So far as the unreality of the world of appearance is concerned, the Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha and the Gaudapāda-kārikās opine positively. That is to say, both of these works clearly declare the unreality of the world. This way, we may consider these works as of the initial stage of the type of Idealism, which firmly challenges even the phenomenal existence of the world.

Besides the Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha and the Gaudapāda-kārikās, there is another work, namely the Viveka-cūḍāmanī, that strikingly enough puts forth similar views. So it would not be out of place to examine the idealistic views propounded in the Viveka-cūḍāmanī.

Unfortunately, there is a great doubt prevailing about the authorship of the Viveka-cūḍāmanī, though traditionally this work is believed to be that of Śaṅkara. As there are hundreds of works attributed to Śaṅkara, much
controversy exists about their authorship. Amongst the numerous works, the commentary on the major Upaniṣads, the commentary on the Brahma-sūtras and the Upadeśa sāhasrī are regarded as undoubtedly: the works of Śaṅkara. The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, a prakaraṇa grantha, is one of those works whose authorship is doubtful. Daniel Ingalls states, "It is improbable that Śaṅkara wrote the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi.

The author of the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi makes an absolute equation of the waking and the dreaming states after the fashion of Gauḍapāda. Śaṅkara may liken the two to each other, but he is careful to distinguish them. Again, and most decisive of all, the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi accepts the classical theory of the there truth values, the existent, the non-existent and that which is anirvācanīya, indescribable as being either existent or non-existent. The work a day world according to the classical theory is anirvācanīya.¹

On the other hand, Dasgupta seems to regard the Viveka-
cūḍāmaṇī as the work of Śaṅkara.²

Whatever it be, we are concerned here about the
philosophical views emphasized in the Viveka-
cūḍāmaṇī.

**Idealistic Views in the Viveka-cūḍāmaṇī**

The Viveka-cūḍāmaṇī is regarded as a valuable work,
propounding the main tenets of Advaita Vedānta. It contains
581 verses in the form of a dialogue between the teacher and
the pupil. The pupil asks the teacher seven questions
viz. (1) What is bondage?
(2) How did it arise?
(3) How does it continue?
(4) How is one released from it?
(5) What is the anātman (non-self)?
(6) What is the nature of the paramātman (supreme self)?
(7) How can one distinguish between the ātman and the anātman?

1. "... no commentary however, is attributed to the Viveka-
cūḍāmaṇī, which seems, to be genuinely attributed to
Śaṅkara....

   - Dasgupta S.N. - History of Indian Philosophy
   Vol.II

   Ch.XI.p.79 (1975) Motilal Banarasidass.

   को नाम वन्यः क्रमेष्ठ आगतः
   कर्ण्य प्रतिपठार्थ कर्म विमृद्धः ।
   को तात्त्वात्मकः प्रमः के आरम्भः
   तपोविविदः क्रमेष्ठविविदः ॥

   - Vi-51

   - Sankaranarayananah P.(Tr)
   Viveka-cūḍāmaṇī (1979) Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan.
Answering these questions, the teacher has given expression to his Absolutistic views very lucidly, presenting appropriate similes, analogies and metaphors, which certainly ensure pleasant reading and easy understanding.

That Brahman is the Ultimate Reality and this world of appearance is unreal (mithyā) is the main purport of this work. The phenomenal world is brought about due to delusion (Mohā), during which, one cannot discriminate between the ātman (self) and anātman (non-self) and one superimposes anātman on the ātman. As a result, bondage is created. One can cross the gulf of delusion only by discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal (nityāntyā-vastuviveka), detachment from the enjoyments of fruits of this world and the other world (ihāmutra- phalabhogavirāga), possession of six virtues (āmādisā- dhanasaṃpāt) and the desire for liberation (mumukṣutva).

1. ब्रह्म तत्त्व जग्निमित्येन्द्रैयं सो विशिष्टः ।
   - Vi. 20 (ab)

2. आदि नित्यानित्यवस्तुदिवेष: परिगणयेत ।
   इहामुत्रश्रवणिगतः दलन्तरम् ।
   रामादिष्टेकं परिविष्ठित: सुवार्त्तपत्तिः स्वतः ।
   - Vi. 19
While explaining vedāntic tenets, the author of the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi has expressed Idealistic views, which we shall examine in the form of some points.

Waking state: Compared with the dreaming state:

In the fashion of Gauḍapāda, the author of the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi has put the waking state on the same footing as the dreaming state. It is stated very clearly that in the dreaming state, not a single thing exists but it is the mind itself, which creates the world consisting of the enjoyer etc. Similarly in the waking state, there is no difference. Hence everything is merely an expansion of the mind.¹ Further, it is stated that if the phenomenal world be real, it should appear in the state of dreamless sleep also. But it does not, so it is unreal like a dream.²

1. स्वप्नेऽथीत्ये सृजति स्वयमत्या
   मौक्षादि विक्षेप मन स्ववैवः ।
   तथेषय नाग्रुण्यम नो विशेषः ।
   तत्त्वज्ञानसोऽनुभवं पुणिकः ॥ -VI-172

2. यदि सत्यं मौक्षिकम् गुणुपादुपलम्भः ।
   यन्नापलम्बः किंचिह्वैसौ सात्तो स्वप्नवन्नभः ॥ -VI-236
A thing which is real, never perishes in any period of time. If the phenomenal world be real, then it should appear in every period of time. But it does not appear during the dream as well as during the dreamless sleep. So it must not be considered real. Comparing the waking state again with the dreaming state it is stated that the place, time, objects, knower etc. imagined during a dream are all unreal (mīthyā). Similarly, the waking world is also unreal as it is brought about by one’s own ajñāna.¹

This reminds us of the Gaudapādakārikā, where Gaudapāda has compared both the states — namely, the dreaming and the waking; and has concluded that there is no difference between the dreaming and the waking state; both the state are unreal.² On the other hand, the author of the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi seems to differ from the view put forth by Śaṅkara in works, which can with certainty be

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1. निद्राकल्पितदेशस्वात्विशेषतः त्र्यं यथा मिथ्या।
   तदुपदीषिताय ज्ञाति जग्नेन्द्रियानकार्यतः।
   - Vī - 254 (ab)

2. G.K. II - 4,5.
said to be his. On the commentary on the Brahma-sūtra II. 2.29, Śaṅkara clearly differentiates the waking state from the dreaming state. 1

Here, a doubt arises about the authorship whether the Viveka-cūḍāmaṇi was composed by Śaṅkara or not. Śaṅkara differentiates the waking state from the dreaming state, while the author of the Viveka-cūḍāmaṇi has put both the states on the same footing!

The Concept of Avidyā (Māyā) :-

As in the Yoga-vasīṣṭha and the Gauḍapādakārikā, in the Viveka-cūḍāmaṇi Avidyā-māyā-Ajñāna and mind are held responsible for the projection of the mundane world. It is stated that know that all these, māyā and its effects from the mahat up to the body are asat and of the nature of the anātman like a mirage. Further, the author states that there is no Avidyā apart from the mind. The mind clearly is Avidyā, the cause of bondage of Saṃsāra. 2

1. वैधमप्याच्य न स्वप्नाद्विद्यत । वैधम्य विद्यत । भवति स्वप्नार्जुगितिसिद्धोः ।

2. नाया मायाशार्य तव : महासाहिद्धद्वर्यन्तयम् ।
   आतिदम्यानात्मतेऽविद्यत तव मस्मारीविधाक्यपम् ।

   न द्वारत्याक्य जन्तोत्तितिरिवत्ता द्वनिह द्वारत्याक्याभावन्त्रेभुः ।
   - vi- 125

   - vi- 171 (ab).
It is noteworthy that the Vivekādūtāmani regards manas (mind) and avidyā as one and the same.

As the Ultimate Reality viz. Brahman pervades everywhere and everything; whatever one perceives, is Brahman only. But due to ignorance or false knowledge, superimposition is brought about; as a result, one superimposes this world of appearance on Brahman. As long as ignorance persists, such superimposition lasts. But with the dawn of knowledge of the Ultimate Reality, the superimposition vanishes. The author has presented the well known analogy of rope-snake (rajju-sarpa). Due to delusion, rope is mistaken for a snake, but when the delusion disappears, the (unreal) snake also disappears. The existence of what is projected by false knowledge due to error, continues as long as the illusion lasts. The Sarpa exists in rajju as long as the illusion persists. When the illusion is dispelled, the thing, which is wrongly projected does not exist at all. Similar is the case of the world-illusion.¹

¹ Clay, Prāntiṣṭhāna, p. 119
When one obtains true knowledge, this phenomenal world does not appear at all, for Brahman alone exists in reality.

Now, to a layman a question may occur: "If everything is Brahman, why does it appear as the phenomenal world?" The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi states that it is Māyā, the potency of the Supreme Lord, because of which this phenomenal world appears.

The concept of Māyā plays an important role in the Advaita Vedānta. As we have elsewhere stated that it helps to solve the mystery of the seeming existence of the world to some extent. It is stated in the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi that - māyā, which is the potency of the Supreme Lord, called avyakta (अव्यक्तमाणित), is beginningless Āvidyā of the nature of the three guṇas. It is to be inferred from its effects. This world of appearance is born from māyā. ¹

Here, it is noteworthy that the author of the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi holds māyā as identical with Āvidyā. In later chapters we shall see that some of the Saṅkaraśāiras consider māyā

1. क्षणकालानामनी परमेश्वरे: कार्यविषया त्रिगुणात्मकतं परः।
काय दुःखयातु मूर्ख्याति ययात् जगत्विसवीपिम्वं प्रसूक्ते॥

- VI - 110.
as different from Avidyā.

Further, the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi explains the characteristics of māyā as follows: Māyā is neither sat nor asat, nor sat-asat. It is neither different, nor non-different, nor different-non different. It neither has parts; nor is without parts, nor is both. It is wonderful and inexplicable.¹

Another noteworthy thing is that, the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi is perhaps the first work, which specifically describes māyā as having two powers viz. concealing power (āvarana śakti) and projecting power (Vikṣepa Śakti).² In the Yogavāsiṣṭha and in the Gauḍapādakārikā we do not find the concept of Avidyā or māyā developed to this extent. As we are not sure about the date and the authorship of the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, we cannot enter into details. Nevertheless,

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1. सन्नयासन्नपानपानामामतिका नौ
   मिन्नमात्तमपानपानामामतिका नौ।
   हाङ्गानामपानपानामामतिका नौ
   पहाङुपुस्यान्निर्धरीयङ्कम ॥
   - VI - 111.

2. सन्नयाससः वृत्तिमयी नमोगुणान्यै शक्तियां वस्तुव्यवस्थांवेदनयथा ॥
   देशाय निदानं पुरुषार्थम् संसारम्: विद्वैपश्चै: प्रशस्य हेतुः ॥
   - VI - 115.
we may state that the concept of \( \text{Avidyā (}\text{māyā}\text{)} \) is found developed in the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi to some extent. Besides, in the Brahmaśidhāhi we find the concept of \( \text{Avidyā} \) developed to this extent.

As \( \text{māyā} \) has two types of powers, its concealing power enables it to conceal the real nature of its object; while its projecting power is responsible for the persistence of mundane life. It is stated that from Mahat up to the gross body, everything is brought about by \( \text{māyā} \) only.\(^1\) So this world of appearance can be considered to be a display of \( \text{māyā} \).

After examining the concept of \( \text{Avidyā (}\text{māyā}\text{)} \), we may now concentrate on the creative power of the mind, as emphasized in the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi.

**Creative Power of the Mind**

We have already stated that the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi considers the mind and \( \text{Avidyā} \) as one and the same. It is stated that \( \text{Avidyā} \) is not different from the mind. Mind

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1. माया मायाकाय तर्म महादिविद्यद्विन्त्यम्

- VI - 125 (ab)
itself is Avidyā, which is the cause of the bondage.

When the mind perishes, everything perishes. On the other hand, when the mind expands itself, everything is expanded.¹ Hence it can be said that this world of appearance is nothing else but the mind's constructive net-work. Mind is the only seed, from which this huge tree of the mundane world has sprouted. With the aid of the maxim of positive and negative abhāyāvyatireka (envaya-vyatireka) it can be said that when the mind starts vibrating, this world of appearance appears before its perceiver. On the other hand, when the mind stops vibrating, there remains no such construct.

Thus this world is caused by the mind; and it is not there in the absence of the mind.² We find the very same idea put forth in the Yoga-vāsishṭha as well as in the

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1. न इष्टविषया मनोःतिरिक्तः
   मनः इष्टविषया मकरस्तुः।
   तस्माः विनष्टेः सकलोः विनष्टे
   विनष्टमितिः सिद्धमेव सकले विनष्टमेव ||
   - VI - 171.

2. विज्ञाती विषयाय विज्ञाप्येः न क्षुन्न ।
   - VI - 408 (ab)
Gauḍapādakārikā. So this mundane world (samsāra) is imagined by the mind; but it does not exist as a matter of fact.  

It is further stated that as clouds are brought together by the wind, and are scattered away by the wind itself, similarly bondage as well as liberation are imagined by the mind. As clouds wander here and there because of the wind, so this entire universe is projected by the mind.

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1. चित्तान्तरेव संसारः कुम्पंसः कुम्पर्वे यथा ||
   चित्ताशी न संसारः कुम्पाशी न कुम्पर्वम् इति ।
   - RV. V - 50 - 14.

2. पण्डो इत्यमपवे देव नैषोपलयते ||
   - G.K. III 31 (cd)

3. को म: कस्मिन्व व: पुरसः ।
   संसारः ज्ञाते न बुत्तोधिनिः इति ।
   - VI - 173 (cd)

4. वायुनः नीयो भेयः पुनर्हैनेव लीयते ।
   पण्डो कल्पयते कन्यः मौहैनेव कल्पते ।
   - VI - 174.

4. VI - 182.
Here, we may state that the author of the Viveka-
cudāmani seems to be influenced by the subjective Idealism
of Vijñānavāda, which asserts that this phenomenal world
is in no sense real, but is a projection of the mind only.
The above mentioned view runs parallel with the Idealism
of Buddhism (vijñānavāda). Of course, the Viveka-
cudāmani does not specifically state whether this phenomenal world
is imagined by the cosmic mind or by the individual mind.

One thing is noteworthy that the Viveka-cudāmani
does not throw any more light on the concept of the unreality
of the world of appearance. That is to say, we do not find
any development in the concept ahead of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha
and the Gauḍapādakārikā. Problems such as whose Āvidyā is
responsible for the projection of the world, or whether
the jīva is the locus of Āvidyā or the supreme self are
not found discussed. We shall now see that the idealistic
views though not clearly and precisely spelt out in such
vedāntic works as the Viveka-cudāmani are yet necessarily
different from those in the Buddhist works.

**Absolute-Monistic Idealism**

As the main purport of the Viveka-cudāmani is to
elucidate the vedāntic tenets, naturally it believes in Absolute-Monistic Idealism. It strongly emphasizes that there is no reality except Brahman. This world is nothing else but Brahman. It is stated that the world, consisting of various forms which is experienced due to ajñāna, is nothing else but Brahman devoid of all defects of imagination.¹

The Viśeṣacūḍāmaṇi gives the well known analogy of clay and pot, that though the pot is an effect of the clay, it is not different from the clay, as the clay is its very essence. The pot does not exist independently of the clay. So where is the pot? It is just a falsely imagined name.²

Similarly this world of appearance does not exist independently of Brahman, as Brahman is the only reality pervading everything and everywhere. Quoting a statement from the

1. यदिदेव सबकै विस्तार न ततास्तरं प्रतितपभावात् ।
तत्स्वरूपं त्रिभूत्व सृष्टुगुरूवती भवेत भवनादौत ॥

- Vi - 229.

2. भूत्व भूतपूर्विण पृथ्वी न फिनं: कुम्भायेति सर्वं तु मूलस्वभाव तु ॥
न कुम्भल्ले पृथ्विगति कुम्भ: कुलो गुणासकमतलाभमास: ॥

- Vi - 230.
scripture, the author states that "All the universe is Brahman" is the Supreme declaration of the scripture. The author has used the term 'ābhāsa' for this world of appearance. It is stated that this world is like the reflection (ābhāsa) of a city in the mirror. As different things reflected in the mirror do not exist inside the mirror, but are mere ābhāsas (appearances), similarly the world which is unreal, is reflected in Brahman.

Another term used by the author to show the unreality of the world is 'asatkalpa' (as good as non-existent). It is stated that this world with its manifold differences is imagined in the one Reality, and is 'asatkalpa' (as good as non-existent). How could there be any difference in that differenceless Reality which is devoid...
of change, shape and quality? 1

Here the term 'asatkalpa' is used to show the inexplicable character of the world. This world is neither real nor unreal. That is to say, as there is only one Supreme Reality viz. Brahman, what is other than Brahman, must be considered unreal. But on the other hand, in our practical life we respond to this world of appearance, hence how could it be considered unreal? It is rather impossible to positively state that the world is unreal or real. There is no other alternative except accepting the empirical as well as the ultimate points of view; that is to say, accepting the world as real from the empirical standpoint and as unreal from the ultimate standpoint.

Thus the author has not completely negated the reality of the world. Until the ultimate Truth is realised, the world appears as real. The author admits the world as unreal only after self-realisation. It is

1. "क्वत्कल्पी विकल्पोऽय विभासित्येक्वतुविनः।
निरिखिकाः निरूपाः निरिक्षणं पिदय कुलः।
- VI - 400."
stated that when the Ultimate Truth is realised, there exists no phenomenal world in the unchanging Brahman, which is the Supreme Reality, as the snake does not exist in the rope, nor water drops exist in the mirage-water in any of three periods of time. This seeming duality is merely māyā. The ultimate truth is non-duality.

Here, the author obviously emphasizes Absolute Monistic Idealism, according to which the Absolute is the Ultimate Reality. The conclusion of Absolutist Advaita Vedānta is that the jīva and the entire universe are not different from Brahman; they are Brahman only. Going a

1. नःपर्याप्त्वा विस्तृतः प्रतत्त्वायोऽद्व 

   सदात्मनि ब्रह्मण निर्भिष्केऽ।

   कालस्य नाप्यःहीः चित्तावो गुणे

   नःपर्याप्तं विन्दुः मुग्धार्थप्रक्ष्य।।

   - VI - 405.

2. मायामात्रयामि केल्ल मैले परमाष्ट्रः ।

   - VI - 406 (ab)

   - See G.K. I - 17(cā)

3. वैद्यनाथसिद्धान्तिकान्तेऽति दृश्यं जीवं सबलं जगत्य ।

   - VI - 479 (ab)
step ahead, the author declares the highest position of the Advaita Vedānta that there is no suppression, no origination, no one is bound, no one is desirous of liberation, and no one is liberated. This is the Highest Truth.¹ We find similar views narrated in the Mūla Madhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna, except there is no reference to any Ultimate Reality. Ajātivāda (Acosmism) put forth in this verse is the highest vedāntic position. That is to say, as all this is Brahman, there arises no question of an other thing. If another exists, then the problems of origination, suppression, bondage, liberation would arise. But as everything is just Brahman, nothing else exists.

So, from the ultimate stand point, there is no world of appearance, but Brahman is the only reality.

Conclusion:
As far as our topic of research is concerned, we may state that in the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi we find some expressions which can guide us towards the direction of the

¹. न निरोधी न चौत्पत्ति: न ब्लोधी न च रामकः।
   न सुकुलः: न वै सुकः: हत्येशा परमाप्यति॥
   - VI - 575.
Drsti-srśtivāda. Since the main goal of this work is of emphasizing Absolute Monistic Idealism, we find views though not precisely only stated that are ideas related to the type of Idealism, which boldly negates the reality of the world of appearance, and regards it as a projection of the mind.

In the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, the actual term 'Drstisrśti' is not used, but we do find expressions which can be said to indicate an initial stage of the Drstisrśtivāda. It is stated that if the phenomenal world were real, it would appear in the dreamless sleep also. But it is well known that nothing of the mundane world appears in the dreamless sleep, hence the mundane world is only an imagination of the mind. It does not exist in reality.¹ So the mind is the cause of the world. If this mind is understood as the individual mind, it would mean that there are as many worlds as there are minds or this can

¹ सुधुपितकाले मनसि प्रलेिने नैवासिति किचिदु सचलुसिद्दे:।
को मन: कतिपि तव पुलि: संसार सत्य न वसुलोक्ष्यि ॥

- Vi - 173.
be interpreted in the light of Ekajīvavāda – the only jīva enveloped in Ajñānā; that is the Mind imagines everything – all the jīvas and the world of manifold differences.

Such expressions can be understood as stating the doctrine of Subjective Idealism. Though the author seems eager to elucidate Absolutism, at the same time he is concerned with proving the unreality of the world; and thus invites comparison with the expression and ideas found in the yoga-vasistha and the Gaudapādakārikā. Though similar views and expressions are traced in Buddhistic works, these latter do not admit one Absolute Reality, but admit only individual streams of consciousness.