of Great Britain brought about change in the East Asian order. Great Britain precluded competition through its command of seas to maintain its colonies, markets and supply of raw materials. The emergence of French and German navies in the 1880s challenged the British domination.

Japan’s relative power position as a late developer in the international system determined its strategic needs. The power vacuum in East Asia, and the encroachment of the imperial powers, made it imperative that Japan look to its strategic needs (Pyle 2007). The prevailing instability of East Asia outside of Japan created opportunities for it. Apart from the lure of raw material and markets, the prospect of weak governments in China and Korea might be replaced by Western powers would compromise Japanese security. This drive for security led Japan to embark on journey of imperial expansionism in East Asia rather than economic incentives (Pyle 2007).

An opportunity arrived sooner than later for Japan. Korea invited Chinese forces to quell a rebellion in 1894. Japanese perceived it as danger to overthrow Japanese rule and Chinese expansion. Japan sent its own troops; following the suppression of the rebellion Japan demanded that Korea sever all its ties with China. War broke out between Japan and China. Japanese victory over China both at sea and land in 1895 ended in Treaty of Shimonoseki in April 1895 (Kajima 1965). Korea was declared
independent, Japan annexed Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pen Fu islands (Pescadores) as well as the Liaotung peninsula and a reparation payment of 300 million yen.

This military victory was short lived. Russia, France and Germany made a common demarche to Japan that it renounces all the annexed territories. Japan having exhausted all its military strength in the war, acceded to the demand ignominiously. The Triple Intervention made Japan to realise that it had no ally to support its cause. Therefore, the strong desire for Japan to seek an alliance with a major power in world politics (Togo 2005) emerged. Russian expansion in the southern and eastern part of Eurasian Continent was increasingly threatening the interests of Great Britain. Both Japan and Britain’s perception of Russia as a common adversary led to the first Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902.

The agreement promised British assistance if Japan became involved in conflict with more than one power. This had set a pattern in Japanese foreign policy for most of the twentieth century of seeking to ally with the ascendant world power. Besides, it was the first military pact arranged on equal terms between a Western power and a non-Western power. This has established Japan’s place among great powers in East Asia.

Meanwhile, Russian designs for East Asia made the Japanese wary. Japan perceived the Russian ambition of making a warm water port in the Southern Sea coupled with its intention of exploiting the confusion in East Asia as expansionist. In addition to that Russia was reluctant in withdrawing its troops from Manchuria as it was agreed with China in 1902. Japan construed it as Russian attempt to occupy Korea as Manchuria was a buffer between Japan and Russia. Japan formally declared war against Russia on 10 February 1904 (Kajima 1965).

Japanese victory over Russia culminated in a peace treaty in 1905 at Portsmouth. Accordingly, Japanese supremacy in Korea was recognised; both Japan and Russia agreed on withdrawing their troops from Manchuria; Japan gained the right to lease the Liaotung peninsula and the right to control the southern Manchurian railroad between Changchun and Ryuushun; Japan also annexed the southern half of Sakhalin Island (Togo 2005). This had brought great power status to Japan; the first Asian power to win a war against an European power. The annexation of Korea in 1910 further strengthened Japan’s position in the East Asian region.
Japan’s victory over Russia fundamentally changed its relationship with the major powers in the East Asian region. The US which mediated the Portsmouth Peace Treaty began to take the rapidly growing power of Japan seriously. The US had begun to expand and strengthen its navy. In 1907, the US drafted a plan called ‘Orange Plan’ to counter a possible war against Japan in Pacific (Togo 2005). Japanese also realised the US ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region. In spite of this, both the states signed the Katsura-Taft Memorandum in 1905 recognising each others’ respective spheres of influence in Korea and Philippines. Through the 1908 Takahara-Root Agreement both countries agreed to preserve the status quo in the Pacific region and the independence of China.

As the tension was growing with the US, Japan signed an accord with Russia in 1907, notwithstanding the 1905 war. The necessity was to ensure post-war stability and preservation of balance of power in the south and north Manchuria. The second accord was signed in 1910; third accord was concluded in 1912 and the fourth one was sealed in 1916. The common concern was the US and fourth treaty was even seen as an alliance between Russia and Japan (Kajima 1965).

The World War I broke out in August 1914 in Europe; Japan seized this opportunity to expand and strengthen its position, particularly in East Asia. Japan declared war against Germany on 23 August at the behest of Great Britain. The primary Japanese objective was to take over German interests in the region; Japan immediately attacked and occupied Chintao, a major German base in the region located on the Shandong peninsula and the Japanese navy also occupied some of the South Pacific islands which were under German control.

Japan also realised an opportunity to enlarge its traditionally accepted ‘sphere of influence’ – China and Manchuria – as other great powers were occupied in Europe. Japan presented ‘Twenty-One Demands’ to China, which sought privileges over Shandong Peninsula; special rights in Manchuria and Mongolia apart from employing of Japanese nationals as political, economic and military advisers in China (Kajima 1965). The Paris Peace Conference of 1919, which was convened after the end of the war in 1918, had two outcomes for Japan: (a) Japan secured her rights on the Shandong peninsula (b) but there was to be no new territorial seizure.
The post-World War I order, advocated by American president Woodrow Wilson, was to be based on the ideals of self-determination and collective security, replacing balance of power and cooperative imperialism. The Wilson’s Fourteen Points sought to end secret treaties, removal of trade barriers to international trade, withdrawal of foreign armies from occupied territories, a readjustment of colonial claims, freedom of the seas, reduction of armaments, recognition of the principle of self-determination of nationalities, and an international political organisation to prevent war (Pyle 2007). The League of Nations was the outcome.

The US convened the Washington Conference of 1921-22 to provide new set of principles and institutions to guide the workings of the international system in East Asia. Broadly it aimed at: (a) preservation of free trade so that it was open to US trade and investment (b) the US would maintain the balance of power in the region in order to preclude any another domination (c) the US would promote democratic politics so as to maintain peace in the region. The Naval Arms Limitation Treaty of 1922 also imposed stringent restrictions on Japanese naval build up while augmenting the Western powers’ navies (Togo 2005).

**Japan and World War II**

The Washington System though lasted in the 1920s when the environment was favourable, started to falter at the end of that decade as the turbulence began. Its idealistic foundations had inadequate enforcement powers and depended on voluntary abstention from use of force. The hope of peaceful commercial competition would replace armed rivalries was also belied. The system itself was the issue. It was revolutionary situation, and the fundamental principles underlying the status quo was being questioned (Pyle 2007). This change in the international system provided strong incentive for Japan to improve its power position.

The global recession neither spared Japan. Maintaining Japan’s sphere of influence in Manchuria was vital to tide over the crisis as it not only provided raw materials and also market for Japanese products. The Kwantung army which was stationed in Manchuria engineered a crisis in 1931; in the ensuing struggle a puppet government was installed and Japan recognised it as an independent state in 1932. Although the League of Nations recognised the special status of Manchuria in relation to
Japan, did not recognise the newly created Manchurian state. Japan formally withdrew from the League of Nations.

Notwithstanding its withdrawal from the League of Nations, Japan also tried to re-establish a viable policy of alliances with the major powers of the world in order to avoid isolation. At a time when Japan was expanding its activities around China, Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany was rapidly gaining power in Europe. As Japan had always done – aligning with the stronger state – the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed between Japan and Germany in 1936. Japan’s strategy was that stronger ties with Germany and Italy would consolidate Japan’s position and allow her to enter into a reasonable agreement with America (Togo 2005). Thus, in September 1940 the Triple Alliance was concluded.

Japan’s attempt to conclude a non-aggression agreement with Soviet Russia failed. Later, the Soviets found reasons to enter an agreement with Japan in order to prepare for a possible clash with Hitler. Japan seized the opportunity and in April 1941 a neutrality pact was signed between Japan and the Soviet Union. In the meanwhile, the US abrogated the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan that was to expire in 1940. As a result, Japan’s apprehension about the possible shortage of oil and steel forced it to expand its sphere of influence to ensure these resources in the northern part of Indo-China, where there had been power vacuum because of France’s defeat in Europe. Japan entered the southern part of Indo-China in July 1941. The United States immediately froze Japanese assets in America and soon declared an overall embargo on oil to Japan (Kajima 1965).

Negotiations to diffuse the situation also continued. The important American demands were: (a) Japan to nullify the Triple Alliance (b) complete withdrawal from Indo-China and China (c) withdrawing of support to the Wang Ching-wei government. The negotiations failed. On 8 December declared war on America and the Japanese Navy attacked the Pearl Harbour. To declare war on a power with no less than eight times the material power though appears to be a rash and reckless act, under the prevailing circumstances for a state which was attempting a change in the international order was a risk worth taking.

Japan announced that it had embarked on Great East Asian War in order to construct a new order in East Asia and to liberate East Asian people from the aggression
of America and Britain. Even though this rhetoric pleased domestic audience and many Asian leaders, Japan's foreign policy had never been driven by ideals (Pyle 2007). Japan occupied most of Southeast Asia by the middle of 1942. Soon, the war situation for Japan started to deteriorate; in June Japan lost a historic naval battle at Midway; in February 1943 it to abandon Guadalcanal in the Pacific; in the course of 1944 the US forces successively occupied South Pacific islands such as Palau and Saipan (Togo 2005).

On 25 July Allied Powers – the US, Soviet Russia, Great Britain and China – issued the Potsdam Declaration prescribing the conditions for ending the war. The primary demands were: (a) unconditional surrender of the entire Japanese armed forces and (b) the occupation of Japan by the Allied Powers (Kajima 1965). Atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August; another bomb was dropped on Nagasaki on 9 August and on 15 August 1945 Japan formally surrendered.

**Allied Occupation and Cold War Japan**

Japan was occupied following its defeat by Allied Forces acting through the eleven-member Far Eastern Commission (FEC), though it was almost American (Hayes 2009). General Douglas MacArthur, who was the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) and there was the Allied Council for Japan consisted of Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and China to advise the SCAP. The advisory body was essentially powerless and the policies of the US governed.

The US Occupation of Japan had two distinct phases. The first two years, 1945-1947, represented the reformist phase of the Occupation that focused on 'democratisation' and 'demilitarisation'. The second phase of the Occupation 1948-1952, focused on economic recovery and rehabilitation and was shaped by the emerging Cold War international order.

The war time accommodation between the Soviet Union and the United States evaporated after the war ended. The United States and the Soviet Union relations deteriorated over their struggle to maintain or acquire spheres of influence in Eastern Europe and West Asia. The Communist capturing of power in China in October 1949 and the outbreak of Korean War in June 1950 altered the scenario; Asia was brought in the Cold War hitherto confined to Europe. The growing tensions between the US and the Soviet Union compelled the US to rethink its Occupation strategy of Japan. The US need
for an ally and a base in East Asia to contain the communist expansion necessitated this transformation.

The Korean War broke out in October 1950. It was a crucial moment and Japan seized it to shape its post-war strategy to survive in the structure of new world order. Nonetheless, the new situation presented a predicament for Japan: joining the US would divert the attention and resources from domestic economic reconstruction to remilitarisation; on the other hand, Japan would become strategically important to the US in the Cold War and as a result, it would avail US protection.

As Japan was working out its strategy, Article 9 of the American imposed constitution stood as a stumbling block. According to the Article, Japan would renounce the use of force as a means of resolving disputes and therefore would not possess armed forces; as a consequence, its right to belligerence was not recognised (Japan Constitution 1946). But membership in the international community obligates a state to contribute to the maintenance of peace and order of the world. Therefore, Japan had to take measures and act.

Against this background, the United States started negotiating with Japan for a Peace Treaty. The Peace Treaty Conference with Japan was held in San Francisco from 4 to 8 September 1951. Fifty-five countries were invited but China and Korea. The treaty was signed on 8 September. Even though Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia participated, they did not sign the treaty as they were dissatisfied with the content. India, Burma and Yugoslavia did not send their representatives though they were invited.

Article 2 and 3 of the treaty gave territorial demarcation. Japan renounced all rights to Formosa (Taiwan), and the Pescadores and to the Kurile Islands and Southern Sakhalin. As the representatives from these countries – China, Korea, and Soviet Russia – these two articles became the starting point for future negotiations with them in order to normalize the relationship. The Okinawa Islands were placed under the trusteeship of the US under the auspices of the United Nations and the US was also given the administrative rights over these islands (Treaty of Peace with Japan 1951).

Article 5 and 6 confirmed Japan's right of individual and collective self-defence was confirmed. All the Occupation forces were to withdraw from Japan, but this did not prevent the stationing of foreign armed forces based on bilateral or multilateral
agreements (Treaty of Peace with Japan 1951). Article 14 defined the principles of governing reparations. Japan was obliged to pay reparations to Allied Powers. Since Japanese economic resources were not sufficient to pay reparations and improve its war torn economy, Japan attempted to agree to a mutually acceptable amount of reparations, especially with Asian countries.

Whilst the negotiations on San Francisco Peace Treaty was taking place, the United States, as the principal occupying power instructed the Japanese to organise a 75,000-man National Police Reserve (NPR) in 1950. The organisation was in reality a mere disguise for a new Japanese army (Cooney 2007). The National Police Reserve (NPR) was justified as being essential to internal security following the transfer of Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP) from Japan.

On 8 September 1951 in San Francisco, on the same day and at the same place as the Peace Treaty was signed, the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States was signed. One of the key issues of collective defence it was agreed that Japan granted the right to the United States to deploy their forces in Japan and such forces ‘may be utilised to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan’ (Government of Japan 1951). Accordingly, while Japan was obligated to grant facilities for use by the US forces in Japan, the US were not obligated, strictly in a legal sense, to defend Japan.

Besides, the treaty gave the United States the right to intervene to suppress any domestic disturbance in Japan; the right to project military power from bases in Japan against a third country without consulting Japan and an indefinite time period for the treaty. The treaty also retained extraterritorial legal rights for the US military and its dependents. All these provisions made this treaty highly unequal not just in terms of compromising Japan’s sovereignty and also were signed when Japan was also under occupation.

The fundamental security structure of post-war Japanese security policy, to hold minimum adequate forces for the purpose of self-defence, and to rely on security relations with the United States in order to survive in the international system was taking shape. The US pressure on Japan to participate in its alliance system was unrelenting. Japan would respond to the US pressure with the minimum concessions necessary to
maintain alliance relationship, invoking the constitutions to justify the minimalist approach.

In 1952, the National Reserve Police (NRP) was renamed Japanese National Safety Forces (NSF) headed by the Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. The NSF contained both ground and maritime elements. In 1954, with the passage of the Defence Agency Establishment Law, Japan began building Ground Self-Defence Forces, and the NSF was renamed for the third time as the Self-Defence Forces or SDF. Although these incremental changes were challenged in the court and in public debates about their violation of the constitution and Article 9, Japanese public recognised the need for self-defence in the face of Korean War (Cooney 2007). But the public disapproved any military capability that was considered offensive.

There were three basic tenets that signified Japan’s response to Cold War world order – Yoshida Doctrine. Japan’s principal goal was rebuilding its economy. This necessitated political and economic co-operation with the US. Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international political-strategic issues. The Self-Defence Forces would not be employed abroad and Japan would not participate in collective defence arrangements. Finally, in order to get long-term security guarantee from the US, Japan would provide bases for the US army, navy and the air force (Pyle 2007).

The end of Korean War in July 1953 and another war in Indo-China between France and Vietnam also came to an end in July 1954. This changed situation in the region easing the tension on the rearmament issue between Japan and the United States. In May 1957 the first major policy decision on Japanese defence was taken under the ‘Basic Policy for National Defence’. Accordingly, the purpose of national defence was to prevent any direct or indirect aggression on Japan to protect its peace and independence. The basic objectives were to establish the foundations for national security; development of defence capability and adhering to US-Japan Security Agreement (Government of Japan 1957).

The later part of 1950s Japan’s focus shifted toward revising the unequal security treaty of 1951 with the United States. The treaty was revised in June 1960, despite stiff
domestic opposition from anti-militaristic groups and opponent political parties. As per the treaty’s Article V:

‘Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes’

(Government of Japan 1960). This provision obligated the US to defend Japan in case of an armed attack unlike the 1951 treaty. Besides, Japan agreed to contribute to the peace and security of Far East region and provide bases for the US army, navy and air forces (Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security 1960). Any major changes on the part of the US forces in Japan related to equipment, use of facilities or the bases for combat operations had been subjected to prior consultation with Japan.

Japan’s policy continued to rely on the same formula – minimal involvement but concrete security guarantees. In the mean while, the US escalated the war in Vietnam in 1965 by bombing the North. Although Japan supported bilateralism; co-operated with the US in the Vietnam War, this support remained basically indirect, that is, provision of bases not dispatch of troops for combat. At the same time, South Korea, another US alliance partner in the region, dispatched more than 300,000 troops to fight along with the Americans in Vietnam (Pyle 2007).

Japan’s Nuclear Question

Japan had to deal with the nuclear issue following China’s first nuclear weapons test in October 1964. After much debate and evaluation, Japan decided to forgo the nuclear option. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles were announced that Japan will not manufacture, or possess nuclear weapons or allow their introduction in Japan. Later in 1968, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku outlined the four pillars of Japan’s non-nuclear policy: (a) to rely on the US nuclear umbrella (b) the three non-nuclear principles (c) promotion of worldwide disarmament (d) development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This clearly portrays that neither bilateralism nor the security treaty were compromised by the non-nuclear principles (Hook et al. 2001).

The Chinese nuclear explosion had spurred the United States and Soviet Union to preclude further nuclear proliferation. In 1968, a proposal of non-proliferation agreement was made to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The UN General Assembly
got it approved and came into effect in 1970. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prohibited all nuclear testing and established a worldwide network of monitoring stations (United Nations for Disarmament 1970).

Even though Japan signed the NPT in 1970, it took another six years to ratify the treaty while negotiating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to get maximum concessions for its civilian nuclear programme. Japan kept the option of withdrawing from the treaty with three months notice in case of extraordinary events require it open and continued with its civilian nuclear power research.

The Nixon and Oil Shocks

The US started rethinking its strategy towards China in the early 1970s despite the Vietnam War and Cold War antagonism. The driving factor was the friction between the Soviet Union and China. Therefore, in order to isolate Soviet Union, the United States announced its decision to recognise the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in July 1971 and the American President Richard Nixon made an official trip to China in February 1972. The gradual weakening of the US power due to costs of Vietnam War in particular, giving up of gold standard and the introduction of an import surcharge brought a fundamental restructuring of the Cold War international order (Hook et al. 2001).

Although the Japanese felt let down by the American move, swiftly Japan responded to the crisis. The Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited China and the Joint Communique establishing diplomatic relations between Japan and the People’s Republic of China was issued on 29 September 1972. Most importantly, Japan expressed deep remorse for the war time atrocities that Japanese troops committed in China, without formally apologising for the same (Togo 2005).

In the meanwhile, the fourth Arab-Israeli War broke out in the Middle East in October 1973. The Arab countries as a punishment and bargaining device adopted a policy of oil price hike through the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The world oil prices had quadrupled. Middle East oil was a major source of energy for Japan. As the US was pressurising its allies to oppose the OPEC decision, Japan took a decision contrary to US demand. Japan offered loans, technical co-operation and the financing of oil refineries through Official Development Assistance (ODA).
Further, it hosted the leader of Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) Yasser Arafat in August 1975. Even PLO was allowed to open an office in Tokyo in 1977.

Japan's behaviour towards Middle East in the face of oil crisis demonstrated its willingness to act alone to protect its interests even if it were to go against the dictum of its security partner, the United States. The ending of the Vietnam War, and the US détente with the USSR and rapprochement with China transformed the international system in the 1970s, which provided new opportunities for Japanese security policy making. Japan was apprehensive about US abandonment as it was ironing out abandonment with USSR and China. In order to hedge against the abandonment Japan devised the National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) in 1976 (Hughes and Fukushima 2004).

The NDPO was the first attempt by Japan to set out the principles of its security policy along with the military structure to achieve them. The NDPO central theme was 'standard defence force concept' which held that Japan should possess a peacetime force of minimum size but large enough to meet and repel a 'limited and small-scale aggression' and to prevent a fait accompli (Mochizuki 1984). Troops and weapons would have no offensive capacity, nor would Japan maintain any ability to project power abroad. Thus, Japanese jets would have no capability for bombing or mid-air fuelling. An aircraft carrier was out of question. Ironically, the Japanese had also introduced a ceiling of one per cent of Gross National Product (GNP) on defence spending.

The Second Cold War and Japanese Military Build Up

In the late 1970s the tension between the United States and the Soviet Russia began to escalate. The Soviet started a military build-up in the East Asian region. There was an increase in the Soviet naval assets in the Pacific; deployment of aircraft carriers; strengthening of air assets in the Far East; SS-20 mid-range nuclear missile and the Backfire strategic bomber, and the expansion of land forces on the Kurile Islands – part of the disputed northern territories. The controversy over the sovereignty of Northern Territories along with the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations further strained the Soviet-Japanese relations.

As a result, the military co-operation between Japan and the United States got closer. The Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Co-operation was signed in November 1978. The combined exercise between the Japanese Air Self-Defence Forces (ASDF) and

In continuance of this military build-up, Japan announced that it would patrol the sea lines of communication (SLOC) up to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan in May 1981. The growing power of the Soviet Russia also mounted a challenge to the US and Japan. In order to counter this, the Japanese weakened the ban on export of defence related technology by making an exception of exports to the US under the Exchange of Technology Agreement between Japan and the United States of November 1983. Japan also agreed to participate in research on the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI or the ‘star wars’) in September 1986. On the top of all these, the Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone abolished the one per cent ceiling of GNP on defence spending in 1987 (Jitsuo 2000).

**The Post-Cold War Japan**

The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union heralded a new era in the international system. The bi-polar division between the Soviet led communist states and the US led capitalist states had ended. The United States had emerged as the predominant power in the international system. Nonetheless, it was not clear the way it would affect the East Asian order. It was period of flux when the shape of a new order was not yet apparent.

The end of the Cold War in Europe was decisive unlike East Asia: therefore the uncertainty in the region. However, the Cold War structure that controlled East Asian dynamics remained, though weakened. The predicaments of Cold War also remained: the divided Korea; unresolved Taiwan and continuing territorial disputes between Russia and Japan over the southern Kuril Islands. The regional structure remained fragile without any new structure in place.

The post-Cold War period also posed new questions about the rationale of the security treaty between the US and Japan and the dynamic of the alliance, especially in the 1980s, as the primary threat – the Soviet Union – had disappeared. The end of Cold War diminished the utility of Yoshida Doctrine as a national strategy. Besides, the changing dynamics and order of East Asian region posed new challenges for Japan as it was accustomed to dominate the region largely consisted of not so strong powers in the
past. As a result, Japan’s relations with its neighbours became new, more complex and demanding on the part of Japan.

The first challenge for Japan in the post-Cold War period was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. During the crisis Japan failed to respond to the US expectation that as an ally Japan should contribute its troops in Iraq as part of the US led coalition sanctioned by the United Nations. Although many other countries sent their troops to Iraq, not necessarily for combat, the presence of Self-Defence Forces was desired. Japanese response had been ad hoc and reluctant: two billion US dollars each to the Allied forces and to the front line states confronting Iraq, that too two months after the crisis had begun (Calder 1992).

Japan realised when the use of force during the Iraqi war was becoming a reality, it tried to enact a law that would permit the JSDF to engage in non-combat activities to support the war effort (Kawashima 2003). But it fell through in the Diet. On 24 January 1991, Japan made a contribution of $9 billion to the war effort and this brought its total contribution to the war support in the Gulf to $13 billion or 20 per cent of the entire cost of Desert Shield and Desert Storm together.

Japan’s tepid and inadequate response drew widespread criticism of the international community. Japan’s contribution was not commensurate with its economic status and quest for a global role. Once the war was over, Germany sent its mine sweepers to remove thousands of mines remained in the Gulf. Following this, pressure was building on Japan to do the same. On 27 April, Marine Self-Defence Force minesweepers and associated supply ships left for the Gulf in a formal off shore deployment of Japanese military forces since World War Two.

The Gulf War crisis forced Japan to rethink its security strategy and policy. The Diet passed the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Co-operations Bill on 15 June 1992. The legislation ended the ban on sending the Self-Defence Forces abroad. But, participation of Japanese troops even in UN peacekeeping missions violated the constitution. So, it limited troop deployment to logistical and humanitarian support for United Nations missions, monitoring elections, and providing aid in civil administration. The PKO Bill was the first clear departure from Yoshida Doctrine.
In addition to that, five conditions were laid down in the PKO Bill to minimise the chances of the SDF becoming involved in a conflict that would require use of force. They were: (a) a cease fire agreement should be in place (b) consent of both the conflicting parties for their deployment (c) shall maintain strict impartiality d. if the above conditions were not met, forces could be withdrawn e. weapons shall be used for only in case of self-defence (Cooney 2007).

In September 1992, Japan dispatched a contingent of 700 personnel to join UN peacekeeping mission intended to end the long civil war in Cambodia. This was the first time since 1945 that Japanese troops had been deployed abroad. The successful Cambodian mission, Japan dispatched troop abroad in a non-combat capacity as part of UN peacekeeping missions in Mozambique (1993), Zaire (1994), the Golan Heights (1996) and East Timor (2002).

As Japan was setting about a new course in the post-Cold War world order, another crisis erupted in Korea. North Korea announced its decision to withdraw from Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in March 1993. The end of superpower rivalry changed the context of the Korean problem. Their full integration in the Cold War framework provided them any leeway to pursue independent policies from their superpower patrons. The demise of the Soviet Union deprived North Korea both political support as well as economic aid; strategic ties were also cut off. Both China and Russia resumed normal relations with South Korea and promoted trade. Therefore, in order to end its isolation and use as a bargaining chip, North Korea accelerated its nuclear and missile programmes.

Japan recognised that the military build-up of North Korea was a source of instability for the security of Japan and the whole of Asia-Pacific region. More than threatening Japan’s security, it was perceived as an attempt to derail the US security system in Northeast Asia by confronting the US security presence in and around the Korean peninsula in an attempt to restore its strategic position against South Korea (Hughes 1996). Japan relied on US security system in Korean peninsula for maintaining stability and security of Japan in order to ensure against the possible Chinese threat.

Though the Japanese policy makers had varying opinions about the nuclear capability of North Korea, the threat perception remained. Nuclear materials coupled
with *No-dang* 1 missile augmented the threat as they had more than half of Japan within their range. The crisis got escalated as North Korea refused to accept inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and threatened to begin processing spent nuclear fuel in 1994. The escalation of the situation made it appear that a conflict between the US and North Korea imminent. Once again Japan was equivocal in its response when the US command in Japan requested for its back up assistance in case of a conflict.

Following the negotiations, an agreement was reached – Agreed Framework – which diffused the tension. Accordingly, North Korea would be provided with a light-water reactor in exchange for abandoning and cancelling nuclear plutonium reactors. Japan agreed to contribute $1 billion through Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO). The North Korean crisis had exposed the vulnerability of Japanese security despite being under the US security umbrella. This also underscored the limitations of the US-Japan military alliance (Hickey 1998).

Japan’s inability to support in case of a second Korean conflict also promoted the US to rethink its security arrangements with Japan. As a result, both the sides agreed to revise the 1978 framework for defence co-operation. The new US-Japan defence guidelines were issued on 24 September 1997, which sought to draw Japan into a tighter, more integrated and effective operational alliance.

The new guidelines prepare Japan for a more active role in the region in case of a conflict. Apart from participating in blockades to impose sanctions, the Japanese navy would also engage in minesweeping; supply fuel and food to US vessels in the region; sharing of intelligence; evacuation of civilians in unstable situations and most importantly, Japan and the US would co-operate when confronted with the ‘situations that may emerge areas surrounding Japan’ (Government of Japan 1997). As this provision indicates, Japan would not only have to co-operate with the US military actions to protect Japanese interests and also the Taiwan Straits whenever a conflict situation arises. This has further entangled Japan’s security with the security interests of the United States.

In 1998, whilst Japan was negotiating with the changing circumstances, North Korea launched a Taepodong missile over Japan. Besides, suspected North Korean
vessels repeatedly intruded into Japanese territorial waters aggravated the situation (Kawashima 2003). Japan responded by announcing that it would develop its own surveillance satellite system. In addition to that, Japan and the US signed a memorandum of agreement in August 1999 in order to further and deepen joint collaboration of Theatre Missile Defence System (TMD). Since TMD is geographically limited to protecting Japan from missile attacks in Northeast Asia, Japan called it Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) as the aim would be national defence (Hook et al. 2000).

Japan’s decision to launch surveillance satellites and agreeing to co-operate with the US government in developing missile defence was a clear departure from decades old policies. These activities can clearly construe as militarisation of space, which was a second major departure from Yoshida Doctrine in the post-Cold War Japanese security policy.

11 September 2001 and the Aftermath

The 11 September 2001 attacks brought about a change in the US strategic priorities. Besides embarking upon ‘war on terror’, the US also forged ahead in restructuring its alliances. The priority of alliance making shifted from ‘threat based to capability based’. States that were willing to assist in the US mission were preferred; most of them were *ad hoc* in nature though. America’s existing alliance partners were counted on to contribute in its endeavour.

At this juncture, Japan had to respond to the emerging global order that followed US actions. Hitherto, the priorities of the US included East Asia apart from Europe even a decade after the end of Cold War in its strategic calculus. Therefore, Japan’s participation in the alliance co-operation with the US confined to the East Asian region; sending of Self-Defence Forces onto Peacekeeping missions under United Nations (UN) mandate and agreeing to co-operate with the US in the event of any conflict arises in the areas surrounding Japan.

The US led ‘war on terror’ had neither stipulated geographical limit nor scale. The strategy of the United States toward East Asia had been one of ‘hub and spoke’ bilateralism in the post-war period (Ikenberry 2005). The United States acted upon its global interests, thereby forging alliances according to those strategic imperatives. Although states in East Asia – especially Japan and South Korea – aligned with the US
security framework in the form of bilateral institutional arrangements to protect their interests, they had little common cause with the US global strategy.

Nonetheless, Japan having endured the criticism of the US and other alliance states for its equivocal stand during the Gulf War of 1991, revised its security policy. The dispatching of Self-Defence Forces for peacekeeping missions; agreeing to extend its co-operation with the US forces in situations that might emerge in the areas surrounding Japan were significant steps toward not only strengthening its alliance with the US and also its own military capability.

The tangible benefits accruing from multilateral institutions in East Asia for the US would not compensate the concession that it had to make on its policy autonomy. Dominance without institutional constrains though allowed the East Asian states to free-ride, the US could exercise control without restrains on its action. This arrangement also allowed the United States to translate its power advantages into immediate and tangible concessions from Japan and other states.

The events of 11 September 2001 had altered the way the US relates to other great powers, which offered a vast and new opportunities (US President George W. Bush Jr. 2001). The priorities and behaviour has been refocused. The attention of the US following 11 September had shifted from Europe to the Middle East and Southwest Asia and from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia. This shift was self-evident in terms of US allocation of military resources (Mastanduno 2005).

Japan’s response to 11 September 2001 attacks was immediate and robust. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi expressed his outrage over the attacks and resolved to provide necessary assistance and co-operation to the US. Koizumi also expressed Japan’s willingness to fight terrorism along with the US and other countries (Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 2001). Koizumi declared that Japan considered the 11 September attacks as Japan’s own security issue. Japan also showed it readiness to send Self-Defence Forces to assist, support in transportation and supply and medical services to the United States and other states engaged in ‘war on terror’ efforts: apart from sending its Marine Self-Defence Forces to gather information. Further, Japan offered to protect the facilities and areas of US forces in Japan as well (Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 2001).
These pronouncements were clear departures from the ambivalence that Japan showed during the first Gulf War in 1991, when the US requested for Japanese troops for the operations. On the one hand, it offered an opportunity for Japan to show its commitment to the US security alliance, and to assert its role in the international arena in contributing to international stability on the other.

Legislations and Japan’s Security Policy

On 29 October 2001, Japanese Diet passed three bills including the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law. This law allowed Japan to send Self-Defence Forces (SDF) and Marine Self-Defence Forces (MSDF) to provide rear-area support to the US and other allied forces in the Persian Gulf for the invasion of Afghanistan. But they stipulated that the support measures do not constitute the threat or use of force and the support activities will not take place in the combat zones. The Special Measures Law also permitted support measures including supplying of fuel for ships; transporting personnel and goods by JSDF aircrafts; and providing repair, maintenance, medical and seaport activities (Government of Japan 2001).

Most Japanese supported providing this aid to American military operations. A general consensus was reached before the outline of the proposed new laws were even explained to the leaders of the members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The initiative overcame the resistance of major faction leaders. The concerns of the main coalition partner, the Komeito Party, were allayed when the LDP compromised on some issues, most notably putting two-year time limit on the deployment in the Indian Ocean. The Komeito also dropped the initial proposal that the United Nations (UN) had to authorise the action. Although the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) had reservations, intensive negotiations with the ruling LDP had overcome that as well.

Besides, Japan also strengthened the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) to fire upon intruder vessels, given certain conditions. They are: (a) if the intruder vessel represents a danger to security within Japan’s territorial waters (b) that there is a probability that the vessel will repeal the act if not deal with (c) that the vessel is suspected of committing a serious crime (d) that it is not possible to stop and search the vessel. As per this law, the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) fired upon and eventually sunk a North Korean vessel in December 2001.
At the end of 2002, two supply ships and three escort ships, including one Aegis-type destroyer, were operating in the Indian Ocean. By March 2003, these ships carried out 213 rounds of supply operations to deliver a total of 290,000 kilolitres of fuel to US Navy ships as well as to ships of the navies of United Kingdom, Canada and France (Kawashima 2003). The Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) also has deployed C-130 and other aircraft to carry out transport operations.

Although the dispatch of SDF for Afghanistan mission was authorised by the Diet, it was clearly far outside the geographical limit – areas surrounding Japan – stipulated by the 1999 Situations Law. Besides, the mission was not an UN authorised peace keeping mission as permitted under the Peace Keeping Operations Law; as a matter of fact Japan assisted a war effort initiated by another state, which could be construed as an act of collective defence (Arase 2007).

The willingness and enthusiasm shown by Japan in response to the US request for Self-Defence Force (SDF) assistance in the ‘war on terror’ reflected increased fears of abandonment by the US. The steps required to meet US expectations were politically palatable because Japan’s reinterpretations of its bilateral alliance and of the Article 9, with their associated special legal measures, permitted a departure from the decades old norms of exclusive defence.

In the meanwhile, the United States decided to disarm Saddam Hussein. The public opinion in Japan, as in many countries in Europe and other parts of the World, was against a premature attack on Iraq; there was neither proof for development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) nor were evidence for supporting terrorist networks. But Japan was determined from the beginning that eventually it was going to support the US decision to disarm Saddam Hussein. Japan’s calculation was that by declaring Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) was not only a threat to the United States but also to the whole international community, would make the task easier for Japan to justify its support for Iraqi invasion.

Among Japanese legislators the disagreement was not over sending of troops to Iraq but whether the Self-Defence Forces would be responsible for handling Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the arrangements regarding weapons transport. The issue was finally resolved that the law would not allow Self-Defence Forces to handle
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and a compromise was reached on weapons transport (Pekkanen and Krauss 2005). The main opposition party Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was indecisive. The talks between the LDP and the DPJ broke down. Eventually, the legislation was passed, supported by only the ruling coalition.

The United States failed to get the approval of the United Nations for its Iraqi invasion. The long standing allies of the US in Europe, Germany, France except Britain, were vocal in their opposition. Japan emerged as a clear supporter of the US position. On 18 March 2003, only hours after the US issued ultimatum to Iraq, Japan declared its support for the American decision.

Only a few days after the war broke out, Japan announced a humanitarian aid commitment of $5.3 million through United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP) and United Nations Children and Educational Fund (UNICEF) and another $ 3.3 million through Japanese Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to Iraq (Government of Japan 2003).

Japan increased its aid even after the Iraq war ended; the aid reaching $32 million in total by 21 May 2003, when the government announced a further $42 million of humanitarian and reconstruction aid through international organisations and NGOs. The areas envisaged included electricity, water, hospitals, education and reconstruction of demolished buildings (Government of Japan 2003). At the October Madrid Conference, Japan committed $5 billion of reconstruction assistance from 2004 to 2007. It was second largest commitment after the $20 billion of the US commitment.

Apart from this characteristic aid diplomacy, Japan also embarked upon a series of legal measures to facilitate the deployment of Self-Defence Force (SDF). In line with this thinking, Japanese Diet passed three bills in order to respond to armed attack in June 2003: (a) Law Concerning Measure to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack (b) Law to Amend the Security Council Establishment Law (c) Law to Amend the Self-Defence Forces Law. The provocation, apart from 11 September events, came from December 2001 incursion of North Korean spy ships into Japanese waters. This created an increased perception of the Japan Self-Defence Force’s (JSDF’s) need to be better equipped to deal with terrorism and insurgency.
These bills included measures to strengthen the prime minister's authority to co-ordinate the defence against armed attacks by forming a task force to direct the efforts of central and local government, and by the streamlining of the National Security Council decision making. The Japan Self-Defence Force (JSDF) was provided with new authority in times of attack to expropriate private property and construct defensive facilities on private land, and a number of laws were relaxed to allow the military greater freedom to deploy and to provide medical treatment to civilians.

In addition to this, Japan also equipped itself with the Special Measures Law on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance of Iraq in July 2003. This law permitted the deployment of SDF ground troops to Samawah, Iraq, for reconstruction duties. This was an overseas ground troop deployment and even though soldiers were minimally armed to perform non-combat operations. It was neither requested by the host country government nor sanctioned by the United Nations both conditions that would be required under the Peace Keeping Operations Law.

The Laws Concerning the Response to Armed Attack established government emergency powers to deal with potential or actual armed attacks on Japan (Government of Japan 2003). The first bill was concerned with national and local government measures to protect citizens in case of an armed attack on Japan, such as large-scale terrorism, including measure for evacuation and the provision of food and medical aid.

Three bills dealt with the Japan Self-Defence Force's (JSDF's) treatment of prisoners of war and other behaviour under international law, and established the prime minister's authority to enable the JSDF and US military to use civilian seaports, airports, roads, and radio and telecommunication facilities. The last three bills focus on enhancing US-Japan security cooperation, which includes new powers for the prime minister to allow US forces to requisition private land and buildings; Marine Self-Defence Forces powers to inspect, without crew or owner consent, foreign ships in Japan's territorial waters suspected of carrying military items; and a revision to the Self-Defence Forces Law enabling the JSDF to supply US forces with ammunition in the event of an attack on Japan (Hughes 2004).

Seven Contingency Laws followed in June 2004 to improve national security mobilisation by authorising the SDF to take over transportation systems or to
automatically counteract a sudden missile attack. Moreover, Japan also revised the US-Japan Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) on 27 February 2004, which expanded the range of scenarios in which Japan would provide logistical support to the US (Hughes 2004).

These legislative changes that had been brought about since 11 September 2001 mark a significant chapter in the evolution of Japanese security policy. The obvious factor being that the US-Japan security relations ought to be strengthened and to avoid international criticism for inaction similar to the 1991 Iraq war. Japan changed its security policies according to the dynamics of the situation especially revolving around the US policies; beginning with the San Francisco Security Treaty to Self-Defence Forces to the emergency legislations in the post-11 September period.

However, Japan had always been conscious of its security and other interests. Despite the security treaty, Japan evaded direct involvement in Korean and Vietnam wars citing the Article 9 of the constitution. Yoshida Doctrine led the way. In the 1970s, when the US made a volte face towards China, Japan not only responded in normalising ties with China, but also took a stand contrary to the US position during the first oil crisis. The National Defence Programme Outline of 1976 demonstrated the Japanese attempt to chart an autonomous security policy but within the framework of US-Japan security arrangement. Therefore, Japan has always negotiated with the changing dynamics of global order in order to augment its security requirements. The post-11 September legislative changes amply demonstrate it.

**Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and North Korea**

In the meanwhile, the US president George Bush announced Proliferation Security Initiative as part of National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) on 31 May 2003. Proliferation Security Initiative was devised as a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide.

PSI is a cooperative arrangement aimed at interdicting WMD- and missile-related shipments. PSI is not a formal institution or treaty; rather, it is centred on a ‘Statement of Interdiction Principles,’ essentially a statement of purpose. Countries do not ‘join’ PSI, as such, but rather become PSI ‘participants’ when they publicly pledge support for the
The initiative proposed strategies for intercepting cargos suspected of containing chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or missile components. The US has announced an increase in surveillance in the area in addition to increased interdiction by Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Besides expressing its solidarity with the US initiative, the missile and nuclear programmes of North Korea loomed large in Japan’s calculations.

In June 2003, Japan changed its policy in regard to the ferries operating from North Korea. Nearly 2,000 inspectors went to the port of Niigata to check for customs and immigration violations, infectious diseases, and safety violations on the North Korean vessel Man Gyong Bong-92. North Korea responded by immediately ceasing all ferries travelling between the two countries and cancelled a port visit by an unnamed vessel believed to be involved in espionage. This Japanese policy was part of a large US strategy to involve regional actors in policing North Korean exports.

The Japanese Transport Minister, Chikage Ogi, stated that Japan intends to inspect all North Korean vessels at ports in Japan. On 11 June, the 298 ton freighter Namsan 3 was detained at Maizuru and at the Otaru port in Hokkaido the 178 ton Daehungrason-2, carrying crabs, was also detained (Proliferation Security Initiative 2004). Although Japan had become participant in PSI, the interdiction principles had created obstacles for Japan.

The most basic concern was that PSI interdictions would be undertaken primarily on the high seas, without permission of the flag state and without any legal justification short of vague assertions of self-defence. Although interpretations of international law certainly differ, the initiative was clearly conceived to operate within existing legal bounds. The PSI reliance on national legal authorities, such as conducting searches in ports or territorial waters and using national export laws as the basis for seizing cargo had run into hurdles (Winner 2005).
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) facilitated Japan to deploy the Japanese Self-Defence Forces to overseas training outside the frameworks of the Peace Keeping Operations, the Japan-US Security Co-operation or the emergency responses, as they had been considered unconstitutional. Whilst PSI has promoted inter-agency co-ordination in Japan, it also created inter-agency confrontation as well.

Japan attempted to implement all the principles of PSI. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Japan Defence Force (JDF) and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) reviewed all possible national legislations related to nuclear, chemical and biological materials in order to fit into the PSI framework. The existing national legislation was found broad enough to support most of the PSI activities (Yamazaki 2006). Even though a broader consensus was reached among these agencies, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT), the Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry (METI), which is in charge of export control, the National Policy Agency and customs were at odds at the PSI framework.

The bone of contention was about interagency co-ordination for air interception operations. Unlike maritime interdiction which ‘national security agencies’ such as MOFA, the JCG and the JDR can cover most of the operations, air interception needs to involve MLIT which is in charge of air traffic control. The MLIT considers that interdiction prevents them from conducting safe air traffic. Besides, MLIT also considers PSI as a matter of national security.

Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) made its objections based on two reasons: (a) the consideration for Japan’s Asian neighbours (b) it views PSI within the framework of export control not national security policy. Japan Marine Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) participation in interdiction might provoke Asian neighbours such as China and North Korea that would hinder foreign ministry’s efforts for the sake of PSI outreach (Kajimoto 2004). Although the Japan Coast Guard serves as the primary maritime law enforcement agency, the Self-Defence Force Law does allow the JMSDF to conduct boarding operations only when the Coast Guard cannot cope with the situation. On the other hand, MOFA had no objections when Japan’s armed forces participated in the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns.
The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 adopted in April 2004 affirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. This resolution also called on all States to take cooperative action to prevent trafficking in WMD and to criminalise transportation of WMD in domestic level (UN Security Council 2004).

Japan was one of the few countries that had no domestic legislation to board suspicious vessels on the high seas with flag-state consent. This lacuna was rectified with the passage of a law in April 2004 to enable the Japan Marine Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) to inspect ships without their consent on the high seas close to Japan if they are heading for a country which has attacked or on the verge of attacking Japan (Valencia 2005). The new law allows the JMSDF to fire warning shots even at privately owned boats, and to confiscate cargoes of arms, ammunition or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

In September 2003, Japan Coast Guard (JCG) ships participated along with the US and Australian navy ships off the coast of Australia in practice drills to intercept merchant ships carrying WMD. Japan also created two special units in the Japan Marine Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) to respond to intrusions by spy ships. Japan has also been training officials from Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries in the detection and interdiction of WMD and ballistic missiles at sea.

The Japanese Defence Agency’s Advisory Group for Security and Defence Capabilities in October 2004 report said that WMD were a serious security threat to Japan and that Japan should work with the international community, including PSI, to prevent their proliferation. Still, Japan postponed its hosting of a PSI exercise scheduled for May 2004 because of its concern with North Korea and non-supportive attitude of South Korea and China (Valencia 2005).

Japan eventually hosted the exercise in late October 2004. The US and Australia along with other core PSI participants engaged in the exercise with their vessels and aircrafts. In order to remain sensitive to its neighbours Japan confined the role of JMSDF to surveillance. Nevertheless, Japan’s participation in PSI has been low-key because of MOFA’s reluctance to support the commitment of JMSDF assets to this endeavour.
However, the PSI was incorporated as a particular area of US-Japan security co-operation in the 19 February 2005 Joint US-Japan Security Committee Statement. Moreover, Japan’s Marine Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) participated in a Singapore hosted PSI exercise in August 2005 in the South China Sea with 340 armed personnel, the destroyer Shirane, two P-3C patrol planes and an airborne warning-and-command system. This is the first time the SDF has sent armed personnel to take part in a PSI exercise overseas and is a part of the Japan Defence Agency’s plan to have Japan’s military forces engage in more joint activities abroad.

**Japan and Ballistic Missile Defence**

Japan’s security concerns were not confined to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) alone. North Korea’s missile programme was another major security threat for Japan. In East Asia, besides North Korea, China and Russia also possess nuclear, biological and chemical weapons with ballistic and cruise missile capability to carry those weapons.

Japan’s inclination toward missile defence goes back to the agreement of Nakasone government in 1986 to participate in the ‘star wars’ Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). The experience of the first Gulf War influenced Japan, when the US used the Patriot system to intercept Iraqi missiles. The North Korean launch of Nodong missile in May 1993 created the first nuclear crisis in the East Asian region. Once again, North Korea launched the Taepodong missile in 1998 over Japan. North Korean withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 10 January 2003 propelled Japan’s security anxieties.

Apart from this, another important factor behind Japan’s involvement in Missile Defence was China. The disappearance of Soviet threat enabled China to concentrate more on the southward. The increasing military capabilities; regular nuclear tests that China conducted since 1992; and the conduct of missile launch exercises during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis fuelled Japan’s anxieties about missile and nuclear threats (Ishikawa 2005).

In September 1993, Japan and the US established a Theatre Missile Defence Working Group (TMDWG). In 1994, the US put forward proposals for bilateral collaboration in TMD development, leading to the establishment of a Bilateral Study on
Ballistic Missile Defence (BSBMD) to investigate the technological feasibility of BMD systems. The Japanese government had spent 560 million Yen between 1995 and 1998 on BMD research (Hughes 2004).

The US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in December 2001 and began the development and deployment of robust anti-missile system. Although Japan had the fear of entrapment in joining the research efforts, the looming missile threats in East Asia and the compulsion to sustain the US security umbrella forced Japan to join the process. In December 2002, the US decided to begin deployment of a set of Missile Defence capabilities in 2004; Japan and the US agreed to co-operate in the research on ballistic missile technology and to intensify consultation and co-operation on missile defence on the same day.

As part of that process, the Japanese Government announced on 19 December 2003 that it was buying a sophisticated anti-missile system from the United States. It comprises Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) systems capable of intercepting, from the sea, incoming ballistic missiles as they are in mid-course; and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) systems capable of shooting down, from land, missiles about to hit the ground. The programme is set to cost $7 billion, and makes Japan only the second of the US' major allies, after Israel, to invest in a missile defence system (BBC News Online 2003 a).

Japan plans to deploy its first Ballistic Missile Defence capabilities on a Marine Self-Defence AWS equipped-destroyer by 2007 and on six of its destroyers by 2011. The upgraded interceptor missiles for a PAC-III system are slated for acquisition by 2007. Japan's Defence Agency said the project would cost 700bn yen ($6.5bn) over five years, 500bn yen of which would be spent on deploying the missiles. In order to ally hostile criticism from its neighbours the Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda said that ‘It is a purely defensive system and should not threaten our neighbours’ and ‘we will do our utmost to defend our nation and to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction’ (BBC News Online 2003 b).

In order to implement the proposed plans Japan is set to acquire upper-and lower-tier BMD systems. The upper-tier system is the sea-based Navy Theatre Wide Defence (NTWD), now called as Sea-Based Midcourse System (SMD). NTWD carries the
advantage of being sea mobile and having a large defended territorial footprint of up to 2,000 kilometres in diameter against a 1,000 kilometre medium-range ballistic missile. NTWD employs as its platform AWS-equipped ships; its interceptor missile is an upgraded SM-3. For sensors, the NTWD system employs upgraded SPY-1B/D phased array radar to detect and track missile trajectories and provide on-board cueing for interceptor missile launches. The AWS and SPY-1B/D can be supplemented by Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWCS) and E-2C surveillance aircraft equipped with infrared search and tracking (IRST) (Hughes 2004).

However, space-based infrared sensors and the early warning tactical information that they provide, the detection of heat plumes from missiles in their boost phases and in calculating their exact launch point, are essential to a truly effective BMD system. The upgraded SPY-1B/D functions mainly to detect missile launches from post-boost and mid-course phases onwards that pass through their effective field of range. Hence, infrared space-based sensors and their ability to detect at the earliest possible time the launch point of missiles are invaluable in minimising the area for the SPY-1B/D radar to search and maximising the time available for it to do so (Hughes 2004).

Japan’s upper-tier NTWD was to be enforced by the lower tier PAC-3, intended to intercept missiles in their terminal phase, and now termed as the Terminal Defence Segment (TDS). PAC-3 has a smaller defended footprint, but its layering with the NTWD system offers an enhanced probability of preventing leakage in a missile shield. Japan is co-operating with the US research into laser technologies for boost phase intercept (BPI) BMD systems. BPI has the advantage that it may be able to destroy missiles when they are slowest moving in their launch phase and large enough to easily detect (Hughes 2004).

In order to operate BMD effectively, Japan needs to rely on US infrared early warning satellite information, and to link for the first time JSDF command and control systems with those of the United States. Japan also depends on the US black-boxed technology for its off-the-shelf systems. These technological imperatives necessitate Japan for greater integration with the US military forces and strategy (Hughes 2005-06).

There are still further unresolved issues involved in the relationship between Japan’s BMD system and the right of self-defence. BMD implementation required
several adjustments to the military doctrines and capabilities of Japan. Firstly, there would be the case where Japan engages in boost phase intercept. It is difficult to determine accurately whether ballistic missiles are targeted on Japan in their boost phase. Thus there is a possibility that such intercept action could be considered beyond that allowed under the right of individual self-defence.

Secondly, there is the issue of how BMD is related to the exercise of collective self-defence. The statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary in December 2003 indicated that Japan’s BMD system is essentially aimed at defending Japan, will be operated at Japan’s own discretion, and will not be used to defend a third country. Therefore, the issue of collective self-defence right will not emerge (Kaneda et al. 2007).

In July 2005, the Diet adopted a revision to legislation permitting the SDF to conduct BMD operations in a way that conforms to the characteristics of ballistic missile attacks, by adding an “Article 82-2” to the Self-Defense Forces Law that would allow the SDF to respond to ballistic missile attacks even without the issuance of a governmental order for defence actions.

In July 2005, Japan revised the Defense Agency Establishment Law at the same time as the revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law, and established the Joint Staff Office to assist the Director-General of the Defense Agency, thereby shifting to a more unified joint operational structure. In relation to BMD, the joint task units, which consist of relevant service units from each Self-Defense Force, shall be formed when needed under the command of the ASDF Air Defense Command.

**Power Projection Capabilities of Japan**

The new shift in Japanese security policy requires the Japan Self-Defence Force (JSDF) with more interoperable capabilities. These changes have not been taken not only to work along the US military activities and other US led multinational coalitions on global scale (Midford 2003), but also to strengthen the power projection capabilities of Japan.

The Prime Minister’s Council on Security and Defence Capabilities, known as ‘Araki Report’, called for an ‘Integrated Security Strategy’ for Japan that would require a two-pronged strategy for the JSDF: (a) the traditional function of preventing direct threat from having an impact on Japan and (b) a new emphasis on international co-operation
outside Japan's own territory to prevent the rise of security threats (The Council on Security and Defence Capabilities 2004).

The Araki report was followed in December 2004 with the release of the revised National Defence Programme Guidelines and the simultaneous release of a new Mid-Term Defence Programme for 2005-09. The NDPG stressed on Japan's regional security concerns and the importance of US-Japan security alliance like its predecessor NDPG of 1995. It also identified new range of threats ranging from ballistic missile attack to guerrilla attack, special operations attack, incursions into territorial waters to chemical and biological warfare. Besides, specifying North Korea as a destabilising factor in East Asia, it also sought attention toward China for the first time following its military modernisation and its impact on regional security.

The NDPG emphasised on global security interests and the need for Japan to engage actively in 'international peace co-operation' activities through the dispatch of the JSDF to support UN and US-led multinational operations (National Defence Programme Guideline 2005). In order to fulfil these regional and global responsibilities, JSDF were required to establish 'multi-functional, flexible and effective' forces. These forces should be characterised by mobility and rapid reaction; enhanced command and control, including the capability to undertake joint operations amongst the three services; increased interoperability with the UN and US forces; and utilisation of state-of-the-art intelligence and military technologies.

The NDPO and MTDP set the targets and plans for the qualitative upgrading capabilities of JSDF. As a result, the Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF) has acquired the highly sophisticated M-90 main battle tank; the AH-1S and anti-tank and ground-attack helicopter; the UH-60JA multi-role helicopter; and the upgraded Hawk surface-to-air missile. The GSDF has acquired funding to improve its equipment to deal with guerrilla incursions, and nuclear, chemical and biological warfare. In March 2004, the GSDF established a 300-member special operations unit, mainly consisting of elite airborne troops, to assist the police in the gathering of intelligence on, tracking and arrest of suspected terrorists.

The MSDF has plans to increase its number of Aegis war fighting system (AWS) Kongo-class destroyers, the essential platforms for Japan's introduction of BJD system,
from four to six. Japan's coastal protection against 'fushinsen' and other intruder vessels has been beefed up by procuring 200-tonne high-speed missile patrol boats, and the Japan Coast Guard's (JCG) installation of 30mm long-range machine guns on its ships. The Marine Self-Defence Force (MSDF) also aims to acquire a total of three Osumi-class transport ships. These ships have flat-topped decks that enable the landing of helicopter transporters, plus an integral rear dock for the operation of hovercraft capable of landing tanks on shore (Hughes 2006-06).

The flat top of the Osumi-class and its side-positioned super-structure has aroused suspicion that it is the first step in constructing a vertical/short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) aircraft carrier. The MSDF has also plans to construct up to four new class DDH (Destroyer-Helicopter), destroyers, each carrying four helicopters (Hughes 2005-06). Therefore, the configuration of the Osumi and DDH-class indicates that Japan is rehearsing carrier-building technology to reserve for itself this potential military option; considering the constitutional prohibition on the acquisition of power-projection capacities.

The Air Japan Self-Defence Force (ASDF) plans to upgrade the radar and avionics of its F-15s; to continue with the introduction of the F-2 fighter co-developed with the US; and to develop a C-X transport aircraft to replace the C-1. The ASDF has acquired a role in BMD through upgrading 24 Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) batteries to act as a PAC-3 missile interceptor system. The AJSDF was set to procure four Boeing-767 tanker aircraft and an in-flight refuelling capability (Hughes 2004). Although Japan argues that it was basically to assist in UN PKO and other international co-operation missions.

However, in-flight refuelling provides the ASDF with a new power-projection capacity to fly sorties across East Asia and beyond. The acquisition of in-flight refuelling capability demonstrates clearly that Japan was testing the constitutional restrictions on power-projection.

Apart from this, Japan was also changing its military strategy along the lines of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to maintain lead over potential regional rivals through technological and qualitative means and to maintain a force structure capable of interoperability with the US. Japan was upgrading its Battle Management Command,
Control, Computers and Intelligence (BMC41) systems. All the three forces had separate command and control centres. In 2003 the Japan Defence Agency established a Central Command and Control System (CCS) connected to the three JSDF BMC41 systems, which ensures more comprehensive command and control over military operations from the centre (Hughes 2004).

Japan’s decision to launch multi-purpose ‘information gathering satellites’ was spurred by North Korea’s launch of Taepodong missile over Japan in 1998. They are capable of gathering military intelligence as well as to monitor weather patterns, natural disasters and smuggling. This dilution of the primary purpose of the satellites was to blunt the 1969 prohibition on the use of space for military purposes. Japan used these satellites with some success in September 2004 to monitor North Korea’s potential preparations for a missile launch and in the same year in April it confirmed that a blast at Ryongchon near the North’s border with China was in fact a train explosion.

Therefore, Japan’s security policy has witnessed a shift in its priorities following 11 September 2001 events and the subsequent change in the global order. The legislative changes, such as Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law, were intended not only to meet the contingencies in the wake of terrorist attack, but also to overcome the constitutional hurdles. Japan’s participation in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) amply demonstrates Japan’s readiness to take pro-active security policy measures, though it was reluctant initially. The measures undertaken to augment the strength of its Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to project its power capabilities reinforces the change.