In the previous chapter we have stated that according to Śaṅkara, this world of appearance is false (mithyā) independently of the Non-dual sentient principle, viz. Brahman. Nevertheless, Śaṅkara admits the objective reality of the world of appearance. But from the transcendental point of view, according to Śaṅkara the phenomenal world is projected through Avidyā (avidyāpratupasthāpita). Thus, Avidyā is regarded as the root-cause of this world of appearance. Besides, it is noteworthy that for Śaṅkara, even Avidyā does not exist from the ultimate standpoint.

After Śaṅkara, the topic of the locus (āśraya) of Avidyā became a moot problem for the Śaṅkaraite. Different views prevail amongst the Śaṅkaraite regarding the locus of Avidyā. Maṇḍana and Vācaspati hold that the jīva is the locus of Avidyā and Brahman is the object of Avidyā. On the other hand, Suresvara, Sarvajñātman, Prakāśātman and others are of the opinion that Brahman is both the locus and the
The belief that the jīva is the locus of Avidyā, would imply the subjectivistic point of view in the sense that then the Avidyā residing in the jīva could be responsible for the projection of this world of appearance. This could lead to subjective Idealism.

The main purport of this chapter is to examine Maṇḍana Miśra's idealistic views, which positively guide us towards the development of the Drṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda. But before we enter into more details, it would not be out of place to mention briefly about Maṇḍana's identity.

Maṇḍana Miśra:—

The name of Maṇḍana Miśra comes to our mind as a bold and revolutionary philosopher. Maṇḍana's contribution to both Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta is noteworthy.

The identification of Maṇḍana with Suresvara has been a topic of much discussion. Much has been assumed about the early life of Maṇḍana. It is believed that Maṇḍana was a disciple of Kumārila, before he was converted to the Vedāntic fold as Suresvara. According to some, Maṇḍana was
a contemporary of Śaṅkara. On the other hand some regard Mandana as a pupil of Śaṅkara. Professor Hiriyanna has expressed a doubt about the equation of Mandana and Suresvara. On the other hand, R. Balasubramaniam suggests that perhaps Mandana wrote the Brahmasiddhi setting forth a non-Śaṅkara brand of Advaita, then became converted by Śaṅkara, took the name of Suresvara and wrote the Śaṅkaran Advaita works commonly attributed to Suresvara. These seem to be only assumptions about Mandana, which do not seem to be trustworthy after the study of the works attributed to Mandana and Suresvara. On the contrary their views differ and it seems that both Mandana and Suresvara were different personalities. A very noticeable point that distinguishes Mandana from Suresvara is that, Mandana admits the jīva as the locus of Avidyā, while Suresvara holds that Brahman is the locus of Avidyā. This proves that both could not have been one and the same.


Maṇḍana wrote the Brahmasiddhi, which has gained a prominent place in Vedāntic literature. It contains four chapters, viz. (1) Brahma kāṇḍa, (2) Tārka Kāṇḍa, (3) Niṣyoga kāṇḍa and (4) Siddhi Kāṇḍa. The main purpose of this work is to show that this seeming duality is projected by Avidyā and hence it is without any essence of its own. This work is remarkable in the sense that Maṇḍana has expressed some revolutionary views differing from Saṅkara. For instance, (1) Taking rather a bold step, Maṇḍana has stated that the jiva is the locus of Avidyā. This view of Maṇḍana is fairly independent, and has opened a new Vista in Vedāntic thought.

(2) Differing from Saṅkara, Maṇḍana emphasized the 'Sphota' doctrine.

(3) Furtheron, Maṇḍana elucidates the doctrine of 'Prasannākhyāna'. According to Maṇḍana, Mahāvākyas such as 'Tattvam asi' teach the identity of Brahman with Atman. But such knowledge is indirect. So before the actual realisation of Brahman, one has to perform meditation; and after that only one is able to get liberation.
(4) Going against Śaṅkara, Maṇḍana accepts the importance of action—(Karma) even after the purification of the mind.

**Idealistic Views expressed in the Brahmasiddhi:**

Now, we would like to examine some idealistic views as expressed in the Brahmasiddhi. It may be mentioned that as Maṇḍana has some distinctive views, we have assigned a separate chapter to the Brahmasiddhi. Topics like Negation of duality, Negation of creation, Locus of Avidyā-types and nature of Avidyā etc. clearly signify Idealism. But which type of Idealism? That we shall examine in the later part of this chapter.

(1) **Negation of duality:**

Maṇḍana, like Śaṅkara negates the seeming duality of name and form from the transcendental stand point. Quoting the Śruti passages Maṇḍana has shown that this seeming duality has occurred merely due to Nescience, for from the ultimate standpoint, there is non-duality.

In the very first chapter of the Brahmasiddhi viz Brahma-kāṇḍa; presenting the Naiyāyika realist as the Pūrvapaksin, Maṇḍana has refuted the opponent's views and
has established the doctrine of non-duality through šruti-passages.

According to the Pūrvapakṣin, duality is real and so the šruti passages negating duality are to be understood in a secondary sense. The reasons presented by the pūrvapakṣin are as follows:

(1) There is difference of enjoyment in different people.
(2) The difference between the transmigrating and the liberated could be possible only if there is a plurality of souls.
(3) The organ of sight must have an object different from itself, because it is contradictory for it to function on itself, and further the perceiver is known in relation to the perceptible object (drṣya).
(4) We perceive objects as possessing different characteristics related to pleasure, pain and delusion. These seeming objects are classified as being of the diverse nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, or we see them as having the classifications viz. word, form, colour, taste, etc.

And hence the šruti, declaring non-duality viz- 'All this is but the self' should be understood as figurative
as signifying that they are meant for the self.¹

Answering the above mentioned arguments, the Siddhāntin states that the śruti passages are primarily intended to declare non-duality. This knowledge of diverse forms (nānārupasvavagamo) is based on māyā, as declared by the Śruti, so how could it be said that the Śruti passage is to be figuratively understood? Nānatva (manyness) is repeatedly negated by the Śruti. The śruti even emphasizes the falsity of the perception of duality (difference), and tells us that there is perception as it were of duality only due to illusion. The word 'Iva' used in the śruti passage shows that there is absence of difference and hence the śruti passages do not

¹: क्या केवलि - भौगोलिक व्यवस्थानातु, मुक्तिसाधनारिविभागापयपद्धतिः, दुःखसे-चार्हेक्त्व, व्याप्तिमृत्तिकक्रिया, उत्तममें वृत्तिक्रियायत्व, द्विप्रेम च वर्ज्यतुमत्ततुः, द्विवेदिन्न च विज्ञानमोहस्मीच्छवदादिविभागापपलक्ष्यः, एकत्वमुक्तिः जातिनिनिर्विभागामावनिमित्तौपवङ्गमार्क्तमयः। ‘आत्मायेद सबीपु ’ हेति व तात्वायिनिमित्तौपवङ्गमार्क्तमयः।

- Bra.Sid. I, p.6

- Brahmaśiddhi - (1937), Madras Government Press.
speak of ekatva (oneness) in the figurative sense. ¹

We may see how the Siddhāntin refutes the Pūrvapakṣin.

(1) While refuting the first reason put forth by the pūrvapakṣin - the Siddhāntin states that the ordered difference (vyavasthā) of enjoyments is a merely imagined one; and hence it is without any essence of its own. ² The argument put forth by the pūrvapakṣin does not seem to be a sound one for the ordered difference of enjoyment can even be due to difference which is imagined.

1. वानू पृत्युच्छौ - एकाभित्ति ।... नातां सपावगमो मायानिकन्यो दर्श्यते ।... तथा व्यक्तो नातार्थवानं शैव नातार्थि विभन्न हति ।... नातार्थिदेशसन्नृत्ता च मृत्योऽस मृत्युमाप्न्यात्ति हति ।... नातार्थिदेशसन्नृत्ता च मृत्योऽस मृत्युमाप्न्यात्ति हति ।... एवश्चैव पुकारिणा नापवरित एक्ष्वेवकल्पति ।


2. तत्त्वात्मां प्रदाहृतेऽगव्यवस्था सिद्धेऽस विभैति ।

For example, though the self whether it be omnipresent or of the size of the body or atomic - is one, yet we see difference of experience (enjoyment or suffering), viz. "There is pain in my foot." "There is pain in my head;" and this is based on difference, which is imagined. Further, though there is absence of difference, we see difference of colour or configuration (सावधान) in the various reflections of a face on the different surfaces of stone, sword, mirror etc. Though the original is one and the same, its reflections on various surfaces differ in colour or shape. Similarly, though there is absence of difference, it is experienced.

(2) The difference between the transmigrating and the liberated is also not plausible. The Siddhāntin presents the same explanation to refute the argument of the Pūrvapakṣin.

1. तथावहि - एकसिद्धान्तपत्ति सर्वगै श्रीपरिप्रज्ञ: पुत्रपरिप्रज्ञः कर्मितपेदविवेककार्य भोगवशः देखेते - पादे मैं वेष्यता, शिरसि मैं वेष्यता - हि ।

2. तथा विद्यानाविपणासृष्टु मुला देवनां कर्यविवेक: पैदवश्वः पैदाभवित्त्पि ।
As the same self experiences happiness or pain in different parts of the body, so it could be known as bounding at one place and as liberated at another place. The very same face is seen as dirty on the surface of a dirty mirror and it appears clean on a clean-surfaced mirror. Besides, imagined differences can produce real effects; for example, death occurs due to imaginary snake-bite and illumination is possible from a reflected Sun.

Here, the Siddhāntin wants to assert that, though this duality is an imagined one, it can fulfill practical dealings. Ultimately all these practical dealings of the phenomenal world are imagined ones. But as they are fulfilled, one is tempted to consider this duality as real.

1. एकऽर्थायतम्य प्रश्ने: मुदूः साविनिष्कृत्यमान: तत्र ब्रह्म हरत्र भोकं हवं च गम्यते ।
   - Bra. Sid. I. P. 7

2. यथा वलोक्ष्यं क्षुधं कलव: वलोक्ष्यं पुर्वं विशृंख्लं विशृंख्लं वर्णावर्त्ति च गम्यमानं तत्रुपायोप्याय सृष्टिः ।
   - Bra. Sid. I. P. 7

3. कर्तिकायथ चाहिदहि पराणायथ अस्तेऽ धर्म्याकायथ अस्तेऽ प्रकृत्यवक्ष्य प्रकृतायथ ।
   - Bra. Sid. I. p. 7
(3,4) According to the Pūrvapakṣin the seer is assumed in relation to the seen; and therefore, the difference between the seen and its seer is proved. And the seen are many due to differences of pleasure etc. This view of the Pūrvapakṣin is negated as being not true. The Siddhāntin has emphasized that the seer (dṛṣṭr) is not different from the seen (dṛṣṭya), because there is no contradiction in cognition's functioning on itself, as it is self-luminous, as in the case of a lamp, and in the case of knowledge being both means and fruit. The seer of the nature of sentiency is either thus transformed or appears differently. And if duality be admitted, since things of different natures could not be related to each other, the relation of seer and seen could not be possible.

1. यदापि द्र्ष्टेन्द्रुष्टेन सहस्त्रूष्टेन ह्ययोविदेन्। द्वस्य च सुसादिकेन प्रदीपत्थेन सहस्त्रंत्वनिस्मित्। तद्ध्यवस्तुदालोऽहै॥

- Bra.Sid. I. p.7

2. न च स्वात्मनि वृत्तिविरोधः। प्रदीपक्तं प्रमाणपत्रक्षेत्रम्॥

- Bra.Sid. I. p.7

3. द्वस्य चिदात्मसंवाहलथव विपरितामात्रिक्तिनावः॥

- Bra.Sid. I. p.7

4. नानां तथा तु विविक्षः समावयोरस्य उष्णेऽस्य सर्व स्मायोत्सर्वसंबंधः। कीवीशै

- Bra.Sid. I. pp.7-8
The self, which is non-dual, appears as such (as both seer and seen) either due to transformation or appearance as on the surface of the mirror.¹ As the reflection on the surface of the mirror is not different from its original; so the seen is not different from the seer. And the śruti itself declaring that everything is known on the self being known, emphasizes that the seen is non-different from the seer.²

Thus Maṇḍana regards the seen (drṣṭya) as identical with the seer. This could indicate subjective point of view. When Maṇḍana holds that this seeming duality is non-different from its perceiver; we could get a passing glimpse of subjectivism; which was later on developed by Prakāśānanda in the Vedānta-Siddhānta- Muktāvalī; in the form of the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda. In this respect, Maṇḍana should be considered as an initiator of the Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭivāda of the Vedānta-school.

1. तस्यात्मात्माय तथा विचित्रतामात्माय द्विवादनां विचारतः विचारतं द्विवादनां विचारतं द्विवादनां विचारतं

   - Bra. Sid. I. P.8

2. एवं च तस्यात्मानं तस्यात्मानं तस्यात्मानं तस्यात्मानं तस्यात्मानं

   - Bra. Sid. I. P.8
Thus, Maṇḍana has repeatedly stated that the seeming duality is merely an imagined one. As a matter of fact, in the realm of non-duality, there is no scope for duality. In the Tarka Kāṇḍa, Maṇḍana has said that there is no 'difference' from the ultimate standpoint, as it is simply a display of beginningless Avaidyā.  

(2) Negation of Creation (Srṣṭi) :-

Since Maṇḍana has elucidated that the seen (dṛṣṭya) is projected by Avidyā, this creation must be considered as false.

If the thing were existent, the question of its origin would arise, but when the thing itself is false, the question regarding its origination does not arise at all.

Those, who consider Avidyā as the material cause of the world of appearance, hold that as Avidyā is beginningless and Purposeless, there is no scope for any purpose for the

1. क्यर्यप्रेतेर कृषिः - न भैरो माक्तोदितुः, अर्थाविवाचितित्तमतिदिति।

- Bra.Śid. II. P.48
creation of difference.¹

It may be argued that without having any purpose, even a fool does not act, so there must be some purpose behind the creation. So the purpose of Brahman for creation must be mentioned. But creation could not have taken place for doing favour to the Jīvas; as the Jīvas are totally absent before the creation. And even after the creation, no one experiences grace; but all seem to suffer. Again, the supreme self has not created the world for self-enjoyment as it is self-content. As since creation is based on Avidyā, there remains no scope for the query regarding the purpose of the creation, as Avidyā does not require any motive for its action.²

1. तथा बौद्धविवोधादानोपक्षादिपि: - 'अनार्ध्योक्ता वाविष्य हति; ततानादित्वानात्तताश्चत्वदोषः', अनयोजनस्त्यां मेलप्रप-चर्ग-प्रयोजनपरमुयोगावकाशः।

   - Bra. Sid. I, p.10

2. यदैव परमात्मा-केवलं 'प्रयोजनमत्तुदित्वः न मन्दीरये प्रकटिः हति, तत्र परस्य ज्ञानः प्रप-सवार्ध-योजन वाच्यः न तावत् परतुग हः, प्राकु सर्वस्व-श्राह्यावमभवावः, हि च पञ्चवच भर्गोधः; ज्ञात्मापरीक्षाहि, वाप्यकामत्वादिरि - तत्त्वाविष्याविनवने समजाशः, न दीनविष्या प्रयोजनपौर्ण मन्याति।।

   - Bra. Sid. I, p.10
As there are the S'rtti passages which speak of creation, it may seem that the creation is real. But esoterically the Sruti passages deny creation. The main purport of the Sruti passages is not to show the reality of creation, but to emphasize non-duality. It is stated in the Brahmasiddhi that the description of creation given by the Sruti passages is nor for the sake of describing creation. From the beginning up to the end, the Sruti passages are in consonance with each other as far as their purport of putting forth non-duality is concerned.

Maṇḍana like Śaṅkara has stated that the effect is identical with its cause and the one alone is real. The question of duality does not arise, as everything is non-different from the non-dual Ultimate Reality. To prove this, examples of pot etc are given. The various shapes of clay, viz. pot etc are not different from the clay; in other words, they are nothing but the clay'.

1. सर्गुण्योऽपि न सचेत:......
   - Bra.Sid.III, P.124
2. कारण्यां व्यतिक्रमं कार्यं सत्तमेवयम्.....
   - Bra.Sid.III, P.125
3. पृथ्वीण हि च चट्टाक्यो नैक्स्मपतिक्षामिनि ।
   - Bra.Sid.III, P.125
It may be argued that causality in its primary sense is propounded here. So the answer is given that the passage describing creation is not to be understood in its primary sense; and the theory of causality is not propounded; but it is stated only as a means to the understanding of the concept of oneness. That is to say, the Highest Reality is one and without a second. The repeated statements of the Śruti are meant to negate difference, so it is not possible to state that there is oneness in its nature of cause and plurality in the state of effect. The cause alone is in fact real. Elsewhere all difference is said to be known through māyā. The negation of difference is positively stated. Further, difference and non-difference being contradictory cannot stay together.

Mandana has presented the analogies of reflection, word

1. नन्देवं मुख यथा काय्येकारणमात्र उक्तः स्यात्
   - Bra.Sid. III, P.125

2. नैत्तवस्यीकारणायतम् न विद्य यथा काय्येकारणमात्र रथ प्रतिपादः
   ..... हन्द्रोपायाम् हति वेदस्य पायागम्यतरः त्या: साहाय्यने
   वेदाभिनवस्य क्षणातः - नैह नानासिं र्गिन्न हति...
   - Bra.Sid. III, P.125
and dream-creation to make it clear that creation is not real. Reflections are produced from the originals (Bimba), but they do not exist in reality. Similarly, words arising from letters are not real. The same is the case with dreams. So the statement that ākāsā etc. are produced from Brahman does not mean that the creation is real. And the Āruti itself declares that the effects are brought about by speech.

In Śaṅkhapāṇī's commentary on the Brahmaśīddhi it is emphasized that though there is the creation of a chariot etc. in the dream, it is not regarded as real. It is the same with the creation of the elements-ether, air etc. The statement of creation is only meant to propound unity.

Thus, creation is not considered real by the author of this work. As we have stated above, Avidyā is regarded responsible for the display of the manifold world. But is Samaśṭi Avidyā responsible for the creation or Vyaṣṭi Avidyā?

1. विन्दु स्यायोपि सृष्टिक्षणिकलिकिः । न व ताक्त तत्र यथा दौर्गना सत्यक्षुर । तद्विद्भासनि तु सृष्टिक्षणिक्षणिकलिकिणी । वाच्येष्ठीपुत्रिः-परिस्मरणानि दिक्षिताः ।

   Commentary on the Bra. Sid.III; p. 255
Such a question has remained unanswered in the Brahmasiddhi. Nevertheless, Maṇḍana has mentioned jīva as the locus of Avidyā. This could indicate that Avidyā, residing in the jīva is responsible for creation. But Maṇḍana has not specifically said so.

Now, we shall concentrate on the concept of Avidyā as it is put forth in the Brahmasiddhi.

**The Concept of Avidyā:**

Kevalādvaita Vedānta simply propounds the Absolutist philosophy that everything is Brahman. Each and every thing other than Brahman is unreal, though we all seem to experience the duality consisting of name and form. We are so much absorbed in the so-called reality of the world of appearance, that we do not dare to consider it as a fiction.

So the question may arise as to which force restrains us from admitting this world of appearance as unreal. The only possible answer to this is that it is Avidyā (Nescience), which is responsible for bringing about the wondrous display of the world of appearance; and which impels us to consider it as the real one.
We have stated in the previous chapter that according to Śaṅkara, even Avidyā is unreal from the ultimate standpoint. Since Śaṅkara seems to have concentrated on emphasizing Brahman as the ultimate Reality; he has not presented the concept of Avidyā in all its aspects and from different point of view, so as to put forth a thoroughly consistent explanation in all its details.

After Śaṅkara, the concept of Avidyā was developed by the Śaṅkaraites. Amongst the followers of Śaṅkara, Maṇḍana is the first one, who has discussed this concept at some length. In the Brahma-kāṇḍa; as well as in the Niyogakāṇḍa we find a discussion regarding the locus and Types of Avidyā.

In the Brahmakāṇḍa it is stated that Avidyā is neither the very nature of Brahman nor is it another thing. It is neither absolutely unreal, nor real. For this reason only, it is called Avidyā, māyā, false appearance. If it were the very nature of Brahman, or if it were different thing, then it would

1. अद्वैतानिधान। यथा: स्वप्नं, नानात्मन्तरं, नात्मात्मात्मको कालः, न न्यूत्पत्तिः।
   स्वप्नं यथा: स्वप्नात्मात्मको भवते न न्यूत्पत्तिः।

- Bra. Śi. I, p.9.
be ultimately real (Paramārtha) and not Avidyā. If it were absolutely unreal like a skyflower, it would not be a factor subserving practical dealings. Hence it is known as inexplicable (Anirvacanīya). Refuting the views of the Śūnyavādins and the Yogācārins, Maṇḍana has proved the inexplicable nature of Avidyā.

According to the Śūnyavādin, things are existent as they are seen. There have been no Avidyā if it were existent as it is seen. It would not be Avidyā but rather like a sky flower. Now, in the view of the Vījñānavādin, consciousness alone exists. If knowledge is existent, as it appears, then the object cannot be denied as there is not denial of the shape of the knowable-viz. blue, yellow etc as appearing outside. In the view of those who uphold the reality of external objects, if what appears is unreal or non-existent, its appearance could not be explained as real, it would be just appearance; and the conception "its appearance" also would be just an erroneous one. Therefore Avidyā is neither

1. अल्पन्नतास्तव स्वप्नम्तत्त्वी न यक्षोराहुग्नु; तस्मादनिर्वकनीयोः।
   - Bra. Sid. I, P.9
It might be argued that Avidyā is illusion. If the knowable were to exist as it appears (or is known) it would not be an illusion; but would be right knowledge, and if the knowable were not to exist, its cognition could not be explained (i.e. would not be possible). Therefore, it (knowable) cannot rightly be said to be existent, for can it be said to be non-existent.  

Locus of Avidyā :-

As we have stated in the previous chapter, Śaṅkara would have regarded Brahman as the locus of Avidyā. But he seems to be not much worried about this problem. After Śaṅkara, the main query about the locus of Avidyā became a moot point amongst the Śaṅkarites.

1. अवश्यमाश्च तत्त्वज्ञानोपिवती सत्यत्वे दुर्लभः ; अवश्यमात्रेषु तु स्मातः तद्वभासमहस्तपित्रान्तिवेत् । तस्मानाविषाक्षकरी । नाप्रयज्जैति ।

   - Bra. Sid. I, P.9

2. अविष्कारमविष्नः यथावपाकः च वेष्ठिस्मावे न विष्नः ; विष्टु सम्भवज्ञानः । क्षति चावगमी तुपदन्तः ! तस्मानं पासाधितः ; सत्त्वेन निरुचयः नाप्रयज्जैतन् ॥ ॥ - Bra. Sid. II, P.60
Now amongst the Śaṅkaraítes, Maṇḍana has boldly declared the Jīva as the locus of Avidyā. Such a view could imply that Avidyā, residing in the Jīva is responsible for the projection of this world of appearance. This would lead to Subjective Idealism, that this manifold world is imagined by the individual mind.

Here, we shall peep in to the details as presented by Maṇḍana in respect of the locus of Avidyā.

In the Brahma-kāṇḍa the author has imagined the pūrvapakṣin as asking as to whom Avidyā belongs. It would not be out of place to mention that this very same style of expression we find in the commentary of Śaṅkara on the Brahma-sūtra- IV.I.3. In answer to the pūrvapakṣin, Maṇḍana has positively stated that Avidyā belongs to the Jīvas. It is also noteworthy that Maṇḍana seems to be against the single-soul theory, as he uses the term Jīva in plural.

1. यदृष्ट द्वाराधिघि; जीवानापि मिति बूम्।

- Bra.Śid. I, P.10
It may be objected that the Jīvas are not different from Brahman. As the Jīva is non-different from Brahman, it would not be rational to regard Jīvas as the locus of Avidyā. The reply to this objection is that this is true from the ultimate standpoint, but by virtue of constructive imagination, the Jīvas are different from Brahman. Another question is asked as to whose imagination (Kalpanā) separates them. It could not be Brahman’s, as it is knowledge (Vidyā) itself, and hence it is devoid of false imagination. It may be argued that such imagination could not be of the Jīvas also; as before the functioning of imagination there was the absence of the Jīvas; and thus the fault of mutual dependence would be unavoidable. The difference of the Jīva from Brahman is dependent on imagination and imagination is subsistent in the Jīva. Such a doubt is dispelled by the Siddhānṭin by

1. नतु न जीवा ऋणी मिस्थनेन् सत्त्वं परमाभ्येतः। कल्पनया तु मिथ्यनि।
   - Bra. Sid. I, P.10

2. नापि जीवानां तु कल्पनायाः प्रातः तद्भावातः इतरेतराश्रयसंस्कृताः
   कल्प्याब्धो ति जीवविभागः। जीवाश्च कल्पनैति।
   - Bra. Sid. I, P.10
saying that such a fault of mutual dependence would not arise as both the Jīva and Avidyā are beginningless. Another objection is raised that as the Jīvas being identical with Brahman are pure by nature; Avidyā could not belong to the Jīvas. Giving the example of the original and its reflection, the Siddhānṭin refutes this argument of the Pūrvapākṣin.

Though the Jīvas are pure by nature, they appear impure due to illusion, just as the reflection appears impure on the impure surface of the sword. Regarding the destruction of Avidyā - in the case of one who has become one with Brahman, it may be argued that even if a thing is natural, it could be destroyed on there arising a concept which is different, but

1. तत्रामात्रविद्यानेतरताःहवन्हत्वस्रोषः
   - Bra. Sid. I. P.10

2. नन्तु जीवा वपि श्रवयंत्रायतिकादि श्रवयाः सर्वाः ह, तद्व यथा
   तस्यविवाक्षः ।
   - Bra. Sid. I, P.11

3. न च तात्त्विकादिविद्यात य प्रतिविविभं कहाया दिन्मु भिन्नः, कथ च तत्र ज्ञानसिद्धांविरवकारस लम्भ । एत्यमान्यायजीवानमात्रमुक्ति विन्यमः ।
   - Bra. Sid. I, P.11
Avidyā is beginningless, innate and causeless, so it could not be destroyed. Further, it cannot be said that Vidyā, which is the very nature of Ātman, could be the destroyer of Avidyā, because there is absence of contradiction between the two viz. vidyā and Avidyā as they stay together. And if there were contradiction, since this nature of Ātman is always there, there would be eternal absence of Avidyā and the world would be eternally emancipated. And the other vidyā produced by 'hearing' etc too cannot be regarded as the destroyer of Avidyā.

The Siddhāntin's answer to this is that it is the Jīvas; which are defiled by Avidyā and not Brahman, which is always pure, eternal, self-luminous and unproduced otherwise. Avidyā would not be destroyed even in the case of the one which has become one with Brahman. Further, if Avidyā

1. न सत्वकस्मात् ऋविषा विविधाविविषणिवित्तिका, विविषणा सहव वृत्तो विविषावः, विविषायेत्वा नित्यानित्याविनिलित्येकं जगृ विवात्।

   - Bra.Sid. I, P.11

2. ज्यो चित्तं - उद्देश्यस्मिन्नानाभिविषणपूर्वकतत्वम, न क्रमः; तद्व विश्व नित्याविनिलित्य गतुत्तकिण्येषु; वन्यवा क्रमपूर्वः का स्पाधि नाविषा निकृतस्मि; तत्र निमित्तः।

   - Bra.Sid.I, P.12
belonged to Brahman, Brahman itself would be the transmigrant and the liberated; and when it is released; all would be released at once. So it would mean that due to the perception of difference, Brahman becomes the transmigrant and due to the knowledge of non-duality, it is emancipated and thus all would be emancipated simultaneously. Therefore it is better to believe that due to Avidyā, the Jīvas become the transmigrants and due to knowledge they are released.

Moreover, it is stated that Avidyā is natural and Vidyā is adventitious for the Jīvas. Avidyā, natural to the Jīvas is dissolved only by knowledge, which is produced. Though the Jīvas are non-different from Brahman, the ordered arrangement of Vidyā and Avidyā is possible as in the case of the original and its reflection. That is to say, as eventhough, the

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1. अवद्दव संसारित भ्रूङ्ग मुच्छते, एक मुक्तो बस्मुसिकापसेगः, यते
   भेदाद्विन भ्रूङ्ग संसारितं भेदाद्विन च मुच्छते.
   - Bra.Sid. I, P.12

2. तत्सादविषयं जीवा: संसारितं, विषयं मुच्छति |
   - Bra.Sid. I, P.12

3. विविध हि नैसर्गिकः, तस्या बागन्तुख्यं विषयं पृत्य: |
   - Bra.Sid. I, P.12

4. व्यवस्थः आक्षणिकं च क्रृपणं जीवानं विश्वास इति-विश्वास विषयं
   व्यवस्थः आक्षणिकः |
   - Bra.Sid. I, P.12
original is pure, its reflection over the Surface of a Sword etc appears to be impure. Similarly, though Brahman is knowledge itself, Jīvas can be said to have Avidyā.

Hence we can say that since in Maṇḍana's opinion Avidyā resides in the Jīvas, he can be said to have subjectivistic outlook. Of course, he has not fully discussed how Avidyā residing in the Jīvas projects duality. Nevertheless, Maṇḍana can be considered to be a pioneer of the concept that Avidyā resides in the Jīva.

Types of Avidyā :-

Giving some more details about Avidyā, Maṇḍana has classified Avidyā into two types. It is stated in the Niyoga-kāṇḍa that Avidyā is two-fold. (i) one which conceals the illumination, and (ii) which projects it wrongly.¹ Maṇḍana further states that Avidyā, which has got projecting power, is present in both the waking and the dreaming states; while the other with concealing power, is present in deep

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¹ अय फल - दिव्यप्रकाशयमविषयः पुरुषस्यरूपाचारिका विशेषणाः हः |

- Bra.Sid. III, P.149
sleep and is characterised by dissolution.  

Non-apprehension (agrahaṇa) and misapprehension (anyathāgrahaṇa) are two aspects of Avidyā, which are related as cause and effect. Concealing Avidyā is identical with non-apprehension, while projecting Avidyā is identical with misapprehension. The former is the cause and the latter is its effect. That is to say, at first the true nature of a thing is concealed; and then a false appearance is projected. Thus the two powers are related as cause and effect. Non-apprehension and misapprehension are both found in the dreaming as well as in the waking state; while non-apprehension which is known as cause, is found in the deep sleep.

It may be noted that in the Gaudapādakārikā,

1. स्वप्नबागतियोगिनिधिप्रति कुपुष्ट वाच्यालिका लघुलक्षणं |
   - Bra. Sid. III, P. 149
2. वस्मासुग्रहणविपयवृहणे पुंशे बरवध कार्यकारणामेवाविश्वेते |
   - Bra. Sid. III, Pp. 149 -150
3. स्वप्नबागतियोरिघे ज्ञाततावृखणलक्षणाः कुपुष्ट इत्यविधाप्रिविवाग उपपत्ती |
   - Bra. Sid. P. 150
Gaudapāda has put forth these aspects of Avidyā. So Mandana is indebted to Gaudapāda in this respect. Mandana's effort to specifically describe the nature of Avidyā is praise worthy. This could be detected in Śaṅkara's writings too, but not in such clear terms.

Conclusion:

1. Mandana seems to consider Avidyā as identical with Māyā, as he has used the terms 'Māyā' as a synonymn of Avidyā.

2. Mandana does not seem to consider the world as merely a void (Śunya), as it is of the nature of Brahman and thus has Substantiality. This clearly shows that Mandana accepts the objective reality of the world of appearance and does

1. श्रव्या ग्रहणत्: स्वप्नो निड्रा तत्वम्यानि्।
   - G.K.: 15 (ab) : 149 - 150

2. एवमेवविविषाम माया भौमायावपि हृत्यु च्यते।
   - Bra. Sid. I, P.9

3. कर्मवृत्तं त्वत्तत्त्वम्, कर्मध्येण सापक्, न तु कृत्यवृत्त।
   - Bra. Sid. I, P.20
not consider it absolutely unreal.

(3) Like Śaṅkara, Maṇḍana holds the mundane world and its dealings to be unreal from the ultimate standpoint. While refuting the Yogācāra view, Maṇḍana has said that both transmigration and emancipation are imaginary from the ultimate point of view. This suggests that Maṇḍana seems to accept them as real from the empirical point of view.

(4) Maṇḍana has not shown the systematic process of the creation. Of course, he admits that prapañca is caused by Avidyā. But he has not mentioned whether it is created by Īśvara or by the Avidyā of the Jīva. Further, Maṇḍana has not made it clear whether Avidyā residing in the Jīva creates the world separately or as common for all. Nevertheless, Maṇḍana seems to be an absolutist accepting that everything other than Brahman is non-existent.

1. उचिते विद्वानं तत्त्वविभावं संसारमोहको, न परस्माद्यत्वमः परः कथम्।

   - Bra.Śid. I, P.15

2. .....

   ब्रह्माण्डे व्यतिरिक्तेण प्रत्येकव्यस्तेऽपावर्तकुतः ..... 

   - Bra.Śid. IV, P.157
Hence, in a nutshell we can put it like this that we can find Absolutistic views tinctured with subjectivism, in the Brahmasiddhi. A clear-cut doctrine of pure subjective Idealism is not propounded by Mandana. Still he has paved the way to the subjective type of Idealism by putting forth the Jīvas as the locus of Avidyā. As Dr. S. S. Hasurkar states, "Mandana can thus be legitimately held as the originator of the Jivāsrita-avidyā-vāda, that unique aspect of the post-Śaṅkara career of the doctrine of māyā with his emphatic stand over the problem of locus of Avidyā, and his deep subjectivism, he can be said to be indirectly responsible for the subtle Drsti-srsti-vāda."¹

Hence, an inkling of the 'Drsti-srsti vāda' is provided by Mandana, as he has promoted the Jivāsrita-avidyā-vāda. In short, by pointing out a new direction with his independent thinking, Mandana has attained a prominent place in Vedāntic thought.