III

IDEALISTIC THOUGHT IN THE MADHYAMIKA AND
THE VIJÑĀNAVĀDA SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM

On our way heading towards Drsti-Sṛsti vāda, even incurring the risk of going astray, we would like to examine Buddhism—especially Mahāyāna Buddhism—which is clearly Idealistic. So far as the unreality of the worldly phenomena is concerned, the philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism, namely the Madhyamika (Śūnyavāda) and the Yogācāra (vijñānavāda) propagate it forcefully.

The continuous chain of birth and death, sorrow etc compels a person to think about the substantiality of human life and the world in which one lives. Any sensitive mind would experience that nothing in this world remains permanent. Animate bodies are born only to die. Green leaves on a tree are fast seen changing into dryness. Even non-animate substances perish. In
short, everything in this world keeps on changing continuously and rushing towards its ultimate destiny - viz. extinction.

Influenced by the hard facts of human life such as birth, pain, sorrow, death etc. Buddha renounced worldly life in search of truth. Buddha's way of solving the middle of life was not objective but rather subjective. The main concept on the basis of which the Pāli canon and later works announce the world as essenceless and impermanent is of "dependent origination" - (pratītya samutpāda), which we shall examine later on.

At first, we would like to make it clear that in this chapter, we are not intending to go deep into Buddhistic thought, but are going to examine Idealistic thought in the Mādhyamika as well as in the Yogācāra schools to determine to what extent it could be said to be allied to the Drsti-Srṣṭivāda of Vedāntic thought.

1. "...The Solution, accordingly, of this great problem is attempted by Buddhism not objectively, but subjectively."
   - Sogan Yamakami - Systems of Buddhistic thought. Ch. II, p. 47, (1912), University of Calcutta.
As a result of realistic, logical, critical and psychological ways of thinking, Buddhism is found to be split up into the Vaibhāṣīka, the Sautrāntika, the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra schools of Philosophical thought. Amongst these four trends, since the Vaibhāṣīka and the Sautrāntika schools admit in some form the reality of the external world, they do not enter into the realm of our inquiry. Here, we shall first examine how the Mādhyamika system of thought establishes the worldly phenomena as essenceless (niḥsvabhāva and Śūnya).

(1)

Mādhyamika Buddhism:

Nāgārjuna, (100 A.D.) the pioneer exponent of the Mādhyamika School (Śūnyavāda), has established the external world or rather everything as essenceless with his unique dialectic. He recognises neither the Šāsvatavāda, nor the ucchedavāda but follows the middle path that reality is neither positive nor negative.

1. "... the Mādhyamika claims that he follows Buddha's doctrine of the mean or middle path, by holding that reality is neither positive nor negative...."

A thing is not explained either by itself or by any other entity. As everything is relative and has dependent origination, it is necessarily essenceless and indescribable.

We have stated before that the theory of 'dependent origination' is the main basis, on which the concept of the unreality of the phenomenal world is formed. That is to say, not a single thing exists independently but always depends on some other factor for its existence. To find out a possible solution for the mundane life, Buddha preached the twelvetoif chain of causation that this samsāra appears due to Avidyā, depending on which Āsāṅkṛa, Viññāna, nāmarūpa, Ṣadāyatanas, Sparśa, Vedaṇā, trasā, Upadāna, bhava, jāti-jarā-marāna come-about. In this way, the vicious circle of birth and death goes on.

Widening the scope of this theory of dependent origination, it can be understood that one thing is known and established in relation to another. So things do not seem to have any distinct existence or character or nature of their own. And what does not exist independently, can not be a real thing. From this point
of view, it becomes difficult to put the world of appearance under the category of reality. A chair is known as a chair due to its relation with a table; and the table is known as a table due to its relation with a chair. And a chair or table is so known in relation to the person sitting on or at it. In this context it is stated in Indian Idealism, "... without making any reference to any other entity no entity is intelligible by itself. That being so, every entity involves all other entities for its own support."¹ Thus, all the things are dependent and relative. A line is considered as big or small only in relation to another line. If a bigger line is put next to it, it is considered as a small line; while it is considered as a big line, if a smaller line is beside it. Besides, its being a line also is in relation to other things. Thus all concepts are interdependent. Moreover, the every same entity is looked upon differently in different circumstances. A fire seems soothing in winter, while in

Summer it is unbearable. Hence, all the things are relative, and so are essenceless. Things do not possess a character of their own; but appear relatively, or their conception is always relative. And this is the reason, why things should be considered unreal.

On the basis of relativity, Nāgārjuna establishes the essencelessness (niḥsvabhāvatā) of all entities. In the Madhyamaka Kārikā, Nāgārjuna has demolished the reality of each and every phenomenon such as causality, motion, time, space, 'thinghood', qualities, relations, attributes, substance, Soul, God, Nirvāṇa etc. on the basis of dependent origination.

Here, we shall briefly examine some of the concepts put forth in the Madhyamakakārikā, which may be connected in some way or the other with our inquiry.

Rejection of the theory of Causation:

The theory of causation has no place in the realm of Idealism. It is noteworthy that the Buddhistic Idealism as well as the Vedāntic Idealism reject the theory of causation in their own ways. On the one hand,
the Mādhyamika School of Buddhism refutes it on the very basis of logic, while Kevalādvaite Vedānta negates it taking the metaphysical standpoint. That is to say, as Kevalādvaitavedānta emphasizes that nothing exists apart from the eternally unchanging Ultimate Spiritual Reality viz. Brahman, nothing is ever born. Of course, the very same argument is put forth by the Mādhyamika school. But there is this difference— that it does not admit any permanent reality.

In the Mādhyamakārikā, Nāgārjuna has forcefully demolished the theory of causation, while establishing the doctrine of non-origin. At the very outset he declares, "There is neither destruction, nor production, neither nihilism nor eternalism; there is neither unity nor plurality; neither coming in nor going out."

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1. अनिरोधामुक्तद्वादमुक्तद्वादश्चार्गतः
   अनेकस्यमनात्मकमनाममनिर्गमम्

- M. K. Ch. I (ab)
After putting forth the main thesis of his work, Nagarjuna proceeds to refute the theory of causation:

"Never and nowhere can anything be produced. A thing can originate neither out of itself nor out of not-self nor out of both nor out-of neither."

A thing, which is already existent, has no purpose for re-origination from itself. On the other hand, it does not originate from something else, as there is absence of the other thing.

Nagarjuna shows the uselessness of finding out the cause:

"The talk of finding out the cause of ever-

\[1. \text{न स्वतो नापि परस्तो न द्राम्यां नाप्यस्तुत: |} \]
उत्पत्ता जातृ विवर्त्ते भावाः क्यं कैयन ||

- M. K. Ch.I-1.

2. ...... नहि स्वात्मनो विश्वानां पदार्थानां
पुनस्त्वादे प्रयोजनमति | ...... परतोपि नपथपन्ते
भावाः, पराभावदेव ||

- Page-14, 36

- Extracts from M.K.V. on M.K.I-1. Poussin Louis-de-la-valle (Ed) Mūla-Madhyamaka kārikā of Nagarjuna with prasannapāda vṛtti of candrakīrti. (1903) St. Petersbourg (Bibliotheca Buddhica IV)
existing and non-existing objects is illogical. If a thing is non-existing, whose cause is to be found out? And, if it is ever-existing, what is the use of cause?" That is to say, if a thing is ever-existing, then there is no use of establishing its cause, as the thing is already there. On the other hand, if a thing is non-existing, it is futile to seek out its cause. There is no use of finding out the cause of a round square, as it is not existing. Hence, it is not possible to establish any theory of causality. The theories of causality that are propounded by the different schools of philosophical thought can not stand the test of Reason.

Further, the author explains that the effect cannot be present in the cause. "The effect does not remain in the causes singly or in their totality. Hence how can an effect arise from a cause, where it did not remain?"

1. नैवासस्तः नैव सतः प्रृत्ययोः कर्त्तै गुरुते ।
   असतः प्रृत्ययः कर्त्तै तत्त्वं प्रृत्येकः किम् ॥
   - M. K. Ch. I- 6

2. न च व्यतिरेकस्तु प्रृत्येकेष्वर्ति तत् प्रसू ।
   प्रृत्येकेऽश्च कर्त्तै तत्त्वं भवेन्न प्रृत्येकः यत् ॥
   - M. K. I- 11
Further it is stated, "And if the effect (which is not found to exist in the causes) can be imagined as arising out of causes, then why should not the effect arise out of non-causes?" Nāgārjuna very cleverly states that the effect, which does not exist in the cause, cannot be produced. Suppose it is imagined as being produced from the cause, then it can as well be stated that the effect arises from non-cause. Nāgārjuna then shows the logical inconsistency of the theory of causation: "An effect is of the nature of cause and a cause is not of its own nature. How can an effect coming from one, that is not of its own nature be said to be full of the nature of the cause?" concluding he asserts, "Thus effect is neither constructed of the cause, nor different from cause. In the absence of an effect

1. अथातदि तत्तत्त्वः पृष्ठयक्ष्यः पृष्ठयाति ।
अपृष्ठयक्ष्योऽपि कर्मान्नामविप्रवर्तिते पलम् ॥

2. पल च पृष्ठयमयं पृष्ठयक्ष्यायास्यमयः ॥
फलमस्तवमयेयो यत्ततु पृष्ठयमयं कथम् ॥

- M. K. I. 12

therefore the problem of cause and non-cause cannot arise at all.¹ In other words, it is not possible to establish the nature of cause and effect. From the logical point of view, the relation of cause and effect is inexplicable, and relative.

On the basis of relativity and inexplicability, Nāgārjuna thus rejects the theory of causation. In no way could the theory of causation be established. It may be noted that the rejection of the theory of causation can culminate in the doctrine of non-origination or Acoosmism (Ajātivāda).

We shall see in a later chapter that Gauḍapāda perhaps under the great influence of Nāgārjuna’s way of thinking has forcefully rejected the theory of causation and has established Ajātivāda in his Gauḍapādaśāstra.

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¹ न प्रत्ययमयं फलम् नाप्रत्ययमयं फलम्
तंतविते, फलाभावात् प्रत्ययमृत्या: हुत: ||

- M.K.I.14
Thus, the logical refutation of the theory of causation leads one to negate production. That is to say, as the cause-effect relation is impossible to establish, it is also not possible to be sure about production of things. Then what about the creation of the world? The answer to this question would compel us to conclude logically that it must be unreal and as fictitious as māyā, dream, gandharvanagara etc. It is said, "Things do not exist, nor are they produced or destroyed. Origination, existence and destruction are of the nature of māyā, dreams or gandharvanagara."¹

Confutation of all concepts

Not only the theory of causation, but every phenomenon is demolished by Nāgārjuna.

No one is able to find out who is in the beginning of the world, and what is at its end also cannot be determined. Thus, the world is regarded as beginning-less and endless. Very rationally Nāgārjuna states,

1. यथा माया यथा स्वप्नोऽगन्धर्वनगर्तः ।
   तथोत्त्पत्त्यः स्थानं तथा भंगं उदाहरणम् ॥

   - M.K.VII.34
"If a thing does not have a beginning and an end, it cannot have a middle also." Thus, a thing is clearly established as unreal. On this very basis, Nāgārjuna emphasizes all things as middleless and hence as unreal. "Not only is the Mundane existence beginningless, but all objects are beginningless and hence middleless and endless."  

As everything is relative, it becomes devoid of reality. So every phenomenal entity is compared with a dream, gandharvanagara etc. "Afflictions, actions, bodies, doers and results are like gandharvanagara, a mirage and a dream."  

1. नैवाय्यं नागरं यथयं मध्यं कुलौ स्वेत्
   - M.K.XI-2(ab)  

2. पूर्वं न दियो कोटि: संसारं न केलं।
   सर्वत्रामपि भावानाय पूर्वं कोटि न वियते।
   - M.K.XI-8

3. क्लेवः कर्माणि देशक्य कत्तरत्यः फलानि च।
   गन्धर्वगराजः महिद्वितवाप्नः।
   - M.K.XVII-33
Even Buddha (Tathāgata) is declared to be inexplicable by Nāgārjuna. While stating this, the author has put the nature of the world on a par with Buddha.¹

Not only Buddha, but bondage and liberation are also stated to be relative and unreal. "There is no bondage and no liberation. Both are relative and unreal. When Samsāra is not snatched away, nor nirvāṇa superimposed, then why should they both be imagined."² Thus, Nāgārjuna states the uselessness of imagining bondage as well as liberation.

In short, the worldly phenomena are relative and as a result inexplicable. It is not possible to ascertain their exact nature. Hence, everything is declared to be unreal by Nāgārjuna.

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1. तथागतो यत्रवभावस्तत्स्वभावं हि जगत् ।
   तथागतो नित्यवभावो नित्यवभावं हि जगत् ॥
   - M.K.XXII-16

2. न निर्वाणमारोपो न संसाराभ्यासः ।
   यद्र कः तत्र संसारो निर्वाणं किं विकल्प्यते ॥
   - M.K.XVI-10
Though everything is declared relative and unreal, Nagarjuna does not condemn the world in all its aspects from the empirical standpoint. Only from the ultimate point of view he rejects the world. So, we can compare his philosophical views with Sāṅkara's philosophy; as Sāṅkara also accepts the empirical reality of the world and negates it from the ultimate standpoint.

**Acceptance of two-fold truth**

In order to save the practical life of people from collapsing, the empirical reality of things is accepted by almost all the thinkers. Even though the world is considered unreal from the ultimate point of view, its empirical reality is admitted.

Nāgārjuna, in his Mūla-Mādhyamaka Kārikā declares his acceptance of two-fold truth viz. Satya (empirical truth) and pāramārthika satya (ultimate truth). It is stated, "Buddha's instruction is based on two-fold truth, namely, "lokasamvṛtī satya" (empirical truth) and pāramārthika satya (ultimate truth)."
Here, Candrakīrti defines the term 'saṁvṛti' as "Ajñāna concealing the object from all the sides." Thus, Ajñāna (Nescience) is the root-cause of the phenomenal dealings. (Only the concealing power of Ajñāna is emphasized here, and not its projecting power).

Emphasizing the importance of the two-fold truth it is stated, "Those, who do not recognise two-fold division of truth, they do not understand the deep essence of Buddha's instruction."
Further, Nāgārjuna shows that it is not possible to dispense with the empirical truth. "The ultimate reality cannot be taught without resorting to the empirical usage, and without realising the ultimate reality, liberation is not gained". So, it can be said that the empirical truth is a means to attain the knowledge of the ultimate reality. Candrakīrti states in his Madhyamakakārikāvṛtti, "Therefore, the empirical truth must be recognised as a means to the attainment of Nirvāṇa, just as a person who wants water, must have a pot for it."

Thus, the empirical reality of the world is accepted by Nāgārjuna. Though he compares the worldly phenomena with gandharvanagara, dream, a mirage etc, he admits them from the common-sense point of view; From the ultimate point of view, everything is essenceless, relative and unreal.

1. व्यवहारभवनास्तिकसंयत्सरणेऽत्र परमायत न देशयते ।
   परमायतस्त्वानं निर्वाणं नापित्यऽपेत ॥

   - M. K. XXIV- 10.

2. तर्ममार्यायाविन्यागमोपयायन्यात्यत्वाय स्थायिकताः
   संप्रतिराधायहथोपेय । भाजनमिव सत्तितार्थिनिति ॥

   - M. K. V. p. 494
Now, if we try to dig out an expression, that can lead towards the type of Idealism, which Drsti-Srsti Vāda emphasizes; we do not get a satisfactory link. As a matter of fact, the mādhyaṃkika school did not want to establish any theory as no theory can stand the test of Reason and all theories are equally misleading. We shall see later on that Drsti-Srstit vāda forcefully negates the empirical reality of the world; while the Mādhyaṃkika-Buddhism does accept the conception of the empirical reality if only as a means to the attainment of liberation.

Nevertheless, as everything is considered relative and essenceless by its nature, such an expression can be regarded as leading one towards the unreal character of the world, which the Drsti-Srstit Vāda also establishes.

After a brief survey of the Mādhyaṃkika Buddhism, we shall now turn our attention towards the Yogācāra Buddhism (Vijñānavāda), to find out to what extent it resembles the Idealistic views that the Drsti-Srstit Vāda propounds.
Yogācāra Buddhism : (Vijñānavāda)

Before we enter into some details about the Vijñānavāda, it would not be out of place to mention that the Vijñānavāda was not a sudden outburst. Rather the Sautrāntika school itself paved the way for Vijñānavāda by its theory of representative perception. As mentioned in the Central Philosophy of Buddhism, "The Sautrāntika by its insistence on the creative work of thought and the doctrine of Representative perception directly led to the idealism of the Yogācāra."

Now, a question arises as to what is meant by 'Representative perception'. It can be stated that, according to the Sautrāntikas, the phenomenal world is not directly perceived, but the existence of the world is inferred on the basis of its knowledge that we have. In the process

   also see - Radhakrishnan - Indian Philosophy Vol.I, Ch.-XI, p. 625; Eighth impression (1966) George Allen & Unwin.
of cognition, at first indefinite sensation- (nirvikalpa) is produced; and then a definite image or idea (savikalpaka) about an object takes place. Thus, we do not perceive a thing directly; but our mental images or ideas are imposed on it. On the basis of this Representative perception of the Sautrāntika Buddhism the Vijñānavāda emphasizes that the world does not exist independently of the mind. Our images or ideas alone construct the external world, or appear as if they were outside.

Such a type of Idealism resembles the views put forth in the Drṣṭi-Srṣṭi vāda. The Vijñānavāda propounds Subjective Idealism that nothing exists independently of the mind. Whatever we perceive is imagined or constructed by the mind. This mode of thinking declares the outer objective world as unreal.

Here, we shall examine some Idealistic views expressed in the Lāṅkāvatārasūtra, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and some other works; which seem to resemble the views put forth by the Drṣṭi-Srṣṭi vādin.

The Unreality of the world, and the mind projecting

The Lankāvatārasūtra, which can be said to be oldest
work of the Vījñānavāda school, very lucidly establishes
the unreality of this world of appearance and emphasizes
the mind as the factor projecting the external world.

In order to establish the unreality of the external
world; Similes of a dream, sky flower, mirage, gandhar-
vanagara etc. are employed. It is said, "Things are not
originated as a matter of fact. But as the gandharvanagara,
dream, illusion etc. appear without any cause; so this
world appears." ¹ It is further said, "As a dream hair
floating in the air, māyā, gandharvanagara, and the mirage
appear without any cause, so this world appears." ² In

¹ अनुपनन्मिदं तत्त्वं न घ भावा न सत्त्वं घ ।
गन्धर्वनागरायाय भावा विवतन्येतुः ।

² स्वप्नेनाद्विज्ञायं माया गन्धर्वनागरायां ।
अविवक्तानि द्वारपने तथा लोकविविधता ।

L. S. III-87

Bagchi Sitansusekhar (Ed) Saddharmalakāvatārasūtra
(1963) Buddhist-Sanskrit texts N-3.
The Mithila Institute.

L. S. III-90

L. S.X- 144.
short, the world is devoid of any stuff; it is essenceless. It is the mind (citta) which assumes the form of the external world. In the Lankēvātāra it is stated, "This appearance is nothing else but the mind, which takes the form of the cognised and cogniser." Emphasizing the constructive role of the mind it is said, "Nothing exists outside; but it is the mind only which appears outside in the form of objects." "Everything upto Brahmā is nothing else but the mind only. So when the mind is emancipated, Brahmā and the like are not apprehended."  

1. चित्तमात्र न दृष्टोऽस्तितं दिया चित्तं रूपेऽ दूरयोऽ ।
   चित्तमात्रसमिदं तदं दिया चित्तं प्रथमेऽ ।
   ग्राहयुगाध्वाक्षेन आत्मात्मीयं न पिये ।
   L. S. III.65(ab)  
   नीलसई 11
   L. S. III-121.

2. बहिःनारितं धै दूरयमतो धै चित्तमात्रकृम्म ।
   L. S. X-101 (cd)  
   बहिःनारितं धै सं स्तवपितं हुयोते बापि: ।
   L. S. X-489 (ab)

3. क्रमादित्यान्धेन्तरतं चित्तमात्रं वदामयकृम्म ।
   चित्तमात्रविनिर्धेनं क्रमादिर्नापलक्तं ।
   L. S. III-122
In short, "The mind alone functions, and the mind alone is liberated. The mind itself is originated, and nothing else but the mind itself is suppressed." ¹

Now, in this context a question may arise as to how the mind operates and how varieties of things occur. In answer to such a question, it is stated that the only factor responsible for such a delusion is residual impression (vāsanā). From the residual impressions, various forms emerge. Describing the process, it is stated, "From the Store-consciousness (Ālaya viṣṇāna), proceed the minds like waves. These (the minds) are caused by the residual impressions in accordance with their causes." ² Stating the analogy of a mirror it is stated, "As a form appears on the surface of a mirror, but does not exist inside it.

¹ निदर्शते प्रवृत्तिः परिचयं विद्विद्यते ।
पितामहोऽहायो नान्यत् जित्यो मनः सोऽहायो ॥

L. S. X- 145

² अलयात्सविद्विद्यतानि प्रवृत्तिनिन्त ततं स्वदीर्घः ।
वातनातेहिताः स्वः यथाप्रत्ययं समवधाः ॥

L. S. X- 871
similarly on the surface of the mirror of the residual impressions, the mind is seen as subject and object to the people with a poor intellect."

Besides emphasizing the mind's creative power, the Laṅkāvatārasūtra puts forth the doctrine of Acosmism:

"Everything is non-originated. What appears is an illusion only." Declaring the imaginary character of the objects it is stated, "Nothing whatsoever is originated from causes nor is it suppressed by causes. Only imaginary causes are originated and suppressed." That is to say, only imaginary things seem to be produced and destroyed.

Idealistic views expressed in the Viññaptimātratāsiddhi:

The name of Vasubandhu is remarkable in the history of the Viññānavāda school of Buddhism. Vasubandhu, it is

1. यथा हि दर्षणं त्वं दृष्टस्य न च दिव्यते ।
वासनावांशुण्यमपि द्विय, दृष्टिः बलि: ॥

L. S. III-74

2. अनुपत्तिः यथमाया भान्तिमांशु हि दृष्टयते ॥

L. S. X-96 (ab)

3. न हृदयात्मये विश्वितृप्तयेव निस्तयो ।
उद्धिक्तलो भक्तयेव पुरस्य त्वं कालितः ॥

L. S. X-95 (s)
believed, started as a Vaibhāṣīka, showed leanings towards
the Sautrāntika school and finally emerged as a Viṃśaṭika.
His Viṃśaṭika Vṛtti is an important work propounding subjective Idealism. The main thesis of this work is
to reject the reality of the external world and to assert
consciousness as the Ultimate Reality.

At the very outset, Vasubandhu announces in the
Viṃśaṭika Vṛtti, "In the Mahāyāna School, the three-fold
world-viz- Nāma-dhātu, Rūpa-dhātu and Arūpa-dhātu is instruc-
ted to be Vijnapti only, through the aphorism -
'Jinaputra! What is perceived as the three-fold world, is
only of the form of citta'. Mind, Viṃśaṭika and Vijnapti
are identical" Considering everything as not real but

2. The Vijnaptimātratāsidhī is divided into two sections:
   (1) Viṃśaṭika, (2) Trimsākā.
   On the Viṃśaṭika, Vasubandhu himself has written a
   Commentary; while the commentary on the Trimsākā is
   written by Śthiramāti.

1. महायाने श्रेयातुल विज्ञाप्तिमात्र व्यवस्थाप्यते;
   विकर्तारां भी विनुष्मा ! यदुत श्रेयातुलकयति
   सुवनाचु ! विकर्तां मनो विद्यार्ह विज्ञाप्तिमयेति पर्यया : ।

   Chatterjee K. N. (Ed.) Vijnaptimātratāsidhī
as consciousness only he states, "As a man with defective eyes has the false perception of hairs floating in the air; so everything that appears is not real but consciousness only."

Here, a number of doubts arise. Since we are much attached to worldly things, we cannot readily consider the world as an unreal phenomenon. We perceive a number of things and events around us as occurring at a particular place and time. Hence, we feel like asking that if the external things be unreal, how things could have originated at a particular place and time.

We find such a doubt put forth in the Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi, "If knowledge of colour etc. arises without colour etc.; that is to say without their being a corresponding external colour etc., then why is it originated at a particular place and not everywhere; and why is it originated at that particular place and time and not at all times? Further,  

1. विज्ञाप्तिमात्रात्मकदर्शिन्यप्रदायमातनां।
   यदृच्छैव तत्मितिर्वचायलं कैशोप्रकारदिराजित्यत॥

V.M.S.-Vimsatikē- 1.
why does it arise in the consciousness-continuum of all at that very place and time; and not in that of only one."

We experience in this world that certain objects, viz. fruits etc. grow at a particular place and time. Now, if without any external object, the knowledge of external things arises, then why is such a universal law experienced? Why is everything not originated everywhere and at all times. And why do all the people at a particular place and time experience the things and not just one person?

In answer to this it is stated, "In a dream, even in the absence of objects, - bee, garden. woman etc. are seen only at a particular place and time and not everywhere. In a dream, things are seen at a particular place at sometime and not at all times. Thus, the restriction

1. यदि विनापि स्मार्यन स्मार्दिविहिनात्तपते न स्मार्यमिव, सनातन संधिन देश उत्पत्ति, न तर्कवः तैवर्त्रथा देसे।
   अद्वितेयत्पते न सर्वदा! तद्वशेषालब्धतितिथिताना मध्यां सर्वा तन्त्रान उत्पत्ति, न केशलमकर्षः।

- V.M.S.- Viṃśatikā Vṛttī- p.1.
of place and time is established even without objects.

There is absence of the external objects. It is our ideation that takes the form of the external objects.
Vasubandhu, while putting the waking state on a par with the dreaming state emphasizes that as in a dream, things are apprehended at a particular place and time, though they do not exist as a matter of fact, similarly, in the waking state also, in the absence of things, they (things) are apprehended at a particular place and time.

Now, to a layman, a doubt certainly arises as to how a thing could be considered non-existing when it is actually perceived. But, Vasubandhu in his Vijñaptimātratāsiddhā asserts that perception cannot prove the existence of a thing.

1. स्वप्ने विज्ञप्तिपर्यत्न क्वात्तदेः किन्तु भूतहि भावारामाह्मी-पुस्फार्दितः ृत्त्वयोऽः न सत्त्वः । तत्त्व च द्वैगत्तद्दुपयोऽः न सर्वकालयमः हृति तिथिः विज्ञप्तिपर्यत्ने देशकालनियमः ।

- V. M. S. Vimsatikā Vṛtti- p.2.
External thing cannot be proved by perception.

With the help of the means of knowledge, we can establish whether a thing exists or not. Perception is believed to be the most valid means of knowledge, through which we apprehend the external world and can carry on our practical dealings. Among the Buddhist thinkers, the Vaibhāṣikas hold that the external world is directly perceived, while the Sautrāntikas hold that the world is not directly perceived, but can only be inferred, on the strength of the knowledge that we have.

The Viṣṇuavādins went ahead on the same lines, and said that the perceptual knowledge of a thing need not lead us to infer its objective existence, for in a dream, knowledge arises without an eternal object being present.

In the Vijñaptimāratāsiddhi, Vasubandhu has put forth the doubt of the Realist and has refuted the Realistic view of perception.

It may be asked by the Realist, "If a thing does not exist; how could one have the notion, 'This is perceived'?"

1. V.M.S.-Vimśatikā Vṛtti-p. 18
In answer, the analogy of a dream is presented that as in a dream though the things are not present, perceptual cognition arises; so it happens in the waking state also.

Now, if as the Saṅgrāntika says, an object does not remain present at the time of its perceptual cognition, then how could it be known to be perceived. That is to say, when the perceptual cognition arises - "I perceive this particular thing" - at that time, that particular thing does not remain present. And through 'Manovijñāna' it is decided that a thing is perceived. So how could it be said that the object is perceived? Especially, in the case of momentary objects, their form, taste etc. have ceased to exist at that time.

1. प्रत्यक्षभूमिति: स्वप्नाद्या विनाप्याभिन्नति पूर्वमेव शापितयः।

V.M.S. p.18.

2. न योः भौ दृष्टे तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं कर्म भत्तम।

V.M.S.-Vimsatikā-16(cd)

3. यदा च सा प्रत्यक्षभूमिध्वस्ततिदं म प्रत्यक्षभूमिति तदा न सोऽद्धर्धाय दृष्टे। मनोविज्ञानवेद परिच्छेदाच्युतदेशानुवादं व तदा निद्ध-तपादिति कर्म तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वमिष्टम्। विद्वेषेण तु क्षणितैर्य विश्वस्य तदानां निद्धत्तमेव तूपं रसादिकं भं।

V.M.S.Vimsatikā-vṛtti, p.19
It may be argued that whatever is not experienced, cannot be recalled by 'Manovijñāna'. So the experience of the object must be there in the form of perception. Hence, colour etc. are considered as objects of perception. 

In answer to such an argument Vasubandhu says, It is not proved that only a thing previously experienced is recalled, because it is already stated that consciousness with an image of a thing arises (even though the thing is absent). And from such consciousness, 'Manovijñāna' arises with that every image in association with recollection being constructive of colour etc. Therefore, on the strength of the rise of recollection, experience of a thing cannot be proved.

That is to say, even if we take for granted the reality of external things, they cannot be said to be directly known by perception; at the most their existence can be inferred from the knowledge that arises. But there is no relation of

1. नान्दनूमल्ल मनोविज्ञाने सर्पत इत्यवर्यमर्यांन्यूभेयेन भविष्यते तथ्य वर्जानामित्येवं तदिसि: स्मादेः पर्यव्यात्तयं मतम् 1

2. See next page
invariable concomitance between the existence of a thing
and its knowledge through the sense-organs. In a dream we
have perceptual knowledge of things, but they do not really
exist. Similarly in the waking state, consciousness alone
is established but not the reality of the external things.
It could be said that it is our consciousness that appears
as if it were outside.

Thus, Vasubandhu establishes that the external thing
is not actually perceived; but it is our imagination only
that projects a thing as if it were outside. The object
does not as a matter of fact exist.

It can be seen that Vasubandhu here puts the waking
state on the same footing as the dreaming state; and proves
that even in the absence of a thing, it can be apprehended.

1. previous page foot-note.

-V.M.S.- Vīṃśatikā-vṛtti, pp. 19-20
Similarity between the waking state and the dreaming state:

To show the unreality of a thing, it is generally compared with a dream. So, in order to establish the world as unreal, thinkers put it on a par with a dream.

Now, the Vijñānavādīn asserts that though there is no external thing, consciousness appears as the external object, as it happens in a dream.

To a lay man: a doubt may occur, "If in the waking state, consciousness of the unreal object occurs as in a dream, then people would certainly themselves understand that in the waking state also there is absence of things as in the dreaming state. But this is not what happens. So unlike in a dream, consciousness of all thing should not be considered objectless."¹

Such a doubt is set aside by saying that the absence of the things seen in a dream, cannot be known by the

¹. यदि यथा स्वप्ने विज्ञानवादीयमेण विभक्तं तथा जाग्वतोऽपि र्यात्मकेऽ तदाधावं नोऽऽ न वै भवति तस्मात् र्यप्न ह्यवायस्यपरिक तथा निर्भरित ।

V. N. S.-Vimśatikā-वृत्ति, p. 20
dreamer unless he wakes up from the dreaming state. 1

Similarly, the residual impression (Vāsanā), born of the (long persistent) habit of making wrong constructions, compels people to fall into a slumber as it were, and as in the case of a dream, they perceive things which do not exist as a matter of fact and do not realise their nature till they are awake. But when they wake up on attaining the knowledge just the opposite of that and develop a pure supra-empirical knowledge, then being prone to a pure empirical knowledge they realise the negation of objects. 2

Hence, it is concluded that like dream-consciousness, (in the waking state also) it is consciousness itself which arises in the form of objects though there are no external objects. 3

1. त्वप्त दृश्याभावाय नाप्रपुद्योऽवगच्छति II

V. M. S.-Viṃśatikā- 17, p. 21.

2. तत्त्वं चित्ति-विकल्प-यात्त्यावतन्ता निम्नयया प्रसुदयो लोकः त्वप्त इवाभावाय प्रपुदुर्धत्तत्त्यायं यथायन्त्रावगच्छति। यदा तु तत्त्वसन्धि-सृज्ये-तत्त्वसन्धिप्रस्त्रास तत्त्वाति प्रपुदुर्धो भयंति तदा तत्त्वसन्धिअनुपद्धतो तिथिक्षनासमुद्भावाय तिथिक्षनाय यथात्ववनं वच्छतयि।

V. M. S. - Viṃśatikā-vṛtti-p. 21.

3. तत्त्वं वाद्यार्थाभावाद्व विधिनेवध्यायिकारसुन्मुत्तत्यते। त्वप्त-विधिबन्धयद्व इत्यमापयम्।

V. M. S. - Trīṃśikā - Vṛtti-p. 28.
Thus, Vasubandhu denies the existence of the external objects, putting them on a par with a dream.

Besides, we find in his work a logical refutation of the Vaiśeṣika view, which recognised the external objects.

Refutation of Atomic Realism:

Since the Vaiśeṣika school admits the independent existence of the external objects, it forcefully propounds that since a thing exists, it is directly apprehended. There is not the absence of the external objects.

Now, according to Vasubandhu, the reality could be conceived either as a single thing or as an aggregate of atoms. But both these alternatives are untenable. It is stated, "The object is (experienced) neither as a single entity, nor as many distinct atoms, nor as an aggregate of them, because the single atom is not established."¹

Colour and other things which severally from the contents of eye-consciousness and the like, should either be one in the form of an 'avayavin' (whole) as believed by the

¹ V.M.S.-Vaiśāṭikā -11 p.12.
Vaśesikas or they may be many as atoms or there may be a conglomeration of atoms.

There cannot be one, since apart from the parts, nothing is perceived as a whole. Nor could there be many, as each atom is not perceived. Nor do they form the object in a conglomeration, since the atom is not established as a substance. This is so because if six atoms are believed to simultaneously come into contact with a single atom, then that single atom must be said to have six spatial dimensions... And if they are said to be occupying one a single space then the conglomeration would remain of the

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1. यत्तद्दृष्टादिकन्तन् स्वादिकालश्च च प्रत्येकं विषय: स्वात्तदेकं वा स्वाशादिकालविचें व्यक्तयो धार्मिकः: अनेकं वा परमाणु: संहता वा त एव परमाणवः

- V. M. S. Viṁśatikā-व्यृत्ति- p. 2.

I have taken the help of the translation of the text by chatterjee K. N.

2. न तावदेकं विषयो भवत्यवेक्षणां न्यत्तादिकालविचरणं क्वः कत्वमुखः। नातेकं परमाणुं प्रत्येकमुक्तां नापि हेतु संहता विषयोभवति। यस्मातपरमाणूरेकं दृष्ट्यं न तिष्ठति।

- V. M. S. Viṁśatikā-व्यृत्ति- p. 12.
size of an atom only. If it is admitted that the same
space that the single atom occupies can also accommodate
the six other atoms; then all of them being in the same
space, the whole mass would be of the same size as an atom
only and they could not be perceived. Moreover, atoms being
partless, cannot come into contact with each other.

Now, conglomerations also cannot mutually unite, for
in that case it must not be claimed that the atoms cannot
unite as they are partless; even if conglomeration have
parts, their contact is not recognised. Therefore, the
atom cannot be established as one substance.

1. पुकारण युक्तविनंतपरमाणोऽषमता ।
परमाणूः ततान्तरस्मातां चिन्तितः स्थायिकमात्रः ॥

- V. N. S.- Viṃśatikā - 12 p. 13.

2. अथ य सौकर्ष्य परमाणोदेशः स यथा परमाणूः ।
तैन सवलं तमान्दश-स्वात्त्वं सर्वं चिन्तितं परमाणूः च स्थायिकमात्रं न
कविचित्रितस्य दृश्यं स्थायिकं । नैव हि परमाणेऽपि संयुक्ते निरवधितवाविन्ध।


3. अथ संयताः अध्यत्त्वेऽन्यं न संयुक्तस्य । न तद्यथापरमाणाः निरवधितव्यवा-
लसंयोगः न हि विश्वत्वस्तीत्रादिकण्यं । ज्ञातव्यादिकण्यामि हि परमाणकस्य
संस्कृतिपुष्पमात्रं न तस्मात्स्तिक्षणं ।

- V. N. S.-Viṃśatikā-vṛtti - p. 15.
Thus, Vasubandhu presents the logical inconsistencies in the theory that atoms construct the external world. As atoms are partless, they cannot unite with each other.

Further, "That which has different parts, cannot make a unity, (on the contrary, if it has no parts) how come it is subject to shadow and concealment? It cannot be argued that they belong to the aggregate of atoms, unless the aggregate is admitted to be different from atoms."¹

That is to say, if spatial divisions of each single atom were not admitted, then it would not have one side with shadow and another without shadow. And where the parts of atom are not admitted, there could be no case of one atom being concealed by another, for the atom has no 'other' part. And even because there is no other part where another atom could come to unite, a resistance could not grow and in the absence of resistance, all atoms would...

¹ दिग्ब्रह्मगैय्यो यत्यासित तत्पालवन न युष्मिते ।
भाषाकृति कथा वा अन्यो न गण्डक्यप्यन्ति तस्य ते ॥

- V. M. S. - Viṃśatikā - 14, pp. 15-16.

English translation from: Kochumuttom Thomas A.
- A Buddhist doctrine of experience-Ch.V.p.178.

be having the same spatial dimension, and any conglomeration would be of the size of an atom, as already discussed.

Further, are blue, etc. that are recognised as the objects of the eye and the like - unitary substances or many? Neither of these alternatives can stand here. "If it is one, then no gradual movement is possible; for it can not be that one is grasped and not grasped at the same time. (At the same time) many objects that are so different from each other; could not be held to be existing in the same locus; and the subtle ones could be not perceived by us."

1. यथैकेक्य परमाणो दिग्म्बरमेको न स्यादादित्योदये वक्ष्मण्यत्र छाया भवत्यस्वातात्। न हि तत्स्वात्। प्रदेशोऽसि यमात्यो न स्याव। आधरणं च कर्ष्य भवति परमाणोऽ परमाण्यन्तरेण यदृश दिग्म्बरमेको नेध्यो। न हि कर्षियदर्पण परमाणोऽसि प्रदायगम। द्वन्द्वेनान्तर्यं प्रत्यायात्। स्याव। अति च प्रतियायसे शेषां समान्देशत्वात्। संधाय। परमाणुः मेक्य। स्यादित्युक्तं।
   - V. M. S. - Vīmāśātikā-vṛtti - p. 16

2. यत्तथस्सुरार्द्धिनां विलयी नीलपौलासं किदः भवति। किं तदेक्षे द्रव्यान्य तदनकम्यति।
   - V. M. S. - Vīmāśātikā-vṛtti, p. 17.

3. शक्त्वे न प्रभृतिलिपिपञ्चना ग्रहाः। विनिध्वनानेक्यत्वान्तर्य तुष्मानंक्षा च नो भेजव।
   - V. M. S.-Vīmāśātikā-15, p. 17.
If however, what is indivisible and not many, that only can form the object of the eye and therefore, such a thing is taken to be unitary, then there would be no scope for any gradual movement on the earth since one single foot-step would mean grasping the whole earth. It could not happen that the front part is grasped and the posterior part is not grasped at the same time. What are divisible and many; that is to say— an elephant, a horse etc. cannot co-exist. If where one exists; there you admit another as existing; how could division in that case be admitted? And how could that be one; since between what is occupied and what is not occupied, there is another region which is perceived as void. The subtle worms born in water, which are of the same form as gross animals, should not be beyond perception. If it is thought that it is the difference of characters that brings about the difference of substance and not otherwise, then this difference on the basis of atoms must be recognised and that is not
established as unitary.

And that not being established, colour etc. would cease to be regarded as the object of eye (consciousness) and thus, consciousness alone is established as the only Reality.

Thus, refuting the 'Atomic Realism' of the Vaisesika-system, Vasubandhu establishes that no object exists but consciousness alone exists, which takes the form of the eternal objects.

1. यदि यादवविचिन्तनं नानेक चहुँ विषयतेष्यं द्रव्यं कल्प्यते पूर्विध्यं नोमेतिनं स्याद्गमनमित्यथं: । सकृत्वविचिन्तनं सर्वस्तं गत्त्वात् । अविभागतं च गृहं परमायतं चालायतं युग्मं स्यात् । न विद्यतं तद्यथां गृहं यागायतं च युक्तं । चुन्त्वक्तं स्यात् । न विद्यतं चक्षूंस्क्रनं गृहं च युक्तं । विभिन्नतं याचेकत्तं हस्तस्ववादिक्तेश्वरं धृतितं स्याभैव । चेकं तत्वात्मानं तत्त्वात्मानं तत्त्वात्मानं तत्त्वात्मानं तत्त्वात्मानं च युक्तम्।

2. तत्त्वात्मानं च चक्षुषाः विद्यतं न स्काराद्विवेष्यतं बहुत्तं च विद्यतं अवश्यं स्मरीतं ।

It would not be out of place to mention a verse from the Ālaṁbanaparīkṣā, which emphasizes that consciousness takes the form of the external objects and appears as if it were existing outside. It is said, "It is the object (artha) which exists internally in knowledge itself as the knowledge aspect and which appears to us as if it were existing externally. Because consciousness is the essence (of the external object) and that (object, the essence of which is consciousness) acts as the condition (to consciousness)."

Thus, consciousness alone is the Reality; and the external objects do not exist.

Now, a question might arise that if consciousness alone is real; and everything else is unreal, how could the world appear before us.

1. यदनांवेयस्य तु बहिःपदवभाषते ।
   सोऽथीं विज्ञानस्थिवातात्मायणेयस्यादि च ।।

   Ālaṁbanaparīkṣā - 6
   English translation from: Sastri Aiyaswami N. (Ed.)
   Ālaṁbanaparīkṣā and Vṛtti (1942)
   The Adyar Library Series - 32.
We find an answer to this put forth in the Trimśikā, wherein this world is said to be a transformation of consciousness.

**World: Transformation of consciousness**

It is stated in the Trimśikā that the external world is a result of the three-fold transformation of consciousness, viz. Ālaya Vijñāna (store consciousness), Mano Vijñāna (thought consciousness), and Pravṛtti Vijñāna (active consciousness). Amongst these, Ālaya-vijñāna which is the seed of everything is called vipāka.¹

So, Ālaya vijñāna, which is the store-house of consciousness, is one of the modifications of pure from which consciousness, the worldly phenomena emerge.

Here, we shall briefly discuss this three-fold transformation of consciousness in order to have some

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¹ V.M.S. Trimśikā-1,2
idea of the viññānavādin's view regarding the world phenomenon.

Ālaya Viññāna

"(Ālaya Viññāna) has the representation of consciousness of unknown objects and places. It is always associated with touch, attentiveness, knowledge, conception and volition."¹ Moreover, "The feeling therein is that of indifference. It is unobscured and undefined, similarly indifferent are touch-etc. And it is like a stream of water."²

1. अलाय प्रति कृत्यस्मातिकथानवज्ञानविनविकितं च तत्र ।
   सत्तदम परिचित स्वत: प्रतिपालनानिविलयम् ॥

   - V.M.S. Trīṃśikā-3

2. उपेक्षा चेदना तत्तत्वज्ञाताव्याहर्तं च तत्र ।
   तथा त्वत्त्व: तत्च वत्ति द्वौतसीमान् ॥

   - V.M.S. Trīṃśikā-4

- English translation from:
Motilal Banarasidass.
As Ālaya vijnāna is momentary, it persists not as one, but is like the flow of a stream. It is stated,

"Ālaya vijnāna ceases to exist when arhathood is attained."¹ When arhathood is attained, all the seeds of action are destroyed and thus, Ālaya vijnāna also ceases to exist.

Mano-Vijnāna

"The consciousness called 'Manas' acts depending on Ālaya vijnāna. It is an act of thinking."² Ālaya vijnāna is considered the locus of the root-inclination (vāsanā) of Mano Vijnāna. Further, "Manovijnāna is always associated with four defilements (klesā), which are themselves obscured and undefined. They are belief in self, ignorance about the self, pride in self and love of self."³ It is associated with others like touch etc.

1. तत्स्य व्याघृतिर्हत्ये 

   - V.M.S.Trimāśikā-5(a)

2. ...... तद्यश्चित्य प्रवर्तिते ।
   तदालम्बं मनोनाम विभानं मननात्िस्कुः ।

   - V.M.S.Trimāśikā-5

3. कोष्ठिष्ठत्तितम: सहितं निमुष्टायथापुः: तदा ।
   आत्मज्ञातात्मकायमोदयात्मानात्िस्कुः सहि: ।

   - V.M.S.Trimāśikā-6
which are all of the same nature as the region in which one is born. It does not belong to one in the state of arhathood; nor does it operate in the state of suppressed consciousness, nor in the supra-mundane path. ¹

Pravṛtti Vijñāna

"The third transformation of consciousness is the same as the perception of the six-fold object. It could be good or bad or indifferent in character."²

In short, "This three-fold transformation of consciousness is the distinction (between subject and object). What is thus distinguished, does not exist as such.

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1. यत्रतत्त्वपरंपरेः स्पष्टांविचय अर्ततो न तद् ॥
   न निरोधसमाप्तसातास मांगे लोकोत्तरे न घ ॥
   - V.M.S. Triśākā-7

2. "*****तृतीय: इवविभयतं या ॥
   विषयस्योपविलिकः ता कृताकृताद्वया ॥
   - V.M.S. Triśākā-8
Therefore, all this is mere consciousness.¹

It is well known that in regard to one and the same object, contradictory consciousnesses arise amongst various people. But one and the same object cannot be logically of a contradictory nature. Therefore, in view of being of the form of something superimposed, the object-cause of the constructive imagination has to be understood as unreal.²

As the nature of the external object is thus self-contradictory, the thing cannot be considered as real.

¹ V.M.S. Trīśākṣa-17, p. 102

² V.M.S. Trīśākṣa-Vṛtti, p. 103
Therefore, everything is declared as merely consciousness, being the absence of external objects.¹

The question arises that if everything is consciousness alone, how are such constructions possible? In answer to this it is stated, "The consciousness contains all seeds. Its transformations proceed by mutual influence, as a result different constructions arise."²

Hence, Ālaya Vijñāna is the seed of all the things. Whether it is a cosmic force or is individual, is not made clear. But Buddhism unlike the vedānta would not normally admit a universal consciousness. Ālaya vijñāna is compared with an ocean, from which numerous vijñānas in the form of waves emerge. One wave causes another. From this, the common worldly experience can be explained. "Knowledges get conditioned by each other due to mutual predominance."³ That is to say, knowledges of all

¹ V.M.S.Trimśikā-vṛtti, p.104
² V.M.S.Trimśikā-19, p.105
³ V.M.S.Vimśalikā-18(ab), p.21
persons have a mutual predominance, that gets conditioned by each other as and when called for. Hence, from a particular consciousness of an individual, a particular consciousness develops in another individual and not an external object.¹

Thus, no external object causes a common worldly experience, but consciousness of one individual affects another individual-consciousness, and by virtue of their being mutually affected a common world-experience comes about. As an example it is stated, "Death is a change of course caused by a particular mental representation of another being."² That is to say, due to the predominance of the particular consciousness of others, some change emerges which is opposed to the life force and death.

¹ V.M.S. Vimsalika-Vrtti, p.22
² V.M.S. Vimsalika-Iq (ab)
which is called the disruption of the uniform continuum, occurs.¹

It can be clearly seen that plurality of consciousness continua is recognised. According to the Viśiṇava, the soul is nothing but a continuum of consciousness-point-instants. In the commentary on the Madhyantavibhāga-sūtra it is stated, "Even though there is an absence of different objects, each stream of consciousness reveals its own world."²

1. तथा परविचितविपरिवर्तितविकारितात्मकरेण वीतिविनयायिरोकिती कार्यिन्द्रियोत्पत्तितेषां समागमनतत्तिविधेयकल्पमयं मरणं संगतिति वदितपथम् ।

   - V.M.S. Viṃśatikā-vṛtti, p.23

2. तद्वर भिन्नर्याधिकत्व स्वत्माभासिति विलील्लोण्यत्तिनियमतत्वाद्युत्-तेषां स्वखीर्यातिमन्नार्यात्मिनिश्चित्यां विश्वां द्रूपयंते ।

   - Commentary of Sthiramati on the Madhyantavibhāga-sūtra, p.16
Bhattacarya Vibhushekhar, Tucci(ed), Madhyantavibhāga-sūtraḥ- Part-I (1932), Calcutta Oriental Series, N.24
Thus, the plurality of the individual selves is admitted by the Vijnānavāda. So far as the plurality of the selves is concerned the vijnānavāda certainly differs from the Drṣṭi-Srṣṭivāda, which as we shall see, positively prefers the Ekajīvavāda.

Another query is whether the Vijnānavāda accepts the empirical nature (truth) of the world or not. Drṣṭi-srṣṭi vāda rejects the three-fold existence, admitting only the illusory existence (pratibhāsika sattā) and the ultimate existence (pāramārthika sattā). In the realm of this theory, there is no place for empirical reality.

**Three-fold truth**

We have seen that the Mādhyamika Buddhism recognises empirical truth, eventhough it rejects it from the ultimate standpoint.

Now, what about the Vijnānavāda? Upto here, we have seen that it denounces the independent existence of external objects, and puts them on a par with the objects
of a dream. So, the Vijnānavāda can be said to reject the empirical reality of the world. But it may be noted that the Vijnānavāda also recognises a three-fold nature of things. It is stated in the Trīṃśikā, "In the Sūtras, three natures are spoken of imagined (parikalpita) dependent (paratāntra) and absolute (parinīśpanna)." Though everything is of the nature of consciousness, the three-fold nature can be established.

Parikalpita

By whatever constructive imagination whatever thing is imagined, that is parikalpita svabhāva

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1. सूक्ष्म द्वितीय: स्थानाविवरण: - परिकल्पित: , परतत: , परिनिश्चित: 

- V.M.S. Trīṃśikā-वṛtti, p.115
- also see त्रिविधेन विकल्पीन बालभाविया विकल्पित: 
  L.S.X-171(ab)

2. विभवतिनिष्ठ: एवं तत्त: स्थानय: व्यवस्थानानि 

- V.M.S. Trīṃśikā-वṛtti, pp.115-116
(imagined nature).\footnote{1}

\textbf{Paratantra}

That which is controlled or originated by other causes and conditions is known as \textit{paratantra} (dependent).\footnote{2}

\textbf{Parinigpanna}

The state of ever being free from the previous one (\textit{paratantra}) is called \textit{parinigpanna}.\footnote{3}

It would not be out of place to mention that Vasubandhu, in his Trisvabhāvanirdeśa has explained three-

1. \textit{\textit{र्वगे र्वगे विकल्पोन यथा वस्तु विकल्पः}} \par
\textit{परिकल्पित \textit{श्वातौ} त्वामावौ न \textit{स विचारते}} \par
\textit{- V.M.S. Trimsikā-20, p.116}

2. \textit{\textit{परेषुप्रस्तयत्तरम्}} \textit{इति परतन्त्र उत्पादत् इत्यतः}} \par
\textit{- V.M.S. Trimsikā-vṛtti, p.118}

3. \textit{निष्पन्नतात्तत्त्वं पूर्णं सदा रक्षितं तु या}} \par
\textit{- V.M.S. Trimsikā-21(cd), p.118}
fold nature of a thing.¹ When by means of a spell
(mana), a piece of wood is made to appear in the
illusory form of an elephant, in that case, the elephant
is parikalpita, its form is paratantra, while the absence
of real elephant is the absolute aspect.

Hence, like the Mādhyamika Buddhism, the Vijnānavāda
also recognises the dependent nature of the things. So,
eventhough it rejects the nature of things from the
ultimate stand point, it affirms it empirically.² It can

1. कालंपत्: वरतन्न्यपरिप्रिसत्त्वस्त्ववात्।
अयस्यः तस्मात् धीरारणाय गम्यन्नेतृप्त इत्यते।

- Trisavabhāvanirdesa-1
- Mukhopadyaya S. Trisavabhāvanirdesa of Vasubandhu
  (1939) Visvabharati Series-4, Calcutta.

2. "The Yogācāra is an idealist only transcendentally,
in empirical matters he has no quarrel with the
realist."
Chatterjee Ashok Kumar - The Yogācāra Idealism'
Ch.IV, p.74, Second Edition (1975), Motilal
Banarasidass.
be said that the vijñānavādin has tried to analyse the nature of things as they are imagined in consciousness.

Beside this, the concept that puts the vijñānavāda near to Drṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi vāda is the law of simultaneous apprehension (Sahopalāṃbhaniyama). Here we shall see how this law of simultaneous apprehension resembles Drṣṭi-sṛṣṭi vāda.

The law of simultaneous apprehension (Sahopalāṃbhaniyama)

Realism holds that the thing to be perceived exists independently of its perception. On the other hand, Idealism asserts that nothing is established independently of the consciousness. So, the difference between the thing to be perceived and its consciousness should be considered illusory. According to the Vijnānavāda, the invariably simultaneous apprehension of knowledge and its object is called the law of simultaneous apprehension (sahopalāṃbhaniyama). As stated in Indian Idealism, "Any two things that are simultaneously manifested are identical. This is called the law of simultaneous apprehension
(Sahopalambhaniyama).\(^1\) This law states that there could be no difference between the thing and its cognition, that is to say, the blue thing is identical with the cognition of blue.\(^2\)

To a layman, a thing that is apprehended seems to be different from its cognition. He cannot consider the thing and its cognition as identical, for example, he feels that the rose and the cognition of rose are two different things. But Idealism has a different stand, according to which nothing is established independently of the consciousness. So everything is of the nature of consciousness.

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2. तद्विपल्लविनिधिर्माद्धेशो नीलतद्विधियो: ।
   - Sarvadarśanasamgraha, p.13
   आनंदास्राम सान्क्रित ग्रंथवालि-51 (1906)
Now, the Vijnānavada recognises consciousness alone (Vijñaptimātratā) as the ultimate reality, which takes the form of subject and object. Thus, this manifold world, and its cognition are nothing else but consciousness only. Cognition itself is the illuminator of its own form like light, as there is absence of any grāhya other than itself.¹ The thing to be cognised does not differ from its cognition. And the difference that appears between the thing and its cognition is just an illusion (bhrama) like the illusion of twoness in the moon.² The law of simultaneous apprehension states that a thing and its cognition are both simultaneously apprehended, i.e. blue colour and cognition of blue colour are known at the same time. Thus, there is no difference between knowledge (jñāna) and the thing to be known (jñeya).

1. "सर्वदार्सनसंस्कृतविश्वतिरितिरिव(ग्राह्यविहारसंस्कृतारिति)
   युद्ध: स्वयमेव स्वार्तमभूमण्यसिंाक प्रशस्तमभिति..."
   - SarvadarsanaSanyogarah, p.13

2. "यवपचाय ग्राह्यग्रहसंयुक्तमीतिनां पूरङ्कवामातः"
   "त स एकसत्त्वाचनम् चिन्तवामात् हि भ्रमः"
   - SarvadarsanaSanyogarah, p.13
This very fact is emphasized in Drsti-Srsti vāda. It asserts the existence of a thing, simultaneous with its perception. A thing does not exist when not perceived, for there is no proof for its existence. So far as the approach is concerned, both the Vijñānavāda and Drsti-Srsti vāda work on the same line and do not accept the independent existence of an object.

Conclusion

Concluding the chapter we may state that so far as the unreality of the phenomenal world is concerned, the Buddhist schools, viz. the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra (Vijñānavāda) are Idealistic. Of course, both the trends regard the world as unreal from the transcendental point of view, while they admit some truth or nature from the empirical standpoint. On the other hand, the Drsti-srsti vāda makes bold to totally negate the empirical reality of the world considering it as illusory as a dream.

The point which puts the vijñānavāda and the Drsti-srsti vāda on a par is the law of simultaneous apprehension. That is to say, both Vijñānavāda and Drsti-srsti
vāda regard the object as having the form of consciousness. They assert that consciousness itself assumes the form of subject and object. This naturally establishes identity between the thing to be known and its cognition. So, there is a simultaneous process of a thing's existence and its perception. Such an idealistic way of thinking brings Vijñānavāda and Drsti-srṣṭi vāda very near.

It seems that perhaps the subjectivistic thought of Vijñānavāda has paved the way for the development of Drsti-srṣṭi vāda. In the chapters pertaining to the Idealistic thought in some of the Vedāntic works, such as the Yoga-vāsīṣṭha, the Gauḍapādārākāra, the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi etc. we shall see how they are greatly influenced by the Idealism of the Vijñānavāda in asserting the world as unreal and putting it on the same footing as a dream. The Vijñānavāda does not recognise one eternally unchanging consciousness as the ultimate Reality, but seems to admit a plurality of continua or streams of consciousness moments. While Kevalādvaita vedānta, whatever shape it assumes, always adheres to the Upaniṣadic concept of one
eternally unchanging Ultimate Reality of the nature of Existence - Consciousness - Bliss.