CHAPTER 4

FRENCH EDUCATION, MIGRATION DYNAMICS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE SOCIETY
Migration is a phenomenon in which there is a shift of significant population from one place to another. The reasons for that may vary from region to region but mainly it has to do with economic opportunities and better living. In case of Maghreb there has been migration at almost every level.

Being pre-dominantly a tribal society, Maghreb countries had to go through major displacement process in the beginning under the colonial rule. But after their exposure to French colonialism, this migration process which once seemed to be compulsion turned out to be preference of the new educated social elite groups. Earlier, the industrial revolution supported migration of the labour force to the coloniser country but later on problems and discrimination led to the return migration which added problem to the under developed Maghreb region. In this chapter the focus of analysis has been on the impact of French education on migration dynamics in the region and its impact on the social structure of the Maghreb society. It also deals with the changing migration policies of the host country.

The international conditions of migration have changed to such an extent over the past forty years or so that we can state that immigration is both an old and a new phenomenon. In fact, the migrations during the periods before and after 1973-74 represent two distinct phases of inflow trends. North African migration took off during the sixties, in a context organized and governed by bilateral agreements between labour-exporting countries and host countries, which defined recruitment methods and provided for the establishment of joint consultation and co-operation structures. Up to the seventies, industrialized European countries that needed workers turned to countries with a surplus labour force to satisfy their internal demand.

The 1973 oil crisis marked a change in European immigration policies, and extremely selective policies have been adopted in respect of non-Europeans. This new attitude, which presented the manpower- exporting countries with a fait accompli, was reflected in a number of decisions taken unilaterally without preliminary consultation, such as incentives to return, revision of conditions of residence and family reunion, or the adoption of a policy of integration.
Since the 1980s there has been a change in the economic and social situation of both labour-exporting and labour-importing countries, as well as in the relations between the various countries of the Mediterranean region, and this has the direct effect of changing the geography, economics and structure of international migration. New destinations have been added to the traditional ones, and the whole of Western Europe, from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean countries, has become an area of attraction for migrants. New emigration areas have been added to or substituted for the earlier ones. The nature of the phenomenon has also undergone major changes. While waves of emigration used to consist mainly of young men on their own, now a logical development in the older immigration countries they consist of relatives joining the head of the family abroad.

On the other hand, in countries newly affected by immigration, the characteristic phenomenon of men migrating on their own has reappeared. While flows of legally admitted workers are composed for the most part of top-level specialists, illegal immigrants now account for a very important proportion of total immigration. The new migrants, excluding illegal, are of urban origin and have a higher level of skills training than their predecessors.

As regards the North African communities living in Europe, their profile in the older immigration countries have modified. Foreign workers residing in these countries on a temporary basis have been succeeded by settled immigrants, the "reunited" family and younger generations, many of whom have never migrated. In the countries which confronted with the phenomenon of migration, the North African communities have also had to cope with their economic and social situation in countries that had no regulations or policy concerning immigrant populations.

**Labour migration from the Maghreb: current characteristics**

As far back as we care to go in time, North Africa, in the wider context of the Mediterranean, has always experienced major population movements: the Roman invasion, Arab-Islamic expansion and the Ottoman occupation each caused a population flow and either a spontaneous exodus to escape war, epidemics and famine, or a forced
exodus under slavery. But it is above all European colonisation (French) which has left a profound mark and still today marks the phenomenon of migration in the Maghreb. After the Second World War and particularly after independence, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, which were colonies of metropolitan France, and some other southern European countries, became suppliers of labour for France and Italy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Migration to France</th>
<th>Moroccan</th>
<th>Algerians</th>
<th>Tunisians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>11,094</td>
<td>-43,064</td>
<td>N.A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>17,502</td>
<td>32,636</td>
<td>2,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>15,494</td>
<td>11,745</td>
<td>5,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>14,331</td>
<td>29,169</td>
<td>6,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>13,525</td>
<td>7,432</td>
<td>6,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>13,339</td>
<td>23,468</td>
<td>6,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>19,335</td>
<td>25,357</td>
<td>14,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>24,077</td>
<td>57,612</td>
<td>11,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>20,689</td>
<td>34,694</td>
<td>9,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>17,328</td>
<td>16,193</td>
<td>9,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>26,748</td>
<td>28,729</td>
<td>20,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>14,072</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>4,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2,905</td>
<td>-6,694</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1,802</td>
<td>N.A</td>
<td>797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>212241</td>
<td>316989</td>
<td>100300</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


During the colonial period, population movements between the two countries were controlled by laws and political rules invented by that regime, regardless of the Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the first ILO Convention (C 97) on migrant workers (1949). After political independence, bilateral agreements were signed between these countries to set the framework for migration. Apart from the North African recruits
serving the French army during the First and Second World Wars, there are three main historical periods in the contemporary history of migration from the *Maghreb* to Europe.

Firstly, in the 1950s and 1960s, against a background of decolonisation of the *Maghreb* and European reconstruction, migratory flow were organised in the context of technical cooperation and in the form of a regulated trans-Mediterranean labour market. The labour needs of different sections of the European economy under reconstruction were controlled by a system of quotas.

Secondly, from the 1970s until approximately the end of the 1980s migratory flows from the *Maghreb* to Europe were shaken up in 1975 by France and other European countries unilaterally breaking with previous agreements, and adopting integration policies for migrants already there and for their descendants: the first generation with dual nationality. Algeria, which at the time had an ambitious industrialisation programme, tried to reinsert its migrant workers, especially those with qualifications. This break was however not total or immediate as families continued to join the workers, thus feeding the flow towards Europe. At the same time a process of feminisation of the North African migrant population started to be observed.

Finally, since the 1990s, there has been renewed dialogue around the question of migration between the countries on both sides of the Mediterranean, but in a new context marked by the creation of the Arab-Maghreb union (*Union du Maghreb Arabe* - *UMA*) in 1989 and the signature of association agreements between the European Union and Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. The informal framework of the 5+5 Group which first met in 1990, immediately after the signature of the UMA Treaty, enabled regular meetings where the question of migration was frequently raised.

At recent 5+5 meetings in Tunis (2002), Rabat (2003) and Algiers (2004) there has been a certain political wish to go further in methods of regulating migratory flows and implementing measures to fight irregular migration to Europe, whether from the *Maghreb* or sub-Saharan countries or elsewhere. The new element in relations between Europe and the North African countries lies in the signing of association agreements between the European Union and the three Central *Maghreb* countries (Tunisia in 1975; Morocco in

The recent history of migratory flows underlines how urgent it is to have better management of migratory flows in the Euro Med region, in an institutional context where the governments of the Maghreb countries maintain relatively firm positions concerning the universal standards for migrant rights, but disagree amongst themselves when it comes to national sovereignty. In the face of the Maghreb, the European Union, for its part, collectively and country by country, seems unwilling to ratify the international conventions on migrant rights, particularly the 1990 United Nations Convention.

Migration in the Maghreb has gone through some significant changes, in rhythm and structure, in legal status and in new forms of expressing needs and plans. Over the years it has become a political issue of great importance for governments on both sides of the western Mediterranean (Musette, 2006).

In the past, emigration from the Maghreb was mainly focussed on France (where it remains, for historical reasons, more visible than elsewhere); now the movement has expanded to other migration areas, in Europe, North America and the Gulf Arab states. At the same time as this diversification of migration destinations is taking place, migrants have begun to integrate more easily into the host societies where they settle (Vincent, 1966). As migration increasingly means permanent settlement in the host country, the myth of “return to the homeland” begins to fade. But this does not mean, for all that, a definite break with the mother country, as in spite of great distances, the links with the country of origin very often remain alive.

At the present time all kinds of migration can be found in the Maghreb: internal and International, voluntary and involuntary, regular and irregular. But the most important of these migrations is international migration for work (or migration of the labour force). This migration is becoming increasingly irregular or clandestine: North Africans leave their country to go and work abroad and foreigners (mostly from the sub-Saharan countries) migrate into the Maghreb either as a temporary stop before going on to Europe or to look for works. The Maghreb is therefore involved in the migratory movements in
three different ways. It is considered not only a region with an outgoing population flow but also as a host region and more recently, as a transit zone for migratory flows.

With the closure of the European borders and the clamp-down on national labour markets in the Maghreb, would-be migrants, far from being dissuaded, are opting for procedures that are both irregular and dangerous, thus exposing themselves to administrative and penal sanctions and taking risks that put their own lives in danger.

The fact that the Maghreb is geographically so close to Europe, which has closed its borders and introduced entry visas for the territory of the European Union, makes it attractive to migrants, who are now arriving in an irregular and clandestine movement. The Maghreb has become a transit zone for Europe. As the transit time may be quite long, migrants apply to the North African labour market, but without much success, as they do not have recognised status (Abun-Nasr, 1987; Burke, 1998).

In a context where economic globalisation and advances in the new information technologies have reduced distances and are tending to transform the planet into one big village, the potential of would-be migrants to countries where there is a better standard of living has increased and diversified. The worn image of the unqualified or barely qualified worker who leaves a country in the South to go and find work in a country in the North is obsolete. Emigration is now a movement shared by young people, the less young, those who are illiterate and those who are well-qualified, the employed and the unemployed, men and women and even children.

Overall, the migration phenomenon in the Central Maghreb has some dominant characteristics; it is becoming more complex, with intermingled internal and external flows (departure zone, host country and transit area). It is becoming increasingly clandestine as migrants circulate and/or settle who would take any risk in order to be able to reach their destination. It is diversifying in as much as it is opening up to new categories of migrant: the employed as well as the unemployed, older people as well as young people, women as well as men, those who have university degrees as well as the illiterate, etc.
Maghreb: Immigration and Emigration

Morocco was a country of immigration until it gained independence. The 1960s marked a turning point in the country’s migration history. In 2003, about 60,841 foreigners were living in Morocco and provide an insight into their socio-professional profiles. By far the largest group is the jobless, followed by students. In other words, over half of all foreigners living in Morocco are not employed. Furthermore, Morocco is increasingly being used as a country of transit by thousands of sub-Saharan migrants, who view the country as a stopover on their long journey to a European destination (Chattou, 1998).

Tunisia too is becoming a way station for illegal immigrants. However, it is also a country of immigration proper. According to 1994 general population and housing census 37,953 foreigners were living in Tunisia at the time, and numbers appear to be rising, with people coming from a wider range of countries, although nationals from other Maghreb states still form the vast majority.

More detailed information was available for foreign labour in Algeria. 1998 census figures put the number of foreigners living in Algeria at 75,398, rising to 80,138 in 2002 according to the Department of National Security. 6,963 work primarily in construction and the oil industry. In both sectors, the recruitment of foreign workers is a condition of agreements signed between the Algerian state and foreign companies (ANEM, 5/2/2004).

Under half of all foreigners living in Algeria are Chinese (40.6%), followed by a far smaller population of Egyptians. The breakdown by qualifications shows those foreign workers are highly qualified, bringing technical skills to the Algerian economy, particularly in the public buildings and works, oil and mechanical and electrical sectors.

These points are the shortfalls in the Algerian economy in the sectors which require high and mid-level technical qualifications (Manheim, 1977).

Migrants: More Professionals and Entrepreneurs

According to the United Nations, some 175 million people, i.e., 3% of the world population live outside their country of birth. Europe is part of this trend, with 2,096,600 immigrants from Maghreb in 2000, over half of which (55%) came from Morocco, just
under a third (30%) from Algeria and 14% from Tunisia (OECD statistics, June 2005). Most of these migrants have settled in France, with numbers varying according to country of origin. An overwhelming majority of Algerian migrants live in France (95%), as do over two thirds (70%) of Tunisian migrants. Choice of destination is more varied amongst Moroccans, with just under half (49%) living in France (Musette, 2006). The regional concentration of immigrants from Maghreb seems to be a stable feature of migration.

Since France plays host to a sizeable proportion of Maghreb migrants, the three studies focused on business sectors and employment profiles for these migrants in France. Men were the first to emigrate, gradually followed by families, who settled in host countries on a more permanent basis. Family reunification and people marrying and giving birth abroad redefined the demographic structure. Workforces grew, chiefly due to young people and women joining the labour market in their countries of residence at a time when these countries were facing higher unemployment (Jain, 1998). According a French population census, 41% of female immigrants were registered on the labour market in 1982, compared with 57.1% in 1999.

Table 4.2: Concentration of Maghreb migrants in Europe, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Migrants</td>
<td>3.3 million</td>
<td>1.8 million</td>
<td>1.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration in Europe</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: MIREM EUI REPORT, 2007*

Migrants are also harder hit by joblessness. In 1999, migrants accounted for 15 percent of all unemployed, but only 8.6 percent of the workforce. Moreover, education and degrees afford migrants little protection, with unemployment of 16 percent amongst those with higher level qualifications.
This general trend also affects Tunisians, whose jobless rates more than to just under 19 percent of the labour force in 2004. According to the 1999 census, at least two thirds of economically active Maghreb migrants living in France are blue and white-collar workers.

The socio-professional breakdown of Tunisian immigrants in France is very similar to that of European Union nationals. 11% of male Tunisians work in management or top intellectual professions, a figure which is on a par with that for male immigrant Europeans in France, below that for non-Maghreb African men (12 percent) and higher than that for Moroccan (8 percent) and Algerian (7 percent) men. At 8 percent, Tunisian women are actually ranked above their EU counterparts in this category (7 percent) and do better than Algerian and Moroccan women (5 percent).

When it comes to the intermediate professions, statistics are similar for all three Maghreb countries (11 percent for Tunisians and Algerians, 10 percent for Moroccans), albeit significantly lagging behind those for Europeans and other Africans. Tunisians and Europeans rank high in the category of “craftsmen, shopkeepers and business owners” (11 percent), well above the French average (8 percent). Algerians are within that average and Moroccans slightly below (7 percent).

Hence, Tunisian immigrants not only study longer than most other migrants, as borne out by the fact that they rank higher than Algerians and Moroccans in the category of “managers and top intellectual professions”, but, more importantly, they also tend to be entrepreneurs and set up their own businesses. A small part of this trend is down to rising unemployment, which has prompted many Maghreb migrants to switch to liberal professions, usually setting up small businesses in commerce or crafts (Musette, 2005).

In line with trends in France, the Moroccan study flags a substantial increase in the number of migrants classified as self-employed or businessmen in Italy. Non-EU nationals own 156,000 businesses in total and North Africans 37,100, in three sectors: farming, manufacturing and services. A breakdown of this figure shows the significance of services, which accounts for 83.4 percent of businesses set up by Moroccans,
compared with a mere 14.1 percent in manufacturing and 0.4 percent in farming. Most of the businesses are small ventures.

Table 4.3: Foreign Employees in France by Occupational Categories, 1967 (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineers and Managers</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisory Personnel and Technicians</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Manual Workers</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled manuals</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled manuals</td>
<td>536.5</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Manuals</td>
<td>26.</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The breakdown also highlights the fact that most self-employed Moroccans living in Italy run shops (78.3 percent). The corresponding figures are lower for North Africans on average (55.9 percent), with even smaller percentages for non-EU nationals (38.4 percent) and foreigners in general (36.2 percent). Moroccan entrepreneurs have gained a considerable foothold in manufacturing, with over 3,000 companies, accounting for almost a third of all North African migrant businesses (Tunisians: 3,236, Algerians: 288 and Libyans: 764).

Data available for other host countries substantiates this growth in entrepreneurship amongst immigrants. In Belgium, Moroccan immigrants, especially second-generation immigrants, have moved into new economic arenas, heading up import-export
companies, managing SMEs and SMIs (business services, wholesale and manufacturing) and even working as CEOs at major companies such as the Brussels water supply company, Société de Distribution des Eaux. In the Netherlands, the more established immigrants are most likely to strike out on their own. In 1990, 10 percent of the Dutch workforce as a whole ran their own business, compared with a mere 3 percent of Turks and 2 percent of Moroccans. A similar trend towards Moroccan entrepreneurship can be seen in Canada and the United States, although reliable data on such businesses is not yet available.

Table 4.4: Socio-Professional Categories of immigrants in France-1999-percentage figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisian</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerians</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In this way, the myth of immigrants “taking our jobs” has been turned on its head, with actually generation of employment for the immigrants. Unfortunately, we do not have statistics on the scale of jobs created. However, it is clear that the numbers are quite high and set to increase. The assumption that Moroccans are always employees or shopkeepers no longer holds. Ethnic background no longer predetermines job profiles, at least not in the case of the vast majority of new businessmen from immigrant communities.
These entrepreneurs have refused to repeat the social models adopted by their parents and have no qualms about venturing into uncharted territory. Bolstered by an education that may go beyond secondary school, new generations of immigrants are more driven and more willing to gamble on an investment or go for jobs commensurate with their qualifications. Adopting the nationality of their host countries has been crucial in opening up the different economic sectors, providing access to almost all areas of investment.

Women have played a key part in this process. Moroccan female immigrants are gaining an increasing foothold in their host country economies either in a self-employed capacity or as entrepreneurs (Khachani, 2001). However, according to an FAS study, these women are seeking to attain “a secure social status rather than a purely economic one” (ADRI, 2002). The presence of a large (legal and illegal) immigrant community has become a central plank in the relationship between the Maghreb and the European Union. The Diasporas forge a network of very robust human, economic and cultural ties with their country of origin. In light of its impact on development, the economic strand of these ties is particularly interesting.

Mohamed Khachani (2002) argues that the stereotypical perception of immigrants as “employees” has been overturned. As we stated above, immigrants now create jobs by refusing to accept the social moulds imposed on their parents. In addition to local businesses (restaurants, bakeries, butchers, grocers and other businesses), Maghreb immigrants are also moving into the liberal professions (consultants, architects, lawyers, doctors, accountants, etc.) and heading up SMEs (business services, wholesale or manufacturing). Some are even in charge of large companies or start-ups. Finally, there are an (admittedly unquantifiable) number of Maghreb entrepreneurs managing companies in two or more countries, with a presence either side of the Mediterranean.

Two trends now characterise business creation by Maghreb immigrants: significant rise in the number of entrepreneurs and radical shift in the nature of the companies set up. There are myriad reasons for this growing enthusiasm to be self-employed or start a business:

- Young people account for a larger share of the immigrants’ community;
- demand is high in sectors such as construction and public works, with the spread of “multilayered” outsourcing and more work for craftsmen;
- "cultural" factors which explain the fact that migrants from *Maghreb* regions such as Djerba in Tunisia, Kabylie in Algeria and Sous in Morocco "specialise" in shop keeping;

- Discrimination of migrants applying for salaried positions. The jobless rates for Maghreb immigrants are very high, well above national averages. According to INSEE statistics for France in 2000, 9.2 percent of people born in France were unemployed and 14 percent of those who adopted French nationality, whereas the rates for people of Mghreb origin are generally well over 30 percent (19 percent of Tunisians in 2004).

For many Maghreb immigrants, becoming self-employed is the only way to break the cycle of unemployment and precarious work. The changes noted are not limited to the Maghreb immigrant community alone. Today, immigrants around the world are more likely to be female, face increasing social exclusion and are highly qualified (Migration et avenir, 2002). These characteristics are often contradictory and reflect diverse and unprecedented situations.

**Remittances and development**

Emigration has long been considered as a development factor for the countries and regions of origin or even as a substitute for development, since the migration of workers eases the pressure on the labour market and, consequently reduces unemployment, raises real wages, creates a more skilled workforce and generates cash remittances. However, the reality of these advantages is open to question. One of the principal economic effects of international migration on the migrants' countries of origin is the contribution provided by cash remittances from the migrant workers. The countries profit from the entry of foreign currency and these transfers help to raise the living standards of the families that remain at home, and, when spent at home, can have an impact on the national economy.

Despite the halt to the emigration of workers and the departure of families under the family reunification system, the amount of money sent home by migrant workers is still very considerable. In the absence of data on this phenomenon, we can only hypothesize that families now settled in Europe must, in theory, have reduced these remittances.
However, the volume of such remittances remains substantial, by the contribution of emigrant workers in an irregular situation who, being for the most part men on their own, maintain closer links with their families at home. If the European policy to put a stop to this type of immigration were to have a genuine effect, the economic consequences for the countries of origin would be very serious.

Migrants send remittances worth over 37,145 million Moroccan dirham (EUR 3,377 million) and over 1,800 million Tunisian dinars (Tunisian Central Bank), with the amounts steadily rising. Remittances to Morocco more than doubled within a decade and increased seven-fold in Tunisia in the same period. Morocco receives three times more funds than Tunisia. Over the ten years covered, remittances averaged USD 785 for Tunisia USD 1,066 for Algeria and USD 1,900 for Morocco.

Table 4.5: Remittance from Maghreb Migrants living Abroad, 1990-2000 (in Millions of US $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
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<td>1998</td>
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<td>1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bank of Algeria, Moraccan Exchange Bureau, Tunisian Central Bank.
Morocco is listed fourth (Musette, 2005) in the world ranking of countries receiving earnings remittances and second behind Lebanon in terms of per-capita expatriate remittances. This money is crucial for the home economy. In 2003, it was the main source of foreign currency, outstripping tourism (MAD 30,881 billion) whereas it only matched 50 percent of tourist revenue in 1971. It exceeds foreign private investment and loans combined (MAD 23.9 billion), and is the main source of current income in the balance of payments, offsetting almost 67 percent of the trade deficit (MAD 52,182 billion).

Remittances bring in the equivalent of over 45% of export revenue, up from a mere 4 percent in 1970. In 2003, they were worth just under the combined value of the top four export entries (Musette, 2006) in the balance of trade. Hence, Morocco’s main source of wealth stems from the export of its manual and intellectual workforce.

In Tunisia, disadvantaged regions tend to receive less in the way of remittances and better-off regions more. As such, remittances do not correct existing imbalances, but they are often the only source of income for entire families in regions decimated by unemployment and underemployment. Remittances generally fuel everyday consumption, helping countless families meet their daily needs.

To a lesser extent, remittances to Tunisia are also one of its chief sources of foreign currency and help power the national economy. They rank third behind textiles and tourism. Expressed in terms of the main economic indicators, remittances represented 4.9 percent of GDP, over two thirds of debt servicing (64.4 percent) and 23.8 percent of national savings in 2003. They often outstrip foreign direct investment (FDI), bringing in the equivalent of 150 percent thereof in 1996, falling just short of the mark (96 percent) in 2000, and rising to slightly over (106 percent) in 2003. Remittances were Algeria’s only source of foreign currency in the 1960s, before the oil and gas industry was nationalised in the 1970s. They continued to rise until 1985 and have plummeted since to a mere 1.3 percent of GDP.
Table 4.6: Maghreb: Remittance’s contribution to National GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data/Country</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>3.3 millions</td>
<td>1.8 millions</td>
<td>1 millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>$7 billions</td>
<td>$2.9 billion</td>
<td>$1.8 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances GDP</td>
<td>8.9 percent</td>
<td>2.2 percent</td>
<td>4.9 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MIREM EUI REPORT, 2007

Migrants’ attachment to sending communities is also testified by the establishment of many ‘home town’ associations and development NGOs by migrants. Such ‘development networks’ (Lacroix, 2005) play an increasingly important role in sending regions through the establishment of public infrastructure (road construction, electricity, drinking water, irrigation systems, mills, dams, etc), social development projects (community centers, literacy projects, schools and dormitories, mosques, etc), and, more recently, projects aimed at improving local economies (workshops, women’s cooperatives, handicrafts, vegetable oil and milk production, tourist development, etc.) (Lacroix, 2005; see also Gallina, 2004). The freedom of activities of migrants’ associations used to be very restricted until recently, certainly compared with countries like Mexico and Turkey. However, increasing civil liberties in Maghreb, especially Morocco and Tunisia, over the 1990s have led to a remarkable increase in association activities.

The emigration flow under the system of family reunification is considered as the cause of a decrease in repatriation of wages to the countries of origin, because the workers settle permanently in the host country, reducing the proportion of the money once invested in the home country in anticipation of their return, and giving preference to investments in the host country where they are now residents. Indeed, they must devote more money to the long-term establishment of their family in the country of residence, and this, together with day-to-day household spending, reduces their ability to save.

In the economic crisis situation in Europe, increased unemployment among immigrants and the spread of precarious employment, not only for illegal but also legal immigrants,
means that they have little ability to save, and this proportionately reduces the cash remittances to the families that have stayed behind in the Maghreb. Where individuals are in an irregular situation, moreover, the possibilities of effecting cash transfers to their families through official channels may be very limited. The fact that workers are kept in a precarious situation in Europe also hurts the countries of origin in financial terms.

However, it must also be taken into account that from the end of the eighties, the new monetary policy applied in Tunisia and Morocco, involving, among other things, the lifting of restrictions on exchange and on the repatriation of money, has led to an increase in remittances from emigrants. The value of these remittances has increased because of currency devaluation. It is not easy to establish the total amount of these remittances, since part of the money does not go through official channels; another part is sent not in cash but in kind and is not therefore quantifiable.

In the Maghreb, this phenomenon is particularly manifest in Algeria, which receives repatriations of wages that are far lower in cash value than those received by other Maghreb countries, but which is sent under cover of considerable remittances in kind, which are rarely identified. In 1993, the cash sent by emigrant workers represented 53 per cent of export earnings for Morocco, 16 per cent for Tunisia and 19 per cent for Turkey (IMF). The countries of origin receive more money from cash transfers effected by emigrants than they do from development aid from donor countries.

While in 1993 total public development aid was equivalent to 2.8 per cent of GNP in Morocco, the repatriation of emigrants' earnings was equivalent to 7.3 per cent; these proportions were, respectively, 1.7 per cent and 4 per cent for Tunisia, 0.3 per cent and 4 per cent for Turkey (World Bank, 1995). Furthermore, in the nineties, repatriations of emigrant earnings represented about double the volume of direct foreign investments and provided the most stable capital inflow over time.

However, this financial contribution from the emigrants far from provides a remedy for the problems of development, since cash remittances are often not used in a productive manner and do not allow the creation of many jobs. Finally, these transfers often aggravate the inequalities in income in the community of origin, or cause inflationary pressure which further impoverishes families that do not receive such transfers and
possibly drive these families themselves to emigrate, thus maintaining a heavy migration pressure, especially in rural areas.

Among the reasons for questioning the positive effects of emigration on development, we would also include the fact that, in the event of return, the migrants have very little opportunity to use the skills acquired abroad and few possibilities of productive investment (Mezdour, 1993). This has contributed to the declining probability of return, to the establishment of the families in Europe and to the decline in their remittances.

Furthermore, since those who leave are the most enterprising, educated and skilled elements, migration also produces a brain drain. This phenomenon is a sign not only of disequilibrium between demand and supply in respect of skilled labour within the country, but also of international disequilibrium in skilled workers' earnings between the migrants' country of origin and the countries to which they are attracted. This type of migration represents a considerable financial loss to the country of origin, which has paid for the training of these specialists. It is reflected in a depletion of the country's human resources, especially technicians specializing in new technologies, and thus hampers development.

The brain drain is also a reality at regional level, since it concerns the departure from rural districts of persons having acquired an education above the local average (Cammelli, 1990). Such persons would be indispensable to their region of origin in the creation of an economic fabric which would make possible the integration of new young entrants onto the labour market and thus reduce urbanization and emigration pressure.

Nonetheless, despite these disadvantages, the migration of the workforce does present elements that can enhance the growth of the countries of origin. For the countries that support emigration, the strategy would be to organize migration in such a manner as to increase its real advantages to a maximum.

A breakdown of remittances by country shows how many migrants live in which host countries. 96.25 percent of funds remitted to Algeria come from France. In 2004, 90.5 percent of remittances to Tunisia were sent from Europe, with over 50% coming from France, followed by Germany and Italy. At 91 percent, Europe is also the main source of remittances to Morocco, although France accounts for slightly less (44.5 percent), followed by Italy and Spain.
The amount sent varies from one country to the next, largely depending on income, lifestyle, the presence of family members abroad and long-term plans (move back to country of origin or stay in host country). In a departure from previous habits, immigrants now tend to settle permanently in their host country, and it is there that they focus their plans, make their homes and build up their savings. The fact is that “the amount of money remitted is higher the more family members remain in the country of origin and lower the more family members live in the host country” (Enrico Todisco, 2002).

Table 4.7: *Maghreb Countries: Percentage of Remittances from France to Maghreb Countries, 2004*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>96.25%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Enrico Todisco, 2002

Extreme caution should be exercised when assessing how long remittances will continue. They may evolve in the same way immigration did. The 1970s saw massive immigration of people with little education and no qualifications. Current restrictions at EU borders officially limit immigration to those with qualification (Enrico Todisco, 2002). Qualified immigrants generally enjoy better living conditions and “are in a position to spend more and save proportionately less, ... all the more so since they bring their families with them, meaning that any savings that might be remitted are used in the host country” (Enrico Todisco, 2002).

However, although these new immigrants send less in the way of financial remittances, they do offer more intangible benefits. Qualified immigrants, particularly highly qualified scientists are the only people who can provide their home countries with the scientific and technical knowledge they need. Moroccan migrants overwhelmingly prefer property investments, as borne out by various surveys carried out over the past 35 years or more.

Statistics compiled by the Club of Moroccan Investors Abroad (CIME) indicate that most companies set up by migrants in their home country tend to be small or micro businesses.
According to the survey findings, 40 percent of projects launched by Moroccans living abroad are backed by capital of MAD 500,000 or less. A mere 14 percent manage to raise capital of MAD 5 million. An INSEA poll yielded some interesting data on migrant investment in Morocco.

Table 4.8: Morocco: Investment Pattern of Remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Farming</th>
<th>Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>83%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Club of Moroccan Investors Abroad (CIME)

Property was once again the clear winner, accounting for 83 percent of investments. Manufacturing received a meagre 1.3 percent, farming 7.5 percent and services 8.2 percent. The study also asked migrants about their future investment plans: 57 percent intended to invest in Morocco and 14 percent in their country of residence. More importantly, a shift was noted in their target sectors. Farming was a no runner abroad and the tertiary sector continued to draw ever more migrants. It has become a hot favourite in Morocco, accounting for 44.8 percent of planned investment, split between 27.4 percent for trade, 12.1 percent for tourism and 5.3 percent for miscellaneous services (Musette, 2006). Notwithstanding a percentage increase, manufacturing remained an unpopular choice amongst migrants. Clearly these statistics relate to planned investments and there is no way of assessing the actual level of investment.

However, some of the data does indicate a radical shift in investment patterns amongst migrants targeting Morocco, pointing to the emergence of an entrepreneurial culture. Moroccan expatriates are moving into new territory such as the stock-exchange, farming, breeding, trade, tourism and SMIs in specific areas (bakeries, pastry-making, clothing, etc.). They are also setting their sights on cutting-edge sectors such as new information and communications technology, paving the way for technology transfer through Moroccan expatriates.

Statistics on official investments made by Tunisians living abroad demonstrate a similar overwhelming preference for property. Two thirds of remaining investment is in services,
over a quarter in manufacturing and under 10% in farming. Between 1988 and 2004, Tunisian migrants launched 8,763 ventures, creating 38,265 jobs and raising TND 321,322 billion in investment, in other words an average of 515 ventures, 2,251 jobs and TND 18,901 billion worth of investment each year. Over half of all jobs created were in manufacturing, 45% in services and under 4% in farming, which clearly reflects the sector averages of eight jobs per investment project in manufacturing, three in services and two in farming. Hence, both the number of jobs created and level of investment per venture show these ventures to be small-scale and low on capital.

Despite a host of incentives (Musette, 2006) encouraging Tunisians living abroad to channel their investments into productive ventures, the statistics are disappointing. Tunisian expatriates contribute a mere 0.5 percent towards national investment. The Office for Expatriate Tunisians, OTE37, surveyed a group of participants at a 1999 gathering of Tunisian businessmen based in Europe and came up with several explanations: lack of information on investment opportunities (84 percent), red tape (65 percent) and problems securing loans. An INSEA survey of Moroccans living abroad produced similar findings. The fact is that the scarcity of productive investment has a lot to do with the environment in which migrants live. “This environment comprises a host of variables in several areas which determine the viability of projects undertaken.

A regional breakdown of investment reveals that most money goes to the Grand Tunis region and coastal areas, where prosperity and development is highest. Similarly, poor absorption capacity in Morocco may steer resources towards the more developed regions. For example, the Casablanca region draws in a large share of resources, chiefly through its banking system, unlike the eastern and Rif provinces which boast high emigration but poor infrastructure.

Migration of skills brings something new to the remittances debate. Increasingly, skilled migrants are expected to use their business and social networks and knowledge to help their country of origin. Decision-makers and researchers are taking a growing interest in these intangible transfers, which are underpinned by “a two-fold social rationale” in that the migrants in question can participate in “inter-cultural dialogue” and help “modernise education and research and development systems”39. The French Supreme Council for
International Cooperation deems that “these people belong to more than one culture and, as such, offer added value: they are indisputable mediators, liaising between cultures. Their dual reference systems give them a “competitive edge”, making them ideal mediators, sharing cultures, practices and knowledge.

**Demographic Effects**

Demographic pressure and its consequences constitute the basic elements of social transformation. The impact of the population factor depends on its scale effects and structural effects. The scale effect bears upon a country's entire population at global level causing an increase in the expenditure necessary to its development. The structural affect determines the different constraints that burden its economy: pressure on the labour market is intensified as the proportion of the working-age population increases.

The *Maghreb* countries are in the process of demographic transition. However, even though fertility rates are declining rapidly, demographic pressure is not likely to ease for some time, not until this transition is completed and the population has stabilized. In the meantime, the population continues to increase and its immediate future is predestined, since age structures, in which very young persons are particularly numerous, will ensure a major population growth over the next few years.

Such growth has a considerable impact on the labour market. The age structure is such that the tension will ease only in the long term, and increase in the short and medium term, as the millions of young persons who will enter the labour market are already born. The economically active population is currently increasing at a more rapid rate than that of the total population, owing to a time-lag of about twenty years between the decline in fertility and its effect on the number of young people arriving on the labour market.

In mean time, positive effects might be produced at national level by a decrease in social welfare spending as a result of the stabilization of the very young population in other countries. However, these gains will be limited by the costs of programmes to improve schools and increase the percentage of children in full-time education, as well as by the cost of health care services.
This demographic context will create obligations which will have to be taken into account in economic and social terms. However, even if the demographic factor is considered to be the most important element influencing migration pressure, interventions in this sector, while necessary, will have only marginal and, in any case, very long-term effects. Moreover, the complexity of the phenomenon is such that it is not enough to succeed in slowing down population growth to hope for a reduction of the economic constraints that drive individuals to emigrate.

The effect of migration on decreasing population growth or unemployment at the national level should not be overestimated. Migration is too limited a phenomenon to counter general demographic trends, although demographic effects of migration are often magnified at a regional and local level. Large-scale out-migration of young people and subsequent family migration may cause a considerable slow down in demographic growth at those levels (Kerbout, 1990). Nevertheless, the commonly employed metaphor exudes rural to indicate this process is misleading, as it may evoke an image of absolute rural depopulation, which occurs only in specific, isolated, mostly mountainous or desert areas (De Haas, 1998).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000 Population)</th>
<th>Crude Death Rate (per 1,000 Population)</th>
<th>Total Fertility Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most emigration regions have, instead, witnessed a net population increase (Koubry, 1995). Moreover, where depopulation occurs, it seems to be the result of internal migration. International migration and remittances rather enable family members to stay
in the village and several authors have argued that it has prevented the depopulation of regions such as the Rif, Anti-Atlas and the southern oases (De Mas, 1990; Fadloullah et al., 2000; Heinemeijer et al., 1976; Mter, 1995). Moreover, as we shall see, the long-term direct and indirect effects of remittance expenditure can even lead to an increase in population through reverse migration.

In countries that have reached a stage of intermediary development, such as the Maghreb countries, the population has increased enormously since the mid-fifties owing to a combination of high birth rates and falling death rates. The population has multiplied by 2.6 in the Maghreb whereas it has multiplied by only 1.2 in Europe. This increase, which is even greater than the world average, gives us an idea of the challenge confronting the North African.

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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</table>


In the three countries of the Maghreb, annual rates of natural population growth (representing the surplus of births over deaths) reached a peak in the years 1970-1980, after which they started to decline. Apart from this point in common, the three countries present fairly different demographic characteristics. In Tunisia, the population growth rate was brought down from 2.6 per cent at the beginning of the seventies to a much lower level in the following years, as a result of an active policy to control demographic pressure and a change in the status of women. Since the nineties, Tunisia has been one of the smallest of developing countries in which the level of population growth is lower than 2 per cent.

With a population growth rate which went down from 2.7 per cent in the sixties to 2.4 per cent today, Morocco is not far from achieving comparable results. The population growth
rate in Algeria, which was the highest in the region, is also declining rapidly, from 3.1 per cent in the 1975-1980 periods to 2.7 per cent between 1990 and 1995. By 1994 the decline in fertility has been more rapid than expected in Morocco and Algeria. If rates continue to drop according to the same progression, the population of the Maghreb is likely to be stabilized by the second half of the next century. When we examine the situation in the Maghreb and other Arab countries, we can see that, while they presented comparable demographic indicators in the early sixties, the Maghreb countries have undergone significant and rapid changes.

In the meantime, even though population growth rates are declining, the population itself continues to increase rapidly and the annual number of births has never been so high, because the population, and in particular the number of women of child-bearing age, has increased. According to the average population growth variant in the Maghreb, the population (at present 62.6 million) will number 82.9 million in 2010.

This latter figure (37.4 million for Algeria, 11.2 million for Tunisia and 34.2 million for Morocco) will correspond to a doubling of the population since the 1975-1980 periods. This second figure will correspond to a doubling of the population since the 1970-1975 periods. The same figures also show that between 1990 and 2010 the population should increase by more than 12 million in Algeria, 10 million in Morocco, 3 million in Tunisia. Demographic pressure will, therefore, remain high and probably increase in the coming decades. These margins are calculated on the basis of the hypothesis that fertility trends will correspond to the low or high projection variant.

Social Investments

Population growth has, in the past, been reflected, and will continue to be reflected, in an additional demand for social welfare, education, health care services and community facilities. In order to meet the demands of this increased population, countries will have to develop social infrastructures, if only to maintain present living standards. The social welfare budget will consequently have to be increased and can be used only marginally to improve the quality of these services. Nevertheless, improvement in living standards,
education and health care is all the more essential as it greatly influences not only the lowering of fertility rates but also migration pressure.

Increased spending on the social sectors and on housing will consume major resources which could have been allocated to productive and employment-creating investments to promote development. In Tunisia, according to the Seventh Development Plan (1992-1996), in view of the population increase, an improvement in living standards would require an economic growth rate of about 6 per cent. In Morocco and Algeria, where the population growth rate is higher, a perceptible improvement in living standards is difficult to visualize, at least for the next few generations.

Concerning health care needs show that public spending on health care would have to increase at a faster rate than GDP in order to improve existing benefits and extend them to the sections of the population that do not yet have access to health care services. This category represented 7.6 per cent of the total population in Morocco and 3.1 per cent in Algeria at the beginning of the nineties. Public spending on health amounted to 5.4 per cent of GDP in Algeria, 3.3 per cent in Tunisia and 0.9 per cent in Morocco (UNDP, 1995).

As for education, numbers of school children will rise more rapidly than the total population because of the increase in this age group and also because there will be a general rise in the numbers of persons, male and female, in full-time education. The share of the budget devoted to education, expressed as a percentage of GDP - 9.1 per cent in Algeria, 5.5 per cent in Morocco and 6.1 per cent in Tunisia in 1990 (UNDP, 1995) - should increase as a result.

As we have already indicated, the stabilization of the very young population would in the immediate future lead to a reduction in the social spending necessary today in order to meet the needs of a larger population. This fact, combined with the increased percentage of the working-age population in relation to total population, will result in the countries' registering a lower rate of dependence and a more favourable structure as regards keeping social costs under control. If economic development were to make it possible to create
the necessary jobs, there would be new possibilities of improving the quality of education and health services. However, the social cost of structural adjustment programmes could have an adverse effect on human development. Education and primary health care could pay the price in respect of both quality and quantity.

Migration has not only deeply affected regional economies, but has also changed the social face of communities. Migration is not only an attempt to secure better livelihoods, but also a clear avenue of upward social mobility. For instance, beside the economic and well-being value, the construction of a house is also an expression of the newly acquired social status. Likewise, the renovation or construction of mosques and Hadj, the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, not only fulfils an intrinsic, religious function, but also adds to the social prestige of the migrants. Both internal and international migrations have played a central role in the “landslide of social, political and economic changes” (Crawford, 2001) rural Maghreb is experiencing.

Migration has also accelerated the breakdown of ancient socio-ethnic hierarchies in migrant-sending communities. In fact, in most of rural areas, migration has contributed to the creation of a new social stratification (Fadloullah et al., 2000; Mter, 1995), with international migrant households forming a new kind of “migration elite”. In many respects, the new socio-economic dividing line in Moroccan migrant-sending communities is now between households with and without international remittance income (De Haas, 2003).

One might easily conclude on the basis of such observations that migration and remittances cause increasing intra-community inequality. We know from the literature that this impact is heterogeneous and highly contingent on migration selectivity and migration stage (Jones, 1998). We should therefore be extremely prudent before jumping to conclusions that migration has increased inequality based on rather superficial observations.

Furthermore, it is important to avoid living in the past by acknowledging that traditional communities tended to be inherently unequal. For instance, in oases, with their caste-like
socio-ethnic stratification, most people used to live in grinding poverty, while subaltern (mostly Black) ethnic groups such as the 
*haratin* and *abid* were often restricted to serfdom or slavery (De Haas, 2003). In essence, what has happened is that new forms of inequality, based mainly on access to monetary resources, which are to a considerable extent defined along lines of access to international migration, have been largely superimposed upon the traditional forms of structural, hereditary inequality based on kinship, complexion and land possession.

The rise of new elite groups has gone in parallel with the demise of traditional elites. This exemplifies the ambiguity and subjectivity in judging whether such migration-induced shifts should be regarded as positive or negative.

For many subaltern groups, migration literally constituted liberation and has been their main avenue of upward socio-economic mobility. Migration and remittances have enabled the (at least partial) emancipation of individuals belonging to socially and ethnically subaltern groups. Throughout *Maghreb*, migration has offered new opportunities to earn an external income independent of the constraints set by traditional peasant society. Formerly landless, and hence powerless, men now earn wages that allow them to buy land and gain increasing influence in local affairs (Crawford, 2001; Otte, 2000). In Moroccan oases, the *haratin*, a low-status ethnic group, have been able to acquire a higher social status through their new financial resources (Ilahiane, 2001; cf. Bellakhdar et al., 1992; Ensel, 1999; Mter, 1995; Nairn, 1997).

These migration-induced shifting patterns or sometimes even reversal of social stratification explain why even individuals belonging to traditional high-status groups, who previously did not see the need to migrate, now aspire to emigrate abroad (McMurray, 2001).

Consequently, members of formerly subaltern groups increasingly reject traditional authoritarian structures. They often refuse to work as sharecroppers or agricultural labourers for traditional elite groups (cf. Kerbout, 1990; De Haas, 1998). Consequently, traditional village councils (*jemâas*), the most important local political institutions, have
lost much of their effective power to settle intra-community conflicts (Aït Hamza, 1988; Otte, 2000).

The negative consequence for traditional agriculture can be that collective agricultural works, such as the maintenance of irrigation systems, are not carried out properly and that common law regulating land and water use is decreasingly respected (De Haas, 1998; Kerbout, 1990; Otte, 2000). In particular, in fragile anthropogenic, labour-intensive agricultural systems, such as traditional oases and mountain terraces, the result might be a general decline of traditional agricultural systems and land degradation (cf. De Haas, 2001).

**Migration and the Position of Women Left Behind**

Intra-household relations in Morocco tend to be based on strong patriarchal principles. This is manifested in the fact that only men have historically been allowed to migrate alone (Crivello, 2003). Traditionally, migrants leave their wives and daughters behind with their extended family. In this context, De Mas (1990) interpreted remittances destined for the entire extended family household as the literal price that the migrant pays for this control. In this way men were able to migrate without risking their families' honour. However, nuclear family households have increasingly become the norm over the past decades.

As we have seen, migration-related tensions on remittance use have played an accelerating role in the breakdown of extended families and have stimulated the lifting out of nuclear families and nucleation of family life. Besides increased divorce rates, migration is seen as a major cause of the increasing number of female-headed households in Morocco. Fadloullah et al. (2000) found that the proportion of female-headed households among migrant households is almost double (15 versus 8 per cent) that among non-migrant households. De Haas (2003) concluded that, mainly because of migration, female-headed households accounted for one-third of all the households interviewed in his survey.
Table 4.11: Population and Labour force in North Africa, 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Population (Million)</th>
<th>Total Labour (Million)</th>
<th>Female Share of Labour (%)</th>
<th>Average Annual Growth Rate (%) of Labour Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1980-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The impact of migration on gender roles has received relatively scant attention, since most research focuses on the position of the — mostly male — migrants and interviews tend to be held with — supposedly male — ‘household heads’ (cf. Hajjarabi, 1995). The consequences of migration on women’s wellbeing are generally put in a negative light by predominantly male scholars, while the presumed lack of “paternal authority” is said to increase delinquency among youngsters (Ait Hamza, 1995; Fadloullah et al., 2000).

However, these assertions tend to be based on general impressions rather than on systematic empirical inquiries. It is a common assertion that migration has encouraged the emancipation of women. In the absence of their husbands, women’s responsibilities, autonomy and power are said to increase (Aït Hamza, 1988; 1995; Bouzid, 1992; Fadloullah et al., 2000, p. xix, 130). Nevertheless, a comparative study by Van Rooij (2000) among non-migrants’ and migrants’ wives refuted the hypothesis that migration contributes to changing gender roles.

The lives of migrants’ wives remain largely confined to housekeeping, child-rearing and agricultural work (for similar results, see also Bouzid, 1992; Steinmann, 1993). Although they tend to have more control over the use of their husbands’ earnings and in child-rearing, this gain in authority was mainly temporary, since migrants resume their position...
as patriarchs as soon as they return (Van Rooij, 2000). Based on her fieldwork in Al Hoceima in the Rif area, Crivello (2003) stressed that women also frame their migration within a broader family project and within familiar social networks to garner approval and status.

Since the material situation of wives of international migrants is better and more secure, they are generally able to hire non-migrant women and men for certain domestic and agricultural tasks (Aït Hamza, 1995), easing their physical labour burden compared with other women (Steinmann, 1993; Van Rooij, 2000). Spouses of international migrants gain in power and status vis-à-vis non-migrant women. However, Steinmann (1993) argued that the increasing emphasis on a capital-based economy and one-sided dependency on their husband’s remittances adversely affected women. Moreover, changes in gender roles are not necessarily positive. For instance, if women take over traditional ‘male’ tasks, such as harvesting as a result of migration, some of the younger men may refuse to work in what has now come to be dubbed ‘women’s work’ (Nyberg-Sorensen, 2004).

Furthermore, the emotional burden of the increased responsibilities can be high. Both Hajjarabi (1995) and Van Rooij (2000) revealed that migrants’ wives do not necessarily appreciate the sudden increase in responsibilities and tasks, which were not theirs within the normative context of traditional society and to which they do not always aspire. As this new role is generally not assumed out of free choice, it should not automatically be equated with emancipation in the meaning of making independent and conscious choices against prevailing norms on gender roles. Migration itself apparently has no direct influence or only a limited one on such norms, and gradual changes in these and the improving position of women therefore reflect general processes of cultural change within Moroccan society rather than the particular effect of migration.

However, there might be some more indirect positive effects as well. We have seen that international migration does have a distinct positive influence on the educational participation of migrants’ daughters and that remittances have both pushed and enabled migrants’ wives to establish independent households in newly-constructed houses for their nuclear family, thereby escaping control by in-laws and gaining in personal freedom. Furthermore, Courbage (1995) hypothesized that – besides factors such as
higher age of marriage, increased female labour force participation and improved education – the migration of Moroccan families to European countries has contributed to the diffusion and adoption of European marriage patterns and small family norms, and so has played an accelerating role in the demographic transition (cf. Fargues, 2004).

**Employment generation**

Achievements in the matter of employment creation have always fallen short of needs and been below the expectations of economic plans. This discrepancy between the volume of employment envisaged and that which is actually achieved provides a good illustration of the unreliable nature of any quantitative connection between number of job seekers and number of jobs created.

In Algeria, the number newly created jobs, estimated at 140,000 per year in the early eighties, has decreased steadily; there have been fewer than 100,000 since 1985, though the target of the 1985-1989 plan was 180,000 new jobs each year. At the same time, the active population was increasing annually by almost 200,000 persons. In Morocco, 151,000 jobs were created each year between 1971 and 1982, but the number has fallen since then. Between 1982 and 1990, the discrepancy between employment creation and additional labour supply is illustrated by the fact that, while 124,000 jobs were created each year, the annual additional labour supply amounted to 160,000 persons.

In Tunisia, there is a disparity between forecasts and performance in respect of employment creation, on one hand, and between achievements in employment creation and additional supply of labour, on the other. For the entire period from 1973 to 1991, the rate of absorption of additional labour supply into employment was 68 per cent. The Eighth Plan (1992-96) reckoned with a balance between the additional labour supply and demand through the creation of an average of 64,000 jobs per year. As for actual performance, for the 1992-1994 periods the rate of absorption of the additional labour supply was 84 per cent (Ministry of Economic Development, Tunis, 1994).

However, as we shall see later, the projections concerning the additional labour supply established by the Tunisian Government underestimate the actual supply, which would
appear therefore to be less than for the period from 1987 to 1991. In the 1973-1986 periods, 22 per cent of additional jobs created were in public administration. This percentage fell to 15 per cent for the 1992-1994 periods. In the later period, most of the jobs created were in the "trade and other services" sector.

In Tunisia, projections established for the decade from 1990 to 2000 indicates that an economic growth rate of at least 6 per cent would have to be generated to cover the additional labour supply alone. Moreover, as we have already remarked for the period covered by the Eighth Plan (1992-1996), the additional labour supply was underestimated, to the extent that these projections considered only persons between the ages of 18 and 59 as belonging to the active population. In this respect, the Tunisian authorities plan to apply early retirement measures and extend the duration of school attendance. Another factor of underestimation: the hypothesis concerning women's activity rates, since the planners reckoned with a slight drop in this rate compared to that registered for the 1984-1989 period, whereas this hypothesis contradicts the trend towards increased schooling and employment for women.

Without calling the Tunisian forecasts into question, we may consider that, to absorb the additional labour supply, even if this has been underestimated, an annual investment growth rate of 10 per cent would be necessary. For this, Tunisia, and the other countries also, would have to resort to external financing, which can only be by direct foreign investment, given that external financial equilibrium measures make it impossible for the country to increase its foreign debt.

**Unemployment**

As mentioned earlier, it was during the colonial period that the tradition of labour migration to France was firmly established. Before the industrialization period temporary labour recruitment and contract labour have been significant for centuries throughout the capitalist world. These migrants were of temporary nature and were mainly unorganised.

The Marshall plan for reconstructing Europe, after a mass destruction during the World War II, organised mass recruitment of foreign workers. These workers had played an important role in the rebuilding of Europe. The industrialised countries consumed the labour population from underdeveloped countries who were seeking employment. The
receding demographic trends and labour shortage led Europe to look at *Maghreb* region for cheap labour with no technical knowledge. But by mid 1970's, industrial restructuring and transition to more specialised, flexible production has accompanied a regeneration of the work-force where by fewer and generally skilled workers were employed in more automated factories. As a result of it migrant workers became more vulnerable to unemployment and many had to go back to their native countries. They just remained as a reserve labour force.

The *Maghreb* immigration which had already slowed by government regulations came to a halt due to world economic crisis of the 1930's. This reduced the total number of immigrants to 120,000 in 1930 to 32,000 in 1936. While unemployment rates were low in general during the sixties and seventies, they started to rise in the two succeeding decades and are now very high and still rising in the three countries. The structural nature of unemployment and the economic crisis in Europe had made these foreigners more vulnerable to workforce cutbacks in industry, and given rise to a significant increase in foreign labour in the tertiary sector (OECD, 1993).

Unemployment was estimated in 1992 at 13.8 per cent in Algeria, 13.2 per cent in Morocco and 16 per cent in Tunisia. In absolute figures, Algeria had 1.5 million unemployed in 1992, Morocco 1.1 million and Tunisia 400,000. Urban unemployment rates are in general higher than national unemployment rates, in view of the tendency for the population to increase and women's activity rates in the urban areas to be higher than the national average. In Morocco, the urban unemployment rate was 16 per cent in 1992.

Unemployment particularly affects young persons under the age of 25 and first-time job seekers. In Algeria, 67 per cent of the unemployed in 1992 were under the age of 25, and first-time job seekers accounted for 63.6 per cent of all job seekers. In Tunisia, 46 per cent of unemployed persons in 1989 were looking for work for the first time. Unemployment today can, in fact, be attributed mainly to the impossibility for new arrivals among the active population of finding a job, rather than to lay-offs of employed workers. Unemployment has also rapidly increased among young graduates, who practically used to have a guarantee of employment in the public service.
This phenomenon gives rise to great concern, bearing in mind that, with the general improvement in respect of education in these countries, the proportion of young graduates today is higher than during the preceding decades, and it will continue to increase. We have also observed an increase in the rate of women's unemployment, especially in the case of young women. In 1992, the women's unemployment rate was 20.3 per cent in Algeria, where 75.4 per cent of women under the age of 25 were without work. In Tunisia, the women's unemployment rate increased after the early eighties and had reached 21.9 per cent by 1989.

One of the reasons for discrepancy between the unemployment rates for the women of the three communities depends is the different rates of women's participation in active life. Several explanations can be advanced for this increase in women's unemployment. The first is that educated young women look for work in sectors where employment is not on the increase, for example, the public sector. Another reason is that women's entry onto the labour market took place above all during the eighties, a period in which employment creation was limited.

Side by side with unemployment, there has also been an increase in under-employment. Even though the figures are not reliable, we have already witnessed an increase, especially in the urban informal sector and in agriculture, in low-productivity work, where skills or qualifications are under-used and remuneration lower than the minimum wage.

The situation of the employment market is the central problem area of the Maghreb countries' economies, and employment creation is one of the most pressing issues to be addressed in this area. Mass unemployment and under-employment creates a socio-economic problem, and while there is an obvious connection between unemployment and poverty, unemployment can also give rise to social and political conflict. The fact that young people, for the most part, are affected by unemployment can have even more serious political and social consequences and lead, directly or indirectly, to increased emigration pressure.

The fact that unemployment today is mainly, to be attributed to the impossibility of finding work for new arrivals among the active population, is further justification for the
use of our model of flow of new entrants into the employment market as a basis for determining the pressure of migration from these countries.

Managing Migrant Mobility

Managing worker mobility has become a pressing issue given the rise in illegal immigration and the tendency amongst qualified individuals to emigrate and settle abroad. Let us first point out that migratory flows and the mobility of all workers irrespective of their level of qualifications are no longer handled by public authorities alone. A wider and more diverse range of stakeholders have gradually come into the picture. International organisations, particularly those remitted to tackle migration issues under development programmes, international and national development associations (International Migration Paper- 78E, 200666) and private bodies specialised in finding jobs for qualified workers have all taken up active roles in this area.

To put things in an international perspective, it is worth pointing out that brain drain affects all countries around the world. However, it wreaks most havoc on developing countries and, Africa is undoubtedly worst hit in light of its need for trained professionals. Over the past few decades, Africa is thought to have lost 30% of its highly qualified workforce. It is currently estimated that one in three African university graduates work outside the continent (David Sogge, 2004).

Within Africa, the Maghreb is increasingly becoming a skills migration hub. While reasonably reliable statistics are available on economic migration, ascertaining the movements of top scientists is more complex, indeed very hard to gauge. What we do know is that emigration may follow on from study periods in host countries. According to available data, over 13% of the 34,430 Moroccan students attending foreign universities in 1997 remained in their host countries (UNESCO, 1997). They belong to a global community of foreign students that UNESCO (1997) estimates to be around 1.5 million, spread across some 50 countries, although the US (29%) and France (11%) are still the most popular destinations. This trend is exacerbated by fierce competition between northern hemisphere countries.
Faced with labour shortages in the same sectors, they are focusing their recruitment drives on those developing countries that have invested considerable effort into building up robust education systems. Skills shortages are most acute in cutting-edge sectors such as new information and communication technologies (NICT), sparking off a "war of talents". Host countries have are softening their tough immigration legislation and adapting their increasingly restrictive immigration policies to satisfy market demand for highly qualified workers. In France, many foreign researchers with a PhD or higher qualification work at the National Centre of Scientific Research (CNRS). More than 1,600 researchers at the CNRS come from the Maghreb region, with 800 from Morocco. Yet more qualified Maghreb migrants are employed at universities and other specialised institutes (L'express, 1999).

In response to calls from the business community, the French Ministry of Employment and Solidarity issued a circular decree on 16 July 1998 authorising foreign recruitment of IT specialists and engineers and exempting them from legislation requiring preference to be given to workers already available on the French labour market. As a result, 2001 saw 4,000 professionals recruited from Morocco, Romania and Lebanon. On a similar note, 8,000 doctors from the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East work in French hospitals. "Without them, French hospitals would grind to a halt" (L'Harmattan, 2003). Although recruitment drives target a wide range of graduates, their main focus is specialised fields such as NICTs.

This explains why the Moroccan graduates in most demand are alumni from the three most prestigious third-level institutions, the National Postal and Telecommunications Institute (INPT), the National Higher School of Information Technology and System Analysis (ENSIAS) and the Mohammedia School of Engineering (EMI). According to a Moroccan newspaper, 50% to 60% of their graduates in 2000 "had already left or were about to leave by the graduation ceremony" (Liberation, 2000).

Intermediate professions, such as nursing, are also affected by the migration of skilled labour. Supply is growing scarce in southern hemisphere countries, partly because medical workers are being lured away to plug gaps in the northern hemisphere. Morocco does not have enough paramedics to cover the needs of its population, with a mere 10.5
nurses per 100,000 inhabitants, well short of the World Health Organization’s recommended target of one nurse per 300 inhabitants (Le Matin du Sahara, 2003).

In light of this trend, skilled migrants have a key role to play, as demonstrated by the setting up of niche organisations such as the Association of Moroccan IT Specialists in France (some 200 members), the Moroccan Association of Biologists in France, the Moroccan Association of Biologists in the US, the Moroccan Academic Research Scientists Network, also in the US, the Network of Moroccan Intellectuals in Europe and the “Knowledge and Development” Association, representing skilled professionals from a range of fields (200 members).

By joining the labour market in their host countries, Algerian migrants have amassed a wealth of professional experience, technical and scientific skills and know-how that Algeria can tap into to foster development. To ascertain how this capital acquired abroad can be of benefit to society, we need to examine the impact on the home society of migrants integrating the different labour market segments in their host countries. In this way, we can establish the extent to which such integration can meet the needs of the Algerian economy.

During the Colonial era, emigration to France was according to a rotation principle with migrants returning to settle in Algeria after a few years and younger countrymen taking their place (the *noria* principle), thus ensuring a steady supply of farm labour and bringing workers into new sectors of salaried employment to build up the financial resources needed for the traditional system to survive. Following independence, migration out of Algeria was in the form of organised dispatches, marking a break with the *noria* model.

While the new flows reduced labour market pressure, they did not lead to a boost in agricultural production or overall economic output through the transfer of new knowledge since migrants were generally employed in sectors such as public buildings and works, which were not very developed in Algeria. The end of organised emigration in 1973 exposed another facet of the migration and labour-market dilemma. The problem is that migration creates a shortage of qualified labour and ultimately diminishes the overall level of qualifications amongst those recruited.
To illustrate this point, we propose to examine some sectors in which emigration eases labour-market pressure and reduces the general level of qualifications. Farming hit productivity crisis when mass recruitment of migrants was focused on rural populations. The *noria* rationale which created a balance between emigration and the renewal of farm labour was replaced by a new system which absorbed surplus rural workers but disrupted the transmission of agricultural know-how.

Healthcare is one of the sectors worst affected by migration, with qualifications and quality of service declining. Emigrating doctors, particularly those with specialisations such as surgery, are not replaced by fresh recruits with sufficient qualifications to maintain service levels. Moreover, the loss of medical specialists has undermined the calibre of doctor training, most strikingly in fields like cardiology. Aside from falling qualifications and service levels, the remaining workforce is poorly managed, leading to a shortage of specialists in the southern regions. Faced with the refusal of female doctors to accept postings in the south, the Algerian Ministry of Health is contemplating the recruitment of foreign specialists.

Higher education and scientific research has also lost out through the forced or willing departure of university lecturers and researchers. The ensuing shortfall is estimated at more than 2,000 teachers and several thousand researchers, with National Research Programme projects suffering most. The Algerian Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research estimates that over 4,000 teachers and several thousand researchers are needed to meet new demand. To this end, the Ministry has launched a recruitment drive amongst foreign professors, to little avail. There is a shortage of specific qualifications in the public buildings and works sector, most strikingly on a project to build a million houses. Consequently, the head of the General Union of Algerian Entrepreneurs has called on the government to bring in skilled labour from abroad, to bolster existing Chinese and Egyptian workforces.

As a sector, Artistic creation and communications has not escaped the general trend. Many talented and established artists, experienced journalists and renowned writers and stage actors have left, reducing the scale and quality of artistic output. Recent graduates have come up through the ranks to replace those lost, but they do not have the same
profile or skills although migration is high in the IT sector, the effects appear to be less keenly felt. This is because the focus in this sector is on marketing rather than research and development. Those leaving are highly qualified, but there is no great difficulty in replacing them since those hired for marketing do not need to possess the same level of qualification.

Regarding managing mobility of competencies, experiences analysis from the three countries reveals similarities as well as differences among the countries. It should be stressed that mobility of competencies is becoming an international phenomenon and with an increasingly accurate competition between countries to drain the skilled people and especially highly qualified.

Recruitment through Internet appears as an additional channel further to traditional ones to accelerate the recruitment and placement of these competencies. This competition even generated several adjustments of migration laws. All countries whatever their development level face this phenomenon. Nevertheless, developing countries seem the most penalized, since Africa for example would have lost thirty percent of its highly skilled labour force. This phenomenon is amplified by the significant number of students who do not return after their studies period in the developed countries.

### Conclusion

Migration has been one of the major determinants in explaining the population dynamics in the *Maghreb* region. The migration process is not new for the *Maghreb* region. There has been a long history of population inflow in the region from different parts of the world. The French colonists took the population with them to Europe as a labour resource and later on also deputed them in army to fight against the other colonizers. Many of these Berber populations were trained and taught French so that they could understand the command. Meanwhile these native Berber populations got exposed to the modern society and nationalism which in later period helped them in fighting for their independence.
After the industrial revolution there has been a large inflow of labour migration to the European countries from the *Maghreb* region. The international conditions for migration has changed since 20th century and for North African countries it was after 1969, when it was more organized and governed by bilateral agreements between labour exporting countries and host countries. The 1970s crisis marked the change in the policies related to immigration, more selective polices were adopted for non European migrants. It became more professional and technical oriented.

Migrant workers who were brought in by European industry during the post-war economic boom have gradually been replaced by a myriad array of new socio-professional categories: women, minors, families, students, craftsmen, self employed entrepreneurs and, more recently, an increasing number of people with very high level of scientific and technical skills. These specialised skilled migrants are the second generation of those populations who got exposure of French culture and accepted the importance of French education in general. Young and single population from technical background were preferred alone whereas earlier families including women and children were allowed.

The permanent settlement in France was now a distant history; single immigration came into existence that weakened the family values and emotional attachment towards family members. The married women were the victims of these policies as they were left behind alone and sometimes they were forced to prostitution to earn their living. In many cases families were taken care of financially but that is not the only thing women expect from their married life. In most of the cases women acted as a single parent. This had a great impact on the population dynamics in the region.

Though, the changing policies for immigration, from time to time, affected the life of the general people, the remittances from the immigrant population have been the major contribution to the *Maghreb* economy. At least one member from each family had been a regular migrant to France since colonial era but after the crisis of 1973 it was almost a stop to the migration from *Maghreb* to the France. By 1980s, again the French government reviewed the policy but now only the skilled labourers were entitled to go to France. The population having technical degrees could only earn an opportunity in
France. Majority of the population who were allowed to migrate to France were of urban origin and had higher level of skilled training than their predecessors and had good knowledge of French language.

In the recent years there has been trend in migration which shows that *Maghreb* region is going through the process of brain drain. Due to France's immigration policy unskilled and labourer class people faced difficulty in getting an opportunity in France. Most of the works in France was offered to French speaking *Maghreb* population and only to those with technical knowledge. This process has led to the under development of the region as there is a shortage of educated working class in the *Maghreb* countries itself. But at the same time the remittances from these skilled workers in France contributes majorly in the national economy. Their remittances continued but families who were sent back had to suffer a lot and found themselves in difficult position between the two cultures.

During the period of crisis, those families who were sent back to their native countries, added to the number of unemployed population as there were not much avenues to explore back home. It disturbed not only the government alone but also the existing population who had no experience and exposure to outer world. This reunion of families back home led to sharing of their experiences, liberal and modern ideas as well as importance of French education which in later stages helped in modernization and higher enrolment number of young *Maghrebian*. In the present *Maghrebian* population the educated youths are looking for their economic betterment in the region itself.

The knowledge of French language has helped the *Maghrebian* youth in settling themselves in various fields like tourism and other service sectors. In Morocco and Tunisia these newly developed sectors contributed the major part of their economy. Not only the French educated male population but also the educated females were now exposed to the global economy. They are now more independent and modern in their practices. The women of *Maghreb* today feel more liberated and emancipated.