How could the world which we all experience at each and every moment be unreal? We all have one and the same experience of this world. We see the same sky, rivers, houses etc. The surroundings, which we perceive at present, are the very same as we perceive the next day also. Hence, we do not dare to consider the world as unreal, being obsessed with its reality. But this is what we laymen think about the world. According to the highest vedāntic position, the world is unreal independent of the Ultimate Reality viz. Brahman.

In the previous chapters we have seen that the yoga-vāsiṣṭha, the Gauḍapādakārikā, the Vivekacudāmanī etc. place the common world of experience (empirical world) on the same footing as the dream-world; and boldly consider it as just unreal. On the other hand, saṅkara, not strictly following in the foot-steps of Gauḍapāda emphasizes the waking world as different from the dream-world. Saṅkara regards each action as meaningful before the dawn of knowledge. Similarly, he accepts the
phenomenal reality of the world, and does not condemn the world as absolutely unreal and as ephemeral as a dream. Of course, from the transcendental stand point Śaṅkara accepts the world as unreal, as Brahman is the only reality. Hence, Śaṅkara's transcendental stand point reveals him as an Absolutist rather than as a mere Idealist.¹ No doubt, he is an Idealist, so far as he considers the ultimate Reality as pure consciousness. But since he recognises the unapprehended existence

¹ "But Śaṅkara's Advaita is not idealism in the usually accepted epistemological sense of the word: there is a world, not projected by our thought, that is independent of our thinking and will not go away just by our thinking it away. The world is 'false', not in the sense of being a figment of our imagination, but in the sense that it is not real — the only real ultimately being nirguṇa Brahman."

(Ajñāta-Sattā) of the world, his name could be said to lead us towards the Srṣṭi-Dṛṣṭi Vāda. Of course, Śaṅkara has not specifically discussed the points which could establish him as a Srṣṭi-Dṛṣṭi Vādin. Nevertheless, it could be said that he would have accepted the Srṣṭi-Dṛṣṭi Vāda, if pointedly asked to show his leaning.

* Srṣṭi-Dṛṣṭi Vāda is a rival theory of the Dṛṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi Vāda, which asserts the 'Ajñāta Sattā' of the world. That is to say, it holds that the world exists even when it is not perceived. In opposition to this theory, the Dṛṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi Vāda considers the world as illusory as a dream, and negates its 'Ajñāta Sattā'. It emphasizes that the world exists simultaneously with its perception (Dṛṣṭi), or Dṛṣṭi itself is Sṛṣṭi.
After Śaṅkara, we have seen the views of Maṇḍana Misra, which can be said to have an inclination towards Drsti-Sṛṣṭi Vāda. Now, in this chapter, we shall examine the views of those Śaṅkaraites, who favour the Sṛṣṭi-Drsti Vāda, as it is also important to have a general idea about the rival theory of the Drsti-Sṛṣṭi Vāda.

In our query regarding the views of the Śaṅkaraites, the Siddhāntaśāstrasamgraha is very helpful, as it contains the views of the Śaṅkaraites regarding the material cause (Upādāna Kārana) of the world, the locus of Avidyā etc. Here, it would be important to make it clear that regarding the views of the Śaṅkaraites, we shall follow the order mentioned in the Siddhāntaśāstrasamgraha, and not the actual chronological order. Moreover, in this connection, we shall discuss the material cause of the world, the locus of Avidyā, oneness and manyness of the Jīva as well as of Avidyā, and then proceed to the exposition of the Sṛṣṭi-Drsti Vāda.

The material cause of the world:

So far as the theory of Sṛṣṭi-Drsti is concerned, an inquiry related to the creator of the world first
arises. Who is the creator of the world? This question has given rise to many perplexing problems, and as a result different theories have been formulated.

"God has created this world, and God is the material cause of the world" - this is the common response to the above-mentioned question. The world, which is commonly experienced by all, which does not change or get lost after its perception - that is to say, which has got an unapprehended existence (Ajñāta Sattā), how could it be created by any other than God? The Realist considers the world to be existing independently of the Sentient Principle. On the other hand, the Srṣṭi-Dṛṣṭi vādin holds that the world exists independently of its perception, but not independently of the Ultimate Reality. The world is created by the Ultimate Reality (conditioned by Avidyā) out of itself. It has got 'Ajñāta-Sattā', that is to say, it exists even when not perceived. It is our common experience that houses, trees, roads, shops etc. do not disappear, after we go away from that area. The class room which we leave does not vanish. Hence, the things of
the world have phenomenal reality. This is what the Srsti-Drti Vāda emphasizes.

Now, returning to our inquiry about the material cause of the world, we shall examine the views of the Saṅkaraṇites as mentioned in the Siddhāntalesaṃgraha.

Most of the Saṅkaraṇites consider Brahman as the material cause of the world, following the foot-mark of Saṅkara, or rather the Upaniṣads. Here, we would like to emphasize that Saṅkara strictly holds Brahman (conditioned by Avidyā) as the material cause (Upādāna Kāraṇa) as well as the efficient cause (Nimitta Kāraṇa) of the world. As Saṅkara and his followers regard Brahman as the material cause of the world, they do not consider the world as illusory, but accept it as real—of course, from the common-sense point of view.

(1) As stated in the Siddhāntalesaṃgraha, according to some, who follow the view of the Saṅkṣepaśārīraka, pure Brahman is the material cause of the world. They
Those who follow the Vivaraṇa School of Prakāśātmā, hold that Brahman qualified by omniscience, etc. being associated with Māyā, i.e. God is the material cause, as the scripture mentions that qualified Brahman is the cause of the world.

1. कते विद्वानां राज्यमात्रानि: केवलामु: श्रड्यौपयादास्त्रु, ज्ञातिद्वृक्तमात्रायं राज्यदानस्य काश्यश्चार्गण्याऽकीः।

- S.L.S. Ist chapter. P-58

- Siddhāntalesā Sanskrita. - Chawkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benaras. (1916)

See: सामायकौत्पली विकृतश्चिनी

संसारकारणमिति प्रवृत्तिः पोरः।

- Samkṣepaśārīraka. I.323.

- संसारकारणस्य विविधशः किमं विविधसदानकारणा

प्रश्न तु केवल द्वारकारणमेवैवित वदविष्णु।

- Si-Bi - Introduction P-11.


2. विवरणकारणार्गणांस्य - ‘य: सर्वं क्षेत्र यथा तत्वं तत्तुष्ण तपः।

तस्मादेतद् त्रिइन नामश्चमन्त्र च जायते ’ हि त्तु: सर्वविद्विविधिित्वे

प्रश्न चक्षुस्य ब्रह्मपैश्च ज्ञातवन्ने।

- S.L.S. Ist chapter. P-59
(3) Now, some of the Śaṅkaraites consider Avidyā as different from Māyā. According to them, Avidyā is related to the jīva; while Māyā is associated with Brahman. So the task of creation is distributed between God and the jīvas. These Śaṅkaraites declare that ether etc. are the products of Māyā, supported in God. Here, God is the material cause - (Upādāna Kāraṇa) of the five elements, on the other hand the internal organ, etc. are created through Avidyā of the jīva, which is their Upādāna. Thus, both God and the jīva are regarded as the material cause.

Some believe that God is the Upādāna of the ether etc. by virtue of his Māyā, whereas the internal organ etc. are due to Avidyā residing in the jīva, and the jīva is their Upādāna.

(4) On the other hand, some Advaitins do not differentiate Māyā from Avidyā, but consider them as non-different. Some amongst these hold that though God is the Upādāna of the ether etc, it is the jīva, which is the Upādāna of the

1. यथा विद्यादिप्रम्पः दृढःराक्षितमायापरिणाम हति तत्र हृथ्वर 
   उपादानस्, तथासनां करणादि जीवाच्छिन्नाविपायापरिणाम हति 
   तत्र जीव एव उपादानस्।

internal organ, etc., as they are known as identical with the jīva.

Here, it would not be out of place to mention the view of Vidyārāṇya, as in his works, namely the Pañcadasī and the Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha, we find contradictory statements regarding Avidyā and Māyā. On the one hand, Vidyārāṇya very clearly draws a distinction between Avidyā and Māyā in the Pañcadasī stating that Avidyā is the Prakṛti, in which the impure Sattva is dominant, while Māyā is the prakṛti, in which the pure Sattva is dominant. Consciousness, reflected in Māyā is known as omniscient God, while consciousness reflected in Avidyā is called the jīva. On the other hand, in his Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha, he does not differentiate


1. सत्यमुदाविशुद्धिमया मायाविचारं चतै मले ।
   माया शिवो वशीकृत्य तत् स्यात्सर्वं हैः इत्यः ॥
   – अतिशिवास्त्रध्वनिस्योऽविद्यायदेशः ॥
   P.D.I-16, 17-(ab)

Pañcadasī – (Gujarati edition)

between Avidyā and Māyā, but regards them as identical. ¹

Hence, we cannot ascertain the specific view of Vidyārānya about the material cause. We can only assume that he considers God as the Upādāna of the five elements, while he regards the jīva as the Upādāna of the internal organ, etc. Mahadevan says in The Philosophy of Advaita, "According to Bhārtītīrtha, Īśvara and the jīva are the joint creators of the world. But there is this difference. While the Lord is the principal author, the jīva is only a subsidiary parent." ²

(5) Besides this, we find another view mentioned in the Siddhāntalesāsāṃgraha, according to which Brahman is the material cause of the whole phenomenal world. In its support, a śruti - "From this, vital air, mind, all the

1. .... मात्रु यृष्णगविषा ; मात्रा तु पुरुषिमिति स्वाधेदार नल्लुने:।
कृत्य लाभान्येवविषा।

- Vivaraṇa Pramāṇavāsanāṅgarat - Sū-1, Varṣaka-1, P-134.

sense organs are originated", is quoted. On the other hand, the jīva is regarded as the material cause of the illusory phenomena and of the dream world.¹

(6) According to Padārthatattvaniṃayakārā, both Brahman and Māyā are the material causes of the world, as the scripture describes both of them to be the material cause. Here, it should be noted that Brahman is regarded as the material cause in the sense that it is the cause of the effect being projected on it, while Avidyā is the cause in the sense that it is modified in the form of the effect. That is to say, Brahman is the Vivartopādana Kāraṇa as rajju is of Sarpa, while Avidyā is the Pariṇāmiupādana Kāraṇa, the one, that is modified in the form of the world.

(7) Sarvajñātman holds that only Brahman is the material cause of the world, while Māyā is the intermediary cause (dvāra Kāraṇa), as immutable (Kuṭastha) Brahman itself cannot
be the cause. Here, Māyā does not play an outstanding role in the creation of the world, though not the cause it persists in the effect as the dvāra-intermediary.

(8) Vācaspati Miśra opines that Brahman, in the form of 'Vivartopādāna'; being an object through Māyā, residing in the jīva is the material cause of the world; so Māyā is only a subordinate cause and not an intermediary cause. That is to say, in Vācaspati's view, Brahman which is made its object by Māyā having its locus in the jīva is itself the Upādāna inasmuch as it appears in the form of the manifold phenomena, which is non-sentient and so Māyā is but a Sahakāri Kāraṇa (subordinate cause). Māyā is not an

1. सद्वैप्रैपारीरक्रृत स्युः - ब्रह्मविद्यानां विम्यायुः कर्मा कारकारणाः।
कृतस्य क्यं कारणालोकपति पावया कारकारणाः।
- S.L.S. - Ist chapter, pp.75-76

2. वाचसपतिमिथनीसु जीवाधिमायाय विम्यायुः कृत्री भ्रात स्युः
जाहियाधिमायाय विम्यायुः कारणालोकपति पावया कर्मा कारकारणमित्याः।
- S.L.S. - Ist chapter, p-77
intermediary cause which persists in the effect.*

Here, it is noteworthy that though Vācaspati regards Brahman as the material cause of the world, yet he considers the jīva as the locus of Avidyā - a view which carried to the logical extreme could result in Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda. We shall discuss this point at length later on as in this chapter we are dealing with the Sṛṣṭi-Drṣṭi vāda.

The above mentioned are some of the different views put forth by the Śaṅkaraites about the material cause of the world. As we have stated before, since Brahman is the material cause of the world, it (the world) is considered as real till Avidyā is eradicated. The Śaṅkaraites consider the world as unreal only if viewed as independent of its very cause. The world is not in any case illusory like a sky flower or dream. It has got phenomenal reality,

* See Bhāmati on the Br.Śū.Śā.Śha.1.4-3 P-378. - The Brahmasūtra Śaṅkara Bhāṣya with the commentaries - Bhāmati, Kalpataru and Parimala (1981), Parimala Publications, also see - Siddhāntabindu - Introduction, p 11
- Abhyankar Vasuđeva Shastri (Ed) 2nd edition (1962)
  Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.
as it fulfils our practical usages, and
it is the common object of the worldly experience of all.
This is what the Sršti-Dṛsti vādin holds.

As we have seen, since the Sršti-Dṛsti vāda holds Brahman as the material cause of the world-creation, (and this explains why all experience the same worldly objects) the jīva has no role to play so far as the creation of the world is concerned. Thus, it is not the jīva who creates the world, but God.

In this context, a question arises whether Brahman is the locus of Avidyā or the jīva.

Locus (Āśraya) of Avidyā

We have already stated that Saṅkara does not seem much bothered about the problem regarding the locus of Avidyā. But after Saṅkara, this problem received much attention from the Saṅkaraites. It is also noteworthy that all the Saṅkaraites are not unanimous about the locus of Avidyā. A difference of opinion prevails amongst the Saṅkaraites in respect of it.

It seems that those who support the Sršti-Dṛsti vāda regard Brahman as the locus of Avidyā.
Here, we shall briefly mention those Śaṅkaraśīlites, who regard Brahman as the locus of Avidyā.

We have seen that amongst the earliest Śaṅkaraśīlites, Miśra boldly regards the jīva as the locus of Avidyā. Such a revolutionary thinking of his thus paved the way for the Drsti-Srṣṭi vāda.

But Suresvara, strictly following Śaṅkara opines that Brahman is the locus as well as the object of Avidyā. In the Naiṣkarmyādīdhī Suresvara states, “Now ignorance must be ignorance of someone about something, it must have a conscious locus and a content that it conceals. We have shown that only two categories exist self and not-self. The not-self cannot be the locus of ajñāna, for it is itself ajñāna, if it were the locus the arising of it in itself would not be an event of any significance, and worse, there could be no obtaining of knowledge, ignorance is also the cause of the not-self, and it is absurd to suppose that the cause can exist only as supported by its effect. The same arguments show that the not-self cannot be the content of ignorance either. So the locus and content of ignorance must be the self.¹

¹. See next page.

Motilal Banarasidass.
Unlike Suresvara, Padmapāda has not specifically mentioned his view. Nevertheless, it seems that according to him, the jīva is the locus and Brahman is the object of Avidyā. It is stated, "Avidyā concealing the illumination which is the very nature of Brahman, is imagined in the jīva, otherwise if it were from the highest point of view of that nature, its awareness also would be eternally established and so the instruction about their identity would be superfluous."

Vācaspati Miśra, following Maṇḍana Miśra, regarded the jīva as the locus of Avidyā. Nevertheless, he regarded God as the Upādāna of the world inasmuch as it is the object of Avidyā which has its locus in the jīva.

Sarvajñātman Muni considers pure consciousness as the locus and object of Avidyā. The Śāmkṣepāśārīraka declares, "Undifferenced, absolute sentiency is the locus and object of Nescience. For that which proceeds from previously

1. क्रम एवां धातृनिये ज्ञात्स्वस्थम्प्रकाशांत्वमविष्णू कल्प्यते श्रवणार्थ-क्रमः क्लेषभूत तदवबौधोऽपि यदि नित्यसिद्धः च्याक्ति तदात्म्योपदेशाः
व्यथः सः तः ।

- Pañcapādikā, p-14, Rāmashastrībhagavatācārya (ēd).
existing Nescience, cannot become either locus or object of Nescience".  

Vidyāraṇya also considers pure consciousness as the locus of Avidyā. In the Vivaraṇaprameyasāṁgrahaṇa we find this point discussed at some length in the first varṇaka of the first sutra. Vidyāraṇya has tried to refute all the doubts put forth against the view that consciousness is the locus of Avidyā.

It may be doubted as to how Avidyā could reside in consciousness itself. But this is not proper, for the nature of Avidyā itself is established through witness-consciousness. Furthermore, Avidyā does not require a locus different from its object as it is inactive like the pot etc.

1. Bāṣyāntvaṃsaśāntamārginī nivṛttiḥvibhāgācittir eva kṣeṣa.
   Pūrvāṅgaśāya hi pariśākṣā nākṣaṃkṣā phānti na pi gātva:  
   - Saṁkṣepaśārīraka, I-319

2. Bāṣyāntvaṃsaśāntamārginī nivṛttiḥvibhāgācittir eva kṣeṣa.
   Pūrvāṅgaśāya hi pariśākṣā nākṣaṃkṣā phānti na pi gātva:  
   - V.P.S. Sūtra-I, Varṇaka-I, p.171

3. Bāṣyāntvaṃsaśāntamārginī nivṛttiḥvibhāgācittir eva kṣeṣa.
   Pūrvāṅgaśāya hi pariśākṣā nākṣaṃkṣā phānti na pi gātva:  
   - V.P.S. Sūtra-I, Varṇaka-I, p.164

4. Bāṣyāntvaṃsaśāntamārginī nivṛttiḥvibhāgācittir eva kṣeṣa.
   Pūrvāṅgaśāya hi pariśākṣā nākṣaṃkṣā phānti na pi gātva:  
   - V.P.S. Sūtra-I, Varṇaka-I, p.164
Avidyā conceals the thing, in which it resides, as it is 'concealing' by its very virtue like darkness.\(^1\) It is our daily experience that darkness resides in the very room, which it makes its object and conceals. Moreover, while accepting Brahman as the locus of Avidyā, no loss occurs to its attribute of omniscience. In this context, it would be essential to make it clear that according to Vidyāraṇya, reflection of sentiency in the pure Sattva of Prakṛti is known as God; while reflection of sentiency in the impure Sattva of Prakṛti is called the jīva. So even though there is unity between the prototype and its reflection, as the fairness of the prototype is not lost even when the reflection on the mirror is darkened through the impurity of the mirror. Similarly, it can be said that the attributes of omniscience, etc. in God would remain unaffected even when Avidyā resides in the jīva.\(^2\)

1. तथा विस्तारमेयकाव्यस्य ्श्रवित्तामृताः श्रवित्तामृताः वो वीरावत्यायपवर- कर्मधीवादिति ......

2. नापि ग्रःशणः सर्वज्ञाविद्यानिरिति, यथा सत्वापि विस्तारमेय- विस्तारस्याकै मलिकापुर्णाति विस्तारस्याकै मलिकापुर्णाति श्रवित्तामृताः न विस्तारस्याकै मलिकापुर्णाति तथा जीवस्याविश्वास्याः पि न ग्रःशणः श्रवित्तामृताः निरिति वक्ष्यु श्चक्ति तात्.

- V.P.S. Sutra-I, Varnaka-I, p.164

- V.P.S. Sutra-I, Varnaka-I, p.166
Thus, without being affected, Brahman becomes the locus of Avidyā, and creates the world.

Now, another query is whether Ekajīvavāda or Anekajīvavāda could affect the Srṣṭi-Drṣṭi vāda. For this, we shall examine both the views as they are described in the Siddhāntalesasamgrāhā, and then arrive at our conclusion.

Ekajīvavāda

In the Siddhāntalesasamgrāhā it is stated that according to the holders of Ekajīvavāda, there is only one jīva, and hence only one body is animate, while the rest are inanimate like the bodies seen in a dream. The world is imagined by the Ajñāna or Nescience of that one jīva. All kinds of practical dealings take place as in a dream, until the Ajñāna of the jīva lasts. Further, as there is only one jīva, there arises no question about the respective individual bondages and liberations. Liberation of Śūka etc. is also an imagined one like the liberation of a man that takes place in the dream. In short, all the types of doubts should be put aside by the analogy of a dream.1

1. See next page.
This is Ekajīvavāda, which denounces all the dealings of the world and puts them on the same footing as a dream, considering them as merely illusory.

Now, some of the Śaṅkaraiteś, not preferring this view, favour 'Saṃśesā-anekāśarīra ekajīvavāda'. Those who hold this vāda, believe that the jīva is not the creator of the world, but it is God who creates the world. Though God is self-content, he creates the world as merely a play. Hiraṇyagarbha, which is the reflection of Brahman in Māyā is the

1. एको जीवः, तैन चैंकैल शरीरं सकीवम्। बन्यानि स्वप्न-पूर्णत्वसरीराणिव निरतेऽयति। तद्वानकल्पतिः सर्वं जगम्, तस्य स्वप्न-पूर्णत्वधार्यसंवर्तिः सर्वं व्यवहारः। बद्धुकी स्वप्न-स्वास्ति नाशिः, जीवस्यकल्पत्। शुक- नुक्त्वादिक्षिप तं स्वप्न-सूर्याणां नामअवक्त्वादिक्षिप कल्पितम्। अः च सम्बांविवधस्वत्तुप्रथमाः, अस्मिन्स्वप्न-पूर्णत्वसाधित्वादेव स्त्रृष्टा नासिलिजायेऽवं कर्क्षण्यतिः।

main soul, while the other jīvas being its reflections are just appearances.  

On the other hand, some Śaṅkaraṇeśes, finding fault with the above mentioned view, prefer 'Āvīśeṣa anekāsarīra-ekajīva vāda'. They believe that there is no deciding factor as to which Hiranyagarbha could considered the main soul from the

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1. बन्ये त्याप्रविधानाते नेक्षरीरात्मक मनः प्रत्येकसमानस: 'अॅसुक तु कैलावोमे-निवृत्तातु ' । उ ५० यो २ प० १० १, सू २२। 'लोकपनलोल' कैलावयुत । उ ५० यो २ प० १० १, सू ३३। हल्काधिकृतोत्सवादिक हल्काधिकृतोत्सवादिक हल्काधिकृतोत्सवादि प्रकाश वा ज्ञान: 'ज्ञान' न जीवः। तत्त्वातिकामल्लेन प्रयोजनात्मायेंचित् प्रकाश वा ज्ञान: 'ज्ञान' न जीवः। तत्त्वातिकामल्लेन प्रयोजनात्मायेंचित् प्रकाश वा ज्ञान: 'ज्ञान' न जीवः। बन्ये तु 'ॅत्त्वातिकामल्लेन प्रयोजनात्मायेंचित् प्रकाश वा ज्ञान: 'ज्ञान' न जीवः। तत्त्वातिकामल्लेन प्रयोजनात्मायेंचित् प्रकाश वा ज्ञान: 'ज्ञान' न जीवः। बन्ये तु 'ॅत्त्वातिकामल्लेन प्रयोजनात्मायेंचित् प्रकाश वा ज्ञान: 'ज्ञान' न जीवः। बन्ये तु 'ॅत्त्वातिकामल्लेन प्रयोजनात्मायेंचित् प्रकाश वा ज्ञान: 'ज्ञान' न जीवः।

- S.L.S 1st chapter, pp.125-126.
Hiraṇyagarbhas in the different Kalpas. So it is better to hold that one jīva resides in all the bodies.

Here, a doubt may arise that if one soul resides in all the bodies, it must have experiences of pain, sorrow and happiness of all the bodies. But this is never seen. All the bodies have their separate pain, sorrow etc. As an answer to this it is stated that we find that there is no remembrance of the pleasures etc. of another birth so here also since the bodies are different there will not be the experience or remembrance of all the pleasures, pains etc.

The above mentioned are two offshoots of Ekajīvavāda. It seems that the Ekajīvavāda aims at being the highest Vedāntic position. As Brahman is the only one sentiency, there is no other sentient principle. So Brahman itself due to Avidyā becomes the jīva, and imagines God, world and all its

1. करे तु हिरण्यगर्भस्य पुत्रस्य जैन स्वयं हिरण्यगर्भस्य पुरुषं जीवल्पक्तात् निश्चारण नानीति मन्यते एव जीवाः विवेक्षाणा सदैव अनिष्टविवेचन्ति। न केवल शरीररूपिणेन इव शरीरस्मिदांते परम्परानुसारयुतः जन्मात पार्जन-सत्यात्मेन शरीररूपिणेन तदनुस्य स्वात्मप्रयोजकत्वकृते।

- S.L.S.Ist chapter, P-127.
dealings, like a dream. Thus, everything is considered to be simply illusion.

Now, this concept seems to be identical with the Drṣṭī- Srṣṭi vāda, which we shall discuss in the next chapter. In the Siddhāntabindu, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has considered Ekajīvavāda and the Drṣṭī-Srṣṭi vāda as one and the same.¹ It would be noteworthy here that Divanji, while commenting on this has stated, "The three theories above set forth are propounded by the followers of Śaṅkarācārya who differed from him in some minor particulars. His own theory is known

1. व्याप्तेषु दृष्टिभिद्रव्यं हि जीव इति वा क्लेश नातुपरिष्ठं शून्यं के नामीः।
   वसो नोपपरिष्ठं च जीव इति वा मृत्यों केदा कार्यर्थार्थ संकीर्णवादस्यः॥
   हृदयमेव च बृह्स्यास्मिद्विद्वादशतामः॥

as the एकजीवावद or द्विमृग्यजीवावद. However, we would not like to agree with this that Śaṅkara favours or prefers Drsti-Srsti vāda. We shall discuss this a bit later.

Now, we may see whether Anekajīvāvāda is connected with the Srsti-Drstivāda or not.

Anekajīvāvāda

Preferring the common sense point of view, most of the Śaṅkaraśāstrins hold Anekajīvāvāda, and emphasize that because of the manyness of the jīvas, the system of bondage and liberation becomes possible, as each jīva has its pleasure or pain in accordance with its own 'karma'. On holding Ekajīvāvāda, the empirical experience would be contradicted. We do not experience that the world disappears at the very moment of the liberation of one jīva. To avoid this problem, it is proper to recognise the manyness of the jīvas.

Thus, concentrating mainly on the system of bondage and liberation, the Śāṅkaraśāstrins favour Anekajīvāvāda.

We experience manyness of the jīvas in our practical life. Moreover, we all experience the very same objective

world consisting of earth, sky, water, trees etc. In this context a question may arise as to how we all experience one common phenomenal world? Is this possible due to common Nescience (Avidyā)? If common Nescience is believed, then what about the separate experiences regarding the very same thing.

We find answers to such questions mentioned in the Siddhānta-śaṅkāraḥ, in all its different ramifications - such as (1) Brahmāśrita-eka-Avidyā-vāda, (2) Anekajīvāśrita-eka-Avidyā vāda and (3) Anekajīvāśrita-aneka-Avidyā vāda.

Brahmāśrita eka Avidyā vāda

Some Advaitins, among the upholders of the manyness of the jīvas, believe that though Ajñāna whose locus and object is Brahmān is one, and its destruction itself is liberation, still since its projecting aspect or power continues in the jīvanmukti also; it can be seen that Ajñāna has aspects; and in that adjunct in which knowledge of Brahmān is produced, it would be destroyed in one aspect,
while in the rest, other aspects of Ajñāna would continue.¹

Thus, to make the system of bondage and liberation plausible, here Avidyā is believed to have numerous aspects.

Some Śaṅkaraites, following the Naiyāyika view state that in the Vṛtti (occurrent) of the absence of a pot on the ground, the absence of pot's connection is responsible, so here the mind is responsible for the subsistence of Ajñāna in sentiency. That is to say, Ajñāna subsists in different sentiency locations by virtue of that adjunct, viz. mind; but when on the rise of Brahman realisation, the mind is destroyed, Ajñāna is no longer associated with that sentiency-location, but it continues to be associated with other sentiency-locations.

Aneka-jīvāśrita-eka-Avidyā-vāda

Some Śaṅkaraites believe that the one Ajñāna does not reside in the pure sentiency, but in the jīva making

¹ तैनु कैवतः - यस्य शुद्धाच्छायविषयमेकैवाकरणस्तत्नाश एव व धोः, तत्त्वापि जीवन्नुकों उत्तात्माशानुकारथुपगै नानानास्य सांतालू पैर्व जानियां शास्त्रावगमो स्थलों कैसी निकति, उपा च जानरुय यथापूर्वमाथिनौ नौ रतुते हरि।

- S.L.S. Ist chapter, pp.129-130.
Brahman its object.

Now, Ajñana resides in the jīvas as jāti resides in Vyakti. So when an individual dies, jāti still persists in the other individuals. Thus, only in the case of that particular individual it (jāti) is lost. Similarly, Ajñana leaves the jīva, in which knowledge arises, while it resides in the rest of the jīvas, in whom there is still Ajñana.¹

Anekajīvāsrita aneka Avidvā vāda

Some Advaitins hold Ajñana differs from one jīva to another jīva. That is to say, each and every jīva has its own separate Ajñana. When Ajñana residing in one jīva is destroyed, it gets liberation, while for the rest of the

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¹ S.L.S. 1st chapter, pp.132-133.
jīvas bondage still continues.¹ Vācaspati Miśra's name is noteworthy here. He says, "We Vedāntins do not say that there is one Avidyā like one Pradhāna in all jīvas, so that we should be charged with this fault. Avidyā is different in each jīva, so only the Avidyā of that jīva in whose case vidyā has arisen will be dispelled and not of other jīvas, and so there is not the contingency of their being the eradication of the entire Samsāra."²

1. इतरे तु प्रत्येकादिविषयः केवलमपमपयोयावनुभूतिनिष्कल्पयाः
वज्ञायावस्था समयेस्ये ।

- S.L.S. Ist chapter, pp.132-133.

2. न वर्य प्राणान्वयिण्यः कस्यीत्स्रोताकाराचकमहे, चैव अपुर्वत्तपति ची, किंतु यत्र प्रत्येकीष्य फिलते । तैन यस्येव जीवस्य विधोत्तत्त्वा
तस्येव विषयाः प्रत्येकस्ये न जीवाननुस्तात् ।।

- Bhāmati on the Br.Sū.Śā-Bhā. I.4-3-pp.378-379.

Here, a question perplexing the mind is, "If each jīva has its own Avidyā, what about the world, which is commonly experienced by all of us?" We all perceive the same houses, the same trees, the same river around us. Thus, it could not be said with certitude as to whose Ajñāna has created the world, which is commonly experienced by all.

In order to avoid such a difficult problem, the holders of this view state that as cloth is made up from several threads, similarly, the world is created jointly by everyone's Avidyā. Now, when the Avidyā of one jīva is destroyed, and it gets liberation, the world (prapañca) for it vanishes. But the position of the world for the rest of the jīvas becomes just like cloth and threads. That is to say, when a thread of a cloth is destroyed; the cloth made up from those threads is destroyed. But immediately the rest of the threads create a new cloth. Similarly, the Avidyās of the rest of the jīvas create the common world
According to Appaya Dikṣīt, the commonness of experience can be explained by the fact of the adhisthāna being one. Several men may have the simultaneous illusion of silver (in the mother of pearl) when silver is brought about by the Avidyās of the several erring persons. If the error of one of these is dispelled, and the error in the case of the others continues then another silver is brought about by the Avidyās of all the other persons and thus the commonness of the illusion is possible. This same explanation applies to the world phenomena, where Brahman is

1. जस्मत्स पञ्च निष्काषिक्षा प्रफळ, दृष्टबोधिनी यहुः।
विनिकामकावानु मकरविषेयरूपं वर्तन्तेः प्रवर्तितुः॥
एकस्य मुखतो तदविषय नाशे एक जुनाशे परस्ये स्वाधि दशणम् प्रफळकः नाशे ।
तदव विषयान तत्त्वार् परिवर्तनम् राशियण-नवतर्निष्काषिक्षा राशियण-नविष्कान्तियिम् सकृद्गांहरुणारण्यमव्यासारसंहादनित्यः॥

- S.L.S. Ist chapter, p.-133.
the Ultimate Reality common to all.\footnote{1}

Hence, though each jīva has got its own Avidyā, the common world experience becomes possible.

Besides, there is another view which holds that the world consisting of earth, air, sky etc. is as a matter of fact separate for each and every jīva; just like 'Apekṣābuddhi\footnote{1}' as described in the Nyāya system. That is to say, when the illusion of silver in the mother of pearl occurs to a number of people, they have the notion, viz. "The silver which you perceived, that I also perceived."

\begin{itemize}
  \item 1. यदि तत्र युग्मश्रोणयुक्तात्मन्यत्र आधुनिकतैसैव रजत कस्य विद्या
\end{itemize}


\footnote{1} अनेकत्वविचारायणी बुद्धि: अपक्षापूर्द्धि: ।
Just like this, a common experience seems to occur in the case of the perception of the world - "That world which you see, the very same one is perceived by me." But actually each one perceives the world, created by his own Avidyā. The world illusion is different for each creature.  

It would not be out of place to mention that though Vācaspati Miśra regards the jīva as the locus of Avidyā, and Avidyā as numerous, he does not seem to hold that each jīva creates its own world, as we do not find it specifically stated by him. The world-appearance has its adhiśṭhāna Brahman which is the object of Avidyās of the jīvas and the Avidyās jointly bring about the world-appearance which therefore is common to all. Moreover, in his Bhāmati (II.2-28) he states that all appearances are indescribable entities and

1. तत्तत्ववृत्त प्रातिमासिकर्तकृत्, त्यायम्यति तत्तत्त्ववृत्त कुप्रित्यज्ञ-प्रतिप्रज्ञवचं तत्तत्त्ववृत्तमृतर्भं किं कार्यादिफँक्ष: प्रतिपुरुषर्ष प्रमाण:।
श्रुत्स्वरूपोत्तेऽय: त्यदूर्दृष्टेऽर्वं तदेव मयाधिसूचितविद्यः क्रमस्तत-मिलये।

not mere mental ideas. The external objects have Ajñāta Sattā, and are existent even when they are not perceived as they have empirical existence and are brought about by the beginningless Avidyā-Śaktis of all. Thus, Vācaspati Miśra did not support Drṣṭi-Śrṣṭi vāda though he regarded the jīvas as the locus of Avidyās and though he accepted that each jīva has its own Avidyā.

The above mentioned are the views expressed by the Śaṅkaraiteś about oneness and manyness of Avidyā. Amongst these views, Brahmaśrita-Avidyā vāda can be said to be connected with the Śrṣṭi-Drṣṭi vāda, while jīvāśrita Avidyā vāda seems to be connected with the Drṣṭi-Śrṣṭi vāda.

The Śrṣṭi-Drṣṭi vāda considers Avidyā as residing in Brahman, and hence the world created by God is real (from the common-sense point of view) and exists even when not perceived. Moreover, so far as oneness (Ekajīvavāda) and manyness (Anekajīvavāda) is concerned. The Śrṣṭi-Drṣṭi vāda seems to be favouring the manyness of the jīvas with God as the Supreme Lord as it is in consistency with the empirical reality of the world and the individual pleasures, etc. and bondage and realisation of the respective jīvas.
Now, we shall deal with the Sṛṣṭi-Drṣṭi vāda, as put forth in the Siddhāntalesaśaṃgraha.

The Sṛṣṭi-Drṣṭi vāda

As we have stated, the Sṛṣṭi-Drṣṭi vāda is a rival theory of the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda, it (Sṛṣṭi-Drṣṭi vāda) firmly asserts the empirical reality of the world. For this reason only, Sṛṣṭi-Drṣṭi vāda seems to be more appealing than the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda.

In the Siddhāntalesaśaṃgraha, it is stated, “The Śaṅkaraites who do not favour the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda, prefer the Sṛṣṭi-Drṣṭi vāda.”

In opposition to the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda, the Sṛṣṭi-Drṣṭi vāda propounds that the world is created by God as narrated in the scriptures. So the world exists, even when the objects are not perceived. In short, it has got unapprehended existence (Ajñāta Sattā). Objects are known through the means of knowledge, so they are not illusory in the sense the Drṣṭi-

1. द्वितियोऽथ पुष्पिभृष्टिृष्टि वादे मनः पुष्पियमलभानाति कैविदाचायाः पुष्पिभृष्टिृष्टि वादे राज्यसि ।

Srṣṭi vāda holds them to be illusory.  

That is to say, in no way is the world illusory like the silver seen in the mother of pearl, as it is known and experienced by all worldly beings with the help of the means of knowledge. Food satisfies our hunger, so how could it be considered illusory? Clothes protect our bodies, so how could they be regarded as illusory? While living and satisfying our daily usages we cannot dare to consider the empirical world as illusory like a dream.

Nevertheless, one thing is obvious that the Advaitins, recognising the Srṣṭi-Dṛṣṭi vāda, though they do not denounce the phenomenal reality of the world, yet do not affirm its Ultimate Reality either.

A doubt is put forth in the Śiddhāntaśāsana-grāha, "If the world is not believed to be an imagined one, then the world, which is known through the scriptures, and

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1. 

Srṣṭi-dṛṣṭi vāda pratyākṣa-pracinam jñātasaṃvadābhāvi viśvesa
tattvavijnanaṇa-bhutān ca tasya tasya dṛṣṭi-siddhītān 

though the other means of knowledge would be a real one."¹

Setting aside this doubt, it is stated that though the world consisting of ether etc. does not exist simultaneously with its conception, yet since it is destroyed or it vanishes with the rise of right knowledge alone, and as it is inexplicable, and not existing in the three periods of time, it is unreal.²

This clearly reveals the difference between the Drṣṭi- Srṣṭi-vāda and the Srṣṭi-Drṣṭi vāda. On the one hand, the Drṣṭi-Srṣṭi vāda does not believe in the phenomenal reality, while the Srṣṭi-Drṣṭi vāda clearly affirms the phenomenal reality of this world.³ Of course, the world is

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1. .... पुप्पःचय कर्पत्त्वाभावे द्वैताविद्यातिप नस्य प्रवृत्तिहृद्याकरिणः सत्य सत्यत्मेवा मुपपर्वः स्यादिति....।
   - S.L.S. 2nd chapter, pp. 356-357.

2. .... क्रि-नात्स्मशाक्त्व नाभैष्ठिपि ज्ञात्वात्निब प्रत्यतिकत्रात्सप्तत्व च, सत्यविद्व-लक्षणत्वम्युष, प्रतिक्तः नौसाठित्वंखितात्कृतिकान्तिप्रतिगात्त्वम् यथा निजद्वात्स्यायत्वमुपपमात्।
   - S.L.S. 2nd chapter, p. 357.

3. सत्यत्वंतो पुप्पचेन उक्तापिनितापात्ताभावेन ततो देवतामुः॥
   - S.L.S. 2nd chapter, p. 358.
unreal (mithyā) from the ultimate standpoint. But in no way could its phenomenal reality be denied.

In short, we may mention a few points, which would give a clear idea of the Srsti-Dṛṣṭi vāda.

(1) Brahmān is considered to be material cause (Upādāna Kāraṇa) of the world.

(2) Avidyā is believed to be located in Brahmān.

(3) The world, created by God is not utterly illusory, but has phenomenal reality.

(4) The world has got unapprehended existence (Ajñāta Sattā).

That is to say, it exists even when not perceived.

Conclusion

Thus, in this chapter we have tried to give a brief exposition of the Srsti-Dṛṣṭi vāda, as it is necessary to have an idea of the rival theory before we proceed to discuss the Dṛṣṭi-Srṣṭi vāda.

It is noteworthy that the Srṣṭi-Dṛṣṭi vāda in comparison with the Dṛṣṭi-Srṣṭivāda satisfies the minds of ordinary people with a Vedāntic bent of mind more. Obviously, no one would dare to consider the world as unreal and
illusory while it lasts as it satisfies and fulfils the common usages and dealings. Our daily experiences compel us to regard the world as real.

As we have seen, since most of the Śaṅkaraites propound the Srstī-Drṣṭī vāda, it has not been criticized like the Drṣṭī-Srṣṭī vāda.

But if we think deeply from the ultimate stand point, it is the Drṣṭī-Srṣṭī vāda, which seems to be more faithful to the Vedāntic position than the Srṣṭī-Drṣṭī vāda. That is why the Drṣṭī-Srṣṭī vāda is considered the main doctrine of the Vedāntic thought,* and we shall examine it in the next chapter.

* See - Siddhantabindu, p.49.